	Exploited Weaknesses in Aviation Security

The National Commission on Terrorists Attacks Upon the United States (the 9/11Commission) found that al Qaeda terrorists exploited weaknesses in the aviation security system tocarry out the attacks of September 11, 2001. 2490). Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission

The 9/11 Commission also recognized many of these vulnerabilities. The 9/11 Commissionconcluded that "[m]ajor vulnerabilities still exist in cargo and general aviation security. (5) These are: 1) enhancingpassenger pre-screening; 2) improving measures to detect explosives on passengers; 3) addressinghuman factors issues at screening checkpoints; 4) expediting deployment of in-line baggagescreening systems; 5) intensifying efforts to identify, track, and screen potentially dangerous cargo;and 6) deploying hardened cargo containers on passenger aircraft. In addition to these sixaviation-specific recommendations, the 9/11 Commission also issued an overarchingrecommendation for transportation security policy to set priorities based on risk and implement themost practical and cost effective deterrents assigning appropriate roles and missions to federal, state,and local authorities, as well as private stakeholders. The 9/11 Commission recommended that improved passenger pre-screeningcapabilities should not be delayed while the argument about a successor to CAPPS continues. 108-90 ; 117 Stat. Strategic Plan for Aviation Security. The 108th Congress passed two major pieces of legislation containing numerous provisionspertaining to aviation security: Vision 100 -- Century of Aviation Reauthorization Act ( P.L.108-176 ), which was enacted prior to the 9/11 Commission's final report, and the NationalIntelligence Reform Act ( P.L. 108-458 ; 118 Stat. 108-176 )which was enacted on December 12, 2003. The act authorizes the TSA to take necessary action to expedite the installation and use ofin-line baggage screening equipment at airports.
The 9/11 Commission found that al Qaeda operatives exploited known weaknesses in U.S.aviation security to carry out the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. While legislation andadministration actions after September 11, 2001 were implemented to strengthen aviation security,the 9/11 Commission concluded that several weaknesses continue to exist. These include perceivedvulnerabilities in cargo and general aviation security as well as inadequate screening and accesscontrols at airports.
The 9/11 Commission issued several recommendations designed to strengthen aviationsecurity by: enhancing passenger pre-screening; improving measures to detect explosives onpassengers; addressing human factors issues at screening checkpoints; expediting deployment ofin-line baggage screening systems; intensifying efforts to identify, track, and screen potentiallydangerous cargo; and deploying hardened cargo containers on passenger aircraft. In addition to thesespecific recommendations, an overarching recommendation for transportation security policy assertsthat priorities should be set based on risk, and the most practical and cost effective deterrents shouldbe implemented assigning appropriate roles and missions to federal, state, and local authorities, aswell as private stakeholders.
In response to the 9/11 Commission's recommendations, the National Intelligence ReformAct of 2004 ( P.L. 108-458 ; 118 Stat. 3638) was enacted on December 17, 2004. The act containsnumerous aviation security provisions, many of which address 9/11 Commission recommendationsrelated to aviation safety. These provisions build upon prior aviation security-related provisions,contained in Vision 100 - the Century of Aviation Reathorization Act ( P.L. 108-176 ; 117 Stat. 2490)that was enacted a year earlier on December 12, 2003, addressing many of the concerns expressedby the 9/11 Commission.
This report will not be updated.