Agencies Have Programs to Combat Nuclear Smuggling

Four U.S. agencies have implemented programs to combat nuclear  smuggling both domestically and in other countries by providing radiation  detection equipment and training to border security personnel. From fiscal  year 1994 through fiscal year 2005, the Congress has appropriated about  $800 million for these efforts, including about $500 million to DOE, DOD,  and State for international efforts and about $300 million to DHS for  installing radiation detection equipment at U.S. points of entry. Initial  concerns about the threat posed by nuclear smuggling were focused on  nuclear materials originating in the former Soviet Union. As a result, the  first major initiatives to combat nuclear smuggling during the late 1990s  concentrated on deploying radiation detection equipment at borders in  countries of the former Soviet Union and in Central and Eastern Europe. According to DOE, through the end of fiscal year 2004, the Second Line of  Defense program had completed installations at 66 sites, mostly in Russia. Additionally, in 2003, DOE began its Megaports Initiative, which seeks to  install radiation detection equipment at major foreign seaports to enable  foreign government personnel to screen shipping containers entering and  leaving these ports for nuclear and other radioactive material. After September 11, 2001, this effort was expanded by  DHS’s Bureau of Customs and Border Patrol. In May 2005, DHS reported that it has  installed more than 470 radiation portal monitors nationwide at sites  including international mail and package handling facilities, land border  crossings, and seaports. U.S. Programs to Combat Nuclear Smuggling in the United States and Other Countries Have Lacked Effective Planning and Coordination

A common problem faced by U.S. programs to combat nuclear smuggling  both domestically and in other countries is the lack of effective planning  and coordination among the agencies responsible for implementing these  programs. Regarding assistance to foreign countries, we reported in 2002  that there was no overall governmentwide plan to guide U.S. efforts, some  programs were duplicative, and coordination among the U.S. agencies was  not effective. We found that the most troubling consequence of this lack of  effective planning and coordination was that DOE, State, and DOD were  pursuing separate approaches to enhancing other countries’ border  crossings. Regarding efforts to deploy radiation detection equipment at U.S. points of  entry, we reported that DHS had not coordinated with other federal  agencies and DOE national laboratories on longer-term objectives such as  attempting to improve the radiation detection technology used in portal  monitors. We found that a number of  factors hindered coordination, including competition between the DOE  national laboratories and the emerging missions of various federal  agencies with regard to radiation detection. Currently Deployed Radiation Detection Equipment Has Limitations

Recently, concerns have been raised about the ability of radiation  detection equipment to detect illicitly trafficked nuclear material. In particular, nuclear materials are more  difficult to detect if lead or other metal is used to shield them. Given the inherent  limitations of currently deployed radiation detection equipment and  difficulties in detecting certain nuclear materials, it is important that it be  installed, operated, and maintained in a way that optimizes authorities’  ability to interdict illicit nuclear materials. DHS has faced similar concerns  from port operators in the United States. It is important to note that radiation detection equipment is only one of the  tools in the toolbox that customs inspectors and border guards must use  to combat nuclear smuggling. Combating nuclear smuggling requires an  integrated approach that includes equipment, proper training, and  intelligence gathering on smuggling operations. Although efforts to combat nuclear smuggling through the installation of  radiation detection equipment are important, the United States should not  and does not rely upon radiation detection equipment at foreign or U.S.  borders as its sole means for preventing nuclear materials or a nuclear  warhead from reaching the United States. Customs Service: Acquisition and Deployment of Radiation Detection  Equipment. This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the  United States.
Why GAO Did This Study

According to the International Atomic Energy Agency, between 1993 and 2004, there were 650 confirmed cases of illicit trafficking in nuclear and radiological materials worldwide. A significant number of the cases involved material that could be used to produce either a nuclear weapon or a device that uses conventional explosives with radioactive material (known as a "dirty bomb"). Over the past decade, the United States has become increasingly concerned about the danger that unsecured weapons-usable nuclear material could fall into the hands of terrorists or countries of concern. In the aftermath of September 11, 2001, there is heightened concern that terrorists may try to smuggle nuclear materials or a nuclear weapon into the United States. This testimony summarizes the results of our previous reports on various U.S. efforts to combat nuclear smuggling both in the United States and abroad. Specifically, this testimony discusses (1) the different U.S. federal agencies tasked with installing radiation detection equipment both domestically and in other countries, (2) problems with coordination among these agencies and programs, and (3) the effectiveness of radiation detection equipment deployed in the United States and other countries.

What GAO Found

Four U.S. agencies, the Departments of Energy (DOE), Defense (DOD), State, and Homeland Security (DHS), are implementing programs to combat nuclear smuggling by providing radiation detection equipment and training to border security personnel. From fiscal year 1994 through fiscal year 2005, the Congress has appropriated about $800 million for these efforts, including about $500 million to DOE, DOD, and State for international efforts and about $300 million to DHS for installing radiation detection equipment at U.S. points of entry. The first major initiatives to combat nuclear smuggling concentrated on deploying radiation detection equipment at borders in countries of the former Soviet Union. In particular, in 1998, DOE established the Second Line of Defense program, which has installed equipment at 66 sites mostly in Russia through the end of fiscal year 2004. In 2003, DOE began its Megaports Initiative to focus on the threat posed by nuclear smuggling at major foreign seaports and to date has completed installations at two ports. Regarding efforts at U.S. points of entry, the U.S. Customs Service began providing its inspectors with portable radiation detection devices in 1998 and expanded its efforts to include larger-scale radiation detection equipment after September 11, 2001. This program is continuing under DHS, which reported in May 2005 that it has installed more than 470 radiation portal monitors nationwide at mail facilities, land border crossings, and seaports. A common problem faced by U.S. programs to combat nuclear smuggling is the lack of effective planning and coordination among the responsible agencies. For example, we reported in 2002 that there was no overall governmentwide plan to guide U.S. efforts, some programs were duplicative, and coordination among U.S. agencies was not effective. We found that the most troubling consequence of this lack of effective planning and coordination was that the Department of State had installed less sophisticated equipment in some countries leaving those countries' borders more vulnerable to nuclear smuggling than countries where DOE and DOD had deployed equipment. Since the issuance of our report, the agencies involved have made some progress in addressing these issues. Regarding the deployment of equipment in the United States, we reported that DHS had not effectively coordinated with other federal agencies and DOE national laboratories on longer-term objectives, such as attempting to improve the radiation detection technology. We found that a number of factors hindered coordination, including competition between DOE national laboratories and the emerging missions of various federal agencies with regard to radiation detection. The effectiveness of the current generation of radiation detection equipment is limited in its ability to detect illicitly trafficked nuclear material, especially if it is shielded by lead or other metal. Given the inherent limitations of radiation detection equipment and difficulties in detecting certain materials, it is important that the equipment be installed, operated, and maintained in a way that optimizes its usefulness. It is also important to note that the deployment of radiation detection equipment--regardless of how well such equipment works--is not a panacea for the problem of nuclear smuggling. Rather, combating nuclear smuggling requires an integrated approach that includes equipment, proper training of border security personnel in the use of radiation detection equipment, and intelligence gathering on potential nuclear smuggling operations.