According to USAID, as of  February 2016, U.S. government assistance was reaching 4 million  people inside Syria per month. Humanitarian assistance provided by the  United States in response to the conflict in Syria is part of a broader  international response. Three Factors Complicate the Delivery of Humanitarian Assistance to People inside Syria

Effective delivery of U.S. humanitarian assistance to people inside Syria  is complicated by three related factors—a dangerous operating  environment, access issues, and remote management of programs. U.S. Agencies Do Not Require Comprehensive Risk Assessments from Implementing Partners and Most Partners Have Not Assessed Risks of Fraud

State and USAID do not require implementing partners to conduct  comprehensive risk assessments for humanitarian assistance delivered to  people inside Syria, and while most partners assessed safety and  security risks associated with such programs, most did not assess  financial risks, such as the risk of fraud. U.S. Most Implementing Partners Have Identified and Assessed Safety and Security Risks to Effective Aid Delivery inside Syria, But Most Have Not Assessed Risk of Fraud

All of the implementing partners in our sample have policies, procedures,  or guidance related to conducting risk assessment for their programs to  provide humanitarian assistance into Syria, including safety and security  checklists, risk registers, and other tools for conducting various types of  risk assessments. Further, in May 2016, USAID  OIG reported the identification of bid-rigging and multiple bribery and  kickback schemes related to contracts to deliver humanitarian aid in  Syria, investigations of which resulted in the suspension of 14 entities and  individuals involved with aid programs from Turkey. Partners Have Implemented Controls for Delivering Humanitarian Assistance inside Syria, but U.S. To help address these issues, U.S.  agencies have taken some steps to oversee partner programs;  nevertheless, opportunities to assess and mitigate the potential impact of  fraud risks remain. U.S. For instance, State  officials in the region conduct quarterly meetings with partners and collect  information on programmatic objectives and on partner programs. Further, in  October 2015, USAID’s OFDA hired a third party monitoring organization  to review its projects in Syria. Fraud Oversight Could Be Strengthened

Based on our analysis, USAID’s third party monitoring contract and  supporting documentation contain guidelines for verifying the progress of  activities in Syria; however, they do not clearly instruct field monitors to  identify potential fraud risks as they conduct site assessments of projects  in Syria. Given the opportunity for fraud that exists in humanitarian  assistance programs, as well as the ongoing USAID OIG investigations,  without instructions to specifically collect data on fraud and training to  identify it, USAID may be missing an opportunity to assist in its activities  to mitigate fraud risks and design appropriate controls. Conclusions

The ongoing conflict in Syria has created a complex humanitarian  emergency. Ensure that field monitors in Syria are trained on assessing and  identifying potential fraud risks. In this report we examine  humanitarian assistance provided by the Department of State (State), the  U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and implementing  partners to people inside Syria, including (1) factors affecting delivery of  such assistance; (2) the extent to which State, USAID, and their partners  have assessed risks to the programs; and (3) implementation of controls  to mitigate identified risks and ensure appropriate financial oversight of  humanitarian assistance projects. To determine the extent to which State, USAID, and their partners have  assessed risks to the programs, we selected a nongeneralizable sample  of 12 fiscal year 2015 State and USAID funding instruments, out of a total  of 52 funding instruments, from 9 different implementing partners.
Why GAO Did This Study

The conflict in Syria has created a complex humanitarian challenge, with an estimated 13.5 million people inside Syria in need of assistance. In response, the United States has provided more than $5 billion since 2011 in humanitarian assistance, with about half supporting those inside Syria. Without an embassy in Syria, State and USAID oversee assistance remotely from neighboring countries.
In this report GAO examines humanitarian assistance provided by State, USAID, and their implementing partners to people inside Syria, including (1) factors affecting delivery of such assistance; (2) the extent to which State, USAID, and their partners have assessed risks to the programs; and (3) implementation of controls to mitigate identified risks and ensure appropriate financial oversight of humanitarian assistance. GAO selected a nongeneralizable sample of 12 funding instruments involving 9 implementing partners and analyzed the partners' risk assessments and control activities, interviewed relevant officials, and conducted fieldwork in Jordan, where several implementing partners are based.

What GAO Found

Delivery of U.S. humanitarian assistance to people inside Syria is complicated by three factors including a dangerous operating environment, access constraints, and remote management of programs. Active conflict creates a dangerous environment characterized by attacks on aid facilities and workers, and humanitarian organizations face difficulties accessing those in need. Additionally, U.S. agency officials must manage programs in Syria remotely, increasing risks to the program, including opportunities for fraud. Despite these challenges, according to the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), U.S. humanitarian assistance has reached 4 million people inside Syria per month.
The Department of State (State), USAID, and their implementing partners have assessed some types of risk to their programs inside Syria, but most partners have not assessed the risk of fraud. Of the 9 implementing partners in GAO's sample of funding instruments, most assessed risks related to safety and security, but only 4 of 9 assessed fraud risks. Such an assessment is important as USAID's Office of Inspector General (OIG) has uncovered multiple instances of fraud affecting U.S. programs delivering humanitarian assistance to Syria. In May 2016, USAID OIG reported that 1 of its active fraud investigations resulted in the suspension of 14 entities and individuals. Given the challenging environment in Syria, fraud risk assessments could help U.S. agencies better identify and address risks to help ensure aid reaches those in need.
Partners have implemented controls to mitigate certain risks, but U.S. agencies could improve financial oversight. For example, almost all partners in our sample have controls to mitigate safety risks and some use technology to monitor the transport of goods. Additionally, U.S. agencies have taken steps to oversee activities in Syria, such as quarterly meetings with partners and spot checks of partner warehouses. Further, in October 2015, USAID hired a third party monitor to improve oversight of its activities and help verify progress of its programs. However, the monitors' training curriculum lacks modules on identifying fraud risks. Without such training, monitors may overlook potential fraud risks and miss opportunities to collect data that could help USAID improve its financial oversight.

What GAO Recommends

To provide more complete information to assist oversight activities, State and USAID should require their implementing partners to conduct fraud risk assessments. In addition, USAID should ensure its field monitors are trained to identify potential fraud risks and collect information on them. State and USAID concurred with GAO's recommendations.