Currently, TSA conducts compliance inspections of domestic and foreign  passenger carriers transporting cargo into the United States, but does not  perform such inspections of all air carriers transporting inbound air cargo. For instance, TSA has completed a strategic  plan to address domestic air cargo security and has identified the primary  threats associated with inbound air cargo. Also within DHS, CBP has recently initiated efforts to mitigate the threat  of a WMD entering the United States by targeting inbound air cargo  transported on passenger and all-cargo aircraft that may pose a security  risk and inspecting such cargo once it arrives in the United States. Finally, TSA and CBP have taken steps to coordinate  their responsibilities to safeguard air cargo transported into the United  States, but the two agencies do not have a systematic process in place to  share information that could be used to strengthen their efforts to secure  inbound air cargo. TSA officials acknowledged that it is important to partner with CBP,  foreign governments, and international air cargo stakeholders in  developing a strategy for securing inbound air cargo. The final rule also acknowledges that TSA  amended its security directives and programs to triple the percentage of  cargo inspected on domestic and foreign passenger aircraft. However,  TSA has not developed a similar inspection plan for international aviation  security. However, working with foreign governments to achieve  harmonization may be challenging because these efforts are voluntary. In addition, some foreign governments do not share DHS’s view regarding  the threats and risk associated with air cargo. To help strengthen the Transportation Security Administration’s inbound  air cargo security efforts, we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland  Security direct the Assistant Secretary for the Transportation Security  Administration to take the following four actions:  (3) establish a methodology and time frame for completing assessments of  inbound air cargo vulnerabilities and critical assets, and use these  assessments as a basis for prioritizing the actions necessary to enhance  the security of inbound air cargo;  (4) establish a time frame for completing the assessment of whether  existing inspection exemptions for inbound air cargo pose an  unacceptable vulnerability to the security of air cargo, and take steps, if  necessary, to address identified vulnerabilities;  (5) develop and implement an inspection plan that includes performance  goals and measures to evaluate foreign and domestic air carrier  compliance with inbound air cargo security requirements; and  (6) in collaboration with foreign governments and the U.S. air cargo  industry, systematically compile and analyze information on air cargo  security practices used abroad to identify those that may strengthen the  department’s overall air cargo security program, including assessing  whether the benefits that these practices could provide in strengthening  the security of the U.S. and inbound air cargo supply chain are cost- effective, without impeding the flow of commerce. While CBP’s and TSA’s efforts to collaborate  on their air cargo security activities are worthwhile, it is also important  that TSA and CBP develop a system to share information—such as the  results of TSA inspections of air carrier compliance with TSA inbound air  cargo security requirements and TSA assessments of foreign airports’  compliance with international air cargo security standards—that could be  used to strengthen the department’s efforts to secure inbound air cargo. (2) What  practices have the air cargo industry and select foreign countries adopted  that could potentially be used to enhance DHS’s efforts to strengthen air  cargo security, and to what extent have the Transportation Security  Administration (TSA) and the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP)  worked with foreign government stakeholders to enhance its air cargo  security efforts? To determine what actions DHS has taken to secure inbound air cargo,  and how, if at all, these efforts could be strengthened, we reviewed TSA’s  domestic air cargo strategic plan, proposed and final air cargo security  rules, air cargo-related security directives and emergency amendments,  aircraft operator security programs, and related guidance to determine the  requirements placed on air carriers for ensuring inbound air cargo  security.
Why GAO Did This Study

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has primary responsibility for securing air cargo transported into the United States from another country, referred to as inbound air cargo, and preventing implements of terrorism from entering the country. GAO examined (1) what actions DHS has taken to secure inbound air cargo, and how, if at all, these efforts could be strengthened; and (2) what practices the air cargo industry and foreign governments have adopted that could enhance DHS's efforts to strengthen inbound air cargo security, and to what extent DHS has worked with foreign governments to enhance their air cargo security efforts. To conduct this study, GAO reviewed relevant DHS documents, interviewed DHS officials, and conducted site visits to seven countries in Europe and Asia.

What GAO Found

Within DHS, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) have taken a number of actions designed to secure inbound air cargo, but these efforts are still largely in the early stages and could be strengthened. For instance, TSA completed a risk-based strategic plan to address domestic air cargo security, but has not developed a similar strategy for addressing inbound air cargo security, including how best to partner with CBP and international air cargo stakeholders. In addition, while TSA has identified the primary threats to inbound air cargo, it has not yet assessed inbound air cargo vulnerabilities and critical assets. Moreover, TSA's air cargo security rule incorporated a number of provisions aimed at enhancing the security of inbound air cargo. This final rule also acknowledges that TSA amended its security directives and programs to triple the percentage of cargo inspected on domestic and foreign passenger aircraft. However, TSA continues to exempt certain types of inbound air cargo transported on passenger air carriers from inspection. Further, TSA inspects domestic and foreign passenger air carriers with service to the United States to assess whether they are complying with air cargo security requirements, but currently does not conduct compliance inspections of all air carriers transporting inbound air cargo. Moreover, TSA has not developed performance goals and measures to determine to what extent air carriers are complying with security requirements. In addition, CBP recently began targeting inbound air cargo transported on passenger and all-cargo aircraft that may pose a security risk and inspecting such cargo once it arrives in the United States. TSA and CBP, however, do not have a systematic process in place to share information that could be used to strengthen the department's efforts in securing inbound air cargo, such as the results of TSA air carrier compliance inspections and foreign airport assessments. The air cargo industry and foreign governments have implemented various security practices that could provide opportunities for strengthening DHS's overall air cargo security program. TSA officials acknowledged that compiling and analyzing security practices implemented by foreign air cargo stakeholders and foreign governments may provide opportunities to enhance U.S. air cargo security, and have begun an initial review of practices in select foreign countries. TSA has also begun working with foreign governments to coordinate security practices to enhance security and improve oversight, referred to as harmonization, but these efforts may be challenging to implement. For example, some foreign countries do not share the United States' view regarding air cargo security threats and risks, which may make the harmonization of air cargo security practices difficult to achieve.