	Introduction

Since the creation of the modern U.S. intelligence community after World War II, neither Congress nor the executive branch has made public the total extent of intelligence spending except for two fiscal years in the 1990s. Rather, intelligence programs and personnel have largely been contained, but not identified, within the capacious expanse of the budget of the Department of Defense (DOD). This practice has long been criticized by proponents of open government. Despite the release of data for fiscal years 1997 and 1998, however, no subsequent appropriations levels have been made public. More recently, the FY2007 Intelligence Authorization legislation ( S. 372 ) reported in the Senate in January 2007 would require publication of budget totals for national, but not tactical, intelligence programs. the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the following elements of the United States government:
(1) the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA);
(2) the National Security Agency (NSA);
(3) the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA);
(4) the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) (formerly the National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA));
(5) the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO);
(6) the intelligence elements of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and the Marine Corps
(7) the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR);
(8) the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI);
(9) the Department of Homeland Security (DHS);
(10) the Coast Guard;
(11) the Department of the Treasury;
(12) the Department of Energy;
(13) the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA). Past Budgetary Practice

Budgeting for secret intelligence efforts has long presented difficult challenges to the Congress. This legislation, reported by the two armed services committees, provided authority for the CIA "to transfer to and receive from other Government agencies such sums as may be approved by the Bureau of the Budget [predecessor of today's Office of Management and Budget]...." The 1949 Act also provided that "sums transferred to the [CIA]... may be expended for the purposes and under the authority of this Act without regard to limitations of appropriations from which transferred...."
Representative Carl Vinson, speaking on the floor of the House shortly after passage of the 1949 Act, stated that the legislation contained:
the authority to transfer and receive from other Government agencies such sums as may be approved by the Bureau of the Budget for the performance of any of the agency functions. These include not only some intelligence programs but also procurement of new weapons systems such as stealth aircraft. There are several parts of the intelligence budget that are made public. Advocates of disclosure argue that greater public discussion of intelligence spending made possible by the disclosure of spending levels would ultimately lead to a stronger intelligence effort. From our review of the constitutional language, its history, and the sparse judicial interpretation of its import, it seems that the courts regard the Congress as having the power to define the meaning of the clause. In addition, the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, known as the 9/11 Commission, recommended that the "overall amounts of money being appropriated for national intelligence and to its component agencies should no longer be kept secret." This would be different from the Clinton Administration's practice in FY1997 and FY1998 when the total appropriated amount for all intelligence and intelligence-related activities was released. 108-458 , did not include the Senate's provision to make intelligence spending figures public. Even some of those who believed that Cold War conditions necessitated that intelligence budgets be kept secret now argue that conditions have changed and that current enemies would not be able to make use of information on overall levels of intelligence budgets. Funding for intelligence-related activities presents special difficulties; budgetary totals can fluctuate from year to year solely because certain DOD programs are transferred into or out of intelligence accounts.
Although the United States Intelligence Community encompasses large Federal agencies—the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the National Reconnaissance Office, the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA), and the National Security Agency (NSA)—among others—neither Congress nor the executive branch has regularly made public the total extent of intelligence spending. Rather, intelligence programs and personnel are largely contained, but not identified, within the capacious budget of the Department of Defense (DOD). This practice has long been criticized by proponents of open government and many argue that the end of the Cold War has long since removed any justification for secret budgets. In 2004, the 9/11 Commission recommended that "the overall amounts of money being appropriated for national intelligence and to its component agencies should no longer be kept secret."
The Constitution mandates regular statements and accounts of expenditures, but the courts have regarded the Congress as having the power to define the meaning of the clause. From the creation of the modern U.S. Intelligence Community in the late 1940s, Congress and the executive branch shared a determination to keep intelligence spending secret. Proponents of this practice have argued that disclosures of major changes in intelligence spending from one year to the next would provide hostile parties with information on new program or cutbacks that could be exploited to U.S. disadvantage. Secondly, they believe that it would be practically impossible to limit disclosure to total figures and that explanations of what is included or excluded would lead to damaging revelations.
On the other hand, some Members dispute these arguments, stressing the positive effects of open government and the distortions of budget information that occur when the budgets of large agencies are classified. Legislation has been twice enacted expressing the "sense of the Congress" that total intelligence spending figures should be made public, but on several separate occasions both the House and the Senate have voted against making such information public. The Clinton Administration released total appropriations figures for intelligence and intelligence-related activities for fiscal years 1997 and 1998, but subsequently such numbers have not been made public. Legal efforts to force release of intelligence spending figures have been unsuccessful.
Central to consideration of the issue is the composition of the "intelligence budget." Intelligence authorization bills have included not just the "National Intelligence Program"—the budgets for CIA, DIA, NSA et al., but also a wide variety of other intelligence and intelligence-related efforts conducted by the Defense Department. Shifts of tactical programs into or out of the total intelligence budgets have hitherto been important only to budget analysts; disclosing total intelligence budgets could make such transfers matters of concern to a far larger audience. Legislation reported by the Senate Intelligence Committee in January 2007 (S. 372) would require that funding for the National Intelligence Program be made public but it does not address other intelligence activities. Earlier versions of this Report were entitled Intelligence Spending: Should Total Amounts Be Made Public? This report will be updated as circumstances change.