Purpose and Effectiveness of IAEA’s Technical Cooperation Program

U.S. officials and representatives of other IAEA major donor countries told us that the principal purpose of IAEA’s technical cooperation program is to help ensure that IAEA member states, many of whom are developing countries, support IAEA’s safeguards and the NPT. IAEA’s Technical Cooperation Program Helps Ensure Support for Safeguards and the NPT

While the United States and other IAEA major donor countries believe that applying safeguards is IAEA’s most important function, most developing countries believe that receiving technical assistance through the technical cooperation program is just as important, and they participate in IAEA primarily for the technical assistance it provides. Technical assistance ($89.0)
Other programs ($67.2)

		Concerns About the Effectiveness and Efficiency of IAEA’s Technical Cooperation Program Led to IAEA Initiatives to Improve the Program

In the past, officials in the United States and other IAEA major donor countries had concerns about the effectiveness and efficiency of the technical cooperation program. We found that most of the 40 reports and audit summaries did not assess the impact of specific technical assistance projects, and no performance criteria had been established to help measure the success or failure of the projects. Cost of U.S. About $16 million of the $36 million U.S. voluntary contribution to IAEA went to the technical cooperation fund; this contribution represented about 32 percent of the fund, which totaled $49 million. Seventy-two—or 58 percent—of the member states made no payments at all, yet 57 of these states received technical assistance. U.S. Officials Do Not Systematically Monitor Projects for Consistency With U.S. Nuclear Nonproliferation and Safety Goals

U.S. officials do not systematically review or monitor all of IAEA’s technical assistance projects to ensure that IAEA’s activities do not conflict with U.S. nuclear nonproliferation and safety goals. Moreover, since 1996, a portion of the funds for projects in countries of concern to the United States has come from U.S. voluntary contributions to IAEA. ACDA, DOE, and U.S. Mission officials told us that the vast majority of IAEA’s technical assistance projects do not pose any concerns about nuclear proliferation because the assistance is provided in benign areas, such as medicine and agriculture, that do not involve transferring sensitive nuclear materials and technologies. Although IAEA provides most of its technical assistance in areas that do not generally pose concerns about nuclear proliferation, our review of projects in countries of concern to the United States identified three cases in which IAEA provided technical assistance to countries where the United States has concerns about nuclear proliferation and threats to nuclear safety. We reviewed program files at the Department of State and at the U.S. Mission to the United Nations System Organizations in Vienna, Austria. The United States and other IAEA member states strongly support the Deputy Director General’s efforts to improve the program. Nuclear Safety: International Atomic Energy Agency’s Nuclear Technical Assistance for Cuba (GAO/RCED-97-72, Mar.
Why GAO Did This Study

Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO examined: (1) the purpose and effectiveness of the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) technical cooperation program; (2) the cost of U.S. participation in IAEA's technical cooperation program; and (3) whether the United States ensures that the activities of IAEA's technical cooperation program do not conflict with U.S. nuclear nonproliferation and safety goals.

What GAO Found

GAO found that: (1) while the United States and other IAEA major donor countries believe that applying safeguards is IAEA's most important function, most developing countries believe that receiving technical assistance through IAEA's technical cooperation program is just as important; (2) the United States and other major donors principally participate in the program to help ensure that the member states fully support IAEA's safeguards and the 1970 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons; (3) in the past, concerns were raised about the effectiveness and efficiency of the technical cooperation program; (4) most of IAEA's program evaluation reports, internal audits, and project files that GAO reviewed did not assess the impact of the technical cooperation program, and no performance criteria had been established to help measure the success or failure of the program; (5) for the past 5 years, IAEA's Deputy Director General for Technical Cooperation has been taking steps to improve the overall effectiveness and efficiency of the program, but State Department officials are concerned about their sustainability; (6) the United States, historically the largest financial donor to the fund, provided a voluntary contribution of about $16 million, or about 32 percent of the total $49 million paid by IAEA member states for 1996; (7) for 1996, 72 of the 124 member states made no payments at all to the technical cooperation fund yet most of these states received technical assistance from IAEA; (8) officials from the Department of State, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and the U.S. Mission to the United Nations System Organizations in Vienna, Austria, told GAO that they do not systematically review or monitor all of IAEA's technical assistance projects to ensure that they do not conflict with U.S. nuclear nonproliferation or safety goals; (9) however, GAO found that U.S. officials had sporadically reviewed projects in countries of concern to the United States; (10) U.S. officials also told GAO that the vast majority of IAEA's technical assistance projects do not pose any concerns about nuclear proliferation because the assistance is generally in areas that do not involve the transfer of sensitive nuclear materials and technologies; (11) however, GAO found that IAEA has provided nuclear technical assistance projects for countries where the United States is concerned about nuclear proliferation and threats to nuclear safety; and (12) moreover, a portion of the funds for projects in countries of concern is coming from U.S. voluntary contributions to IAEA.