Multiple Stakeholders Have Responsibility for Security

			Coast Guard Is the Lead Federal Agency

As the lead federal agency for maritime security, the Coast Guard has  broad responsibilities for ensuring the security of OCS facilities and  deepwater ports. For example, staff at Coast Guard headquarters  oversee and develop policies and procedures for field staff to follow when  conducting security inspections of offshore energy infrastructure and to  assist affected owners and operators so that they can comply with  maritime security regulations. Coast Guard Could Further Ensure the Security of OCS Facilities by Improving Its Process for Managing Security Inspections

		Coast Guard Actions to Ensure Security

The Coast Guard has taken actions to ensure the security of OCS  facilities in the Gulf of Mexico, within which all OCS facilities are presently  located. For  example, the Coast Guard conducted about one-third of annual  inspections of OCS facilities from 2008 through 2010 (see table 1). The Coast Guard does not have procedures in place to help ensure that  its field units conduct security inspections of OCS facilities annually in  accordance with its guidance. Inconsistent Documentation and Database Limitations

In addition to challenges in the Coast Guard’s inspection efforts,  inconsistent documentation of security inspections as well as limitations in  the MISLE database—the database in which security inspection results  are recorded—hinder the Coast Guard’s ability to manage the offshore  security inspection program or analyze inspection data needed for making  management decisions about OCS facilities. Actions Are Needed to Further Ensure the Security of Deepwater Ports

		Coast Guard Actions to Ensure Security

The Coast Guard has taken actions to ensure the security of deepwater  ports that are similar to actions it has taken to ensure the security of OCS  facilities. The Coast Guard has  also reviewed and approved deepwater port operations manuals for the  three deepwater ports that, among other things, must include deepwater  port security plans that are comparable to the security plans required for  OCS facilities pursuant to 33 C.F.R. Coast Guard Could Improve the Security of Deepwater Ports by Conducting Security Inspections

The Coast Guard has conducted only one security inspection of a  deepwater port from 2008 through 2010. While deepwater port operators are required to develop  security plans as part of their operations manuals, which are to be  approved by the Coast Guard, and the Coast Guard acknowledges that  its mandate to verify the effectiveness of security plans applies to  deepwater ports where an incident may meet the definition of a  transportation security incident, the Coast Guard has not implemented  procedures for conducting inspections to verify the effectiveness of the  deepwater port security plans on annual basis. Additionally, the Coast Guard is aware of  potential risks regarding MODUs and is conducting a study designed to  help determine whether additional actions could better ensure the security  of offshore energy infrastructure in the Gulf of Mexico, including MODUs. Gaining a fuller  understanding of the security risks associated with MODUs could better  inform Coast Guard decisions and potentially improve the security of  these facilities. Because it is not complying with its established maritime  security requirements, the Coast Guard may not be adequately meeting  one of its stated goals of reducing the security risk and mitigating the  potential results of an act that could threaten the security of personnel,  the OCS facility, the environment, and the public. We also found  limitations in the MISLE database which make it difficult for Coast Guard  managers to determine if security inspections were conducted when  reviewing the data, and current guidance does not describe policies and  procedures that would fully address these limitations. By addressing  some of these inconsistencies and other limitations, Coast Guard  managers could more easily summarize data, identify issues related to  OCS facilities, and use the data as a management tool to inform decision  making. Although the  Coast Guard has conducted only one security inspection of a deepwater  port from 2008 through 2010, Coast Guard officials have recognized the  importance of conducting annual security inspections of deepwater ports  and are planning to update guidance to require such inspections and to  address the way in which such inspections are to be conducted. Recommendations for Executive Action

To strengthen the Coast Guard’s efforts to ensure the security of OCS  facilities and deepwater ports, we recommend that the Commandant of  the Coast Guard take the following three actions:    Develop policies and procedures to monitor and track annual security  inspections for OCS facilities to better ensure that such inspections  are consistently conducted. DHS and the Coast Guard concurred with the findings and  recommendations in the report, and DHS stated that the Coast Guard is  taking actions to implement our recommendations. We used this database to address the  objectives on what the Coast Guard has done to ensure the security of  Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) facilities and deepwater ports, and what  additional actions, if any, are needed. part 106 but were not included on the Coast Guard list.
Why GAO Did This Study

Congressional interest in the security of offshore energy infrastructure has increased because of the lives lost and the substantial damages that resulted from the Deepwater Horizon incident in April 2010. The U.S. Coast Guard--a component of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)--is the lead federal agency for maritime security, including the security of offshore energy infrastructure. The Coast Guard oversees two main types of offshore energy infrastructure--facilities on the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) and deepwater ports. GAO was asked to examine (1) Coast Guard actions to ensure the security of OCS facilities and what additional actions, if any, are needed; (2) Coast Guard actions to ensure the security of deepwater ports and what additional actions, if any, are needed; and (3) what limitations in oversight authority, if any, the Coast Guard faces in ensuring the security of offshore energy infrastructure. GAO reviewed Coast Guard documents, such as inspection records, and relevant laws and regulations and interviewed Coast Guard inspectors and officials, including those at Coast Guard headquarters and the two Coast Guard districts that oversee all OCS facilities and deepwater ports that are subject to security requirements.

What GAO Found

The Coast Guard has taken actions to address the security of OCS facilities (that is, facilities regulated for security pursuant to 33 C.F.R. part 106), but could improve its process for managing security inspections. For example, the Coast Guard developed a security plan for the Gulf of Mexico, in which all 57 OCS facilities are located, and it reviews security plans developed by the owners and operators of OCS facilities. It has also issued guidance, which states that Coast Guard personnel should conduct security inspections of OCS facilities annually, but has conducted about one-third of these inspections from 2008 through 2010. Further, the Coast Guard does not have procedures in place to ensure that its field units conduct these inspections. Consequently, the Coast Guard may not be meeting one of its stated goals of reducing the risk and mitigating the potential results of an act that could threaten the security of personnel, the OCS facility, the environment, and the public. The Coast Guard also faces challenges in summarizing inspection results. Specifically, its database for storing inspection data has limitations that make it difficult to determine if security inspections were conducted. For example, there is no data field to identify OCS facilities, which makes it difficult to readily analyze whether required inspections were conducted. By addressing some of these challenges, Coast Guard managers could more easily use the data as a management tool to inform decision making. The Coast Guard has also taken actions to ensure the security of the four deepwater ports, but opportunities exist for improvement. The Coast Guard's actions to ensure the security of deepwater ports are similar to actions it has taken to ensure the security of OCS facilities. For example, Coast Guard security plans address security at deepwater ports, and the Coast Guard also reviews security plans developed by the owners and operators of the deepwater ports. However, Coast Guard guidance for deepwater ports does not call for annual security inspections, and it has conducted only one security inspection at a deepwater port from 2008 through 2010. Coast Guard officials said that the Coast Guard plans to begin annual security inspections of deepwater ports in recognition of the risk of a transportation security incident. However, limitations in the Coast Guard's inspection database and lack of guidance available to database users may complicate the Coast Guard's management and oversight of inspections at deepwater ports. For example, the data field for deepwater ports has been incorrectly applied to other types of infrastructure and some deepwater ports are recorded under multiple names. Unless the Coast Guard addresses these database limitations and issues updated guidance to database users, it will be difficult for the Coast Guard to verify that the deepwater ports are complying with applicable maritime security requirements. The Coast Guard has limited authority regarding the security of mobile offshore drilling units (MODU) registered to foreign countries, such as the Deepwater Horizon. The Coast Guard is taking action, though, to gain a fuller understanding of the security risks associated with MODUs by conducting a study to help determine whether additional actions could better ensure the security of offshore energy infrastructure in the Gulf of Mexico, including MODUs.

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that the Coast Guard develop policies or guidance to ensure that (1) annual security inspections are conducted at OCS facilities and (2) information entered into its database for both OCS facilities and deepwater ports is more useful for management. DHS and the Coast Guard concurred with these recommendations.