Proliferation of Cruise Missiles and UAVs Poses a Growing Threat to U.S. National Security Interests

Although cruise missiles and UAVs provide important capabilities for the  United States and its friends and allies, in the hands of U.S. adversaries  they pose substantial threats to U.S. interests. The United States and other governments have traditionally  used multilateral export control regimes, principally the MTCR, to address  missile proliferation. The U.S. government uses its national export control authorities to  address missile proliferation but finds it difficult to identify and track  commercially available items not covered by control lists. This gap in U.S. export control authority enabled American  companies to legally export dual-use items to a New Zealand resident who  bought the items to show how a terrorist could legally build a cruise  missile. Compliance with Conditions on Exports of Cruise Missiles, UAVs, and Dual-use Items Seldom Verified through End-use Monitoring

End-use monitoring refers to the procedures used to verify that foreign  recipients of controlled U.S. exports use such items according to U.S.  terms and conditions of transfer. Based on Commerce licensing data, we found that  Commerce issued 2,490 dual-use licenses between fiscal years 1998 and  2002 for items that could be useful in developing cruise missiles or UAVs. Most  countries already possess cruise missiles, UAVs, or related technology,  and many are expected to develop or obtain more sophisticated systems in  the future. Because some key dual-use components can be acquired  without an export license, it is difficult for the export control system to  limit or track their use. Furthermore, the U.S. government seldom uses  its end-use monitoring programs to verify compliance with the conditions  placed on items that could be used to develop cruise missiles or UAVs. As  a result, the U.S. government does not have sufficient information to know  whether recipients of these exports are effectively safeguarding equipment  and technology and, thus, protecting U.S. national security and  nonproliferation interests. State disagreed with the  need to conduct a comprehensive assessment of the nature and extent of  compliance with license conditions for cruise missile and UAV technology  transfers.
Why GAO Did This Study

Cruise missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) pose a growing threat to U.S. national security interests as accurate, inexpensive delivery systems for conventional, chemical, and biological weapons. GAO assessed (1) the tools the U.S. and foreign governments use to address proliferation risks posed by the sale of these items and (2) efforts to verify the end use of exported cruise missiles, UAVs, and related technology.

What GAO Found

The growing threat to U.S. national security of cruise missile and UAV proliferation is challenging the tools the United States has traditionally used. Multilateral export control regimes have expanded their lists of controlled technologies that include cruise missile and UAV items, but key countries of concern are not members. U.S. export control authorities find it increasingly difficult to limit or track unlisted dual-use items that can be acquired without an export license. Moreover, a gap in U.S. export control authority enables American companies to export certain dual-use items to recipients that are not associated with missile projects or countries listed in the regulations, even if the exporter knows the items might be used to develop cruise missiles or UAVs. American companies have in fact legally exported dual-use items with no U.S. government review to a New Zealand resident who bought the items to build a cruise missile. The U.S. government seldom uses its end-use monitoring programs to verify compliance with conditions placed on the use of cruise missile, UAV, or related technology exports. For example, State officials do not monitor exports to verify compliance with license conditions on missiles or other items, despite legal and regulatory requirements to do so. Defense has not used its end-use monitoring program initiated in 2002 to check the compliance of users of more than 500 cruise missiles exported between fiscal years 1998 and 2002. Commerce conducted visits to assess the end use of items for about 1 percent of the 2,490 missile-related licenses we reviewed. Thus, the U.S. government cannot be confident that recipients are effectively safeguarding equipment in ways that protect U.S. national security and nonproliferation interests.