However, the commission has not  developed its approach in sufficient detail to ensure that its certification  activities are performed thoroughly and consistently. Officials further stated that they do not yet have written plans for  addressing these gaps. Moreover, this lack of definition has caused  EAC stakeholders to interpret certification requirements differently, and  the resultant need to reconcile these differences has contributed to delays  in certifying systems that several states were planning on using in the 2008  elections. According to EAC officials, its approach does not yet include such details  because it is still new and evolving and because the commission’s limited  resources have been devoted to other priorities. EAC Has Largely Followed Its Defined Certification Approach, but a Key System Verification Capability to Support States and Local Jurisdictions Is Not Yet in Place

EAC has largely followed its defined certification approach for each of the  dozen voting systems that it is in the process of certifying, with one major  exception. This means that states and local jurisdictions  are at increased risk of using a version of a system during an election that  differs from the certified version. EAC Has Not Established a Sufficient Means for States and Local Jurisdictions to Verify That Their Systems Match the Certified Version

Notwithstanding EAC’s efforts to follow its defined approach, it has not  yet established a sufficient mechanism for states and local jurisdictions to  use in verifying that the voting systems that they receive from  manufacturers for use in elections are identical to the systems that were  actually tested and certified. This approach reflects some key aspects of  relevant guidance. However, other aspects are either missing or not  adequately defined, and although EAC officials stated that they intend to  address some of these gaps, the commission does not have defined plans  or time frames for doing so. In addition, EAC’s problem tracking and resolution approach does not  extend to any of the voting systems that are likely to be used in the 2008  elections, and it is uncertain when, and to what extent, this situation will  change. In  addition, while these officials said that they intend to address some of  these gaps, they do not have defined plans or time frames for doing so. This in turn leaves state and local  jurisdictions on their own to discover, disclose, and address any shared  problems with systems. EAC plays a pivotal role in testing and  certifying voting systems. Beyond the state of EAC’s efforts to define and follow an approach to  testing and certifying voting systems, including efforts to track and resolve  problems with certified systems and use this information to improve the  commission’s testing and certification program, a void exists relative to  having a national focus on tracking and resolving problems with voting  systems that EAC has not certified, and thus has not been assigned explicit  responsibility or has the resources to address. Recommendations for Executive Action

To assist EAC in building upon and evolving its voting systems testing and  certification program, we recommend that the Chair of the EAC direct the  commission’s Executive Director to ensure that plans are prepared,  approved, and implemented for developing and implementing    detailed procedures, review criteria, and documentation requirements to  ensure that voting system testing and certification review activities are  conducted thoroughly, consistently, and verifiably;    an accessible and available software repository for testing laboratories to  deposit certified versions of voting system software, as well as procedures  and review criteria for evaluating related manufacturer-provided tools to  support stakeholders in comparing their systems with this repository; and   detailed procedures, review criteria, and documentation requirements to  ensure that problems with certified voting systems are effectively tracked  and resolved, and that the lessons learned are effectively used to improve  the certification program. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

Our objectives were to determine whether the Election Assistance  Commission (EAC) has (1) defined an effective approach to testing and  certifying voting systems, (2) followed its defined approach, and   (3) developed an effective mechanism to track problems with certified  systems and use the results to improve its certification program.
Why GAO Did This Study

The 2002 Help America Vote Act (HAVA) created the Election Assistance Commission (EAC) and, among other things, assigned the commission responsibility for testing and certifying voting systems. In view of concerns about voting systems and the important role EAC plays in certifying them, GAO was asked to determine whether EAC has (1) defined an effective approach to testing and certifying voting systems, (2) followed its defined approach, and (3) developed an effective mechanism to track problems with certified systems and use the results to improve its approach. To accomplish this, GAO compared EAC guidelines and procedures with applicable statutes, guidance, and best practices, and examined the extent to which they have been implemented.

What GAO Found

EAC has defined an approach to testing and certifying voting systems that follows a range of relevant practices and statutory requirements associated with a product certification program, including those published by U.S. and international standards organizations, and those reflected in HAVA. EAC, however, has yet to define its approach in sufficient detail to ensure that certification activities are performed thoroughly and consistently. This lack of definition also has caused voting system manufacturers and test laboratories to interpret program requirements differently, and the resultant need to reconcile these differences has contributed to delays in certifying systems that several states were intending to use in the 2008 elections. According to EAC officials, these definitional gaps can be attributed to the program's youth and the commission's limited resources being devoted to other priorities. Nevertheless, they said that they intend to address these gaps, but added that they do not yet have written plans for doing so. EAC has largely followed its defined approach for each of the dozen systems it is in the process of certifying, with one major exception. Specifically, it has not established an effective and efficient repository for certified versions of voting system software, or related procedures and tools, for states and local jurisdictions to use in verifying that their acquired voting systems are identical to what EAC has certified. Further, EAC officials told GAO that they do not have a documented plan or requirements for a permanent solution. As an interim solution, they stated that they will maintain copies of certified versions in file cabinets and mail copies of these versions upon their request by states and local jurisdictions. In GAO's view, this process puts states and local jurisdictions at increased risk of using a version of a system during an election that differs from the certified version. Under its voting system testing and certification program, EAC has broadly described an approach for tracking problems with certified voting systems and using this information to improve its certification program. While this approach is consistent with some aspects of relevant guidance, key elements are either missing or inadequately defined. According to EAC officials, while they intend to address some of these gaps, they do not have documented plans for doing so. In addition, even if EAC defines and implements an effective approach, it would not affect the vast majority of voting systems that are to be used in the 2008 elections. This is because the commission's approach only applies to those voting systems that it has certified, and it is unlikely that any voting systems will be certified in time to be used in the upcoming elections. Moreover, because most states do not currently require EAC certification for their voting systems, it is uncertain if this situation will change relative to future elections. As a result, states and other election jurisdictions are on their own to discover, disclose, and address any shared problems with these noncertified systems.