According to NSC officials,  this document serves as a governmentwide strategy for the 4-year  initiative. Interagency Strategy for the 4-Year Global Nuclear Material Security Initiative Lacks Key Implementation Details, and the Initiative’s Overall Costs, Time Frames, and Scope Are Uncertain

We found that the interagency strategy for the 4-year global nuclear  material security initiative lacks specific details concerning how the  initiative will be implemented, including the identity of and details  regarding vulnerable foreign nuclear material sites and facilities to be  addressed, agencies and programs responsible for addressing each site,  planned activities at each location, potential challenges and strategies for  overcoming those obstacles, anticipated timelines, and cost estimates. The future  of these efforts in Russia could be jeopardized by an uncertain high-level  Russian political commitment to further nuclear security cooperation with  the United States. In particular, because of the challenges facing the  MPC&A program, NNSA is unlikely to meet the deadline under current  U.S. law requiring Russia to assume sole responsibility for sustaining  MPC&A by January 1, 2013, and MPC&A program activities will likely need  to continue in Russia beyond 2012. NNSA Program Securing Russian Nuclear Warhead and Material Facilities Has Made Progress, while NNSA Programs to Consolidate Russian HEU and Convert Russian Research Reactors Have Produced More Limited Results

While the MPC&A program has made considerable progress in improving  the security of Russia’s nuclear warheads and material facilities, the other  two programs—MCC and GTRI—have had more limited success in  achieving their objectives in Russia. The MPC&A program in particular faces two principal challenges  to completing its efforts in Russia by the end of 2012, as required under  U.S. law, including (1) successfully completing upgrades against insider  and outsider threats at some Russian nuclear material facilities and (2)  developing both Russian national-level infrastructure and practices and  procedures at Russian sites to ensure effective long-term sustainability of  MPC&A systems for nuclear materials. NNSA’s Efforts to Improve Nuclear Material Security in Other Countries Are Under Way, but Progress Is Mixed

In addition to its efforts in Russia, NNSA is working with other countries  on issues related to the security of weapon-usable nuclear materials. In  two countries that are believed to have large nuclear material stockpiles— China and India—NNSA’s efforts have been primarily limited to the  relatively noncontroversial exchange of nuclear security best practices,  training, and demonstration projects, rather than working to develop a  program of security improvements at nuclear material facilities in those  countries. NNSA is also seeking to accelerate the removal of weapon- usable nuclear materials from other priority countries through the GTRI  program, including key countries that made new commitments at the April  2010 Nuclear Security Summit to relinquish or reduce their weapon-usable  nuclear material stockpiles. Recommendations for Executive Action

We recommend that the Secretary of Energy and the Administrator of  NNSA take the following three actions:  to assist Congress in its decision whether and for how long to extend the  current deadline, clarify in a written plan the scope of remaining MPC&A  work in Russia beyond the current program deadline, including  information on remaining MPC&A activities by site or facility, timelines,  and estimated costs of completing MPC&A program work in that country;  to enhance NNSA nuclear nonproliferation program planning, and provide  a clearer picture of Russia’s willingness and ability to support and sustain  MPC&A and other nuclear security investments the United States has  made in Russia, strengthen cooperation with the Russian government  regarding the transparency of its current and future spending plans on  nuclear security programs and activities; and reevaluate NNSA strategies—with an eye toward new incentives,  inducements, or other sources of leverage—to persuade Russia to expand  its cooperation with the MCC and GTRI programs with the goal of  expediting the consolidation of Russian HEU to fewer locations and the  conversion of Russian HEU-fueled research reactors and related facilities. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are  listed in appendix V.

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

The objectives of our review were to assess (1) U.S. governmentwide  efforts to implement the President’s initiative to secure all vulnerable  nuclear materials worldwide within 4 years; (2) the status and challenges,  if any, of the National Nuclear Security Administration’s (NNSA) nuclear  security programs in Russia; and (3) NNSA efforts to secure nuclear  materials in countries other than Russia.
Why GAO Did This Study

In April 2009, President Obama announced an international initiative to secure all vulnerable nuclear materials worldwide within 4 years. Nonproliferation programs administered by the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) are working to secure nuclear materials in Russia and other countries. GAO assessed (1) U.S. governmentwide efforts to implement the President's 4-year nuclear material security initiative; (2) the status and challenges, if any, of NNSA's nuclear security programs in Russia; and (3) NNSA efforts to secure nuclear materials in countries other than Russia. To address these issues, GAO analyzed U.S. nuclear security strategies and plans and interviewed U.S. and Russian government officials. This report summarizes the findings of GAO's classified report on securing nuclear materials worldwide.

What GAO Found

NSC officials have approved a governmentwide strategy for the President's 4-year global nuclear material security initiative that describes the scope and objectives of the interagency effort and identifies the main efforts by U.S. agencies and programs to support the initiative. However, this interagency strategy lacks specific details concerning how the initiative will be implemented, including the identity of vulnerable foreign nuclear material sites and facilities to be addressed, agencies and programs responsible for addressing each site, planned activities at each location, potential challenges and strategies for overcoming those obstacles, anticipated timelines, and cost estimates. As a result, key details associated with the initiative are unclear, including its overall estimated cost, time frame, and scope of planned work. Three NNSA nuclear nonproliferation programs GAO reviewed--the MPC&A program, the Materials Consolidation and Conversion (MCC) program, and the Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI)--have made varying degrees of progress in securing Russian nuclear warheads and materials. While the MPC&A program has made considerable progress securing Russia's nuclear warhead and material facilities, the MCC and GTRI programs have had more limited success achieving their objectives in Russia. Moreover, the future of these efforts in Russia is unclear because of questionable high-level Russian political commitment to nuclear security cooperation with the United States. Each of these three programs also faces implementation challenges. The MPC&A program, in particular, faces challenges in successfully completing upgrades against insider and outsider threats at some Russian nuclear material facilities and in transitioning responsibility to Russia for sustaining MPC&A systems. Because of the time required to address these challenges, NNSA is unlikely to meet a deadline under current U.S. law requiring Russia to assume sole responsibility for sustaining MPC&A by January 1, 2013, and MPC&A program activities will need to continue in Russia beyond the statutory deadline. In addition to its efforts in Russia, NNSA is working with other countries on issues related to the security of weapon-usable nuclear materials. In two countries believed to have large nuclear material stockpiles--China and India--political sensitivities have limited NNSA's efforts in both nations to the relatively noncontroversial exchange of nuclear security best practices, training, and demonstration projects instead of implementing MPC&A activities directly at nuclear sites. NNSA is also seeking to accelerate the removal of weapon-usable nuclear materials from other priority countries through the GTRI program, including key countries that made new commitments at the April 2010 Nuclear Security Summit to relinquish or reduce their weapon-usable nuclear material stockpiles. In particular, NNSA officials reported progress in negotiations with several nations--including Ukraine and South Africa--following the summit for the removal of some highly enriched uranium located in those countries. GAO suggests that Congress consider extending the deadline for NNSA to complete Material Protection, Control, and Accounting (MPC&A) program activities in Russia.

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that the Department of Energy (DOE) and NNSA take several actions regarding three nonproliferation program efforts in Russia, such as clarifying the remaining scope and costs of MPC&A work in Russia. GAO also recommends that the National Security Council (NSC) lead interagency development of a more detailed implementation plan for the President's 4-year initiative. DOE and NNSA agreed with the recommendations. NSC did not comment on GAO's recommendations.