In recognizing this array of challenges, DOD and Congress have  established a number of “technology transition” programs, each with a  particular focus. Three of the more recent initiatives include the TTI and DACP, both  established by Congress in fiscal year 2003, and the Quick Reaction Fund,  established by DOD the same year. TTI is focused on speeding the  transition of technologies developed by DOD’s S&T programs into  acquisition programs, while DACP is focused on introducing innovative  and cost-saving technologies developed inside and outside DOD. Nevertheless, it is too early for us to determine the impact that these  programs have had on technology transition. In addition, the  programs had limited performance measures to gauge success of  individual projects or track return on investment over time. However, the missile  experiences operational deficiencies in certain weather conditions, and  the program has had problems producing components for the optics. At the time we selected  projects for review, only 11 of 68 projects started in fiscal years 2003 and  2004 had been completed, and, of those, only 4 were currently available to  warfighters. The Ping project, funded by the Quick Reaction Fund, is an example of  a project that is considered complete, but a prototype was never field  tested by the warfighter. Selection, Management and Oversight, and Assessment Processes Could Be Improved by Adopting Additional Practices

To ensure that new technologies can be effectively transitioned and  integrated into acquisitions, transition programs need to establish effective  selection, management and oversight, and assessment processes. The three programs we reviewed adopted these practices to varying  degrees. Overall, the DACP had disciplined and well-defined processes for  selecting and managing, and overseeing projects. Selection

Success in transitioning technologies from a lab to the field or an  acquisition program hinges on a transition program’s ability to choose the  most promising technology projects. The DACP also solicits technical experts  from inside and outside DOD to assess potential benefits and risks. The program’s popularity, however, has had  some drawbacks. The program, which is focused on  reaching DOD’s S&T community rather than outside industry, had been  communicating in a relatively informal manner and it was unclear during  our review the extent to which the TTI was reaching its intended audience. The program manager is currently taking steps to  improve the management and oversight of projects. Conclusions

The ability to spur and leverage technological advances is vital to  sustaining DOD’s ability to maintain its superiority over others and to  improve and even transform how military operations are conducted. The  three new transition programs are all appropriately targeted on what has  been a critical problem in this regard—quickly moving promising  technologies from the laboratory and commercial environment into actual  use. Moreover, by tailoring processes and criteria to focus on different  objectives, whether that may be saving time or money or broadening the  industrial base, DOD has had an opportunity to experiment with a variety  of management approaches and criteria that can be used to help solve  transition problems affecting the approximately $69 billion spent annually  on advanced stages of technology development. Recommendations for Executive Action

We recommend that the Secretary of Defense take the following five  actions:  To optimize DOD’s growing investment in the Technology Transition  Initiative, the Defense Acquisition Challenge Program, and the Quick  Reaction Fund, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the  Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics) to  develop data and measures that can be used to support assessments of the  performance of the three transition programs as well as broader  assessments of  the return on investment that would track the long-term  impact of the programs.
Why GAO Did This Study

The Department of Defense (DOD) and Congress both recognize that Defense technology innovations sometimes move too slowly from the lab to the field. Three new programs have been recently created in DOD to help speed and enhance the transition of new technologies. A report accompanying the fiscal year 2003 National Defense Authorization Act required GAO to review two of these programs--the Technology Transition Initiative (TTI) and Defense Acquisition Challenge Program (DACP). The first is designed to speed transition of technologies from DOD labs to acquisition programs and the second is designed to introduce cost-saving technologies from inside and outside DOD. We were also asked to review the Quick Reaction Fund, which is focused on rapidly field testing promising new technology prototypes. We assessed the impact the programs had on technology transition and the programs' selection, management and oversight, and assessment practices.

What GAO Found

The ability to spur and leverage technological advances is vital to sustaining DOD's ability to maintain its superiority over others and to improve and even transform how military operations are conducted. The three new transition programs we reviewed are all appropriately targeted on what has been a critical problem in this regard--quickly moving promising technologies from the laboratory and commercial environment into actual use. Moreover, by tailoring processes and criteria to focus on different objectives, whether that may be saving time or money or broadening the industrial base, DOD has had an opportunity to experiment with a variety of management approaches and criteria that can be used to help solve transition problems affecting the approximately $69 billion spent over the past 3 years on later stages of technology development. However, it is too soon for us to determine the impact the three new DOD technology transition programs are having. At the time of our review, the programs--the TTI, DACP, and Quick Reaction Fund--had completed only 11 of 68 projects funded in fiscal years 2003 and 2004; of those, only 4 were providing full capability to users. Additionally, the programs have limited measures to gauge success of individual projects and return on investment. Nonetheless, reports from the programs have pointed to an array of benefits, including quicker fielding of technological improvements, cost savings, and the opportunity for DOD to tap into innovative technologies from firms that are new to defense work. Some sponsored technologies are bringing benefits to warfighters, such as a small, unmanned aircraft that can detect chemical and biological agents, and a device the size of an ink pen that can be used to purify water on the battlefield or in disaster areas. Furthermore, DOD officials credit the programs with giving senior leaders the flexibility to rapidly address current warfighter needs and for highlighting smaller technology projects that might otherwise be ignored. Long-term success for the programs likely will depend on how well the programs are managed and overseen. The programs must have effective processes for selecting the best projects, and management and oversight processes that will catch potential problems early. Thus far, of the three programs, the DACP has adopted the most disciplined and structured process for selecting and managing projects, and has encountered few problems managing projects. However, the program has had some difficulties processing the large number of proposals it receives. The TTI has also established selection criteria and processes, but it is unclear the extent to which it is reaching its intended audience and has had less success in tracking its projects. The Quick Reaction Fund has the least structured processes of the three programs--a deliberate approach seen as providing the flexibility needed to field innovations rapidly. It has had some difficulty selecting, managing and tracking projects.