Determining Top Secret Clearances for Industry Personnel Averaged More Than a Year, and Government Statistics Did Not Portray All Delays

At the time of our September 2006 report, our independent analysis of  timeliness data showed that industry personnel contracted to work for the  federal government waited more than 1 year on average to receive top  secret security clearances, and government statistics did not portray the  full length of time it takes many applicants to obtain clearances. Delays in Determining Eligibility Are Caused by Many Factors

As table 1 shows, industry personnel granted eligibility for top secret  clearances from DISCO from January to February 2006 waited an average  of 446 days for their initial clearances or 545 days for their clearance  updates. The application-submission phase of the  clearance process took an average of 111 days for the initial clearances  that DISCO adjudicated in January and February 2006 (see table 1). Investigations for the initial top secret clearances of  industry personnel adjudicated in January and February 2006 took an  average of 286 days, compared to OMB’s 180-day goal for that period (see  table 1). Delays in any phase of the clearance process cost money and threaten  national security. OMB’s and OPM’s Timeliness Reporting Does Not Convey Full Magnitude of Delays

The statistics that OMB and OPM have provided to Congress on the  timeliness of the personnel security clearance process do not convey the  full magnitude of the investigation-related delays facing the government. While our September 2006 report noted additional problems with the  transparency of the timeliness statistics, I will review our concerns about  five such issues: (1) limited information on reinvestigations for clearance  updating, (2) not counting the total number of days to finish the  application-submission phase, (3) shifting some investigation-related days  to the adjudication phase or not counting them, (4) not counting the total  number of days to complete closed pending cases, and (5) not counting  the total number of days to complete investigations sent back for rework. We have  noted in the past that focusing on completing initial clearance  investigations could negatively affect the completion of clearance update  reinvestigations and thereby increase the risk of unauthorized disclosure  of classified information. In addition, use of incomplete investigative  reports and not fully documenting adjudicative considerations may  undermine the government’s efforts to increase the acceptance of security  clearances granted by other federal agencies. Almost All of the Sampled Investigative Reports Were Incomplete

In our review of 50 initial investigations randomly sampled from the  population used in our timeliness analyses, we found that 47 of 50 of the  investigative reports were missing documentation required by the federal  investigative standards. We also found a total of 36 unresolved issues in 27 of the investigative  reports. Federal standards indicate that investigations may  be expanded as necessary to resolve issues. In our November 2005 testimony evaluating the government plan for  improving the personnel security clearance process, we stated that  developers of the plan may wish to consider adding other indicators of the  quality of investigations. DISCO Adjudicators Granted Top Secret Clearance Eligibility for Cases with Missing Information

Our review found that DISCO adjudicators granted top secret clearance  eligibility for all 47 of the 50 industry personnel whose investigative  reports did not have full documentation. The adjudicators granted eligibility for the 27 industry personnel whose  investigative reports (discussed in the prior section) contained unresolved  issues without requesting additional information or documenting in the  adjudicative report that the information was missing. DISCO began  using JPAS in February 2003, and it became the official system for all of  DOD in February 2005. Delivery and Use of Incomplete Investigations Increase Risks to National Security and Reciprocity

Decisions to grant clearances based on incomplete investigations increase  risks to national security because individuals can gain access to classified  information without being vetted against the full federal standards and  guidelines. When I testified before this Subcommittee in  November 2005, we were optimistic that the government plan for  improving the clearance process prepared under the direction of OMB’s  Deputy Director for Management would be a living document that would  provide the strategic vision for correcting long-standing problems in the  personnel security clearance process. Continued  failure to address the shortcomings we have cited could significantly limit  the positive impact that the government has made in other portions of the  clearance process through improvements such as hiring more  investigators and promoting reciprocity. GAO-06-748T. GAO’s High-Risk Program. Questions for the Record Related to DOD’s Personnel Security Clearance  Program. DOD Personnel Clearances: Some Progress Has Been Made but Hurdles  Remain to Overcome the Challenges That Led to GAO's High-Risk  Designation.
Why GAO Did This Study

Individuals working for the private industry are playing a larger role in national security work conducted by Department of Defense (DOD) and other federal agencies. As of May 2006, industry personnel held about 34 percent of DOD-maintained personnel security clearances. The damage that the unauthorized disclosure of classified information can cause to national security necessitates the prompt and careful consideration of who is granted a security clearance. Long-standing delays in determining clearance eligibility and other challenges led GAO to designate the DOD personnel security clearance program as a high-risk area in January 2005 and again in GAO's January 2007 update of the high-risk areas. In February 2005, DOD transferred its security clearance investigations functions to the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) and now obtains almost all of its clearance investigations from OPM. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) is responsible for effective implementation of policy relating to determinations of eligibility for access to classified information. This testimony addresses the timeliness of the process and completeness of documentation used to determine eligibility of industry personnel for top secret clearances in January and February 2006. This statement relies primarily on GAO's September 2006 report (GAO-06-1070).

What GAO Found

GAO's analysis of timeliness data showed that industry personnel contracted to work for the federal government waited more than 1 year on average to receive top secret clearances, longer than OMB- and OPM-produced statistics would suggest. GAO's analysis of 2,259 cases in its population showed the process took an average of 446 days for initial clearances and 545 days for clearance updates. While the government plan has a goal for the application-submission phase of the process to take 14 days or less, it took an average of 111 days. In addition, GAO's analyses showed that OPM used an average of 286 days to complete initial investigations for top secret clearances, well in excess of the 180-day goal specified in the plan that OMB and others developed for improving the clearance process. Finally, the average time for adjudication (determination of clearance eligibility) was 39 days, compared to the 30-day requirement that began in December 2006. An inexperienced investigative workforce, not fully using technology, and other causes underlie these delays. Delays may increase costs for contracts and risks to national security. In addition, statistics that OMB and OPM report to Congress on the timeliness of the clearance process do not portray the full length of time it takes many applicants to receive a clearance. GAO found several issues with the statistics, including limited information on reinvestigations for clearance updating and failure to measure the total time it took to complete the various phases of the clearance process. Not fully accounting for all the time used in the process hinders congressional oversight of the efforts to address the delays. OPM provided incomplete investigative reports to DOD, and DOD personnel who review the reports to determine a person's eligibility to hold a clearance (adjudicators) granted eligibility for industry personnel whose investigative reports contained unresolved issues, such as unexplained affluence and potential foreign influence. In its review of 50 investigative reports for initial clearances, GAO found that that almost all (47 of 50) cases were missing documentation required by federal investigative standards. Moreover, federal standards indicate expansion of investigations may be necessary to resolve issues, but GAO found at least one unresolved issue in 27 of the reports. GAO also found that the DOD adjudicators granted top secret clearance eligibility for all 27 industry personnel whose investigative reports contained unresolved issues without requesting additional information or documenting in the adjudicative report that the information was missing. In its November 2005 assessment of the government plan for improving the clearance process, GAO raised concerns about the limited attention devoted to assessing quality in the clearance process, but the plan has not been revised to address the shortcomings GAO identified. The use of incomplete investigations and adjudications in granting top secret clearance eligibility increases the risk of unauthorized disclosure of classified information. Also, it could negatively affect efforts to promote reciprocity (an agency's acceptance of a clearance issued by another agency) being developed by an interagency working group headed by OMB's Deputy Director.