U.S. and foreign airlines have reported that they have used FOQA analysis to identify a variety of potential safety problems and take corrective action to resolve or mitigate them. Because FOQA programs analyze additional data on aircraft systems and engine conditions, airlines are better able to achieve optimum fuel consumption and avoid unneeded engine maintenance. Although more difficult to quantify and directly relate to a FOQA program, enhanced safety should result in lower costs over time as a result of accidents avoided and lower insurance premiums. Factors Impeding Implementation and Actions to Overcome Impediments

Although airline officials, pilot organizations, and FAA officials recognize the potential for improving safety and operations through FOQA programs, airline officials and representatives of the pilot organizations were unanimous in their view that data protection issues need to be resolved. According to the Flight Safety Foundation’s 1992 report, the greatest impediment to the implementation of FOQA in the United States is associated with the “protection of data from use for other than safety and operational improvement purposes.” Basically, airline managers and pilots have three concerns: (1) that the information may be used in enforcement/discipline actions, (2) that such data in the possession of the federal government may be obtained by the public and the media through the provisions of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), and (3) that the information may be obtained in civil litigation through the discovery process. Airline Enforcement. The report states that to provide assurance that such information is not publicly released, the legislation would prohibit FAA from disclosing voluntarily submitted safety information. FAA is currently working on a rulemaking procedure that will prohibit the release of voluntarily submitted safety data through FOIA. 9.13). If the agency is a party to the litigation, FAA will seek to protect the information, if appropriate, under a claim of government privilege and, if that fails, to release the information under a protective order. Over the years, the number of foreign airlines that have implemented a FOQA-type program has steadily risen. “The proposal was based on FSF’s conviction, formed by the positive experiences of its international member airlines using FOQA, that the appropriate use of FOQA data by airlines, pilot associations and aircraft and equipment manufacturers would result in a significant improvement of flight safety by identifying operational irregularities that can foreshadow accidents and incidents.”
The FSF study concluded that FOQA must proceed in the United States and that the implementation of FOQA by U.S. airlines would have a more positive impact on Part 121 operational safety than any other human factors program included in FAA’s research and development plans. Data capture. These include Boeing 737-500s, –600s, –700s, and –800s as well as a number of 757s. Begun in July 1996, the program has analyzed the flight data from over 5,000 flights to date. FAA’s Voluntary Safety Reporting: Selected Programs

FAA has implemented a number of voluntary programs involving the self-reporting of safety-related information to enhance aviation safety. Aviation Safety Reporting Program. Under 14 C.F.R. A recorded menu will provide information on how to obtain these lists.
Why GAO Did This Study

Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on: (1) how the Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) and U.S. airlines' Flight Operational Quality Assurance (FOQA) programs will enhance aviation safety; (2) the costs and benefits of such programs; and (3) the factors that could impede their full implementation and actions that could be taken to overcome any impediments.

What GAO Found

GAO noted that: (1) the early experience of domestic airlines with established FOQA programs, as well as the testimony of foreign airlines with extensive experience in this area, attests to the potential of such programs to enhance aviation safety by identifying possible safety problems that could lead to accidents; (2) airlines have used FOQA programs to identify potential problems that were previously unknown or only suspected; (3) where potential problems where already known, airlines have used these programs to confirm and quantify the extent of the problems; (4) on the basis of analyses of flight data, airlines have taken actions to correct problems and enhance aviation safety; (5) costs associated with implementing a FOQA program depend on a large number of factors, including the technology used to capture flight data, the number and types of aircraft to be equipped with this technology, and personnel costs; (6) although the program is primarily viewed as a safety program, U.S. and foreign airlines have reported financial benefits as well; (7) with additional data on aircraft systems and engine conditions, airlines are better able to achieve optimum fuel consumption and avoid unneeded engine maintenance; (8) enhanced safety should result in lower costs over time as a result of accidents avoided and lower insurance premiums; (9) FAA's estimates suggest a net savings from 50 aircraft of $892,000 per year; (10) the primary factor impeding the implementation of FOQA programs among the major domestic carriers is the resolution of data protection issues; (11) airline managers and pilots raise three significant data protection concerns: (a) use of data for enforcement and disciplinary purposes; (b) disclosure to the media and the public under the provisions of the Freedom of Information Act; and (c) disclosure through the civil litigation discovery process; (12) FAA has taken a number of actions that may resolve these issues, although it is not clear whether the aviation community will be satisfied with FAA's actions; (13) FAA has begun work on a rulemaking procedure to establish what protections from enforcement actions, if any, will apply to information submitted to FAA under a FOQA program; (14) Congress enacted legislation, and FAA has begun work on a rulemaking procedure, that would prohibit the Administrator from disclosing voluntarily submitted safety information under certain circumstances; and (15) airlines seek to protect voluntarily collected safety information from disclosure in civil litigation on a case-by-case basis.