Because the costs of the program are directly related  to the length of the schedule, DOD also increased the projected life-cycle  costs, from $15 billion in 1998 to $24 billion in 2001 (see fig. 1). Shifts in Leadership Confuse Decision-Making Authority and Obscure Accountability

The Chem-Demil Program has experienced frequent shifts in leadership  providing oversight, both between DOD and the Army and within the  Army, and frequent turnover in key program positions. Recent Reorganization Has Not Reduced Organizational Complexity

The recent reorganization by the Army has not streamlined the program’s  complex organization or clarified roles and responsibilities. Most Sites Will Miss Schedule Milestones due to Program’s Inability to Anticipate and Influence Issues

The program continues to miss most milestones, following a decade long  trend. The neutralization sites have not missed  milestones yet but have experienced delays as well. DOD and the Army  have not developed an approach to anticipate and address potential  problems that could adversely affect program schedules, costs, and safety. As a result, the Chem-Demil  Program will have a higher level of risk of missing its schedule milestones  and CWC deadlines, incurring rising costs, and unnecessarily prolonging  the potential risk to the public associated with the storage of the chemical  stockpile. Program officials told us that they estimate costs have  already increased $1.2 billion. The program  will have a low probability of achieving its principal goal of destroying the  nation’s chemical weapons stockpile in a safe manner within the 2001  schedule unless DOD and Army leadership take immediate action to  clearly define roles and responsibilities throughout the program and  implement an overarching strategic plan. Recommendations for Executive Action

We recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Under Secretary  of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, in conjunction with  the Secretary of the Army, to    develop an overall strategy and implementation plan for the chemical  demilitarization program that would:   articulate a program mission statement,   identify the program’s long-term goals and objectives,    delineate the roles and responsibilities of all DOD and Army offices,    establish near-term performance measures, and  implement a risk management approach that anticipates and influences  internal and external factors that could adversely impact program  performance. To determine the progress that DOD and the Army have made in  meeting revised 2001 cost and schedule estimates and Chemical Weapons  Convention (CWC) deadlines, we interviewed relevant program officials  and reviewed a number of documents. Our analysis identified the effect  that schedule delays would have on schedule milestones at incineration  and neutralization sites. Chemical Weapons Destruction: Issues Affecting Program Cost,  Schedule, and Performance.
Why GAO Did This Study

Congress expressed concerns about the Chemical Demilitarization Program cost and schedule, and its management structure. In 2001, the program underwent a major reorganization. Following a decade long trend of missed schedule milestones, in September 2001, the Department of Defense (DOD) revised the schedule, which extended planned milestones and increased program cost estimates beyond the 1998 estimate of $15 billion to $24 billion. GAO was asked to (1) examine the effect that recent organization changes have had on program performance and (2) assess the progress DOD and the Army have made in meeting the revised 2001 cost and schedule and Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) deadlines.

What GAO Found

The Chemical Demilitarization Program remains in turmoil because a number of long-standing leadership, organizational, and strategic planning issues remain unresolved. The program lacks stable leadership at the upper management levels. For example, the program has had frequent turnover in the leadership providing oversight. Further, recent reorganizations have done little to reduce the complex and fragmented organization of the program. As a result, roles and responsibilities are often unclear and program actions are not always coordinated. Finally, the absence of a comprehensive strategy leaves the program without a clear road map and methods to monitor program performance. Without these key elements, DOD and the Army have no assurance of meeting their goal to destroy the chemical stockpile in a safe and timely manner, and within cost estimates. DOD and the Army have already missed several 2001 milestones and exceeded cost estimates; the Army has raised the program cost estimates by $1.2 billion, with other factors still to be considered. Almost all of the incineration sites will miss the 2001 milestones because of schedule delays due to environmental, safety, community relations, and funding issues. Although neutralization sites have not missed milestones, they have had delays. DOD and the Army have not developed an approach to anticipate and influence issues that could adversely impact program schedules, cost, and safety. Unless DOD and the Army adopt a risk management approach, the program remains at great risk of missing milestones and CWC deadlines. It will also likely incur rising costs and prolong the public's exposure to the chemical stockpile.