	Introduction1

Eight times since the enactment of the War Powers Resolution in 1973, Members of Congress have filed suit to force various Presidents to comply with its requirements or otherwise to recognize Congress's war powers under the Constitution. In each instance where a ruling was delivered, the reviewing court refused to render a decision on the merits. Most recently, 10 Members of Congress filed suit to enjoin U.S. military operations against Libya in the absence of a declaration of war, but the reviewing federal district court dismissed the case on jurisdictional grounds due to lack of standing. Article I, Section 8, of the Constitution confers on Congress the power to "declare War," and Congress has enacted declarations eleven times in American history. Nonetheless, concern that Congress had allowed its war power to atrophy in the contexts of the Cold War and the wars in Korea and Vietnam led to the enactment in 1973, over President Nixon's veto, of the War Powers Resolution (WPR; P.L. 93-148 ). Accordingly, the WPR requires the President to consult with Congress "in every possible instance" prior to introducing U.S. Armed Forces into hostilities and to report to Congress within 48 hours when, absent a declaration of war, U.S. Armed Forces are introduced into "hostilities or ... situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances." After this report is submitted (or after such date that it was required to be submitted), the WPR requires that U.S. troops be withdrawn at the end of 60 days (90 days in certain circumstances), unless Congress authorizes continued involvement by passing a declaration of war or some other specific authorization for continued U.S. involvement in hostilities. Several Presidents have viewed aspects of the War Powers Resolution as unconstitutionally trenching upon their constitutional authorities in matters of war and foreign relations. This report summarizes the eight suits that have been brought by Members of Congress since the enactment of the War Powers Resolution which have alleged presidential noncompliance with the Resolution or the requirements of the Constitution with respect to the involvement of U.S. Armed Forces in El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Grenada; U.S. escort operations in the Persian Gulf; Iraq's invasion of Kuwait; NATO's actions against Yugoslavia, Iraq's noncompliance with its obligation to disarm; and U.S. military operations against Libya. He had not yet, however, sought or obtained congressional authorization for the use of force. NATO's Air War in Kosovo and Yugoslavia

In 1999, 26 Members of the House initiated a suit in the case of Campbell v. Clinton , asking for a declaratory judgment that U.S. participation in NATO's military actions against Yugoslavia in the Kosovo situation violated Congress's constitutional power to declare war or otherwise authorize military action and that the War Powers Resolution required the termination of U.S. participation "no later than sixty calendar days after March 24, 1999" (the date NATO began bombing Yugoslavia), unless Congress authorized continued U.S. involvement. The appellate court did, however, reach the merits of the issue on the plaintiffs' other claim; namely, that the discretionary authority to use force conferred on the President by the October authorization unconstitutionally delegated Congress's power to declare war. These circumstances, the court concluded, did not warrant judicial intervention. Thus, the case continues not to be fit for judicial review." The plaintiffs also requested the issuance of a judicial order enjoining further military operations against Libya absent a declaration of war. The courts have variously relied on the political question doctrine, the equitable/remedial discretion doctrine, ripeness, mootness, and congressional standing.
Article I, Section 8, of the Constitution confers on Congress the power to "declare War." Modern Presidents, however, have contended that, notwithstanding this clause, they do not need congressional authorization to use force. Partly in response to that contention, and because of widespread concern that Congress had allowed its war power to atrophy in the Korean and Vietnam conflicts, Congress in 1973 enacted the War Powers Resolution (WPR; P.L. 93-148). Among other things, the WPR generally requires the President to report to Congress within 48 hours when, absent a declaration of war, U.S. Armed Forces are introduced into "hostilities or ... situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances." After a report is submitted or required to be submitted, the WPR requires that the forces be withdrawn within 60 days (90 days in specified circumstances) unless Congress declares war or otherwise authorizes their continued involvement.
Nonetheless, subsequent Presidents have continued to maintain that they have sufficient authority independent of Congress to initiate the use of military force, and several Presidents have viewed aspects of the WPR as unconstitutionally infringing upon their Commander-in-Chief authority. Congress has on four occasions enacted authorizations specifically waiving the 60-90 day limitation on the use of force otherwise imposed by the WPR. But on eight occasions Members of Congress have filed suit to force various Presidents to comply with WPR requirements or otherwise to recognize Congress's war powers under the Constitution. In seven of the eight cases where final rulings were issued, the courts have found reasons not to render a decision on the merits of the plaintiffs' claims. In one case, involving the President's authority to pursue military action against Iraq following congressional authorization, the court ruled on the merits of the plaintiffs' claim concerning the constitutionality of this authorization, but dismissed all other claims on jurisdictional grounds. The courts have variously found the political question doctrine, the equitable/remedial discretion doctrine, the issue of ripeness, and the question of congressional standing to preclude judicial resolution of the matter. Although the courts have not ruled out the possibility that a conflict over the use of force between Congress and the President could require a judicial resolution, they have thus far deemed the matter to be one for the political branches to resolve.
On June 15, 2011, 10 Members of Congress brought suit in federal court seeking a declaratory judgment that U.S. military operations against Libya violated Congress's constitutional power to declare war, and also requested a judicial order enjoining further operations against Libya absent a declaration of war. The reviewing federal district court dismissed the case on jurisdictional grounds due to lack of standing.
This report summarizes the eight cases initiated by Members of Congress in which final rulings were reached, which concerned U.S. military activities in El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Grenada; military action taken during the Persian Gulf conflict between Iraq and Iran; U.S. activities in response to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait (prior to the congressional authorization); U.S. participation in NATO's action in Kosovo and Yugoslavia; and U.S. military action in Libya. This report will be updated as circumstances warrant.