These objectives support the international goals in the U.S. national drug-control strategy. Specifically, we examined (1) the nature of the drug-trafficking threat; (2) the political, economic, and operational impact of counternarcotics activities in Colombia since the initial U.S. decertification decision; and (3) U.S. efforts to plan and manage counternarcotics activities in Colombia. To address the impact of the 1996 and 1997 decertification decisions on Colombia and U.S. efforts to plan and manage counternarcotics activities, we visited various agencies in Washington, D.C.; Panama; and Colombia. Conclusion

The narcotics threat from Colombia continues and may be expanding. Coca cultivation has increased significantly in recent years, and Colombian heroin is becoming more prevalent in the United States. Political, Economic, and Operational Implications of the U.S. Decertification of Colombia

Since the initial decision to decertify Colombia in 1996, the State Department has reported that Colombia has made some progress in strengthening its political will to work with the United States to achieve U.S. counternarcotics objectives. When Colombia was initially decertified, the State Department was unprepared to determine whether some programmed assistance intended for the Colombian police and military could be provided. It took State, in conjunction with other executive branch agencies, about 8 months to decide what could be provided. As a consequence, approximately $35 million in U.S. counternarcotics assistance was canceled or delayed. Operational Implications of Assistance Delays Are Unclear

After the decertification decision on March 1, 1996, the Departments of State and Defense canceled or delayed about $35 million worth of assistance to the counternarcotics units of the Colombian police and military. Moreover, State did not take steps to ensure that equipment included in a $40 million assistance package from Defense Department inventories was consistent with the priority needs of the counternarcotics forces of the Colombian police and military or with the Embassy’s counternarcotics plan. As a result, the assistance package included equipment that may be of limited benefit to the Colombian police and military and will require additional funding not budgeted for in Embassy plans. Moreover, the military assistance was delayed for 10 months because State and the Embassy could not reach agreement with the government of Colombia over acceptable end-use provisions to ensure that the assistance was not being provided to units suspected of human rights violations.
Why GAO Did This Study

Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the status of drug control efforts in Colombia and the impact of the 1996 and 1997 U.S. decisions to decertify Colombia as a drug-fighting ally, focusing on: (1) the nature of the drug-trafficking threat from Colombia; (2) the political, economic, and operational implications of the decertification decisions; and (3) U.S. efforts to plan and manage counternarcotics activities in Colombia.

What GAO Found

GAO noted that: (1) the narcotics threat from Colombia remains and may be growing, and U.S. efforts in Colombia continue to face major challenges; (2) the United States has had limited success in persuading the Colombian government to take aggressive actions to address corruption within the government, which limits its ability to arrest and convict traffickers; (3) for its part, the United States has had difficulty implementing a well-planned and coordinated strategy to assist Colombian authorities; (4) according to recent Department of State and Drug Enforcement Administration reports, the cultivation of coca leaf in Colombia increased by 50 percent between 1994 and 1996, and the prevalence of Colombian heroin on the streets of the United States has steadily increased; (5) since the initial decertification decision in March 1996, Colombia has taken several actions to address U.S. concerns; (6) at the initial decertification decision in March 1996, State was not prepared to determine whether some programmed assistance intended for the Colombian police and military could continue to be provided; (7) it took State, in conjunction with other executive branch agencies, about 8 months to decide what could be provided; (8) as a consequence, about $35 million in programmed counternarcotics assistance was cancelled or delayed; (9) however, the overall operational implications of the cutoff on U.S. and Colombian counternarcotics program is unclear; (10) the U.S. counternarcotics effort in Colombia has continued to experience management challenges; (11) State did not take adequate steps to ensure that equipment included in a 1996 $40 million assistance package from the Department of Defense inventories could be integrated into the U.S. Embassy's plans and strategies to support the Colombian police and military counternarcotics forces; (12) as a result, the assistance package contained items that had limited immediate usefulness to the Colombian police and military and will require substantial additional funding to become operational; and (13) moreover, the military assistance was also delayed for 10 months because State and the Embassy could not reach agreement with the government of Colombia over acceptable end-use provisions to ensure that the assistance was not being provided to units suspected of human rights violations.