NSVI Retains Original Desired End-State, but Changing Assumptions and Circumstances Make it Unclear How It Will Achieve These Objectives

The NSVI, issued by the NSC in November 2005, incorporates the same  desired end-state for U.S. operations in Iraq that first was established by  the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) in 2003: a peaceful, united,  stable, secure Iraq, well integrated into the international community, and a  full partner in the global war on terrorism. First, the  original plan assumed a permissive security environment that never  materialized. Second, the CPA assumed that U.S. funded reconstruction  activities would help restore Iraq’s essential services to prewar levels but  has failed to achieve these goals. As  a result, it is unclear how the United States will achieve its desired   end-state in Iraq given these changes in assumptions and circumstances. Expected Level of Iraq and International Community Financial Support for Iraq’s Developmental Needs Have Not Yet Been Met

From the outset of the reconstruction and stabilization effort, the U.S.  strategy assumed that the Iraqis and the international community would  help finance Iraq’s developmental needs. However, these expectations have  not yet been met, and Iraq’s estimated future reconstruction needs vastly  exceed what has been offered to date. While the  NSVI does not identify the magnitude of additional financing needed, it  acknowledges that there is “room for the international community to do  more.”

	The NSVI and Its Supporting Documents Do Not Address All the Characteristics of an Effective National Strategy, thus Limiting Its Usefulness as a Planning Tool

The NSVI aims to improve U.S. strategic planning for Iraq; however, the  NSVI and its supporting documents are incomplete because they do not  fully address the six desirable characteristics of effective national  strategies that GAO has identified through its prior work. The strategy identifies U.S.  involvement in Iraq as a vital national interest, identifies the risks and  threats facing coalition forces, and discusses overarching U.S. political,  security, and economic objectives. The strategy neither identifies the current and future costs of implementing  the strategy, nor does it identify the sources of funding (U.S. government,  international donors, or Iraqi government) needed to achieve U.S. political,  security, and economic objectives in Iraq. It does not address the extent to which the Iraqi government  will contribute financially to its own rebuilding effort. For instance, the NSVI and supporting  documents identify the need to integrate the efforts of the coalition, the  Iraqi government, and other nations but do not discuss how the U.S. goals  and objectives are integrated with the strategies, goals, and objectives of  the international donors and the Iraqi government. The dispersion of information across the NSVI and seven supporting  documents further limits the strategy’s usefulness as a tool for planning and  reporting on the costs, progress, and results of the U.S. mission in Iraq. In  addition, this report is available on GAO’s Web site at http://www.gao.gov. Specifically, we (1) assess the  evolution of the U.S. national strategy for Iraq in response to changing  political, security and economic circumstances and (2) evaluate whether  the November 2005 National Strategy for Victory in Iraq (NSVI) and its  supporting documents include the desirable characteristics of an effective  national strategy. In this report, the NSVI and its supporting documents are  referred to as the U.S. strategy for Iraq.
Why GAO Did This Study

According to the National Strategy for Victory in Iraq (NSVI) issued by the National Security Council (NSC), prevailing in Iraq is a vital U.S. interest because it will help win the war on terror and make America safer, stronger, and more certain of its future. This report (1) assesses the evolving U.S. national strategy for Iraq and (2) evaluates whether the NSVI and its supporting documents address the desirable characteristics of an effective national strategy developed by GAO in previous work. In this report, the NSVI and supporting documents are collectively referred to as the U.S. strategy for Iraq.

What GAO Found

The November 2005 National Strategy for Victory in Iraq and supporting documents incorporate the same desired end-state for U.S. stabilization and reconstruction operations that were first established by the coalition in 2003: a peaceful, united, stable, and secure Iraq, well integrated into the international community, and a full partner in the global war on terrorism. However, it is unclear how the United States will achieve its desired end-state in Iraq given the significant changes in the assumptions underlying the U.S. strategy. The original plan assumed a permissive security environment. However, an increasingly lethal insurgency undermined the development of effective Iraqi government institutions and delayed plans for an early transfer of security responsibilities to the Iraqis. The plan also assumed that U.S. reconstruction funds would help restore Iraq's essential services to prewar levels, but Iraq's capacity to maintain, sustain, and manage its rebuilt infrastructure is still being developed. Finally, the plan assumed that the Iraqi government and the international community would help finance Iraq's development needs, but Iraq has limited resources to contribute to its own reconstruction, and Iraq's estimated future needs vastly exceed what has been offered by the international community to date. The NSVI is an improvement over previous planning efforts. However, the NSVI and its supporting documents are incomplete because they do not fully address all the desirable characteristics of an effective national strategy. On one hand, the strategy's purpose and scope is clear because it identifies U.S. involvement in Iraq as a vital national interest and central front in the war on terror. The strategy also generally addresses the threats and risks facing the coalition forces and provides a comprehensive description of the desired U.S. political, security, and economic objectives in Iraq. On the other hand, the strategy falls short in three key areas. First, it only partially identifies the current and future costs of U.S. involvement in Iraq, including the costs of maintaining U.S. military operations, building Iraqi government capacity at the provincial and national level, and rebuilding critical infrastructure. Second, it only partially identifies which U.S. agencies implement key aspects of the strategy or resolve conflicts among the many implementing agencies. Third, it neither fully addresses how U.S. goals and objectives will be integrated with those of the Iraqi government and the international community, nor does it detail the Iraqi government's anticipated contribution to its future security and reconstruction needs. In addition, the elements of the strategy are dispersed among the NSVI and seven supporting documents, further limiting its usefulness as a planning and oversight tool.