Scientists working at the facility are responsible for  protecting U.S. livestock against foreign animal diseases that could be  accidentally or deliberately introduced into the United States. The North  American Foot-and-Mouth Disease Vaccine Bank is also located on Plum  Island. DHS and USDA Have Successfully Coordinated Research and Diagnostic Programs at Plum Island

DHS’s and USDA’s efforts to coordinate research and diagnostic programs  at Plum Island have been largely successful because of the agencies’ early  efforts to work together to bring structure to their interaction at the island. Budget Changes at Time of the Transfer in Part Modified Overall Priorities and the Scope of Work at Plum Island

Program budget changes that occurred soon after the transfer—resulting in  part from implementation of the Homeland Security Act of 2002—modified  overall priorities and the scope of USDA’s work at Plum Island. They also noted that some of  the aspects of the research being conducted at the island could be  performed elsewhere. ARS Is Focusing Its Research on FMD, While Other Programs Were Terminated or Slowed Down Because of Budget Reductions

After the transfer, ARS designated FMD—traditionally one of the high- priority diseases at Plum Island—as its top research priority because it  poses the greatest threat to the agriculture economy. For example, research on  classical swine fever, which included development of a marker vaccine, is  proceeding at a slower pace than it did before the budget reductions. An expert we consulted  said that doing this work at Plum Island decreases the island’s already  limited resources available to study foreign animal diseases. However, APHIS officials told us that as a result of the transfer, the $2.3  million increase that APHIS officials were expecting to receive was not  fully realized. DHS Continues to Address Infrastructure Needs and Develop Programs Addressing Its Bioterrorism Priorities at Plum Island

As discussed elsewhere in this report, DHS has assumed responsibility for  operations and maintenance at Plum Island and has developed its own  applied research program. Agency  officials did not consider it prudent to speculate on long-term objectives of  joint work, in part, because DHS plans to replace the existing Plum Island  facility, and aspects of the new facility have not yet been determined. Furthermore, officials told us it is premature to firmly commit to long-term  objectives of joint work at Plum Island, in part, because DHS has plans to  replace the existing facility with a new, modernized facility. DHS estimates that, pending congressional approval, it will  become fully operational by 2012. As DHS evaluates the size and capabilities of the new foreign  animal disease facility that the agency estimates will be completed by 2012,  it will be important to explore the cost-effectiveness of shifting some  current work, such as research that does not involve the use of live agents,  to other laboratories and reserve the limited laboratory space at Plum  Island for work that can only be performed in that facility. Scope and Methodology

To determine how the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the  U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) coordinate research and diagnostic  activities at Plum Island, we analyzed DHS and USDA joint strategy  documents, including an interagency agreement between DHS and USDA  for Plum Island, the Joint DHS and USDA Strategy for Foreign Animal  Disease Research and Diagnostic Programs, and the Plum Island Animal  Disease Center Charter. To determine what changes, if any, have taken place regarding research and  diagnostic priorities at Plum Island since the facility was transferred to  DHS, and the reasons for and implications of such changes, we interviewed  the current and two former Plum Island directors, spoke with current and  former Plum Island scientists, and discussed research and diagnostic  priorities with senior officials in the DHS Science and Technology  Directorate and USDA’s Agricultural Research Service (ARS) and Animal  and Plant Health and Inspection Service (APHIS). This  work is important in order to remain prepared to respond to outbreaks  of various foreign animal diseases.
Why GAO Did This Study

The livestock industry, which contributes over $100 billion annually to the national economy, is vulnerable to foreign animal diseases that, if introduced in the United States, could cause severe economic losses. To protect against such losses, critical research and diagnostic activities are conducted at the Plum Island Animal Disease Center in New York. The Department of Agriculture (USDA) was responsible for Plum Island until June 2003, when provisions of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 transferred the facility to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Under an interagency agreement, USDA continues to work on foreign animal diseases at the island. GAO examined (1) DHS and USDA coordination of research and diagnostic activities, (2) changes in research and diagnostic priorities since the transfer, and (3) long-term objectives of joint activities at Plum Island.

What GAO Found

DHS and USDA's coordination at Plum Island Animal Disease Center has been largely successful because of the agencies' early efforts to work together to bring structure to their interactions at the island. For example, prior to the transfer, officials from DHS and USDA worked in concert to develop a written interagency agreement--effective when the island was transferred to DHS--that coordinated management activities. Subsequently, DHS and USDA created a detailed strategy to guide their joint work on foreign animal disease research and diagnostics. According to this joint strategy, DHS's role is to augment the research and diagnostic work that USDA's Agricultural Research Service (ARS) and the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) conduct at the island. Since the transfer, budget changes, in part, have modified overall priorities and the scope of work at the island. First, ARS narrowed its research priorities to focus its work primarily on a single foreign animal disease, foot-and-mouth disease (FMD). Traditionally one of the high-priority diseases studied at Plum Island, FMD has emerged as its top research priority because, according to officials, it poses the greatest threat of introduction because of its virulence, infectivity, and availability. Other research programs have been terminated or are proceeding at a slower pace. National experts we consulted confirmed the importance of studying FMD, but stated that it is also important to study a variety of other diseases to remain prepared. They suggested that, to free up limited space at the facility, some of the work that does not require the unique features of Plum Island could be performed elsewhere: for example, work that does not involve the use of a live virus, such as certain aspects of vaccine development. Second, while APHIS's overall priorities have not changed, diagnostic work has been curtailed. Officials said that, after the transfer, because the agency did not receive an expected budget increase, their plans to expand development of diagnostic tools for high-priority diseases were curtailed. This work is vital to rapidly identifying diseases when outbreaks occur. APHIS officials told us that the funds to support work on diagnostic tools remain insufficient. Finally, DHS has assumed responsibility for operations and maintenance at Plum Island and has established an applied research science and agricultural forensics team. While DHS and USDA plan to continue to work together on FMD, agency officials told us that it is not prudent to speculate on long-term objectives at Plum Island, in part, because DHS has plans to replace the Plum Island Animal Disease Center with a new, modernized facility that could be located at Plum Island or elsewhere. Pending congressional approval, DHS estimates that the new facility will be fully operational by 2012.