	Background

This section describes the public’s longstanding opposition to siting  nuclear waste repositories, DOE’s efforts to develop a repository under  the NWPA and its amendments, and DOE’s efforts since terminating the  Yucca Mountain repository to develop other strategies to manage and  store nuclear waste. In 2010, DOE terminated its licensing efforts at  Yucca Mountain. In Recommending a Separate Defense High-Level Waste Repository, DOE Did Not Quantify Cited Benefits or Show How Certain Benefits Would Be Achieved or the Effect If Not Realized

In the information DOE provided to the President, DOE cited benefits of a  separate defense HLW repository but did not quantify the benefits when  possible, nor did it provide detailed support demonstrating that the  benefits it cited could be achieved or show the risks if certain benefits  could not be realized as planned. How the Department of Energy Evaluated  the Six Factors under the Nuclear Waste  Policy Act (NWPA)  The Department of Energy (DOE) reported  that in evaluating the six factors required under  the NWPA, it included (1) a summary of the  1985 evaluation conclusions; (2) a discussion  of post-1985 changes and new information  bearing on the cost efficiency factor; and (3)  conclusions as to whether each factor  supports a finding that a defense   high-level radioactive waste repository is  required. Cost Efficiency. Public acceptability. Regulation. DOE did not show that the national security  benefits it cited could be achieved. Health and safety. DOE’s Estimates for the Projected Costs and Schedule to Site, License, and Construct a Defense High-Level Waste Repository Are Not Reliable

The preliminary cost and schedule estimates DOE provided to the  President for a defense HLW repository are not reliable. According  to DOE officials, they did not develop reliable estimates to reflect all likely  costs and schedule activities because their plan was still at the  conceptual stage, and DOE officials did not have enough information to  generate cost and schedule estimates that met best practices; however,  industry best practices documented by GAO state that it is possible to  generate reliable estimates of cost and schedule even when information  is limited. We shared with DOE officials the results of our assessment of DOE’s cost  estimates that DOE provided to the President. Waste transportation. Also, DOE’s estimates exclude site selection and  site characterization, which could add decades to the time frames, based  on past DOE experience and plans. Moreover, DOE is planning to develop  a consent-based siting process before it has addressed certain  prerequisites—such as the possible need for EPA to update health and  safety regulations—which are necessary to solicit public comment on its  consent-based siting process, screen potential sites for a repository, and  engage in site selection discussions with local communities. These  experts and stakeholders added that it would be premature for DOE to  site a defense HLW or a subsequent, mostly commercial SNF repository  until health and safety regulations are revised. The information DOE provided  to the President in 2015—concluding that a strong basis exists to find that  a defense HLW repository is required—served as the basis for the  decision that started the nation down the path of developing two  repositories. DOE faces significant public opposition in developing a consent-based  siting process and engaging in site selection discussions with local  communities, in part because DOE has not yet addressed certain  prerequisites that are needed for the site selection process, such as the  possible need to revise health and safety regulations. 1. The Secretary of Energy should direct the Office of Nuclear Energy to  conduct a comprehensive assessment, which adheres to OMB  guidance and best practices, of the benefits, costs, and schedules of  the options it reviewed and provided to the President in 2015, and, in  light of the new information and results of its assessment, revise—if  needed—the report’s conclusion that a strong basis exists to find that  a defense HLW repository is required. 2. However, as we stated in our report, the public  cannot provide meaningful input into a consent-based siting process  without having key information that is a precondition for discussion and  which could influence public input. Therefore, we  believe that DOE should reassess its decision to simultaneously pursue  such activities until key prerequisites have been addressed. Appendix I: Methodology

To assess the benefits that DOE cited in its recommendation to the  President about the need for a separate defense HLW repository, we  reviewed DOE’s March 2015 report and additional planning and cost  documents supporting that report. Furthermore, the guidance  states that benefits and cost estimates involve some degree of  uncertainty and that the risk that a benefit may not be realized as planned  should be factored into the cost-benefit analysis. We also reviewed DOE’s project management  orders regarding “pre-conceptual” planning activities and similar DOE  documents indicating the importance of front-end planning. If  the nation develops separate repositories, these costs would be spent  again for each separate repository. The President found that a separate repository for defense HLW and SNF was  required.
Why GAO Did This Study

DOE had long planned to store defense and commercial nuclear waste in a single repository at Yucca Mountain, Nevada, funded largely from commercial power fees. In 2010, DOE terminated this plan, and then considered developing separate defense and commercial repositories. This approach requires a Presidential finding under the NWPA. In 2015, DOE provided information to the President supporting separate repositories and cited several benefits, including cost efficiencies. On the basis of this information, the President in 2015 reversed a 1985 presidential finding and determined that a separate repository for defense waste was required, setting DOE down the path of developing separate repositories. Taxpayers would likely fund a defense waste repository rather than industry fees. GAO reviewed DOE's efforts to develop a separate defense waste repository. This report assesses (1) the information on benefits DOE provided to the President; (2) the reliability of DOE's cost and schedule estimates; and (3) DOE's efforts to site a defense HLW repository. GAO reviewed DOE documents and interviewed more than 50 experts.

What GAO Found

The information that the Department of Energy (DOE) provided to the President about whether a separate defense waste repository was required did not quantify cited benefits, when possible, show how these benefits could be achieved, or show the risks if certain benefits could not be realized as planned. In the information provided to the President, DOE stated that separate repositories for defense high-level waste (HLW) and commercial spent nuclear fuel (SNF) would produce certain benefits. DOE cited benefits in each area required by the Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA)—cost efficiency, public acceptability, regulation, transportation, national security, and health and safety—in concluding that there is a strong basis for a defense HLW repository. Federal guidance states that benefits must be quantified when possible, and that the risk that a benefit may not be realized as planned should be factored into the cost-benefit analysis. DOE officials said their plan was still conceptual and the guidance did not yet apply. Nevertheless, DOE did not show that benefits outweighed costs in recommending to the President that the nation should depart from its longstanding nuclear waste strategy.
DOE's preliminary cost and schedule estimates for the two-repository approach that it provided to the President are not reliable because the estimates do not meet industry best practices. DOE's cost estimates excluded major costs, such as site selection and site characterization costs that could add tens of billions of dollars. Regarding its schedule estimates, DOE did not provide information on how its schedules would be achieved. GAO found that DOE's estimates leave little time for major activities and that DOE's schedule appears optimistic, given its past repository siting experiences. Without reliable estimates that reflect best practices, DOE provided information to the President that supported a decision that could commit the nation to expending undisclosed but significant future resources and to a time frame that appears optimistic.
DOE is planning to develop a process to obtain consent for an eventual repository site; however, DOE faces significant public opposition and certain prerequisites have not yet been established. These prerequisites include updated health and safety regulations, which are necessary for the public to consider as part of a consent-based siting process. Without updated health and safety regulations, which establish radiation exposure limits, the public cannot provide meaningful input into a consent-based siting process and local communities cannot effectively be engaged in hosting potential repository sites. DOE officials acknowledge that health and safety regulations—which were developed in the 1980s—need to be updated and revised for any future defense HLW or mostly commercial SNF repository. Revising such regulations is the responsibility of other federal agencies. Experts and stakeholders told GAO that updated health and safety regulations are a precondition for having discussions with the public and for screening potential sites. An internal project management requirement directs DOE to perform key “preconceptual” planning activities to enhance front-end planning. In proceeding with siting activities without ensuring key prerequisites have been established, DOE runs the risk of increasing public opposition and potentially wasting resources.

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that DOE (1) assess benefits, costs, and schedule estimates, and (2) reassess its decision to conduct site selection activities. DOE agreed on the need for a more thorough assessment, but disagreed on the need to reassess site selection activities, citing benefits of its approach. GAO continues to believe its recommendation is valid, as discussed in the report.