Stockpile Surveillance Tests Are Behind Schedule

DOE is currently behind schedule in conducting some flight tests, nonnuclear systems laboratory tests, and nuclear and nonnuclear components laboratory tests. These schedule slippages are the result of a variety of factors, including an unapproved safety study, suspension of testing at some facilities, and the transfer of testing functions to new facilities. According to DOE officials, in November 1992, DOE reduced its plan for testing Air Force InterContinental Ballistic Missiles from three tests per year to two—or eight tests over a 4-year period. DOE’s Ability to Conduct Some Future Tests Is Uncertain

DOE has taken actions to increase the number of stockpile surveillance tests but has not prepared detailed plans for returning the stockpile surveillance program to its schedule. To get nonnuclear laboratory systems tests on schedule, DOE plans to consolidate 3 years of testing into 2 years. However, DOE does not have formal contingency plans for continuation of stockpile surveillance tests in the event that one or more of the testing facilities experienced serious operational problems and could not perform testing for an extended period of time. Most recently, as discussed previously, Y12 was unable to conduct surveillance tests because of procedural safety problems. DOE has a draft report that discusses alternate locations for conducting weapons-related activities. Depending on the nature of the problem at the original facility, the length and nature of the outage, and the specific weapon(s) involved, DOE would determine the best course of action.
Why GAO Did This Study

Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on the Department of Energy's (DOE) Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Surveillance program, focusing on DOE efforts to get the testing program on schedule.

What GAO Found

GAO found that: (1) DOE is behind schedule in conducting flight tests, nonnuclear system laboratory tests, and nuclear and nonnuclear component laboratory tests; (2) these schedule slippages are a result of unapproved safety studies, suspended testing at certain nuclear facilities, and inappropriate transfer of testing functions; (3) DOE has reduced its plan for testing the Air Force's intercontinental ballistic missiles from three tests per year to two tests per year; (4) flight testing of W88 warheads is suspended until a safety study plan is approved; (5) DOE has taken actions to increase the number of stockpile surveillance tests, but DOE does not have formal contingency plans for continuous stockpile testing; (6) one DOE facility is unable to conduct surveillance tests due to procedural safety problems; (7) DOE uses the Stockpile Management Preferred Alternative Report to determine alternative locations for weapons testing depending on the nature of the problem at the original testing facility, length and time of the outage, and particular weapon involved; and (8) DOE prefers to develop a specific plan of action after testing problems occur to confront the wide range of problems and variables involved in the surveillance testing process.