Gaps in the Statutory and Regulatory Framework for Some Live Animal Imports May Contribute to Disease Risks, according to Experts and Agency Officials

The statutory and regulatory framework governing live animal imports has  gaps that could allow the introduction and spread of zoonotic diseases and  diseases affecting wildlife, according to the experts we surveyed, our  discussions with agency officials, and scientific studies on zoonotic and  animal diseases. APHIS Has Regulations to Protect U.S. Agriculture from Live Animal Imports That Could Carry Disease

APHIS has regulations to prevent the importation of live animals that it has  determined could pose a disease risk to agricultural animals. CDC Has Regulations for Some Live Animal Imports but Does Not Prevent the Importation of Many Animals That May Pose a Risk of Zoonotic Diseases

CDC has regulations to prevent the importation of certain live animals that  may pose a previously identified disease risk to humans for some diseases,  such as rabies, but, according to agency officials, CDC’s regulations are  limited to specific species and regions and do not comprehensively  prevent the importation of animals that are known to present a high risk of  zoonotic diseases. To address this  problem, in 2007, CDC issued an advance notice of proposed rulemaking  on live animal imports to take steps to better prevent the introduction of  zoonotic disease into the United States. In addition to  reviewing the petition to restrict amphibian imports, in January 2010, the  Secretary of the Interior directed FWS to comprehensively review  statutory authorities and regulations to address existing invasive species  problems and to recommend potential tools to more effectively prevent  the introduction of new invasive threats. Agencies Have Collaborated to Meet Their Responsibilities, but Experts and Agency Officials Identified Barriers to Further Collaboration

APHIS, CBP, CDC, and FWS have collaborated to meet their  responsibilities by taking actions in five areas—strategic planning, joint  strategies, written procedures, leveraging resources, and sharing data— but experts responding to our survey and agency officials we interviewed  identified barriers to further collaboration on live animal imports. Experts also identified  the need for an entity to help the agencies overcome these barriers. In  particular, experts responding to our survey noted that because each of  the agencies is focused on a different aspect of live animal imports, no  single entity has comprehensive responsibility for the zoonotic and animal  diseases risks posed by live animal imports. Joint strategies to reduce disease risk from imported live animals. In addition, while the agencies participating in ITDS  have formed workgroups for some types of trade data, APHIS, CBP, CDC,  and FWS have yet to jointly determine which data elements are needed for  them to effectively oversee live animal imports, according to CBP officials. As a result, it is unclear whether the data in the completed system will  meet interagency needs. These barriers—such as  different program priorities and unclear roles and responsibilities—are  inherent when multiple agencies have related responsibilities. Recommendations for Executive Action

To better prevent the importation of live animals carrying zoonotic and  animal diseases and improve the responsible agencies’ collaboration, we  recommend that the Secretaries of Agriculture, Health and Human  Services, Homeland Security, and the Interior take the following two  actions:    Develop and implement, in coordination with the relevant federal  agencies, a strategy for their collaboration in preventing the importation of  animals that may be carrying zoonotic and animal diseases into the United  States. The Department of Health and Human Services only  provided technical comments, which we included as appropriate. The Department of the Interior agreed with our findings and  recommendations. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

This report examines the (1) potential gaps in the statutory and regulatory  framework governing live animal imports, if any, that may allow the  introduction and spread of zoonotic and animal diseases; (2) extent to  which the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s Animal and Plant Health  Inspection Service (APHIS), Department of Homeland Security’s Customs  and Border Protection (CBP), Department of Health and Human Services’  Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, (CDC), and Department of the  Interior’s Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) collaborate to meet their  responsibilities and face barriers, if any, to collaboration; and (3) the  performance information that the responsible agencies have reported on  live animal imports. GAO Comments

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Why GAO Did This Study

The United States legally imported more than 1 billion live animals from 2005 through 2008. With increased trade and travel, zoonotic diseases (transmitted between animals and humans) and animal diseases can emerge anywhere and spread rapidly. The importation of live animals is governed by five principal statutes and implemented by four agencies. GAO was asked to examine, among other things, (1) potential gaps in the statutory and regulatory framework governing live animal imports, if any, that may allow the introduction and spread of zoonotic and animal diseases and (2) the extent to which the agencies collaborate to meet their responsibilities, and face barriers, if any, to collaboration. GAO reviewed statutes, met with agency officials, visited ports of entry, and surveyed experts on animal imports.

What GAO Found

The statutory and regulatory framework for live animal imports has gaps that could allow the introduction of diseases into the United States, according to the experts GAO surveyed, discussions with agency officials, and scientific studies. Specifically, (1) The Department of Health and Human Services' Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) has regulations to prevent the importation of live animals that may pose a previously identified disease risk to humans for some diseases, but gaps in its regulations may allow animals presenting other zoonotic disease risks to enter the United States. CDC has solicited comments in advance of a rulemaking to better prevent the importation of animals that pose zoonotic disease risks. (2) The Department of the Interior's Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) has regulations to prevent imports of nonnative live animals that could become invasive. However, it has not generally emphasized preventing the introduction of disease through importation. FWS is taking some initial steps to address disease risks. For example, in January 2010, the department directed FWS to review statutory authorities and regulations to address existing problems concerning nonnative live animals and recommend tools to better prevent the introduction of new threats. In contrast, the U.S. Department of Agriculture's Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) has regulations to prevent importing live animals it finds may pose a disease risk to agricultural animals. In 2008, APHIS issued a long-term strategy that would broaden its oversight of live animal imports. APHIS, the Department of Homeland Security's Customs and Border Protection (CBP), CDC, and FWS have collaborated to meet their responsibilities related to live animal imports by taking actions in five areas--strategic planning, joint strategies, written procedures, leveraging resources, and sharing data. However, experts GAO surveyed and agency officials GAO interviewed identified barriers to further collaboration on live animal imports, such as different program priorities and unclear roles and responsibilities, which are inherent when multiple agencies have related responsibilities. For example, experts noted that because each of the agencies is focused on a different aspect of live animal imports, no single entity has comprehensive responsibility for the zoonotic and animal disease risks posed by live animal imports. Experts also reported the need for an entity to help the agencies overcome these barriers to collaboration. Furthermore, the agencies have largely incompatible data systems, and a completion date for CBP's planned data system, which would provide the agencies with full operational access to information on incoming shipments of live animals, has not been established. In addition, APHIS, CBP, CDC, and FWS have yet to jointly determine which data elements on live animal imports are needed in this system for them to effectively oversee these imports, according to CBP officials. As a result, it is unclear whether the data elements in the completed system will meet interagency needs.

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that the Secretaries of Agriculture, Health and Human Services, Homeland Security, and the Interior develop a strategy to address barriers to agency collaboration that may allow potentially risky imported animals into the United States and jointly determine data needs to effectively oversee imported animals. In commenting on a draft of this report, the Departments of Agriculture, Interior and Homeland Security generally agreed with GAO's findings and recommendations. The Department of Health and Human Services provided technical comments only.