	Background

U.S. embassy security needs have evolved and expanded over recent decades. The issue of embassy security again gained focus and urgency after the bombing of the U.S. embassy in Beirut, Lebanon in April 1983, the bombing of the Marinebarracks in Beirut in October 1983, and the bombing of the embassy annex in Beirut in September 1984. Some of the recommendations by the Inman Panel included (1) a reorganization of the offices in the Department of State that are primarily responsible for securityand counter-terrorism and consolidation of operational security offices into a new bureau for Diplomatic Security;(2) improvements in State's protectiveintelligence, threat analysis, and alerting procedures; (3) improvements in the Department's training of ForeignService personnel and dependents to deal moreeffectively with terrorist threats; (4) improvements in contingency planning at the posts; (5) assigning MarineSecurity Guard detachments to all highly sensitiveposts; (6) revising the Diplomatic Security Service physical security standards; (7) pursuing a substantial buildingprogram to correct security deficiencies; and (8)initiating a capital budgeting procedure to avoid security improvement delays due to budgetary reasons. The panelalso offered a number of classifiedrecommendations. Given that the assessed threat levels of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzaniawere medium to low, the State Department isreviewing its methodology for evaluating threat levels and the significance the Administration places on threatassessments in its allocation of security resources. The levels Congress enacted in the omnibus appropriation emergency supplemental provisionsto the Department of State follow:
Congress provided $790.8 million for the Diplomatic and Consular Programs Account , $748 million for reestablishing embassy functions inKenya and Tanzania and for security improvements overseas, as requested. The Administration had testified that much of the emergencysupplemental funds was still in the pipeline to bespent on security needs. State's FY2000 Diplomaticand Consular Programs account included $254 million for worldwide security upgrades, and the Embassy Security,Construction and Maintenance (ESCM)account contained $313.6 million for worldwide security upgrades. 3427 ), which authorizes $900 million for overseas security from FY2000through FY2004-a total of $4.5 billion. After the September 11, 2001 terrorist attack on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, Congress passed the Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act forRecovery from and Response to Terrorist Attacks on the United States, FY2001 ( P.L. The report recommended that the U.S. government spend $1.4 billion a year over 10 years to improvesecurity at U.S. overseas facilities. (12) Additionally, the Secretary of State establishedthe OverseasPresence Advisory Panel on February 23, 1999 to make recommendations on the organization of U.S. overseasposts. Administration Request.
The September 11, 2001 terrorist attack on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon led to the closing the following day of 50 of the nearly 260 U.S. embassiesand consulates worldwide. A week later, however, all U.S. facilities were open for business. Additionally, threeembassies - in Pakistan, Yemen, andTurkmenistan - allowed for voluntary evacuations immediately after the attack. In the months prior to the attack,travel warnings were issued and embassies wereput on high alert as Osama bin Laden had issued vague, but credible, threats against Americans and Americaninterests around the world.
Earlier this year, Secretary of State Colin Powell had testified before Congress that embassy security is among his highest priorities. He made the case that theU.S. government owes State Department personnel on the front lines of diplomacy the same high level of tools andsecurity given to our military on the front lines. The Administration requested a total of $1.3 billion for embassy security and worldwide security upgrades forFY2002. The House concurred; the Senate passed atotal of $1.07 billion.
Throughout the summer 2001, the United States received credible threats against American embassies and tourists overseas. The Department of State respondedby issuing a worldwide travel warning to American citizens and cancelling Independence Day celebrations atAmerican overseas facilities.
In June 2000 the U.S. Embassy in Amman, Jordan was put on full alert after receiving "credible evidence" that Osama bin Laden followers were planning toattack it. Additionally, the Department of State advised American travelers to be mindful of the August7th anniversary of the bombing of U.S. embassies inKenya and Tanzania. Then, in September 2000, terrorists attacked the U.S.S. Cole Navy destroyer.
The August 7, 1998 terrorist attacks on U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania resulted in a number of actions by the Administration and Congress. Withevidence that bin Laden was involved in the attacks, the Administration, on July 4, 1999, imposed sanctions on theTaliban government because it refused tocooperate in his arrest. In October 1999, the UN Security Council imposed limited sanctions on the Taliban, andin August 2000 both the United States andRussia agreed to work together to tighten the sanctions.
Embassy security budget ramifications of the 1998 bombings continue. In November 1999, Congress expanded authority for State's FY2000 through FY2004expenditures on overseas security within the Embassy Security, Construction and Maintenance (ESCM)account to $900 million annually, in addition to securityfunds in the Diplomatic and Consular Programs account (D&CP) for FY2000-FY2004 ( P.L.106-113 ).