DOD’s Urgent Needs Processes Provide Solutions to Emerging Battlefield Threats but DOD Is Unable to Fully Assess the Effectiveness of Those Processes or of Fielded Solutions

Although DOD has taken steps to create urgent needs processes that are  more responsive to urgent warfighter requests than its traditional  acquisition procedures, DOD is unable to fully assess how well the urgent  needs processes are addressing critical deficiencies or to measure the  effectiveness of solutions fielded in the theater because it has not  established an effective management framework for those processes. As a result, the department does not  have the tools it needs to fully assess how well its processes are working  to address critical warfighter needs, to manage their performance, to  ensure the efficient use of resources, and to make decisions regarding the  long-term sustainment of a fielded combatant command capability. DOD’s Guidance for the Urgent Needs Processes Does Not Include Standards for Collecting and Managing Data

The online data management systems of the joint and Army urgent needs  processes lack comprehensive, complete, and reliable information on the  achievement of key process phases, as well as the ability to generate  reports to track key dates and activities because DOD guidance has not  established standards for the collection and management of urgent needs  data. In one case, DOD fielded a solution to a joint need for an  airborne counter-improvised explosive device for more than 18 months,  although it did not meet the warfighters’ needs. Challenges Associated with Training and Funding Can Prolong the Fielding of Solutions to Meet Urgent Warfighter Needs

During our field work in Iraq as well as our analysis of 23 urgent needs  case studies, we found several challenges that hinder DOD’s ability to  respond to urgent warfighter needs as quickly as possible. Not All Personnel Involved in the Urgent Needs Process Receive Adequate Training

Army personnel who utilize the joint and Army urgent needs processes do  not receive adequate training on how to select which process to use to  request a solution for an urgent need and how to submit and review  requests. According to DOD’s strategic plan for transforming training, deploying  personnel should receive priority for training and be responsive to the  needs of the combatant commander across the full spectrum of  operations. This is due in part because OSD has not designated any one  organization with primary responsibility for determining when to  implement the department’s statutory rapid acquisition authority or to  execute other timely funding decisions. In 11 of our 23 case studies—7 joint, 3 Army, and 1 Marine Corps— obtaining funding was a challenge that increased the amount of time  needed to field solutions to the theater. Without greater high-level participation in the  decision-making process over when to invoke, or not to invoke, its rapid  acquisition authority, OSD will continue to play a reactive, rather than  proactive, role in the timely use of DOD resources to meet urgent  warfighter needs. OSD Has Not Provided Leadership Over Reprogramming Appropriated Funds to Meet Joint Urgent Needs

Apart from the Secretary’s rapid acquisition authority, DOD has a  reprogramming authority, but the military services are reluctant to  reprogram funds from their respective budgets to fund solutions to joint  urgent needs, and OSD has not exercised its authority to do so. This work has also  found that midlevel agencies, such as JRAC, can not guide policies at a  high enough level to promote effective interagency cooperation. Conclusions

Due to rapidly changing battlefield threats in Iraq and Afghanistan,  Congress has recognized DOD’s need to be more nimble in its response to  warfighter requests for urgently needed capabilities than the department’s  usual acquisitions process allows. Recommendations for Executive Action

We recommend that the Secretary of Defense take the following nine  actions:  To improve the department’s ability to fully assess how well the urgent  needs processes are addressing critical warfighter deficiencies and to  measure the effectiveness of solutions fielded in the theater, we  recommend that the Secretary of Defense, in conjunction with the  Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, combatant commands, military services,  and other DOD components, as necessary, take the following actions to  permanently establish the joint urgent needs process and to improve  consistency with federal internal control standards:    Clearly define the roles and responsibilities of the Office of the  Secretary of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, the military services, and  other DOD components, as necessary, through the issuance of new or  updated OSD and Joint Chiefs of Staff guidance, to identify who is  accountable for implementation, monitoring, and evaluation of all  phases of the process—including applying the technological maturity  criteria. Include rapid acquisition authority procedures available to officials  responsible for meeting joint urgent need requests.
Why GAO Did This Study

Forces in Iraq and Afghanistan have faced rapidly changing threats to mission failure or loss of life, highlighting the Department of Defense's (DOD) need to develop and field new capabilities more quickly than its usual acquisition procedures allow. Since 2006, Congress has provided nearly $16 billion to counter improvised explosive devices alone. GAO and others have reported funding, organizational, acquisition, and oversight issues involving DOD's processes for meeting warfighters' urgent needs. The Senate Armed Services Committee asked GAO to determine 1) the extent to which DOD has a means to assess the effectiveness of its urgent needs processes, and 2) what challenges, if any, have affected the overall responsiveness of DOD's urgent needs processes. To conduct this review GAO looked at three urgent needs processes--joint, Army, and the Marine Corps processes--visited forces overseas that submit urgent needs requests and receive solutions, and conducted 23 case studies.

What GAO Found

Although DOD has taken steps to create urgent needs processes that are more responsive to urgent warfighter requests than traditional acquisition procedures, DOD is unable to fully assess how well the processes address critical deficiencies or to measure the effectiveness of solutions fielded in the theater because it has not established an effective management framework for those processes. GAO found that DOD's guidance for its urgent needs processes is dispersed and outdated. Further, DOD guidance does not clearly define roles and responsibilities for implementing, monitoring, and evaluating all phases of those processes or incorporate all of the expedited acquisition authorities available to acquire joint urgent need solutions. Data systems for the processes lack comprehensive, reliable data for tracking overall results and do not have standards for collecting and managing data. In addition, the joint process does not include a formal method for feedback to inform joint leadership on the performance of solutions. In one case, a solution for a joint request was fielded for 18 months without meeting warfighter needs. In the absence of a management framework for its urgent needs processes, DOD lacks tools to fully assess how well its processes work, manage their performance, ensure efficient use of resources, and make decisions regarding the long-term sustainment of fielded capabilities. In conducting field work in Iraq as well as 23 case studies, GAO found several challenges that could hinder DOD's ability to rapidly respond to urgent warfighter needs. First, not all personnel involved in the initial development and review of urgent needs documentation receive adequate training. DOD policy states that deploying personnel should receive priority for training and be responsive to the needs of the combatant commander; however, officers responsible for drafting, submitting, and reviewing Army and joint urgent needs requests are not likely to receive such training. Hence, once in theater, they often face difficulties processing the large volume of requests, in a timely manner. Second, in 11 of 23 cases GAO studied, challenges obtaining funding were the primary factor that increased the amount of time needed to field solutions. Funding has not always been available for joint urgent needs in part because the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) has not assigned primary responsibility for implementing the department's rapid acquisition authority. Congress provided OSD with that authority to meet urgent warfighter needs, but OSD has played a reactive rather than proactive role in making decisions about when to invoke it. In addition, DOD can reprogram funds appropriated for other purposes to meet urgent needs requests, but authority for determining when and how to reprogram funds has been delegated to the services and combatant commands. Prior GAO work has shown that strong leadership from OSD over resource control is critical, and midlevel agencies such as the Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell, which is responsible for facilitating urgent needs requests, including funding, cannot guide other agencies at a high enough level to promote effective interagency coordination. Finally, GAO found that attempts to meet urgent needs with immature or complex technologies can result in significant delays.