	Background

The U.S. commercial aviation industry, with less than one fatal accident  per 5 million flights from 2002 through 2005 has an extraordinary safety  record. The National Work Program Guidelines (NPG)  is the original oversight program for these airlines. 1.) FAA’s Safety Oversight System Includes Programs That Focus on Risk Management and Leveraging Resources, but System Is Hindered by Data Limitations and Lack of Evaluations

FAA’s safety oversight system has programs that focus on identifying and  mitigating risk through a system safety approach, leveraging resources,  and enforcing safety regulations, but the programs lack fully developed  evaluative processes. Both programs emphasize a  system safety approach of using risk analysis techniques, which allow for  the efficient use of inspection staff and resources by prioritizing workload  based on areas of highest risk and require that inspectors verify that  corrective actions are taken. With the  expansion of the ATOS program, it will be important to monitor the  magnitude of the shift in resources and the effect it may have on FAA’s  overall capability to oversee the industry as well as any changes to the  current ATOS program that may be required by the expansion. We reported that designees  perform about 90 percent of certification-related activities, thus greatly  leveraging the agency’s resources and enabling inspectors to concentrate  on what FAA considers the most safety-critical activities. Data Limitations and Lack of Evaluations Limit FAA’s Ability to Manage Risk and Are Particularly Critical as FAA’s Oversight Becomes More Indirect

Effective processes for evaluating FAA’s safety oversight programs, along  with accurate nationwide data on those programs would provide FAA’s  program managers and other officials with assurance that the programs  are having their intended effect, especially as FAA’s oversight becomes  more indirect. Our most recent work has shown that FAA had not  evaluated its safety programs, and we recommended that the agency  establish continuous evaluative processes for the SEP program, designee  programs, industry partnership programs, and enforcement program. However, FAA does not plan to  evaluate the SEP program because it intends to discontinue the program  after December 2007. Training Is an Integral Part of FAA’s Safety Oversight System, but Several Actions Could Improve Results

FAA’s use of a risk-based system safety approach to inspections requires  inspectors to apply data analysis and auditing skills to identify, analyze,  assess, and control potential hazards and risks. It is also important that FAA’s large cadre of designees  is well-trained in federal aviation regulations and FAA policies. FAA has  made training an integral part of its safety inspection system by  establishing mandatory training requirements for its workforce as well as  designees. We have reported that FAA has generally followed effective management  practices for planning, developing, delivering, and assessing the impact of  its technical training for safety inspectors, although some practices have  yet to be fully implemented. On the other hand, FAA develops  technical courses on an ad hoc basis rather than as part of an overall  curriculum for each inspector specialty—such as air carrier operations,  maintenance, and cabin safety—because the agency has not systematically  identified the technical skills and competencies each type of inspector  needs to effectively perform inspections. FAA has begun to address these recommendations. FAA Faces a Number of Challenges in Overseeing Aviation Safety

FAA faces a number of key safety challenges, including meeting its  performance target for commercial air carrier safety, which it will not  meet in fiscal year 2006 because of recent fatal accidents. FAA Faces Challenges in Human Resources

FAA’s ability to oversee aviation safety will be affected by recent and  anticipated trends in attrition of its inspectors compounded, in some  cases, by delays in hiring and increased workload. 3.) FAA is taking actions to address these  issues. FAA Faces Challenges in Implementing Advanced Technology to Increase Air Traffic Safety

To enhance runway safety, FAA intends to rely on new technologies— beginning with the Airport Movement Area Safety System (AMASS) and  Airport Surface Detection Equipment Model X (ASDE-X)—that are  expected to reduce runway accidents. Aviation Safety: Better Management Controls Are Needed to Improve  FAA’s Safety Enforcement and Compliance Efforts.
Why GAO Did This Study

The U.S. commercial aviation industry has had an extraordinary safety record in recent years. However, expected increases in air-traffic--including the introduction of new vehicles into the national airspace, such as unmanned vehicles and very light jets--and human resource issues, present challenges that have the potential to strain the existing safety oversight system. GAO's testimony focuses on these questions: (1) How is the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) ensuring that the areas of highest safety risk are addressed? (2) How is FAA ensuring that its staff maintain the skills and knowledge to consistently carry out the agency's oversight programs? and (3) What are the key safety challenges facing FAA? This statement is based on our recent reports on FAA's inspection oversight programs, industry partnership programs, and enforcement and training programs. It is also based on interviews with FAA and relevant industry officials.

What GAO Found

FAA's aviation safety oversight system includes programs that focus on identifying and mitigating risks through a system safety approach and by leveraging resources, but as FAA is still developing evaluations for some of these programs, it remains unclear the extent to which they are achieving their intended effects. FAA's system safety approach for overseeing airlines--through the Air Transportation Oversight System (ATOS) and Surveillance and Evaluation Program (SEP)--uses inspection staff efficiently by prioritizing workload based on areas of highest risk and ensuring that corrective actions have been taken. However, recent and planned changes that would move inspections of about 100 airlines from SEP to ATOS will shift inspector workload and might affect FAA's capability to oversee the industry. FAA also concentrates its limited staff resources on the most safety-critical functions and through its designee programs delegates other, less critical activities to designees. Designees perform about 90 percent of certification-related activities, and thus allow FAA to better leverage resources. GAO's recent work found some weaknesses in FAA's system safety approach and recommended that FAA develop effective evaluative processes and accurate nationwide data on its safety oversight programs to address these weaknesses so that program managers and other officials have assurance that the programs attain their intended effect. FAA has begun implementing those recommendations but does not plan to evaluate SEP, which it intends to discontinue after December 2007. Training--including mandatory training requirements for FAA's workforce as well as designees--is an integral part of FAA's safety oversight system. GAO has reported that FAA has generally followed effective management practices for planning, developing, delivering, and assessing the impact of its technical training for safety inspectors, although some practices have yet to be fully implemented. However, several actions could improve the results of its training efforts. For example, FAA develops technical courses on an ad hoc basis rather than as part of an overall curriculum for each type of inspector, such as inspectors of operations or cabin safety, because the agency has not systematically identified the technical skills and competencies each type of inspector needs to effectively perform inspections. FAA has recognized the need to improve its training program in this and other areas. FAA faces several key safety challenges, including not meeting its performance target for commercial air carrier safety this year because of recent fatal accidents. Further, FAA's ability to oversee aviation safety will be affected by recent and anticipated trends in inspector and air traffic controller attrition. Also, FAA intends to enhance runway safety by relying on new technologies that are expected to reduce runway accidents. However, schedule delays and cost increases challenge FAA's ability to deploy this technology. Finally, new types of aviation vehicles are changing the aviation industry and will require new areas of expertise for FAA's inspectors and controllers.