	Federal Agencies Take Actions against a Small Portion of the Estimated Overstay Population

		ICE Investigates Few In- Country Overstays, but Its Efforts Could Benefit from Improved Planning and Performance Management

As we reported in April 2011, ICE CTCEU investigates and arrests a  small portion of the estimated in-country overstay population due to,  among other things, ICE’s competing priorities; however, these efforts  could be enhanced by improved planning and performance management. Specifically, from fiscal years 2006 through 2010, ICE reported devoting  from 3.1 to 3.4 percent of its total field office investigative hours to  CTCEU overstay investigations. ICE was considering assigning some responsibility for noncriminal  overstay enforcement to its Enforcement and Removal Operations (ERO)  directorate, which has responsibility for apprehending and removing  aliens who do not have lawful immigration status from the United States. We reported in  April 2011 that by developing such a time frame and utilizing the  assessment findings, as appropriate, ICE could strengthen its planning  efforts and be better positioned to hold staff accountable for completing  the assessment. We reported that by establishing such mechanisms, CTCEU  could better ensure that managers have information to assist in making  decisions for strengthening overstay enforcement efforts and assessing  performance against CTCEU’s goals. DHS Has Not Implemented a Reliable Exit System and Faces Reliability Issues with Existing Visa Overstay Data

		DHS Has Not Yet Implemented a Comprehensive Biometric Exit System

DHS has not yet implemented a comprehensive biometric system to  match available information provided by foreign nationals upon their  arrival and departure from the United States. In August 2007, we reported  that while US-VISIT biometric entry capabilities were operating at air, sea,  and land ports of entry, exit capabilities were not, and that DHS did not  have a comprehensive plan or a complete schedule for biometric exit  implementation. DHS conducted two pilots in 2009, and we reported on them in  August 2010. We reported on limitations with the pilots, such as the  reported scope and approach of the pilots including limitations not defined  in the pilot evaluation plan like suspending exit screening at departure  gates to avoid flight delays, that curtailed their ability to inform a decision  for a long-term air exit solution and pointed to the need for additional  sources of information on air exit’s operational impacts. In April 2011, we reported that DHS’s efforts  to identify and report on visa overstays were hindered by unreliable data. Specifically, CBP does not inspect travelers exiting the United States  through land ports of entry, including collecting their biometric information,  and CBP did not provide a standard mechanism for nonimmigrants  departing the United States through land ports of entry to remit their  arrival and departure forms. If the benefits outweigh the costs, a mechanism to provide  nonimmigrants with a way to turn in their arrival and departure forms  could help DHS obtain more complete and reliable departure data for  identifying overstays. As a result, DHS’s methodology counted overstays who left the  country, but did not identify overstays who have not departed the United  States and appear to have no intention of leaving. For example, agency officials stated that they have met  to assess the costs and benefits of creating lookouts for those categories  of overstays. Additional Steps Needed to Address Risks in the Visa Security and Visa Waiver Programs

		Visa Security Program

As we reported in March 2011, the Visa Security Program faces several  key challenges in implementing operations at overseas posts. DHS concurred with our  recommendation and has actions under way to address it. In addition, ICE developed a plan to expand the Visa Security Program to  additional high-risk visa-issuing posts, but ICE had not fully adhered to  the plan or kept it up to date. The  expansion of the Visa Security Program may be limited by a number of  factors—including budget limitations and objections from Department of  State officials at some posts—and ICE had not identified possible  alternatives that would provide the additional security of Visa Security  Program review at those posts that do not have a program presence. Visa Waiver Program

As we reported in May 2011, DHS implemented the Electronic System for  Travel Authorization (ESTA) to meet a statutory requirement intended to  enhance Visa Waiver Program security and took steps to minimize the  burden on travelers to the United States added by the new requirement. However, DHS had not fully evaluated security risks related to the small  percentage of Visa Waiver Program travelers without verified ESTA  approval. According to officials, DHS assesses, among other things,  counterterrorism capabilities and immigration programs. This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the  United States.
Why GAO Did This Study

The attempted bombing of an airline on December 25, 2009, by a Nigerian citizen with a valid U.S. visa renewed concerns about the security of the visa process. Further, unauthorized immigrants who entered the country legally on a temporary basis but then overstayed their authorized periods of admission--overstays--could pose homeland security risks. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has certain responsibilities for security in the visa process and for addressing overstays. DHS staff review visa applications at certain Department of State overseas posts under the Visa Security Program. DHS also manages the Visa Waiver Program through which eligible nationals from certain countries can travel to the United States without a visa. This testimony is based on GAO products issued in November 2009, August 2010, and from March to May 2011. As requested, this testimony addresses the following issues: (1) overstay enforcement efforts, (2) efforts to implement a biometric exit system and challenges with the reliability of overstay data, and (3) challenges in the Visa Security and Visa Waiver programs.

What GAO Found

Federal agencies take actions against a small portion of the estimated overstay population, but strengthening planning and assessment of overstay efforts could improve enforcement. Within DHS, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement's (ICE) Counterterrorism and Criminal Exploitation Unit (CTCEU) is the lead agency responsible for overstay enforcement. CTCEU arrests a small portion of the estimated overstay population in the United States because of, among other things, ICE's competing priorities, but ICE expressed an intention to augment its overstay enforcement resources. From fiscal years 2006 through 2010, ICE reported devoting about 3 percent of its total field office investigative hours to CTCEU overstay investigations. ICE was considering assigning some responsibility for noncriminal overstay enforcement to its Enforcement and Removal Operations directorate, which apprehends and removes aliens subject to removal from the United States. In April 2011, GAO reported that by developing a time frame for assessing needed resources and using the assessment findings, as appropriate, ICE could strengthen its planning efforts. Moreover, in April 2011, GAO reported that CTCEU tracked various performance measures, but did not have a mechanism to assess the outcomes of its efforts. GAO reported that by establishing such a mechanism, CTCEU could better ensure that managers have information to assist in making decisions. DHS has not yet implemented a comprehensive biometric system to match available information (e.g., fingerprints) provided by foreign nationals upon their arrival and departure from the United States and faces reliability issues with data used to identify overstays. GAO reported that while the United States Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology Program's biometric entry capabilities were operating at ports of entry, exit capabilities were not, and DHS did not have a comprehensive plan for biometric exit implementation. DHS conducted pilots to test two scenarios for an air exit solution in 2009, and in August 2010, GAO concluded that the pilots' limitations, such as limitations not defined in the pilot evaluation plan like suspending exit screening at departure gates to avoid flight delays, curtailed DHS's ability to inform a decision for a long-term exit solution. Further, in April 2011, GAO reported that there is not a standard mechanism for nonimmigrants departing the United States through land ports of entry to remit their arrival and departure forms. Such a mechanism could help DHS obtain more complete departure data for identifying overstays. GAO identified various challenges in the Visa Security and Visa Waiver programs related to planning and assessment efforts. For example, in March 2011, GAO found that ICE developed a plan to expand the Visa Security Program to additional high-risk posts, but ICE had not fully adhered to the plan or kept it up to date. Further, ICE had not identified possible alternatives that would provide the additional security of Visa Security Program review at those high-risk posts that do not have a program presence. In addition, DHS implemented the Electronic System for Travel Authorization (ESTA) to meet a statutory requirement intended to enhance Visa Waiver Program security and took steps to minimize the burden on travelers to the United States added by the new requirement. However, DHS had not fully evaluated security risks related to the small percentage of Visa Waiver Program travelers without verified ESTA approval.

What GAO Recommends

GAO has made recommendations in prior reports that, among other things, call for DHS to strengthen management of overstay enforcement efforts, mechanisms for collecting data from foreign nationals departing the United States, and planning for addressing certain Visa Security and Visa Waiver programs' risks. DHS generally concurred with these recommendations and has actions planned or underway to address them.