DOD and the Services are Taking Steps to Manage the Impact of Continued Deployments on Readiness

		Persistently Low Reported Readiness Levels Attributed to Various Factors

After more than a decade of conflict, recent budget uncertainty, and  decreases in force structure, U.S. forces are facing significant challenges  in rebuilding readiness. The Navy currently has 272 ships, a decrease from 333  ships in 1998—an 18 percent decrease. For example, in 1991 the Air Force had  154 fighter and bomber squadrons, and as of December 2015 the Air  Force had 64 fighter and bomber squadrons—a 58 percent decrease  from 1991 levels. Global Demands Are Expected to Continue and to Challenge Some Portions of the Force

Though DOD officials indicated that overall demand has been decreasing  since 2013—primarily because of the drawdown of forces in Iraq and  Afghanistan—DOD has reported that the ability of the military force to  rebuild capacity and capability is hindered by continued, and in some  cases increased, demand for some types of forces. Some portions of the force have experienced reduced demand and  improved readiness. However, at the time of our  report, the department was still working to complete implementation of  Global Force Management reform initiatives and thus it is too soon to tell  what impact implementation of these initiatives will have on DOD’s  readiness recovery efforts. The intent is to better  balance the distribution of forces for high-priority missions with the need  to rebuild the readiness of the force. Revising combatant command plans: DOD officials noted that in 2015  the department began efforts to revise several major plans in an  attempt to better reflect what the current and planned force is  expected to achieve. DOD’s Implementation and Oversight of Department-Wide Readiness Rebuilding Efforts Do Not Fully Incorporate Key Elements of Sound Planning

DOD has stated that readiness rebuilding is a priority, but implementation  and oversight of department-wide readiness rebuilding efforts has not  fully included key elements of sound planning, which could place  readiness recovery efforts at risk given the continued high pace of  operations and many competing priorities. Each service has also established readiness recovery  strategies, but these strategies have been incomplete or not  comprehensive and, in many cases, have not fully identified the  resources required to achieve the goals the strategies support. Service Readiness Recovery Plans Do Not Capture the Entire Force and Have Changing Time Frames

In 2015, the services reported their readiness rebuilding plans to DOD,  which included some readiness goals, strategies for achieving the  identified goals, and time frames for when the rebuilding efforts would be  complete. In  response, the services selected force elements that were either  experiencing a high pace of deployments, facing challenges in achieving  readiness recovery, or were key to their respective readiness recovery  efforts. Extended deployments to meet global demands have resulted in greater  and more costly maintenance requirements. Metrics and Evaluating Progress: DOD and the Services Track Readiness Trends, but Most of the Services Have Not Established Metrics and DOD Has Not Developed a Method to Evaluate Progress Toward Achieving Readiness Recovery

An element of sound planning is developing a set of metrics that will be  applied to gauge progress toward attainment of the plan’s long-term  goals. In addition, DOD has not  validated the service-established readiness rebuilding goals, nor does it  have metrics on which it can evaluate readiness recovery efforts to  determine the extent to which they reflect the department’s priorities and  are achieving intended goals. Recommendations for Executive Action

To ensure that the department can implement readiness rebuilding  efforts, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the  Secretaries of the Departments of the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force  to take the following three actions:
Establish comprehensive readiness rebuilding goals to guide  readiness rebuilding efforts and a strategy for implementing identified  goals, to include resources needed to implement the strategy. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

This report is a public version of our June 2016 classified report. DOD  deemed some of the information in that report as SECRET, which must  be protected from public disclosure. To describe the factors that affect reported readiness levels and to  identify the steps the department is taking to manage the impact of  continued deployments on readiness, we reviewed and analyzed  readiness data and information from the Office of the Secretary of  Defense, the Joint Staff, the combatant commands, and each of the  military services. We also conducted interviews with Office of the Secretary of Defense,  Joint Staff, and combatant command officials to discuss global demand  trends, and obtained documentation, such as departmental guidance and  related briefings, and reviewed these documents to understand DOD’s  efforts to reform the departmental process used to source global  demands.
Why GAO Did This Study

For over a decade, DOD deployed forces to support operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, and is now supporting increased presence in the Pacific and emerging crises in the Middle East and Eastern Europe. These deployments have significantly stressed the force.
The House Report accompanying the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016 included a provision that GAO review DOD's efforts to rebuild military readiness. This report (1) describes the factors that affect reported readiness levels and DOD's efforts to manage the impact of deployments on readiness, and (2) assesses DOD's implementation and oversight of department-wide readiness rebuilding efforts. This report is a public version of a previously issued classified product and omits information DOD identified as SECRET, which must be protected from public disclosure.
GAO analyzed and reviewed data on reported readiness rates and departmental readiness rebuilding efforts. GAO interviewed DOD, Joint Staff, and combatant command officials regarding current demand and readiness rates and challenges with rebuilding military readiness. GAO also conducted separate reviews of the readiness of the military services.

What GAO Found

The Department of Defense (DOD) recognizes that more than a decade of conflict, budget uncertainty, and force structure reductions have degraded military readiness, and the department has efforts under way to manage the impact of deployments on readiness. The military services have reported persistently low readiness levels, which they have attributed to emerging and continued demands on their forces, reduced force structure, and increased frequency and length of deployments. For example, the Air Force experienced a 58 percent decrease in the number of fighter and bomber squadrons from 1991 to 2015 while maintaining a persistent level of demand from the combatant commands for the use of its forces. In addition, the Navy has experienced an 18 percent decrease in its fleet of ships since 1998 and an increase in demand, resulting in the deployment lengths for many ships increasing from 7 months to a less sustainable 9 months. DOD officials have indicated that overall demand has been decreasing since 2013, but the department has reported that the ability to rebuild capability and capacity is hindered by continued demand for some forces. To mitigate the impact of continued deployments on readiness, the Joint Staff has focused on balancing the distribution of forces for high-priority missions with the need to rebuild the readiness of the force. Efforts include revising major plans to better reflect what the current and planned force is expected to achieve and improving the management of DOD's process for sourcing global demands by, among other things, balancing the supply of forces with the minimum required to meet global demands. However, it is too soon to tell what impact implementation of these initiatives will have on DOD's readiness recovery efforts because the department is still working to complete implementation.
DOD has stated that readiness rebuilding is a priority, but implementation and oversight of department-wide readiness rebuilding efforts have not fully included key elements of sound planning, putting the rebuilding efforts at risk. Key elements of sound planning for results-oriented outcomes include a mission statement supported by long-term goals, strategies for achieving the goals, metrics, and an evaluation plan to determine the appropriateness of the goals and effectiveness of implemented strategies. In 2014, DOD tasked the military services to develop plans for rebuilding readiness. Each service developed a plan based on the force elements that were experiencing a high pace of deployments or facing challenges in achieving readiness recovery. In 2015, the services reported their readiness rebuilding plans to DOD, which identified readiness goals and timeframes for achieving them, but these goals were incomplete and some of the timeframes have been extended. GAO found that the services have also not defined comprehensive strategies, with the resources required for achieving the identified goals, nor have they fully assessed the effect of external factors such as maintenance and training on readiness rebuilding goals. Moreover, the services have not fully established metrics that the department can use to oversee readiness rebuilding efforts and evaluate progress towards achieving the identified goals. Without DOD incorporating key elements of sound planning into recovery efforts, and amid competing priorities that the department must balance, successful implementation of readiness recovery plans may be at risk.

What GAO Recommends

GAO is making five recommendations, including that DOD and the services establish comprehensive readiness goals and strategies for implementing them, as well as associated metrics that can be used to evaluate whether readiness recovery efforts are achieving intended outcomes. DOD generally concurred with GAO's recommendations.