DOD has referred to this contingency as an “exit  strategy.”

	Army and Air Force Encountered Limitations in Their Sustainment Plans for Some Fielded Weapon Systems

The Army and the Air Force have encountered limitations in their  sustainment plans for some fielded weapon systems because they lacked  needed technical data rights. The lack of technical data rights has limited  the services’ flexibility to make changes to sustainment plans that are  aimed at achieving cost savings and meeting legislative requirements  regarding depot maintenance capabilities. Although the circumstances  surrounding each case were unique, earlier decisions made on technical  data rights during system acquisition were cited as a primary reason for the  limitations subsequently encountered. According to Air Force officials, there are  some instances where the sub-vendor is unwilling to provide the needed  technical data. Without the rights  to the technical data or a partnership with the sub-vendor, the Air Force  cannot develop a core maintenance capability for this equipment item. Although we did not assess the rationale for the decisions made on  technical data rights during the acquisition of these systems, several  factors may complicate program managers’ decisions on long-term  technical data rights for weapon systems. The extent to which the system being acquired incorporates technology  that was not developed with government funding. DOD Acquisition Policies Do Not Specifically Address Long-term Needs for Technical Data Rights

DOD’s acquisition policies do not specifically address long-term needs for  technical data rights to sustain weapon systems over their life cycle, and in  the absence of a DOD-wide policy, the Army and the Air Force are working  independently to develop structured approaches for defining technical data  requirements and securing rights to those data. DOD’s current acquisition  policies do not specifically require program managers to assess long-term  needs for technical data rights to support weapon systems and,  correspondingly, to develop acquisition strategies that address those needs. Army and Air Force logistics officials have recognized  weaknesses in their approaches to assessing and securing technical data  rights, and each service has begun to address these weaknesses by  developing more structured approaches. However, current DOD  acquisition policies do not facilitate these efforts. Unless DOD assesses  and secures its rights for the use of technical data early in the weapon  system acquisition process when it has the greatest leverage to negotiate,  DOD may face later challenges in developing sustainment plans or  changing these plans as necessary over the life cycle of its weapon systems. These assessments and corresponding acquisition  strategies should  be developed prior to issuance of the contract solicitation;  address the merits of including a priced contract option for the future  delivery of technical data;  address the potential for changes in the sustainment plan over the  weapon system’s life cycle, which may include the development of  maintenance capability at public depots, the development of new  sources of supply to increase production, or the solicitation of  competitive offers for the acquisition of spare parts and components;  and  apply to weapon systems that are to be supported by performance- based logistics arrangements as well as to weapon systems that are to  be supported by other sustainment approaches. For the other  seven weapon system programs—the C-17 aircraft, F-22 aircraft, C-130J  aircraft, Up-armored High-Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle, Stryker  family of vehicles, Airborne Warning and Control System aircraft, and M4  carbine—we obtained information on the service’s requirement for rights  to use the data, their success in obtaining data rights from the  manufacturer, and the effect that a lack of data rights had on system  sustainment plans. Specifically, DOD should: “consider requiring program offices, during weapon system acquisition, to  develop acquisition strategies that provide for a future delivery of sufficient  technical data to enable the program office to select an alternative  source—public or private—or to offer the work out for competition if the  performance-based arrangement fails or becomes prohibitively expensive.”

	Objectives

GAO will analyze and report on the following:   To what extent DOD policies limit the services from purchasing technical  data when acquiring new weapons systems;  The status of DOD’s plans to revise acquisition policy in response to the  previous GAO recommendation on technical data;   The costs for obtaining access in order to view, modify, or distribute  technical data relating to the sustainment of procured systems; and  The amount of time required to reach back to the system manufacturer for  technical data and what impact, if any, that delay has on repairing or  modifying fielded systems.
Why GAO Did This Study

A critical element in the life cycle of a weapon system is the availability of the item's technical data--recorded information used to define a design and to produce, support, maintain, or operate the item. Because a weapon system may remain in the defense inventory for decades following initial acquisition, technical data decisions made during acquisition can have far-reaching implications over its life cycle. In August 2004, GAO recommended that the Department of Defense (DOD) consider requiring program offices to develop acquisition strategies that provide for future delivery of technical data should the need arise to select an alternative source for logistics support or to offer the work out for competition. For this review, GAO (1) evaluated how sustainment plans for Army and Air Force weapon systems had been affected by technical data rights and (2) examined requirements for obtaining technical data rights under current DOD acquisition policies.

What GAO Found

The Army and the Air Force have encountered limitations in their sustainment plans for some fielded weapon systems because they lacked needed technical data rights. The lack of technical data rights has limited the services' flexibility to make changes to sustainment plans that are aimed at achieving cost savings and meeting legislative requirements regarding depot maintenance capabilities. GAO identified seven weapon system programs that encountered such limitations--C-17, F-22, and C-130J aircraft, Up-armored High-Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle, Stryker family of vehicles, Airborne Warning and Control System aircraft, and M4 carbine. Although the circumstances surrounding each case were unique, earlier decisions made on technical data rights during system acquisition were cited as a primary reason for the limitations subsequently encountered. As a result of the limitations encountered, the services had to alter their plans for developing maintenance capability at public depots, developing new sources of supply to increase production, or soliciting competitive offers for the acquisition of spare parts and components to reduce sustainment costs. For example, the Air Force identified a need to develop a core maintenance capability for the C-17 at government depots to ensure it had the ability to support national defense emergencies, but it lacked the requisite technical data rights. To mitigate this limitation, the Air Force is seeking to form partnerships with C-17 sub-vendors. However, according to Air Force officials, some sub-vendors have declined to provide the needed technical data needed to develop core capability. Although GAO did not assess the rationale for the decisions made on technical data rights during system acquisition, several factors, such as the extent the system incorporates technology that was not developed with government funding and the potential for changes in the technical data over the weapon system's life cycle, may complicate program managers' decisions. Current DOD acquisition policies do not specifically address long-term technical data rights for weapon system sustainment. For example, DOD's policies do not require program managers to assess long-term needs for technical data rights to support weapon systems and, correspondingly, to develop acquisition strategies that address those needs. DOD, as part of the department's acquisition reforms and performance-based strategies, has deemphasized the acquisition of technical data rights. Although GAO has recommended that DOD emphasize the need for technical data rights, DOD has not implemented these recommendations. The Army and the Air Force have recognized weaknesses in their approaches to assessing and securing technical data rights and have begun to address these weaknesses by developing more structured approaches. However, DOD acquisition policies do not facilitate these efforts. Unless DOD assesses and secures its rights for the use of technical data early in the weapon system acquisition process when it has the greatest leverage to negotiate, DOD may face later challenges in sustaining weapon systems over their life cycle.