Since then, State has taken steps to explore  access to such databases. Examples of Potentially Fraudulent or High-Risk Passport Issuances Found, but Pervasive Fraud Not Identified

Of the combined total of approximately 28 million passport issuances we  reviewed from fiscal years 2009 and 2010, we found instances of  issuances to individuals who applied for passports using identifying  information of deceased or incarcerated individuals, as well as applicants  with active felony warrants. Since fiscal years  2009 and 2010, State has taken steps to improve its detection of passport  applicants using the identifying information of deceased or incarcerated  individuals. In addition, State modified its process for identifying  applicants with active warrants, and has expanded measures to verify  SSNs in real time. However, State  officials said fraud could likely be ruled out in all four cases for various  reasons, such as the inadvertent use of an incorrect SSN. State’s subsequent review of these cases  indicated that fraud could likely be ruled out in four cases, and that  five of the cases should be referred to DS for further investigation. We provided information on all our matches, including  the 14 state prisoner cases in our sample, to State for review. Figure 5 summarizes our matching  analysis and sample of 15 cases. From our sample of 15 cases, we did not identify any individuals who  applied for a passport using the identity of a federal prisoner in their  passport application. State officials highlighted various challenges with respect to using  prisoner data during adjudication, including technical requirements and  issues related to data transmission, as well as potential legal limitations. Among the 13 applicants we reviewed in detail, we found five cases with  warrants that State identified during the adjudication process. In the other 3 of the  13 sample cases we reviewed, we found no indications that State was  aware of or alerted to the individuals’ warrants at the time they applied for  passports, even though it appeared that CLASS should have included the   We referred all passport issuances we identified from our  warrant data.matching analysis, including our sample cases, to State for further review  and investigation. State’s Records Contained Erroneous SSNs for Thousands of Passport Issuances as a Result of Applicant or State Data- Entry Error

Out of the combined total of approximately 28 million passport issuances  we reviewed from fiscal years 2009 and 2010, we found 13,470 passport  issuances to individuals who submitted an SSN associated with a  deceased individual, but where the name used in the passport  application did not match the name of the deceased individual. We  randomly selected a nongeneralizable sample of 15 cases from the  population of unique, likely invalid SSNs for additional review (see fig. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are  listed in appendix V.

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

You asked that we assess potential fraud in the Department of State’s  (State) passport program. This report examines potentially fraudulent or  high-risk issuances among passports issued during fiscal years 2009 and  2010. To examine potentially fraudulent and high-risk passport issuances in  fiscal years 2009 and 2010, we matched State’s passport-issuance data  for approximately 28 million passport issuances to databases containing  information about individuals who were (1) deceased, (2) incarcerated in  a state prison facility, (3) in the custody of the federal Bureau of Prisons  (BOP), or (4) the subject of an active warrant at the time of the passport   We conducted this matching on the basis of common data  issuance.elements including Social Security number (SSN), name, and date of  birth. We also analyzed the passport data to identify issuances to  applicants who provided an invalid SSN, which was defined as an SSN  that had not been assigned at the time of the passport application, or had  a high risk of misuse. The  results of this sample are not generalizable to the entire population of  applicants using the SSN and name of a deceased person. From this population, we selected 15 cases  for additional analysis.
Why GAO Did This Study

Fraudulent passports pose a significant risk because they can be used to conceal the true identity of the user and potentially facilitate other crimes, such as international terrorism and drug trafficking. State issued over 13.5 million passports during fiscal year 2013.
GAO was asked to assess potential fraud in State's passport program. This report examines select cases of potentially fraudulent or high-risk issuances among passports issued during fiscal years 2009 and 2010—the most recently available data at the time GAO began its review. GAO matched State's passport data from fiscal years 2009 and 2010 for approximately 28 million issuances to databases with information about individuals who were deceased, incarcerated in state and federal prison facilities, or who had an active warrant at the time of issuance. GAO also analyzed the passport data to identify issuances to applicants who provided a likely invalid SSN, which had not been assigned at the time of the passport application, or had been publically disclosed. From each of these five populations, GAO selected nongeneralizable samples for additional review. GAO also randomly selected a generalizable sample from a population of passport issuances to applicants who used only the SSN of a deceased individual. GAO reviewed State's adjudication policies, and examined passport applications for these populations to further assess whether there were potentially fraudulent or high-risk issuances. State provided technical comments and generally agreed with our findings. This report contains no recommendations.

What GAO Found

Of the approximately 28 million passports issued in fiscal years 2009 and 2010 that GAO reviewed, it found issuances to applicants who used the identifying information of deceased or incarcerated individuals, had active felony warrants, or used an incorrect Social Security number (SSN); however, GAO did not identify pervasive fraud in these populations. The Department of State (State) has taken steps to improve its detection of passport applicants using identifying information of deceased or incarcerated individuals. In addition, State modified its process for identifying applicants with active warrants, and has expanded measures to verify SSNs in real time. GAO referred, and State is reviewing, matches from this analysis. The following summarizes GAO's findings:
Deceased individuals. As shown in the figure, GAO identified at least 1 case of potential fraud in the sample of 15 cases, as well as likely data errors. State reviewed the cases referred by GAO, and indicated fraud could likely be ruled out in 9 of the 15 cases; State plans to further review 6 cases.
State prisoners. GAO found 7 cases of potential fraud among the sample of 14 state prisoner cases. State noted fraud could likely be ruled out in 10 of the 14 cases, and intends to conduct additional reviews of 4 cases.
Federal prisoners. None of the 15 cases in this sample had fraud indicators, since all individuals were not actually in prison when applying for passports.
Individuals with active warrants. GAO found five cases where State identified the warrant and resolved it prior to issuance. As the figure shows, GAO also identified three cases with warrants that State was not aware of or alerted to, but should have been in State's system for detection during adjudication.
In addition, GAO found 13,470 passport issuances to individuals who used the SSN, but not the name, of a deceased person, as well as 24,278 issuances to applicants who used a likely invalid SSN. GAO reviewed a 140-case generalizable sample and a 15-case nongeneralizable sample for these two populations, respectively, and determined the cases were likely data errors. State has taken steps to capture correct SSN information more consistently.