In the case of sludge, the material is  immobilized through vitrification—a process that stabilizes waste by  mixing it with molten glass and then pouring it into large metal canisters  where it hardens—at the Savannah River Site’s Defense Waste Processing  Facility (DWPF), which has operated since March 1996. Based on Current Cost Estimates and Schedule, Closing the Savannah River Site’s Tanks Is Likely to Cost More and Take Longer Than Originally Estimated

Emptying, cleaning, and permanently closing the 22 underground liquid  radioactive waste tanks at the Savannah River Site that lack secondary  containment is likely to cost significantly more and take longer than  estimated in the December 2008 contract between DOE and SRR. Specifically, SRR notified DOE in June 2009 that the total cost to close the  22 tanks had increased by slightly more than $1.4 billion from $3.2 billion  as estimated in the December 2008 contract to about $4.6 billion. In  addition, closing the tanks may take longer than originally estimated  because of persistent delays constructing SWPF—a facility vital to  successful tank closure because it will treat a large portion of the waste  removed from the tanks. Although DOE is exploring ways to mitigate the effects of SWPF  construction delays by deploying new technologies to treat additional  quantities of waste, DOE officials told us that additional research and  development on these technologies is still required and that it would be  several years before these new technologies could be deployed. Our review indicates that much of this  increase is because the cost estimate in DOE’s 2007 request for proposals  that formed the basis of the December 2008 contract was not accurate or  comprehensive. In addition, DOE did not account for the more than $600 million in pension  costs that were needed to make up for significant losses suffered by the  Savannah River Site workers’ defined-benefit pension plans as a result of  the economic crisis that began in 2007. In addition, on-time completion of the SWPF may be in question because  the facility’s construction schedule does not fully meet GAO-identified  best scheduling practices. Although these officials also identified  steps the department is taking to ensure these challenges are met, several  factors raise concerns about whether DOE will be able to resolve them. Moreover, although most experts we spoke with were generally confident  of DOE’s ability to successfully overcome these challenges, some of them  identified additional concerns about DOE’s ability to successfully close the  underground tanks. DOE Is Taking Steps to Overcome the Primary Challenges That Could Impede Savannah River Site Tank Closure, but Concerns Remain About Its Ability to Resolve Them

According to DOE officials, there are three primary challenges to  successfully closing the liquid radioactive waste tanks at the Savannah  River Site: (1) on-time construction and successful operation of SWPF; (2)  increasing the amount and speed at which high-level radioactive waste is  vitrified at DWPF; and (3) successfully implementing an enhanced  chemical cleaning process for the underground tanks. SRR is relying on a new chemical cleaning  process to accelerate tank cleaning with minimal creation of additional  waste that must be treated. Conclusions

The potential for significant cost increases and the possibility of  accomplishing one-third fewer tank closures by 2017 than agreed to under  the December 2008 contract between DOE and SRR raises concerns about  the department’s ability to successfully close the 22 underground liquid  radioactive waste tanks that lack secondary containment at the Savannah  River Site within DOE’s cost and schedule goals. However, we share the experts’ concerns that DOE has not engaged in  sufficient planning in the event that the department’s chosen waste  removal, treatment, and tank closure strategies are unsuccessful. Furthermore, it is  important to note that construction delays have already occurred and SRR  already estimates that between 2 and 7 fewer tanks than originally planned  will be closed by 2017. However, DOE disagreed with our recommendation to  revise DOE contract management guidance to ensure it includes  provisions that detail how contract cost increases should be requested by  a contractor. In particular, both of our  assessments found that the schedule had problems with excess float time,  which indicates that the schedule’s activities are not sequenced logically. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

To determine the current costs and schedule for closing the tanks at the  Savannah River Site and the extent to which the Department of Energy  (DOE) established these using best practices, we analyzed cost and  schedule documents such as DOE’s June 2007 tank closure cost estimate,  the December 2008 tank closure contract between DOE and Savannah  River Remediation, LLC (SRR), SRR’s contract performance baseline, and  tank closure cost increase proposals. To determine the extent to which DOE established the tank closure  schedule using best practices, we reviewed the construction schedule for  the Salt Waste Processing Facility (SWPF), a facility that will be used to  treat a majority of the tank waste.
Why GAO Did This Study

Decades of nuclear materials production at the Department of Energy's (DOE) Savannah River Site in South Carolina have left 37 million gallons of radioactive liquid waste in 49 underground storage tanks. In December 2008, DOE entered into a contract with Savannah River Remediation, LLC (SRR) to close, by 2017, 22 of the highest-risk tanks at a cost of $3.2 billion. GAO was asked to assess: (1) DOE's cost estimates and schedule for closing the tanks at the Savannah River Site, and (2) the primary challenges, if any, to closing the tanks and the steps DOE has taken to address them. GAO visited the Savannah River Site and reviewed tank closure documents, as well as conducted an analysis of the construction schedule of the Salt Waste Processing Facility (SWPF), which is a facility vital to successful tank closure because it will treat a large portion of the waste removed from the tanks.

What GAO Found

Emptying, cleaning, and permanently closing the 22 underground liquid radioactive waste tanks at the Savannah River Site is likely to cost significantly more and take longer than estimated in the December 2008 contract between DOE and SRR. Originally estimated to cost $3.2 billion, SRR notified DOE in June 2010 that the total cost to close the 22 tanks had increased by more than $1.4 billion or 44 percent. Much of this increase is because DOE's cost estimate in the September 2007 request for proposals that formed the basis of the December 2008 contract between DOE and SRR was not accurate or comprehensive. For example, DOE underestimated the costs of labor and fringe benefits. DOE also omitted certain other costs related to equipment and services needed to support tank closure activities. Moreover, more than $600 million of this increase is due to increased funding needed to make up for significant losses suffered by Savannah River Site workers' pension plans as a result of the recent economic crisis. Closing the tanks may also take longer than originally estimated because of persistent delays and shortcomings in the construction schedule for SWPF. According to SRR, construction delays that have already occurred will result in between 2 and 7 fewer tanks being closed by 2017 than agreed to in the contract. Furthermore, the SWPF construction schedule does not fully meet GAO-identified best scheduling practices. For example, the schedule had problems with excess float time between activities, indicating that the schedule's activities may not be sequenced logically. DOE is exploring ways to mitigate the effects of construction delays by deploying new technologies to treat radioactive waste. However, additional research and development on these new technologies is still required and, therefore, it will be several years before they are deployed. DOE officials identified three primary challenges to closing the liquid radioactive waste tanks at the Savannah River Site: (1) on-time construction and successful operation of SWPF; (2) increasing the amount and speed at which radioactive waste is processed at the Savannah River Site's Defense Waste Processing Facility, which prepares the waste for permanent disposal by mixing it with molten glass and then pouring it into large metal canisters where it hardens; and (3)successful implementation of an enhanced chemical cleaning process that will remove residual waste from the tanks with minimal creation of additional waste that must be treated. DOE officials identified steps the department is taking to ensure these challenges are met. However, several factors raise concerns about whether DOE will be able to resolve them. For example, the enhanced chemical cleaning process that is a cornerstone of SRR's ability to close tanks on time has never been used in liquid radioactive waste tanks and, according to SRR officials, DOE has not consistently funded additional research and development on the technology. Most experts GAO spoke with were generally confident of DOE's ability to successfully overcome these challenges, although some of them identified additional concerns. For example, some experts suggested that DOE has not engaged in sufficient contingency planning in the event that the department's chosen waste removal, treatment, and tank closure strategies are unsuccessful.

What GAO Recommends

GAO is making five recommendations to DOE to, among other things, clarify how cost increases should be requested by a contractor, as well as reviewed and approved by DOE and to ensure the SWPF construction schedule conforms to best practices. Although DOE generally agreed with two of our recommendations, they disagreed on the necessity of additional clarity on how cost increases should be requested by a contractor and that the SWPF construction schedule did not conform to best practices. We continue to believe our recommendations are valid.