	Overview

As an ongoing response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and a justification forthe U.S. invasion of Iraq, the Bush Administration has made the promotion of democracy in theMiddle East a national security priority, stating that greater political freedom can undercut the forcesof Islamic radicalism and indoctrination. At the heart of this upheaval lies a long, vexing dilemma for U.S. policy makers: should theUnited States exert pressure on Arab governments to open their political systems and respect humanrights with the knowledge that Islamists, the most popular opposition force in Arab politics, standto benefit from regional democratization? Many observers assert that Islamist (2) political parties andorganizations are largely opposed, at least rhetorically, to key aspects of U.S. foreign policy in theMiddle East, such as support for Israel, the occupation of Iraq, and the large U.S. military presencein the Persian Gulf. This reportexamines how U.S. democracy promotion efforts interact with the political realities on the groundin three Arab countries (Morocco, Egypt, and Jordan) and raises the following questions: Who arethe Islamists? Are such groups legitimate democratic actors or militant fundamentalists in disguise?To what extent are Islamists opposed to U.S. Middle East policy? Do non-violent Islamist groups even welcome or accept dialogue with theUnited States or would such action discredit them among their followers? Some of thesegroups have renounced violence and peacefully oppose their respective governments. (4) Some experts argue that non-violent Islamist groups that renounceviolence as a tactic in their own countries but support its use in the Palestinian-Israeli context shouldnot be considered non-violent. Within the U.S. foreign policy establishment, there has been an ongoing, vigorousdebate over the issue of engaging Islamist groups, some of which have renounced the use ofviolence and entered into mainstream politics. With U.S. democracy promotion policy toward Islamists left somewhat vague, perhaps evendeliberately so, there are many foreign policy practitioners in the U.S. State Department who believethat, at the moment, the United States is taking a pragmatic approach toward Middle Eastdemocratization. U.S. Democracy Programs

Since the September 11, 2001, terroristattacks, the United States has significantlyincreased funding for democracy promotion inthe Arab world. Rather, it must be properlychanneled to support reformers withoutde-legitimizing them in the process. Indeed, many groups inside and outside the Arab world would provide additional insights.Groups that have not disarmed their militias or renounced terrorism are not treated in this study. U.S. Policy in Egypt.
This report assesses U.S. policy toward Islamist organizations in the Arab world, specificallythose groups that have renounced violence and terrorism. The report analyzes U.S. governmentattitudes toward Islamist movements and investigates how U.S. democracy promotion policy isapplied in three Arab countries with a significant Islamist presence in the political sphere: Morocco,Egypt, and Jordan. It may be updated periodically to include new case studies of Islamist movementsin Algeria, Yemen, Kuwait, Bahrain, or areas outside the Arab world.
The Bush Administration has made the promotion of democracy in the Middle East a nationalsecurity priority, stating that greater political freedom can undercut the forces of Islamic radicalismand indoctrination. As U.S. democracy promotion policies have moved forward, policy makers haveconfronted a significant dilemma: how to respond to challenges posed by political Islamistmovements (i.e. parties and political organizations that promote social and political reform inaccordance with Islamic religious principles that may lead them to oppose U.S. foreign policy).
In response to this dilemma, some observers have questioned whether the United Statesshould exert pressure on Arab governments to open their political systems and respect human rightswith the knowledge that such steps, if successful, may benefit Islamist groups. Representing apowerful and popular political force in the Arab world today, many Islamist political parties andorganizations are largely opposed, at least rhetorically, to key aspects of U.S. foreign policy in theMiddle East, such as support for Israel, the occupation of Iraq, and the large U.S. military presencein the Persian Gulf. Elections in Iraq, Egypt, and the Palestinian Authority that were supported bythe United States have strengthened the political positions of Islamist organizations, including, inthe case of Hamas, armed groups that have refused to renounce violence.
Non-violent Islamist groups, which have chosen or been permitted to peacefully participatein politics, present their own challenges to U.S. policy makers. This report raises the followingquestions: Are Islamists liberal democrats or fundamentalists? Should the United States support theirparticipation in democratic politics? Do non-violent Islamists welcome dialogue with the UnitedStates or would such action discredit them among their followers?
While many continue to speculate over the direction of U.S. democracy promotion in theMiddle East, Congress may use its oversight authority to bring further clarity to the Administration'sregional strategy, particularly on the issue of dealing with Islamist groups. Congress alsoappropriates funds for regional democratization programs and foreign aid projects and may specifythat these funds be used for certain projects or channeled to certain groups.