U.S. Efforts to Build Iraqi Government Capacity Lack Unified Direction

U.S. efforts to help build the capacity of the Iraqi national government are  characterized by (1) multiple U.S. agencies leading individual efforts  without overarching direction from a lead entity or a strategic approach  that integrates their efforts with Iraqi government priorities and  (2) shifting time frames and priorities in response to deteriorating  conditions in Iraq. As of May 2007, six U.S. agencies were implementing about 53 projects at  individual ministries and other national Iraqi agencies. Although State, USAID, and DOD have improved the coordination of their  capacity-building efforts since early 2007, there is no lead agency or  strategic plan to provide overarching guidance. Low Capacity of the Iraqi Ministries and Other Challenges Pose Risks to U.S. Efforts

U.S. efforts to develop Iraqi ministerial capacity face four key challenges  that pose a risk to their success and long-term sustainability. First, Iraqi government institutions have significant shortages of personnel  with the skills to perform the vital tasks necessary to provide security and  deliver essential services to the Iraqi people. Second, Iraq’s government confronts significant challenges in staffing a  nonpartisan civil service and addressing militia infiltration of key  ministries. Third, according to State, widespread corruption undermines efforts to  develop the government’s capacity by robbing it of needed resources,  some of which are used to fund the insurgency; by eroding popular faith in  democratic institutions seen to be run by corrupt political elites; and by  spurring capital flight and reducing economic growth. The high level of  violence hinders U.S. advisors’ access to their counterparts in the  ministries, increases absenteeism among ministry employees, and  contributes to “brain drain” as ministry employees join the growing  number of Iraqis leaving the country. A senior USAID official indicated that it is uncertain whether the high-level  summary will be developed into a strategy, although the administration  received $140 million in funding for its capacity development efforts in  fiscal year 2007 and requested $255 million for fiscal year 2008. For example:    We found little evidence that the U.S. government has clearly defined  the purpose, scope, and methodology for developing an overall  strategy. While U.S. agencies have clearly identified the overall goals of capacity  development at the Iraqi ministries, most U.S. efforts lack clear ties to  Iraqi priorities for all ministries. U.S. efforts lack an overall strategy,  no lead agency provides overall direction, and U.S. priorities have been  subject to numerous changes. Key components of an overall capacity development strategy should  include a clear purpose, scope, and methodology; a clear delineation of  U.S. roles, responsibilities, and coordination, including the designation of  a lead agency; goals and objectives based on Iraqi-identified priorities;  performance measures based on outcome metrics and milestones; and a  description of how resources will be targeted to achieve the desired end- state. Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

In commenting on a draft of the report accompanying this testimony, State  and USAID noted (1) their concern over our recommendation to condition  future appropriations for capacity development on the completion of a  strategy; (2) the recent appointment of an ambassador to supervise all  short- and medium-term capacity development programs; and (3) the need  to tailor capacity development needs to each Iraqi ministry. In response to  the agencies’ first comment, we do not recommend stopping U.S.  investment in capacity development; the $140 million in supplemental  funding appropriated in fiscal year 2007 remains available for the agencies  to continue their efforts. However, this action  occurred in July 2007, underscoring our point that U.S. capacity  development efforts have lacked overall leadership and highlighting the  need for an overall integrated strategy. This  is  a  work  of  the  U.S.  government  and  is  not  subject  to  copyright  protection  in  the  United  States.
Why GAO Did This Study

The development of competent and loyal government ministries is critical to stabilizing and rebuilding Iraq. The ministries are Iraq's largest employer, with an estimated 2.2 million government workers. U.S. efforts to build the capacity of Iraqi ministries include programs to advise and help Iraqi government employees develop the skills to plan programs, execute budgets, and effectively deliver services. The administration received $140 million in fiscal year 2007 to fund U.S. capacity-building efforts and requested an additional $255 million for fiscal year 2008. This testimony discusses (1) U.S. efforts to develop ministry capacity, (2) the key challenges to these efforts, and (3) the extent to which the U.S. government has an overall integrated strategy. This statement is based on GAO-08-117 . To accomplish our report objectives, we reviewed reports from and interviewed officials of U.S. agencies, the Iraqi government, the United Nations, and the World Bank. We conducted fieldwork in Washington, D.C.; New York City; Baghdad, Iraq; and Amman, Jordan.

What GAO Found

Over the past 4 years, U.S. efforts to help build the capacity of the Iraqi national government have been characterized by (1) multiple U.S. agencies leading efforts without overarching direction from a lead agency or a strategic plan that integrates their efforts; and (2) shifting timeframes and priorities in response to deteriorating conditions in Iraq. As of May 2007, six U.S. agencies were implementing about 53 projects at individual ministries and other national Iraqi agencies. Although the Departments of State and Defense and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) have improved the coordination of their capacity-building efforts, there is no lead agency or strategic plan to provide overarching guidance. U.S. efforts to develop Iraqi ministerial capacity face four key challenges that pose risks to their success and long-term sustainability. First, Iraqi government institutions have significant shortages of personnel with the skills to perform the vital tasks necessary to provide security and deliver essential services to the Iraqi people. Second, Iraq's government confronts significant challenges in staffing a nonpartisan civil service and addressing militia infiltration of key ministries. Third, widespread corruption undermines efforts to develop the government's capacity by robbing it of needed resources, some of which are used to fund the insurgency. Finally, violence in Iraq hinders U.S. advisors' access to Iraqi minstries, increases absenteeism among minstry employees, and contributes to the growing number of professional Iraqis leaving the country. The U.S. government is beginning to develop an overall strategy for ministerial capacity development, although agencies have been implementing separate programs since 2003. GAO's work in this area shows that an overall strategy for capacity development should include (1) a clear purpose, scope, and methodology; (2) a delineation of U.S. roles and responsibilities and coordination with other donors including the United Nations; (3) goals and objectives linked to Iraqi priorities; (4) performance measures and milestones; and (5) costs, resources needed, and assessment of program risks. U.S. ministry capacity efforts have included some but not all of these components. For example, agencies are working to clarify roles and responsibilities. However, U.S. efforts lack clear ties to Iraqi-identified priorities at all ministries, clear performance measures, and information on how resources will be targeted to achieve the desired end-state. State and USAID noted concerns over our recommendation to condition further appropriations and cited the appointment of an ambassador to supervise civilian capacity development programs. GAO does not recommend stopping U.S. investment in capacity development. The $140 million in fiscal year 2007 funds remains available to continue efforts while developing an integrated strategy. In addition, the U.S. ambassador arrived in Iraq in July 2007 underscoring our point that U.S. efforts lacked overall leadership and highlighting the need for an overall integrated strategy.