The Army is just beginning the mid- and long-term phases of its BCI efforts with the development of a COEA to identify affordable and promising alternatives. Cohesive Management Plan and Structure Needed

The services’ current management plan and structure for cooperative IFF Q&A systems, which reflect the division of responsibility between the Army and the Navy, lack needed cohesiveness. The current management structure also risks unnecessary delays in the development and fielding of a set of systems planned to help prevent future fratricide by allowing the services to prioritize their efforts differently. For example, while DOD has made development of combat identification systems a high priority, the Navy, through its funding process, did not make CAI a high priority. A joint COEA would ensure that DOD and the services have a joint analysis that will help to select systems representing the most cost and operationally effective integrated solution. In our prior report on combat identification, we noted that the Army planned to begin procuring the near-term millimeter wave cooperative identification system without an analysis of whether the near-term system could be integrated into the mid- and long-term solution(s). Recommendations

We recommend that the Secretary of Defense (1) create a single OSD funding line for the Army’s BCI and Navy’s CAI efforts, (2) direct the Secretaries of the Army and the Navy to develop and institute a cohesive management structure and plan in line with the Process Action Team’s recommendation, and (3) direct the Secretaries of the Army and the Navy to develop a joint COEA for their BCI and CAI efforts giving due consideration to the problem and costs of obtaining systems’ interoperability. This, however, should not be the basis for acquiring more systems than are needed to accomplish the goals of the demonstration. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8.
Why GAO Did This Study

GAO reviewed the Army's and Navy's development of combat identification systems to reduce the occurrences of friendly fire incidents, focusing on the services' management plans and structures for the systems' development and integration.

What GAO Found

GAO found that: (1) the Army and Navy do not have a cohesive management plan and structure for the development of their cooperative combat identification systems; (2) the lack of cohesiveness reflects the division in the services' responsibilities for developing systems for different combat modes; (3) the two services have based their system development plans on different technologies and have not fully addressed how and at what cost these systems will be integrated; (4) the lack of a cohesive management structure could lead to development and deployment delays by allowing the services to prioritize their efforts differently; (5) the Navy has developed a cost and operational effectiveness analysis (COEA) for its system, but the Army is just beginning to develop its COEA; (6) the development of separate COEA risks wasting resources because of duplication and delays in system development and deployment and does not address the need for interoperability; (7) the DOD proposal for a single funding line for system development would help ensure better cooperative systems development; and (8) the Army plans to procure more near-term identification systems than it needs for its planned field demonstration and without knowing if the systems are affordable and can be integrated into long-term solutions.