	DHS Has Enhanced Its Resource Alignment, but Could Better Assure Resources Deployed Abroad Support Highest Priorities

In September 2013, we reported on actions DHS has taken to align its  programs abroad with its resource use and with other U.S. governmental  strategic priorities. We found that DHS had taken actions toward  increasing organizational and programmatic alignment for its resource  use abroad consistent with requirements set forth in law. For example,  we found that DHS had established an intradepartmental governance  board to provide a formal organizational mechanism for DHS component  heads and OIA to collaborate and coordinate crosscutting policy issues  related to international engagement. We also found that DHS reviewed its  international footprint—the complete set of resources and efforts DHS  has deployed abroad—with the intention of enhancing organizational and  programmatic alignment. Although DHS has a broad  mission set and decision making about resource use abroad is  decentralized to the components, we found that DHS had not established  specific department-wide strategic priorities—such as specific types of  activities or target regions to further combating terrorism goals—for  resource use abroad to help promote organizational alignment in  resource decision making. DHS concurred, and as  of May 2015, has started to draft an international engagement strategy to  identify specific department-wide priorities. We also found that although OIA conducted a one-time exercise from  2011 to early 2012 to evaluate the department’s international footprint to  try to bring it into better organizational and programmatic alignment, DHS  had not established a routine or ingrained process that would continually  assess the alignment between strategic goals and resource decisions. To  address these concerns, we recommended that DHS establish a routine,  institutionalized mechanism to ensure alignment of the department’s  resource use abroad with the highest department-wide and government- wide strategic priorities. DHS concurred, and as of May 2015, OIA plans  to use the international engagement plan as the foundation of a footprint  review, starting with a specific international region, to identify  opportunities to realign resources with priorities and to identify  crosscutting management efficiencies for the department’s fiscal year  2017 budget request. In addition, in 2013, we found that DHS did not have comparable cost  data for its programs and activities abroad and had not established a  standardized framework to capture these data to help inform resource  decision making and to achieve management efficiencies when  addressing issues that are common across the department. We recommended that DHS establish a common reporting  framework to allow for the collection of reliable, comparable department- wide cost data for resource use abroad. DHS Carries Out Activities Abroad That Help Prevent High- Risk Passengers and Cargo from Traveling to and Entering the United States

DHS conducts various programs and mission activities abroad to prevent  people and cargo posing a threat to the United States from reaching the  homeland. These include, among other things, efforts to ensure visa  security, inspect international passengers prior to boarding a flight bound  for the United States, and identify and target high-risk maritime  containerized cargo shipments before being loaded onto U.S.-bound  vessels. Visa Security

In March 2011, we reported on ICE’s efforts to strengthen visa issuance  procedures. We found that ICE, through the Visa Security Program (VSP), works to prevent terrorists and otherwise inadmissible travelers  from attempting to enter the United States by screening visa applicants  before the travel process begins. Under VSP, ICE deploys personnel to certain U.S.  embassies and consulates to assist the Department of State’s consular  officers with security reviews of visa applications and investigations of  passport and visa fraud, among other things. We made several recommendations to help DHS better manage VSP at  posts overseas. DHS did not concur with this  recommendation and has taken no action to implement it. From 2008 to January 2015, we reported on DHS’s  efforts to assess potentially risky foreign ports, and target, screen, and  interdict vessels and cargo container shipments destined for the United  States.global supply chain—the flow of goods from manufacturers to retailer— and cargo destined for the United States—the Container Security  Initiative (CSI), the Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C- TPAT), and the Secure Freight Initiative (SFI). According to CBP officials, CBP plans to complete the necessary steps to  implement this recommendation by the end of December 2015. Specifically, in January 2015, we found,  among other things, that CBP did not have accurate data on the number  and disposition of each high-risk maritime cargo shipment scheduled to  arrive in the United States. DHS concurred with our  recommendations and has actions planned or underway to address them. Supply Chain Security: DHS Could Improve Cargo Security by  Periodically Assessing Risks from Foreign Ports, GAO-13-764.
Why GAO Did This Study

The National Strategy for Counterterrorism calls for a rapid and coordinated effort that uses U.S. government resources to mitigate threats to homeland security. DHS contributes to the U.S. government's efforts to combat terrorism and works to prevent inadmissible travelers and cargo from entering the United States. DHS's overseas efforts include ensuring visa security, inspecting passengers prior to boarding U.S.-bound flights, and identifying high-risk cargo shipments.
This statement addresses (1) the extent to which DHS has aligned resource use abroad with strategic priorities and (2) selected DHS programs abroad aimed at preventing high-risk travelers and maritime containerized cargo from entering the United States. This statement is based on prior products GAO issued from 2008 through January 2015, along with selected updates conducted in May 2015 to obtain information from DHS on actions it has taken to address prior GAO recommendations.

What GAO Found

In September 2013, GAO reported on actions the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) had taken to align its programs abroad with its resource use and with other U.S. governmental strategic priorities. GAO found that DHS had taken actions to better align its resource use with its programs abroad consistent with requirements set forth in law. Specifically, from 2011 to early 2012, DHS conducted a onetime review of its international footprint—the complete set of DHS resources and efforts it has deployed abroad—and created a department-wide international engagement plan. However, DHS had not established specific department-wide strategic priorities for resource use abroad. Specifically, DHS (1) had not established department-wide strategic priorities for international engagement, such as specific types of activities or target regions to further combating terrorism goals; (2) did not have a mechanism for monitoring alignment between resource deployment abroad and strategic priorities; and (3) did not have reliable, comparable cost data for its programs and activities abroad and had not established a standardized framework to capture these data. GAO recommended that DHS establish department-wide strategic priorities, a mechanism to routinely monitor alignment between strategic priorities and resource deployment abroad, and reliable cost data to provide DHS with critical information to make informed resource deployment decisions. DHS concurred and, as of May 2015, has taken steps to implement GAO's recommendations, such as drafting an international engagement strategy to identify specific department-wide priorities and establishing a common cost framework. DHS plans to finalize this strategy by early summer 2015 and use it a mechanism to facilitate additional footprint reviews in future budget years.
DHS deploys multiple screening and targeting programs designed to help interdict high-risk travelers, such as potential terrorists, and otherwise inadmissible passengers and cargo shipments before they board U.S.-bound commercial vessels. For example, in March 2011, GAO reported on the Visa Security Program (VSP) through which DHS's U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) deploys personnel to certain U.S. embassies and consulates to conduct security reviews of visa applications, among other things. GAO found that ICE had limited guidance for the program and could improve its program expansion planning. DHS concurred with GAO's recommendations to issue guidance and strengthen its planning and took steps to address them. GAO also found that DHS did not collect comprehensive data on all VSP performance measures and track the time officials spent on visa security activities; DHS did not concur with GAO's recommendations to address these limitations. Further, since 2008, GAO has reported on CBP's programs intended to secure the maritime global supply chain—the flow of goods from manufacturers to retailer—and cargo destined for the United States. For example, in September 2013, GAO found that CBP had not regularly assessed foreign ports for risks to since 2005. While CBP took steps to rank ports for risks in 2009, CBP did not use this information to modify where CBP staff were posted. DHS concurred with GAO's recommendation to periodically assess the supply chain security risks from foreign ports and has plans to conduct such assessments by the end of 2015.

What GAO Recommends

GAO previously made recommendations to DHS to inform its resource deployment abroad and strengthen screening and targeting programs. DHS agreed with GAO's recommendations to inform resource deployment abroad and has actions planned or underway to address them. DHS did not agree with some of GAO's recommendations related to VSP; GAO continues to maintain that all of these recommendations should be addressed.