In addition, U.S. officials said that Colombia  had existing infrastructure that facilitated the program’s restart, such as air  bases and a national air command center. Since 2002, the United States has provided $68.4 million and surveillance  aircraft for the ABD program (see table 1) and plans to provide an  additional $25.9 million in fiscal year 2006. United States and Colombia Implemented New Safety Requirements

In response to the findings of the Peru investigation and other  determinations, the United States and Colombia developed new safeguards  for the renewed ABD program which were implemented consistently in the  interdiction missions we observed. In response,  safeguards were developed to reinforce and clarify procedures, bolster  safety monitoring, enhance language skills of ABD personnel, and improve  communication channels. The pilot of the suspicious  aircraft in Peru was unaware that he was being called over the radio by the  ABD aircrew. Both Colombian and U.S.  program managers review the video to determine if the checklist was  followed. In addition, the Congress requires an annual report from the President on  the program’s resources and procedures used to intercept drug trafficking  aircraft. Available ABD Program Data Shows Mixed Results, but the Program Lacks Well- Defined Performance Measures

Our analysis of available data—the number of suspicious tracks and law  enforcement activities—indicates that the ABD program’s progress to date  is mixed. According to U.S. and Colombian officials, the reduction in  tracks indicates that the program is deterring drug traffickers from  transporting drugs by air, and is allowing the Colombian government to  meet its goal of regaining control of its airspace, but performance measures  with benchmarks and timeframes linking the reduction of suspicious tracks  to the overall goal have not been developed. For example,  personnel consider whether the aircraft has inexplicably deviated from its  planned flight path or the aircraft’s altitude is unusually low. Only one ABD mission  resulted in a drug seizure—0.6 metric tons (about 1,300 pounds) of  cocaine. We found the results of the ABD program mixed. Although the number of suspicious aircraft tracks has apparently  declined—from about 49 to 30 per month, the Colombian Air Force seldom  locates the suspicious aircraft. Out of about 390  suspicious tracks pursued since the start of the program, the Colombian  Air Force located 48; law enforcement or military authorities went to the  scene of 14, including four that were already on the ground. Besides calling  the Colombian National Police during a mission, as required by the  procedural checklist, the Colombian Air Force rarely involves the police. Moreover, many of the suspicious aircraft  tracks detected in recent months are along Colombia’s border regions with  Brazil and Venezuela where ABD aircraft are often too far away to threaten  the trafficking mission. To evaluate the program’s progress in attaining U.S. and Colombian  objectives, we examined data regarding law enforcement activities;  suspicious tracks; aircraft pursued, located, and fired at.
Why GAO Did This Study

In the 1990s, the United States operated a program in Colombia and Peru called Air Bridge Denial (ABD). The ABD program targeted drug traffickers that transport illicit drugs through the air by forcing down suspicious aircraft, using lethal force if necessary. The program was suspended in April 2001 when a legitimate civilian aircraft was shot down in Peru and two U.S. citizens were killed. The program was restarted in Colombia in August 2003 after additional safeguards were established. To date, the United States has provided about $68 million in support and plans to provide about $26 million in fiscal year 2006. We examined whether the ABD program's new safeguards were being implemented and its progress in attaining U.S. and Colombian objectives.

What GAO Found

The United States and Colombia developed additional safeguards for the renewed ABD program to avoid the problems that led to the accidental shoot down in Peru. The safety measures aim to reinforce and clarify procedures, bolster safety monitoring, enhance language skills of ABD personnel, and improve communication channels. We found the safeguards were being implemented by the Colombians and U.S. safety monitors. In addition, the program managers perform periodic reviews and evaluations, including an annual recertification of the program, and have made efforts to improve civilian pilots' awareness of the ABD program's procedures. Our analysis of available data indicates that the ABD program's results are mixed, but the program's progress cannot be readily assessed because performance measures with benchmarks and timeframes do not exist. The stated objective for the program--for the Colombian National Police to take control of suspicious aircraft--seldom happens. During October 2003 through July 2005, the Colombian Air Force located only 48 aircraft out of about 390 suspicious tracks pursued; and the military or police took control of just 14 aircraft--four were already on the ground. Only one resulted in a drug seizure. However, many of the suspicious aircraft land in remote locations controlled by insurgent groups that require time to enter safely. Yet, the air force rarely involves the police besides calling them at the start of a mission and before firing at the suspicious aircraft. In addition, many of the suspicious tracks are near border areas with Brazil and Venezuela, which is too far from an ABD air base for aircraft to intercept without refueling. Nevertheless, the number of suspicious tracks has apparently declined from 49 to 30 per month, but the track counts may not be consistent over time because they are based on subjective criteria, such as whether an aircraft has inexplicably deviated from its planned flight path. According to U.S. and Colombian officials, the reduction in suspicious tracks indicates that Colombia is deterring traffickers and regaining control of its airspace.