These items included 3 ceramic body armor inserts identified as  small arms protective inserts (SAPI), which are the ceramic inserts  currently in demand by soldiers in Iraq and Afghanistan; a time selector  unit used to ensure the accuracy of computer-based equipment, such as  global positioning systems and system-level clocks; 12 digital microcircuits  used in F-14 Tomcat fighter aircraft; guided missile radar test sets used to  check the operation of the data link antenna on the Navy’s Walleye (AGM- 62) air-to-ground guided missile; and numerous other electronic items. Posing as DOD contractor employees, our investigators also entered  DRMOs in two east coast states, and obtained about $1.1 million in excess  military items that required demilitarization as well several other items that  are currently in use by the military services. Sensitive Excess Military Items Purchased at DOD Excess Property Liquidation Sales

Using a fictitious identity as a private citizen, our undercover investigator  applied for and received an account with DOD’s liquidation sales  contractor. The undercover investigator was then able to purchase several  sensitive excess military items that were being improperly sold to the  public. The following discussion presents the case study details of our  undercover purchases of sensitive excess military items that should have  been destroyed when no longer needed by DOD and should not have been  sold to the public. Universal frequency counter. These  items included two guided missile launcher mounts for shoulder-fired  missiles, several types of body armor, an all-band antenna used to track  aircraft, six circuit card assemblies used in Navy computerized systems, a  digital signal converter used in naval electronic surveillance, and two Palm  V personal digital assistants (PDA) that were certified as having their hard  drives removed. During our undercover security penetration at  DRMO B in June 2006, our investigators noticed two Palm V Organizer  PDAs and accessories. Waste Associated with Sales of A-Condition Excess Items that Military Services Are Continuing to Use in Operations

Because significant numbers of new, unused A-condition excess items still  being purchased or in use by the military services are being disposed of  through liquidation sales, it was easy for our undercover investigator to  pose as a liquidation sales customer and purchase several of these items for  a fraction of what the military services are paying to obtain these same  items from DLA supply depots. Undercover Purchases of New, Unused Items that DOD Is Continuing to Buy or that Are in Demand by Military Units

Our undercover investigator used a fictitious identity to obtain a DOD  liquidation sales customer account and purchase several new, unused  excess DOD items that the military services are continuing to order from  supply inventory or use in operations. Further, liquidation sales of items that  military units are continuing to purchase at full cost from supply inventory  demonstrates continuing waste and inefficiency in DOD’s excess property  reutilization program. 1). The  table below defines the DOD demilitarization codes.
Why GAO Did This Study

GAO's previous work found problems in security controls over sensitive excess military equipment that resulted in lost and stolen items, some of which were sold to the public, and significant waste and inefficiency in the Department of Defense (DOD) excess property reutilization program. GAO was asked to perform follow-up investigations to determine whether (1) unauthorized parties could obtain sensitive excess military equipment that requires demilitarization (destruction) when no longer needed by DOD and (2) system and process improvements are adequate to prevent sales of new, unused excess items that DOD continues to buy or that are in demand by the military services.

What GAO Found

GAO investigators posing as private citizens to disguise their identity purchased several sensitive military equipment items from DOD's liquidation sales contractor, indicating that DOD has not enforced security controls for preventing sensitive excess military equipment from release to the public. GAO investigators at liquidation sales purchased ceramic body armor inserts currently used by deployed troops, a cesium technology timing unit with global positioning capabilities, a universal frequency counter, 2 guided missile radar test sets, 12 digital microcircuits used in F-14 fighter aircraft, and numerous other items. GAO was able to purchase these items because controls broke down at virtually every step in the excess property turn-in and disposal process. GAO determined that thousands of military items that should have been demilitarized (destroyed) were sold to the public. Further, in June 2006, GAO undercover investigators posing as DOD contractor employees entered two excess property warehouses and obtained about $1.1 million in sensitive military equipment items, including 2 launcher mounts for shoulder-fired guided missiles, several types of body armor, a digital signal converter used in naval surveillance, an all-band antenna used to track aircraft, and 6 circuit cards used in computerized Navy systems. At no point during GAO's warehouse security penetration were its investigators challenged on their identity and authority to obtain DOD military property. The table below shows examples of sensitive military equipment obtained during GAO's undercover operations. GAO investigators posing as private citizens also bought several new, unused items currently being purchased or in demand by the military services from DOD's excess property liquidation sales contractor. Although military units paid full price for these items when they ordered them from supply inventory, GAO paid a fraction of this cost to purchase the same items, demonstrating continuing waste and inefficiency.