However, the program’s approved cost and schedule baseline is not  achievable, and problems with two critical sensors continue to drive the  program’s cost and schedule. Costs are expected to grow by about   $1 billion from the current $13.95 billion cost estimate, and the schedules  for NPP and the first two NPOESS satellites are expected to be delayed by  7, 14, and 5 months, respectively. Over the past year, selected  components of the NPOESS program have made progress. Specifically,  three of the five instruments slated for NPP have been delivered and  integrated on the spacecraft; the ground-based satellite data processing  system has been installed and tested at both of the locations that are to  receive NPP data; and the satellites’ command, control, and  communications system has passed acceptance testing. An  independent review team, established to assess key program risks,  recently reported that the constellation of satellites is extremely fragile  and that a single launch failure of DMSP or of the NPP satellite could  result in a gap in satellite coverage from 3 to 5 years. Executive Committee Has Not Effectively Fulfilled Its Responsibilities

While the NPOESS Executive Committee has made improvements over the  last several years in response to prior recommendations, it has not  effectively fulfilled its responsibilities and does not have the membership  and leadership it needs to effectively or efficiently oversee and direct the  NPOESS program. Specifically, the DOD Executive Committee member  with acquisition authority does not attend committee meetings—and  sometimes contradicts the Committee’s decisions, the Committee does not  aggressively manage risks, and many of the Committee’s decisions do not  achieve desired outcomes. Until these shortfalls are  addressed, the Committee is unable to effectively oversee the NPOESS  program—and important issues involving cost growth, schedule delays,  and satellite continuity will likely remain unresolved. To address DOD’s requirement, the NPOESS Program Executive Officer  sponsored two successive alternative management studies; however,  neither of the studies identified a viable alternative to the existing satellite  integrator. The first study, conducted in 2007, identified three alternatives  to the existing satellite integrator, including (1) re-competing the entire  prime contract, (2) obtaining an independent system integrator while  having the existing prime contractor continue to develop space and  ground components, and (3) having the government take over  responsibility for the system integration. The Program Executive Officer plans to conduct a final assessment of  alternatives prior to the June 2010 decision on whether to exercise the  option to have the current system integrator produce the next two  NPOESS satellites. We also recommend that the Secretaries of Defense and Commerce and  the Administrator of NASA direct the NPOESS Executive Committee to  take the following five actions:    establish a realistic time frame for revising the program’s cost and    develop plans to mitigate the risk of gaps in satellite continuity;  track the Committee’s action items from inception to closure; improve the Committee’s ability to achieve successful outcomes by  identifying the desired outcome associated with each of the Committee’s  actions, as well as time frames and responsible parties, when new action  items are established; and improve the Committee’s efficiency by establishing time frames for  escalating risks to the Committee for action so that they do not linger  unresolved at the program executive level. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

Our objectives were to (1) identify the status and risks of key National  Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS)  program components, (2) assess the NPOESS Executive Committee’s  ability to fulfill its responsibilities, and (3) evaluate efforts to identify an  alternative system integrator for later NPOESS satellites. We  also interviewed agency officials from the Department of Defense (DOD),  National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), and National  Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) and the NPOESS  program office to determine the status and risks of the key program  segments.
Why GAO Did This Study

The National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS) is a tri-agency acquisition--managed by the Department of Commerce's National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), the Department of Defense (DOD), and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)--that has experienced escalating costs, schedule delays, and technical difficulties. As the often-delayed launch of its demonstration satellite draws closer, these problems continue. GAO was asked to (1) identify the status and risks of key program components, (2) assess the NPOESS Executive Committee's ability to fulfill its responsibilities, and (3) evaluate efforts to identify an alternative system integrator for later NPOESS satellites. To do so, GAO analyzed program and contractor data, attended program reviews, and interviewed agency officials.

What GAO Found

While selected components of the NPOESS program have made progress over the past year, the program is once again over budget and behind schedule. In terms of progress, three of the five instruments slated for a demonstration satellite (called the NPOESS Preparatory Project--NPP) have been delivered and integrated on the spacecraft; the ground-based satellite data processing system has been installed and tested at both of the locations that are to receive NPP data; and the satellites' command, control, and communications system has passed acceptance testing. However, the program's approved cost and schedule baseline are not achievable, and problems with two critical sensors continue to drive the program's cost and schedule. Costs could grow by $1 billion over the current $13.95 billion estimate, and the schedules for NPP and the first two NPOESS satellites are expected to be delayed by 7, 14, and 5 months, respectively. These delays increase the risk of a gap in satellite continuity. An independent review team established to assess key program risks recently reported that the constellation of satellites is extremely fragile, and that there could be a 3 to 5 year gap in satellite coverage if NPP, NPOESS, or other DOD satellites fail on launch. The NPOESS Executive Committee responsible for overseeing the program has made improvements over the last several years, but still has not effectively fulfilled its responsibilities. Responding to past concerns expressed by GAO and the Department of Commerce's Inspector General, the Committee now meets on a regular basis, and has sought and reacted to advice from external advisors to mitigate specific risks. However, the Committee lacks the membership and leadership needed to effectively and efficiently oversee and direct the program. Specifically, the DOD Committee member with acquisition authority does not attend Executive Committee meetings--and sometimes contradicts the Committee's decisions, the Committee does not track its action items to closure, and many of the Committee's decisions do not achieve desired outcomes. Program officials and external independent reviewers explained that it is extremely difficult for the Committee to navigate three agencies' competing requirements and priorities. Until these shortfalls are addressed, the Committee will remain ineffective. The NPOESS program has conducted two successive studies of alternatives to using the existing system integrator for the last two NPOESS satellites, but neither identified a viable alternative to the current contractor. Both studies assessed a variety of alternatives, including re-competing the entire prime contract, obtaining an independent system integrator while having the existing prime contractor continue to develop space and ground components, and having the government take over responsibility for the system's integration. The first study identified strengths and weaknesses and the second study identified high-level costs and benefits. Neither study identified an alternative that is viable. Program officials plan to conduct a final study prior to the June 2010 decision on whether to proceed with the existing prime contractor.