	The National Energy Policy Report Was the Product of a Centralized, Top-Down Process

The National Energy Policy report was the product of a short-term, labor- intensive process that involved the efforts of several hundred federal  employees governmentwide. In the 3½ months between NEPDG’s inception  and its presentation of the final report, the Principals and Support Group  controlled most facets of the report’s development, including setting  meeting schedules and agendas, controlling the workflow, distributing  work assignments, rewriting chapters, approving recommendations, and  securing the report’s contents from premature disclosure. Senior agency  officials served on a select interagency Working Group, while the majority  of staff working on the NEPDG effort played a tributary role, (1) helping  their agency fulfill its NEPDG-related obligations, (2) providing NEPDG  with analytical information, and (3) responding to the Support Group’s  subsequent requests for information, review, or comment. In developing  the National Energy Policy report, the NEPDG Principals, Support Group,  and participating agency staff also met with, solicited input from, or  received information and advice from nonfederal energy stakeholders,  primarily petroleum, coal, nuclear, natural gas, electricity industry  representatives and lobbyists. NEPDG met and conducted its work  in two distinct phases: the first phase culminated in a March 19, 2001,  briefing on challenges relating to energy supply and the resulting economic  impact; the second phase ended with a May 16, 2001, presentation of the  final report to the President. Cabinet-Level Officials and Support Group Staff Controlled the Report Development Process

In a January 29, 2001, memorandum, the President established NEPDG— comprised of the Vice President, nine cabinet-level officials, and four other  senior administration officials—to gather information, deliberate, and  make recommendations to the President by the end of fiscal year 2001. NEPDG Principals

The 14 NEPDG members—the Vice President, 9 Cabinet-level officials, and  4 other senior administration officials—were responsible for developing  the National Energy Policy report. In a series of formal meetings convened  by the Vice President, the group presented briefings, received assignments  and the latest drafts, and discussed agenda items and recommendations. The following list shows the NEPDG members. The extent to which submissions from any of  these stakeholders were solicited, influenced policy deliberations, or were  incorporated into the final report is not something that we can determine  based on the limited information at our disposal. Federal Agencies Did Not Track the Amount of Public Money Spent on NEPDG Activities

None of the key federal entities involved in the NEPDG effort provided us  with a complete accounting of the costs they incurred during the  development of the National Energy Policy report. Several agencies  provided us with rough estimates of their respective NEPDG-related costs;  but these estimates, all calculated in different ways, were not  comprehensive. The two federal entities responsible for funding the  NEPDG effort—OVP and DOE—did not provide us with the comprehensive  cost information we requested. OVP provided us with 77 pages of  information, two-thirds of which contained no cost information, while the  remaining one-third contained miscellaneous information of little to no  usefulness. In response to our requests seeking clarification on the  provided information, OVP stated that it would not provide any additional  information. DOE was to “make funds  appropriated to the Department of Energy available to pay the costs of  personnel to support the activities of the Energy Policy Development  Group.” The memorandum further stated that if DOE required additional  funds, the Vice President was to submit a proposal to the President to use  “the minimum necessary portion of any appropriation available to the  President to meet the unanticipated need” or obtain assistance from the  National Economic Council staff. Agency Comments

We provided DOE, Interior, and EPA with an opportunity to review and  comment on a draft of this report. Representatives from each of these three  agencies reviewed the report and chose not to provide written comments.
Why GAO Did This Study

On January 29, 2001, the President established the National Energy Policy Development Group (NEPDG)--a group of cabinet-level and other senior administration officials, chaired by the Vice President--to gather information, deliberate, and recommend a national energy policy. The group presented its final report to the President in May 2001. GAO was asked to (1) describe the process used by the NEPDG to develop the National Energy Policy report, including whom the group met with and what topics were discussed and (2) determine the costs associated with that process. Although appointed NEPDG Chair, the Vice President elected not to respond to GAO's request for certain factual NEPDG information. Accordingly, as authorized by GAO's access-torecords statute, and after exhausting efforts to achieve a resolution and following the processes specified in that statute, GAO filed suit in U.S. District Court to obtain the information. The district court later dismissed GAO's suit on jurisdictional grounds, without reaching the merits of GAO's right to audit and evaluate NEPDG activities or to obtain access to NEPDG records. For a variety of reasons, GAO decided not to appeal the district court decision. DOE, Interior, and EPA reviewed the draft report and chose not to comment. OVP declined an offer to review the draft and comment.

What GAO Found

According to the best information that GAO could obtain, the National Energy Policy report was the product of a centralized, top-down, short-term, and labor-intensive process that involved the efforts of several hundred federal employees governmentwide. In the 3 = months between the inception of NEPDG and its presentation of the final report, the Principals (the Vice President, selected cabinet-level and other senior administration officials) and their support staff (Support Group) controlled most facets of the report's development, including setting meeting schedules and agendas, controlling the workflow, distributing work assignments, rewriting chapters, and approving recommendations. Senior agency officials served on a select interagency Working Group, while the majority of agency staff working on the NEPDG effort played a tributary role, helping their agencies fulfill their NEPDG-related obligations and responding to the Support Group's subsequent requests for information, review, or comment. In developing the National Energy Policy report, the NEPDG Principals, Support Group, and participating agency officials and staff met with, solicited input from, or received information and advice from nonfederal energy stakeholders, principally petroleum, coal, nuclear, natural gas, and electricity industry representatives and lobbyists. The extent to which submissions from any of these stakeholders were solicited, influenced policy deliberations, or were incorporated into the final report cannot be determined based on the limited information made available to GAO. NEPDG met and conducted its work in two distinct phases: the first phase culminated in a March 19, 2001, briefing to the President on challenges relating to energy supply and the resulting economic impact; the second phase ended with the May 16, 2001, presentation of the final report to the President. The Office of the Vice President's (OVP) unwillingness to provide the NEPDG records or other related information precluded GAO from fully achieving its objectives and substantially limited GAO's ability to comprehensively analyze the NEPDG process. None of the key federal entities involved in the NEPDG effort provided GAO with a complete accounting of the costs that they incurred during the development of the National Energy Policy report. The two federal entities responsible for funding the NEPDG effort--OVP and the Department of Energy (DOE)--did not provide the comprehensive cost information that GAO requested. OVP provided GAO with 77 pages of information, two-thirds of which contained no cost information while the remaining one-third contained some miscellaneous information of little to no usefulness. OVP stated that it would not provide any additional information. DOE, the Department of the Interior, and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) provided GAO with estimates of certain costs and salaries associated with the NEPDG effort, but these estimates, all calculated in different ways, were not comprehensive.