Coordinated Plans and New Organizations Have Facilitated Progress in the Drawdown from Iraq, but DOD Has Yet to Plan for All Contracted Support Needed During the Drawdown

A number of DOD organizations have issued plans outlining a phased  drawdown from Iraq that meet time frames set forth in the Security  Agreement and presidential guidance while being responsive to security  conditions on the ground. In support of its plans DOD created several organizations to oversee the  drawdown and ensure unity of effort. While DOD’s progress since May 2009 exceeded some of its targets, a large  amount of personnel, equipment, and bases remain to be drawn down  within the established timelines. USF-I guidance, however, may not allow sufficient time for all  contracted services needed during the drawdown to be put on contract in  a responsible manner. Several Additional Challenges May Affect the Efficient Execution of the Drawdown

Efficient execution of the drawdown from Iraq may be complicated by  several challenges. First, challenges associated with the planned  simultaneous transition of several key contracts may lead to the  interruption of vital services and wasteful contracting practices. Third, persistent shortages of  contract oversight personnel may increase the potential for fraud, waste,  and abuse. And lastly, DOD lacks complete visibility over its inventory of  equipment and shipping containers. However, these anticipated  benefits may not be fully realized since DOD will have only until December  31, 2011, to realize potential cost savings before the U.S. military  completely withdraws. According to DOD reports, these efforts  to date have contributed to the meeting or exceeding of established goals  for drawing down forces and retrograding equipment. However, while DOD has made significant progress executing the  drawdown, there remains a large amount of personnel, equipment, and  bases yet to be drawn down, and several actions needed to facilitate this  are incomplete. While DOD has begun to address some of  these issues, none of them has yet been fully resolved. Recommendations

To facilitate DOD’s ability to efficiently conduct the drawdown of U.S.  forces and equipment from Iraq in accordance with established timelines,  we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the appropriate  authorities to:    Ensure that joint doctrine regarding operational planning for contract  support is followed and that operational personnel identify contract  support requirements in a timely manner to avoid potential waste and  abuse and facilitate the continuity of services;    Ensure unity of effort in contract management is attained through the  clarification of the roles and responsibilities of the various contract  review boards in the CENTCOM theater;    Assess and develop options to mitigate the risks associated with the  upcoming simultaneous contract transitions in Iraq and Kuwait;    Conduct an analysis of the benefits, costs, and risks of transitioning  from LOGCAP III to LOGCAP IV and other service contracts in Iraq  under current withdrawal timelines to determine the most efficient and  effective means for providing essential services during the drawdown;    Evaluate the risk of having too few qualified contract oversight  personnel in light of the planned proportional increase in the number  of Iraqi contractors during the drawdown and take steps to rectify, if  needed;    Clarify in existing planning the extent to which Kuwait and other  locations in southwest Asia can support the temporary staging of  equipment and materiel retrograded from Iraq while DOD is finalizing  the disposition instructions for certain types of equipment. To identify factors that may impact the efficient execution of the  drawdown we reviewed DOD plans and interviewed officials in the United  States, Iraq, and Kuwait on issues that may hamper the progress of the  drawdown.
Why GAO Did This Study

The drawdown from Iraq is a complex operation of significant magnitude. Established drawdown timelines dictate a reduction in forces to 50,000 troops by August 31, 2010, and a complete withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq by December 31, 2011. While DOD has made progress toward meeting these goals, a large amount of equipment, personnel, and bases remain to be drawn down. Moreover, escalating U.S. involvement in Afghanistan may increase the pressure on DOD to efficiently execute the drawdown. Due to broad congressional interest in drawdown issues, GAO performed this work under the Comptroller General's Authority. GAO examined (1) the extent to which DOD has planned for the drawdown from Iraq in accordance with set timelines, and (2) factors that may impact the efficient execution of the drawdown. To evaluate these efforts GAO reviewed documents and interviewed officials from over 20 DOD organizations in the U.S., Kuwait, and Iraq.

What GAO Found

Several DOD organizations have issued coordinated plans for the execution of the drawdown and created new organizations to oversee, synchronize, and ensure unity of effort during the drawdown. To date, DOD reports that its drawdown efforts have exceeded its goals. For example, in January 2010, DOD reported that it had exceeded its target figure for withdrawing wheeled and tracked combat vehicles in Iraq, among other items, by over 2,600 pieces, yet a large amount of personnel, equipment, and bases remain to be drawn down. However, DOD has not (1) fully included contracted support in its operational planning for the drawdown, (2) allowed sufficient time in its guidance to ensure that all contracted services can be put on contract in a responsible manner, or (3) clearly defined the roles and responsibilities of various contract validation review boards. Several other issues may impede the efficient execution of the drawdown from Iraq. First, challenges associated with the planned simultaneous transition of several major contracts may lead to the interruption of vital services. Second, DOD has not determined whether the benefits of transitioning its major base and life support contract in Iraq outweigh the costs and risks of doing so. Third, shortages of contract oversight personnel may increase the risk of fraud, waste, and abuse. Fourth, key decisions concerning equipment that will be retrograded from Iraq have yet to be made. And finally, DOD lacks precise visibility over its inventory of equipment and shipping containers. While DOD has begun to address some of these issues, GAO has not fully assessed DOD's actions.