Core contract personnel  perform the types of functions that may affect an IC element’s decision- making authority or control of its mission and operations. However, we identified  several issues that limit the comparability, accuracy, and consistency of  the information reported by the civilian IC elements as a whole. Changes to Core Contract Personnel Definition and Data Shortcomings Limit Comparability of Obligation and FTE Data Across Years

Trends in the civilian IC elements’ use of core contract personnel from  fiscal year 2007 to 2011 in terms of the number of personnel and  associated costs cannot be identified due to changes in the definition of  core contract personnel and known data shortcomings. IC CHCO did not  explain that the rebaselining would limit the comparability of the number  and costs of core contract personnel for both this civilian IC element and  the IC as a whole because the element did not adjust the number and  costs previously reported. For 37 percent of the 287 records we reviewed, we could not determine  the reliability of the information reported. Inventory Provides Limited Insight into Functions Performed by Contractors and Reasons for Their Use

The civilian IC elements have used core contract personnel to perform a  range of functions, such as human capital, information technology, and  program management, and have reported in the core contract personnel  inventory the reasons for using contractors for such functions. Further, in the inventory, the civilian IC elements provided  information on their reasons for using core contract personnel, such as  the need for unique expertise, but our analysis found that 40 percent of  the contracts in our sample did not contain evidence of the reasons  reported. As a result, we could not corroborate the information reported in  the inventory on the reasons for using core contract personnel. Limited Progress Has Been Made in Developing Policies and Strategies on Contractor Use to Mitigate Risks

CIA, ODNI, and the executive departments, which are responsible for  developing policies to address risks related to contractors for the other six  civilian IC elements within those departments, have generally made  limited progress in developing such policies. Further, the eight civilian IC  elements have generally not developed strategic workforce plans that  address contractor use. Without guidance, strategies, and tools related to  services that closely support inherently governmental functions and  critical functions, the civilian IC elements may not be well-positioned to  identify and manage the related risks of contracting for those functions. ICD 612 directs IC  elements to determine, review, and evaluate the number and uses of core  contract personnel when conducting strategic workforce planning but  does not reference the requirements related to determining the  appropriate workforce mix specified in OMB’s July 2009 memorandum or  require elements to document the extent to which contractors should be  used. Not fully disclosing  these limitations and the effects of these changes limits the transparency  and usefulness of the information reported to Congress. To improve the ability of the civilian IC elements to strategically plan for  their contractors and mitigate associated risks, we recommend that IC  CHCO take the following three actions:
Revise ICD 612’s provisions governing strategic workforce planning to  require the IC elements to identify their assessment of the appropriate  workforce mix on a function-by-function basis;
Assess options for how the core contract personnel inventory could be  modified to provide better insights into the functions performed by  contractors when there are multiple services provided under a  contract; and
Require the IC elements to identify contracts within the core contract  personnel inventory that include services that are critical or closely  support inherently governmental functions. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

The objectives of this review were to determine (1) the extent to which the  civilian intelligence community (IC) elements rely on core contract  personnel; (2) the functions performed by core contract personnel and the  factors that contribute to their use; and (3) whether the civilian IC  elements have developed policies and guidance and strategically planned  for their use of these contract personnel to mitigate related risks. The  eight civilian IC elements covered by our review are the Central  Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Department of Energy’s Office of  Intelligence and Counterintelligence (DOE IN), Department of Homeland  Security’s Office of Intelligence and Analysis (DHS I&A), Department of  State’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research (State INR), Department of  the Treasury’s Office of Intelligence and Analysis (Treasury OIA), Drug  Enforcement Administration’s Office of National Security Intelligence  (DEA NN), Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and Office of the  Director of National Intelligence (ODNI). Therefore, this report omits sensitive  information about (1) the number and associated costs of government  and core contract personnel and some details on how the civilian IC  elements prepare the core contract personnel inventory, (2) specific  contracts from civilian IC elements we reviewed, and (3) details related to  the civilian IC elements’ or their respective departments’ progress in  developing policies to mitigate risks related to contractors and the civilian  IC elements’ strategic workforce planning efforts. We subsequently worked with ODNI from September 2013 to  December 2013 to prepare an unclassified version of this report for public  release.
Why GAO Did This Study

The IC uses core contract personnel to augment its workforce. These contractors typically work alongside government personnel and perform staff-like work. Some core contract personnel require enhanced oversight because they perform services that could inappropriately influence the government's decision making.
This report is an unclassified version of a classified report issued in September 2013. GAO was asked to examine the eight civilian IC elements' use of contractors. This report examines (1) the extent to which the eight civilian IC elements use core contract personnel, (2) the functions performed by these personnel and the reasons for their use, and (3) whether the elements developed policies and strategically planned for their use. GAO reviewed and assessed the reliability of the eight civilian IC elements' core contract personnel inventory data for fiscal years 2010 and 2011, including reviewing a sample of 287 contract records. This sample is nongeneralizable as certain contract records were removed due to sensitivity concerns. GAO also reviewed agency acquisition policies and workforce plans and interviewed agency officials.

What GAO Found

Limitations in the intelligence community's (IC) inventory of contract personnel hinder the ability to determine the extent to which the eight civilian IC elements--the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), and six components within the Departments of Energy, Homeland Security, Justice, State, and the Treasury--use these personnel. The IC Chief Human Capital Officer (CHCO) conducts an annual inventory of core contract personnel that includes information on the number and costs of these personnel. However, GAO identified a number of limitations in the inventory that collectively limit the comparability, accuracy, and consistency of the information reported by the civilian IC elements as a whole. For example, changes to the definition of core contract personnel and data shortcomings limit the comparability of the information over time. In addition, the civilian IC elements used various methods to calculate the number of contract personnel and did not maintain documentation to validate the number of personnel reported for 37 percent of the 287 records GAO reviewed. Further, IC CHCO did not fully disclose the effects of such limitations when reporting contract personnel and cost information to Congress, which limits its transparency and usefulness.
The civilian IC elements used core contract personnel to perform a broad range of functions, such as information technology and program management, and reported in the core contract personnel inventory on the reasons for using these personnel. However, limitations in the information on the number and cost of core contract personnel preclude the information on contractor functions from being used to determine the number of personnel and their costs associated with each function. Further, civilian IC elements reported in the inventory a number of reasons for using core contract personnel, such as the need for unique expertise, but GAO found that 40 percent of the contract records reviewed did not contain evidence to support the reasons reported.
Collectively, CIA, ODNI, and the departments responsible for developing policies to address risks related to contractors for the other six civilian IC elements have made limited progress in developing those policies, and the civilian IC elements have generally not developed strategic workforce plans that address contractor use. Only the Departments of Homeland Security and State have issued policies that generally address all of the Office of Federal Procurement Policy's requirements related to contracting for services that could affect the government's decision-making authority. In addition, IC CHCO requires the elements to conduct strategic workforce planning but does not require the elements to determine the appropriate mix of government and contract personnel. Further, the elements' ability to use the core contract personnel inventory as a strategic planning tool is hindered because the inventory does not provide insight into the functions performed by contractors, in particular those that could inappropriately influence the government's control over its decisions. Without guidance, strategies, and tools related to these types of functions, the eight civilian IC elements may not be well-positioned to identify and manage related risks.

What GAO Recommends

GAO is recommending that IC CHCO take several actions to improve the inventory data's reliability and transparency and revise strategic workforce planning guidance, and develop ways to identify contracts for services that could affect the government's decision-making authority. IC CHCO generally agreed with GAO's recommendations.