	Background

Under the provisions of the National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958,  NASA is authorized to acquire aircraft. For purposes of this aggregate comparative cost analysis,  we considered available NASA reported data on costs applicable to its  passenger aircraft services—both variable and fixed costs--in comparison  with commercial airline service costs. Specifically, estimated costs associated  with NASA’s passenger aircraft operations during fiscal years 2003 and 2004  were almost $25 million, while we estimated the cost of commercial coach  tickets for the same number of travelers would have been approximately $5  million—about $20 million more to provide NASA passenger aircraft  services than if commercial airlines were used to provide passenger  transportation over the 2-year period. Table 1 summarizes our analysis of commercial and NASA passenger  transportation costs by types of NASA-owned or -chartered aircraft. NASA Passenger Aircraft Ownership to Support Routine Business Not Justified

Not only were NASA’s passenger aircraft services significantly more costly  than commercial airlines, but NASA’s continued ownership of aircraft to  provide air transportation supporting routine NASA business operations  was not in accordance with OMB guidance. Our analysis of available flight data showed that an  overwhelming majority (86 percent) of the flights taken during fiscal years  2003 and 2004 using NASA passenger aircraft services were to support  routine business operations, including attending meetings, conferences,  and site visits. A-126, the governing federal policy guidance  in this area, provides that agencies should own aircraft only to the extent  needed to meet mission requirements, such as troop transportation,  prisoner transportation, intelligence and counter narcotics activities, and  aeronautical research. NASA’s studies compared its aircraft ownership costs against costs  of NASA leasing aircraft to provide passenger transportation services  because “commercial airlines cannot effectively meet all mission  requirements.”  For example, NASA’s March 2004 A-76 study was based on  the assumption that NASA aircraft would be required to support mission  requirements of an estimated 400-450 flight hours a year--essentially the  total number of flight hours flown by that NASA center’s passenger aircraft  during 2003 and 2004. However, since purchasing the  aircraft, NASA has been using these aircraft as part of its passenger aircraft  services fleet. This may  include NASA employee spouses and relatives, contractors, or other  federal agency personnel. Without agencywide data on flight purposes and costs related  to its passenger aircraft services, NASA managers and Congress lack  critical information they need to make key aircraft ownership decisions. Weaknesses In Justification Process for Individual Passenger Aircraft Flights

As discussed previously, our analysis of available estimates of NASA’s  aggregate costs associated with its passenger aircraft services in  comparison with commercial airline ticket costs showed that NASA’s  passenger aircraft services cost about $20 million more than commercial  airlines. To assess the effectiveness of NASA’s oversight and management of its  passenger aircraft operations, we held discussions with appropriate  aircraft management officials at NASA headquarters and centers operating  passenger aircraft.
Why GAO Did This Study

Since its creation, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) has operated passenger aircraft services. These operations have been questioned in several prior audit reports. GAO was asked to perform a series of audits of NASA's controls to prevent fraud, waste, and abuse of taxpayer dollars. In this audit, GAO assessed (1) the relative cost of NASA passenger aircraft services in comparison with commercial costs, (2) whether NASA aircraft services were retained and operated in accordance with governmentwide guidance, and (3) the effectiveness of NASA's oversight and management of this program.

What GAO Found

NASA-owned and -chartered passenger aircraft services provide a perquisite to employees, but cost taxpayers an estimated five times more than flying on commercial airlines. While the majority of NASA air travel is on commercial airlines, NASA employees took at least 1,188 flights using NASA passenger aircraft services during fiscal years 2003 and 2004. Use of NASA passenger aircraft services can save time, provide more flexibility to meet senior executives' schedules, and provide other less tangible and quantifiable benefits. However, GAO's analysis of available reported data related to NASA passenger aircraft services during fiscal years 2003 and 2004 showed NASA reported costs were nearly $25 million compared with estimated commercial airline coach transportation costs of about $5 million. Further, this relative cost comparison, based on available NASA reported costs, did not take into account all applicable types of costs associated with its passenger aircraft services, including, for example, depreciation associated with the estimated $14 million NASA paid in 2001 to acquire several aircraft used for passenger transportation. Consequently, NASA's passenger air transportation services are much more costly than indicated by available data. Further, NASA is currently considering additional expenditures of about $77 million to upgrade and expand its existing passenger fleet. NASA's ownership of aircraft used to provide passenger transportation conflicts with federal policy allowing agencies to own aircraft only as needed to meet specified mission requirements, such as prisoner transportation and aeronautical research. GAO's analysis of NASA passenger aircraft flights for fiscal years 2003 and 2004 showed that an estimated 86 percent--about seven out of every eight flights--were taken to support routine business operations specifically prohibited by federal policy regarding aircraft ownership, including routine site visits, meetings, speeches, and conferences. Further, agencywide oversight and management of its passenger aircraft services was not effective. NASA's ability to make informed decisions on continued ownership of its passenger aircraft fleet and on flight-by-flight justifications was impaired by the lack of reliable agencywide data on aircraft costs and other weak management oversight practices.