However, in  service-level UAS vision statements, the Air Force and the Army have  identified limitations in their approaches to provide personnel for UAS  operations, but they have not yet fully developed strategies that specify the  actions and resources required to supply the personnel needed to meet  current and projected future UAS force levels. Facilities Needed to Support UAS Programs Have Not Been Systematically Defined and Costs Are Uncertain

Although DOD has requested funding to some extent in recent budget  requests and expects to request additional funds in future years, the Air  Force and the Army have not fully determined the specific number and  type of facilities needed to support UAS training and operations. 2). Various Factors Have Contributed to a Lag in Planning for Personnel, Facilities, and Communications Infrastructure for UAS Programs

Several factors have contributed to a lag in Air Force and Army planning  for the personnel, facilities, and some communications infrastructure that  are integral to the operation of UAS. Finally, while  DOD components are expected to identify deficiencies in their strategies  to support weapon systems programs and to make necessary adjustments  to them as requirements change, the Air Force and the Army have not  completed the analyses or developed plans to account for new personnel  and facility requirements, and the Air Force has not developed a plan to  ensure the communications infrastructure needed to support its UAS  programs. In the absence of detailed action plans that fully account for  these factors and include milestones for tracking progress and  synchronize funding and personnel, DOD cannot have a reasonable  assurance that these services’ approaches will fully support current and  projected increases in UAS inventories. This competition, among  other factors, has affected the amount of training UAS personnel can  conduct and their ability to prepare for deployments. As more advanced UAS are fielded in greater numbers, the military  services will require increased access to the national airspace system. DOD estimated in a December 2008 report  that based on planned UAS inventories in fiscal year 2013, the services will  require more than 1 million flight hours to train UAS personnel within the  United States. DOD’s current UAS simulators have limited capabilities, however, to  enhance training. Absent an integrated, results-oriented plan to  address the challenges in a comprehensive manner, DOD will not have a  sound basis for prioritizing available resources, and it cannot be assured  that the initiatives it has under way will fully address limitations in Air  Force and Army training approaches. The lack of comprehensive and timely publications that are written for a  range of stakeholders limits the quality of information that is available to  serve as the foundation for effective joint training programs and to assist  military planners and operators in integrating UAS on the battlefield. However, the rapid fielding  of new systems and the considerable expansion of existing Air Force and  Army programs has posed challenges for military planners to fully account  for UAS support elements, such as developing comprehensive plans that  account for the personnel and facilities needed to operate and sustain UAS  programs and ensure the communications infrastructure that is necessary  to control UAS operations. To ensure that DOD can comprehensively resolve challenges that affect  the ability of the Air Force and the Army to train personnel for UAS  operations, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Under  Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, in coordination with  the military services and other organizations as appropriate, to develop a  results-oriented training strategy that provides detailed information on the  steps that DOD will take to   identify and address the effects of competition and airspace  restrictions on UAS training,   increase the opportunities that Army ground units and Air Force UAS  personnel have to train together in a joint environment,    maximize the use of available assets in training exercises, and    upgrade UAS simulation capabilities to enhance training. However, we  identified many cases where DOD’s UAS publications did not incorporate  updated information needed by military personnel to understand current  practices and capabilities, and we found that the military services have  not, in some instances, assigned personnel to positions that are  responsible for UAS publication development. In determining the extent to which DOD addressed challenges that affect  the ability of the Air Force and the Army to train personnel for UAS  operations, we visited select military installations and the Army’s National  Training Center at Fort Irwin, California, and spoke with knowledgeable  DOD and military service officials to determine the specific challenges that  the Air Force and the Army faced when training service personnel to  perform UAS missions in joint operations. To determine the extent to which DOD updated its existing publications  that articulate doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures to reflect  the knowledge gained from using UAS in ongoing operations, we  examined joint, multiservice, and service-specific UAS doctrine, tactics,  techniques, and procedures, and concept of operations publications.
Why GAO Did This Study

The Department of Defense (DOD) requested about $6.1 billion in fiscal year 2010 for new unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) and for expanded capabilities in existing ones. To support ongoing operations, the Air Force and Army have acquired a greater number of larger systems. GAO was asked to determine the extent to which (1) plans were in place to account for the personnel, facilities, and communications infrastructure needed to support Air Force and Army UAS inventories; (2) DOD addressed challenges that affect the ability of the Air Force and the Army to train personnel for UAS operations; and (3) DOD updated its publications that articulate doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures to reflect the knowledge gained from using UAS in ongoing operations. Focusing on UAS programs supporting ongoing operations, GAO reviewed the services' program and funding plans in light of DOD's requirements definition and acquisition policy; interviewed UAS personnel in the United States and in Iraq about training experiences; and reviewed joint, multiservice, and service-specific publications.

What GAO Found

DOD continues to increase UAS inventories, but in some cases, the Air Force and the Army lack robust plans that account for the personnel, facilities, and some communications infrastructure to support them. Regarding personnel, the Air Force and the Army have identified limitations in their approaches to provide personnel to meet current and projected UAS force levels, but they have not yet fully developed plans to supply needed personnel. Further, although DOD has recently requested funding and plans to request additional funds, the Air Force and the Army have not completed analyses to specify the number and type of facilities needed to support UAS training and operations. Having identified a vulnerability to the communications infrastructure network used to control UAS missions, the Air Force is taking steps to mitigate the risk posed by a natural or man-made disruption to the network but has not formalized a plan in the near term to provide for the continuity of UAS operations in the event of a disruption. While DOD guidance encourages planning for factors needed to operate and sustain a weapon system program in the long term, several factors have contributed to a lag in planning efforts, such as the rapid fielding of new systems and the expansion of existing ones. In the absence of comprehensive planning, DOD does not have reasonable assurance that Air Force and Army approaches will support current and projected UAS inventories. The lack of comprehensive plans also limits the ability of decision makers to make informed funding choices. DOD has not developed a results-oriented strategy to resolve challenges that affect the ability of the Air Force and the Army to train personnel for UAS operations. GAO found that the limited amount of DOD-managed airspace adversely affected the amount of training that personnel conducted to prepare for deployments. As UAS are fielded in greater numbers, DOD will require access to more airspace for training; for example, DOD estimated that based on planned UAS inventories in fiscal year 2013, the military services will require more than 1 million flight hours to train UAS personnel within the United States. Further, Air Force UAS personnel and Army ground units have limited opportunities to train together in a joint environment, and they have not maximized the use of available assets during training. Current UAS simulators also have limited capabilities to enhance training. DOD has commenced initiatives to address training challenges, but it has not developed a results-oriented strategy to prioritize and synchronize these efforts. Absent a strategy, DOD will not have a sound basis for prioritizing resources, and it cannot be assured that the initiatives will address limitations in Air Force and Army training approaches. In many cases, DOD's UAS publications articulating doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures did not include updated information needed by manned and unmanned aircraft operators, military planners, and ground units to understand current practices and capabilities. Such information can serve as the foundation for effective joint training programs and can assist military personnel in integrating UAS on the battlefield.