The strategy  identified four lead agencies, each responsible for developing a plan to  implement a component of the strategy: USDA is responsible for the  veterinary response, HHS is responsible for the medical response, the  Department of State is responsible for international activities, and DHS is  responsible for overall domestic incident management and federal  coordination. For  example, the department has put mechanisms in place to prevent the  importation of infected poultry and poultry products. In addition, it has  developed several surveillance programs to detect AI. Moreover, in the  event outbreaks do occur, USDA is developing written response plans and  has begun preliminary exercises to test aspects of these plans with federal,  state, local, and industry partners. For example, the  Agricultural Research Service is testing currently available poultry AI  vaccines to determine if they are protective against highly pathogenic  H5N1; developing new vaccines to protect against AI viruses that can be  efficiently administered to large number of birds at once, such as through  aerosol; enhancing diagnostic tools to allow for rapid testing of wild bird  samples; sequencing the genomes—a complete set of hereditary factors— of 1,000 AI viruses in order to better understand the epidemiology, or  causes, of the diseases; and conducting experiments in birds to better  understand how the virus causes disease and death in some domestic  poultry and wild birds but not in others. Currently, USDA is not planning for the lead  coordinating role that DHS would assume in certain outbreak emergencies. Our prior work  has shown that roles and responsibilities at all levels of government must  be clearly defined, effectively communicated, and well understood to  facilitate rapid and effective decision making during an emergency. USDA Has Not Identified Response Capabilities for Highly Pathogenic AI

DHS and state officials have expressed concern that USDA’s plans for  highly pathogenic AI do not identify the capabilities needed to carry out the  tasks associated with an outbreak scenario—that is, the entities  responsible for carrying out the tasks, the specific resources needed, and  the source of those resources (as described in fig. Incomplete State Plans Could Slow Response

USDA officials told us, and our own review corroborated, that some state  plans for addressing outbreaks of highly pathogenic AI are lacking  important components that could facilitate rapid containment of the virus  (see table 2). USDA and state officials told us there are several reasons why planning at  the state level is not more complete. Unresolved Issues Could Delay Response

We have identified several unresolved issues that, if not addressed, could  hinder response efforts. According to USDA, state,  and industry officials from all five states that we visited, containing an  outbreak among backyard birds remains a challenge because their  numbers and location are still unknown. Antiviral medication. USDA has not estimated the amount of antiviral  medication that it would need in the event of an outbreak of highly  pathogenic AI or resolved how to provide such supplies within the first  24 hours of an outbreak. Scope and Methodology

To describe the steps that the Department of Agriculture (USDA) has taken  to prepare for outbreaks of highly pathogenic avian influenza (AI) in  domestic poultry, we reviewed statutes, regulations, directives, and  national planning documents that broadly define USDA’s role in an animal  health or other national emergency.
Why GAO Did This Study

A highly pathogenic strain of avian influenza (AI) has spread to nearly 60 countries over the past few years, killing millions of birds and more than 170 humans. Controlling the virus in poultry is key to reducing the risk of a human pandemic. The Department of Agriculture (USDA) is responsible for planning for AI outbreaks in poultry, with states' assistance. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is responsible for coordinating the federal response for certain emergencies and developing policy documents that serve as a basis for national emergency planning. GAO described the steps USDA is taking to prepare for highly pathogenic AI and identified key challenges. GAO reviewed response plans, statutes, and regulations; visited poultry operations; interviewed federal, state, and industry officials in five states that experienced outbreaks; and reviewed 19 state plans.

What GAO Found

USDA is taking important steps to prepare for highly pathogenic AI. For example, the department has established mechanisms to prevent infected poultry and products from being imported and has developed several surveillance programs to detect AI. In addition, USDA is developing response plans specific to highly pathogenic AI and has begun conducting exercises to test these plans. Moreover, USDA is building a National Veterinary Stockpile to maintain critical supplies, including equipment to protect responders. Finally, USDA has launched various AI research projects, including one to explore why the virus causes disease and death in some domestic poultry and wild birds but not in others. While USDA has made important strides, incomplete planning at the federal and state levels, as well as several unresolved issues, could slow response. First, USDA is not planning for the lead coordinating role that DHS would assume if an outbreak among poultry occurred that is sufficient in scope to warrant various federal disaster declarations. GAO's prior work has shown that roles and responsibilities must be clearly defined and understood to facilitate rapid and effective decision making. Moreover, USDA response plans do not identify the capabilities needed to carry out the critical tasks associated with an outbreak scenario--that is, the entities responsible for carrying them out, the resources needed, and the provider of those resources. Furthermore, some state plans lack important components that could facilitate rapid AI containment, which is problematic because states typically lead initial response efforts. Finally, there are several unresolved issues that, absent advance consideration, could hinder response. For example, controlling an outbreak among birds raised in backyards, such as for hobby, remains particularly difficult because federal and state officials generally do not know the numbers and locations of these birds. In addition, USDA has not estimated the amount of antiviral medication that it would need during an outbreak or resolved how to provide such supplies in a timely manner. According to federal guidance, poultry workers responding to an outbreak of highly pathogenic AI should take antiviral medication to protect them from infection.