The Navy plans on fielding one anti-submarine warfare (ASW)  increment and four mine countermeasures (MCM) and surface warfare  (SUW) increments. Initial Deployment and Further Testing Yielded Additional Learning about LCS Systems and Capabilities, but Gaps in Knowledge Remain

Since July 2013, the Navy has made progress demonstrating and testing  various facets of LCS systems and capability but significant gaps remain  in the Navy’s knowledge of how the LCS will operate and what  capabilities it will provide the Navy. The deployment to Singapore  provided the Navy with an opportunity to examine key LCS concepts  operationally, including: the ship’s smaller manning profile, rotational  crewing, and use of off-ship maintenance and support. The deployment  was limited because only one of the two variants carrying one mission  package was deployed, and mechanical problems prevented USS  Freedom from spending as much time as planned underway—that is, at  sea unanchored and not at port. As a result, some key concepts could not  be demonstrated. The Navy has also completed additional  developmental testing on the seaframes and mission packages, which  has enabled the Navy to characterize performance of some systems, but  many capabilities have not been demonstrated in an operational  environment. Outstanding Weight Management and Concurrency Risks Continue to Complicate LCS Acquisition

Although the Navy has gained knowledge related to LCS capabilities and  concepts since our July 2013 report, there continue to be significant  acquisition risks to the program. Initial LCS seaframes face limitations resulting from weight  growth during construction of the first several ships. This weight growth  has required the Navy to make compromises on performance of LCS 1  and LCS 2 and may complicate existing plans to make additional changes  to each seaframe design. Compounding these issues, the Navy has not  received complete or accurate weight reports from the LCS seaframe  prime contractors—and the Navy’s lengthy review process has hindered a  timely resolution. As is depicted, there are several seaframes that do not have  the required amount of service life remaining due to weight growth. These  studies have not yet been completed. According to Navy officials,  reviews of weight reports now take less than 6 months. Risk of LCS Concurrency Remains—with Mission Package Procurement Exceeding Levels Needed for Operational Testing

As we previously reported, the Navy’s acquisition approach to the LCS  program involves a significant degree of concurrency; that is, the Navy is  buying the ships while key concepts and performance are still being  tested. As shown in figure 4, we found that a number of significant test events as  outlined in the TEMP will not be completed in time to inform the  development or release of a request for proposals or the award of follow- on contract(s), or they will be completed on one variant but not both. In addition,  the Navy’s recent decision to accelerate the acquisition of mission  packages further limits the flexibility that the program will have to adjust to  any problems that may arise during operational testing. Recommendations for Executive Action

1. Have completed rough water, ship shock, and total ship  survivability testing; and  c.  Have completed initial operational test and evaluation of the SUW  mission package on the Freedom variant and the MCM mission  package on the Independence variant. 2. In its  written comments, which are included in appendix IV, DOD partially  agreed with our recommendations to complete certain testing and  deployment activities before approving the release of the request for  proposals for future seaframes. DOD agreed with our recommendations  related to seaframe weight management. Specifically, the service life  allowance for weight is deficient by 30 tons. 3)  A certification that the Joint Requirements Oversight Council—  a)  has reviewed the capabilities of the legacy systems that the  Littoral Combat Ship is planned to replace and has compared  such capabilities to the capabilities to be provided by the  Littoral Combat Ship;  b)  has assessed the adequacy of the current capabilities  development document for the Littoral Combat Ship to meet  the requirements of the combatant commands and to address  future threats as reflected in the latest assessment by the  defense intelligence community; and  c)  has either validated the current capabilities development  document or directed the Secretary to update the current  capabilities development document based on the performance  of the Littoral Combat Ship and mission modules to date.
Why GAO Did This Study

LCS represents an innovative approach to Navy acquisitions and operations, consisting of a ship—called a seaframe—and reconfigurable mission packages. These packages provide combat capability to perform three primary missions: surface warfare; mine countermeasures; and anti-submarine warfare. The Navy plans to buy no more than 32 seaframes in two variants from two shipyards, and 64 mission packages, with an estimated acquisition cost of over $25 billion in 2010 dollars. GAO was mandated to examine elements related to the LCS program. This report examines (1) knowledge that the Navy has gained since GAO issued a report on the LCS program in July 2013 and (2) outstanding acquisition risks with the LCS program. GAO analyzed key documents, including test and weight reports, and interviewed Navy officials responsible for the LCS deployment and program officials. This report is a public version of a sensitive but unclassified report issued in April 2014.

What GAO Found

Since July 2013, the Navy has continued to demonstrate and test various facets of Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) systems and capability, but important questions remain about how LCS will operate and what capabilities it will provide the Navy. The first operational deployment of an LCS to Singapore gave the Navy an opportunity to examine key LCS concepts operationally. The deployment was limited to only one of the two variants carrying one of three mission packages. In addition, mechanical problems prevented the ship from spending as much time operationally as planned. As a result, some key concepts could not be tested. The Navy has completed some additional testing on the seaframes and mission packages, which has enabled the Navy to characterize performance of some systems, but performance has not yet been demonstrated in an operational environment.
Outstanding weight management and concurrency risks related to buying ships while key concepts and performance are still being tested continue to complicate LCS acquisitions. Initial LCS seaframes face capability limitations resulting from weight growth during construction. This weight growth has resulted in the first two ships not meeting performance requirements for sprint speed and/or endurance, as well as potentially complicating existing plans to make additional changes to each seaframe design. Several seaframes now do not have the required amount of service life allowance—margin to accommodate future changes without removing weight over the ship's lifetime—but Navy officials said they have a plan to recover the service life allowance on the Independence class variant.
b
The Navy has not received accurate or complete weight reports from the seaframe prime contractors, and the Navy's lengthy review process has hindered a timely resolution of the Navy's concerns. Additionally, a number of significant test events, including rough water, shock and total ship survivability trials, will not be completed in time to inform upcoming acquisition decisions—including future contract decisions. Finally, the Navy's recent decision to accelerate low rate initial production of mission packages above the quantity necessary for operational testing limits the flexibility that the program will have to adjust to any problems that may arise during operational testing.

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that the Navy (1) demonstrate certain capabilities for both LCS seaframe variants before the Navy is approved for future contract awards and (2) ensure a timely review of contractor seaframe weight reports and take actions to make contractors more responsive to comments on the reports' content. DOD agreed with the weight report recommendation and partially agreed with the other, noting that it intends to complete as much testing as possible—but not all—before releasing the request for proposals for future contracts.