DHS Uses Collaborative Mechanisms to Share Information, Target Resources, and Leverage Assets

DHS has taken a number of actions to coordinate border security efforts  both within CBP and externally with interagency partners using  collaborative mechanisms in Arizona and South Texas in three primary  areas: (1) information sharing, (2) resource targeting and prioritization,  and (3) leveraging of assets. Information sharing. For  example, in Arizona the JFC maintains the Joint Intelligence and  Operations Center, which is an operations coordination center and  clearinghouse for intelligence information. The  ACTT is to act as a “force multiplier,” as interagency partners can  leverage one another’s resources and capabilities to target individuals  and criminal organizations involved in illegal cross-border activity. DHS and CBP, through the JFC, ACTT, and STC,  have leveraged assets of CBP components and interagency partners  through resource sharing or joint operations. DHS Has Established Performance Measures and Reporting Processes for the JFC, ACTT, and STC, but Could Strengthen These Collaborative Mechanisms

		DHS and CBP Have Performance Measures and Reporting Processes in Place for Collaborative Mechanisms in Arizona and South Texas

DHS and CBP have established processes, including objectives and  performance measures, to report on the results of the JFC, ACTT, and  STC, and these reporting processes vary across the mechanisms. Each collaborative mechanism reports on its results to its  leaders, or DHS or CBP leadership, through a variety of means, such as  accomplishment reports and after-action reports, as discussed below. Assessment of Collaborative Mechanisms, Written Agreements, and a Monitoring Mechanism Could Strengthen Integration and Coordination Efforts along the Southwest Border

Opportunities exist to strengthen collaborative mechanisms by conducting  an assessment of results across the mechanisms and establishing written  agreements and a strategic-level mechanism to monitor coordination  efforts. DHS Could Benefit from an Assessment of the JFC and STC Mechanisms

CBP has not assessed the JFC and STC to evaluate results across the  mechanisms to identify any possible areas for improvement. An  assessment of the JFC and STC mechanisms could provide CBP with  information to help better address these challenges. Resource management challenges. Opportunities  also exist for CBP components to share best practices across Arizona  and South Texas. Best  practices for interagency collaboration call for federal agencies engaged  in collaborative efforts to create the means to monitor and evaluate their  efforts to enable them to identify areas for improvement. planning for joint operations. Limited resource commitments by participating agencies. For example, a partner with the ACTT noted that resources  are limited for all partners, and that there have been operations in which  partners did not follow through with the resources they had committed  during the planning stages. Lack of common objectives. For example, as  previously discussed, officials from ACTT and STC Unified Command  partner agencies we interviewed identified challenges associated with  limited partner resource commitments to the collaborative mechanisms. Conclusions

Security threats along the southwest border highlight the importance of  integrated operations and interagency coordination with respect to DHS’s  border security efforts. DHS has established collaborative mechanisms in  Arizona and South Texas to help better integrate CBP components and  facilitate coordination with federal, state, local, tribal, and military  homeland security partners. To strengthen coordination among partner agencies participating in the  ACTT and the STC Unified Command, we recommend that the Secretary  of Homeland Security take the following two actions:  1.  establish written agreements with interagency partners participating in  the ACTT and the STC Unified Command, and  2.  establish a strategic-level mechanism to monitor the interagency  coordination efforts of the ACTT and the STC Unified Command. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

This report (1) describes how the Department of Homeland Security  (DHS) uses collaborative mechanisms in Arizona and South Texas to  coordinate border security efforts, and (2) examines the extent to which  DHS has established performance measures and reporting processes  and how, if at all, DHS has assessed and monitored the effectiveness of  the collaborative mechanisms in Arizona and South Texas. To address these objectives we visited the Joint Field Command (JFC)  and the Alliance to Combat Transnational Threats (ACTT) in Arizona and  the South Texas Campaign (STC) in South Texas and conducted  interviews with officials in U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP)  headquarters.
Why GAO Did This Study

According to DHS's CBP, Arizona and South Texas represent some of the highest-threat areas along the southwest border for illegal entrants and smuggling. DHS and CBP coordinate border security with interagency partners, including other federal, state, local, and tribal entities. DHS established collaborative mechanisms in Arizona and South Texas to integrate CBP operations and improve interagency coordination.
GAO was asked to review DHS efforts to coordinate resources along the southwest border. This report (1) describes how DHS uses collaborative mechanisms in Arizona and South Texas to coordinate border security efforts, and (2) examines the extent to which DHS has established performance measures and reporting processes and how, if at all, DHS has assessed and monitored the effectiveness of the collaborative mechanisms in Arizona and South Texas. GAO analyzed documentation, such as campaign plans for the mechanisms; conducted visits to Arizona and South Texas; and interviewed CBP components and interagency partners selected on the basis of agency type and level of participation in the mechanism. Information from these interviews cannot be generalized to all components and partners, but provided insights into the mechanisms.

What GAO Found

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has coordinated border security efforts using collaborative mechanisms in Arizona and South Texas, specifically (1) the Joint Field Command (JFC), which has operational control over all U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) resources in Arizona; (2) the Alliance to Combat Transnational Threats (ACTT), which is a multiagency law enforcement partnership in Arizona; and (3) the South Texas Campaign (STC), which integrates CBP resources and facilitates coordination with other homeland security partner agencies. Through these collaborative mechanisms, DHS and CBP have coordinated border security efforts in (1) information sharing, (2) resource targeting and prioritization, and (3) leveraging of assets. For example, to coordinate information sharing, the JFC maintains an operations coordination center and clearinghouse for intelligence information. Through the ACTT, interagency partners work jointly to target individuals and criminal organizations involved in illegal cross-border activity. The STC leverages assets of CBP components and interagency partners by shifting resources to high-threat regions and conducting joint operations.
DHS and CBP have established performance measures and reporting processes for the JFC and ACTT in Arizona and the STC in South Texas; however, opportunities exist to strengthen these collaborative mechanisms by assessing results across the efforts and establishing written agreements. Each collaborative mechanism reports on its results to DHS or CBP leadership through a variety of means, such as accomplishment reports and after-action reports. However, CBP has not assessed the JFC and STC mechanisms to evaluate results across the mechanisms. JFC and STC components GAO interviewed identified challenges with managing resources and sharing best practices across the mechanisms. For example, officials from all five JFC components GAO interviewed highlighted resource management challenges, such as inefficiencies in staff conducting dual reporting on operations to CBP leadership. Best practices for interagency collaboration call for federal agencies engaged in collaborative efforts to create the means to monitor and evaluate their efforts to enable them to identify areas for improvement. An assessment of the JFC and STC could provide CBP with information to better address challenges the mechanisms have faced. In addition, DHS has not established written agreements with partners in the ACTT and STC Unified Command—the entity within STC used for coordinating activities among federal and state agencies—consistent with best practices for sustaining effective collaboration. Officials from 11 of 12 partner agencies GAO interviewed reported coordination challenges related to the ACTT and STC Unified Command, such as limited resource commitments by participating agencies and lack of common objectives. For example, a partner with the ACTT noted that that there have been operations in which partners did not follow through with the resources they had committed during the planning stages. Establishing written agreements could help DHS address coordination challenges, such as limited resource commitments and lack of common objectives.

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that CBP assess the JFC and STC, and that DHS, among other things, establish written agreements with ACTT and the STC Unified Command partners. DHS concurred with the recommendations.