	TSA Reports that It Met the Screening Mandate as It Applies to Domestic Cargo, but Previously Identified Data Limitations and Other Challenges Persist

TSA took several actions to address the 9/11 Commission Act mandate to  screen 100 percent of air cargo as it applies to domestic cargo transported  on passenger aircraft by August 2010. As of August 2010, TSA reported that  it met the 9/11 Commission Act mandate to screen 100 percent of air cargo  as it applies to domestic cargo, although in June 2010 we reported that  TSA lacked a mechanism to verify the accuracy of the data used to make  this determination. To help meet the mandate, TSA took several actions, among them:  TSA created a voluntary program to facilitate screening  throughout the air cargo supply chain. TSA is taking steps to test technologies for screening air cargo. TSA expanded its explosives detection canine program. Among the  challenges and recommendations previously identified in our June 2010  report are the following. Given that the agency uses these data to report to Congress its  compliance with the screening mandate as it applies to domestic  cargo, we continue to believe that verifying the accuracy of the  screening data is important so that TSA will be better positioned to  provide reasonable assurance that screening is being conducted at  reported levels. TSA concurred and stated that as part of the staffing study, the agency  is working to develop a model to identify the number of required  transportation security inspectors and that this effort would be  completed in the fall of 2010. TSA Has Taken Steps to Enhance the Security of Inbound Air Cargo, but Previously Identified Screening Data Limitations and Other Challenges Persist

TSA has taken a number of steps to enhance the security of inbound air  cargo, as discussed below. TSA moved its deadline for meeting the 100 percent screening  mandate as it applies to inbound air cargo. According to TSA officials, the agency determined it was  feasible to require air carriers to meet a December 2011 screening deadline  as a result of trends in carrier reported screening data and discussions  with air cargo industry leaders regarding progress made by industry to  secure inbound cargo on passenger aircraft. TSA implemented additional security measures following the  October 2010 Yemen air cargo bomb attempt. Even with these steps to improve the security of inbound air cargo, as we  previously reported in June 2010, TSA faces challenges that could hinder  its ability to meet the 9/11 Commission Act screening mandate as it applies  to inbound cargo. TSA lacks a mechanism to verify data on screening conducted on  inbound air cargo. As we reported in June 2010, questions exist about  the reliability of TSA’s reported screening data for inbound cargo because  TSA does not have a mechanism to verify the accuracy of the data  reported by industry. In June 2010, we reported that TSA’s screening  percentages were estimated based on screening requirements of certain  countries and were not based on actual data collected from air carriers or  other entities, such as foreign governments. As of March 2011, TSA officials  stated that current screening percentages are based on actual data  reported by air carriers, but stated that it is difficult to verify the accuracy  of the screening data reported by air carriers. No technology is currently approved or qualified by TSA to screen  cargo once it is loaded onto a unit-load device. As we noted earlier  for domestic air cargo, TSA has not approved any equipment to screen  cargo transported on unit-load device (ULD) pallets or containers—both  of which are common means of transporting air cargo on wide-body  passenger aircraft—on both domestic and inbound aircraft. As a result,  questions remain about air carriers’ ability to effectively and efficiently  screen air cargo bound for the United States. We will  be examining these issues as part of our ongoing review of TSA’s efforts to  secure inbound air cargo for the House Committee on Homeland Security  and Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. We plan to issue the final results later this year.
Why GAO Did This Study

The Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is the federal agency with primary responsibility for securing the air cargo system. The Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 mandated DHS to establish a system to screen 100 percent of cargo flown on passenger aircraft by August 2010. GAO reviewed TSA's progress in meeting the act's screening mandate, and any related challenges it faces for both domestic (cargo transported within and from the United States) and inbound cargo (cargo bound for the United States). This statement is based on prior reports and testimonies issued from April 2007 through December 2010 addressing the security of the air cargo transportation system and selected updates made in February and March 2011. For the updates, GAO obtained information on TSA's air cargo security programs and interviewed TSA officials.

What GAO Found

As of August 2010, TSA reported that it met the mandate to screen 100 percent of air cargo as it applies to domestic cargo, but as GAO reported in June 2010, TSA lacked a mechanism to verify the accuracy of the data used to make this determination. TSA took several actions in meeting this mandate for domestic cargo, including creating a voluntary program to facilitate screening throughout the air cargo supply chain; taking steps to test technologies for screening air cargo; and expanding its explosives detection canine program, among other things. However, in June 2010 GAO reported that TSA did not have a mechanism to verify screening data and recommended that TSA establish such a mechanism. TSA partially concurred with this recommendation and stated that verifying such data would be challenging. As GAO reported in June 2010, data verification is important to provide reasonable assurance that screening is being conducted at reported levels. As GAO further reported in June 2010, there is no technology approved or qualified by TSA to screen cargo once it is loaded onto a pallet or container--both of which are common means of transporting domestic air cargo on passenger aircraft. As a result, questions remain about air carriers' ability to effectively screen air cargo on such aircraft. TSA has also taken a number of steps to enhance the security of inbound air cargo, but also faces challenges that could hinder its ability to meet the screening mandate. TSA moved its deadline for meeting the 100 percent screening mandate as it applies to inbound air cargo to the end of 2011, up 2 years from when the TSA administrator previously reported the agency would meet this mandate. According to TSA officials, the agency determined it was feasible to accelerate the deadline as a result of trends in air carrier reported screening data and discussions with air cargo industry leaders regarding progress made by industry to secure cargo on passenger aircraft. TSA also took steps to enhance the security of inbound cargo following the October 2010 Yemen air cargo bomb attempt--such as requiring additional screening of high-risk cargo prior to transport on an all-cargo aircraft. However, TSA continues to face challenges GAO identified in June 2010 that could impact TSA's ability to meet this screening mandate as it applies to inbound air cargo. For example, GAO reported that TSA's screening percentages were estimates and were not based on actual data collected from air carriers or other entities, such as foreign governments, and recommended that TSA establish a mechanism to verify the accuracy of these data. TSA partially agreed, and required air carriers to report inbound cargo screening data effective May 2010. However, TSA officials stated while current screening percentages are based on actual data reported by air carriers, verifying the accuracy of the screening data is difficult. It is important for TSA to have complete and accurate data to verify that the agency can meet the screening mandate. GAO will continue to monitor these issues as part of its ongoing review of TSA's efforts to secure inbound air cargo, the final results to be issued later this year.

What GAO Recommends

GAO has made recommendations in prior work to strengthen air cargo screening. Although not fully concurring with all recommendations, TSA has taken or has a number of actions underway to address them. Continued attention is needed to ensure some recommendations are addressed, such as establishing a mechanism to verify screening data. TSA provided technical comments on the information in this statement, which GAO incorporated as appropriate.