	NRC Has Implemented Three of the Six Recommendations from GAO’s 2003 Report

Since 2003, NRC has worked with agreement states and others to identify  the radioactive materials that pose the greatest risk of being used to make  an RDD, established additional security measures for these materials, and  taken steps to ensure the increased security measures are effectively  implemented. However, NRC has not successfully corrected the  weaknesses in its radioactive materials licensing processes. Finally, NRC has not yet  decided whether certain radioactive sources need stronger licensing  requirements. 1). According to NRC, all increased controls were to be fully implemented by  June 2006. Weaknesses Persist in NRC’s Materials Licensing Process

To increase the security of radioactive materials and sealed sources and  better ensure that they are used as intended, we recommended in 2003  that NRC modify its process for issuing specific licenses to ensure that  such sources cannot be purchased before NRC has verified, through  inspection or other means, that the materials and sources will be used as  intended. NRC Has Taken No Significant Actions to Mitigate the Potential Psychological Effects of an RDD

In addition to recommending that NRC work with agreement states and  others to identify and better secure the radioactive sources that pose the  greatest risk of being used to make an RDD, we also recommended that  NRC determine how to effectively mitigate the potential psychological  effects of malicious use of radioactive materials. NRC Has Improved Its Ability to Monitor and Track Radioactive Sealed Sources, but New Systems Have Been Delayed

NRC has developed an interim database that can monitor and track the  more dangerous, category 1 and 2 radioactive sealed sources. In its technical comments on a draft of this report, NRC told us  that it is developing a third system—a license verification system—which,  once operational, will draw on the information in NSTS and the Web-based  licensing system which will provide regulators and vendors of radioactive  sources with an easily accessible ability to verify that those seeking to  purchase nationally tracked sources are licensed to do so. Moreover, the Web- based licensing system may not initially include any information on  radioactive materials licenses issued by agreement states—which  represent over 80 percent of all U.S. licenses for these materials. The delays in the development of both the NSTS and the Web-based  licensing system are especially consequential because NRC officials, both  commissioners and staff, have identified the deployment of these systems  as key to improving the control and accountability of radioactive materials  in the United States. More specifically, in NRC’s September 2007 public  hearing addressing the weaknesses that we uncovered in NRC’s materials  licensing program, the commissioners said that an expanded NSTS  including category 3 and perhaps the largest category 4 sources, a Web- based licensing system including agreement state data, and some means  for making relevant information in both of these systems available to  vendors and officials at ports of entry, would be a secure and effective  means of verifying that those seeking to obtain radioactive materials, or  enter the United States with licensable quantities of radioactive materials  or sources, were doing so for legitimate purposes. However, some equipment that is used to protect  CBP officers is in short supply. Some Radiation Detection Equipment Is in Short Supply

Finally, we found that personal radiation detectors—an important  component of the suite of radiation detection equipment at the borders— are in short supply. This updated guidance, however, was not effectively communicated to  officers at the border. The  recent decision to develop a third new system has added to these  concerns. While CBP has a comprehensive system in place to detect radiation at  ports of entry on the northern and southern borders, CBP’s task of  preventing the smuggling of radioactive materials is made more difficult by  the fact that guidance on when officers should verify whether radioactive  materials being brought into the United States are legitimately licensed has  not been effectively communicated. Finally, to improve the likelihood of preventing radioactive sources and  materials from being smuggled into the United States, we recommend that  the Secretary of Homeland Security direct the Commissioner of Customs  and Border Protection to    effectively communicate current Customs and Border Protection  guidance to officers at ports of entry regarding when they are required  to contact the National Targeting Center to verify that radioactive  materials are legitimately licensed, and  take measures to ensure that this guidance is being followed. Even very small amounts of radioactive material are sufficient to  set off the radiation detectors of first responders.
Why GAO Did This Study

Concerns have grown that terrorists could use radioactive materials and sealed sources (materials sealed in a capsule) to build a "dirty bomb"-- a device using conventional explosives to disperse radioactive material. In 2003, GAO found weaknesses in the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC) radioactive materials licensing process and made recommendations for improvement. For this report, GAO assesses (1) the progress NRC has made in implementing the 2003 recommendations, (2) other steps NRC has taken to improve its ability to track radioactive materials, (3) Customs and Border Protection's (CBP) ability to detect radioactive materials at land ports of entry, and (4) CBP's ability to verify that such materials are appropriately licensed prior to entering the United States. To perform this work, GAO assessed documents and interviewed NRC and CBP officials in headquarters and in several field locations.

What GAO Found

NRC has implemented three of the six recommendations in GAO's 2003 report on the security of radioactive sources. It has worked with the 35 states to which it ceded primary authority to regulate radioactive materials and sources and others to (1) identify sealed sources of greatest concern, (2) enhance requirements to secure radioactive sources, and (3) ensure security requirements are implemented. In contrast, NRC has made limited progress toward implementing recommendations to (1) modify its process for issuing licenses to ensure that radioactive materials cannot be purchased by those with no legitimate need for them, (2) determine how to effectively mitigate the potential psychological effects of malicious use of such materials, and (3) examine whether certain radioactive sources should be subject to more stringent regulations. Beyond acting on GAO's recommendations, NRC has also taken four steps to improve its ability to monitor and track radioactive materials. First, NRC created an interim national database to monitor the licensed sealed sources containing materials that pose the greatest risk of being used in a dirty bomb. Second, NRC is developing a National Source Tracking System to replace the interim database and provide more comprehensive, frequently updated information on potentially dangerous sources. However, this system has been delayed by 18 months and is not expected to be fully operational until January 2009. Third, NRC is also developing a Web-based licensing system that will include more comprehensive information on all sources and materials that require NRC or state approval to possess. Finally, NRC is developing a license verification system that will draw information from the other new systems to enable officials and vendors to verify that those seeking to bring these radioactive materials into the country or purchase them are licensed to do so. However, these systems are more than 3 years behind schedule and may not include the licensing information, initially at least, on radioactive materials regulated by agreement states--which represent over 80 percent of all U.S. licenses for such materials. The delays in the deployment and full development of these systems are especially consequential because NRC has identified their deployment as key to improving the control and accountability of radioactive materials. While CBP has a comprehensive system in place to detect radioactive materials entering the United States at land borders, some equipment that is used to protect CBP officers is in short supply. Specifically, vehicles, cargo, and people entering the United States at most ports of entry along the Canadian and Mexican borders are scanned for radioactive materials with radiation detection equipment capable of detecting very small amounts of radiation. However we found that personal radiation detectors are not available to all officers who need them. Moreover, while CBP has systems in place to verify the legitimacy of radioactive materials licenses, it has not effectively communicated to officers at the borders when they must contact officials to verify the license for a given sealed source. Consequently, some CPB officers are not following current guidance, and some potentially dangerous radioactive materials have entered the country without license verification.