	Background

DOD plays a support role in CBRNE consequence management, including  providing those capabilities needed to save lives, alleviate hardship or  suffering, and minimize property damage caused by the incident. The federal government  provides assistance to states if they require additional capabilities and  request assistance. DOD CBRNE Consequence Management Plans and Integration with Other Federal Plans

DOD has operational plans for CBRNE consequence management. However, DOD has not integrated its plans with other federal government  plans, because the concept and strategic plans associated with the  Integrated Planning System mandated by Presidential directive in  December 2007 have not been completed. DOD Has Developed Plans for CBRNE Consequence Management

Unlike most federal agencies, DOD has had CBRNE consequence  management operational plans for over 10 years. DOD’s plans and those of other federal and state entities cannot be fully  integrated until the supporting strategic and concept plans are completed. However, its ability to respond effectively may be  compromised because (1) its planned response times may not meet the  requirements of a particular incident, (2) it may lack sufficient capacity in  some key capabilities, and (3) it faces challenges in adhering to its strategy  for sourcing the CCMRFs with available units. These challenges to sourcing the CCMRF increase the  risk that DOD’s ability to effectively respond to one or more major  domestic CBRNE incidents will be compromised. That risk can be  mitigated by plans that integrate the active and reserve component  portions of the CCMRF and agreements between DOD and the states on  the availability of National Guard units and the duty status under which  they would respond to a major incident requiring federal forces. DOD Actions on CCMRF Readiness and Training and the Impact of Current Deployments

DOD has taken a number of actions in the past year to improve the  readiness of its CCMRF units. However, our ongoing work shows that the  CCMRF may be limited in its ability to successfully conduct consequence  management operations because (1) it does not conduct realistic full force  field training to confirm units’ readiness to assume the mission or to  deploy rapidly, and (2) conflicting priorities between the CCMRF mission  and overseas deployments impact some units’ mission preparation and  unit cohesion. Therefore, for the first time, identified units  are conducting individual and collective training focused on the CCMRF  mission. While DOD has identified  CCMRF as a high priority mission, competing demands associated with  follow-on missions may distract from a unit’s focus on the domestic  mission. These training and force  rotation issues have prevented DOD from providing the kind of stability to  the force that would allow units to build cohesiveness. CCMRF Requirements Development, Funding, and Oversight

DOD is making progress in identifying and providing funding and  equipment to meet CCMRF mission requirements; however, its efforts to  identify total program requirements have not been completed, and its  approach to providing program funding has been fragmented, because  funding responsibilities for CCMRF-related costs are dispersed throughout  DOD and are not subject to central oversight. Extent of Dedicated Funds for Some CCMRF Training Impacts Mission

In the spring of 2008, sourcing priority for the CCMRF mission increased  substantially within the department, and funding was provided for specific  aspects of the mission. This, in turn, puts units at risk of not being fully prepared  if they are needed to respond to an incident. Because DOD has  assigned funding responsibilities across the department and because much  of the funding for the CCMRF is coming from existing operations and  maintenance accounts, DOD lacks visibility across the department over  the total funding requirements for this mission. Without an overarching  approach to developing requirements and providing funding, and a  centralized focal point to ensure that all requirements have been identified  and fully funded, DOD’s ability to carry out this high-priority homeland  security mission in an efficient and effective manner is at risk. We plan to provide this subcommittee and our other congressional  requesters with our final report on DOD’s CBRNE consequence  management efforts in September 2009.
Why GAO Did This Study

DOD plays a support role in managing Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosives (CBRNE) incidents, including providing capabilities needed to save lives, alleviate hardship or suffering, and minimize property damage. This testimony addresses GAO's preliminary observations on DOD's role in CBRNE consequence management efforts and addresses the extent to which (1) DOD's plans and capabilities are integrated with other federal government plans, (2) DOD has planned for and structured its force to provide CBRNE consequence management assistance, (3) DOD's CBRNE Consequence Management Response Forces (CCMRF) are prepared to perform their mission; and (4) DOD has funding plans for the CCMRF that are linked to requirements for specialized CBRNE capabilities. GAO reviewed DOD's plans for CBRNE consequence management and documents from the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Federal Emergency Management Agency. GAO also met with officials from the Undersecretary of Defense for Homeland Defense, U.S Northern Command, U.S. Army Forces Command, U.S. Army North, the National Guard Bureau, and some CCMRF units.

What GAO Found

DOD has its own CBRNE consequence management plans but has not integrated them with other federal government plans because all elements of the Integrated Planning System mandated by Presidential directive in December 2007 have not been completed. The system is to develop and link planning documents at the federal, state, and local levels. While the system's framework is established, the CBRNE concept and strategic plans that provide further guidance are incomplete. DOD has had operational plans in place and revises these plans regularly. However, until the Integrated Planning System and its associated plans are complete, DOD's plans and those of other federal and state entities will not be integrated, and it will remain unclear whether DOD's CCMRF will address potential gaps in capabilities. With a goal to respond to multiple, near-simultaneous, catastrophic CBRNE incidents, DOD has plans to provide the needed capabilities, but its planned response times may not meet incident requirements, it may lack sufficient capacity in some capabilities, and it faces challenges to its strategy for sourcing all three CCMRFs with available units. Without assigned units and plans that integrate the active and reserve portions of the CCMRF, and agreements between DOD and the states on the availability of National Guard units and the duty status in which they would respond to an incident requiring federal forces, DOD's ability to train and deploy forces in a timely manner to assist civil authorities to respond to multiple CBRNE incidents is at risk. DOD has taken a number of actions in the past year to improve the readiness of units assigned to the CCMRF, increasing both individual and collective training focused on the mission and identifying the mission as high priority. However, the CCMRF has not conducted realistic full force field training to confirm units' readiness to assume the mission or to deploy rapidly. Competing demands of overseas missions may distract from a unit's focus on the domestic mission, and some CCMRF units rotate more frequently than stated goals. These training and force rotation problems have prevented DOD from providing the kind of stability to the force that would allow units to build cohesiveness. DOD is making progress in identifying and providing funding and equipment to meet CCMRF mission requirements; however, its efforts to identify total program requirements have not been completed, and funding responsibilities have been assigned across the department and are not subject to central oversight. When the CCMRF mission priority increased in the spring of 2008, more funding was provided. However, units did not have dedicated funding and thus purchased equipment with existing funding which is also used for other missions. DOD lacks visibility over the mission's total funding requirements. Without an overarching approach to developing requirements and providing funding and a centralized focal point to ensure that all requirements have been identified and funded, DOD's ability to ensure that its forces are prepared to carry out this high priority mission remains challenged.