As shown in figure 1, DOD has allocated nearly three-quarters of these funds to delivery vehicle and infrastructure dismantlement and destruction and to improving nuclear material controls. The second plan, now in draft, is for 1996. For example, the plan would not reflect the program’s reallocation of $60 million in fiscal year 1996 funds from Russian chemical weapons destruction to strategic delivery vehicle dismantlement work in Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakstan; progress made in early 1996 in defining CTR dismantlement projects in Russia; and the U.S. response to Russian requests in March and June 1996 for help in upgrading as many as 50 nuclear weapons storage sites. The CTR program is seeking to address these concerns by helping Russia construct a fissile material storage facility and control its nuclear weapons. The CTR program’s draft 1996 multiyear plan indicates that the program lacks the data and analytical tools needed to assess the extent to which its nuclear security projects are achieving CTR objectives. Russia has signed the Chemical Weapons Convention. DOD officials have stated that Russian chemical and nuclear weapon proliferation would pose a major security problem for the United States and that the eventual destruction of Russia’s huge stockpile would significantly reduce the chemical weapon threat. However, DOD officials have also stated that the threat of chemical weapons is less significant and urgent than that of nuclear weapons. By May 1997, CTR officials hope to have a preliminary design of the pilot facility and completed (1) tests on optimizing the Russian destruction technology and (2) a feasibility study to support Russian decisions on the facility’s location. Potential Impact of Chemical Weapon Destruction

CTR program officials plan to assess the effectiveness of their chemical weapons destruction projects only in terms of their success in achieving project milestones. It would not address Russia’s need to construct additional facilities at six more sites in time to meet the Chemical Weapons Convention’s time frames. We also recommend that the Secretary of Defense refrain from obligating any CTR funds for constructing a chemical weapons destruction facility in Russia until DOD has completed a construction cost estimate based on a one-third completed design and specified the U.S. share of the estimated costs. Funding Status of the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program

The Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program has made continued progress in obligating and disbursing funds. A recorded menu will provide information on how to obtain these lists.
Why GAO Did This Study

Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on the Department of Defense's (DOD) draft 1996 multiyear Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program plan, focusing on its: (1) estimated costs; and (2) potential impacts on helping control nuclear weapons and materials, and eliminating strategic delivery vehicles.

What GAO Found

GAO found that: (1) the draft 1996 CTR multiyear plan does not adequately reflect budgetary uncertainties associated with some projects and cost estimates or important developments that have occurred since 1995; (2) although the CTR program has made progress in helping Russia dismantle and store its nuclear weapons arsenal, DOD has not yet resolved important issues concerning planned Russian nuclear weapons storage and chemical weapons destruction facility projects; (3) the estimated costs for the chemical weapons facility are unknown; (4) the United States has capped its support for the nuclear weapons storage facility that is now under construction, but CTR officials do not plan to cap support for the chemical weapons destruction facility; (5) funding decisions for the chemical weapons destruction facility are compounded by the facility's potential high cost and questions on whether the facility will be effective at reducing the overall Russian chemical weapons threat; (6) DOD officials consider the threat from chemical weapons to be less urgent than the Russian nuclear threat; (7) Russia may not be able to meet the terms of the Chemical Weapons Convention unless six more facilities are constructed and other nations resume their funding commitments; (8) CTR officials lack the data needed to independently determine the extent and effect of Russia's controls over nuclear materials; (9) DOD has allocated or requested almost $1.5 billion for chemical weapon destruction, nuclear security, and delivery vehicle destruction projects through 1997; and (10) CTR program costs through 2001 are estimated to be $3.2 billion.