In 2000, however, the Congress created a separately  organized agency within DOE—the NNSA. NNSA’s Lack of Safeguards and Security Direction in Key Areas Results in Inconsistent Management of Contractors

NNSA has not been fully effective in managing its safeguards and security  program in four key areas, and therefore, it cannot be assured that its  contractors are working to maximum advantage to protect its sites. First,  NNSA has not fully defined safeguards and security roles and  responsibilities. Third, even  when assessments are done, NNSA contractors do not consistently  conduct required DOE analyses in preparing corrective action plans. Finally, NNSA’s shortfalls at its site offices in the total number of staff and  expertise could make it more difficult for the site offices to oversee  safeguards and security effectively. However, NNSA needs a  stable structure to establish clear roles and responsibilities for its  headquarters and site offices, including safeguards and security oversight. NNSA’s Security Assessment Processes Differ among Sites and Are Inconsistent with DOE Requirements

NNSA site offices are not consistent in how they assess contractor  safeguards and security activities, and they may not be conducting these  assessments in accordance with DOE policy. Consistency problems are likely to continue without effective NNSA  guidance for corrective actions. As a result, NNSA cannot be assured that all  contractors are considering the costs of corrective actions in conjunction  with the risk posed or the potential benefits to be gained. Recommendations for Executive Action

In order to strengthen the safeguards and security program of the nuclear  weapons complex, we recommend that the NNSA Administrator and  Secretary of Energy  formalize the roles and responsibilities of site offices and headquarters  for conducting oversight;    ensure that sites are performing oversight using a survey approach that  provides an integrated comprehensive view of security conditions and  is consistent with DOE orders;    ensure that contractors’ corrective action plans are prepared and  documented consistently and are based on qualitative root-cause, risk-  assessment, and cost-benefit analyses, and that appropriate incentives  are used to help motivate contractors toward effectively addressing  findings; and    develop and implement a plan to ensure that NNSA allocates  safeguards and security staff so that it provides effective safeguards  and security oversight over the long term.
Why GAO Did This Study

The attacks of September 11, 2001, intensified long-standing concerns about the adequacy of safeguards and security at four nuclear weapons production sites and three national laboratories that design nuclear weapons--most of these facilities store plutonium and uranium in a variety of forms. These facilities can become targets for such actions as sabotage or theft. The Department of Energy (DOE) and the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)--a separately organized agency within DOE--are responsible for these facilities. NNSA plays a crucial role in managing the contractors operating many of these facilities to ensure that security activities are effective and in line with departmental policy. GAO reviewed how effectively NNSA manages its safeguards and security program, including how it oversees contractor security operations.

What GAO Found

NNSA has not been fully effective in managing its safeguards and security program in four key areas. As a result, NNSA cannot be assured that its contractors are working to maximum advantage to protect critical facilities and material from individuals seeking to inflict damage. Defining clear roles and responsibilities: NNSA still has not fully defined clear roles and responsibilities for its headquarters and site operations. Assessing sites' security activities: Without a stable and effective management structure and with ongoing confusion about roles and responsibilities, inconsistencies have emerged among NNSA sites on how they assess contractors' security activities. Consequently, NNSA cannot be assured that all facilities are subject to the comprehensive annual assessments that DOE policy requires. Overseeing contractors' corrective actions: To compound the problems in conducting security assessments, NNSA contractors do not consistently conduct required analyses in preparing corrective action plans. As a result, potential opportunities to improve physical security at the sites are not maximized because corrective actions are developed without fully considering the problems' root causes, risks posed, or cost versus the benefit of taking corrective action. Allocating staff: NNSA has shortfalls at its site offices in the total number of staff and in expertise, which could make it more difficult for site offices to effectively oversee security activities.