Some of these issues, suchas biennial budgeting, have extensive legislative histories. The Budget Resolution and Reconciliation

The budget resolution represents an agreement between the House and Senate concerning theoverall size of the federal budget, and the general composition of the budget in terms of functionalcategories. Key enforcement procedures under the Budget Enforcement Act of 1990 (i.e., discretionaryspending caps and PAYGO) expire at the end of FY2002. They are as follows:
extending the duration of budgetary control mechanisms, in order to retain thebudgetary discipline that has been in place since 1990;
establishing a joint budget resolution that would require the President'ssignature, thereby formally and directly involving the President and Congress in deliberations on thebudget early in the process;
establishing an emergency reserve fund, in order to change the way Congressand the President budget for emergencies and other unanticipated situations;
creating an automatic continuing resolution to provide an automatic source offunding for discretionary activities and prevent a federal government shutdown;and
changing to a biennial budget, lengthening the budget cycle to 2 years from oneyear as a way of promoting better management of both Congress's and the administration's budgetaryworkload. Extension of Budget Enforcement Mechanisms

Most of the budget enforcement mechanisms under the Congressional Budget Act arepermanent. Instead of maximum deficit targets, the BEA tiedsequestration to new statutory limits on discretionary spending and a "pay-as-you-go" (PAYGO)requirement for new direct spending and revenue legislation. An adjustment for such purposes may be desirable in any extension of discretionary caps. Because the budgetresolution is in the legislative form of a concurrent resolution, it is not presented to the President forhis signature, and thus does not become law. Options and Discussion

Proposals to reform the existing process of budgeting for emergencies largely involveestablishing a reserve fund for emergencies, with the appropriation of such funds tied to meetingspecific criteria concerning what constitutes an emergency. Emergency reserve fund proposals also require that appropriations from the reserve fundmeet specific criteria regarding what constitutes an emergency. Automatic Continuing Resolutions

Delays in the consideration and enactment of appropriations have been a source of chronicdifficulties in the budget process. 853 , the Comprehensive Budget Process Reform Act. 981 included 2-year budget resolutions,2-year appropriations, and multiyear authorizations. The Senate took nofurther action on the proposal in the 106th Congress.
This report examines several budget process reform options that have received prominentcongressional consideration in recent years: an extension of the Budget Enforcement Act; a jointbudget resolution; an emergency reserve fund; an automatic continuing resolution; and biennialbudgeting. For each reform option, the analysis includes a summary of the procedural issues relatedto the reform option, the arguments that have been raised for and against the proposal, and thelegislative history of past proposals.
First, key enforcement procedures under the Budget Enforcement Act (BEA) of 1990 expireat the end of FY2002 (i.e., September 30, 2002). These include the statutory caps on discretionaryspending and the "pay-as-you-go" (PAYGO) requirement for direct spending and revenue legislation. Possible considerations related to an extension of these budget enforcement procedures include thetime frame covered, possible categories for caps on discretionary spending, the types of automaticor permissible adjustments to the caps, and the application of the PAYGO requirement.
Second, a joint budget resolution would require the President's signature, thereby formallyand directly involving the President in congressional deliberations on the budget early in the process. Under the existing budget process, there is a concurrent resolution on the budget that represents anagreement between the House and Senate concerning overall budget policy. It is not presented tothe President for his signature, and thus does not become law.
Third, proposals for an emergency reserve fund are intended to change the way Congress andthe President budget for emergencies and other unanticipated situations. Instead of appropriatingfunds for such situations as the need arises, emergency reserve fund proposals would requireCongress and the President to set aside money for such purposes in the budget, with theappropriation of such funds tied to meeting specific criteria of what constitutes an emergency.
Fourth, an automatic continuing resolution would provide an automatic source of fundingfor discretionary activities in the event one or more regular appropriations acts are not enacted bythe start of a new fiscal year. This reform proposal is intended to prevent a shutdown of the federalgovernment due to the expiration of funding.
Finally, biennial budgeting proposals would change the budget cycle to 2 years from oneyear. This reform has been discussed as a way of promoting better management of both Congress'sand the administration's budgetary workload. Biennial budgeting proposals could involve multiyearauthorizations, 2-year budget resolutions, 2-year appropriations, or some combination of the three.
This report will be updated to reflect changes in congressional concerns or actions.