Persons entering the United States under the Visa  Waiver Program must    have a valid passport issued by the participating country and be a national    be seeking entry for 90 days or less as a temporary visitor for business or    have been determined by CBP at the U.S. port of entry to represent no  threat to the welfare, health, safety, or security of the United States;    have complied with conditions of any previous admission under the  program (for example, individuals must have stayed in the United States  for 90 days or less during prior visa waiver visits); if entering by air or sea, possess a round-trip transportation ticket issued  by a carrier that has signed an agreement with the U.S. government to  participate in the program, and must have arrived in the United States  aboard such a carrier; and if entering by land, have proof of financial solvency and a domicile abroad  to which they intend to return. In 2002, we  reported that eliminating the program would increase State’s resource  requirements. Lost and  stolen passports from visa waiver countries are highly prized travel  documents, according to the Secretary General of Interpol. Although DHS has intercepted some travelers with fraudulent passports at  U.S. ports of entry, DHS officials acknowledged that an undetermined  number of inadmissible aliens may have entered the United States using a  lost or stolen passport from a visa waiver country. In 2004, DHS reviewed the law enforcement and  security risks posed by the continued participation of 25 of the 27  countries in the program. Specifically, DHS has:    conducted site visits in all 27 participating countries;    completed comprehensive assessments of 25 participating countries,  examining the effect of continued participation in the Visa Waiver  Program on U.S. security and law enforcement interests, including the  enforcement of immigration laws; identified risks in some of the countries and brought the concerns to the  attention of host-country governments in five visa waiver countries;   submitted a six-page report to Congress in November 2005 that  summarized the findings from the 2004 assessments; and  initiated assessments for the remaining two countries in August and  September 2005. DHS Lacks a Clearly- Defined, Consistent, and Timely Process to Assess Risks of Visa Waiver Program

Despite these steps to strengthen and improve the management of the  program, we identified several problems with the process DHS uses to  assess the risks posed by each of the visa waiver countries’ continued  participation in the program—namely the mandated biennial country  assessment process. Review Process Did Not Involve Key Stakeholders

We found that the review process lacked clear protocols, as key  stakeholders were left out of the report development process. In particular, DHS has not finalized its operating procedures  for site visits. DHS Faces Difficulties in Mitigating Program Risks

DHS has taken some actions to mitigate the risks of the Visa Waiver  Program, such as terminating the use of the German temporary passport  for travel under the program. Since 2002, the law has required the timely  reporting of passport thefts for continued participating in the Visa Waiver  Program, but DHS has not established and communicated time frames and  operating procedures to participating countries. While most visa waiver countries use and  contribute to Interpol’s database, four do not. However, Interpol’s data on lost and stolen travel documents is not  automatically accessible to border inspectors at primary inspection—one  reason why it is not currently an effective border screening tool, according  to DHS, State, and Justice officials. To evaluate the U.S. government’s efforts to assess and mitigate these  risks, we analyzed the laws governing the program, relevant agency  operating procedures, and DHS OIG reports. We also spoke with U.S. Embassy officials in six Visa Waiver  Program countries, as well as foreign government officials in three of  these countries. 2. 3.
Why GAO Did This Study

The Visa Waiver Program enables citizens of 27 countries to travel to the United States for tourism or business for 90 days or less without obtaining a visa. In fiscal year 2004, more than 15 million people entered the country under the program. After the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, the risks that aliens would exploit the program to enter the United States became more of a concern. In this report, we (1) describe the Visa Waiver Program's benefits and risks, (2) examine the U.S. government's process for assessing potential risks, and (3) assess actions taken to mitigate these risks. We met with U.S. embassy officials in six program countries, and reviewed relevant laws, procedures, and reports on participating countries.

What GAO Found

The Visa Waiver Program has many benefits as well as some inherent risks. It facilitates travel for millions of people and eases consular workload, but poses challenges to border inspectors, who, when screening visa waiver travelers, may face language barriers or lack time to conduct in-depth interviews. Furthermore, stolen passports from visa waiver countries are prized travel documents among terrorists, criminals, and immigration law violators, creating an additional risk. While the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has intercepted many fraudulent documents at U.S. ports of entry, DHS officials acknowledged that an undetermined number of inadmissible aliens may have entered the United States using a stolen or lost passport from a visa waiver country. The U.S. government's process for assessing the risks of the Visa Waiver Program has weaknesses. In 2002, Congress mandated that, every 2 years, DHS review the effect that each country's continued participation in the program has on U.S. law enforcement and security interests, but did not set a reporting deadline. In 2004, DHS established a unit to oversee the program and conduct these reviews. We identified several problems with the 2004 review process, as key stakeholders were not consulted during portions of the process, preparation for the in-country site visits was not consistent, and the final reports were untimely. Furthermore, DHS cannot effectively achieve its mission to monitor and report on ongoing law enforcement and security concerns in visa waiver countries due to insufficient resources. DHS has taken some actions to mitigate the program's risks; however, the U.S. government has faced difficulties in further mitigating these risks. In particular, the department has not established time frames and operating procedures regarding timely stolen passport reporting--a program requirement since 2002. Furthermore, DHS has sought to require the reporting of lost and stolen passport data to the United States and the International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol), but it has not issued clear reporting guidelines to participating countries. While most visa waiver countries participate with Interpol's database, four do not. DHS is not using Interpol's data to its full potential as a border screening tool because DHS does not automatically access the data at primary inspection.