However, EPA’s second program does  not incorporate other items. EPA also agreed to test for contaminants in dust. EPA Is Not Assessing the Extent of WTC Contamination, and It Did Not Agree to Evaluate Risk in Workplaces

Though EPA expanded the number of contaminants tested for in its  second program, it did not adopt recommendations and additional input  from the EPA Inspector General or the expert panel that addressed the  following issues:    Evaluating risks in geographic areas north of Canal Street and in  Brooklyn. Some expert panel members had suggested that EPA  investigate whether it was feasible to develop a method for distinguishing  between normal urban dust and WTC dust. Beginning in 2004—almost 3 years after the disaster—EPA conducted this  investigation into developing a WTC dust signature. Two Factors Limited the Expert Panel’s Ability to Meet Its Goals

The expert panel’s ability to meet its goals was limited by two factors: (1)  EPA officials’ belief that some panel goals were more appropriately  addressed by other agencies and (2) EPA’s approach to managing the  panel process. Furthermore, the majority of expert panel members do not  believe the panel successfully met any of its goals. According to all expert panel members who responded to our follow-up  inquiry regarding EPA’s second program (10 out of 10 members), this  program does not respond to the concerns of residents and workers  affected by the collapse of the WTC towers. While EPA stated that the number of samples in its first program  exceeding risk levels for airborne asbestos was “very small,” EPA did not  provide the following additional information to help inform residents’  decisions regarding participation in the second program:    Voluntary program participation. Without complete explanations of EPA’s sampling data, residents who  could have elected to participate might have decided not to do so. EPA Is Implementing the Second Program with $7 Million and Did Not Complete a Cost Estimate to Determine Whether This Was an Appropriate Amount

EPA is implementing its second program with the funding remaining after  completion of its first program—approximately $7 million—but EPA did  not determine whether this amount would support the effective  implementation of its second program. EPA Has Taken Preparedness Actions, but Some Concerns Remain

EPA has acted upon lessons learned from the WTC disaster to prepare for  future disasters, such as clarifying internal roles and responsibilities and  improving health-related cleanup benchmarks. However, EPA’s approach to emergency  response does not differentiate between indoor and outdoor  contamination, and therefore it is difficult to determine how EPA’s  preparedness actions have improved EPA’s readiness to respond  specifically to indoor contamination. Appendix II: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

We were asked to determine (1) the extent to which the Environmental  Protection Agency (EPA) incorporated recommendations and additional  input from the expert panel and its Inspector General in its second  program; (2) what factors, if any, limited the expert panel’s ability to meet  its goals; (3) the completeness of information EPA provided to the public  in its second plan; (4) the way EPA estimated the resources needed to  conduct the second program; and (5) the extent to which EPA has acted  upon lessons learned to better prepare for indoor contamination that  could result from future large-scale disasters. 11.
Why GAO Did This Study

The September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks and World Trade Center (WTC) collapse blanketed Lower Manhattan in dust from building debris. In response, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) conducted an indoor clean and test program from 2002 to 2003. In 2003, EPA's Inspector General (IG) recommended improvements to the program and identified lessons learned for EPA's preparedness for future disasters. In 2004, EPA formed an expert panel to, among other goals, guide EPA in developing a second voluntary program; EPA announced this program in 2006. As requested, GAO's report primarily addresses EPA's second program, including the (1) extent to which EPA incorporated IG and expert panel member recommendations and input; (2) factors, if any, limiting the expert panel's ability to meet its goals; (3) completeness of information EPA provided to the public; (4) way EPA estimated resources for the program; and (5) extent to which EPA has acted upon lessons learned regarding indoor contamination from disasters.

What GAO Found

EPA has incorporated some recommendations and input from the IG and expert panel members into its second program, but its decision not to include other items may limit the overall effectiveness of this program. For example, while EPA agreed to test for more contaminants, it did not agree to evaluate risks in areas north of Canal Street and in Brooklyn. EPA reported that it does not have a basis for expanding the boundaries of its program because it cannot distinguish between normal urban, or background, dust and WTC dust. The expert panel's ability to meet its goals was limited by two factors: (1) EPA officials' belief that some panel goals were more appropriately addressed by other agencies, and (2) EPA's approach to managing the panel process. Furthermore, the majority of expert panel members believe the panel did not meet any of its goals, and that EPA's second program does not respond to the concerns of residents and workers affected by the disaster. EPA's second plan does not fully inform the public about the results of its first program. EPA concluded that a "very small" number of samples from its first program exceeded risk levels for airborne asbestos. However, EPA did not provide information such as how representative the samples were of the affected area. Residents who could have participated in this voluntary second program might have opted not to do so because of EPA's conclusion about its first program. EPA did not develop a comprehensive cost estimate to determine the resources needed to carry out its second program. EPA is implementing this program with $7 million remaining from its first program. While EPA has acted upon lessons learned following this disaster, some concerns remain about its preparedness to respond to indoor contamination following future disasters. Specifically, EPA has not developed protocols on how and when to collect data to determine the extent of indoor contamination, one of the concerns raised by panel members.