For  troops stationed in Iraq, mail is transferred onto a contracted cargo plane  and flown directly into Iraq. According to the Military Postal Service Agency, more than 65 million  pounds of letters and parcels were delivered to U.S. Central Command’s  contingency area of responsibility during calendar year 2003 at a cost of  nearly $150 million. Timeliness of Mail Delivery Cannot Be Accurately Determined

The timeliness of mail delivery to troops serving in Operation Iraqi  Freedom cannot be accurately determined because DOD does not have a  reliable, accurate system in place to measure timeliness. Data collected by  military postal units using the Transit Time Information Standard System  for Military Mail indicate that average delivery times met the Army  wartime standard of 12 to 18 days. Military postal officials acknowledge that mail delivery to  troops serving in Operation Iraqi Freedom was not timely. In addition,  more than half of the 127 soldiers and marines we talked with during  informal meetings at their home bases in the United States said they were  dissatisfied with the timeliness of mail delivery while they were deployed. However, on the basis of our analysis, we found that the methodology  used to calculate and report transit times significantly understates the  actual time it takes for a service member to receive mail. Service Members Express Dissatisfaction with Mail Service

In the absence of reliable data to describe timeliness, we held discussions  with a non-representative sample of 127 soldiers and marines who served  in theater, and who were selected prior to our visits to Fort Stewart,  Georgia, and Camp Pendleton, California. Many Problems Identified in Operations Desert Shield/Storm Continued to Hamper Mail Delivery in Operation Iraqi Freedom

Despite differences in operational theaters and an effort by postal planners  to consider experiences from Operations Desert Shield/Storm in planning  for Operation Iraqi Freedom, many of the same problems continued to  hamper postal operations during Operation Iraqi Freedom. These  problems include (1) difficulty with implementing joint-service postal  operations, (2) postal personnel who were inadequately trained and  initially scarce because of late deployments, and (3) inadequate postal  facilities, material-handling equipment, and transportation assets to handle  mail surge. Consequently, early mail operations were conducted with insufficient  postal troops to carry out the mission. Despite early efforts made by the Military Postal  Service Agency in this regard, this agency does not have the authority to  ensure that these problems are jointly addressed and resolved prior to the  next military contingency. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

To address overall issues of military mail delivery to and from the Gulf  region and determine responsibilities for mail service, we obtained and  reviewed Department of Defense (DOD) guidance and operations plans for  mail delivery to troops serving in a contingency area, and specifically  during Operation Iraqi Freedom. To assess efforts to resolve military postal problems for future  contingencies, we collected any available after action reports and plans for  addressing military postal problems.
Why GAO Did This Study

Mail is a morale booster for troops fighting overseas and for their families at home. More than 65 million pounds of letters and parcels were delivered to troops serving in Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003 and problems with prompt and reliable mail delivery surfaced early in the conflict. Congress and the White House forwarded more than 300 inquiries about mail delivery problems to military postal officials. GAO was directed to review mail delivery to troops stationed in the Middle East. In this report, GAO assesses (1) the timeliness of mail delivery to and from troops in Operation Iraqi Freedom, (2) how mail delivery issues and problems during this operation compared with those experienced during Operations Desert Shield/Storm in 1991, and (3) efforts to identify actions to resolve problems in establishing mail operations for future contingencies.

What GAO Found

The timeliness of mail delivery to troops serving in Operation Iraqi Freedom cannot be accurately assessed because the Department of Defense (DOD) does not have a reliable, accurate system in place to measure timeliness. In general, DOD's transit time and test letter data show that mail delivery fell within the current wartime standard of 12 to 18 days. However, the methodology used to calculate transit times significantly understated actual delivery times. In the absence of reliable data, GAO conducted discussion groups with a non-representative sample of 127 service members who served in-theater. More than half reported they were dissatisfied with mail delivery, underscoring the negative impact it can have on troop morale. Despite differences in operational theaters and efforts by DOD postal planners to incorporate Operations Desert Shield/Storm experiences into planning for Operation Iraqi Freedom, postal operations faced many of the same problems: difficulty with conducting joint-service mail operations; postal personnel who were inadequately trained and initially scarce owing to late deployments; and inadequate postal facilities, equipment, and transportation. The operations plan created for joint-service mail delivery contained certain assumptions key to its success but led to unforeseen consequences or did not occur. Also, plans for a Joint Postal Center were not fully put in place. One lesson learned from 1991 was carried out with success during Operation Iraqi Freedom: mail was transported overseas by dedicated contractor airlifts rather than by military. DOD has not officially tasked any entity to resolve the long-standing postal problems experienced during contingency operations. Moreover, the Military Postal Service Agency does not have the authority to ensure that these problems are addressed jointly. This agency and the military services, however, have taken some steps toward tackling these issues.