DOD Analysis of Potential Duplication Does Not Address All NGJ Roles and Planned Acquisition Programs

DOD has assessed whether the planned NGJ program is duplicative  using a variety of means, but none of them address all of the system’s  planned roles or take into account the military services’ evolving airborne  electronic attack investment plans. However, these analyses do not  address potential duplication or overlap between the NGJ and other  systems being developed for other roles, such as communications  jamming in irregular warfare environments. DOD’s analyses support its conclusion that the NGJ is not duplicative of  existing capabilities in its primary role—the joint suppression of enemy air  defenses in a modified escort setting, which includes defended airspace  outside the range of known surface-to-air missiles. Based on our analysis of DOD airborne electronic attack systems and  missions, none of the systems we reviewed that have emerged since  DOD’s NGJ analysis was completed duplicate planned capabilities;  however, there is some overlap in the roles that the systems are intended  to perform. Ongoing DOD Efforts Provide Another Mechanism to Address Potential Overlap and Duplication

DOD has several ongoing efforts that could provide a mechanism for  updating its analysis of potential overlap and duplication related to the  NGJ and other airborne electronic attack investments, including its annual  Electronic Warfare Strategy Report to Congress, a U.S. Strategic  Command review of DOD’s portfolio of electronic warfare systems, and  the NGJ capability development document. However, we found  weaknesses in two of the three efforts. DOD could address new duplication issues as they emerge and, if  necessary, explain the need for overlapping capabilities in its electronic  warfare strategy report to Congress. However, the  analysis was limited and did not examine potential overlap between  capabilities or explain why that overlap was warranted. Capability development documents, which define the performance  requirements of acquisition programs, are another vehicle to discuss  potential redundancies across proposed and existing programs. The  NGJ is not intended to meet all of the military services’ airborne electronic  attack needs, and the services are planning to make additional  investments in systems that are tailored to meet their specific warfighting  roles. The military services may be able to leverage the NGJ program in  support of their own acquisition priorities and programs because its  current acquisition strategy is based on a modular open systems  approach, which allows system components to be added, removed,  modified, replaced, or sustained by different military customers or  manufacturers without significantly impacting the remainder of the  system. This approach could make it easier to integrate the NGJ or its  technologies into other systems in the future. EA-18Gs can  use the NGJ jamming capabilities in these settings to disrupt enemy radar  and communications and suppress enemy air defenses. While the Navy’s NGJ is expected to provide  airborne electronic attack capabilities to support all military services in  both major combat operations and irregular warfare environments, the  other services are also planning to make additional investments in  airborne electronic attack systems that are tailored to their specific  warfighting roles. At an estimated cost of over $7 billion, the NGJ  represents a significant investment in airborne electronic attack  capabilities. Redundancy  in some of these areas may, in fact, be desirable, but pursuing multiple  acquisition efforts to develop similar capabilities can also result in the  same capability gap being filled twice or more, lead to inefficient use of  resources, and contribute to other warfighting needs going unfilled. Identifying existing and planned systems across all of the  NGJ’s planned roles in its capability development document could help  ensure that DOD’s analysis of potential overlap and duplication is  complete. Recommendations for Executive Action

We recommend that the Secretary of Defense take the following two  actions:
To help ensure that the NGJ does not unnecessarily duplicate existing  or planned capabilities, require the Navy, in coordination with the Joint  Staff, to address overlap and duplication between the NGJ and other  systems in all of its planned roles in the NGJ capability development  document. DOD responded that it  concurs with the need to continue to assess unnecessary duplication and  redundancy, but it does not concur with including the assessment in the  capability development document. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

To determine the extent to which the Department of Defense (DOD)  assessed duplication among the Next Generation Jammer (NGJ), existing  capabilities, and other acquisition programs, we reviewed key NGJ and  DOD electronic warfare documents, including the 2004 Airborne  Electronic Attack Initial Capabilities Document, the 2009 Electronic  Warfare Initial Capabilities Document, the NGJ Analysis of Alternatives  (AOA), and the DOD Annual Electronic Warfare Strategy Report to  Congress, to determine whether potential duplication was considered as  DOD developed NGJ requirements and prepared for initiation of the NGJ  acquisition program.
Why GAO Did This Study

At an estimated cost of over $7 billion, the Navy's NGJ program represents a significant investment in airborne electronic attack capabilities. Jammers, like the planned NGJ, fly on aircraft, such as Navy EA-18Gs, and transmit electronic signals that can neutralize or temporarily degrade enemy air defenses and communications, thus aiding combat aircraft and ground forces' freedom to maneuver and strike. Senate Report 112-196 mandated GAO to review the NGJ program and potential duplication. This report examines the extent to which (1) DOD assessed whether there is duplication among NGJ, existing capabilities, and other acquisition programs, and (2) NGJ is being managed as a joint solution. GAO reviewed key NGJ requirements and acquisition documents and DOD and military service documents describing airborne electronic attack capabilities.

What GAO Found

Generation Jammer (NGJ) program is duplicative using a variety of means, but none of them address all of the system's planned roles or take into account the military services' evolving airborne electronic attack investment plans. DOD analyses support its conclusion that the NGJ meets a valid need and is not duplicative of existing capabilities in its primary role--suppressing enemy air defenses from outside the range of known surface-to-air missiles. However, these analyses do not address all planned NGJ roles, such as communications jamming in irregular warfare environments, or take into account the military services' evolving airborne electronic attack investment plans. According to GAO's analysis, none of the systems that have emerged since DOD completed its NGJ analyses duplicate its planned capabilities; however there is some overlap in the roles they are intended to perform. Redundancy in some of these areas may, in fact, be desirable. However, pursuing multiple acquisition efforts to develop similar capabilities can result in the same capability gap being filled twice or more, lead to inefficient use of resources, and contribute to other warfighting needs going unfilled. Therefore, continued examination of potential overlap and duplication among these investments may be warranted.
DOD has several ongoing efforts that could provide a mechanism for updating its analysis of potential overlap and duplication to address these shortcomings as the program moves forward. However, GAO found weaknesses in two of these efforts as well.
Electronic Warfare Strategy Report to Congress : DOD could address new duplication issues as they emerge and, if necessary, explain the need for overlapping capabilities in this report. However, to date, the analysis of overlap and duplication in this report has been limited and did not examine potential overlap between capabilities or explain why overlap was warranted.
NGJ Capability Development Document : Redundancies are required to be considered when a capability development document--which defines the performance requirements for an acquisition program--is validated. The draft NGJ capability development document does not identify the systems the Navy considered when analyzing potential redundancies, so it is difficult to evaluate whether its analysis includes existing and proposed programs across all of the NGJ's planned roles.
The NGJ is not being managed as a joint acquisition program, which is a distinction related to funding, but it is expected to provide the Navy with airborne electronic capabilities that will support all military services in both major combat operations and irregular warfare environments. The NGJ's capabilities are not intended to meet all of the military services' airborne electronic attack needs and the services are planning to make additional investments in systems that are tailored to meet their specific warfighting roles. The military services might be able to leverage the NGJ program in support of their own acquisition priorities because it plans to use a modular open systems approach, which allows for components to be added, removed, or modified without significantly impacting the rest of the system. This approach could make it easier to integrate the NGJ or its technologies into other systems in the future.

What GAO Recommends

To help ensure that DODs analysis of potential overlap and duplication is complete, GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense: (1) require the NGJ capability development document to discuss potential redundancies between NGJ and existing and proposed programs across all of its planned roles and (2) ensure that the Electronic Warfare Strategy Report to Congress includes information on potentially overlapping capabilities and why that overlap is warranted. DOD agreed to continue to assess duplication and redundancies but not with using the capability development document to do so. GAO believes the recommendation remains valid as discussed in the report. DOD agreed with the second recommendation.