	Introduction

This report provides a review of congressional oversight of the Intelligence Community (IC) since establishment of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI), particularly since the 9-11 Commission published its recommendations in its 2004 report. When there have been perceived abuses, Congress has often intervened to conduct hearings and legislate changes in intelligence process or organization. Several competing, sometimes overlapping, perspectives exist on the purpose for conducting congressional oversight of the IC: 
Some have argued that the primary responsibility of the intelligence committees is to provide the authority and strategic direction to enable continual improvement in the performance of intelligence programs in support of the most pressing national security challenges. To the extent that Members share a perspective on oversight of the IC, they may be more likely to share views on the ways to conduct the oversight. This legislation resulted from Congress not being informed of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) activities abroad—in Chile and Southeast Asia in particular. Church and Pike Committees

In 1974, media reporting about potentially illegal domestic surveillance by the IC of the anti-Vietnam War movement prompted Congress to establish two select committees on intelligence to investigate—in the Senate, chaired by Idaho Senator Frank Church, and in the House, chaired by Representative Otis Pike. Previously, the Subcommittees on the CIA of the Senate and House Committees on Armed Services exercised nominal oversight of the IC. Since their establishment, however, the HPSCI and SSCI have been assisted in their oversight role by other committees that long had jurisdiction over intelligence matters related to their areas of responsibility. Intelligence and intelligence-related activities are often closely tied to foreign and defense policy, military operations, homeland security, cybersecurity, and law enforcement. Committees in both chambers for Foreign Affairs/Relations, Armed Services, Appropriations, Judiciary, and Homeland Security (after they were created), therefore, today share oversight jurisdiction of intelligence programs. Some observers of the IC have suggested these overlapping committee jurisdictions contribute to a perception of weak congressional intelligence committees that have relatively little authority and insufficient expertise. Under a section on "Oversight of Intelligence Organizations," the order established that the:
"…[Director of Central Intelligence] and heads of departments and agencies of the United States involved in intelligence activities shall…keep the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate fully and currently informed concerning intelligence activities, including any significant anticipated activities which are the responsibility of, or engaged in, by such department or agency." Nevertheless, many have suggested more needs to be done and continue to cite the Commission's recommendations as a frame of reference for further reform. A single committee could also enable Congress to have a more focused, integrated perspective of intelligence programs and strengthen Congress's accountability of IC performance, advocates say. Others have observed that it has been very difficult to change longstanding congressional appropriations rules and organization. Aside from what more might be done, a potential overarching question for Congress to frame the discussion is: Could additional changes to the rules governing congressional oversight of intelligence enable Congress to more effectively fund programs, influence policy, and legislate improvements in intelligence standards, organization, and process that would make the country safer? Would enhancements in oversight enable Congress to measure the IC's effectiveness more effectively?
Prior to the establishment of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) in 1976 and 1977, respectively, Congress did not take much interest in conducting oversight of the Intelligence Community (IC). The Subcommittees on the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) of the congressional Armed Services Committees had nominal oversight responsibility, though Congress generally trusted that IC could more or less regulate itself, conduct activities that complied with the law, were ethical, and shared a common understanding of national security priorities. Media reports in the 1970s of the CIA's domestic surveillance of Americans opposed to the war in Vietnam, in addition to the agency's activities relating to national elections in Chile, prompted Congress to change its approach. In 1975, Congress established two select committees to investigate intelligence activities, chaired by Senator Frank Church in the Senate (the "Church Committee"), and Representative Otis Pike in the House (the "Pike Committee").
Following their creation, the Church and Pike committees' hearings revealed the possible extent of the abuse of authority by the IC and the potential need for permanent committee oversight focused solely on the IC and intelligence activities. SSCI and HPSCI oversight contributed substantially to Congress's work to legislate improvements to intelligence organization, programs, and processes and it enabled a more structured, routine relationship with intelligence agencies. On occasion this has resulted in Congress advocating on behalf of intelligence reform legislation that many agree has generally improved IC organization and performance. At other times, congressional oversight has been perceived as less helpful, delving into the details of programs and activities.
Other congressional committees have cooperated with the HPSCI and SSCI in their oversight role since their establishment. Intelligence programs are often closely tied to foreign and defense policy, military operations, homeland security, cybersecurity, and law enforcement. Committees in both chambers for Foreign Affairs/Relations, Armed Services, Appropriations, Judiciary, and Homeland Security, therefore, share jurisdiction over intelligence. Some have suggested the current overlapping jurisdictions for oversight of the IC in Congress contribute to the perception of weak congressional intelligence committees that have relatively little authority and insufficient expertise. Others cite the overlapping responsibilities as a strength. Oversight of the IC spread over more committees can contribute to greater awareness and transparency in Congress of classified intelligence activities that are largely hidden from public view. They also claim that since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, Senate, and House rules have changed to enable the congressional intelligence committees to have more authority and be more effective in carrying out their oversight responsibilities. Further reform, they argue, may be unrealistic from a political standpoint.
An oft-cited observation of the Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States (i.e., the 9-11 Commission) that congressional oversight of intelligence is "dysfunctional" continues to overshadow discussion of whether Congress has done enough. Does congressional oversight enable the IC to be more effective, better funded and organized, or does it burden agencies by the sheer volume of detailed inquiries into intelligence programs and related activities?
A central question for Congress is: Could additional changes to the rules governing congressional oversight of intelligence enable Congress to more effectively fund programs, influence policy, and legislate improvements in intelligence standards, organization and process that would make the country safer?