What Is the Mission of the Current and Planned Fleet? The current C-130 fleet is comprised of 12 different variants and the missions vary with each variant. While most of the current fleet is comprised of combat delivery aircraft, many of the C-130 variants perform specialized missions. At the time of our review, peacetime and wartime requirements for the Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve combat delivery aircraft inventory totaled 264 aircraft. Requirements for the Guard and Reserves’ C-130 combat delivery aircraft are established in the Air Force’s C-130 MSP, which was delivered to Congress in 1997. What Is the C-130 Procurement History in the Guard and Reserve Units? For the past 21 years, with the exception of five aircraft, Congress has directed the procurement of C-130s for the Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve units. According to C-130 program officials, the Air Force has not requested these aircraft because aircraft in those units have many years of service life remaining. What Are Air Force Plans for Retiring Excess C-130s in the MSP? About 50 C-130 aircraft were identified in the Air Force MSP as excess over requirements. Thirty of these were in the Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve units and the remaining were in the active duty force. Reductions in the Air National Guard were expected to be 24 aircraft (from 190 to 166 aircraft) and the Air Force Reserve Command units were to be reduced by 6 aircraft (from 104 to 98 aircraft). According to Air Force officials, these reductions were not made. Is the Air Force Process for Retiring C-130 Aircraft When Replacement Aircraft Become Available Effective? Although the Air Force has a process governing the retirement of its aircraft, it has not been able to implement the process effectively. As a result, some C-130 aircraft have been retired with substantial service life remaining and/or shortly after the aircraft had been modified. As of March 1998, the Air Force had not decided how many C-130Js will be required. Accordingly, the Air Force has only been requesting one or two C-130Js per year since 1996 for the active force. As previously shown in figure 1, the remaining J acquisitions were congressionally directed buys for the Guard and Reserve. Regarding alternatives to the J, we were told that alternatives have been evaluated and rejected in the past. What Is the C-130J Logistics Support Funding Shortfall? Air Force C-130 officials stated that funding shortfalls for the C-130 fleet have historically been a problem, primarily because Congress has added C-130 aircraft to their budget without providing the needed funding for logistics support. Scope and Methodology

To accomplish our objectives, we interviewed a number of officials within the Office of the Secretary of Defense; the Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Office of the Secretary of the Air Force; the Air Mobility Command, Scott Air Force Base, Illinois; the Air Combat Command, Langley Air Force Base, Virginia; the Air Force Materiel Command, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio; the Air Education and Training Center, Little Rock Air Force Base, Arkansas; Air National Guard Headquarters, Washington, D.C.; Air National Guard Readiness Center, Andrews Air Force Base, Maryland; Air National Guard, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania; the Air Force Reserve Command, Robins Air Force Base, Georgia; the Warner-Robins Air Logistics Center, Robins Air Force Base, Georgia; Air Force Reserve Components in Baltimore and Minneapolis; Lockheed Martin, Arlington, Virginia; Air Force Audit Agency; the National Science Foundation, Virginia; and the Defense Contract Management Command, Marietta, Georgia. To determine the Air Force requirement/justification for the C-130J aircraft and whether or not alternatives to buying the new J model were considered, we reviewed the C-130J Operational Requirement Document; the Single Acquisition Management Plan and other applicable program documentation; Senate Report 104-267, which required the Secretary of Defense to report by March 1997 on the benefits of remanufacturing the C-130 fleet and the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology’s April 29, 1997, letter to congressional defense committees on this subject; Wright-Patterson Air Force Base’s assessment of an unsolicited proposal to remanufacture the C-130 fleet; and data provided by Air Force headquarters regarding the requirement for the program.
Why GAO Did This Study

Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Air Force's C-130 program, focusing on: (1) the mission of the current and planned C-130 fleet; (2) the C-130 requirements for the Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve; (3) the C-130 procurement history in the Guard and Reserve units; (4) the Air Force's plans for retiring excess C-130s in the Mastering Station Plan (MSP); (5) whether the Air Force's process for retiring C-130 aircraft when replacement aircraft become available is effective; (6) what the Air Force C-130J requirement is and what other alternatives were considered; and (7) the C-130J logistics support funding shortfall.

What GAO Found

GAO noted that: (1) the current C-130 fleet is comprised of 12 different variants and the missions vary with each variant; (2) while most of the current fleet is comprised of combat delivery aircraft, many of the C-130 variants perform specialized missions; (3) at the time of GAO's review, peacetime and wartime requirements for the Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve combat delivery aircraft totalled 264 aircraft; (4) requirements for the Guard and Reserves' C-130 combat delivery aircraft are established in the Air Force's C-130 MSP, which was delivered to Congress in 1997; (5) for the past 21 years with the exception of five aircraft, Congress has directed the procurement of C-130s for the Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve units; (6) according to C-130 program officials, the Air Force has not requested these aircraft because aircraft in those units have many years of service life remaining; (7) about 50 C-130 aircraft were identified in the Air Force MSP as excess over requirements; (8) thirty of these were in the Air National Guard and the Air Force Reserve units and the remaining were in the active duty force; (9) reductions in the Air National Guard were expected to be 24 aircraft and the Air Force Reserve Command units were to be reduced by 6 aircraft; (10) according to Air Force officials, these reductions were not made; (11) although the Air Force has a process for governing the retirement of its aircraft, it has not been able to implement the process effectively; (12) as a result, some C-130 aircraft have been retired with substantial service life remaining and shortly after the aircraft had been modified; (13) as of March 1998, the Air Force had not decided how many C-130Js will be required; (14) the Air Force has been requesting one or two C-130Js per year since 1996 for the active force; (15) the remaining J acquisitions were congressionally-directed buys for the Guard and Reserve; (16) regarding alternatives to the J, GAO was told that alternatives have been evaluated and rejected in the past; and (17) Air Force C-130 officials stated that funding shortfalls for the C-130 fleet have historically been a problem, primarily because Congress has added C-130 aircraft to their budget without providing the needed funding for logistics support.