The CSTs are designed to support civil authorities in the event  of a domestic WMD event by identifying WMD agents and substances,  assessing current and projected consequences, advising on response  measures, and assisting with appropriate requests for additional support. CSTs Are Prepared to Conduct Their Mission, but the Role of Non- WMD Missions Causes Confusion

Based on the CSTs’ readiness measures for staffing, training, and  equipment; the data we obtained from the CSTs on each of these measures;  the process NGB has in place to maintain and monitor CST readiness; and  the discussions we had with CSTs and state, local, and federal officials in  the 14 states and territories we visited, we found that the certified CSTs  have thus far been trained, equipped, and staffed to conduct their mission. Further, NGB, DOD, and the states have guidance in place for operational  command and control of the CSTs, specifying how and when teams will  operationally respond to a WMD event. However, confusion about the types  of non-WMD missions the CSTs conduct to help them prepare for WMD  missions could impede coordination between state, local, and federal  officials about the appropriate use of the CSTs. This confusion results from a lack of clear guidance interpreting the   legislation that establishes the CST mission to “prepare for or to respond  to” WMD or terrorist attacks and from DOD’s use of the term chemical,  biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosives (CBRNE) in  its  characterization of the CSTs’ official mission. As part of their coordination efforts with state and local  emergency management officials, CST members highlight the WMD and  catastrophic terrorism mission limitation of the CSTs. But there remains no guidance that would assist CSTs or state and  local officials in understanding what types of non-WMD missions are  appropriate for the CSTs to conduct in preparing for their WMD terrorism  mission. DOD has requested that Congress allow CSTs to coordinate and operate  with Mexican and Canadian officials in the event of a cross-border WMD  incident. Although these challenges have  not yet affected the overall readiness of the CSTs, if the current efforts to  address them are unsuccessful, they could impede the progress of the  newer teams and increase the risk to the long-term sustainment of the  program. CSTs Struggle to Fully Staff Teams

NGB faces several challenges to the CST program that could impede the  progress of the newer teams as well as hinder the long-term sustainment of  the CST program. CSTs Face Equipment, Training, Readiness Reporting, and Facilities Challenges

CSTs experience other challenges that NGB recognizes as important, and it  has efforts under way to address them. NGB Lacks Guidance to Help State National Guard Commands Oversee and Support CSTs

NGB has made progress in issuing guidance that explains state National  Guard roles and responsibilities for overseeing and supporting their CSTs,  but this has been insufficient to fully inform the states about the unique  nature and requirements of the CSTs and how to integrate such a unit into  the state National Guard command structure. As a result, some  states approved equipment for a CST while other states did not. Though DOD  indicates that it is not planning to request that Congress expand the CSTs’  role to encompass more demanding overseas missions, to the extent  missions such as regular CST support to overseas combatant commands  are considered in the future, they would likely have a detrimental impact  on the readiness and availability of the teams to perform their original  mission to support domestic WMD response. This should help NGB and the  states provide an effective long-term partnership to sustain the CST  program. To assess the extent to which effective administrative mechanisms are in  place for the CSTs, we compared National Guard Bureau (NGB)  regulations and guidance on management of the CSTs with the practices in  place at the 14 CSTs we visited. Our site visits to 14 of the 55 CSTs were conducted from August through  December 2005. 2. Reported to NGB? 1.
Why GAO Did This Study

To prepare for potential attacks in the United States involving weapons of mass destruction (WMD), Congress approved the development of National Guard Civil Support Teams (CST) tasked to identify chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or high-yield explosive weapons; assess consequences; advise civil authorities on response measures; and assist with requests for additional support. Thus far, 36 of the 55 approved teams have been fully certified to conduct their mission. The National Guard Bureau (NGB) is in the process of establishing, certifying, and planning for the long-term sustainment of the CSTs. GAO was asked to address the extent to which (1) the CSTs are ready to conduct their mission and (2) effective administrative mechanisms are in place for the CSTs.

What GAO Found

The established CSTs have thus far been trained, equipped, and staffed and have command and control mechanisms in place to conduct their domestic mission. However, confusion resulting from a lack of guidance on the types of non-WMD missions the CSTs can conduct to prepare for their WMD terrorism mission could impede coordination between state authorities and local emergency management officials on the appropriate use of the CSTs. CSTs were created to focus on assisting civil authorities in domestic WMD events. Based on its review of the CSTs' training, equipment, and staffing criteria; analysis of CST readiness data; site visits to 14 CSTs; and discussions with state, local, and federal responders, GAO found the certified teams visited to be ready to conduct their mission. NGB and the states have a clear structure for operational command and control of the CSTs. Though current NGB guidance and the CSTs' message to state and local officials emphasize the CST mission as being focused on WMD events, some CSTs have responded to non-WMD events, such as providing emergency assistance to the Gulf Coast states after the 2005 hurricanes. While NGB views such missions as useful preparations for WMD events, guidance has not been clarified to reflect the type of non-WMD missions that would be appropriate. This lack of clarity has caused confusion among state, local, and NGB officials, potentially slowing coordination efforts. Also, DOD is proposing a limited role for the CSTs to coordinate and operate with Mexican and Canadian officials in the event of a cross-border WMD incident. DOD and NGB are informally considering limited overseas missions for the teams, though they have no plans to request a further expansion of the CSTs' mission to encompass overseas operations. According to NGB and the CST commanders, some overseas missions could provide valuable experience and have a positive effect on CST readiness, while other, more demanding missions, such as supporting the warfighter, could be detrimental to the readiness and availability of the CSTs. Although NGB continues to develop a long-term sustainment plan for the CST program, going forward, it faces challenges to the administration and management of the CSTs that could impede both the progress of newer teams and the long-term sustainment of the program. NGB has made progress in establishing an administrative management structure for the CSTs, including issuing a broad CST management regulation and initiating a standardization and evaluation program. However, the CSTs face challenges in personnel, coordination plans, equipment acquisition and planning, training objectives, readiness reporting and facilities. Further, insufficient NGB guidance on state National Guard roles and responsibilities for overseeing and supporting their CSTs has resulted in varied support at the state National Guard level. NGB is aware of the challenges and has efforts under way to address them. While these challenges have not yet undermined CST readiness, if NGB efforts are unsuccessful, the progress of newer teams could be impeded and the long-term sustainment of the CST program put at greater risk.