CBP  officials at 12 of 21 land POE sites we visited told us about US-VISIT- related computer slowdowns and freezes that adversely affected visitor  processing and inspection times, and at 9 of the 12 sites, computer  processing problems were not always reported to CBP’s computer help  desk, as required by CBP guidelines. While the US-VISIT  Program Office established performance measures for fiscal years 2005  and 2006 intended to gauge performance of various aspects of US-VISIT at  air, sea, and land POEs in the aggregate, performance measures  specifically for land POEs had not been developed. Additional performance measures that  consider operational and facility differences at land POEs would put US- VISIT program officials in a better position to identify problems, trends,  and areas needing improvements. Various Factors Have Prevented US-VISIT from Implementing a Biometric Exit Capability

Various factors have prevented US-VISIT from implementing a biometric  exit capability. According  to these officials, it is unclear how new traffic lanes and new facilities  could be built at land POEs where space constraints already exist, such as  those in congested urban areas. For  example, the RFID solution did not meet the congressional requirement  for a biometric exit capability because the technology that had been tested  cannot meet a key goal of US-VISIT—ensuring that visitors who enter the  country are the same ones who leave. Until such a plan is finalized and issued,  DHS is not able to articulate how entry/exit concepts will fit together— including any interim nonbiometric solutions—and neither DHS nor  Congress is positioned to prioritize and allocate resources for a US-VISIT  exit capability or plan for the program’s future. DHS Had Not Articulated How US- VISIT Strategically Fits with Other Land Border Security Initiatives

My statement will now focus on DHS efforts to define how US-VISIT fits  with other emerging border security initiatives. Among  other things, we found that    key decisions had yet to be made about what documents other than a  passport would be acceptable when U.S. citizens and citizens of  Canada enter or return to the United States—a decision critical to  making decisions about how DHS is to inspect individuals entering the  country, including what common facilities or infrastructure might be  needed to perform these inspections at land POEs, and     a DHS and Department of State proposal to develop an alternative form  of passport, called a PASS card, would rely on RFID technology to help  DHS process U.S. citizens re-entering the country, but DHS had not  made decisions involving a broad set of considerations that included  (1) utilizing security features to protect personal information, (2)  ensuring that proper equipment and facilities are in place to facilitate  crossings at land borders, and (3) enhancing compatibility with other  border crossing technology already in use. Because US-VISIT will likely continue to have an  impact on land POE facilities as it evolves—especially as new technology  and equipment are introduced—it is important for US-VISIT and CBP  officials to have sufficient management controls for identifying and  reporting potential computer and other operational problems that could  affect the ability of US-VISIT entry capability to operate as intended. Our recommendation also stated that DHS’s  report should include a description of how DHS plans to align US-VISIT  with other emerging land border security initiatives and what facilities or  facility modifications would be needed at land POEs to ensure that  different technologies and processes work in harmony. This concludes my prepared testimony. The act provided  that US-VISIT “shall include a requirement for the collection of biometric  exit data for all categories of individuals who are required to provide  biometric entry data, regardless of the port of entry where such categories  of individuals entered the United States.”
The new provisions in the 2004 act also addressed integration and  interoperability of databases and data systems that process or contain  information on aliens and federal law enforcement and intelligence  information relevant to visa issuance and admissibility of aliens;  maintaining the accuracy and integrity of the US-VISIT data system; using  the system to track and facilitate the processing of immigration benefits  using biometric identifiers; the goals of the program (e.g., serving as a vital  counterterrorism tool, screening visitors efficiently and in a welcoming  manner, integrating relevant databases and plans for database  modifications to address volume increase and database usage, and  providing inspectors and related personnel with adequate real time  information); training, education, and outreach on US-VISIT, low-risk  visitor programs, and immigration law; annual compliance reports by DHS,  State, the Department of Justice, and any other department or agency  subject to the requirements of the new provisions; and development and  implementation of a registered traveler program.
Why GAO Did This Study

This testimony summarizes a December 2006 GAO report on the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) efforts to implement the U.S. Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology (US-VISIT) program at land ports of entry (POE). US-VISIT is designed to collect, maintain, and share data on selected foreign nationals entering and exiting the United States at air, sea, and land POEs. These data, including biometric identifiers like digital fingerprints, are to be used to screen persons against watch lists, verify identities, and record arrival and departure. This testimony addresses DHS's efforts to (1) implement US-VISIT entry capability, (2) implement US-VISIT exit capability, and (3) define how US-VISIT fits with other emerging border security initiatives. GAO analyzed DHS and US-VISIT documents, interviewed program officials, and visited 21 land POEs with varied traffic levels on both borders.

What GAO Found

US-VISIT entry capability had been installed at 154 of the 170 land POEs. Officials at all 21 sites GAO visited reported that US-VISIT had improved their ability to process visitors and verify identities. DHS plans to further enhance US-VISIT's capabilities by, among other things, requiring new technology and equipment for scanning all 10 fingerprints. While this may aid border security, installation could increase processing times and adversely affect operations at land POEs where space constraints, traffic congestion, and processing delays already exist. GAO's work indicated that management controls in place to identify such problems and evaluate operations were insufficient and inconsistently administered. For example, GAO identified computer processing problems at 12 sites visited; at 9 of these, the problems were not always reported. US-VISIT has developed performance measures, but measures to gauge factors that uniquely affect land POE operations were not developed; these would put US-VISIT officials in a better position to identify areas for improvement. US-VISIT officials concluded that, for various reasons, a biometric US-VISIT exit capability cannot now be implemented without incurring a major impact on land POE facilities. An interim nonbiometric exit technology tested (see photo, below right) did not meet the statutory requirement for a biometric exit capability and thus cannot ensure that visitors who enter the country are those who leave. DHS had not yet reported to Congress on a required plan describing how it intended to fully implement a biometric entry/exit program or use nonbiometric solutions. Until this plan is finalized, neither DHS nor Congress is in a good position to prioritize and allocate program resources or plan for POE facilities modifications. DHS had not articulated how US-VISIT is to align with other emerging land border security initiatives and mandates, and thus could not ensure that the program would meet strategic program goals and operate cost effectively at land POEs. Knowing how US-VISIT is to work with these initiatives, such as one requiring U.S. citizens, Canadians, and others to present passports or other documents at land POEs in 2009, is important for understanding the broader strategic context for US-VISIT and identifying resources, tools, and potential facility modifications needed to ensure success.