The Army Test and Evaluation Command must also provide an  operational test report. Operational test and evaluation is conducted to  estimate a system’s operational effectiveness and operational suitability. DOD Research and Development Efforts Have Yielded Few Products to Address Non-Lethal Weapon Needs

The Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Program has conducted more than 50  research and development efforts and spent at least $386 million since  1997, but it has not developed any new weapons, and the military services  have fielded 4 items stemming from these efforts that only partially fill  some capability gaps identified since 1998. Among the contributing  factors, we found that DOD did not prioritize departmentwide non-lethal  capability gaps until 2007 and still does not have efforts under way to fully  address these gaps, that DOD did not give consistent consideration to  logistics and supportability in its NLW development process; and that DOD  exercises limited general oversight of the program. 3). This has resulted in gaps in the timeliness and utility of key program  guidance as well as limited measurement of progress and performance. NLW Program Funding Lacks Centralized Visibility

Further complicating DOD’s ability to oversee its NLW program is the fact  that no single organization has visibility over all spending categories, and  available budget information may not fully capture all spending associated  with the development of non-lethal capabilities. DOD Has Not Fully Developed Policy and Doctrine for Use and Training in Non-Lethal Weapons Capabilities

DOD has begun to incorporate ideas about non-lethal capabilities into  policy, doctrine, and training, but gaps in key policy decisions limit the  effectiveness of doctrine changes and subsequent training. DOD has not  yet clearly defined the accepted level of risk for fatality, nor has it fully  developed weapons employment policies for overseas warfighting or  homeland applications or ensured that warfighters and domestic  responders are fully trained in NLW use. DOD has also not fully clarified what constitutes acceptable risk short of  fatality. Current DOD policy defines NLW as weapons that are explicitly  designed and primarily employed so as to incapacitate, and are intended to  have “relatively reversible” effects. Until these issues are resolved, doctrine and training for non- lethal weapons may be limited, and the warfighter or domestic responder  may have fewer options other than resorting to lethal force. DOD testing for commercial-off-the-shelf items can be even more limited  than for those urgently fielded because agency officials can use contractor  test data instead of conducting their own tests. DOD has begun to develop elements of a risk assessment methodology,  but the methodology will not be complete until human effects testing  requirements are standardized in DOD policy. DOD has not yet established a risk assessment methodology for human  effects testing that is capable of identifying the potential risks associated  with the use of NLW. These problems have contributed to the  program’s overall limited progress in fielding suitable NLW. To help DOD more fully incorporate non-lethal concepts and capabilities  into its existing and new policy and doctrine for operations overseas and  in the homeland,  the Secretary of Defense should direct the Under Secretary of Defense  for Policy to articulate a methodology and develop a time frame for  determining acceptable risk with respect to lethality and permanent  injury for operators, targets, and bystanders due to the use of specific  types of NLW, and  the Secretary of Defense should direct the Joint Staff, in consultation  with the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and the Services, to  provide clearer weapons employment guidance that can be used to  modify or augment existing rules of engagement or rules for the use of  force for both warfighters and domestic responders on how non-lethal  weapons should be used under certain conditions, and incorporate this  guidance into training curricula.
Why GAO Did This Study

Nonlethal weapons (NLW) provide an alternative when lethal force is undesirable. The Department of Defense (DOD) defines NLW as those that are explicitly designed and primarily employed to incapacitate personnel or materiel, while minimizing fatalities, permanent injury to personnel, and undesired damage to property and the environment. DOD created the Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Program in 1996 to have centralized responsibility for the development of NLW and coordinate requirements among the services. GAO was asked to review the status of NLW programs within DOD and the military services by identifying the extent to which (1) DOD and the Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Program have developed and fielded NLW since the program's inception; (2) DOD has established and implemented policy, doctrine, and training for NLW; and (3) DOD has conducted testing and evaluation prior to fielding NLW. GAO reviewed and analyzed DOD and service plans, guidance, and doctrine and interviewed officials associated with NLW development.

What GAO Found

The joint non-lethal weapons program has conducted more than 50 research and development efforts and spent at least $386 million since 1997, but it has not developed any new weapons and the military services have fielded 4 items stemming from these efforts that only partially fill some capability gaps identified since 1998. Three major factors contribute to the program's limited progress in fully addressing capability gaps. First, DOD did not prioritize departmentwide non-lethal capability gaps until 2007 and still does not fully address these gaps. Second, DOD has not consistently incorporated logistics and supportability considerations early in the development process. As a result, DOD may miss opportunities to allocate resources more effectively. Third, DOD has exercised limited general oversight of the NLW program which has resulted in gaps in key program guidance as well as limited measurement of progress and performance. For example, DOD's road map of ongoing and projected NLW capabilities and efforts could be used to discharge oversight responsibilities, but the road map lacks guidance about how to allocate resources and evaluate performance. Further, DOD has no single organization with visibility over all spending, and available budget information may not fully capture all spending associated with the development of non-lethal capabilities. DOD has begun to incorporate ideas about non-lethal capabilities into policy, doctrine, and training but has not yet clearly articulated what constitutes acceptable risk for fatality, fully developed weapons employment policies for the use of force in overseas warfighting or homeland applications, or ensured that warfighters and domestic responders are fully trained in NLW use. Until these issues are resolved, doctrine and training for non-lethal weapons may be limited, and the warfighter or domestic responder may have fewer options other than resorting to lethal force. DOD lacks a clear methodology for estimating the human effects of non-lethal weapons and does not fully test and evaluate many non-lethal weapons because they have been fielded under urgent operational requirements that abbreviate normal DOD testing standards. Testing can be bypassed for commercial items because DOD officials can use contractor test data instead of conducting their own tests. Therefore, when NLW are fielded, commanders are uncertain about acceptable risk on targets and bystanders and cannot accurately predict their effects. DOD has begun to develop elements of a risk assessment methodology to address human effects testing; for example, it has drafted a Risk of Significant Injury scale, which broadly categorizes levels of health care capabilities required to reverse NLW effects. However, DOD has not completed a risk assessment methodology that would provide information to commanders so that they may then make a determination about its acceptability in their operating environment.