However, the Department of Energy (DOE)  has led U.S. efforts to detect radiation in cargo containers originating at  foreign seaports. CSI places staff at participating foreign seaports to work with host country customs  officials to target and examine high-risk cargo to be shipped in containers for weapons  of mass destruction before they are shipped to the United States. CBP Collaborated on the DHS Strategy to Enhance International Supply Chain Security, and Met Goals for CSI Expansion and Increased Container Examination

CBP has undertaken strategic planning to guide efforts to secure the  international supply chain and, more specifically, to manage the CSI  program. As CBP expanded the number of CSI seaports and increased the  proportion of total U.S.-bound container cargo passing through CSI  seaports, the agency also achieved increases in security activities that  occur at CSI seaports—targeting (CBP screens container cargo with ATS  to produce risk scores and conducts additional review or research to  ascertain risk levels) and examining high-risk container cargo (host  government officials examine high-risk containers by scanning with  nonintrusive inspection equipment or by physically searching the  container). To Strengthen CSI Operations, CBP Has Taken Steps to Address Human Capital Challenges and Enhance Host Government Relations, but Operational Challenges Remain

CBP has made various operational improvements to CSI, though  challenges remain. In addition, CBP has taken action to enhance its human capital planning  process for CSI, but has not yet included important factors in its staffing  allocation model. CBP’s Lack of Information on Host Government Examination Systems Potentially Limits Assurance That Examinations of High- Risk Container Cargo are Effective

CBP’s lack of a systematic way to collect information on host  governments’ examination systems—including their equipment, people,  and processes—potentially limits CBP’s ability to ensure that  examinations of high-risk container cargo at CSI seaports can detect and  identify WMD. For example,  the target of one of CBP’s performance measures—the “number of  operational CSI seaports”—was to have 58 CSI seaports operating in fiscal  year 2007, which the agency achieved as described previously in this  report. Also, we identified a weakness in how some CSI performance measures  are calculated. However, limitations that remain in CBP’s  evaluation process affect the accuracy and completeness of the program  information available for making sound management decisions about the  CSI program as a whole. Though CBP identified performance  measures it considers proxies for program outcomes (given the difficulty  in assessing the deterrent effect of CSI), these measures do not cover a  key core program function, for example a performance measure for the  number of high-risk U.S.-bound containers examined at CSI seaports. Recommendations for Executive Action

To help ensure that CBP has the information needed to assess its  achievement of CSI program goals to help enhance supply chain  security—while at the same time balancing security concerns with the  need to facilitate the free flow of commerce—we recommend that the  Secretary of Homeland Security direct the Commissioner of U. S. Customs  and Border Protection to take the following actions in three areas:  Strengthen CBP’s process for evaluating CSI teams at overseas ports  by (a) systematically capturing and maintaining all relevant evaluation  data and documentation so that it can be used by CBP management to  guide operating decisions, monitor program performance, and inform  resource allocation decisions; (b) ensuring that CSI evaluation teams  follow established evaluation procedures; and (c) monitoring the  completion, within established time frames, of recommendations made  in previous evaluations. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

	Objectives

We addressed the following issues regarding the U.S. Customs and Border  Protection’s (CBP) Container Security Initiative (CSI):    How has CBP contributed to strategic planning for supply chain  security efforts and the CSI program in particular, and what progress  has been made in achieving CSI performance goals? This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the  United States.
Why GAO Did This Study

Customs and Border Protection's (CBP) Container Security Initiative (CSI) aims to identify and examine high-risk U.S.-bound cargo at foreign seaports. GAO reported in 2003 and 2005 that CSI helped to enhance homeland security, and recommended actions to strengthen the program. This report updates information and assesses how CBP has (1) contributed to strategic planning for supply chain security, (2) strengthened CSI operations, and (3) evaluated CSI operations. To address these issues, GAO interviewed CBP officials and reviewed CSI evaluations and performance measures. GAO also visited selected U.S. and CSI seaports, and met with U.S. and foreign government officials.

What GAO Found

By collaborating on the development of the Department of Homeland Security's Strategy to Enhance International Supply Chain Security, and by revising the CSI strategic plan as GAO recommended, CBP has contributed to the overall U.S. strategic planning efforts related to enhancing the security for the overseas supply chain. Also, CBP reached its targets of operating CSI in 58 foreign seaports, and thereby having 86 percent of all U.S.-bound cargo containers pass through CSI seaports in fiscal year 2007--representing a steady increase in these measures of CSI performance. To strengthen CSI operations, CBP has sought to address human capital challenges and previous GAO recommendations by increasing CSI staffing levels closer to those called for in its staffing model and revising its human capital plan. However, challenges remain because CBP continues to rely, in part, on a temporary workforce; has not determined how to optimize its staffing resources; and reports difficulties in identifying sufficient numbers of qualified staff. In addition, CBP has enhanced relationships with host governments participating in CSI. However, hurdles to cooperation remain at some seaports, such as restrictions on CSI teams witnessing examinations. CBP improved its evaluation of CSI team performance at seaports, but limitations remain in the evaluation process that affect the accuracy and completeness of data collected. CBP has not set minimum technical criteria for equipment or systematically collected information on the equipment, people, and processes involved in CSI host government examinations of high-risk, U.S-bound container cargo. Also, CBP has not developed general guidelines to use in assessing the reliability of these examinations. Thus, CBP potentially lacks information to ensure that host government examinations can detect and identify weapons of mass destruction, which is important because containers are typically not reexamined in the United States if already examined at a CSI seaport. CBP refined overall CSI performance measures, but has not fully developed performance measures and annual targets for core CSI functions, such as the examination of high-risk containers before they are placed on vessels bound for the United States. These weaknesses in CBP's data collection and performance measures potentially limit the information available on overall CSI effectiveness.