In 2002, about 6.8 million recipients were paid  about $35 billion in SSI benefits. According to our own analysis of SSA’s data,  residency overpayments appear to vary by geographic region, with the  majority of overpayments having been detected in several large  metropolitan areas. Moreover, of approximately 3,000 counties in the United  States, 50 accounted for 77 percent of all residency overpayments detected  by SSA during this time. Most Overpayments Were Made to Recipients Born outside the United States

SSA’s data also show that individuals born outside the United States  accounted for at least 87 percent of all SSI residency overpayments  between 1997 and 2001. Reliance on Self- Reported Information and Other Vulnerabilities Impede SSA’s Ability to Detect and Deter Violations

SSA’s ability to detect and deter residency violations is impeded by three  kinds of weaknesses: dependence on self-reported information by clients,  insufficient use of existing compliance tools, and a failure to pursue  independent data sources for its verifications. First, the agency relies  heavily on self-reported information from recipients to determine  domestic residency, often without independently verifying such  information. Finally, the agency has not employed the use of  independent data sources from other federal agencies or private  organizations to detect nonresidency of SSI recipients. SSA has  used statistical risk analysis techniques for many years in the SSI program  to identify recipients who are more likely to be overpaid. Thus, the agency’s approach to this problem has been  generally ad hoc and restricted in scope. We recognize that the SSI program is  complex to administer and residency requirements are particularly  difficult to enforce because they can necessitate time-consuming, labor- intensive verification checks, such as home visits. However, SSA has not  employed a systematic, comprehensive approach to this problem that  would allow the agency to use its available systems and procedures more  efficiently and reduce the program’s exposure to additional violations. For example, SSA noted that financial  records may not be an accurate basis for identifying recipients who are  outside the country for more than 30 days. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

This appendix provides additional details about our analysis of the  Supplemental Security Income program’s (SSI) residency violations,  including potential weaknesses in the Social Security Administration’s  (SSA) policies and procedures. 1. 2.
Why GAO Did This Study

The Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program paid about $35 million recipients in 2002. In recent years, the Social Security Administration (SSA) has identified a general increase in the amount of annual overpayments made to (1) individuals who are found to have violated program residency requirements or (2) recipients who leave the United States and live outside the country for more than 30 consecutive days without informing SSA. This problem has caused concern among both program administrators and policy makers. As such, GAO was asked to determine what is known about the extent to which SSI benefits are improperly paid to individuals who are not present in the United States and to identify any weaknesses in SSA's processes and policies that impede the agency's ability to detect and deter residency violations.

What GAO Found

Overpayments resulting from residency violations totaled about $118 million between 1997 and 2001. However, this figure, which represents only violations detected by SSA, likely understates the true level of the problem. Additionally, the extent of violations appears to vary by geographic region, with overpayments being more prevalent in several large metropolitan areas. GAO found that 54 percent of all overpayments detected by SSA during this period occurred in just 15 counties. In addition, GAO found that recipients born outside the United States accounted for at least 87 percent of all residency overpayments. SSA's ability to detect and deter residency violations is impeded by three kinds of weaknesses. First, the agency relies heavily on self-reported information from recipients to determine domestic residency, often without independently verifying such information. Second, SSA makes insufficient use of existing tools to detect violations, such as its "risk analysis" system, redeterminations, and home visits. Finally, the agency has not adequately pursued independent sources of information from other federal agencies or private organizations to detect nonresidency of SSI recipients. GAO recognizes that the SSI program is complex to administer, and residency requirements are particularly difficult to enforce because they can necessitate time-consuming, labor-intensive verification checks, such as home visits. However, SSA has not employed a systematic, comprehensive approach to this problem that would allow the agency to use its available systems and procedures more efficiently and reduce the program's exposure to additional violations.