1). Army’s Modular Report Generally Met Legislative Requirements

The Army’s annual report on its modular force generally met legislative  requirements by providing information that either fully or partially  addressed each of the requirements. Our analysis showed that of the 14  legislative requirements, the report fully addressed 9 and partially  addressed 5. The fully addressed requirements included information  related to the status of key enabler personnel and equipment, an  assessment of the modular force capabilities, and the status of doctrine  for the modular force, among others. The partially addressed  requirements included risks associated with shortfalls; mitigation  strategies for shortfalls; scheduling for repairing, recapitalizing, and  replacing equipment; itemizing information by active-duty and reserve  components; and comments by the National Guard and Army Reserve  regarding key enabler personnel and equipment. By fully or partially  addressing the requirements, the Army’s 2013 report provided more  thorough information to congressional decision makers on the Army’s  progress in its modular force transformation than previous reports. The Army generally agreed with 18 of those  recommendations, but it has so far implemented only 3 of them. Army Has Made Some Progress Creating a Results-Oriented Plan, Including Taking Initial Steps in Ongoing Restructuring

			Summary of GAO Recommendations to Army on Creating a Results-Oriented Plan

In order to improve the Army’s focus on the relationship between key  enabler investments and results and the completeness of the information  that the Army provides Congress, between 2005 and 2008 we made four  recommendations regarding creating a results-oriented plan. GAO’s Prior Work Found That the Army Did Not Have Adequate Plans to Staff and Equip Modular Forces

Our work since 2005 found that the Army began its modular transition  without creating a results-oriented plan with clear milestones to provide  units with specially trained personnel and specialized equipment. By creating  a results-oriented plan for the inactivations and reorganizations, the Army  has established a baseline against which to measure performance. If the  Army follows through its initial steps to create a results-oriented plan for  changes to the modular force design, it would help to provide senior  officials and Congress the ability to identify and mitigate any potential  problems that may arise. Army Did Not Develop Realistic Cost Estimates Associated with Its Modular Force Transformation, and Costs and Savings of Ongoing Restructuring Are Not Clear

			Summary of GAO Recommendations to Army on Developing Realistic Cost Estimates

In order to improve information available to decision makers on the cost  of the Army’s plan for its modular force transformation, between 2005 and  2008 we made 10 recommendations regarding creating a realistic cost  estimate. GAO’s Prior Work Found That Modularity Costs Increased Dramatically from Initial Estimates, but Were Never Clearly Reported

From 2005 through 2013, the Army did not create realistic cost estimates  for implementing its modular force transformation. We continue to  believe that realistic cost estimates would enhance DOD decision makers’  ability to weigh competing priorities in a fiscally constrained environment  and provide Congress with the information needed to evaluate funding  requests. Army Has Not Completed a Comprehensive Assessment Plan to Monitor Performance of Its Modular Force Transformation, and Assessments for Ongoing Restructuring Are Not Formalized

			Summary of GAO Recommendations to Army on Planning Comprehensive Assessments

In order to assess the implications of changes to the Army force structure  in terms of the goals of modular restructuring, from 2005 through 2008 we  made six recommendations regarding creating comprehensive  assessment plans. GAO’s Prior Work Found That the Army Did Not Provide Comprehensive Assessments of Modular Restructuring

Since 2004, the Army has made many refinements to its modular design  based on lessons learned and limited assessments of specific  capabilities, but it has not completed a comprehensive assessment plan  to measure the extent that its modular force transformation is meeting  performance goals. The Army has developed some plans to conduct assessments and  capture lessons learned as it changes its modular force design, but it has  not formalized these plans with a detailed methodology, data-collection  procedures, or outcome-based metrics. If the  Army created a comprehensive assessment plan, it could help enable the  Army to clearly measure the extent to which it is achieving desired  benefits in the design of its modular force. Agency Comments

We are not making new recommendations in this report. However, this  report’s analysis provides additional support for past recommendations to  develop realistic cost estimates and to create a comprehensive  assessment plan to measure achievement of desired benefits. We  provided a draft of this report to DOD for comment. To  determine how the Army is addressing these challenges, we reviewed  whether the Army implemented the recommendations in our prior GAO  reports that evaluated the Army’s modular force structure.
Why GAO Did This Study

The Army considers its modular force transformation, which began in 2004, to be its most extensive restructuring since World War II. The Army expanded the number of deployable units and incorporated advanced equipment and specialized personnel, but removed a maneuver battalion from its brigades. Throughout the transformation, GAO reported, testified, and made recommendations on associated challenges the Army faced. In 2013, the Army stated it had completed its transformation and submitted its last required report to Congress on its modular progress. It also announced plans to restore a maneuver battalion to most brigades.
Congress mandated that GAO report annually on the Army's modular force. For this report, GAO (1) evaluates whether the Army addressed the legislative requirements in its modular force report and (2) provides an overview of any challenges that the Army faced in its modular force transformation and describes how the Army is addressing these challenges as it implements further changes in its force structure. GAO analyzed the Army's report against the legislative requirements, reviewed key Army reports, and spoke to Army officials.

What GAO Found

The Army's annual report on its modular force either fully or partially addressed all of the requirements mandated by law. GAO's analysis showed that of the 14 legislative requirements, the report fully addressed 9 and partially addressed 5. The requirements that were fully addressed included an assessment of the modular force capabilities and the status of doctrine for the modular force, among others. Some of the requirements that were partially addressed included information related to risks and mitigation strategies associated with shortfalls; scheduling for repairing, recapitalizing, and replacing equipment; and itemizing information by active-duty and reserve components. The 2013 report provided more thorough information to congressional decision makers on the Army's progress in its modular force transformation than previous reports.
GAO's body of work since 2005 on the Army's modular restructuring found that the Army faced challenges in creating a results-oriented plan, developing realistic cost estimates, and planning comprehensive assessments. GAO made 20 recommendations from 2005 through 2008 to help address these challenges; the Army generally agreed with 18 of the recommendations but so far has implemented only 3. As the Army plans to restructure its modular force it has made some progress in creating a results-oriented plan, but more work remains in developing realistic cost estimates and planning comprehensive assessments.
Creating a results-oriented plan. As the Army plans further changes to its modular force design, it has taken initial steps to create a results-oriented plan by developing a timeline with associated tasks and milestones. When the Army began its modular force transformation it did not create a plan with clear milestones to guide its efforts to fully staff and equip the modular force. By incorporating lessons identified in GAO's prior work as it makes further changes, the Army has established a baseline against which to measure performance and may provide decision makers the ability to mitigate any potential problems that may arise.
Developing realistic cost estimates . From 2005 through 2013, the Army did not create realistic cost estimates or provide a reliable accounting of past spending or future funding needs for implementing its modular force transformation. As the Army plans further changes to its modular force design, it has not developed cost estimates for military construction, personnel relocation, or training for the reorganized units. GAO continues to believe that realistic cost estimates would better position the Army to weigh competing priorities in a fiscally constrained environment and provide Congress with the information needed to evaluate funding requests.
Planning comprehensive assessments. Since 2004, the Army has made many changes to its modular design based on limited assessments, but it has not completed a comprehensive assessment plan to measure the extent that its modular force transformation is meeting performance goals. As the Army continues to make changes to its modular design, the Army plans to conduct assessments but has not identified outcome-oriented metrics to measure progress. If the Army created a comprehensive assessment plan, it could help decision makers identify capability gaps and mitigate risks.

What GAO Recommends

GAO is not making new recommendations, but this analysis provides additional support for past recommendations to develop realistic cost estimates and to create a comprehensive assessment plan to measure achievement of desired benefits. In oral comments on a draft of this report, the Army concurred with the report.