The remaining 212,000 personnel are in headquarters units and units that support combat. The Guard’s eight combat divisions and three separate combat units are not required to accomplish the two-conflict strategy, according to Army war planners and war planning documents that we reviewed. The Guard’s 15 enhanced brigades are the principal reserve component ground combat forces. Guard Combat and Support Structure Exceeds State Mission Needs

The Guard has a wide range of state missions. Study of Guard Combat Structure

The Army is studying the redesign of the Guard’s combat structure to meet critical shortages in support capabilities. review the Army’s future unresourced support requirements, review the structure and missions of the Guard combat elements and develop options for changing the structure to meet future Army requirements, conduct a resource feasibility assessment of the options to determine whether the Army possesses or is able to program the resources needed to equip and maintain the redesigned structure, and refine and prioritize the options for presentation to the Army leadership by March 1996. The Commission determined that the Army’s combat structure exceeds the requirements for a two major regional conflict scenario and concluded that reserve component forces with lower priority tasks should be eliminated or reorganized to fill shortfalls in higher priority areas. Because the Guard’s combat forces exceed projected war requirements and the Army’s analysis indicates a shortage of support forces, we believe it is appropriate for the Army to study the conversion of some Guard combat forces to support roles.
Why GAO Did This Study

Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the: (1) roles and missions of the Army National Guard's combat units; and (2) efforts by the Department of Defense (DOD) and the Army to redesign the Guard's combat divisions.

What GAO Found

GAO found that: (1) despite reductions, the Army National Guard's combat units may still be too large for projected war requirements; (2) the Guard's eight remaining combat divisions and three separate combat units are not needed to meet the two-conflict strategy or any probable conflict scenarios; (3) DOD considers the excess Guard forces to be a strategic reserve that could be used as occupational and rotational forces, a deterrent against aggressive regimes, and support for civilian authorities, but it did not present any analytical support for the continued force levels; (4) DOD has not finalized plans for 15 enhanced Guard combat brigades, and fewer than 15 may be needed; (5) state missions often require more support skills and equipment than Guard combat forces, which usually supplement other state resources in emergencies; (6) over the last decade, states have needed only a fraction of the Guard's personnel to meet their emergency requirements; (7) the Army is studying ways that the Guard could meet critical shortages in its support capabilities; and (8) DOD believes that since Guard forces exceed combat needs, reserve components with lower priority tasks should be eliminated or reorganized to meet higher priorities.