CBP Currently Does Not Have Reasonable Assurance That ATS Is Effective

CBP does not yet have key controls in place to provide reasonable  assurance that ATS is effective at targeting oceangoing cargo containers  with the highest risk of containing smuggled weapons of mass destruction. To address this shortcoming, CBP is (1) developing and implementing  performance metrics to measure the effectives of ATS, (2) planning to  compare the results of randomly conducted inspections with the results of  its ATS inspections, (3) developing and implementing a simulation and  testing environment, and (4) addressing recommendations contained in a  2005 peer review. To date, none of these control activities have been fully  completed or implemented. Thus, CBP does not yet have key internal  controls in place to be reasonably certain that ATS is providing the best  available information to allocate resources for targeting and inspecting  containers that are the highest risk and thus not overlook inspecting  containers that pose a high threat to the nation. CBP Has Not Yet Tested the Effectiveness of ATS in Targeting Cargo Containers for Inspection but Has Plans to Do So

Currently, CBP does not conduct simulated events (e.g., covert tests and  computer-generated simulations)—a key control activity—to test and  validate the effectiveness of ATS in targeting oceangoing cargo containers  with the highest risk of containing smuggled weapons of mass destruction  and has not yet implemented a dedicated simulation and testing  environment. CBP does not  have a comprehensive, integrated system in place to report details on  security inspections nationwide that will allow management to analyze  those inspections and refine ATS. However, without analyzing and using security inspection results  to adjust ATS, CBP is limited in refining ATS, a fact that could hinder the  effectiveness of CBP’s overall targeting strategy. These officials stated that overall the feedback they  have received from CBP targeting officers at the seaports related to the  operation and usefulness of ATS has been positive. CBP Has Taken Steps to Better Implement the Targeting Strategy at the Seaports

CBP has implemented a testing and certification process for its officers  who complete the Sea Cargo Targeting Course that should provide better  assurance of effective targeting practices. CBP has also made a good faith  effort to address longshoremen’s safety concerns regarding radiation  emitted by nonintrusive inspection equipment. Nevertheless, it has not  been able to persuade one longshoremen’s union to permit changes in the  procedure for staging containers to increase inspection efficiency. CBP has implemented such a  testing and certification process. In response to our recommendation that CBP work with longshoremen to  address their safety concerns, CBP engaged in two efforts: (1) establishing  CBP’s radiation threshold in accordance with the Nuclear Regulatory  Commission’s (NRC) federal guidelines for public radiation exposure and  advertising this threshold to longshoremen through the unions, and (2)  working with longshoremen’s unions and other maritime organizations to  develop public radiation tests on nonintrusive inspection equipment. -     -     -     -     -  In closing, ATS is an integral part of CBP’s layered security strategy. These seaports were selected based on the  number of cargo containers arriving at the seaport and their geographic  dispersion as reported by the U.S. Department of Transportation. To evaluate how CBP provides assurance that the Automated Targeting  System (ATS) targets the highest-risk oceangoing cargo containers for  inspection, we reviewed CBP documentation and prior GAO work on  performance measures. To assess how CBP adjusts ATS to respond to findings that occur during  the course of its operational activities, we met with CBP officials  responsible for gathering and disseminating intelligence and for  incorporating intelligence into CBP’s targeting operations.
Why GAO Did This Study

U.S. Customs and Border Protection's (CBP) Automated Targeting System (ATS)--a computerized model that CBP officers use as a decision support tool to help them target oceangoing cargo containers for inspection--is part of CBP's layered approach to securing oceangoing cargo. GAO reported in February 2004 on challenges CBP faced in targeting oceangoing cargo containers for inspection and testified before Congress in March 2004 about the findings in that report. The report and testimony outlined recommendations aimed at (1) better incorporating recognized modeling practices into CBP's targeting strategy, (2) periodically adjusting the targeting strategy to respond to findings that occur during the course of its operation, and (3) improving implementation of the targeting strategy. This statement for the record discusses preliminary observations from GAO's ongoing work related to ATS and GAO's 2004 recommendations addressing the following questions: (1) What controls does CBP have in place to provide reasonable assurance that ATS is effective at targeting oceangoing cargo containers with the highest risk of smuggled weapons of mass destruction? (2) How does CBP systematically analyze security inspection results and incorporate them into ATS? and (3) What steps has CBP taken to better implement the rest of its targeting strategy at the seaports?

What GAO Found

CBP has not yet put key controls in place to provide reasonable assurance that ATS is effective at targeting oceangoing cargo containers with the highest risk of containing smuggled weapons of mass destruction. To provide assurance that ATS targets the highest-risk cargo containers as intended, CBP is (1) working to develop and implement performance measures related to the targeting of cargo containers, (2) planning to compare the results of its random inspections with its ATS inspection results, (3) working to develop and implement a testing and simulation environment, and (4) addressing recommendations contained in a 2005 peer review of ATS. CBP expects to begin using performance measures in June 2006 and enter the final phase of software development for its testing and simulation environment at the same time. However, to date, none of these four initiatives has been fully implemented. Thus, CBP does not yet have key internal controls in place to be reasonably confident that ATS is providing the best information to allocate resources for targeting and inspecting containers that are the highest risk and not overlook inspecting containers that pose a threat to the nation. CBP does not yet have a comprehensive, integrated system in place to analyze security inspection results and incorporate them into ATS. CBP currently adjusts ATS based on intelligence information it receives and has initiated a process to track suggestions submitted by CBP targeting officers at the seaports for modifying ATS. However, CBP has not yet implemented plans to refine ATS based on findings from routine security inspections. Without a more comprehensive feedback system, CBP is limited in refining ATS, a fact that could hinder the overall effectiveness of the targeting strategy. CBP has taken steps to improve implementation of the targeting strategy at the seaports. It has implemented a testing and certification process for its officers who complete the Sea Cargo Targeting Course that should provide better assurance of effective targeting practices. CBP has also made a good faith effort to address longshoremen's safety concerns regarding radiation emitted by nonintrusive inspection equipment by taking actions such as working with longshoremen's unions and other maritime organization to develop public radiation tests on the nonintrusive inspection equipment. Nevertheless, CBP has not been able to persuade one longshoremen's union to permit changes in the procedure for staging containers to increase inspection efficiency at some West Coast seaports where the union's members work.