DOD Has Taken Steps to Incorporate Internal Safeguards into DCIPS, but Two Safeguards and Monitoring Have Not Been Fully Implemented

Although DOD has taken some steps to implement internal safeguards to  ensure that the DCIPS performance management system is fair, effective,  and credible, opportunities exist to improve DOD’s implementation of 2 of  the 10 safeguards. We have previously reported that continued monitoring of such  systems’ safeguards is needed to help ensure DOD’s actions are effective  as implementation proceeds. However, during our  nongeneralizable discussion groups with employees, we found that  employee perceptions of training were somewhat mixed, as participants at  9 of our 13 discussion group sites stated that too many questions regarding  DCIPS went unanswered, including questions posed during training. Without continuous employee involvement in the  implementation of DCIPS, employees may experience a loss of ownership  over the system, which could ultimately undermine its credibility. Until DOD specifies  these steps in its guidance, the intelligence components may not follow a  consistent approach in these areas, the department may be unable to fully  determine whether potential barriers to fair and equitable ratings exist,  and employees may lack confidence in the fairness and credibility of the  DCIPS and its ratings. According to DOD officials, they do not expect to execute the evaluation  plan until after the first payout, in January 2010. DOD Had Several Mechanisms to Provide Information to Employees, but These Did Not Comprehensively Identify Employee Perceptions of DCIPS, and Future Mechanisms Do Not Include Some Needed Questions

At the time of our review, DOD had several mechanisms to engage  employees and provide information. Specifically, the defense intelligence components conducted  numerous town hall meetings to brief employees on DCIPS—covering  such topics as the performance management cycle and roles and  responsibilities of employees/supervisors---and to understand their  concerns. USD(I) also maintained a Web site that contained frequently  asked questions submitted by employees and USD(I)’s response. However,  USD(I) does have plans to implement additional mechanisms that will be  discussed later in this report. Employees Generally Expressed Positive Views about the Concept of Pay-for- Performance but Were Concerned About the Pace of Implementation

At 7 of the 13 locations visited, discussion group participants generally  expressed positive views about the concept of pay for performance. However, participants in 9  of 13 discussion groups felt that DCIPS was being implemented too  quickly. However, at the end of this  review, legislation was signed by the President that contained provisions  that affect DCIPS. Recommendations for Executive Action

To improve DOD’s implementation of internal safeguards in DCIPS, and  mechanisms to identify employee perceptions of it, we recommend that  the Secretary of Defense direct that the Under Secretary of Defense for  Intelligence take the following four actions:  Issue guidance to institutionalize a process to involve employees  continually in future design and implementation changes to DCIPS;  Issue guidance on its analysis of finalized ratings that explains how the  demographic analysis of ratings is to be conducted, to help ensure  equity, fairness, and non-discrimination in ratings;    Finalize and execute its evaluation plan with metrics to assess the  system, including the implementation of internal safeguards, to help  ensure the department evaluates the impact of DCIPS; and    Expeditiously implement mechanisms—including the four surveys— that comprehensively and accurately identify and measure employee  perceptions; and ensure those mechanisms include questions regarding  certain safeguards, such as the internal grievance process and  employees’ acceptance of DCIPS. Our draft  noted both of these points. 1. Extent to which DOD Incorporated Internal Safeguards into DCIPS

To determine the extent to which DOD has incorporated internal  safeguards and accountability mechanisms into DCIPS, we used the  following internal safeguards and accountability mechanisms, which were  derived from our previous work on pay-for-performance management  systems in the federal government:    Assure that the agency’s performance management system links  employee objectives to the agency’s strategic plan, related goals,  and desired outcomes;   Implement a pay-for-performance evaluation system to better link  individual pay to performance, and provide an equitable method for  appraising and compensating employees;    Provide adequate training and retraining for supervisors, managers,  and employees in the implementation and operation of the  performance management system;   Institute a process for ensuring ongoing performance feedback and  dialogue between supervisors, managers, and employees  throughout the appraisal period and setting timetables for review;     Assure that the agency’s performance management system results  in meaningful distinctions in individual employee performance;     Provide a means for ensuring that adequate agency resources are  allocated for the design, implementation, and administration of the  performance management system;     Assure that there is an independent and credible employee appeals    Assure that there are reasonable transparency and appropriate  accountability mechanisms in connection with the results of the  performance management process, including periodic reports on  internal assessments and employee survey results relating to  performance management and individual pay decisions while  protecting individual confidentiality;   Involve employees in the design of the system, to include employees  directly involved in validating any related implementation of the  system; and     Adhere to the merit principles set forth in section 2301 of title 5 of  the U.S. Code. Extent to which DOD has Mechanisms to Identify Employee Perceptions about DCIPS

To determine the extent that DOD had developed mechanisms to identify  and address employee perceptions about DCIPS, we evaluated two  primary sources of information. As noted, we conducted 26 discussion groups with employees  and supervisors of DOD civilian intelligence personnel at the 13 DOD sites  we visited. (U) In 2001 GAO identified human capital as a "High Risk Area" across the executive branch, and it has been a champion of civil service reform ever since. Posthearing Questions Related to Strategic Human Capital  Management.
Why GAO Did This Study

Since 2001, Government Accountability Office (GAO) has designated strategic human capital management as a high-risk area because of the federal government's long-standing lack of a consistent approach to such management. In 2007, the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD(I)) began developing a human capital system--called the Defense Civilian Intelligence Personnel System (DCIPS)--to manage Department of Defense (DOD) civilian intelligence personnel. In response to a congressional request, GAO examined the extent to which DOD has (1) incorporated internal safeguards into DCIPS and monitored the implementation of these safeguards and (2) developed mechanisms to identify employee perceptions about DCIPS. GAO analyzed guidance, interviewed appropriate officials, and conducted discussion groups with employees at select DOD components. At the end of GAO's review, legislation was enacted that impacts, among other things, how DCIPS employees will be paid.

What GAO Found

While early in its implementation of DCIPS, DOD has taken some positive steps to incorporate 10 internal safeguards to help ensure the fair, effective, and credible implementation of the system; however, opportunities exist to immediately improve the implementation of two of these safeguards, and continued monitoring of all is needed. For example, one safeguard requires employees to be trained on the system's operations, and GAO noted that DOD had provided extensive training to employees on DCIPS to include several Web-based and classroom courses. For another safeguard--which requires ongoing performance feedback--GAO noted that DOD's guidance requires feedback between employees and supervisors at the midpoint and at the close of the performance rating cycle. However, GAO determined that in the case of two safeguards--involving employees and fully implementing the merit principles--DOD could immediately improve its implementation. First, while DOD has leveraged mechanisms like town hall meetings and "brown bags" to involve employees in DCIPS, its guidance does not identify a formalized process for the continuous involvement of employees in the system implementation--which could ultimately undermine its credibility. Second, while DOD has stated that it will conduct an analysis of final ratings utilizing demographic data, DOD does not have a written policy outlining how this will be accomplished, and therefore may be unable to fully determine whether potential barriers to fair and equitable ratings exist. Without steps to improve implementation of this safeguard, employees may lack confidence in the system. Finally, GAO previously reported--for systems like DCIPS--that continued monitoring of such systems' safeguards is needed to help ensure agency actions are effective. In October 2009, DOD provided GAO with a draft DCIPS evaluation plan that would be executed after the first payout in January 2010. Without finalizing and executing the plan, DOD will not know if it has achieved desired outcomes from the system. DOD has used several mechanisms to provide employees with information; however, these mechanisms do not comprehensively identify and address employee perceptions of DCIPS. For example, USD(I), among other things, maintains a Web-site that contains frequently asked questions submitted by employees and responses by USD(I). Absent, however, are mechanisms to systematically identify employee perceptions. The nongeneralizable results of the discussion groups GAO conducted with employees and supervisors yielded mixed views. For example, participants generally expressed positive views about the concept of pay for performance. But participants at most of the Intelligence Components noted that DCIPS was being implemented too quickly or many questions went unanswered. Although DOD officials have drafted surveys that will allow them to more comprehensively collect employee perceptions about DCIPS, these surveys lack questions that would provide insight about employee perceptions of certain safeguards and overall acceptance of DCIPS. Without including such questions and expeditiously implementing its surveys, DOD will not have clear insight into employee perceptions.