Figure 1 shows the locations of DOD’s prepositioned stocks. Inventory Shortfalls and Poor Equipment Condition Leave Many of DOD’s Prepositioning Programs at Risk

DOD faces some near-term operational risks should another large-scale  conflict emerge due to inventory shortfalls and poor maintenance  condition of some of its prepositioned stocks. For example, the  department has drawn heavily on its prepositioned stocks to support  ongoing operations in Iraq and relatively little has been reconstituted. In  addition, while remaining stocks provide some residual capability, many  have significant inventory shortfalls and in some cases, maintenance  problems. For example, the Army used much of  the equipment and supplies associated with the combat brigade sets stored  at land sites in Kuwait and Qatar and aboard prepositioning ships afloat  near Diego Garcia to support operations in Iraq. The Air Force Is Reporting Low Inventory Fill and Some Stocks in Poor Condition

The Air Force has used a considerable amount of its prepositioned  equipment and supplies to support combat operations in Afghanistan and  Iraq and, as a result, the inventory fill of many of these stocks is low. While the Air Force is working on  refilling its prepositioned equipment and supplies, if a conflict arises in the  near term, these stocks may not be available for use as it is unclear when  these stocks will be refilled. Although the precise operational risks created by shortfalls in the Marine  Corps and Air Force’s prepositioned stocks are difficult to assess, officials  from these services told us that these risks can be managed. However, should a new conflict arise in the near  term—especially one where U.S. forces did not control the timing—the  combatant commander would likely face even more difficult operational  challenges. DOD and Some of the Military Services Have Provided Insufficient Oversight Over Their Prepositioning Programs

Oversight over prepositioning programs by DOD and the military services  has been insufficient, despite the importance of prepositioning to the  military. This inattention has allowed long-standing problems to linger. However, DOD has not adhered to its directive on war reserve materiel  policy that could provide oversight over its prepositioning programs. Officials further told us they did not believe the reporting requirement in  the directive was necessary because they were able to provide adequate  oversight of the department’s prepositioning programs through other  mechanisms, such as reviewing the services’ budget submissions and  quarterly readiness assessments. As a  result, the services cannot assess the overall readiness of their  prepositioning programs, which potentially leaves war fighters at risk of  not having needed stocks in the future. Army officials told us that its information management system does not  provide reliable information on the inventory levels and maintenance  condition of its operational projects and sustainment stocks. Inventory management issues, and more recently supply chain  management, have been considered high-risk areas by us since 1990. DOD Lacks A Plan To Coordinate Future Prepositioning Programs

DOD has not developed a coordinated departmentwide plan or joint  doctrine to guide the future of its prepositioning programs, despite the  heavy use of prepositioned stocks in recent conflicts and the department’s  plans to rely on them in the future. In the absence of a  departmentwide plan or joint doctrine to coordinate the reconstitution and  future plans for these programs, the military services have been  recapitalizing some stocks and developing future plans for their programs  without a clear understanding of how they will fit together to meet the  evolving defense strategy. Without an overarching framework that  establishes priorities for prepositioning among competing initiatives and  identifies the resources required to implement the future programs, DOD  cannot provide assurances to Congress that the billions of dollars that will  be required to recapitalize the stocks and develop future programs will  ultimately produce programs that will operate jointly, support the needs of  the war fighter, and are affordable. To assess the sufficiency of the Department of Defense’s (DOD) and  service-level oversight of these prepositioning programs, we discussed the  processes used by DOD and the services to oversee their prepositioning  programs with officials from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the  Joint Staff, and the military services. To assess whether DOD has developed a coordinated plan for the future of  its prepositioning programs that would meet the goals of the recently  published defense strategy, we collected and analyzed information from  the military services and the Defense Logistics Agency on the future plans  for their prepositioning programs.
Why GAO Did This Study

The importance of prepositioned stocks to the U.S. military was highlighted during recent operations in Iraq, as much of the equipment and supplies stored at land sites in the region and aboard prepositioning ships were used to support operations. Long-standing problems in the Department of Defense's (DOD) prepositioning program are systematic of the inventory management issues, and more recently supply chain management issues, that GAO has considered as high-risk areas since 1990. GAO was asked to review the risks facing DOD's prepositioning programs, including an assessment of (1) the near-term operational risk given the continuing use of these stocks, (2) the sufficiency of DOD and service-level oversight of these prepositioning programs, and (3) whether DOD has developed a coordinated plan for the future of the department's prepositioning programs that would meet the goals of the recently published defense strategy.

What GAO Found

DOD faces some near-term operational risks should another large-scale conflict emerge because it has drawn heavily on its prepositioned stocks to support ongoing operations in Iraq. And, although remaining stocks provide some residual capability, many of the programs face significant inventory shortfalls and in some cases, maintenance problems. For example, the Army has drawn equipment from virtually all of its prepositioned stocks to support operations in Iraq. Some of its storage sites have shortfalls of equipment and sustainment items, like spare parts, and some stocks are in poor condition. Additionally, the Marine Corps has used a significant portion of the stocks downloaded from 5 of its 16 prepositioning ships to support operations in Iraq and it is unclear when this equipment will be refilled. The Air Force is also continuing to use a considerable amount of its prepositioned stocks to support combat operations in Iraq and it is unclear when these stocks will be refilled. The precise operational risk created by these shortfalls is difficult to assess. However, should a new conflict arise in the near term, the combatant commander would likely face difficult operational challenges. The department and the military services have provided insufficient oversight over DOD's prepositioning programs. This inattention has allowed long-standing problems with determining program requirements and managing inventory to persist. DOD has not enforced its directive that could provide centralized oversight over its prepositioning programs. Officials told us they did not enforce this directive because they were able to provide adequate oversight through other mechanisms. Even if the department had enforced its directive, however, the requirements underpinning some of DOD's prepositioning programs are questionable and the services do not have sufficient information on the inventory level and maintenance condition of some prepositioned stocks. Without reliable information on requirements, inventory levels, and maintenance condition, DOD cannot provide sufficient oversight over its programs, which potentially leaves war fighters at risk of not having needed stocks in the future. DOD has not developed a coordinated departmentwide plan or joint doctrine to guide the future of its prepositioning programs, despite the heavy use of prepositioned stocks in recent conflicts and the department's plans to rely on them in the future. DOD's recently published defense strategy indicates that prepositioning programs should be more innovative, flexible, and joint. In the absence of a departmentwide plan or joint doctrine to coordinate the reconstitution and future plans for these programs, the services have been recapitalizing stocks and developing future plans without an understanding of how the programs will fit together to meet the evolving defense strategy. Without a framework that establishes priorities for prepositioning among competing initiatives, DOD cannot provide assurances to Congress that the billions of dollars that will be required to recapitalize the stocks and develop future programs will produce programs that operate jointly, support the needs of the war fighter, and are affordable.