TSA has named this  prospective prescreening program Secure Flight. Additional information on the  President’s budget request for fiscal year 2008 as it relates to airline  passenger prescreening, airline passenger and checked baggage screening,  and air cargo security is provided later in this statement. Accordingly, as TSA moves forward, it will need to employ a range  of program management disciplines, which we previously found missing,  to control program cost, schedule, performance, and privacy risks. TSA Has Taken Steps to Enhance Security at Passenger Screening Checkpoints and Checked Baggage Screening Stations, but Continues to Face Challenges

TSA has taken steps to strengthen the three key elements of the passenger  and checked baggage screening systems—people (TSOs), screening  procedures, and technology—but continues to face management,  planning, and funding challenges. For example, in May 2006, TSA  reported that under current investment levels, the installation of optimal  checked baggage screening systems would not be completed until  approximately 2024. TSA, in collaboration with key stakeholders, has  identified several funding and financing strategies for installing optimal  checked baggage screening systems, such as continued appropriations for  the procurement and installation of EDS machines. However, as  part of our ongoing work, we identified that TSA’s data collection and  analyses could be improved to help TSA determine whether proposed  procedures that are operationally tested would achieve their intended  purpose. Additionally, in September 2006, Congress directed TSA to  take a variety of actions—most of which we recommended in our July  2006 report—to monitor and assess the use of alternative screening  procedures, including (1) develop performance measures and  performance targets for the use of alternative screening procedures;   (2) track the use of alternative screening procedures at airports; (3) assess  the effectiveness of these measures; (4) conduct covert testing at airports  that use alternative screening procedures; (5) develop a plan to stop  alternative screening procedures at airports as soon as practicable; and   (6) report to the Senate and House Committees on Appropriations, the  Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, and the  House Committee on Homeland Security by January 23, 2007, on  implementation of these requirements. However, limited progress has been made in  fielding explosives detection technology at passenger screening  checkpoints, in part due to challenges DHS S&T and TSA face in  coordinating research and development efforts. Despite TSA’s efforts to develop passenger checkpoint screening  technologies, preliminary results from our ongoing work suggests that  limited progress has been made in fielding explosives detection  technology at checkpoints. TSA is collaborating with key stakeholders to identify funding and  financing strategies for installing optimal checked baggage screening  systems. However, more work remains to ensure that TSA  has a comprehensive strategy to secure air cargo that fully incorporates  risk management principles. However, TSA has not established a  timeframe for completing these assessments. According to TSA officials,  the federal government and the air cargo industry face several challenges  that must be overcome to effectively implement any of these technologies  to inspect or secure air cargo. This report will address (1) the actions TSA and CBP have taken to  secure inbound air cargo, and how, if at all these efforts could be  strengthened; and (2) the practices the air cargo industry and select  foreign governments have adopted that could be used to enhance TSA’s  efforts to strengthen inbound air cargo security, and the extent to which  TSA and CBP have worked with foreign governments to enhance their air  cargo security efforts. Concluding Observations

DHS and TSA have undertaken numerous initiatives to strengthen the  security of the nation’s aviation system, and should be commended for  these efforts. Meeting the congressional mandates to screen airline  passengers and checked baggage alone was a tremendous challenge. Since  that time, TSA has turned its attention to strengthening passenger  prescreening, more efficiently allocating and deploying TSOs,  strengthening screening procedures, developing and deploying more  effective and efficient screening technologies, and improving domestic air  cargo security, among other efforts. In implementing a risk-based approach, DHS and  TSA must also address the challenges we identified in our work related to  program planning, risk assessments, and implementation and monitoring  of aviation security programs. Aviation Security: TSA Has Strengthened Efforts to Plan for the Optimal  Deployment of Checked Baggage Screening Systems but Funding  Uncertainties Remain. Aviation Security: Transportation Security Administration Has Made  Progress in Managing a Federal Security Workforce and Ensuring  Security at U.S.
Why GAO Did This Study

The Transportation Security Administration (TSA), established in November 2001, has developed and implemented a variety of programs to secure the commercial aviation system. To implement these efforts, TSA funding related to aviation security has totaled about $20 billion since fiscal year 2004. Other Department of Homeland Security (DHS) components, such as the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and the Science and Technology Directorate (S&T), also play roles in securing commercial aviation. In this testimony, we address the efforts TSA has taken or planned to strengthen aviation security, and the challenges that remain, in three key areas: airline passenger prescreening, airline passenger and checked baggage screening, and air cargo screening. GAO's comments are based on issued GAO reports and testimonies and our preliminary observations from ongoing work on TSA's passenger checkpoint screening procedures and technologies, and staffing standards for Transportation Security Officers (TSO).

What GAO Found

DHS and TSA have undertaken numerous initiatives to strengthen the security of the nation's aviation system, and should be commended for these efforts. However, more work remains. Meeting the congressional mandates to screen airline passengers and checked baggage alone was a tremendous challenge. Since that time, TSA has turned its attention to, among other things, strengthening passenger prescreening; more efficiently allocating, deploying, and managing the TSO workforce; strengthening screening procedures; developing and deploying more effective and efficient screening technologies; and improving domestic air cargo security. Some of the actions taken by TSA in these areas were in response to GAO recommendations. For example, consistent with GAO's recommendation to strengthen checked baggage screening, TSA has developed a strategic planning framework and identified several funding and financing strategies for installing optimal checked baggage screening systems. While TSA has undertaken numerous efforts to strengthen aviation security, GAO found that DHS and TSA could strengthen their risk-based decision-making efforts and collaboration with stakeholders. For example, as TSA moves forward with Secure Flight--TSA's prospective domestic passenger prescreening program--it will need to employ a range of program management disciplines, which we previously found missing, to control program cost, schedule, performance, and privacy risks. TSA has put in place a new management team, but it is too early to know how this change will affect the program's development. In addition, while TSA has tested some proposed modifications to passenger screening procedures at airports to help determine whether to implement the changes, GAO identified that TSA's data collection and analyses could be improved. GAO also found that limited progress has been made in developing and deploying technologies due to planning and funding challenges. For example, limited progress has been made in fielding explosives detection technology at passenger screening checkpoints, and while TSA has begun to systematically plan for the optimal deployment of checked baggage screening systems and to identify funding and financing strategies for installing these systems, the agency has identified that under current investment levels, installation of optimal checked baggage screening systems will not be completed until approximately 2024. Additionally, the federal government and the air cargo industry face several challenges that must be overcome to effectively implement technologies to inspect air cargo, such as ensuring that air cargo can be inspected in a timely manner to meet the delivery time frames of air carriers. GAO also found that more work is needed to fully implement a risk-based approach to securing air cargo, including finalizing a methodology and schedule for completing assessments of air cargo vulnerabilities and critical assets. TSA stated that the agency intends to perform a vulnerability assessment of U.S. air cargo operations and activities, as recommended by GAO, and plans to complete this assessment in 2007.