Critical Equipment Shortages Have Degraded the Overall Equipment Readiness of Nondeployed Army National Guard Units

While deploying Army National Guard units have had priority for getting  the equipment they needed, readying these forces has degraded the  equipment inventory of the Guard’s nondeployed units and equipment  shortages threaten the Guard’s ability to prepare forces for future  deployments. The Army National Guard’s Initial Equipment Shortages and the Continuing Need for Fully Equipped Forces for Current Operations Have Resulted in Critical Equipment Shortages

Most Army National Guard units mobilized for recent overseas operations  had equipment shortages that had to be filled so that the unit could meet  the combatant commander’s equipment requirements for their mission. As an increasing number of Army  National Guard forces have been needed to support current operations,  the Army National Guard has supplied the equipment its deploying units  need to meet combatant commander requirements by transferring  equipment from within the Army National Guard. We previously reported that as of June 2004 the  Army National Guard had transferred more than 35,000 pieces of  equipment to ready units for recent operations. The National Guard  Bureau estimates that when substitute items, equipment undergoing  maintenance, and equipment left overseas for follow-on forces are  subtracted, its nondeployed units had available only about 34 percent of  essential warfighting equipment as of July 2005. As of July 2005, the Army National Guard reported that equipment  transfers had reduced its inventory of more than 220 items to less than 5  percent of the required amount or a quantity of fewer than 5 items. Among  these 220 high-demand items are generators, trucks, and radios. This has  challenged Guard units preparing to deploy because equipment  requirements are not defined and communicated to them until close to  their deployment dates. Army’s Lack of Accountability and Plans to Replace All Army National Guard Equipment Retained in Theater Hinder the Guard’s Ability to Prepare and Train Units

The Army National Guard estimates that, since 2003, it has left more than  64,000 equipment items valued at over $1.2 billion overseas to support  continuing operations. But, the Army lacks a full accounting of this  equipment and has not prepared plans to replace it as required under DOD  policy. While the Army has now instituted processes to account for certain high- demand equipment items that are being left in theater for the duration of  the conflict and expects replacement plans for this equipment to be  developed by August 2005, it does not appear that these replacement plans  will account for all items transferred to the active component because the  Army has not been tracking all Guard equipment left in theater in a  centralized manner. Army National Guard Units Are Changing to New Designs, but Will Continue to Lack Equipment Comparable to Active Forces

Army National Guard units are scheduled to convert to new designs within  the Army’s modular force by 2008, but they are expected to convert with  the equipment they have on hand and will lack some equipment for these  designs until at least 2011. While the Army estimated in June 2005 that it would cost  about $15.6 billion to convert most of the Guard’s units, this estimate did  not include all expected costs and the Army was unable to provide  detailed information to support the estimate. Further, it has not developed  detailed equipping plans that specify the Guard’s equipment requirements  as it progresses through the new rotation cycle used to provide ready  forces for ongoing operations. In the short  term, units nearing deployment will continue to receive priority for  equipment, which may delay when units will receive the equipment needed  for modular conversions. Further, without more complete  equipment requirements and cost estimates, the DOD and Congress will  not have all the information they need to evaluate funding requests for the  Army National Guard’s transition to the modular force. This plan should include:  the specific equipment requirements, costs, timelines, and funding strategy  for converting Army National Guard units to the modular force and the  extent to which Guard units will have comparable types of equipment and  equipment levels as the active modular units,    an analysis of the equipment the Army National Guard’s units will need for  their missions in each phase of the rotation cycle, and    how the Army will manage implementation risks to modular forces if full  funding is not provided on the expected timeline.
Why GAO Did This Study

Recent military operations have required that the Army rely extensively on Army National Guard forces, which currently comprise over 30 percent of the ground forces in Iraq. Heavy deployments of Army National Guard forces and their equipment, much of which has been left overseas for follow-on forces, have raised questions about whether the Army National Guard has the types and quantities of equipment it will need to continue supporting ongoing operations and future missions. GAO was asked to assess the extent to which (1) the Army National Guard has the equipment needed to support ongoing operations and (2) the Army can account for Army National Guard equipment left overseas. GAO also assessed the Army's plans, cost estimates, and funding strategy for equipping Guard units under its modular and rotational force initiatives.

What GAO Found

While deploying Army National Guard units have had priority for getting the equipment they needed, readying these forces has degraded the equipment inventory of the Guard's nondeployed units and threatens the Guard's ability to prepare forces for future missions at home and overseas. Nondeployed Guard units now face significant equipment shortfalls because (1) they have been equipped at less than war-time levels with the assumption that they could obtain additional resources prior to deployment and (2) current operations have created an unanticipated high demand for certain items, such as armored vehicles. To fully equip its deploying units, as of July 2005, the Army National Guard had transferred more than 101,000 pieces of equipment from its nondeployed units. As of May 2005, such transfers had exhausted the Guard's inventory of more than 220 high demand equipment items, such as night vision equipment, trucks, and radios. Further, as equipment requirements for overseas operations continue to evolve, the Army has been unable to identify and communicate what items deploying units need until close to their scheduled deployments, which challenges the Guard to transfer needed equipment quickly. To meet the demand for certain types of equipment for continuing operations, the Army has required Army National Guard units to leave behind many items for use by follow-on forces, but the Army can account for only about 45 percent of these items and has not developed a plan to replace them, as DOD policy requires. DOD has directed the Army to track equipment Guard units left overseas and develop replacement plans, but they have not yet been completed. The Army Guard estimates that since 2003 it has left more than 64,000 items, valued at more than $1.2 billion, overseas to support operations. Without a completed and implemented plan to replace all Guard equipment left overseas, Army Guard units will likely face growing equipment shortages and challenges in regaining readiness for future missions. Thus, DOD and Congress will not have assurance that the Army has an effective strategy for addressing the Guard's equipping needs. Although Army National Guard units are scheduled to convert to new designs within the Army's modular force by 2008, they are not expected to be equipped for these designs until at least 2011. The Army has not developed detailed equipping plans that specify the Guard's equipment requirements to transform to a modular force while supporting ongoing operations. As of June 2005, the Army estimated that it would cost about $15.6 billion to convert most of the Guard's units, but this estimate did not include all expected costs and the Army was unable to provide detailed information to support the estimate. In the short term, units nearing deployment will continue to receive priority for equipment, which may affect the availability of equipment needed for modular conversions. Until the Army fully identifies the Guard's equipment requirements and costs for both the near and long term, DOD and Congress will not be in a sound position to weigh the affordability and effectiveness of the Army's plans.