When a visitor arrives at a U.S. POE, the  biometric information is used to verify that the visitor is the person  who was issued the visa or other travel documents. However, after almost 4 years and  more than $1 billion, DHS has implemented entry capabilities at  most POEs but has not implemented exit capabilities. For example, on January 5, 2004, it  deployed and began operating most aspects of its planned biometric  entry capability at 115 airports and 14 seaports for selected foreign  nationals, including those from visa waiver countries; as of  December 2006, the program office had deployed and began  operating this entry capability in the secondary inspection areas of  154 of 170 land POEs. In 2003, the program office estimated that  it would cost approximately $3 billion to implement US-VISIT entry  and exit capability at land POEs where US-VISIT was likely to be  installed, and that such an effort would have a major impact on  f implementing a biometric exit  facility infrastructure at land POEs. In light of  nonbiometric technology to record travelers’ departure, but testing  showed numerous performance and reliability problems. Moreover, even if RFID deficiencies were to be fully addressed and  deadlines set, the RFID solution does not meet the legislative  requirement for a biometric exit capability. According to program officials, technological advances over the  next 5 to 10 years will make it possible to utilize alternative  technologies that provide biometric verification of persons exiting  the country without major changes to facility infrastructure and  without requiring those exiting to stop and/or exit their vehicles,  thereby mitigating traffic backup, congestion, and resulting delays. DHS Continues to Face Longstanding US-VISIT Management Challenges and Future Uncertainties

Our work and other best practice research have shown that applying  disciplined and rigorous management practices improves the  likelihood of delivering expected capabilities on time and within  budget. For almost 4 years, we have reported on fundamental limitations in  DHS’s efforts to define and justify the program’s future direction  and to cost-effectively manage the delivery of promised capabilities  on time and within budget. DHS needs to address these challenges going forward, and the  recommendations that we made over the last 3 years are aimed at  encouraging this. For almost 4 years, DHS has continued to pursue US-VISIT (both in  terms of deploying interfaces between and enhancements to  existing systems and in defining a longer-term, strategic US-VISIT  solution) without producing the program’s operational context. According to the program’s Chief Strategist, an immigration and  border management strategic plan was drafted in March 2005 to  show how US-VISIT is aligned with DHS’s organizational mission  and to define an overall vision for immigration and border  management. As of February 2007,  about 2 years later, we were told that this strategic plan has not yet  been approved, although the program’s Acting Director stated that  the plan is currently with OMB and should be provided to the House  and Senate Appropriations Subcommittees on Homeland Security by  March 2007. It is also to interoperate US-VISIT’s IDENT  system and the Department of Justice’s IAFIS system. At this same time, DHS has launched other major border security  programs without adequately defining the relationships to US-VISIT  and each other. Despite these dependencies, DHS has yet to define these  relationships or how they will be managed. US-VISIT had not assessed the cost and benefits of its early  increments. Further, the cost estimate upon which the analysis was based did  not meet key criteria for reliable cost estimating. DHS Did Not Adequately Assess the Impact of Entry Capabilities on Land Ports of Entry  Operations and Planned Capability Enhancements Carry Potential Cost Implications  Knowing how planned US-VISIT capabilities will impact POE  operations is critical to US-VISIT investment decision makers. DHS Has Not Fully Implemented Key US-VISIT Acquisition and Financial Management Controls

Managing major programs like US-VISIT requires applying discipline  and rigor when acquiring and accounting for systems and services. Specifically, we reported that the program had not effectively  overseen US-VISIT-related contract work performed on its behalf by  other DHS and non-DHS agencies, and these agencies did not always  establish and implement the full range of controls associated with  effective management of contractor activities. Moreover,  the program is overdue in establishing the means to ensure that it is  pursuing the right US-VISIT solution, and that it is managing it the  right way.
Why GAO Did This Study

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is investing billions of dollars in its U.S. Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology (US-VISIT) program to collect, maintain, and share information on selected foreign nationals who enter and exit the United States. The program uses biometric identifiers (digital fingerscans and photographs) to screen people against watch lists and to verify that a visitor is the person who was issued a visa or other travel document. The program is also to biometrically confirm the individual's departure. For over 3 years, GAO has reported on US-VISIT capability deployments and shortfalls, as well as fundamental limitations in DHS's efforts to define and justify US-VISIT's future direction and to cost-effectively manage the delivery of program capabilities on time and within budget. GAO was asked to testify on (1) the status of the program's implementation and (2) the program's progress in addressing longstanding management weaknesses. Given where US-VISIT is today and the challenges and uncertainties associated with where it is going, GAO believes that DHS is long overdue in demonstrating that it is pursuing the right US-VISIT solution and that it is managing US-VISIT the right way.

What GAO Found

After spending almost 4 years and more than $1 billion, DHS has implemented entry capabilities at most ports of entry; however, it has not implemented a biometric exit capability or a suitable alternative. As of December 2006, US-VISIT had deployed and was operating entry capability at 115 airports, 14 seaports, and 154 of 170 land ports of entry. However, the implementation of a biometric land exit capability is currently not feasible, according to program officials, because the only proven technology available would require additional staffing and infrastructure demands, and cause delays with potential impacts on trade and commerce. Also, testing and analysis of a non-biometric solution identified numerous performance and reliability problems, and such an alternative technology does not meet legislative requirements. DHS believes that advances over the next 5 to 10 years will allow solutions that do not require major infrastructure changes, but the prospects for such technology are uncertain. DHS continues to face longstanding US-VISIT management challenges and future uncertainties. For almost 4 years, DHS has continued to pursue US-VISIT without producing the program's operational and technological context. According to program officials, an immigration and border management strategic plan was drafted in March 2005 to show how US-VISIT is aligned with DHS's organizational mission and to define an overall immigration and border management vision. After almost 2 years, this plan has not yet been approved, but the Acting Director said that it is currently with OMB for approval. At the same time, DHS has launched other major security programs without defining the relationship between US-VISIT and these programs. DHS has yet to economically justify its investment in US-VISIT increments or assess their operational impacts. For over 3 years, we reported that the program did not adequately assess the increment's costs and benefits because the assessments were unclear and insufficient, and the cost estimates upon which they were based did not meet key criteria for reliable cost estimating. GAO further reported that the program had not assessed the impact of the entry and exit capabilities on operations and facilities, in part, because the scope of the evaluations performed were too limited. DHS has not implemented key acquisition and financial management controls. For example, GAO reported that the program had not effectively overseen contract work performed on its behalf by other DHS and non-DHS agencies, and these agencies did not always establish and implement effective contract oversight activities. Without these management controls, there is greater risk that US-VISIT will not produce the right solution, and be managed the right way. Accordingly, GAO has made numerous recommendations to address these management challenges.