The BushAdministration wishes NATO countries to send forces to Iraq to reduce the demands on U.S. forces,and to spread the costs of stabilization and reconstruction. Some other allies appear to reject involvement in a U.S.-led force,as a NATO force would be, and prefer a force with a substantial U.N. role. A Role for European Forces? Before the conflict in Iraq, some Administration officials made a case for NATO involvement in post-war Iraq. Theseexperiences have led the allies to demand a greater share of decision-making and more authority forthe U.N. in Iraq before committing military forces to that country, issues that will be discussed ina later section of this report. He added that by bringing in military forces from other countries,U.S. forces could be drawn down. Current operational costs for U.S. forces in Iraq are approximately $4 billion per month. Key Europeangovernments, such as France and Germany, want a strong U.N. role in Iraq, and a new U.N.resolution to outline that role. The German government has said that it might send troops to Iraq, but that they would not serve under UNSC 1483 because the resolution embodiesthe idea of an "occupying power." Some Bush Administration officials, including DeputyDefense Secretary Wolfowitz, sharply criticized Turkey as a result. These forces are underTurkish, and not U.S., command. At the same time, in France, Germany, and other allied states, there are influential voices that do not wish to see the United States fail to bring stability and at least a measure of representativegovernment to Iraq. Failure of theU.S. Such a compromise could free U.S.forces for availability elsewhere; provide European (and other) governments with a voice in Iraq'sfuture, and legitimacy through a U.N. imprimatur; and shift part of the financial burden forreconstruction from the U.S. government to other governments and to the international privatesector.
Bush Administration officials have said that they wish to see NATO countries contribute forces to bring stability to Iraq, possibly as part of a U.S.-led NATO or U.N. force. Key European alliessuch as France and Germany would first like to see a new U.N. mandate that would includeobjectives, such as a timetable for turnover of authority to Iraqis and a transparent process forimproving Iraq's petroleum industry, that the Administration now opposes. Some European alliesdo not wish to serve under a U.S. command in Iraq; other European allies already have troops in Iraq.
Administration officials are concerned that greater international involvement in governing Iraq could deflect the United States from achieving some of its stated goals for that country's future. Such goals include establishing a democracy there that would influence other Middle Easterngovernments to follow a similar course, and easing of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Some Europeansargue that these goals are unattainable in the framework established by the U.S.-led occupation. Atthe same time, involvement of European forces, if a common outlook could be worked out, couldfree some U.S. forces for other missions, dampen international criticism of U.S. management of Iraq,and spread costs for reconstructing Iraq to other countries and the private sector.
See also CRS Report RL31339 , Iraq: U.S. Regime Change Efforts and Post-War Governance , CRS Report RL31701, Iraq: U.S. Military Operations, and CRS Report RL31843(pdf) , Iraq: ForeignContributions to Operation Iraqi Freedom, Peacekeeping Operations, and Reconstruction .
This report will be periodically updated.