2). LANL Conducts Over 175 Program Activities That Fall into Three Major and Two Support Program Categories

LANL has three major program categories—Nuclear Weapons Science,  Threat Reduction Science and Support, and Fundamental Science and  Energy. Nuclear Weapons Science programs ensure the safety,  performance, and reliability of the U.S. nuclear deterrent. Threat  Reduction Science and Support programs support nonproliferation and  counterproliferation efforts. LANL has two support program categories—Environmental Programs and  Safeguards and Security. Of these 633 facilities, 607  are used by LANL’s major programs. LANL Is Implementing Over Two Dozen Initiatives Officials Believe Will Reduce Security Risk and Improve Protection of Classified Resources

LANL has initiatives under way that are principally aimed at reducing,  consolidating, and better protecting classified resources, as well as  reducing the physical footprint of the laboratory by closing unneeded  facilities. Classified removable electronic media. Classified documents. Inconsistent efforts to reduce classified holdings. Specifically, LANL’s  storage of classified parts in unapproved storage containers and its  process for ensuring that actions taken to correct security deficiencies are  completed have been cited repeatedly in past external evaluations, but  LANL has not implemented complete security solutions in these areas. In acknowledging the problem of sustaining security improvements, LANL  officials described three management approaches they intend to use to  ensure that security improvements currently being implemented are  sustained over the long-term: (1) DOE’s July 2007 Compliance Order, (2)  LANL’s Contractor Assurance System, and (3) NNSA’s annual performance  evaluation plans. Specifically, the actions required by the Compliance Order must be  completed by December 2008. This plan  outlined the 27 actions LANL intends to take to address seven critical  security issues identified as having contributed to the October 2006  security incident and to meet the requirements of the Compliance Order. LANL is designing the Contractor Assurance System to measure and track  performance from the top down. Recommendations for Executive Action

To improve security at Los Alamos National Laboratory, we recommend  that the Secretary of Energy and the Administrator of NNSA require LANL  to develop a comprehensive strategic plan for laboratory security that (1)  addresses all previously identified security weaknesses, (2) contains  specific and objective measures for developing and implementing  solutions that address previously identified security weaknesses and  against which performance can be evaluated, (3) takes an integrated view  of physical and cyber security, (4) focuses on improving security program  effectiveness, and (5) provides for periodic review and assessment of the  strategic plan to ensure LANL identifies any additional security risks and  addresses them. To identify the initiatives LANL is taking to consolidate its classified  resources and reduce the scope of its physical footprint, we collected and  reviewed data on LANL’s plans for consolidating classified resources and  interviewed key LANL, National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA),  and DOE officials. As part of this review, we determined  the extent to which each of these management approaches could sustain  security improvement initiatives over the long-term and the extent to  which these management approaches focused on either compliance with  DOE security requirements or improved effectiveness of LANL’s security  program. Supports the operation and maintenance of facilities and infrastructure  that support the accomplishment of Nuclear Weapons Science  programmatic missions   Re-establishes an immediate capability to manufacture pits in support of  the nuclear weapons stockpile, plans for long-term pit manufacturing  capability, and manufactures specific quantities of W88 pits   Supports the construction of new facilities and significant upgrades to  existing facilities  Provides the advanced computing infrastructure—hardware, software,  and code—to simulate nuclear weapon performance  Conducts research, development, and production work that is applicable  to multiple nuclear weapon systems, as opposed to a specific weapons  system (for example, basic research on critical factors of nuclear weapon  operations)

Appendix III: LANL’s NNSA Supported Threat Reduction Science and Support Programs

LANL conducted work on 12 Threat Reduction Science and Support  programs in fiscal year 2007 that were supported by NNSA.
Why GAO Did This Study

In 2006, a Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) contract employee unlawfully removed classified information from the laboratory. This was the latest in a series of high-profile security incidents at LANL spanning almost a decade. LANL conducts research on nuclear weapons and other national security areas for the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). GAO was asked to (1) identify LANL's major programs and activities and how much they rely on classified resources; (2) identify initiatives LANL is taking to reduce and consolidate its classified resources and physical footprint and the extent to which these initiatives address earlier security concerns; and (3) determine whether its new management approaches will sustain security improvements over the long-term. To carry out its work, GAO analyzed LANL data; reviewed policies, plans, and budgets; and interviewed officials.

What GAO Found

With fiscal year 2007 budget authority of about $2.7 billion, LANL conducts work on over 175 programs that can be grouped into three major program categories--Nuclear Weapons Science, Threat Reduction Science and Support, and Fundamental Science and Energy--and two support program categories--Environmental Programs and Safeguards and Security. Respectively, LANL's major programs serve to ensure the safety, performance, and reliability of the U.S. nuclear deterrent; support nonproliferation and counterproliferation efforts; and address energy security and other emerging national security challenges. LANL's Nuclear Weapons Science programs are the primary users of the facilities housing classified resources. For example, the Nuclear Weapons Science programs are the primary users of 14 facilities that store special nuclear material while LANL's other major programs are the primary users of only 7 such facilities. LANL has over two dozen initiatives under way that are principally aimed at reducing, consolidating, and better protecting classified resources, as well as reducing the physical footprint of the laboratory by closing unneeded facilities. While many of these initiatives address security concerns identified through past external evaluations--such as efforts to consolidate storage of classified documents and media into fewer secure facilities and to destroy unneeded classified nuclear weapon parts--significant security problems at LANL have received insufficient attention. Specifically, LANL has not implemented complete security solutions to address either classified parts storage in unapproved storage containers or weaknesses in its process for ensuring that actions taken to correct security deficiencies are completed. LANL intends to use three management approaches to sustain the security improvements it has been able to achieve to this point over the long-term: (1) undertake management actions required of LANL under the Compliance Order issued by the Secretary of Energy as a result of the 2006 security incident, (2) develop a Contractor Assurance System to measure and improve LANL's performance and management, and (3) implement annual performance evaluation plans NNSA uses to measure LANL's performance and determine a contract award fee. These approaches contain weaknesses that raise doubts about their ability to sustain security improvements over the long-term. Specifically, the actions LANL has proposed to take to meet the terms of the Compliance Order are only short-term--with completion planned for December 2008. Further, according to LANL officials, the Contractor Assurance System is not fully deployed and the measures it includes may not be fully effective. Finally, the annual performance evaluation plans do not sufficiently reward improving long-term security program effectiveness.