NRC’s regional offices are responsible  for implementing the ROP, along with the inspectors who work directly at  each of the nuclear power facilities. NRC Uses Various Tools and Takes a Risk-Informed and Graded Approach to Ensuring the Safety of Nuclear Power Facilities

In implementing its ROP, NRC oversees the safe operation of nuclear  power facilities through physical inspections of the various complex plant  equipment and operations, reviews of reactor operator records, and  quantitative measures or indicators of each reactor’s performance. Ninety-seven percent of these findings were designated green—very low  risk to safe facility operations, but important to correct. For varying periods from 2001 through 2005, on the combined basis of  inspection findings and performance indicators, NRC has subjected more  than 75 percent of the reactor units to oversight beyond the baseline  inspections. While most reactors received the lowest level of increased  oversight through a supplemental inspection, five reactors were subjected  to NRC’s highest level of oversight. Reactor units in this category were  generally subjected to this higher oversight for long periods due to the  more systemic nature of their performance problems. NRC Continues to Make Improvements to Its ROP in Key Areas

Our 2006 report found that NRC has generally taken a proactive approach  to continuously improving its oversight process, in response to  recommendations that grew out of the Davis-Besse incident; independent  reviews; and feedback that is usually obtained during NRC’s annual self- assessment of its oversight process from stakeholders, including its  regional and on-site inspectors. Continued efforts will be needed to  address other shortcomings or opportunities for improvement, however,  particularly in improving its ability to identify and address early  indications of declining safety performance at nuclear power facilities. Although NRC and others have long recognized the effects of a facility’s  safety culture on performance, NRC did not undertake efforts to better  incorporate safety culture into the ROP until 2005, when it formed a  working group to lead the agency’s efforts. While NRC has largely  implemented initial safety culture enhancements to the ROP that primarily  address cross-cutting issues, it does not plan to take any additional actions  to further implement either recommendation before it completes its  assessment of an 18-month implementation phase at the end of this year. NRC Has Implemented Many Actions to Prepare Its Workforce for New Reactor Licensing Reviews and Manage Its Workload, but Several Key Elements Are Still Under Way

NRC has prepared its workforce for new reactor licensing reviews by  increasing funding for new reactor activities, reorganizing several offices,  creating and partly staffing the Office of New Reactors (NRO), and hiring a  significant number of entry-level and midlevel professionals. NRC is using a project management approach to better schedule, manage,  and coordinate COL application and design certification reviews. However, NRC has not yet developed  specific criteria to set priorities for reviewing these applications if it needs  to decide which applications take precedence. However, it has not clearly defined the board’s  role, if any, in setting priorities or directing resource allocation. NRC Has Significantly Revised Its Overall Regulatory Framework and Review Process, but Several Activities Are Still in Progress

NRC has significantly revised most of its primary regulatory framework  and review process to prepare for licensing new reactors. Specifically,  NRC has revised and augmented its rules, guidance, and oversight criteria  for licensing and constructing new reactors primarily to provide for early  resolution of issues, standardization, and predictability in the licensing  process. While NRC  has made progress in these areas, it has not yet completed some ancillary  rules and regulatory guidance, or actions to implement certain review  process components. We recommended  that NRC enhance the process for requesting additional information by (1)  providing more specific guidance to staff on the development and  resolution of requests for additional information within and across design  centers and (2) explaining forthcoming workflow and electronic process  revisions to COL applicants in a timely manner.
Why GAO Did This Study

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is responsible for overseeing the nation's 104 commercial nuclear power reactors to ensure they are operated safely. Since 2000, NRC has used a formal Reactor Oversight Process (ROP) to oversee safety. NRC is also responsible for licensing the construction and operation of new reactors. Electric power companies have announced plans to submit 20 applications in the next 18 months. This testimony is based on GAO reports that reviewed (1) how NRC implements the ROP, (2) the results of the ROP over several years, (3) the status of NRC's efforts to improve the ROP, (4) NRC's efforts to prepare its workforce and manage its workload for new reactor licensing, and (5) NRC's efforts to develop its regulatory framework and review processes for new reactor activities. In conducting this work, GAO analyzed programwide information and interviewed cognizant NRC managers and industry representatives.

What GAO Found

In implementing its ROP, NRC uses various tools and takes a risk-informed and graded approach to ensure the safety of nuclear power facilities. The ROP primarily relies on physical inspections of equipment and operations and quantitative measures or indicators of performance at each facility to assess the status of safety and determine appropriate levels of oversight. Since 2001, NRC has made more than 4,000 inspection findings that reactor unit operators had not fully complied with safety procedures. Almost all of these findings were for actions NRC considered important to correct but of low significance to safe operations. As a result of NRC inspections, more than 75 percent of the nation's reactor units received some level of increased oversight while five units were subjected to NRC's highest level of oversight for long periods because their performance problems were more systemic. In 2006, GAO reported that NRC has generally taken a proactive approach to improving its ROP. However, concerted efforts will be needed to address shortcomings, particularly in identifying and addressing early indications of declining reactor safety performance. For example, NRC is implementing several enhancements to the ROP to better assess a facility's safety culture--organizational characteristics that ensure safety issues receive the attention their significance warrants. GAO made recommendations to further improve this effort, and NRC has taken initial steps to implement them. NRC has taken important steps to prepare its workforce for new licensing reviews, but several key activities are still underway and uncertainties remain about its management of the expected surge of applications. For example, NRC has increased funding, hired hundreds of new employees, and created and partly staffed a new office. However, NRC has not completed its development of some computer-based tools for enhancing the consistency and coordination of application reviews and has not fully developed criteria for setting priorities if the workload exceeds available resources. Also, while NRC's Office of New Reactors established a resource management board for coordinating certain office review activities, it has not clearly defined the extent of the board's responsibilities. NRC agreed with recommendations GAO made to further improve its workload management. NRC has revised most of its primary regulatory framework and review processes, including its rules, guidance, and oversight criteria to provide for early resolution of issues, standardization, and enhanced predictability. However, NRC has not yet completed some associated rules, guidance, and review process components, including revisions to its environmental guidance, its hearing process, and its process for requesting additional information from applicants. Without these components, expected efficiencies and predictability may be limited regarding the total time an applicant needs to obtain a license. NRC agreed with a recommendation GAO made to further improve its application review process.