RRF Use During the Persian Gulf War

Of the 96 ships that were in the RRF in August 1990, 78 were called upon to support the Persian Gulf War. Specifically, we determined whether (1) the changes implemented to address problems encountered during war activations have improved the ships’ overall readiness, (2) the readiness level of the highest priority ships exceeds that of other strategic mobility components, and (3) a further decline in the number of available U.S. merchant mariners would have a long-term effect on crewing the force. It identified and corrected equipment deficiencies, instituted more uniform and comprehensive specifications for the deactivation and preservation of RRF ships, strengthened ship manager controls by expanding and clarifying the manager’s contractual responsibilities, and developed and implemented automated information systems for tracking maintenance repairs. These successful activations resulted largely from maintenance and repairs made during and after the war. Conclusions

The readiness of the RRF has improved since the Persian Gulf War due to the $1 billion invested in the program. RRF Readiness Exceeds Other Deployment Components and Is Not Supportable

On the basis of DOD’s 1992 Mobility Requirements Study, MarAd plans to keep 63 RRF ships in a high state of readiness (i.e., ready to activate within 4 or 5 days) starting in fiscal year 1996. Ability to Unload Ships Is Limited in Underdeveloped Overseas Ports

The Army’s ability to meet its mobility requirements is also affected by its capability to deliver forces to underdeveloped or damaged overseas seaports. As part of that concept, auxiliary crane ships will be used to unload RRF ships. Therefore, MarAd should not have a labor supply problem for crewing RRF ships in the near term. As a result, the number of shipboard jobs decreased. Recommendation

We recommend that the Secretary of Transportation direct the Maritime Administrator to annually assess whether an adequate number of experienced U.S. merchant mariners would be available to crew RRF ships within DOD’s specified time frames.
Why GAO Did This Study

Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Ready Reserve Force (RRF) program, focusing on: (1) the readiness of RRF ships to respond to large-scale contingencies; (2) the program changes that were implemented to improve ship readiness and address problems encountered during the Persian Gulf War; (3) whether the readiness level of the highest-priority ships exceeds other strategic mobility components; and (4) the effect of further decreases in the number of available U.S. merchant mariners on RRF crew availability.

What GAO Found

GAO found that: (1) as a result of the problems it encountered during the Persian Gulf War, the Maritime Administration (MARAD) identified and corrected equipment deficiencies, instituted comprehensive specifications for the deactivation and preservation of RRF ships, strengthened ship manager controls, developed automated information systems for tracking maintenance repairs, and implemented new strategies for maintaining high-priority ships; (2) RRF ships will be able to meet their delivery schedules and sail within specified time frames as a result of maintenance and repairs performed during and after the Persian Gulf War; (3) MARAD ability to activate ships within 4 or 5 days exceeds the readiness level of other strategic mobility components; (4) the Army's ability to transfer unit equipment from key Army installations to seaports is constrained by deteriorated facilities; (5) although the Army plans to increase its capability to activate ships within 4 or 5 days, most projects will not be completed by 1999; (6) the Department of Defense has not justified maintaining 63 ships in a high state of readiness; (7) although the reduced number of available mariners should not immediately affect MARAD ability to crew RRF ships, its future ability to crew RRF ships is questionable; and (8) none of the proposed alternatives to resolve this situation have been adopted.