The Army and the Air Force Face Challenges Ensuring that Their UAS Pilots Complete Their Required Training

		Most Army UAS Pilots Are Not Completing All of Their Unit Training, and the Army Does Not Have Visibility over Whether UAS Pilots in Units Have Completed Training

			Most Army UAS Pilots Are Not Completing Continuation Training

A March 2015 Army review showed that pilots in most Army Shadow  units did not complete training in their units in fiscal year 2014, which we  corroborated through both discussions with pilots in our focus groups and  unit responses to our questionnaires. Similarly, focus groups we conducted with Army UAS pilots and  responses to questionnaires we administered indicated that Army UAS  pilots face challenges to complete training in units. We found that a nongeneralizable sample of training records for seven Air  Force UAS units showed that, on average, 35 percent of the pilots in  these units completed the continuation training for all of their seven  required missions in fiscal year 2014. In  particular, we found that the Air Force had operated below its optimum  crew ratio, which is a metric used to determine the personnel needs for  Air Force aviation units, and that the Air Force had not tailored its  recruiting and retention strategy to align with the specific needs and  challenges of UAS pilots. We made four recommendations related to  these findings including that the Air Force update crew ratios for UAS  units to help ensure that the Air Force establishes a more accurate  understanding of the required number of UAS pilots needed in its units  and that the Air Force develop a recruiting and retention strategy that is  tailored to the specific needs and challenges of UAS pilots to help ensure  that the Air Force can meet and retain required staffing levels to meet its  mission. The Air Force concurred with these recommendations and has taken  some actions but has not yet fully implemented them. Specifically, a  headquarters Air Force official stated that, in February 2015, the Air Force  completed the first phase of a three-phase personnel requirements study  designed to update the UAS unit crew ratio. The Army and the Air Force Have Taken Actions to Increase the Number of Instructors in UAS Units, but the Army Has Not Fully Addressed Potential Risks that Could Hinder the Success of Its UAS Pilot Training

		The Army Has Taken Action to Increase the Number of Instructors, but Its Use of Less Experienced Instructors Could Affect the Quality of UAS Pilot Training

The Army has taken action to increase the number of UAS pilot  instructors, but in doing so, it is using less experienced instructors, which  could affect the quality of the training provided to UAS pilots. The Army waived the instructor course  prerequisites for about 40 percent of the UAS pilots attending the course  from the beginning of fiscal year 2013 through February 2015. The Army has taken some steps to mitigate the potential risks of using  less proficient instructors. Although the Army  reduced the number of waivers granted so far in fiscal year 2015 by no  longer waiving the course prerequisites related to minimum proficiency,  the Army can continue to grant waivers for the course prerequisites  related to experience, including that UAS pilots have a minimum number  of flying hours in a UAS and hold the minimum enlisted rank of sergeant. However, we found that as of March 2015, the  Air Force staffed its UAS training squadrons at Holloman Air Force Base  at 63 percent of their planned staffing levels. In December 2014, the  commanding general of Air Combat Command stated that the Air Force  has not fully staffed the formal training unit due to shortages of UAS pilots  across the Air Force and as a result “pilot production has been  decimated.” An Air Force headquarters official stated that shortages of  instructors at the formal training unit are a key reason that the Air Force  has shortages of UAS pilots across the Air Force. Specifically, the Air Force is studying the  personnel requirements for the formal training unit, and expects the Air  Force to report the results of this study by spring 2016. Conclusions

DOD’s UAS portfolio has grown over the years to rival the traditional  manned systems. To help ensure that Army UAS pilots receive the highest caliber of  training to prepare them to successfully accomplish UAS missions, we  recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the  Army to take additional steps to mitigate potential risks posed by its  waiver of course prerequisites for less experienced UAS pilots  attending the course to become instructors, such as by providing  additional preparation for current and future instructors who do not  meet one or more course prerequisites to enhance their ability to  successfully provide training. In written  comments, DOD concurred with each of our three recommendations. We determined that these data  were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report, such as the  discussion of the percentage of Army UAS pilots that required a waiver to  become a UAS instructor by fiscal year; the overall staffing levels of Air  Force UAS pilots; the staffing levels of Air Force UAS instructor pilots at  the formal training unit; and the completion of continuation training by a  nongeneralizeable sample of seven UAS units at Creech Air Force Base. The results of  this review are not generalizable. We also conducted 18 focus groups with active-duty UAS pilots at these  locations to gain their perspectives on their services’ UAS training efforts.
Why GAO Did This Study

The Department of Defense's (DOD) UAS portfolio has grown over the years to rival traditional manned systems, and, as of July 2013, DOD had acquired over 10,000 UAS, according to a 2013 DOD report. Training DOD UAS pilots, most of whom are in the Army or the Air Force, is an integral part of DOD's strategy to accomplish its mission. Senate Report 113-176 included a provision that GAO review DOD's efforts to train UAS pilots.
This report examines, among other things, the extent to which the Army and the Air Force (1) face challenges ensuring that their UAS pilots complete required training and (2) have taken steps to ensure they have sufficient numbers of UAS instructors. GAO analyzed DOD guidance on training UAS pilots, distributed a questionnaire to Army and Air Force headquarters and units, examined nongeneralizeable training records of seven Air Force UAS units selected because they have the same mission requirements, and interviewed DOD officials. GAO also conducted 18 focus groups with active duty UAS pilots who were selected based on rank and other factors. The results of the questionnaire and focus groups are not generalizable.

What GAO Found

The Army and the Air Force face challenges ensuring that the pilots who remotely operate their unmanned aerial systems (UAS) complete their required training. Specifically, a March 2015 Army review showed that most pilots in certain Army units did not complete fundamental training tasks in fiscal year 2014—a finding that GAO corroborated through discussions with pilots in focus groups and unit responses to questionnaires. In addition, Army unit status reports do not require UAS pilot training information, and as a result, the Army does not know the full extent to which pilots have been trained and are therefore ready to be deployed. In addition, Air Force training records from a nongeneralizeable sample of seven UAS units showed that, on average, 35 percent of the pilots in these units completed the training for all of their required missions. Pilots in all of the seven focus groups GAO conducted with Air Force UAS pilots stated that they could not conduct training in units because their units had shortages of UAS pilots.GAO found similar shortages of UAS pilots in April 2014 and in particular, GAO found that the Air Force operated below its crew ratio, which is a metric used to determine the number of pilots needed in units. At that time, GAO made four recommendations including that the Air Force update its update crew ratio. The Air Force concurred with these recommendations and has taken actions, or has actions underway. For example, an Air Force Headquarters official stated that, in February 2015, the Air Force completed the first phase of a three-phase personnel requirements study on the crew ratio and expects to update the crew ratio in 2015. However, at this time, the Air Force has not fully implemented any of the recommendations.
The Army and the Air Force are taking actions to increase the number of UAS instructors, but the Army has not fully addressed the risks associated with using less experienced instructors and the Air Force faces instructor shortages. In order to increase the number of its instructors in response to an increase in the number of UAS units, the Army waived course prerequisites for about 40 percent of the UAS pilots attending the course to become instructor pilots from the beginning of fiscal year 2013 through February 2015.The Army originally established these prerequisites—such as a minimum number of flight hours—for UAS pilots volunteering to become instructors to help ensure that instructors were fully trained and ready to instruct UAS pilots. The Army has taken some steps to mitigate the potential risks of using less proficient UAS instructors. For example, beginning in fiscal year 2015, the Army no longer grants waivers for course prerequisites related to proficiency. However, the Army can continue to grant waivers for additional course prerequisites related to experience. As a result, the Army risks that its UAS pilots may not be receiving the highest caliber of training needed to prepare them to successfully perform UAS missions. Furthermore, as of March 2015, the Air Force had staffed its UAS training squadrons at Holloman Air Force Base at 63 percent of its planned staffing levels. This shortage is a key reason that the Air Force has shortages of UAS pilots across the Air Force, according to an Air Force headquarters official. The Air Force is studying the personnel requirements for its school and expects to report the results of this study by spring 2016.

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends, among other things, that the Army require unit status reports to include information on the readiness levels of UAS pilots; and the Army take additional steps to mitigate potential risks posed by its waiver of course prerequisites related to experience for pilots attending the course to become instructors. DOD concurred with each of GAO's recommendations.