1.) DOE Has a Technical Basis for Most but Not All of Its National Security Plutonium

The nation’s 99.5-metric-ton inventory of plutonium is divided into two categories—that which is allocated for national security (46.8 metric tons) and that which is designated as excess (52.7 metric tons). The national security plutonium is further allocated among several subcategories. According to DOE officials, DOE reviewed its existing plutonium inventory records to determine how much of its weapons-grade plutonium was needed for national security. All weapons-grade plutonium that was in the custody of DOD in the active and inactive stockpile and some of the weapons-grade plutonium assigned to and managed by DOE’s Defense Programs organization was categorized as needed for national security. The remainder of the national security plutonium, managed by DOE, is allocated to the strategic reserve and to mutual defense and research and development programs. DOD determines the types and numbers of weapons it wants to support national security needs, and DOE determines how much plutonium is needed for the required warheads and for their support. Unstable Excess Plutonium Is Costly to Manage

From fiscal year 1995 through fiscal year 2002, DOE expects to spend about $18.8 billion on plutonium management and related activities at the eight sites responsible for managing most of its plutonium. These costs include about $10.5 billion for plutonium inventory management and about $8.3 billion for plutonium-related waste management and site cleanup. The inventory management costs include about $8.7 billion for excess plutonium and about $1.8 billion for national security plutonium. In contrast, the costs of managing national security plutonium will continue as long as the United States requires plutonium for its nuclear weapons. DOE’s Storage and Conversion Plan Faces Long-Term Costs and Uncertainties

In addition to the current and near-term costs of managing plutonium from fiscal year 1995 through fiscal year 2002, DOE expects to incur long-term costs, through about 2023, for storing and converting excess plutonium to safer forms that will ultimately be disposed of in a permanent underground repository. This estimate is based on DOE’s January 1997 record of decision, which details the Department’s plan for storing and converting excess plutonium to forms that are difficult to reuse in nuclear weapons and are suitable for permanent disposal. Facility Uncertainties

Questions about facilities also pose uncertainties, most of which stem from the immaturity of the conversion technologies. The plutonium that the Department of Energy (DOE) produced is held in several physical forms, including metals, oxides, solutions, residues, and scraps. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

Our objectives for this assignment were to (1) review how much plutonium the United States allocated for national security, how much was designated as excess, and how DOE determined these amounts; (2) review DOE’s estimates of the current and near-term costs for managing plutonium; and (3) review DOE’s estimates of the long-term costs for managing plutonium.
Why GAO Did This Study

Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Department of Energy's (DOE) management of its plutonium inventory, focusing on: (1) how much plutonium the United States allocated for national security needs, how much it designated as excess, and how DOE determined these amounts; (2) DOE's estimates of the current and near-term costs for managing plutonium; and (3) DOE's estimates of the long-term costs for managing plutonium.

What GAO Found

GAO noted that: (1) the United States allocated 46.8 metric tons of its 99.5 metric-ton plutonium inventory for national security purposes and designated the remaining 52.7 metric tons as excess; (2) to determine how much plutonium was needed for national security, DOE reviewed its plutonium inventory database; (3) in general, the plutonium in the custody of the Department of Defense and some of the plutonium managed by DOE's Defense Programs (the organization responsible for supporting the nation's nuclear weapons) was categorized as needed for national security purposes; (4) the remaining plutonium managed by Defense Programs and other DOE organizations was categorized as excess to national security needs and will ultimately be disposed of; (5) the national security plutonium is further divided into several subcategories; (6) DOE has a technical basis to support the need for the amounts of plutonium it holds in most of its national security needs, but not for the plutonium it holds for reliability replacement warheads and strategic reserves; (7) from fiscal year (FY) 1995 through FY 2002, DOE expects to spend about $18.8 billion on plutonium management and related activities; (8) these costs consist of about $10.5 billion for plutonium inventory management activities, including approximately $1.8 billion for national security plutonium and $8.7 billion for excess plutonium; (9) DOE expects to spend another $8.3 billion for plutonium-related waste management and site cleanup activities; (10) the costs of managing excess plutonium are about four times greater than the costs of managing national security plutonium because much of the excess plutonium is held in unstable forms and requires special management activities, such as handling, processing, and packaging; (11) national security plutonium is generally contained in more stable forms, such as metals and weapons components, and therefore requires less management; (12) DOE also expects to spend over $3 billion for longer-term plutonium storage and conversion activities through about 2023; (13) this estimate is based on DOE's plans for storing the excess plutonium and converting it to forms that will make it more difficult to reuse in nuclear weapons; and (14) however, DOE's cost and schedule estimates are subject to many uncertainties, a number of which stem from the relative immaturity of the planned conversion technologies.