	Background

		DOD Biometric and Forensic Roles and Responsibilities

In April 2011 DOD issued a directive establishing a “defense forensic  enterprise” that, among other things, provided policy and assigned  responsibilities within the department to develop and maintain an  enduring and holistic forensic capability to support the full range of  military operations. DOD Has Developed Materiel Biometric and Forensic Capabilities to Meet Several Enduring Requirements and Has Made Progress in Transitioning These Capabilities to Base Funding

DOD has developed biometric and forensic capabilities to meet several  validated enduring materiel requirements, and it has made progress in  transitioning these capabilities from OCO to base funding. SOCOM Biometric Collection Device. DOD’s Efforts to Institutionalize Deployable Biometric and Forensic Capabilities Are Limited by Strategic Planning Gaps and Acquisition Management Challenges

DOD’s efforts to institutionalize its enduring deployable biometric and  forensic capabilities are limited by strategic planning gaps and acquisition  management challenges. DOD Lacks Current Biometric Strategic Planning Documents

While DOD has a current and approved forensic strategic plan, it does not  have a current and approved biometric strategic plan. However, according to DOD officials, the biometric strategic plan has not  been reviewed or updated since 2008, and a supporting implementation  plan has not been issued. DOD’s mission-critical authoritative biometrics database (i.e., DOD  ABIS) faces heightened operational risk because it does not have a  geographically dispersed back-up capability. At that time the Army did not develop a geographically  dispersed DOD ABIS back-up capability, and it has not subsequently  developed such a capability because of anticipated costs and the  assumption that the existing back-up system suffices, according to  DOD officials. Conclusions

DOD relies on its deployable biometric and forensic capabilities to support  a range of military operations, including the identification and targeting of  enemy combatants and terrorists. Since 2011 DOD has made  considerable progress in institutionalizing these capabilities, the majority  of which were developed through rapid acquisition processes and funded  with OCO funds to meet urgent and emergent warfighter needs in Iraq  and Afghanistan. Addressing these strategic planning and acquisition  management challenges will help DOD sustain the progress it has made  toward establishing enduring deployable biometric and forensic  capabilities. DOD also cited actions it plans to take to address  them. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

This report evaluates the extent to which the Department of Defense  (DOD) has since 2011 (1) validated enduring requirements for deployable  biometric and forensic capabilities; (2) taken actions to meet enduring  requirements for deployable biometric and forensic capabilities and  overcome any related challenges; and (3) taken actions to address prior  GAO recommendations regarding DOD’s biometric and forensic  capabilities. This included reviewing and assessing the Army’s 2015 analysis of  alternatives and 2016 draft capability production document for DOD’s  authoritative biometric database to identify key performance requirements  for the department’s follow-on biometric database.
Why GAO Did This Study

Since 2008 DOD has used biometric and forensic capabilities to capture or kill 1,700 individuals and deny 92,000 individuals access to military bases. These capabilities were mainly developed through rapid acquisition processes and were resourced with Overseas Contingency Operations funds—funds that are provided outside of DOD's base budget process. As a result, concerns have been raised about DOD's long-term ability to fund these capabilities.
The House Armed Services Committee and House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence included provisions in committee reports for GAO to review DOD's progress in institutionalizing deployable biometric and forensic capabilities. This report examines, among other issues, the extent to which DOD since 2011 has (1) validated long-term requirements for deployable biometric and forensic capabilities; and (2) taken actions to meet long-term requirements for deployable biometric and forensic capabilities and overcome any related challenges. GAO examined DOD directives, strategies, policies, plans, and requirements and met with cognizant DOD officials.

What GAO Found

The Department of Defense (DOD) has validated its requirements for long-term deployable biometric capabilities (such as fingerprint collection devices) and forensic capabilities (such as expeditionary laboratories). Biometric capabilities are used to identify individuals based on measurable anatomical, physiological, and behavioral characteristics such as fingerprints, iris scans, and voice recognition. Forensic capabilities support the scientific analysis of evidence—such as deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) and latent fingerprints—to link persons, places, things, and events. DOD utilizes deployable biometric and forensic capabilities to support a range of military operations, such as targeting, force protection, and humanitarian assistance.
DOD has made significant progress in addressing its long-term requirements for deployable biometric and forensic capabilities, such as issuing new doctrine and establishing long-term funding for several capabilities, including DOD's authoritative biometric database that is used for identifying enemy combatants and terrorists. However, DOD's efforts to institutionalize these capabilities are limited by the following strategic planning gaps and acquisition management challenges:
While DOD has a current and approved forensic strategic plan, it does not have one for its biometric capabilities, because no entity has been assigned responsibility for developing such a plan, according to DOD officials.
The Army did not follow DOD's acquisition protocols in developing a recent key biometric capability, and it may have missed an opportunity to leverage existing, viable, and less costly alternatives.
DOD's authoritative biometric database that is used for identifying enemy combatants and terrorists does not have a geographically dispersed back-up capability to protect against threats such as natural hazards. Having such a back-up could enhance the database's availability.
Addressing these strategic planning and acquisition management challenges could help DOD sustain the progress it has made to establish enduring deployable biometric and forensic capabilities.
The photographs above depict a warfighter obtaining a biometric iris image (left) and a forensic investigator collecting a latent fingerprint (right).

What GAO Recommends

GAO is making 6 recommendations, including that DOD update its biometric enterprise strategic plan; take steps to more effectively manage the acquisition of a recent biometric capability; and consider developing a geographically dispersed back-up capability for its authoritative biometric database. DOD concurred with all of the recommendations and cited actions it plans to take to address them.