In February 2007, we reported on the process that DOD and DOE have  established for fulfilling the annual assessment of the safety, performance,  and reliability of the nation’s nuclear stockpile.STRATCOM Commander’s annual assessment of the nuclear stockpile is  based primarily on the advice of a technical advisory group and provides an  operational perspective; (2) the technical advisory group holds an annual  conference where each entity involved in managing the stockpile—national  laboratories, Project Officer Groups, NNSA, and DOD—present briefings to  provide a complete perspective on the various issues affecting the stockpile;  and (3) the laboratory director’s annual assessment is derived primarily from  ongoing activities associated with NNSA’s Stockpile Stewardship Program,  such as the results of weapon system and component level tests conducted   We found that (1) the  by NNSA’s stockpile surveillance program as well as data that provides an  assessment of a weapon’s current reliability. Action Being Taken to Address Limitations of U.S. Nuclear Weapons

For all U.S. nuclear weapons in the current nuclear stockpile, NNSA  identified 52 weapon limitations, and of these, the majority fall into six  types. Furthermore, the national laboratories identified four existing weapon  limitations (8 percent of all limitations) that are no longer valid—because,  among other things, corrective action to address the limitation is  complete—while some limitations will remain in effect until DOD changes  potentially outdated military requirements. Eighty-six percent of these limitations fall into 6 types: detonation safety  under abnormal conditions, weapon reliability, weapon delivery, more  frequent replacement of limited life components, nuclear yield, and worker  safety. However, some DOD officials expressed  concerns to us over the impact of a few weapon limitations, such as  increased maintenance costs or additional issues to consider when  developing war plans. For most limitations about which they raised  concerns, DOD officials told us that current DOD mitigation actions, as well  as the successful completion of ongoing and planned NNSA efforts, should  address these concerns. DOD officials stated that the current stockpile  allows sufficient flexibility to mitigate limitations. However, they told us there  may be less flexibility in the future as the stockpile continues to age and  decreases in size. NNSA Has Not Developed a Corrective Action Plan to Improve the Nuclear Stockpile Surveillance Program

NNSA has begun to implement some of the recommendations from its  draft October 2010 management review of the nuclear stockpile  surveillance program, but NNSA has not developed a formal corrective  action plan to guide its multiple actions. Actions NNSA has taken to  implement the recommendations include the following:
The creation of a Senior Technical Advisor for Surveillance (senior  advisor) position. This position was created in response to the  review’s recommendation to establish strong NNSA leadership for the  surveillance program. According to an OMB circular that defines  management’s responsibility for internal control in federal agencies,  federal managers are to develop a corrective action plan to address  weaknesses found in program operations, as identified through  management reviews, inspector general and GAO reports, program  evaluations, and financial statement audits. Corrective action plans are  to include specific dates, assigned responsibilities, and metrics to  measure progress to resolve the findings of audits and reviews. According to the acting senior  advisor, NNSA did not address many of the findings and  recommendations in its three previous surveillance program management  reviews primarily because the agency did not have a specific approach  for implementation. Without such a plan, it is unclear how NNSA will (1)  ensure that the draft review’s recommendations are fully implemented  and (2) demonstrate to key stakeholders, such as Congress and DOD,  that NNSA is committed to improving the surveillance program. With most weapons currently in the  stockpile having been produced over 20 years ago and being sustained  beyond their original design lifetimes, it is a testament to NNSA, the  national laboratories, and the production plants that DOD officials were  confident that nuclear weapon limitations do not currently reduce the  effectiveness of the nation’s strategic deterrent. However, several factors  raise concerns with the limitations and NNSA’s management of them. Second, NNSA guidance on limitations does not always clearly  communicate to DOD the potential impacts that limitations have on  nuclear weapon operations, maintenance, and war planning and does not  include all identified limitations; it is uncertain if the risks associated with  limitations are comprehensively identified and analyzed. Recommendations for Executive Action

To improve the processes used to test and report on the nation’s nuclear  weapons stockpile, we are making four recommendations to the  Secretaries of Defense and of Energy and the Administrator of the  National Nuclear Security Administration, as appropriate:
To improve the clarity of information NNSA provides to DOD about  nuclear weapon limitations, we recommend that the Secretary of  Energy and the Administrator of the National Nuclear Security  Administration, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense, (1)  expand the guidance provided by NNSA to DOD so that it includes  each existing limitation and (2) assess, and revise as appropriate, the  guidance provided by NNSA to DOD to ensure it clearly describes the  potential impacts that each limitation may have on nuclear weapon  operations, maintenance, and war planning. A-123.
Why GAO Did This Study

Most weapons in the U.S. nuclear stockpile were produced over 20 years ago and are being sustained beyond original design lifetimes. It is critical to ensure that these weapons are safe, secure, and reliable to perform as the nations nuclear deterrent. The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), a semiautonomous agency within the Department of Energy, is responsible for the nations nuclear weapons program. NNSA identifies nuclear weapon limitationsareas where military requirements may not be metand conducts nonnuclear tests to evaluate the condition and reliability of weapons through its nuclear stockpile surveillance program. GAO was asked to determine the (1) number and types of such limitations and any concerns raised by Department of Defense (DOD) officials, and (2) actions NNSA has taken to implement its prior recommendations for the nuclear stockpile surveillance program. GAO reviewed agency documents, analyzed limitations, and interviewed key NNSA and DOD officials.

What GAO Found

For the 52 NNSA identified limitations for all weapons in the U.S. nuclear stockpile, 86 percent fall into six types: detonation safety under abnormal conditions, weapon reliability, weapon delivery, more frequent replacement of limited life components, nuclear yield, and worker safety. Some DOD officials expressed concern over the impact that certain weapon limitations have on weapon operation, maintenance, and war planning. According to DOD officials, current DOD mitigation actions, as well as the successful completion of ongoing and planned NNSA efforts, should address most limitations for which the officials raised concerns. DOD officials stated that the current stockpile allows sufficient flexibility to mitigate limitations. However, they told GAO that there may be less flexibility in the future as the stockpile continues to age and decreases in size. For each weapon system, NNSA provides DOD with guidance containing additional information on nuclear weapon limitations. However, GAO found that this guidance does not cover all limitations and some DOD officials said that it may not provide them with relevant information for some limitations. Specifically, the guidance addresses approximately 60 percent of all limitations but does not include limitations based on certain weapon components. In addition, one senior DOD official stated that the guidance did not help clarify the potential impact that a particular limitation may have on weapon operation and maintenance. The applicable military service is now conducting its own analysis of this limitations potential impact. Furthermore, the national laboratories identified four existing weapon limitations (8 percent of all limitations) that are no longer valid because, among other reasons, corrective action to address the limitations is complete. In addition, it is uncertain if an ongoing DOD and NNSA review of nuclear weapon military requirements will be used to eliminate limitations based on potentially outdated military requirements.
NNSA has begun to implement some recommendations from the agencys draft October 2010 management review of the nuclear stockpile surveillance program but has not developed a corrective action plan to guide its multiple actions. For example, NNSA (1) created and staffed the position of Senior Technical Advisor for Surveillance in response to the reviews recommendation to establish strong NNSA leadership and (2) established a formal process for setting surveillance testing requirements. National laboratory and DOD officials GAO interviewed generally viewed NNSAs actions as positive steps to improve the program. However, NNSA has not developed a corrective action plan, as called for by Office of Management and Budget Circular No. A-123. According to this circular on management controls, federal managers are to develop a corrective action plan to address program operations weaknesses identified through management reviews, among other things. Such plans are to include specific dates, assigned responsibilities, and metrics to measure progress and hold management accountable. According to a senior level NNSA official, the agency did not implement many of the recommendations from three prior surveillance program management reviews primarily because there was no specific approach for implementation. Without a corrective action plan, it is unclear how NNSA will (1) ensure that the draft October 2010 management reviews recommendations are fully implemented and (2) demonstrate to key stakeholders, such as Congress and DOD, that NNSA is committed to improving the surveillance program.

What GAO Recommends

Among other things, GAO recommends that NNSA, in appropriate collaboration with DOD, expand guidance on weapon limitations to include all limitations, revise this guidance to clearly describe the limitations potential impacts, and develop a corrective action plan for implementing surveillance program recommendations. NNSA generally agreed with GAOs recommendations and outlined planned actions to address them. DOD agreed with GAOs recommendations.