Marine Corps Met Truck Armor Requirements in September 2004

The Marine Corps met its requirements for production and installation of  add-on truck armor in September 2004—-8 months after that initial  requirement was identified in January 2004. In addressing its truck armor  requirements, the Marine Corps used a three-phased approach. In the first  phase, the Marine Corps validated its initial requirement in January 2004 to  armor 1,169 trucks for protection against IEDs and other similar threats. Due to the immediacy of the need to deploy forces to Iraq by March 2004,  the Marine Corps addressed this initial requirement by installing interim  armor on all 1,169 trucks. In the second phase, the Marine Corps  increased its armor requirement to 1,438 trucks in April 2004 and fully met  that requirement in September 2004 with add-on armor that provided the  required IED protection. In the third phase, the Marine Corps is upgrading  armor protection from add-on armor to integrated armor for 900 7-ton  trucks in Iraq and Afghanistan, which were included in the 1,438 trucks  armored during the second phase. Figure 1 shows Marine Corps  production and installation of the interim armor protection over the 2- month period taken to address the initial requirement. As of March 2006, the Marine Corps had  completed installation of integrated armor on 803 MTVRs. According to Marine Corps officials, since the MTVR is at the beginning of  its economic life cycle, the Marine Corps decided to armor this truck with  armor that was integrated into the body of the truck. Lack of a Synchronized Approach between the Services and Mission Needs Affected the Time to Provide Truck Armor to Marine Corps Forces

Two factors affected the timely production and installation of Marine  Corps truck armor. First, a lack of a synchronized approach between the  Marine Corps and the Army on truck armor requirements and solutions  resulted in the Marine Corps identifying its truck armor requirements and  seeking armor solutions 2 months later than the Army. Lack of Synchronization between the Marine Corps and Army in Identifying Truck Armor Requirements and Developing Solutions May Have Affected Armor Availability For Deploying Units

A lack of synchronization between the Marine Corps and Army in  identifying truck armor requirements and coordinating an armor solution  from industry may have limited the Marine Corps’ ability to field interim  armor that met IED protection requirements and may have contributed to  the time to provide the second phase armor protection to deployed Marine  Corps forces. As a  result, as an interim solution to meet deployment deadlines, they  purchased the best armor steel available, although it did not provide  sufficient IED protection. Specifically, mission needs restricted the rate at which  armor could be installed onto vehicles in the theater of operations. Marine Corps and DOD Took Actions to Improve Truck Armor Availability

The Marine Corps and DOD have taken several actions to improve the  timely availability of truck armor and other critical wartime equipment. For example, the Marine Corps increased the rate of installation for  integrated armor by expanding its armor installation capacity. The Marine  Corps is also developing a longer-term plan to address the availability of  truck armor for future operations. However, it is unclear whether this  policy applies to urgent wartime needs such as armor because it excludes  the development of new technology solutions. The Marine Corps is also taking longer-term actions to improve the  availability of truck armor for future operations. Instead, the Army identified its first truck armor requirements and began  developing solutions in November 2003, while the Marine Corps did not  begin its program until January 2004. To determine the extent to which truck armor was produced and installed  to meet identified requirements and the factors that affected the time to  provide armor, we interviewed Marine Corps officials involved in  identifying armor requirements, providing funding, and acquiring truck  armor for deployed forces. However, the armor did not provide sufficient  IED protection. 2. 3.
Why GAO Did This Study

The increasing threat of improvised explosive devices (IED) in Iraq has led to widespread interest by Congress and the public regarding the availability of critical force protection equipment. GAO initiated a series of engagements under the Comptroller General's authority to address these concerns. In March 2006, GAO reported on factors that affected the production and installation of armor for the Army's medium and heavy trucks. This engagement examines issues affecting the production and installation of armor for the Marine Corps' medium and heavy trucks. The objectives were to (1) determine the extent to which truck armor was produced and installed to meet identified requirements, (2) identify what factors affected the time to provide truck armor, and (3) identify what actions the Marine Corps and DOD have taken to improve the timely availability of truck armor.

What GAO Found

The Marine Corps met its requirements for the production and installation of add-on truck armor in September 2004--8 months after the requirements were identified in January 2004. In addressing its truck armor requirements, the Marine Corps used a three-phased approach. In the first phase, the Marine Corps validated its initial requirement in January 2004 to armor 1,169 trucks for protection against IEDs and other similar threats. Due to the immediacy of the need to deploy forces to Iraq by March 2004, the Marine Corps installed interim armor that did not provide sufficient IED protection, which Marine Corps officials acknowledged, stating that their intent was to field some level of protection until a more robust armor solution became available. In the second phase, the Marine Corps increased its armor requirement to 1,438 trucks in April 2004 and fully met that requirement in September 2004 with armor that provided enhanced IED protection. In the third phase, the Marine Corps is upgrading to integrated armor for its 7-ton trucks, which provides improved protection because the armor is built into the body of the vehicle. They expect to complete installation by May 2006. Two factors affected the timely production and installation of Marine Corps truck armor. First, a lack of a synchronized approach between the Marine Corps and the Army on addressing truck armor requirements and solutions resulted in the Marine Corps identifying its truck armor requirements and seeking armor solutions 2 months after the Army. Consequently, this delay may have limited the Marine Corps' ability to field interim armor that met IED protection requirements in the first phase, and may have contributed to the time to provide add-on truck armor to deployed Marine Corps forces in the second phase. The Marine Corps did not officially identify a requirement for truck armor and did not begin seeking out armor materials from industry until January 2004--2 months after the Army began its truck armor program in November 2003. According to Marine Corps officials, the armor-grade steel needed for sufficient IED protection was not available from suppliers in time to meet the Marine Corps' deployment timeline of March 2004. As a result, the Marine Corps fielded the interim armor with only limited IED protection. Second, mission needs restricted the rate at which the Marine Corps could replace its interim armor with add-on armor and install integrated armor. The Marine Corps and DOD have taken actions to improve the timely availability of truck armor and other critical wartime equipment. For example, the Marine Corps increased the rate of installation for integrated armor by expanding its armor installation capacity. The Marine Corps is alsotaking longer-term actions, such as developing a plan to address the availability of truck armor for future operations. In addition, DOD established a joint requirements process to improve coordination and accelerate the process of fielding urgent wartime solutions. However, it is unclear whether this process applies to urgent wartime needs such as armor because it excludes the development of new technology solutions.