Counternarcotics- Related Programs Have Had Mixed Results in Meeting Supply Reduction and Interdiction Goals

Our work in Afghanistan, Colombia, and the transit zone has shown that  the United States and its partner nations have partially met established  targets for reducing the supply of illicit drugs. Most programs designed to  reduce cultivation, production, and trafficking of drugs have missed their  performance targets. Plan Colombia Partially Met Six-Year Drug Supply Reduction Goals and Recent Data Suggest More Improvements Have Been Made

In 2008, we reported that Plan Colombia’s goal of reducing the cultivation  and production of illegal drugs by 50 percent in 6 years was partially  achieved. Other factors, such as dry weather  conditions, may be contributing to these decreases in potential cocaine  production. Cocaine Interdiction Programs in the Transit Zone Has Fallen Short of Targets

According to ONDCP data, the United States has fallen slightly short of its  cocaine interdiction targets each year since the targets were established in  2007. Several Factors Have Limited the Effectiveness of U.S. Programs

A number of factors to counternarcotics-related programs have limited the  effectiveness of U.S. counternarcotic efforts. These factors include a lack  of planning by U.S. agencies to sustain some U.S.-funded programs over  the longer term, limited cooperation from partner nations, and the  adaptability of drug producers and traffickers. Agencies to Sustain Some Programs

U.S. agencies had not developed plans for how to sustain some programs,  particularly those programs providing assets, such as boats, to partner  nations to conduct interdiction efforts. Corruption has also hampered Dominican Republic-based, money- laundering investigations, according to DEA. In production countries, such as Colombia, drug producers also proved to  be highly adaptive. Counternarcotics Initiatives Have Been Closely Aligned with Broad U.S. Foreign Policy Objectives

U.S. counternarcotics programs have been closely aligned with the  achievement of other U.S. foreign policy goals. Many counternarcotics-related programs involve supporting democracy  and the rule of law in partner nations, which is itself a U.S. foreign policy  objective worldwide. Support for legal institutions, such as courts,  attorneys general, and law enforcement organizations, in drug source and  transit countries is not only an important part of the U.S. counternarcotic  strategy but also advance State’s strategic objectives relating to  democracy and governance. Judging the Effectiveness of Some Counternarcotics- Related Programs is Difficult

In many of our reviews of international counternarcotic-related programs,  we found that determining program effectiveness has been challenging. Existing Performance Measures and Results Reporting Are Often Not Useful for Assessing Progress in Achieving Program Goals

The Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 requires federal  agencies to develop performance measures to assess progress in achieving  their goals and to communicate their results to the Congress. Alternative Development Performance Measures in Colombia Do Not Capture Programs’ Effect on Drug Supply

For Plan Colombia, several programs we reviewed were focused on root  causes of the drug problem and their impact on drug activity was difficult  to assess. However, these indicators have not been consistent over  time or among countries. In  our 2008 report on U.S. assistance to transit zone countries, we  recommended that the Secretary of State, in consultation with the  Secretary of Defense (1) develop a plan to ensure that partner nations in  the transit zone could effectively operate and maintain all  counternarcotics assets that the United States had provided, including  boats and other vehicles and equipment, for their remaining useful life and  (2) ensure that, before providing a counternarcotics asset to a partner  nation, agencies determined the total operations and maintenance cost  over its useful life and, with the recipient nation, develop a plan for  funding this cost. Improved performance measures. Related GAO Products

Drug Control: Long-Standing Problems Hinder U.S. International Efforts. Drug Control: Assets DOD Contributes to Reducing the Illegal Drug Supply  Have Declined. Drug Control: Coca Cultivation and Eradication Estimates in Colombia. Agencies Need More Detailed Plans for Reducing  Assistance.
Why GAO Did This Study

The overall goal of the U.S. National Drug Control Strategy, prepared by the White House Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP), is to reduce illicit drug use in the United States. GAO has issued more than 20 products since 2000 examining U.S.-funded international programs aimed at reducing the supply of drugs. These programs have been implemented primarily in drug source countries, such as Colombia and Afghanistan as well drug transit countries, such as Mexico, Guatemala, and Venezuela. They have included interdiction of maritime drug shipments on the high seas, support for foreign military and civilian institutions engaged in drug eradication, detection, and interdiction; and rule of law assistance aimed at helping foreign legal institutions investigate and prosecute drug trafficking, money laundering, and other drug-related crimes.

What GAO Found

GAO's work on U.S.-funded international counternarcotics-related programswork has centered on four major topics: (1) Counternarcotics-related programs have had mixed results. In Afghanistan, Colombia, and drug transit countries, the United States and partner nations have only partially met established targets for reducing the drug supply. In Afghanistan, opium poppy eradication efforts have consistently fallen short of targets. Plan Colombia has met its goals for reducing opium and heroin but not coca crops, although recent data suggest that U.S.-supported crop eradication efforts over time may have caused a significant decline in potential cocaine production. Data also indicate an increase in coca cultivation in Peru and Bolivia that may eventually offset these declines. Interdiction programs have missed their performance targets each year since goals were established in 2007. (2) Several factors have limited program effectiveness. Various factors have hindered these programs' ability to reduce the supply of illegal drugs. In some cases, we found that U.S. agencies had not planned for the sustainment of programs, particularly those providing interdiction boats in transit countries. External factors include limited cooperation from partner nations due to corruption or lack of political support, and the highly adaptive nature of drug producers and traffickers. (3) Counternarcotics-related programs often advance broader foreign policy objectives. The value of these programs cannot be assessed based only on their impact on the drug supply. Many have supported other U.S. foreign policy objectives relating to security and stabilization, counterinsurgency, and strengthening democracy and governance. For example, in Afghanistan, the United States has combined counternarcotics efforts with military operations to combat insurgents as well as drug traffickers. U.S. support for Plan Colombia has significantly strengthened Colombia's security environment, which may eventually make counterdrug programs, such as alternative agricultural development, more effective. In several cases, U.S. rule of law assistance, such as supporting courts, prosecutors, and law enforcement organizations, has furthered both democracy-building and counterdrug objectives. (4) Judging the effectiveness of some programs is difficult. U.S. agencies often lack reliable performance measurement and results reporting needed to assess all the impacts of counterdrug programs. In Afghanistan, opium eradication measures alone were insufficient for a comprehensive assessment of U.S. efforts. Also, the State Department has not regularly reported outcome-related information for over half of its programs in major drug transit countries. Furthermore, DOD's counternarcotics-related measures were generally not useful for assessing program effectiveness or making management decisions.

What GAO Recommends

GAO has made recommendations to the Departments of Defense (DOD) and State and other agencies to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of U.S. counternarcotics- related programs. In particular, GAO has recommended that these agencies develop plans to sustain these programs. GAO has also recommended that they improve performance measurement and results reporting to assess program impacts and to aid in decision making. Agencies have efforts under way to implement some of these recommendations.