	Overview

The United States Congress has a long history of engagement on U.S. policy toward Sudan—since the end of apartheid in South Africa, there is no country (now countries) in Africa on which Congress has focused greater attention. Fighting in these states is driven by local grievances against Khartoum and has severely affected more than half a million people. These conflicts and the ongoing hostilities in Sudan's western Darfur region complicate U.S. relations with both countries and have led the Obama Administration to defer efforts to begin normalizing relations with Sudan. U.S. Special Envoy for Sudan and South Sudan Princeton Lyman outlined his view of the challenge in August 2012: 
Sudan cannot deal with the ongoing troubles in Darfur, Southern Kordofan, Blue Nile, the east, and elsewhere in the country with a system that does not meet the demands for greater political space, for greater sharing of wealth and opportunity and for greater democracy. As Appendix B indicates, population displacement and food insecurity are significant problems in both countries. As with the north-south war, casualty estimates in the Darfur conflict vary extensively. This came more than six years after the SPLM and the government of Sudan signed the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) to bring an end to over two decades of civil war between north and south. Outstanding Issues and Disputes

Despite their formal separation, Sudan and South Sudan remain linked by—and divided over—a range of shared interests and outstanding disputes. Donors who had played a key role in the peace process, including the United States, offered incentives to encourage Khartoum to recognize the result of the south's referendum and ensure a peaceful transition. Sudan's military operations in the borderlands and related human rights violations have discouraged the delivery of support to Khartoum. The borderlands were the front lines of the civil war, and negotiations to conclusively define the precise location of the border have been complicated by grievances and distrust among the communities who live along it, and by the concentration of oil reserves in these areas. Throughout the current conflict, access by relief agencies to populations in both states has been extremely limited, and humanitarian conditions have deteriorated dramatically. Experts suggest that the condition of refugees arriving at camps across the border in South Sudan and Ethiopia is likely indicative of conditions inside the two states—refugees who fled in 2011 were primarily fleeing the violence and moving in anticipation of coming food shortages. Normalizing Relations Between the Sudans

The working relationship built between the NCP and the SPLM during the CPA period has deteriorated dramatically in the past year. They formally became two separate organizations on July 9, 2011, but remain tied by historic bonds and close relationships. Some, but not all, of those accused of serious abuses have faced military justice. Insecurity in parts of the country periodically impedes access to other populations that have been internally displaced. Within the NCP, reports of large-scale state corruption, including allegations directed at Bashir himself, have led to calls for internal party reform. The Administration has been publicly critical of both Sudan's aerial and artillery attacks against South Sudan and South Sudan's attack on Heglig, and has demanded that South Sudan cease any support for the SPLM-N. Administration officials also continue to register "grave concern" with the delayed implementation of agreements on humanitarian access in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile, stressing Khartoum's responsibility to act with urgency. Further sanctions were imposed more recently—several relate specifically to the Darfur conflict. Should the Administration decide to ease certain sanctions against Sudan, possibly in exchange for concessions from Khartoum, changes to some restrictions would require congressional action. While the relationship between Washington and Juba, which has been characterized by President Obama and Secretary Clinton as a "partnership," is markedly warmer than that with Khartoum, it too is tempered by concerns about human rights abuses and corruption. After decades of war, distrust between the two governments is high. The Humanitarian Situation
Appendix C. U.S. Foreign Assistance to the Sudans
Appendix D. Acronyms
Acronyms
AMIS: African Union Mission in Sudan
AUHIP: African Union High-Level Implementation Panel
CPA: Comprehensive Peace Agreement
DDPD: Doha Document for Peace in Darfur
DRA: Darfur Regional Authority
DUP: Democratic Unionist Party (an opposition party in Sudan)
JEM: Justice and Equality Movement (an insurgent group in Darfur)
LJM: Liberty and Justice Movement
NCF: National Consensus Forces (an alliance of opposition parties in Sudan)
NCP: National Congress Party (Sudan's ruling party)
NIF: National Islamic Front
PCP: Popular Congress Party (an opposition party in Sudan)
PDF: Popular Defense Forces (Sudanese government-backed militia)
SAF: Sudan Armed Forces (the Sudanese military)
SDBZ: Safe Demilitarized Border Zone
SLM/A: Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (an insurgent group in Darfur)
SPLM/A: Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (South Sudan's ruling party and its army, respectively)
SPLM/A-N: Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army – North (formerly a recognized opposition party in Sudan, became an insurgent group in 2011)
SRF: Sudan Revolutionary Front (an alliance of insurgent groups in Sudan) 
UNAMID: United Nations – African Union Hybrid Mission in Darfur
UNISFA: United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei
UNMIS: United Nations Mission in Sudan
UNMISS: United Nations Mission in South Sudan
Appendix E. Peacekeeping Operations
Congress has played an active role in U.S. policy toward Sudan for more than three decades. Efforts to support an end to the country's myriad conflicts and human rights abuses have dominated the agenda, as have counterterrorism concerns. When unified (1956-2011), Sudan was Africa's largest nation, bordering nine countries and stretching from the northern borders of Kenya and Uganda to the southern borders of Egypt and Libya. Strategically located along the Nile River and the Red Sea, Sudan was historically described as a crossroads between the Arab world and Africa. Domestic and international efforts to unite its ethnically, racially, religiously, and culturally diverse population under a common national identity fell short, however. In 2011, after decades of civil war and a 6.5 year transitional period, Sudan split in two. Mistrust between the two Sudans—Sudan and South Sudan—lingers, and unresolved disputes and related security issues still threaten to pull the two countries back to war.
The north-south split did not resolve other simmering conflicts, notably in Darfur, Blue Nile, and Southern Kordofan. Roughly 2.5 million people remain displaced as a result of these conflicts. Like the broader sub-region, the Sudans are susceptible to drought and food insecurity, despite significant agricultural potential in some areas. Civilians in the conflict zones are particularly vulnerable. Instability and Sudanese government restrictions have limited relief agencies' access to conflict-affected populations. Humanitarian conditions in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile have been at crisis levels for months, but an estimated half a million people remain largely beyond the reach of aid groups. Logistical challenges constrain the delivery of relief for those who have fled, primarily to remote refugee camps across the border in South Sudan. The harassment of aid workers is a problem in both Sudans, further hindering aid responses.
The peaceful separation of Sudan and South Sudan was seen by some players as an opportunity to repair relations between Sudan's Islamist government and the United States. Those ties have long been strained over Khartoum's human rights violations and history of support for international terrorist groups. Among the arguments in favor of normalizing relations with Sudan has been the notion that the United States has few additional unilateral "sticks" to apply against Khartoum, given robust sanctions already in place. Applying certain "carrots," such as easing sanctions, might encourage further political reforms, proponents say. The Obama Administration sought to improve the relationship with Khartoum in 2011, given South Sudan's successful referendum and separation from Sudan, and Sudan's cooperation on counterterrorism. The U.S. effort has been impeded by ongoing reports of abuses, including allegations that Khartoum continues to commit war crimes against civilians. Some observers argue that improving the relationship would reward bad behavior. Relations are also complicated by the fact that several government officials, notably President Omar al Bashir, have been accused of war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide at the International Criminal Court in relation to the Darfur conflict.
U.S. relations with South Sudan, which are rooted in years of American activism and disaster relief to the south during the civil war, remain close, though there have been signs of strain in 2012. The United States is the country's largest bilateral donor, but the Administration has expressed concern over certain actions taken by leaders in Juba that have, in its view, further aggravated the relationship between the Sudans and the economic situation in both countries.
This report examines the shared interests and outstanding disputes between the Sudans after separation, and gives an overview of political, economic, and humanitarian conditions in the two countries, with a focus on possible implications for U.S. policy and congressional engagement.