In  September 2007, State nominated Greece for admission into the program,  and DHS is currently reviewing this nomination to assess the impact of  Greece’s participation on U.S. security, law enforcement, and illegal  immigration interests. In addition,  we plan to report this year on the cost and resource implications for  State’s consular operations of changes in the countries that participate in  the Visa Waiver Program. DHS’s Current Plan to Certify Air Exit System Requirement Will Not Address All Potential Risks of An Expanded Visa Waiver Program

In response to our inquiries, on December 12, 2007, DHS reported to us that it  will match records of foreign nationals’ departures that airlines reported to  the department to records of any prior arrival, change of status action, or  prior departure from the United States to certify the air exit system  requirement (see fig. Using this methodology, DHS stated that it can  achieve a 97.10 percent match rate, based on data from August 2007. Although  DHS acknowledged there are weaknesses with this methodology, the  department told us that it had no intention of altering its plans for certifying  the air exit system requirement. On February 21, 2008, in commenting on a  draft of this testimony, DHS indicated that it had not finalized its decision on  which methodology the department would use to certify compliance;  however, the department confirmed that all methodologies under  consideration would match foreign nationals’ departure records against prior  records “to determine that the person is a foreign national, and that the  person did depart the country through a U.S. airport.”
There are several weaknesses with this approach. First, DHS’s  methodology does not begin with arrival records to determine if those  foreign nationals departed or remained in the United States beyond their  authorized periods of admission—more useful data for oversight of the  Visa Waiver Program and consideration of its expansion. Furthermore,  DHS’s methodology will not inform overall or country-specific overstay  rates, which are key factors in determining illegal immigration risks in the  Visa Waiver Program. Third, DHS’s methodology does not address the accuracy of airlines’  transmissions of departure records, and DHS acknowledges that there are  weaknesses in the departure data. Furthermore, there may be some visitors who did leave the country by air,  but were not recorded on airlines’ manifest data as having departed. DHS reported to us that it had used its methodology for meeting the “97  percent” requirement to match records in the past; however, we were  unable to identify an instance when DHS had used this particular  methodology. Moreover, DHS’s plans to certify the “97 percent” requirement will not  further its efforts in responding to Congress’s longstanding calls for the  development of an automated entry and exit control system to track  visitors to the United States and identify those visitors who have remained  in the country illegally. Without the  capability to verify departures, DHS cannot ensure the integrity of the  immigration system by identifying visitors who have overstayed their  original period of admission. For example, overstay rates would inform decision makers  of illegal immigration risks associated with adding new countries to the  program. The Data Integrity Group also provides similar information to  the department’s Office of Immigration Statistics, as well as the Visa  Waiver Program Office. Contact points for our Offices of  Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page  of this statement. Overstay Tracking: A Key Component of Homeland Security and a  Layered Defense.
Why GAO Did This Study

The Visa Waiver Program, which enables citizens of participating countries to travel to the United States without first obtaining a visa, has many benefits, yet also presents security, law enforcement, and illegal immigration risks. In August 2007, Congress passed legislation that provides the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) with the authority to expand the program to additional countries whose nationals' applications for short-term business and tourism visas were refused between 3 and 10 percent of the time in the prior fiscal year. Countries must also meet certain conditions, and DHS must first complete and certify a number of required actions aimed at enhancing the security of the program. This testimony will focus on one of these required actions--namely, that a system be in place that can verify the departure of 97 percent of foreign nationals who depart through U.S. airports (referred to as an air exit system). Our observations are based on our review of relevant legislation, regulations and agency operating procedures, and prior GAO reports on the Visa Waiver Program and immigrant and visitor entry and exit tracking systems, as well as on discussions with federal agency officials. In commenting on a draft of this statement, DHS emphasized that it had not finalized its plan for certifying the "97 percent" requirement, but that the department believes the current plan would meet the legislative requirement. The Department of State also provided technical comments, which we incorporated, as appropriate.

What GAO Found

On December 12, 2007, DHS reported to us that it will match records of foreign nationals departing the country, as reported by airlines, to the department's existing records of any prior arrivals, immigration status changes, or prior departures from the United States. Using this formula, DHS stated that it can attain a match rate above 97 percent, based on August 2007 data, to certify compliance with the legislative air exit system requirement. DHS told us that it believes this methodology would meet the statutory requirement. On February 21, 2008, DHS indicated that it had not finalized its decision on the methodology the department would use to certify compliance. Nevertheless, the department confirmed that the basic structure of its methodology would not change, and that it would use departure records as the starting point. There are several limitations with this methodology. For example, DHS's methodology does not begin with arrival records and determine if these foreign nationals stayed in the United States beyond their authorized periods of admission (referred to as overstays). Therefore, this methodology will not inform overall and country-specific overstay rates--key factors in determining illegal immigration risks of the Visa Waiver Program. Although most long-term overstays are likely motivated by economic opportunities, a few overstays have been identified as terrorists or involved in terrorist-related activity, including some of the September 11, 2001, hijackers. In addition, DHS's current methodology does not address the accuracy of airlines' transmissions of departure records, and DHS acknowledges that there are weaknesses in the departure data. For example, there may be some visitors who did not leave the country by air even though they were recorded on airlines' manifest data as having departed. The inability of the U.S. government to track the status of visitors in the country, to identify those who overstay their authorized period of visit, and to use this data to compute overstay rates have been longstanding weaknesses in the oversight of the Visa Waiver Program. DHS's plan to meet the "97 percent" requirement in the visa waiver expansion legislation will not address these weaknesses.