Specifically,  DOD has not fully resolved the operational challenges related to moving  Marine units to Guam; limited training facilities in Iwakuni, Hawaii, and  CNMI;  the runway length at the Futenma Replacement Facility; and  challenges for operating in Australia. According to DOD’s Unified  Facilities Criteria 2-100-01, in the context of developing installation  master plans, mission requirements—which would include the capabilities  needed to fulfill the mission—largely determine land and facility support  requirements. As of December 2016, DOD has not resolved selected identified  capability deficiencies in the four areas noted above. If DOD does not resolve the  identified capability deficiencies in these four areas, the Marine Corps  may be unable to maintain its capabilities or face much higher costs to do  so. DOD Has Taken Steps to Develop Infrastructure Plans and Schedules for Its Relocation but Did Not Develop a Reliable Schedule for Guam and Has Not Completed Risk Planning in Guam and Okinawa

DOD has taken steps to develop infrastructure plans and schedules for  the proposed locations for the relocation of Marines from Okinawa;  however, we found that the Marine Corps’ schedule for Guam did not  meet the characteristics of a reliable schedule identified in the GAO  Schedule Assessment Guide. Moreover, DOD has developed plans for infrastructure requirements that  will support the planned relocation to Hawaii and rotational presence of  Marines in Australia. However, a lower- level construction schedule examined was not fully resource loaded; in  addition, the integrated master schedule includes a majority of activities  unrelated to construction efforts, such as information technology and  design activities. Limited Risk Planning for Identified Construction Risks in Guam

Marine Corps officials have conducted limited risk planning and have not  completed a risk-management plan that identifies a strategy to address  construction risks that may affect the cost and schedule for infrastructure  in Guam. The Marine Corps has not completed its risk-management plan for Guam  infrastructure. Without a risk-management plan that identifies  the Marine Corps’ strategy for addressing risks to the infrastructure  buildup in Guam, DOD may not have complete information to address  risks to the design and construction of its infrastructure that may result in  cost overruns and schedule delays related to the relocation of Marines. However, DOD  did not identify its short- or long-term sustainment needs for the Marine  Corps’ infrastructure in its master plan. DOD Has Made Progress in Developing Its Infrastructure Cost Estimates for Guam, Hawaii, and Australia but Its Estimates Partially Met Best Practices for a Reliable Cost Estimate

		DOD Has Made Progress in Developing Its Cost Estimates for Guam but Partially Met Best Practices for a Reliable Cost Estimate

DOD improved its cost estimates for Guam since our June 2013 report by  adding a documented technical baseline description and clear  documentation of ground rules and assumptions for its military  construction cost estimates, and including life-cycle costs for its  nonmilitary construction cost estimates. Without a revision of cost estimates for Hawaii and Australia to include all  of the best practices established by GAO’s cost estimating guide for the  comprehensive characteristic, decision makers in DOD and Congress will  not have reliable cost information to inform their funding decisions  regarding infrastructure for Hawaii and Australia and to help them  determine the viability of the relocation of Marines to Hawaii and the  establishment of a rotational presence in Australia. DOD has  developed a high-level synchronization plan and organized working  groups that coordinate the relocation of Marines to Okinawa, but DOD  has not fully resolved selected identified capability deficiencies associated  with the relocation of Marines. For example, the update to the schedule should include  resources for nonconstruction activities. To provide DOD and Congress with more-reliable information to inform  funding decisions associated with the relocation of Marines to Hawaii and  the establishment of a rotational presence in Australia, we recommend  that the Secretary of Defense direct the appropriate entities to  revise the DOD cost estimates for Hawaii to address all best practices  for the comprehensive characteristic established by the GAO cost  estimating guide, specifically to capture entire life-cycle costs and  develop a Work Breakdown Structure and  revise the DOD cost estimates for Australia to address all best  practices for the comprehensive characteristic established by the  GAO cost estimating guide, specifically to capture entire life-cycle  costs and develop a Work Breakdown Structure. In written comments, DOD concurred with two  recommendations, partially concurred with six recommendations, and  nonconcurred with one recommendation. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

The objectives of our review were to examine the extent to which the  Department of Defense (DOD) has (1) coordinated its efforts and  resolved selected identified capability deficiencies related to the  relocation of Marines from Okinawa, (2) developed infrastructure plans  and schedules for its relocation efforts and completed risk planning for its  infrastructure that will support the relocation, and (3) developed reliable  cost estimates for infrastructure for the relocation to Guam and Hawaii  and for the rotational presence in Australia.
Why GAO Did This Study

For two decades, DOD has planned to realign its presence in the Asia-Pacific region. The Marine Corps has plans to consolidate bases in Okinawa, relocating 4,100 Marines to Guam, 2,700 to Hawaii, 800 to the continental United States, and a rotational presence of 1,300 to Australia.
The Joint Explanatory Statement accompanying the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016, included a provision that GAO study the realignment initiatives in the Asia-Pacific region. This report assesses the extent to which DOD has (1) coordinated its efforts and resolved selected identified capability deficiencies related to the relocation of Marines, (2) developed infrastructure plans and schedules and completed risk planning for its infrastructure that will support the relocation, and (3) developed reliable cost estimates for infrastructure for the relocation of Marines to Guam and Hawaii and the rotational presence in Australia. GAO reviewed relevant policies and plans; analyzed cost documents; interviewed DOD officials; and visited U.S. military installations in the Asia-Pacific region.

What GAO Found

The Department of Defense (DOD) has coordinated the relocation of Marines from Okinawa to other locations in the Asia-Pacific region through developing a synchronization plan and organizing working groups. However, DOD has not resolved selected identified capability deficiencies related to the relocation of Marine units; training needs in the region; the reduction in runway length at the Futenma Replacement Facility in Okinawa; and challenges for operating in Australia. DOD guidance indicates that mission requirements—which would include the capabilities needed to fulfill the mission—largely determine land and facility support requirements. If DOD does not resolve the selected identified capability deficiencies in its infrastructure plans, DOD may be unable to maintain its capabilities or face much higher costs to do so.
DOD has taken steps to develop infrastructure plans and schedules for its relocation efforts, but it did not develop a reliable schedule for the Marine relocation to Guam and has not completed its risk planning for infrastructure in Guam. DOD developed plans that will support construction efforts in Guam and Japan, and developed some initial infrastructure plans for Hawaii and Australia. However, GAO found the Marines Corps' integrated master schedule for Guam did not fully meet the comprehensive, well-constructed, and credible characteristics for a reliable schedule. For example, the schedule does not include resources needed for nonconstruction activities, such as information technology and design activities. Additionally, the Marine Corps has not completed its risk-management plan for infrastructure construction in Guam. Specifically, the Marine Corps has not identified its strategy to address construction risks including labor shortages and endangered-species protection. If DOD does not have a reliable schedule or has not completed risk planning for Guam, it may not have complete information to identify and address risks that may result in cost overruns and schedule delays.
DOD has made progress in developing cost estimates for Guam, but its estimates partially met GAO best practices for reliable cost estimates for the relocations to Guam and Hawaii and the establishment of a rotational presence in Australia. For cost estimates related to Guam military construction activities, DOD included ground rules and assumptions, but did not include some elements of a reliable cost estimate, such as a risk analysis. Additionally, DOD developed cost estimates for nonmilitary construction activities that provide a high-level planning overview of the requirements, but they did not incorporate several other best practices, including a unifying Work Breakdown Structure that defines in detail the work necessary to accomplish a program's objectives. For Hawaii and Australia, the cost estimates are not considered reliable because they did not include all life-cycle costs or a Work Breakdown Structure. If DOD does not revise the cost estimates for these locations, decision makers in DOD and Congress will not have reliable cost information to inform funding decisions and to help them determine the viability of relocation of Marines to Hawaii and the establishment of a rotational presence in Australia.

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that DOD resolve capability deficiencies in the four selected identified areas, update its schedule for Guam infrastructure, complete a risk-management plan for Guam infrastructure, and revise its three cost estimates. DOD concurred with two recommendations, partially concurred with six, and did not concur with one. GAO continues to believe its recommendations are valid, as discussed in this report.