Because the multilateral export control regimes are only one of several policy tools that national governments use to combat the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and advanced conventional weapons, it is difficult to attribute accomplishments exclusively to the regimes. 1). However, officials of the Australia Group Secretariat disagreed with this assertion. Instead, each regime member determines which countries are of concern to it when implementing its national export controls. However, the regimes do not have their own means to monitor and enforce members’ adherence to regime commitments. According to the Department of State, in the most clear and serious example of a violation of regime nonproliferation commitments, Russia shipped nuclear fuel to the Tarapur power reactors in India in January 2001. A key function of each regime is sharing information related to proliferation. Yet the regimes often lack even the basic information that would allow them to assess whether their actions were working as intended. The regimes cannot effectively limit or monitor efforts by proliferators to acquire sensitive technology without more complete and timely reporting of licensing information and without more information on when and how members adopt and implement agreed-upon controls. However, the consensus-based and voluntary nature of these regimes poses organizational and political obstacles to implementing needed reforms. While the regimes have adapted to changing threats or conditions in the past, their continued ability to do so may determine whether the regimes remain viable in curbing proliferation in the future. To ensure that the United States is reporting all relevant information to the multilateral export control regimes, as expected, we recommend that the Secretary of State report U.S. denials of all export licenses for items controlled by a multilateral export control regime at the time the exporter is informed of the U.S. government’s intent to deny an export license. 2.
Why GAO Did This Study

Multilateral export control regimes are consensus-based, voluntary arrangements of supplier countries that produce technologies useful in developing weapons of mass destruction or conventional weapons. The regimes aim to restrict trade in these technologies to keep them from proliferating states or terrorists. The United States seeks to improve the effectiveness of these regimes. GAO was asked to (1) assess weaknesses of the four regimes and (2) identify obstacles faced in trying to strengthen them.

What GAO Found

GAO found weaknesses that impede the ability of the multilateral export control regimes to achieve their nonproliferation goals. A key function of each regime is to share information related to proliferation. Yet the regimes often lack even basic information that would allow them to assess whether their actions are having their intended results. The regimes cannot effectively limit or monitor efforts by countries of concern to acquire sensitive technology without more complete and timely reporting of licensing information and without information on when and how members adopt and implement agreed-upon export controls. For example, GAO confirmed that at least one member, the United States, has not reported its denial of 27 export licenses for items controlled by the Australia Group. Several obstacles limit the options available to the United States in strengthening the effectiveness of multilateral export control regimes. The requirement to achieve consensus in each regime allows even one member to block action in adopting needed reforms. Because the regimes are voluntary in nature, they cannot enforce members' compliance with regime commitments. For example, Russia exported nuclear fuel to India in a clear violation of its commitments, threatening the viability of one regime. The regimes have adapted to changing threats in the past. Their continued ability to do so will determine whether they remain viable in curbing proliferation in the future.