The cumulative development cost for the 10  programs we reviewed increased by over $3 billion, or 37 percent, from  initial estimates. As detailed in  table 2, overall procurement unit costs increased by 12 percent on average,  with three programs experiencing unit cost growth of 25 percent of more. The Reaper and Shadow had unit cost growth despite increased quantities. Four programs had experienced delays of 1 to  nearly 4 years in achieving initial operational capability. For  example, early demonstration and production Global Hawks were rushed  into operational service. Efforts to Collaborate and Identify Commonality Were Successful in Some Cases, While Not in Others

Consistent with DOD’s framework for acquiring unmanned systems, some  of the tactical and theater-level unmanned aircraft acquisition programs  we reviewed had identified areas of commonality to leverage resources  and gain efficiencies. By forgoing any service-unique modifications in order to achieve a high  level of commonality, the Marine Corps avoided the costs of developing  the Shadow. Since the Sky Warrior is a  variant of the Predator, the two aircraft are assembled in the same  production facility. Service-Centric Acquisition Processes and Ineffective Collaboration Have Reduced Opportunities for Commonality

While several of the unmanned aircraft programs we examined had  achieved commonality at the airframe level, service-centric acquisition  processes and ineffective collaboration resulted in service-unique  subsystems, payloads, and ground control stations. Despite DOD’s efforts  to encourage a joint approach to identifying and prioritizing warfighting  needs and to emphasize the need for commonality among the programs,  we noted that the individual services continued to drive requirements and  make independent resource allocation decisions. However, OSD  had not quantified the potential costs or benefits of pursuing various  alternatives, including commonality. OSD  repeatedly directed the Army and Air Force to collaborate on their Sky  Warrior and Predator programs, but the services continued to pursue  unique systems. Congress and OSD took additional action in 2009 aimed at increasing  collaboration and commonality among unmanned aircraft programs. DOD Continues to Increase Its Emphasis on and Funding For Unmanned Aircraft Systems

Since July 2009 when our report was issued, DOD has made several key  investment decisions regarding unmanned aircraft systems that will likely  impact those estimates. In general, these decisions reflect increased  emphasis on developing more advanced unmanned aircraft capabilities  and acquiring larger numbers of specific systems, but they do not appear  to focus on increasing collaboration or commonality among systems. As part of those adjustments, OSD:    Directed the Army to stop development and initial fielding of its Fire    Provided the Air Force an additional $344 million from FY2011 to  FY2015 to develop, procure, and integrate counter-communication and  counter-improvised explosive device jamming pods onto 33 MQ-9  Reaper aircraft, and directed the Air Force to present its assessment of  platforms for this capability by June 1, 2010;    Provided an additional $1.8 billion from FY2011 through FY2015 to  purchase an additional 74 MQ-9 Reaper aircraft;    Added $2 billion to the Navy budget from FY2013 to FY2015 to define  requirements and develop unmanned carrier based capability, and  directed the Navy to develop an execution plan by March 30, 2010;    Added $201.6 million to the Global Hawk procurement budget to  procure 19 Block 40 aircraft by 2015, and 22 total;    Added $270.5 million for development and procurement of Global  Hawk satellite communication terminals;    Added $2.4 billion over the Future Years Defense Program to the  Army’s Extended Range Multi-Purpose (Sky Warrior) Aircraft budget to  procure an additional 12 aircraft and 5 ground stations (one company)  per year from 2011 through 2015. Many of DOD’s  larger unmanned aircraft acquisition programs have experienced cost  growth, schedule delays, and performance shortfalls, while not enough  have achieved the efficiencies one might expect from commonality. DOD  recognizes that to more effectively leverage its acquisition resources, it  must achieve greater commonality among the military services’ various  unmanned system programs. Therefore, in our July 2009 report we recommended that DOD (1) direct  an objective, independent examination of unmanned aircraft requirements  and report a strategy to Congress for achieving greater commonality  among systems and subsystems, and (2) require future unmanned aircraft  programs to take an open systems approach to product development and  to clearly demonstrate that potential areas of commonality have been  analyzed and identified. Table 4  contains the combined total development and procurement funding DOD  has requested in its fiscal year 2011 budget submission for each of the  programs.
Why GAO Did This Study

For the last several years, the Department of Defense (DOD) has planned to invest billions of dollars in development and procurement of unmanned aircraft systems. In its fiscal year 2011 budget request the department indicated a significant increase in these investments, expecting to need more than $24 billion from 2010 through 2015. DOD recognizes that to leverage its resources more effectively, it must achieve greater commonality among the military services' unmanned aircraft system acquisition programs. This testimony is based primarily on GAO's July 2009 report (GAO-09-520) which examined 10 unmanned aircraft acquisition programs: eight unmanned aircraft systems--Global Hawk, Reaper, Shadow, Predator, Sky Warrior, Fire Scout, Broad Area Maritime Surveillance, and Unmanned Combat Aircraft System-Demonstration; and two payload development programs--Multi-Platform Radar Technology Insertion Program, and Airborne Signals Intelligence Payload. The testimony focuses on: 1) the cost, schedule, and performance progress of the 10 programs as of July 2009; 2) the extent to which the military services collaborated and identified commonality among the programs; 3) factors influencing the effectiveness of the collaboration; and, 4) recent DOD investment decisions related to these acquisitions.

What GAO Found

Most of the 10 programs reviewed had experienced cost increases, schedule delays, performance shortfalls, or some combination of these problems. The programs' development cost estimates increased by more than $3 billion collectively, or 37 percent, from initial estimates. Procurement funding requirements for most programs also increased, primarily because of increases in numbers of aircraft being procured, changes in system requirements, and upgrades and retrofits to fielded systems. Procurement unit costs increased by an average of 12 percent, with three aircraft programs experiencing unit cost increases of 25 percent or more. Four programs reported delays of 1 year or more in delivering capability to the warfighter. Global Hawk, Predator, Reaper, and Shadow had been used in combat operations with success and lessons learned, but had been rushed into service in some cases, leading to performance issues and delays in development and operational testing and verification. Programs collaborated and identified areas of commonality to varying degrees. The Marine Corps was able to avoid the cost of initial system development and quickly deliver useful capability to the warfighter by choosing to procure existing Army Shadow systems. The Navy expected to save time and money on Broad Area Maritime Surveillance (BAMS) by using Air Force's Global Hawk airframe, and payloads and subsystems from other programs. However, Army and Air Force had not collaborated on their Sky Warrior and Predator programs, and might have achieved greater savings if they had, given that Sky Warrior is a variant of Predator and being developed by the same contractor. DOD encouraged more commonality between these programs. Although several programs achieved airframe commonality, service-driven acquisition processes and ineffective collaboration were key factors that inhibited commonality among subsystems, payloads, and ground control stations, raising concerns about potential inefficiencies and duplication. Despite DOD's efforts to emphasize a joint approach to identifying needs and commonality among systems, most of the programs assessed continued to pursue service-unique requirements. The services also made independent resource allocation decisions to support their unique requirements. DOD had not quantified the costs and benefits associated with pursuing commonality among these programs, and efforts to collaborate had produced mixed results. However, in order to maximize acquisition resources and meet increased demand, Congress and DOD have continued to push for more commonality. Since July 2009, DOD has made several investment decisions regarding unmanned aircraft systems, which in general, reflect increased emphasis on developing advanced capabilities and acquiring larger numbers of specific systems. However, the decisions do not appear to focus on increasing collaboration or commonality among the programs.