To achieve its goals, US-VISIT uses biometric information (digital  fingerscans and photographs) to verify identity. When a  visitor arrives at a POE, the biometric information is used to verify that the  visitor is the person who was issued the visa. In addition, at certain sites,  visitors are required to confirm their departure by undergoing US-VISIT  exit procedures—that is, having their visas or passports scanned and  undergoing fingerscanning. As a  result of our assessments, we made 24 recommendations aimed at  improving both plans and program management, all of which DHS has  agreed to implement. The Status of DHS’s Implementation of Our Recommendations Is Mixed

The current status of DHS’s implementation of our 18 recommendations on  program risks is mixed, but progress in critical areas has been slow. According to the Program  Director, the pace of progress is attributable to competing demands on  time and resources. Of these 18, DHS has  completely implemented 2, has partially implemented 11, and is in the  process of implementing another 5. The longer that the program takes to  implement the recommendations, the greater the risk that the program will  not meet its goals on time and within budget. Determination and Disclosure of Whether Increments Produce Mission Value Commensurate with Costs and Risks Are Partially Complete

In September 2003, we reported that the program had not assessed the  costs and benefits of Increment 1, which is extremely important because  the decision to invest in any capability should be based on reliable analyses  of return on investment. The latest cost-benefit analysis for Increment 1B (dated June 23, 2005)  identifies potential costs and benefits for three exit solutions at air and sea  POEs and provides a general rationale for the viability of the three  alternatives described. An analysis of  uncertainty is important because it provides decision makers with a  perspective on the potential variability of the cost and benefit estimates  should the facts, circumstances, and assumptions change. Accordingly, we recommended that DHS do the following:   Define program office positions, roles, and responsibilities. Because these criteria were not being met, we recommended  that DHS do the following:  Develop and approve test plans before testing begins that (1) specify the   test environment; (2) describe each test to be performed, including test   controls, inputs, and expected outputs; (3) define the test procedures to   be followed in conducting the tests; and (4) provide traceability between   test cases and the requirements to be verified by the testing. However, the test plan did not adequately trace between test cases and the  requirements to be verified by testing. Assessment of the Impact of Increment 2B on Workforce Levels and Facilities Is Partially Complete

We reported in May 2004 that the program had not assessed its workforce  and facility needs for Increment 2B. Nevertheless, other alternatives, such as surveying officials at these sites to  better understand the increment’s impact on workforce levels and  facilities, have yet to be explored. Until they are, the program may not be  able to accurately project resource needs or make required modifications  to achieve its goals of minimizing US-VISIT’s impact on POE processing  times. However, as we  previously stated, the scope of the evaluations was not sufficient to  satisfy our recommendation. Accordingly, the longer that US-VISIT takes to implement  our recommendations, the greater the risk that the program will not meet  its stated goals and commitments. We would also  observe that we made this recommendation in May 2004, and at that time  the department stated that it agreed with the recommendation but did not  indicate that it had taken any steps to address it, such as commenting that a  report was issued on August 18, 2003. Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology  (US-VISIT) program. Comments from the Department of Homeland Security

Description of US-VISIT Processes

US-VISIT involves complex processes governing the stages of a traveler’s  visit to the United States (pre-entry, entry, status, and exit) and analysis of  hundreds of millions of foreign national travelers at over 300 air, sea, and  land ports of entry (POE).
Why GAO Did This Study

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has established a program--the U.S. Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology (US-VISIT)--to collect, maintain, and share information, including biometric identifiers, on selected foreign nationals entering and exiting the United States. US-VISIT uses these identifiers (digital fingerscans and photographs) to screen persons against watch lists and to verify that a visitor is the person who was issued a visa or other travel document. Visitors are also to confirm their departure by having their visas or passports scanned and undergoing fingerscanning at selected air and sea ports of entry (POE). GAO has made many recommendations to improve the program, all of which DHS has agreed to implement. GAO was asked to report on DHS's progress in responding to 18 of these recommendations.

What GAO Found

The current status of DHS's implementation of the 18 recommendations is mixed, but progress in critical areas has been slow. DHS has implemented 2 of the recommendations: it defined program staff positions, roles, and responsibilities, and it hired an independent verification and validation contractor. It has also taken steps to implement the other recommendations, partially completing 11 and beginning to implement another 5. In September 2003, GAO reported that the program had not assessed the costs and benefits of Increment 1 (which provides entry capabilities to air and sea POEs) and recommended that the program determine whether proposed increments will produce mission value commensurate with cost. In the latest cost-benefit analysis, dated June 23, 2005, the program identified potential costs and benefits for three alternatives for an air and sea exit solution. However, the analysis does not meet key Office of Management and Budget criteria; for example, it does not include a complete uncertainty analysis, which helps to provide decision makers with perspective on the potential variability of the cost and benefit estimates should circumstances change. GAO reported in May 2004 and February 2005 that system testing was not based on well-defined test plans and recommended that before testing begins, the program develop and approve test plans meeting certain criteria. However, although the latest test plan did cover many required areas (such as the tests to be performed), it did not adequately trace between test cases and the requirements to be verified by testing. Without complete and traceable test plans, the risk is increased that the deployed system will not perform as intended. In May 2004, GAO reported that the program had not assessed its workforce and facility needs for Increment 2B (which extends entry capabilities to the 50 busiest land POEs) and recommended that it do so. Since then, the program evaluated the processing times to issue and process entry/exit forms at 3 of the 50 busiest POEs and concluded that the results showed that no additional staff and only minor facilities modifications were required. However, the scope of the evaluation was limited. Since then, DHS has deployed and implemented Increment 2B capabilities to these 50 POEs, making the collection of predeployment baseline data for these sites impractical. Nonetheless, other alternatives, such as surveying site officials about the increment's impacts, have yet to be explored. Until they are, the program may not be able to accurately project resource needs or make any needed modifications to achieve its goals of minimizing US-VISIT's impact on POE operations, which was the impetus for GAO's recommendation. DHS attributed the pace of progress to competing demands on time and resources. The longer that US-VISIT takes to implement the recommendations, the greater the risk that the program will not meet its stated goals on time and within budget.