For fiscal years 2000 through  2004, the United States provided a total of approximately $3.3 billion,  making Colombia the fifth largest recipient of U.S. assistance since fiscal  year 2002. Nonmilitary Assistance Programs Have Begun to Show Intended Results, but Progress May Not Be Sustainable

A key component of U.S. counternarcotics strategy in Colombia has  involved providing nonmilitary assistance for programs to promote  legitimate economic alternatives to the cultivation of coca and opium  poppy; assist Colombia’s vulnerable groups, particularly internally  displaced persons; and strengthen the country’s democratic, legal, and  security institutional capabilities. Each of the three U.S. nonmilitary  assistance programs has begun to produce results envisioned in 2000 when  U.S. funding for Plan Colombia was approved. Furthermore, the USAID/Colombia  mission estimated that implementing such a comprehensive alternative  development program could involve assisting as many as 136,600 families  and cost up to $4 billion over 3 years. The U.S. vulnerable groups program has provided  assistance to many internally displaced persons and others, but program  beneficiaries may not receive all of the services they need, and State and  USAID do not track individuals after they receive assistance. While these services address a  significant need, a relatively small number of beneficiaries will receive  them. Management and Financial Challenges Continue to Complicate Project Implementation

Although the U.S. nonmilitary assistance programs are beginning to  achieve some of the results originally envisioned, Colombia and the United  States must address management and financial challenges. USAID has not  yet maximized the mutual benefits of its programs, and State and USAID  have not coordinated their assistance programs to internally displaced  persons. State, Justice, and USAID have not established timelines, nor have  State or USAID developed an overall strategy for turning programs over to  the Colombian government or to the private sector. A number of domestic and foreign factors have limited the Colombian  government’s ability to contribute more resources. Particular attention should be placed on establishing a  coordination mechanism between State and USAID to facilitate internally  displaced persons’ transition from emergency aid to longer-term  assistance. Scope and Methodology

To identify the objectives of each program; determine the programs’  reported accomplishments; as well as the factors, if any, limiting their  implementation, we   analyzed project design documents, including funding documents and  contracts and grant agreements, describing the projects from State,  Justice, and USAID;  reviewed project documentation, including progress reports and other  documents prepared by the grantees and contractors implementing the  projects;    interviewed cognizant contractor and grantee officials both in  Washington, D.C., and Colombia; and   interviewed State, Justice, and USAID officials responsible for program  oversight and implementation both in Washington, D.C., and at the U.S.  Embassy in Bogotá. Throughout this report, we acknowledge the many obstacles that the  U.S. government faces in reaching its nonmilitary assistance objectives,  including Colombia’s long-standing conflict and limited financial  resources. As such, we recognize that establishing a formal mechanism  for transitioning beneficiaries of the vulnerable groups program from  emergency to longer-term assistance is not an easy task. GAO Comments

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Why GAO Did This Study

Since 2000, the U.S. government has provided a total of $3.3 billion to Colombia, making it the fifth largest recipient of U.S. assistance. Part of this funding has gone toward nonmilitary assistance to Colombia, including programs to (1) promote legitimate economic alternatives to coca and opium poppy; (2) assist Colombia's vulnerable groups, particularly internally displaced persons; and (3) strengthen the country's democratic, legal, and security institutional capabilities. GAO examined these programs' objectives, reported accomplishments, and identified the factors, if any, that limit project implementation and sustainability. We also examined the challenges faced by Colombia and the United States in continuing to support these programs.

What GAO Found

Although U.S. nonmilitary assistance programs have begun to produce some results, individual projects reach a relatively small number of beneficiaries, face implementation challenges, and may not be sustainable. For example, projects designed to promote legitimate economic alternatives to illicit crop cultivation have helped about 33,400 families. However, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) estimated in 2000 and 2001 that as many as 136,600 families needed assistance, and these projects face implementation obstacles, such as difficulty marketing licit products and operating in conflictive areas. U.S. assistance to Colombia's vulnerable groups has provided support to many internally displaced persons, but these program beneficiaries do not receive all of the assistance they need, and there is no systematic way for beneficiaries to transition from emergency aid to longer-term development assistance. The U.S. government has made some progress toward facilitating democratic reform in Colombia, but projects face certain obstacles, such as limited funding and security constraints. Despite the progress made by the three nonmilitary assistance programs, Colombia and the United States continue to face long-standing management and financial challenges. The Colombian government's ability to contribute funds for nonmilitary assistance programs is limited by a number of domestic and foreign factors, and Colombia's longstanding conflict poses additional challenges to implementing and sustaining nonmilitary assistance efforts. The U.S. government has not maximized the mutual benefits of its nonmilitary assistance programs and has not established a mechanism for vulnerable groups to transition from emergency aid to longer-term assistance. Furthermore, the Departments of State and Justice and USAID have not established timelines for achieving their stated objectives, nor have State and USAID developed a strategy to turn programs over to the Colombian government or to the private sector.