DOD Has Taken Steps to Facilitate the Integration of UAS, but Further Steps Are Needed to Address Integration Challenges

DOD components have developed guidance—such as a Multi-Service  Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Tactical Employment of  Unmanned Aircraft Systems and a Joint Concept of Operations for UAS— to facilitate UAS integration. Until DOD takes  steps to address the need for DOD-wide advance coordination, it may  continue to face challenges in successfully integrating UAS into combat  operations and may exacerbate existing integration challenges. DOD Has Developed Guidance to Facilitate the Integration of UAS

DOD components have developed guidance to facilitate the integration of  UAS into combat operations. As additional ISR assets are rapidly  acquired and fielded to meet the increasing demand for ISR support in  ongoing operations, CENTCOM has recognized that advance coordination  is a critical factor in integrating UAS into combat operations by enabling  efficient deployment of assets and effective utilization of them once they  are in theater. Until DOD takes  steps to address the need for DOD-wide advance coordination, it may be  unable to successfully integrate UAS and other ISR assets into combat  operations and existing integration challenges may be exacerbated. DOD’s Approach to Allocating and Tasking UAS and Other ISR Assets Does Not Consider the Capabilities of All ISR Assets

DOD’s current approach to allocating and tasking its ISR assets, including  UAS, does not consider the capabilities of all ISR assets because it lacks  an awareness or visibility over all ISR capabilities available to support the  combatant commanders and how DOD ISR assets are being used, which  hinders DOD’s ability to optimize the use of its assets. While there are procedures,  such as the Air Tasking Order and Airspace Control Order, for tracking  where theater- and tactical-level assets are operating for airspace control  and deconfliction purposes, a comparable mechanism for tracking the  missions these assets are supporting or how they are being used on a daily  basis does not exist. A mechanism that provides this visibility would allow  tactical units, when appropriate, to leverage other assets operating in  their area to optimize the information captured and avoid unnecessary  duplicative taskings. DOD Lacks Complete Metrics and Feedback for Fully Evaluating the Performance of Its ISR Assets to Ensure Warfighter’s Needs Are Met

DOD is unable to fully evaluate the performance of its ISR assets because  it lacks a complete set of metrics and does not consistently receive  feedback from operators and intelligence personnel to ensure the  warfighter’s needs are met. Without feedback and a complete set of metrics for evaluating its ISR  assets, DOD may not be in the best position to validate how well the  warfighter needs are being met, the true demand for ISR assets, and  whether it is optimizing the use of existing assets, or to acquire new  systems that best support warfighting needs. However, DOD currently assesses its ISR missions with limited  quantitative metrics such as the number of targets planned versus the  number collected against. While these metrics are a good start, DOD  officials acknowledge that the current metrics do not take into account all  of the qualitative considerations associated with measuring ISR asset  effectiveness such as the cumulative knowledge provided by numerous  ISR missions, whether the ISR asset did what it was intended to do,  whether it had the intended effect, and whether the intelligence captured  contributed towards accomplishment of the mission. The JFCC-ISR is working with the combatant commands to develop  additional quantitative ISR metrics as well as qualitative metrics to assess  the effectiveness of ISR assets, although DOD officials acknowledge the  progress in developing metrics has been limited. To ensure DOD has the information needed to consider all ISR assets   when allocating and tasking these assets, we recommend that the  Secretary of Defense develop a mechanism for    obtaining information on all ISR assets, including all DOD, national, and  allied assets, operating in each of the combatant commanders’ area of  operations; and   allowing users at all levels within DOD to gain real-time situational  awareness on where DOD ISR assets are operating and, where not  prohibited by the mission, what they are being used to do. To determine the extent to which DOD’s approach to allocating and  tasking its intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets,  including UAS, considers all available ISR assets to optimize their  capabilities, we met with key DOD and service officials, including those  from U.S. Central Command and associated Army and Air Force  component commands, the Combined Air Operations Center at Al Udeid  Air Base in Qatar, the Joint Functional Component Command for  Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance and other organizations.
Why GAO Did This Study

Combatant commanders carrying out ongoing operations rank the need for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities as high on their priority lists. The Department of Defense (DOD) is investing in many ISR systems, including unmanned aircraft systems (UAS), to meet the growing demand for ISR assets to support the warfighter. GAO was asked to evaluate DOD's efforts to integrate UAS into ongoing operations while optimizing the use of all DOD ISR assets. Specifically, this report addresses the extent that (1) DOD has taken steps to facilitate the integration of UAS into combat operations, and (2) DOD's approach to allocating and tasking its ISR assets considers all available ISR capabilities, including those provided by UAS. GAO also reviewed the extent that DOD evaluates the performance of its ISR assets, including UAS, in meeting warfighters' needs. To perform this work, GAO analyzed data and guidance on the use of ISR assets, and interviewed DOD officials, including those supporting ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.

What GAO Found

DOD components have developed guidance to facilitate the integration of UAS into combat operations; however, further steps are needed to coordinate the deployment of these assets. For example, DOD developed guidance for the tactical employment of UAS and a Joint UAS Concept of Operations. This guidance is an important first step but does not address coordinating UAS and other ISR assets prior to deploying them to ongoing operations, which U.S. Central Command recognized is a critical factor in integrating UAS into combat operations. Until DOD addresses the need for DOD-wide advance coordination, it may continue to face challenges in successfully integrating UAS and other ISR assets into combat operations and may exacerbate integration challenges such as limited bandwidth. DOD's approach to allocating and tasking its ISR assets, including UAS, hinders its ability to optimize the use of these assets because it does not consider the capabilities of all available ISR assets. The command charged with recommending how theater-level DOD ISR assets should be allocated to support operational requirements does not have awareness of all available ISR assets because DOD does not have a mechanism for obtaining this information. Similarly, the commander responsible for coordinating ongoing joint air operations does not have information on how assets controlled by tactical units are being used or what missions they've been tasked to support. Nor do tactical units have information on how theater-level assets and ISR assets embedded in other units are being tasked, which results in problems such as duplicative taskings. This lack of visibility occurs because DOD does not have a mechanism for tracking the missions both theater- and tactical-level ISR assets are supporting or how they are being used. Without an approach to allocation and tasking that includes a mechanism for considering all ISR capabilities, DOD may be unable to fully leverage all available ISR assets and optimize their use. DOD is unable to fully evaluate the performance of its ISR assets because it lacks a complete set of metrics and does not consistently receive feedback to ensure the warfighter's needs were met. Although the Joint Functional Component Command for ISR has been tasked with developing ISR metrics, DOD currently assesses its ISR missions with limited quantitative metrics such as the number of targets planned versus captured. While these metrics are a good start, DOD officials acknowledge that the current metrics do not capture all of the qualitative considerations associated with measuring ISR asset effectiveness such as the cumulative knowledge provided by numerous ISR missions. There is an ongoing effort within DOD to develop additional quantitative as well as qualitative ISR metrics, but no DOD-wide milestones have been established. Furthermore, DOD guidance calls for an evaluation of the results of joint operations; however, DOD officials acknowledge that this feedback is not consistently occurring due to the fast pace of operations in theater. Without metrics and feedback, DOD may not be able to validate how well the warfighters' needs are being met, whether it is optimizing the use of existing assets, or which new systems would best support warfighting needs.