However, we found that (1) some initiatives do not support the first digitized division, although the Army initially justified WRAP funding on the basis of the need to urgently field technologies associated with the first digitized division; (2) funds have been used both for production items and development work; and (3) future initiatives may not have sufficient test data for proper evaluation. Some initiatives did not meet all the Army’s criteria for WRAP funding, and others will not be fielded with the first digitized division in 2000. Program Delays Have Affected the Goal of Early Fielding

The key to securing timely congressional approval of WRAP candidates is the Army’s ability to finalize its selection early enough in the budget cycle. In requesting the release of fiscal year 1997 funds from DOD, the Army did not initially justify the need for or indicate the ultimate destination of the funds, delaying the start-up and implementation of programs. As a result, approval of WRAP funds was delayed until very late in the fiscal year (see app. The Army initially estimated that 9 of the first 11 WRAP initiatives would accelerate the fielding of new technologies by an average of about 20 months. Congress Not Notified of Program Changes

The Army made substantial changes to some WRAP initiatives. These changes prolonged implementation. The congressional defense committees were not informed of these developments. To date, the Army has not submitted any of the required reports. The Army’s criteria for WRAP candidates are open-ended and do not ensure that initiatives share a common set of characteristics. Recommendation to the Secretary of Defense

We recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Army to issue WRAP guidance that calls for specific deadlines for candidate identification and selection to ensure timely submission of candidates to Congress and timely obligation of funds, minimum testing and experimentation requirements for WRAP candidates, periodic reports to Congress on the status of ongoing WRAP initiatives. Scope and Methodology

To assess the current status of the program, we reviewed the criteria used to identify, evaluate, and select WRAP candidates.
Why GAO Did This Study

Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Army's implementation of the Warfighting Rapid Acquisition Program (WRAP), focusing on the current status of the program.

What GAO Found

GAO noted that: (1) the Army's criteria for selecting WRAP candidates are open-ended and allow room for different interpretations; (2) as a result, although the Army initially justified WRAP funding on the basis of the need to urgently field technologies associated with the first digitized division, not all WRAP initiatives support the first digitized division; (3) furthermore, some initiatives do not meet all the Army's criteria for WRAP funding; (4) the Army is reducing the testing of new technologies through large-scale warfighting experiments; (5) as a result, the Army may need to change the criteria used to evaluate and rate WRAP candidates; (6) this may affect the quality of future candidates; (7) to date, the Army has not been able to finalize its selection of WRAP candidates early enough to ensure timely approval by Congress; (8) as a result, the final approval of funds and the subsequent start-up of initiatives have been delayed; (9) delays also occurred because the Army did not obtain the timely release of WRAP funds from the Department of Defense (DOD) and because DOD reduced funding for WRAP; (10) in spite of these delays, GAO believes that WRAP funds may still help speed the fielding of some new technologies, though not as much as originally estimated; (11) after initial congressional approval of the first 11 WRAP initiatives, the Army made substantial changes to some of them; (12) these changes affected program implementation; and (13) Congress was not informed of the changes because current reporting requirements do not require the Army to report such changes.