Entry documents can be provided several days after a shipment’s arrival  in the United States and after a shipment leaves the port. A targeting unit may be  responsible for targeting shipments arriving at one port or multiple ports in  its region. CBP partially concurred with the  recommendations but did not implement them. Less than 1 Percent of Arriving Maritime Shipments from Fiscal Years 2009 through 2013 Were High Risk, but CBP Does Not Have Accurate Data on Their Disposition Percentage of High-Risk Shipments Is Very Low and CBP Has Examined the Vast Majority

We determined that less than 1 percent of the maritime shipments  arriving in the United States from fiscal years 2009 through 2013 were  high risk; however, CBP does not have accurate data on the number and  disposition of each high-risk shipment because of various factors. CBP is taking steps  to improve its data on the disposition of high-risk shipments. In particular, CBP’s data  overstate the number of high-risk shipments, including those not  examined/not waived. CBP Targeting Units Are Not Consistently Applying and Documenting Reasons for Waiving Examinations of High- Risk Shipments

When determining the disposition of high-risk shipments, CBP’s targeting  units are inconsistently applying criteria to make some waiver decisions  and are also incorrectly documenting the reasons for waivers. On the  basis of our review of CBP policy and visits to selected targeting units, we  determined that CBP has not established uniform definitions for standard  exception waiver categories; some CBP officials were unaware of existing  waiver guidance for articulable reason waivers; and some CBP targeters  across the targeting units we visited were inconsistently and inaccurately  recording waiver reasons in ATS. As a result, CBP cannot accurately  determine the extent to which standard exception waivers are used  consistently or whether waivers issued for articulable reasons are being  used judiciously, as required by policy. Because of the lack of CBP-wide definitions for the standard exception  categories, CBP targeters may be holding some shipments for  examinations that should be waived. Defining standard exception waiver categories and disseminating those  definitions in policy would better allow targeting units and targeters to  consistently apply criteria when making and recording waiver decisions,  and could help ensure that CBP is examining shipments as intended. Updating and  disseminating guidance in policy on how to record articulable reason  waivers will help ensure that they are correctly recorded. Given that the sample size is generally the same for all port directors  regardless of the number of shipments their ports receive, on the basis of  our analysis, the sample does not provide CBP with an efficient estimate  of compliance at the national level. Further, CBP’s method for calculating the compliance rate does not  accurately reflect compliance nationwide because it does not calculate  the rate based on the number of shipments sampled. To enhance oversight of the disposition of high-risk shipments— examinations and waivers—we recommend that the Commissioner of  CBP direct OFO to take two actions: develop an enhanced methodology for selecting shipment samples  used for self-inspection to increase the likelihood that any potential  deficiencies will be identified so that corrective actions can be taken to  reduce errors in the future, and develop a better national estimate of compliance with maritime cargo  targeting policies by calculating the compliance rate based on  individual shipments rather than worksheets. Because DHS deemed the details of this  recommendation and its response as sensitive security information, they  are not included in this public version of the report. Appendix I: Description of CBP’s Layered Security Strategy for Maritime Cargo Shipments

This appendix describes the core programs related to U.S. Customs and  Border Protection’s (CBP) strategy for ensuring the security of maritime  cargo. More specifically, our  objectives were to examine (1) the number of maritime shipments arriving  in the United States from fiscal years 2009 through 2013 that CBP  determined to be high risk and the extent to which CBP has accurate data  on the disposition of each of those high-risk shipments, (2) the extent to  which CBP is consistently applying standards and documenting reasons  for waiving examinations of high-risk shipments, and (3) the extent to  which CBP ensures that its policies on the disposition of high-risk  shipments are being followed.
Why GAO Did This Study

The U.S. economy is dependent on a secure global supply chain. In fiscal year 2013, approximately 12 million maritime cargo shipments arrived in the United States. Within the federal government, CBP is responsible for administering cargo security, to include identifying “high-risk” maritime cargo shipments with the potential to contain terrorist contraband. GAO was asked to review CBP's disposition of such shipments.
This report discusses (1) how many maritime shipments CBP determined to be high risk and the extent to which CBP has accurate data on the disposition of such shipments, (2) the extent to which CBP consistently applies criteria and documents reasons for waiving examinations, and (3) the extent to which CBP ensures its policies on the disposition of high-risk shipments are being followed.
GAO analyzed CBP data on maritime shipments arriving in the United States during fiscal years 2009 through 2013. GAO also visited four CBP targeting units selected on the basis of the percentage of maritime shipments they waived, among other factors.

What GAO Found

From fiscal years 2009 through 2013, less than 1 percent of maritime shipments arriving in the United States were identified as high risk by U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), but CBP does not have accurate data on their disposition (i.e., outcomes). CBP officials (targeters) are generally required to hold high-risk shipments for examination unless evidence shows that an examination can be waived per CBP policy. In particular, targeters at Advance Targeting Units (targeting units)—responsible for reviewing shipments arriving at ports within their respective regions—can waive an examination if they determine through research that (1) the shipment falls within a predetermined category (standard exception), or (2) they can articulate why the shipment should not be considered high risk (articulable reason), such as an error in the shipment's data. GAO found that CBP examined the vast majority of high-risk shipments, but CBP's disposition data are not accurate because of various factors—such as the inclusion of shipments that were never sent to the United States—and that the data overstate the number of high-risk shipments. On the basis of GAO's analyses and findings, CBP is taking steps to correct its data.
When determining the disposition of high-risk shipments, CBP's targeting units are inconsistently applying criteria to make waiver decisions and are incorrectly documenting the reasons for some waivers. CBP policy lacks definitions for standard exception waivers. As a result, targeters are inconsistently applying and recording standard exception waivers. Because of these inconsistencies, some targeting units may be unnecessarily holding shipments for examination, while others may be waiving shipments that should be examined. Developing definitions for standard exceptions could help ensure that CBP examines shipments as intended. Further, some targeters at targeting units GAO visited were unaware of the guidance on articulable reason waivers and were incorrectly documenting these waivers. As a result, CBP cannot accurately determine the extent to which articulable waivers are being issued and used judiciously per CBP policy. Updating and disseminating guidance in policy could help ensure targeters correctly document such waivers.
CBP has efforts in place, such as self-inspections, to provide oversight of its policies on the disposition (whether examined or waived) of high-risk shipments; however, these efforts are not sufficient. For example, the limited sample size of shipments used in self-inspections does not provide CBP with the best estimate of compliance at the national level. In addition, CBP's method for calculating the compliance rate does not accurately reflect compliance because it is not based on the number of shipments sampled. Developing an enhanced methodology for selecting sample shipments, and changing the method for calculating compliance, could improve CBP's estimate of compliance and its ability to identify and correct deficiencies.
This is a public version of a sensitive report that GAO issued in November 2014. It does not include details that CBP deemed sensitive security information.

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends, among other things, that CBP define standard exception waiver categories and disseminate policy on documenting articulable reason waivers. Further, CBP should enhance its methodology for selecting shipments for self-inspections and change the way it calculates the compliance rate. The Department of Homeland Security concurred with GAO's recommendations.