In 1998, Boeing Reusable Space Systems proposed a propulsion module concept that was to rely heavily on existing shuttle hardware, provide for on-orbit refueling, and cost about $330 million. Basic Project Management and Requirements Principles Not Followed

NASA proceeded with Boeing’s proposal without following fundamental processes involving project planning and execution. Develop realistic cost and schedule estimates for the life of the project. However, other items were unique to the propulsion module project. NASA Reviews Identified Deficiencies in the Propulsion Module Design

NASA proceeded to implement Boeing’s proposal before it determined whether the design would fully meet the project’s technical requirements. Although the assessment team found the Z1 truss option superior, it recommended a follow-on study because issues associated with this option’s integration into the space station were not well understood. NASA Recently Identified Lessons Learned to Apply to Future Programs

NASA acknowledged that problems with the management of the initial propulsion module project contributed to its unsuccessful conclusion, and it is undertaking lessons learned efforts to help avoid similar problems in managing future programs.
Why GAO Did This Study

This report discusses the National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA) contract with Boeing Reusable Space Systems to build the now-canceled follow-on propulsion module for the International Space Station.

What GAO Found

GAO found that the initial propulsion module project did not meet performance, cost, and schedule goals largely because NASA proceeded with Boeing's proposal without following fundamental processes involving project planning and execution. Once it was determined that Boeing's proposal was inadequate, NASA began to assess alternatives to the Boeing-proposed propulsion module. The assessment team defined mission success criteria, identified key design assumptions, and performed comparative analysis on competing designs. On the basis of its analyses, the team recommended a follow-on design. NASA acknowledged that its initial approach to developing a propulsion module was inadequate and contributed to the project's unsuccessful conclusion. NASA officials sought to learn lessons from the project in order to avoid similar problems in managing future programs.