	DHS Has Developed a Strategic Plan for GNDA, but It Does Not Yet Discuss Key Elements for Addressing Gaps

In our past work on GNDA, we made recommendations about the need  for a strategic plan to guide the development of the GDNA. Among other  things, in July 2008, we recommended that DHS develop an overall  strategic plan for the GNDA that (1) clearly defines the objectives to be  accomplished, (2) identifies the roles and responsibilities for meeting  each objective, (3) identifies the funding necessary to achieve those  objectives, and (4) employs monitoring mechanisms to determine  programmatic progress and identify needed improvements. In January  2009, we also recommended that DHS develop strategies to guide the  domestic aspects of the GNDA including establishing time frames and  costs for addressing previously identified gaps in the GNDA—land border  areas between ports of entry, international general aviation, and small  maritime vessels. In December 2010, DNDO issued a strategic plan for the GNDA. For example, the Department of Energy has the lead for several aspects  of enhancing international capabilities for detecting nuclear materials  abroad, DHS has the lead for detecting nuclear materials as they cross  the border into the United States, and the Nuclear Regulatory  Commission has the lead on reporting and sharing information on lost or  stolen domestic radiological material. In addition, earlier this year, DNDO  released the Global Nuclear Detection Architecture Joint Annual  Interagency Review 2011. This review describes the current status of  GNDA and includes information about the multiple federal programs that  collectively seek to prevent nuclear terrorism in the United States. However, neither the strategic plan nor the 2011 interagency review  identifies funding needed to achieve the strategic plan’s objectives nor  establishes monitoring mechanisms to determine programmatic progress  and identify needed improvements—key elements of a strategic plan that  we previously identified in our recommendations. In our view, one of the key benefits of a strategic plan is that it is a  comprehensive means of establishing priorities, and using these priorities  to allocate resources so that the greatest needs are being addressed. Accordingly, while DNDO’s new  strategic plan represents an important step forward in guiding the  development of the GNDA, DNDO could do more to articulate strategies,  priorities, timeframes and costs in addressing gaps and further deploying  the GNDA in order to protect the homeland from the consequences of  nuclear terrorism. In discussing these issues with DHS officials, they  indicated that they will be producing a GNDA implementation plan later  this year that will address several of these issues. DHS Continues to Make Progress in Deploying Radiation Detection Equipment

As we reported in June 2010, DHS has made significant progress in  deploying both radiation detection equipment and developing procedures  to scan cargo and conveyances entering the United States through fixed  land and sea ports of entry for nuclear and radiological materials,  deploying nearly two-thirds of the radiation portal monitors identified in its  deployment plan. According to DHS officials, the department scans nearly  100 percent of the cargo and conveyances entering the United States  through land borders and major seaports. However, as we reported, DHS  has made less progress scanning for radiation in (1) railcars entering the  United States from Canada and Mexico; (2) international air cargo; and  (3) international commercial aviation aircraft, passengers, or baggage. Similarly, at major seaports, according  to DHS officials, the department scans nearly all containerized cargo  entering U.S. seaports for nuclear and radiological materials. DHS Has Had Difficulty in Developing New Technologies to Detect Nuclear Materials

Since 2006, we have reported that DHS faces difficulties in developing  new technologies to detect nuclear and radiological materials. Specifically, we have reported on longstanding problems with DNDO’s  efforts to deploy advanced spectroscopic portal (ASP) radiation detection  monitors. DNDO’s problems developing the ASP and CAARS technologies are  examples of broader challenges DHS faces in developing and acquiring  new technologies to meet homeland security needs. However, it is still too early to assess  the impact of DHS’s efforts to address these challenges. Nuclear Detection: Preliminary Observations on the Domestic Nuclear  Detection Office’s Efforts to Develop a Global Nuclear Detection  Architecture, GAO-08-999T (Washington, D.C.: July 16, 2008). Customs Service: Acquisition and Deployment of Radiation Detection  Equipment, GAO-03-235T (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 17, 2002). This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the  United States.
Why GAO Did This Study

This testimony discusses our past work examining the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) progress and efforts in planning, developing, and deploying its global nuclear detection architecture (GNDA). The overall mission of the GNDA is to use an integrated system of radiation detection equipment and interdiction activities to combat nuclear smuggling in foreign countries, at the U.S. border, and inside the United States. Terrorists smuggling nuclear or radiological material into the United States could use these materials to make an improvised nuclear device or a radiological dispersal device (also called a "dirty bomb"). The detonation of a nuclear device in an urban setting could cause hundreds of thousands of deaths and devastate buildings and physical infrastructure for miles. While not as damaging, a radiological dispersal device could nonetheless cause hundreds of millions of dollars in socioeconomic costs as a large part of a city would have to be evacuated--and possibly remain inaccessible--until an extensive radiological decontamination effort was completed. Accordingly, the GNDA remains our country's principal strategy in protecting the homeland from the consequences of nuclear terrorism. The GNDA is a multi-departmental effort coordinated by DHS's Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO). DNDO is also responsible for developing, acquiring, and deploying radiation detection equipment to support the efforts of DHS and other federal agencies. Federal efforts to combat nuclear smuggling have largely focused on established ports of entry, such as seaports and land border crossings. However, DNDO has also been examining nuclear detection strategies along other potential pathways and has identified several gaps in the GNDA, including (1) land border areas between ports of entry into the United States; (2) international general aviation; and (3) small maritime craft, such as recreational boats and commercial fishing vessels. Developing strategies, technologies, and resources to address these gaps remains one of the key challenges in deploying the GNDA. Some progress has been made, but DHS and other federal agencies have yet to fully address gaps in the global nuclear detection architecture. Specifically, this testimony discusses DHS's efforts to (1) address our prior recommendations to develop a strategic plan for the GNDA, including developing strategies to prevent smuggling of nuclear or radiological materials via the critical gaps DNDO identified, (2) complete the deployment of radiation detection equipment to scan all cargo and conveyances entering the United States at ports of entry, and (3) develop new technologies to detect nuclear or radioactive materials. This testimony is based on our prior work on U.S. government efforts to detect and prevent the smuggling of nuclear and radiological materials issued from October 2002 through September 2010. We updated this information in July 2011 to reflect DHS's efforts to address our prior recommendations by meeting with DNDO officials and reviewing recent DNDO documents, such as the 2010 GNDA Strategic Plan and the 2011 GNDA Joint Annual Interagency Review.

What GAO Found

In summary, since December 2010, DNDO has issued both a strategic plan to guide the development of the GNDA and an annual report on the current status of the GNDA. The new strategic plan addressed some key components of what we previously recommended be included in a strategic plan, such as identifying the roles and responsibilities for meeting strategic objectives. However, neither the plan nor the annual report identifies funding needed to achieve the strategic plan's objectives or employs monitoring mechanisms to determine programmatic progress and identify needed improvements. DHS officials informed us that they will address these missing elements in an implementation plan, which they plan to issue before the end of this year. As we reported in September 2010, DHS has made progress in deploying both radiation detection equipment and developing procedures to scan cargo entering the United States through land and sea ports of entry for nuclear and radiological materials. For example, according to DHS officials, the department scans nearly 100 percent of the cargo and conveyances entering the United States through land borders and major seaports. However, as we reported in July 2011, DHS has experienced challenges in developing new technologies to detect nuclear and radiological materials, such as developing and meeting key performance requirements. DHS has plans to enhance its development and acquisition of new technologies, although it is still too early to assess their impact on addressing the challenges we identified in our past work.