1). OSD, the Joint Staff, and the Services Have Taken Steps to Integrate Operational Contract Support, but Most of the Military Services Have Not Issued Comprehensive Guidance

OSD and the Joint Staff have taken steps to integrate operational contract  support into departmental planning, but the Navy, Marine Corps, and Air  Force have not issued comprehensive guidance for integrating  operational contract support throughout each service’s planning efforts. Working with the Joint Staff, the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy  completed revisions in April 2011 to the Guidance for the Employment of  the Force requiring that the combatant commands, together with their  service components and relevant combat support agencies, plan for the  integration of contracted support and contractor management in all  phases of military operations. It describes responsibilities, policy, and  implementing procedures for operational contract support. DOD and service officials told us that they do not need  to plan for operational contract support in advance because the Army has  been the lead service in recent conflicts. However, according to DOD, the  Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force spent over a billion dollars combined  for contracted services in Afghanistan in fiscal year 2011, and therefore  contracted support has been utilized for which planning should have  occurred. Without specific service-wide guidance to help institutionalize  operational contract support, the other services may not fully understand  their role in operational contract support and may not be prepared to  execute operational contract support in the future—when it is possible  that one of these services, instead of the Army, will play a leading role. We found that DOD’s efforts to fully integrate operational  contract support at the command and component levels are hindered by  not training all planners about new operational contract support  requirements, a lack of focus of operational contract support planners on  areas beyond logistics, and not providing operational contract support  planning expertise at the commands’ components. Combatant Commands and Components Did Not Plan for the Potential Use of Contractors in All Areas Where They Might Be Needed, and Have Recently Been Issued Guidance

While the combatant commands and their components have taken steps  to integrate operational contract support into contingency planning, mostly  in the area of logistics, they are not planning for such support across all  areas—such as intelligence and communications—that are likely to use  contractors in future contingencies. In a briefing document on changes and  anticipated changes to strategic and planning guidance, the Joint Staff  suggested that, among other things, planners would be required to  include assumptions for the use of contractor support in paragraph one of  the base plan and provide estimates of contractors in the Annex W.  Although the combatant commands and their components have  integrated operational contract support in the base plans and Annex Ws  we reviewed, they did not, at the time we reviewed their plans, have  more-specific and comprehensive guidance within the key operations  planning system manual for integrating planning for operational contract  support across all functional areas where contractors might be used. However, the Joint Staff only recently issued in October 2012  the Adaptive Planning and Execution manual that calls on functional  planners beyond the logistics area alone to identify major support  functions planned for commercial support sourcing. Although the Joint Staff has developed new training for planning for  operational contact support, this training is not focused on training  officials from functional areas other than logistics. As a  result, the components may not be able to fully integrate operational  contract support into their planning for contingency operations; therefore,  they may be unprepared to manage deployed contractor personnel and  provide the necessary oversight. Recommendations for Executive Action

To further the integration of operational contract support into all of the  services’ planning, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct  the Secretaries of the Navy and Air Force to provide comprehensive  service-wide guidance for the Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force that  describes how each service should integrate operational contract support  into its respective organization to include planning for contingency  operations. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

To determine the extent to which the Department of Defense (DOD) is  integrating planning for operational contract support through efforts of the  Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), Joint Staff, and military  services, we collected and analyzed documentation such as planning  guidance and policies related to the integration of operational contract  support into DOD’s planning for contingency operations.
Why GAO Did This Study

DOD has relied extensively on contractors for operations in Iraq and Afghanistan over the past decade. At the height of Operation Iraqi Freedom, the number of contractors exceeded the number of military personnel, and a similar situation is occurring in Afghanistan. In January 2011, the Secretary of Defense issued a memorandum noting the risk of DOD's level of dependency on contractors and outlined actions to institutionalize changes necessary to influence how the department plans for contracted support in contingency operations. The memorandum also called for leveraging the civilian expeditionary workforce to reduce DOD's reliance on contractors, but this workforce is not yet fully developed. GAO was asked to examine DOD's progress in planning for operational contract support. Our review determined how DOD is integrating operational contract support into its planning through efforts of the (1) OSD, Joint Staff, and military services, and (2) combatant commands and their components. To conduct its work, GAO evaluated DOD operational contract support guidance and documents and met with officials at various DOD offices.

What GAO Found

The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the Joint Staff, and the services have taken steps to integrate operational contract support into planning for contingency operations. For example, in April 2011, the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, working with the Joint Staff, revised the Guidance for the Employment of the Force to require planning for operational contract support in all phases of military operations. Further, in December 2011, the Department of Defense (DOD) revised an instruction and issued corresponding regulations establishing policies and procedures for operational contract support. The Army issued service-specific guidance that describes roles, responsibilities, and requirements to help integrate operational contract support into its planning efforts for contingency operations. However, the Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force have not issued similar comprehensive guidance for integrating operational contract support throughout each service. Instead, these services have taken actions such as developing training and other individual efforts to familiarize servicemembers with operational contract support. According to service officials, one reason that they have not issued comprehensive guidance similar to the Army's guidance is because the Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force have not been the lead service for contracting in recent operations. However, these services combined spent over a billion dollars for contracted services in Afghanistan in fiscal year 2011. Without specific, service-wide guidance, the other services' future planning efforts may not reflect the full extent of the use of contract support and the attendant cost and need for oversight.
The combatant commands and their components have begun to incorporate operational contract support into their planning for contingencies, but they have not fully integrated operational contract support in all functional areas. We found that the combatant commands and components are not planning for the potential use of contractors in areas where they may be needed beyond logistics such as communications. Recognizing the problem, DOD, in October 2012, issued guidance that calls on functional planners beyond the logistics area to identify major support functions planned for commercial support sourcing. GAO also found that officials involved with logistics planning at the commands receive training from the Joint Staff and assistance from embedded operational contract support planners to help integrate operational contract support into logistics planning. However, officials involved in planning for other areas--such as intelligence--that have used contractors in past operations, do not receive such training. Further, the embedded operational contract support planners do not focus on areas beyond logistics. Moreover, while the combatant commands have embedded experts to assist with operational contract support planning, the military service components do not have such expertise. Without training for all planners, a broader focus beyond logistics for embedded planners, and expertise offered at the military service components, DOD risks being unprepared to plan and manage deployed contractor personnel and may not be able to provide the necessary oversight during future contingencies.

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that the Navy , Marine Corps and Air Force provide guidance on planning for operational contract support; that the Joint Staff provide training for all planners; that the planners broaden their focus to include areas beyond logistics; and that expertise is offered to service components to further integrate operational contract support into plans. DOD generally agreed with the recommendations.