	Introduction

By all accounts, the U.S. military dominates state-on-state conflict. (1) 
In the past, combating non-state actors was seen by many to be a "lesser included case. "Non-state actors appeared to be less threatening to national security than the well funded, wellorganized, and much more militarily potent armed forces of an enemy nation-state. The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 graphically illustrate, however, that small groupsof non-state actors can exploit relatively inexpensive and commercially available technology toconduct very destructive attacks over great distances. Background

The U.S. armed forces that are fielded today were organized, trained and equipped principallywith conventional, state-on-state warfare in mind. Senior leaders in the Department of Defense(DOD) appear to appreciate the distinct challenges that combating non-state actors present, however,and are taking steps to ensure that these challenges are reflected in long-term military plans,programs, and policies. The focus of this report is on a number of challenges associated with uses of military aviation incombating terrorists and other non-state actors directly. Even conventional state-on-state conflict presents collateral damage concerns. When combating non-state actors, however, civilians may needto be engaged at an unprecedented level. Winning the "hearts and minds" of the local population, orat least not alienating them could become a large part of the overall counter insurgent, or counterterrorist strategy. Almost by definition, non-stateactors employ weapons and methods that are inexpensive, when compared to training, equipping andemploying a military force. However, the cost to defend against non-state actors, or to combat them,can be high. Yet, some are more directly applicable than others. Close Air Support (CAS). Special Operations Forces can also take indirect action against non-state actors. Issues and Options

		Introduction

There is a consensus view in defense circles that airpower is one of the United States' greatmilitary advantages. Some are increasingly concerned, however, that military aviation is focused toomuch on the demands of fighting conventional foes to the detriment of irregular warfare, and that"the challenge for the Air Force is to re-shape its forces to increase their relevance in small wars,while maintaining the capability to win major conflicts." (45) 
Some argue that DOD's overall acquisition priorities are still too oriented toward large, "hightech" acquisition programs most applicable to fighting or deterring a peer competitor in state-on-stateconflict. training, doctrine, planning and organization). DOD already operates a number of aerial sensor platforms that can be used to detectnon-state actors.
By all accounts, the U.S. military dominates state-on-state conflict. In the past, non-stateactors (terrorists, guerrillas, drug traffickers) appeared to be less threatening to U.S. national securitythan the well funded, well organized, and potent armed forces of an enemy nation-state. The terroristattacks of September 11, 2001 illustrate, however, that small groups of non-state actors can exploitrelatively inexpensive and commercially available technology to conduct very destructive attacksover great distances.
Today's U.S. armed forces were developed principally with state-on-state conflict in mind.Combating non-state actors, however, presents a number of distinct challenges in terms ofoperations, cost, and mindset. Non-state actors generally strive to hide within civilian populations.While U.S. policy makers typically seek quick and decisive victories, non-state actors seek protractedwar. Non-state actors often employ cheap, commercially available weapons, that often result inexpensive responses by the United States.
Many of the weapons and methods employed today by U.S. armed forces can be used againstnon-state actors. Some, however, are more directly applicable than others. U.S. experience inconducting close air support (CAS), employing special operations forces (SOF) and advising friendlygovernments in using aviation to defend themselves from insurgents and terrorists may form a basisfor building capabilities against non-state actors.
Pursuing objectives against non-state actors while "winning the hearts and minds" of localpopulations, or at least not alienating them, appears to be a key consideration. Recent military actionhas killed or captured prominent terrorists, but it is unclear whether this action actually degraded theterrorist organization's capabilities. In some cases, these actions may have even strengthened them.
There is a consensus view that airpower is one of the United States' great military advantages.Some are increasingly concerned, however, that military aviation is focused too much on thedemands of fighting conventional foes to the detriment of irregular warfare (also called MOOTWA-- military operations other than war), and that the Department of Defense (DOD) must re-shape itsaviation forces to increase their relevance in small wars, while maintaining the capability to winmajor conflicts.
Determination of DOD needs for combating non-state actors and fielding more relevantforces raises a number of acquisition issues. Some argue that DOD's overall acquisition prioritiesare still too oriented toward large, "high tech" acquisition programs most applicable to fighting ordeterring a peer competitor in state-on-state conflict. Equally important, however, are the mindsetchanges that may be required to transition to a force equally adept at fighting conventional and nonconventional foes. These mindset changes could include changes to training, doctrine, planning andorganization. This report will be updated as events warrant.