CBP issued new policies and  procedures to overcome these inspection weaknesses at its land ports of  entry including requiring field office directors to conduct assessments to  ensure compliance with these new inspection procedures. CBP officers also intercepted 40,362 fraudulent documents  used in attempts to enter the country illegally in fiscal year 2006. Improvements Notwithstanding, CBP Acknowledges that It Did Not Apprehend All Inadmissible Aliens and Other Violators

While CBP has had some success in interdicting inadmissible aliens and  other violators, CBP acknowledges that it did not apprehend all  inadmissible aliens and other violators who sought to enter the country at  air and land ports of entry. Using COMPEX, CBP estimates that several thousand inadmissible  aliens and other violators entered the country through air and land ports  of entry in fiscal year 2006. An effective internal control  environment is a key method to help agency managers achieve program  objectives and enhance their ability to address identified weaknesses. To address staffing, CBP developed a staffing model to  identify the resources needed at the nation’s ports of entry. In July 2007, CBP provided us with the results for the staffing model. CBP Has Developed Strategic Goals for Its Traveler Inspection Program, but Challenges Remain in Formalizing Related Performance Measures

		Strategic Plan Establishes Goals and Objectives for Traveler Inspection Program

CBP has developed strategic goals for its traveler inspection program, but  it faces challenges in formalizing a set of performance measures that track  what progress it is making toward achieving these goals. CBP does not use data that measure the extent to which it is  intercepting inadmissible aliens and other violators, one of CBP’s key  strategic objectives. Recommendations for Executive Action

To mitigate the risk of failed traveler inspections at ports of entry, we  recommended in our October 5, 2007 report that the Secretary of  Homeland Security direct the Commissioner of Customs and Border  Protection to take the following four actions:  implement internal controls to help ensure that field office directors  communicate to agency management the results of their monitoring  and assessment efforts so that agencywide results can be analyzed and  necessary actions taken to ensure that new traveler inspection  procedures are carried out in a consistent way across all ports of entry;    develop data on cross-training programs that measure whether the  individuals who require training are receiving it so that agency  management is in a better position to measure progress toward  achieving training goals;  incorporate into CBP’s procedures for its on-the-job training program  (1) specific tasks that CBP officers must experience during on-the-job  training and (2) requirements for measuring officer proficiency in  performing those tasks; and   formalize a performance measure for the traveler inspection program  that identifies CBP’s effectiveness in apprehending inadmissible aliens  and other violators. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

This report addresses the progress the U.S. Customs and Border  Protection (CBP) has made and the remaining challenges it faces in  conducting traveler inspections, staffing, and training at ports of entry. To examine what progress CBP has made in improving staffing and  training at its ports of entry and how successful has it been in carrying out  these workforce programs, we interviewed CBP headquarters officials,  including those from the Offices of Field Operations, Policy and Planning,  Human Resource Management, and Training and Development.
Why GAO Did This Study

U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) is responsible for keeping terrorists and other dangerous people from entering the country while also facilitating the cross-border movement of millions of travelers. CBP carries out this responsibility at 326 air, sea, and land ports of entry. In response to a congressional request, GAO examined CBP traveler inspection efforts, the progress made and the challenges that remain in staffing and training at ports of entry, and the progress CBP has made in developing strategic plans and performance measures for its traveler inspection program. This is a public version of a For Official Use Only report GAO issued on October 5, 2007. To conduct its work, GAO reviewed and analyzed CBP data and documents related to inspections, staffing, and training, interviewed managers and officers, observed inspections at eight major air and land ports of entry, and tested inspection controls at eight small land ports of entry. Information the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) deemed sensitive has been redacted.

What GAO Found

CBP has had some success in identifying inadmissible aliens and other violators, but weaknesses in its operations increase the potential that terrorists and inadmissible travelers could enter the country. In fiscal year 2006, CBP turned away over 200,000 inadmissible aliens and interdicted other violators. Although CBP's goal is to interdict all violators, CBP estimated that several thousand inadmissible aliens and other violators entered the country though ports of entry in fiscal year 2006. Weaknesses in 2006 inspection procedures, such as not verifying the nationality and admissibility of each traveler, contribute to failed inspections. Although CBP took actions to address these weaknesses, subsequent follow up work conducted by GAO months after CBP's actions found that weaknesses such as those described above still existed. In July 2007, CBP issued detailed procedures for conducting inspections including requiring field office managers to assess compliance with these procedures. However, CBP has not established an internal control to ensure field office managers share their assessments with CBP headquarters to help ensure that the new procedures are consistently implemented across all ports of entry and reduce the risk of failed traveler inspections. CBP developed a staffing model that estimates it needs up to several thousand more staff. Field office managers said that staffing shortages affected their ability to carry out anti-terrorism programs and created other vulnerabilities in the inspections process. CBP recognizes that officer attrition has impaired its ability to attain budgeted staffing levels and is in the process of developing a strategy to help curb attrition. CBP has made progress in developing training programs, yet it does not measure the extent to which it provides training to all who need it and whether new officers demonstrate proficiency in required skills. CPB issued a strategic plan for operations at its ports of entry and has collected performance data that can be used to measure its progress in achieving its strategic goals. However, current performance measures do not gauge CBP effectiveness in apprehending inadmissible aliens and other violators, a key strategic goal.