However, unlike the GRRS program, NNSA’s Office of Nonproliferation  and International Security does not fund or install security upgrades at  research reactors overseas. NNSA Has Improved the Security of Research Reactors and Plans to Continue Upgrading the Security of Additional Reactors

As of August 2009, NNSA reports that it had upgraded the security at 18 of  the 22 foreign research reactors in the GRRS program at a total cost of  approximately $8 million. Security upgrades we observed during our visits  to reactors in the GRRS program included, among other things,    construction of new, heavily reinforced vaults to store HEU fuel;  installation of motion detector sensors and security cameras to detect  unauthorized entry into reactor buildings and provide the ability to  remotely monitor activities in those buildings;  replacement of glass entry doors with hardened steel doors equipped with  magnetic locks and controlled by card readers or keypads; and    upgrades or construction of new fortified central alarm stations that allow  on-site guards to monitor alarms and security cameras, and communicate  with response forces. At two reactors,  however, no emergency response exercises had been conducted between  the on-site guard force and off-site response forces, such as the national  police, potentially limiting the effectiveness of these forces in an actual  emergency. In addition, one of these reactors lacked any formal plans for  emergencies involving attempts to steal HEU fuel or to sabotage reactors. However, personnel at one research reactor  we visited did not search visitors or their belongings before granting them  access to restricted areas where nuclear material is present, thereby  potentially compromising the security upgrades made through NNSA  assistance. At the same reactor, according to foreign government officials, the  government agency charged with regulating the operation of the research  reactor had neither developed safety and security regulations, nor had the  country enacted laws ensuring the safe and secure operation of nuclear  facilities—including licensing, inspections, and emergency exercise  procedures—as called for by IAEA guidelines. NNSA and Sandia officials responsible for making security upgrades at  these reactors acknowledged that, even with NNSA-funded upgrades,  these continued vulnerabilities potentially compromise security. However, these visits generally have not been used  to assist the facilities in developing security policy and procedures that  comply with IAEA security guidelines, and there are no specific plans to  continue these visits after security upgrades at the remaining reactors are  completed in 2010. NNSA Coordinates with Other Countries to Implement Upgrades but Faces Challenges in Addressing Security Weaknesses at Some Research Reactors

NNSA officials and the physical security experts at Sandia coordinate with  foreign government research reactor operators to design, install, and  sustain physical security upgrades. Because the GRRS program is voluntary and cooperative, NNSA officials  told us that in some cases they face challenges in obtaining foreign  governments’ commitment to complete security upgrades in a timely  manner. For example, progress to secure a research reactor in one country  we visited has been delayed by as many as 4 years for two reasons. Consequently, NNSA has recently begun  working with IAEA’s Office of Nuclear Security to establish a  sustainability program. IAEA plans to conduct pilot projects of  the sustainability program at three research reactors in 2009, evaluate the  results of the pilot projects, and then potentially expand the program in  2010 to all reactors in the GRRS program that still possess HEU. NNSA  will continue to support sustainability efforts through the IAEA after the  completion of security upgrades at the remaining reactors in 2010. Recommendations for Executive Action

To resolve remaining security weaknesses at foreign research reactors  that use HEU fuel, we recommend that the Secretary of Energy direct the  Administrator of NNSA to take the following three actions:    While continuing to emphasize and accelerate NNSA efforts to convert  reactors to LEU fuel use and return HEU fuel to its country of origin, we  recommend that NNSA work with foreign government officials and  research reactor operators in countries where security upgrades are in  progress or have been completed to (1) take immediate action to address  any remaining security weaknesses, including those that we identified in  this report; and (2) ensure that security policies and procedures, including  those for emergency response to security incidents, fully meet IAEA  guidelines.
Why GAO Did This Study

Worldwide, about 165 research reactors use highly enriched uranium (HEU) fuel. Because HEU can also be used in nuclear weapons, the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) established the Global Research Reactor Security (GRRS) program to make security upgrades at foreign research reactors whose security did not meet guidelines established by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). GAO was asked to assess (1) the status of NNSA's efforts to secure foreign research reactors, (2) the extent to which selected foreign research reactors with NNSA security upgrades meet IAEA's security guidelines, and (3) the extent to which NNSA coordinates the GRRS program with other countries and the IAEA. GAO reviewed NNSA and IAEA documents and visited five of the 22 research reactors in the GRRS program, which were selected on the basis of when upgrades had been completed and because the reactors still possess HEU.

What GAO Found

As of August 2009, NNSA reports that it had upgraded the security at 18 of the 22 foreign research reactors in the GRRS program at a total cost of approximately $8 million. NNSA plans to complete physical security upgrades at the remaining reactors by 2010 at an additional cost of $6 million. Security upgrades that GAO observed during its site visits include heavily reinforced vaults to store HEU fuel, motion detector sensors and security cameras to detect unauthorized access, and fortified central alarm stations that allow on-site guards the ability to monitor alarms and security cameras and communicate with response forces. Foreign research reactors that have received NNSA upgrades where GAO conducted site visits generally meet IAEA security guidelines; however, in some cases, critical security weaknesses remain. At four of the five reactors visited, GAO identified security conditions that did not meet IAEA guidelines. For example, (1) at two reactors, no emergency response exercises had been conducted between the on-site guard force and off-site emergency response force, and one of these reactors lacked any formal response plans for emergencies involving attempts to steal HEU fuel; and (2) personnel at one research reactor did not search visitors or their belongings before granting them access to restricted areas where nuclear material is present. Furthermore, the government agency charged with regulating the operation of one research reactor has neither developed safety and security regulations nor has the country enacted laws ensuring the safe and secure operation of nuclear facilities. NNSA and Sandia National Laboratories officials responsible for making security upgrades at these reactors acknowledged that these continued vulnerabilities potentially compromise security at these reactors. Although the officials stressed the importance of NNSA continuing to work with these countries, there are no specific plans to do so after security upgrades at the remaining reactors are completed in 2010. NNSA officials coordinate with foreign government research reactor operators to design, install, and sustain security upgrades. Because the GRRS program is a voluntary and cooperative program, in some cases, NNSA faces challenges obtaining foreign governments' commitment to complete security upgrades in a timely manner. For example, progress to secure a research reactor in one country GAO visited has been delayed by as many as 4 years due to foreign government reluctance in accepting NNSA assistance and delays approving the designed security upgrades. Recently, NNSA has begun working with IAEA's Office of Nuclear Security to establish a sustainability program to help ensure the continued effectiveness of NNSA-funded security upgrades and to help research reactor operators implement security procedures. IAEA plans to conduct pilot programs at three research reactors in 2009 and then expand the program. NNSA will continue to support sustainability efforts through the IAEA after the completion of security upgrades at the remaining reactors in 2010.