	SBInet Program Challenges, Management Weaknesses, and Cost, Schedule, and Performance Risks Exist

Since the inception of SBInet, we have reported on a range of issues  regarding program design and implementation. For example, in October  2007, we testified that DHS had made some progress in implementing  Project 28—the first segment of SBInet technology across the southwest  border—but had fallen behind its planned schedule. In our September 2008  testimony, we reported that CBP had initially planned to deploy SBInet  technology along the southwest border by the end of 2008, but as of  February 2008, this date had slipped to 2011 and that SBInet would have  fewer capabilities than originally planned. As of April 2010, SBInet’s promised technology capabilities  are still not operational and delays continue to require Border Patrol to  rely on existing technology for securing the border, rather than using the  newer SBInet technology planned to overcome the existing technology’s  limitations. Limitations in the system’s ability to function as intended as well as  concerns about the impact of placing towers and access roads in  environmentally sensitive locations have contributed to these delays. As of January 2010, program officials  stated that the program was working to address system limitations, such  as modifications to the radar. These  recommendations included one regarding the need for future expenditure  plans to include explicit and measurable commitments relative to the  capabilities, schedule, costs, and benefits associated with individual SBI  program activities. DHS concurred with this recommendation and  implemented it as part of the fiscal year 2009 expenditure plan. In  reviewing the fiscal year 2008 and 2009 expenditure plans, we have  reported that, although the plans improved from year to year, providing  more detail and higher quality information than the year before; the plans  did not fully satisfy all the conditions set out by law. In  particular, we reported in September 2008 that important aspects of  SBInet were ambiguous and in a continued state of flux, making it unclear  and uncertain what technological capabilities were to be delivered and  when. We also reported at this time that the  number of new system defects identified over a 17 month period while  testing was underway was generally increasing faster than the number of  defects being fixed—a trend that is not indicative of a maturing system  that is ready for acceptance and deployment. Accordingly, we made additional recommendations and DHS largely  agreed with them and has efforts underway to address them. Although we plan to report on the results of this  review later this month, we briefed DHS on our findings in December  2009, and provided DHS with a draft of this report, including conclusions  and recommendations in March 2010. In light of program shortcomings, continued delays, questions surrounding  SBInet’s viability, and the program’s high cost vis-à-vis other alternatives,  in January 2010, the Secretary of Homeland Security ordered a department  assessment of the SBI program. SBI Has Completed Deploying Most of Its Planned Tactical Infrastructure and Has Begun Efforts to Measure Its Impact on Border Security

In addition to monitoring SBInet implementation, we also reported on the  tactical infrastructure component of the SBI program. CBP reported that tactical infrastructure, coupled with additional trained  agents, had increased the miles of the southwest border under control, but  despite a $2.6 billion investment, it cannot account separately for the  impact of tactical infrastructure. In our September 2009  report, we recommended that to improve the quality of information  available to allocate resources and determine tactical infrastructure’s  contribution to effective control of the border, the Commissioner of CBP  conduct a cost-effective evaluation of the impact of tactical infrastructure  on effective control of the border. DHS concurred with our recommendation and described actions recently  completed, underway, and planned that it said will address our  recommendation. In April 2010, SBI officials told us that the Homeland  Security Institute was conducting an analysis of the impact of tactical  infrastructure on border security. U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s Secure Border Initiative Fiscal  Year 2009 Expenditure Plan. Department of Homeland Security: Better Planning and Assessment  Needed to Improve Outcomes for Complex Service Acquisitions  GAO-08-263.
Why GAO Did This Study

Securing the nation's borders from illegal entry of aliens and contraband, including terrorists and weapons of mass destruction, continues to be a major challenge. In November 2005, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) announced the launch of the Secure Border Initiative (SBI)--a multiyear, multibillion dollar program aimed at securing U.S. borders and reducing illegal immigration. Within DHS, the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) provides agents and officers to support SBI. As requested, this statement summarizes (1) the findings and recommendations of GAO's reports on SBI's technology, known as SBInet (including such things as cameras and radars), and DHS's recent actions on SBInet; and (2) the findings and recommendations of GAO's reports on tactical infrastructure, such as fencing, and the extent to which CBP has deployed tactical infrastructure and assessed its operational impact. This statement is based on products issued from 2007 through 2010, with selected updates as of April 2010. To conduct these updates, GAO reviewed program schedules, status reports and funding and interviewed DHS officials.

What GAO Found

Since the inception of SBInet, GAO has reported on a range of issues regarding design and implementation, including program challenges, management weaknesses, and cost, schedule, and performance risks; DHS has largely concurred with GAO's recommendations and has started to take some action to address them. For example, in October 2007, GAO testified that the project involving the first segment of SBInet technology across the southwest border had fallen behind its planned schedule. In a September 2008 testimony, GAO reported that CBP plans to initially deploy SBInet technology along the southwest border had slipped from the end of 2008 to 2011 and that SBInet would have fewer capabilities than originally planned. As of April 2010, SBInet's promised capabilities were still not operational. Limitations in the system's ability to function have contributed to delays. GAO has also reviewed CBP expenditure plans and found a lack of specificity on such things as planned activities and milestones. GAO made recommendations, including the need for future expenditure plans to include explicit and measurable commitments relative to the capabilities, schedule, costs, and benefits associated with individual SBI program activities. While DHS has concurred with GAO's recommendations, and its expenditure plans have improved from year to year in detail and quality, the plans, including the one for fiscal year 2009, did not fully satisfy the conditions set out by law. Further, in September 2008, GAO made recommendations to address SBInet technological capabilities that were ambiguous or in a state of flux. DHS generally concurred with them. In January 2010, GAO reported that the number of new system defects identified over an 17 month period while testing was underway was generally increasing faster than the number of defects being fixed, not indicative of a maturing system. Given the program's shortcomings, in January 2010, the Secretary of Homeland Security ordered an assessment of the program, and in March 2010, the Secretary froze a portion of the program's fiscal year 2010 funding. GAO plans to report in May 2010 on the SBInet solution and the status of its September 2008 recommendations. CBP has completed deploying most of its planned tactical infrastructure and has begun efforts to measure its impact on border security, in response to a GAO recommendation. As of April 2010, CBP had completed 646 of the 652 miles of fencing it committed to deploy along the southwest border. CBP plans to have the remaining 6 miles of this baseline completed by December 2010. CBP reported that tactical infrastructure, coupled with additional trained agents, had increased the miles of the southwest border under control, but despite a $2.6 billion investment, it cannot account separately for the impact of tactical infrastructure. In a September 2009 report, GAO recommended that to improve the quality of information available to allocate resources and determine tactical infrastructure's contribution to effective control of the border, the Commissioner of CBP conduct a cost-effective evaluation of the impact of tactical infrastructure. DHS concurred with our recommendation and, in April 2010, told GAO that the Homeland Security Institute had undertaken this analysis.