This report provides answers to 20 frequently asked questions regarding contractors and HealthCare.gov, the federal online health insurance portal called for by the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) ( P.L. 111-148 , as amended). Over 50 contractors, including CGI Federal and Quality Software Services, Inc. (QSSI), helped in building the site, which was reportedly largely unusable when it first became available to the public on October 1, 2013, and has been the subject of ongoing work since then. The questions and answers in the report are organized into three broad categories addressing (1) the processes whereby the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) selected vendors; (2) the terms of the vendors' contractual relationships with the government; and (3) potential amendments to federal procurement law that, some commentators suggest, could help prevent issues of the sort experienced with HealthCare.gov. The questions in this report are those that happen to have been frequently asked of the Congressional Research Service by congressional staffers. The inclusion of a particular question, or the exclusion of another question, should not be taken to indicate that particular factors didâor did notâcontribute to the problematic rollout of HealthCare.gov. In addition, answers to these questions must often be provided in general terms, in part, because specific language in the parties' contracts may be subject to multiple interpretations and has not been construed by any court. In addition, the parties' conduct in the course of performing the contractâthe details of which are still emergingâcan affect their rights. For example, the government could potentially be found to have waived certain rights that the contract's plain language would appear to grant to it by engaging in conduct that warrants an inference that it has relinquished the right. The authors of this report rely upon third-party investigations of the facts and circumstances surrounding HealthCare.gov, and additional information may emerge regarding topics discussed herein. There is also a video, CRS WVB00013, Contractors and HealthCare.gov: Background in Brief , by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed], that addresses certain of these questions. CMS's Selection of Vendors for HealthCare.gov

		Were vendors competitively selected to do the initial work on HealthCare.gov? However, the award of a contract is not the only way in which agencies may assign work to specific vendors, and CICA's requirements as to "full and open competition" generally do not apply when agencies assign work to a vendor without awarding a contract. Are there any restrictions on "foreign" participation in federal contracts? Vendors' Contractual Relationships with CMS

		How can I get copies of the contracts? Are vendors required to report performance problems to the government? Can the government get its money back? It remains to be seen whether and how much of the money that CMS spent on HealthCare.gov the government might be able to recover in light of the website's problematic rollout, or on other grounds. Potential Reforms in Response to HealthCare.gov

		What about consideration of risk and modularity in IT contracting? Suggested techniques include modular contracting, among other things. Some have wondered about requiring IT vendors to post performance bonds, as some states did when contracting for IT in the 1990s. What about use of lead system integrators?
The widely reported problems with the rollout of the HealthCare.gov websiteâthe federal online health insurance portal called for by the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) ( P.L. 111-148 , as amended)âhave prompted interest in the role that contractors played in developing this site. The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) relied upon the services of over 50 vendors to build the site, which was reportedly largely unusable when it first became available to the public on October 1, 2013, and has been the subject of ongoing work since then.
Given HealthCare.gov's problematic debut, questions have arisen about how CMS selected vendors to work on HealthCare.gov, and the terms of the vendors' contractual relationships with the government. For example, some have wondered how CMS could assign work to specific vendors without engaging in "full and open competition through the use of competitive procedures"; whether there are any restrictions on agencies' dealings with vendors that have foreign parent corporations, as some HealthCare.gov vendors do; and whether political input plays a role in the source-selection process. There have also been questions about how to obtain copies of particular contracts; vendor obligations to report performance problems to the government; modifications to existing contracts; how parties to a government contract resolve disputes; and whether the government can get its money back.
Most recently, questions have been raised about potential amendments to federal procurement law that could, some commentators suggest, prevent issues of the sort experienced with HealthCare.gov. HeathCare.gov's early difficulties are generally seen to have increased interest in the Federal Information Technology Acquisition Reform Act (FITARA) ( H.R. 1232 ), which would, among other things, increase the authority of the top agency chief information officers. FITARA passed the House, as part of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for FY2014, prior to HealthCare.gov's rollout, but was not included in the NDAA as enacted ( P.L. 113-66 ). Other measures have been introduced specifically in response to the rollout of HealthCare.gov (e.g., H.R. 3373 , S. 1843 ). Yet other potential reforms have been suggested, but are not reflected in proposed legislation. Topics of such proposed reforms include consideration of risk and use of modular contracting methods when acquiring information technology (IT); performance bonds and express warranties; and use of lead system integrators (i.e., contractors responsible for assembling a system from components developed and/or tested by other vendors).
The questions in this report are those that happen to have been frequently asked of the Congressional Research Service by congressional staffers. The inclusion of a particular question, or the exclusion of another question, should not be taken to indicate that particular factors didâor did notâcontribute to HealthCare.gov's problematic debut. In addition, answers to these questions must often be provided in general terms, in part, because specific language in the parties' contracts may be subject to multiple interpretations and has not been construed by any court. In addition, the parties' conduct in performing the contractâthe details of which are generally still emergingâcan affect their rights. For example, the government could potentially be found to have waived certain rights that the contract's plain language would appear to grant to it by engaging in conduct that warrants an inference that it has relinquished the right. The authors of this report rely upon third-party investigations of the facts and circumstances surrounding HealthCare.gov, and additional information may emerge regarding topics discussed herein.
There is also a video, CRS WVB00013, Contractors and HealthCare.gov: Background in Brief , by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed], that addresses certain of these questions.