	Background

Every 4 years, DOD is required to conduct and report on a  comprehensive assessment—the Quadrennial Roles and Missions  Review—of the roles and missions of the armed services and the core  competencies and capabilities of DOD to perform and support such roles  and missions. The Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review that resulted in the July  2012 submission occurred amid a series of strategy and policy reviews  that DOD has undertaken over the past 5 years. For more information about the  Defense Strategic Guidance and other selected strategy and planning  documents, see appendix I.

	DOD Did Not Provide Sufficiently Detailed Information in Its Report to Congress or Conduct a Comprehensive Process for Assessing Roles and Missions

		DOD Did Not Provide Sufficiently Detailed Information to Congress

In July 2012, DOD submitted the Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review  report, together with the Defense Strategic Guidance, to Congress to  meet the statutory reporting requirement; however, DOD’s submission did  not provide sufficiently detailed information about most of the statutorily  required elements of the assessment. Although the statute does not  require DOD to report on all elements of the roles and missions  assessment, a key principle for information quality indicates that  information presented to Congress should be clear and sufficiently  detailed.armed services and some information about core capabilities, but did not,   Specifically, we found that DOD provided the missions of the  for any of the 10 missions, clearly identify the components within the  department responsible for providing the core competencies and  capabilities, or identify any plans to address any capability gaps or  unnecessary duplication. Instead DOD limited its approach to leveraging the results of  another review, conducted in 2011, that resulted in the January 2012  release of the Defense Strategic Guidance. Internal stakeholder involvement: The involvement of key internal  stakeholders was limited. Time frames: DOD did not develop a schedule to gauge progress for  conducting the assessment and completing the report. According to DOD officials, the primary reason that they did not perform a  separate effort to examine roles and missions is that the statutory  assessment and reporting requirements of the Quadrennial Roles and  Missions Review are largely duplicative of the review conducted for the  Defense Strategic Guidance, as well as other reviews and processes. However, by not conducting a specific, comprehensive roles and missions  assessment, DOD missed an opportunity to examine these issues  through a broad, department-wide approach, rather than through  processes established for other purposes. A  comprehensive process that outlined a planned approach for addressing  all statutory requirements of the roles and missions assessment; involved  key internal stakeholders; offered an opportunity for key external  stakeholders, such as Congress, to provide input regarding the  department’s approach; and set clear time frames to gauge progress for  the assessment, would have helped provide DOD with reasonable  assurance that its resulting assessment of roles and missions was  comprehensive and that DOD was positioned to provide such a  sufficiently detailed report to Congress. Recommendation for Executive Action

To assist DOD in conducting any future comprehensive assessments of  roles and missions that reflect appropriate statutory requirements, we  recommend that the Secretary of Defense develop a comprehensive  process that includes a planned approach, including the principles or assumptions used to  inform the assessment, that addresses all statutory requirements;  the involvement of key DOD stakeholders, such as the armed  services, Joint Staff, and other officials within the department; an opportunity to identify and involve appropriate external  stakeholders, to provide input to inform the assessment; and  time frames with milestones for conducting the assessment and for  reporting on its results. Regarding external stakeholders, the department stated that it did  seek limited additional clarification from Congress prior to conducting  the roles and missions assessment, but did not seek formal input to  the assessment from other federal agencies because it relied on the  external stakeholder input obtained during the development of the  Defense Strategic Guidance. The department’s approach resulted in a report that was insufficiently  detailed, therefore, we continue to believe the recommendation is valid to  guide future roles and missions reviews. DOD issued the latest report on this  biennial review in April 2013. Sustaining U.S.
Why GAO Did This Study

DOD is one of the largest organizations in the world, with its budget representing over half of the U.S. federal government's discretionary spending. According to DOD, the global security environment presents an increasingly complex set of challenges. Congress requires DOD to assess and report on its roles and missions every 4 years. In July 2012, DOD submitted its most recent Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review report.
In June 2013, GAO was mandated to review DOD's process for conducting the latest Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review. GAO evaluated the extent to which DOD developed a sufficiently detailed report and conducted a comprehensive process for assessing roles and missions. GAO compared DOD's July 2012 report with the statutory requirements for the assessment, and compared DOD's assessment process with key principles derived from a broad selection of principles GAO and other federal agencies have identified.

What GAO Found

The Department of Defense's (DOD) July 2012 submission to Congress following its most recent Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review did not provide sufficiently detailed information about most of the statutorily required elements of the assessment. Specifically, DOD's July 2012 submission included the results of a 2011 review that led to the January 2012 release of a new strategic guidance document (hereinafter referred to as the Defense Strategic Guidance) as well as the Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review report. Although DOD is not statutorily required to report on all elements of the assessment, the submission that it provided to Congress was lacking key information. A key principle for information quality indicates that information presented to Congress should be clear and sufficiently detailed; however, neither the Defense Strategic Guidance nor the Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review included sufficiently detailed information about certain key elements of the roles and missions assessment. For example, while the submitted documents identify the core missions of the armed services and provide some information on capabilities associated with these missions, neither document provides other information required by the roles and missions assessment—including identifying the DOD components responsible for providing the identified core competencies and capabilities and identifying plans for addressing any unnecessary duplication or capability gaps.
DOD's process for assessing roles and missions missed key principles associated with effective and comprehensive assessments. Specifically, DOD limited its process to leveraging the prior review that resulted in the Defense Strategic Guidance; by doing so its process did not include the following:
A planned approach : DOD did not develop or document a planned approach that included the principles or assumptions used to inform the assessment.
Internal stakeholder involvement: DOD included limited internal stakeholder involvement. For example, DOD gave the armed services a limited opportunity to review the draft prior to its release.
Identification and involvement of external stakeholders : DOD obtained limited input from relevant external stakeholders, such as Congress, on the specific guidance and direction they expected of the roles and missions assessment.
Time frames : DOD did not develop a schedule to gauge progress for conducting the assessment and completing the report, which may have contributed to the report being provided to Congress over 5 months late.
DOD officials stated that the primary reason that they did not perform a separate roles and missions review is that the statutory requirements were duplicative of other reviews and processes, such as the Defense Strategic Guidance. However, by not conducting a comprehensive assessment, DOD missed an opportunity to conduct a department-wide examination of roles and missions. Instead, by relying on processes established for other purposes, DOD has limited assurance that it has fully identified all possible cost savings that can be achieved through the elimination of unnecessary duplication and that it has positioned itself to report clear and sufficient information about the statutorily required assessment to Congress.

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that, in conducting future assessments of roles and missions, DOD develop a comprehensive process that includes a planned approach, involvement of key internal and external stakeholder involvement, and time frames. DOD partially concurred, stating that it had leveraged other processes. GAO maintains that the roles and missions report was insufficiently detailed and continues to believe the recommendation is valid, as discussed in the report.