Force Drawdown Has Increased Challenge of Responding to Peace Operations

The continuing force drawdown has compounded challenges for the U.S. military in responding to extended peace operations. We examined (1) the impact that peace operations have on U.S. military forces, (2) force structure limitations that may affect the military’s ability to respond to other national security requirements while engaged in peace operations, and (3) options for increasing force flexibility and response capability. These operations heavily stress some U.S. military capabilities, including certain Army support forces such as quartermaster and transportation units and specialized Air Force aircraft, while having less impact on other forces, such as Army armored combat divisions and general purpose Air Force combat aircraft outside Europe. If the Army’s early-deploying support units were needed for war, the Army would supplement the units with people and equipment from other active and reserve units. These capabilities would be needed in a major regional conflict. Disengaging these forces from a peace operation and redeploying them to the MRC quickly may be difficult. Although planners have been able to minimize the use of these forces in peace operations, they have had to use a large portion of some of the Army’s CFP 1-3 support forces in large-scale and/or multiple peace operations because there is a limited number of such forces in the active component. We agree that most combat forces would be readily available to respond to a MRC. Finally, some of the forces would need training, supplies, and equipment before deploying to another major operation. Options for Easing the Strain of Peace Operations

There are options available to allow DOD to meet the demands of participation in numerous and/or sizable sustained peace operations on military forces while maintaining the capability to rapidly respond to MRCs.
Why GAO Did This Study

Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on the impact of peace operations on the U.S. military forces' capability to respond to regional conflicts, focusing on the: (1) force structure limitations that affect the military's ability to respond to other national security requirements while engaged in peace operations; and (2) options available for increasing force flexibility and response capability.

What GAO Found

GAO found that: (1) peace operations have heavily stressed some U.S. military capabilities, including Army support forces and specialized Air Force aircraft; (2) because there are relatively few support forces in the military's active force, some of these units and personnel have been deployed to consecutive operations, the tempo of operations has increased, and the time available to prepare for combat missions has been reduced; (3) extended participation in multiple or large scale peace operations could impede the services' ability to timely respond to major regional conflicts (MRC); (4) disengaging support units and specialized aircraft from a peace operation and redeploying them to MRC could be more difficult than estimated because some of these units need training and supplies before deploying to another major operation; (5) the options available to DOD to meet the demands of peace operations while maintaining the capability to respond to MRC include changing the mix of active and reserve forces and making greater use of reserves and contractors; and (6) the United States needs to determine the resources it needs and degree of risk it is prepared to take if it wishes to continue participating in sizeable peace operations for extended periods and still maintain the capability needed to rapidly respond to simultaneous MRC.