Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

To illustrate the need to compare the services’ plans for improving their interdiction capabilities, we evaluated (1) the services’ current and future aggregate interdiction assets for striking identified enemy targets and (2) the effect of the services’ planned modernization programs on total interdiction capabilities and alternatives to those programs. The services have concluded, and we concur, that they have enough capability to carry out the national military strategy. Our analysis indicated that some proposals may not be sound investments. This allowed us to focus on the interdiction contribution of those weapons if they are modified or added to the services’ capabilities. Some of these modernization programs may be worth the cost if they materially strengthen interdiction capabilities, but until DOD’s decision processes give sufficient attention to interdiction capabilities in the aggregate, there can be little assurance that the appropriate, most cost-effective mix of weapon systems is being identified, developed, and fielded for interdiction missions.
Why GAO Did This Study

GAO evaluated the military services' current aggregate interdiction assets for striking enemy targets and the contribution of planned modernization programs to total interdiction capabilities, focusing on the reasonableness of the planned enhancements.

What GAO Found

GAO found that: (1) although the services have determined that they have enough capability to carry out the national military strategy of being able to engage and win in two nearly simultaneous major regional conflicts, the services plan to spend over $213 billion to modify and purchase weapons; (2) the services' independently developed modernization plans do not consider the other services' capabilities, sometimes resulting in interdiction redundancies; (3) some weapons modernization proposals may not be sound investments because they may add expensive new capabilities that may be redundant or unnecessary; and (4) until the Department of Defense assesses interdiction capabilities in the aggregate, there can be little assurance that the appropriate, most cost-effective mix of weapons systems is being identified, developed, and fielded for interdiction missions.