1). 3). Uncertain Security Conditions May Impede Iraqi Returns and Reintegration

Although the overall security situation in Iraq has improved since 2006, the  actual and perceived threat across governorates and neighborhoods  continues to impede Iraqi returns and reintegration, according to U.S.  government, UNHCR, and IOM officials. 4). In February 2009, IOM reported that 43 percent of the  post-2006 Samarra bombing IDPs surveyed did not have access to their  homes, primarily because the property was occupied or destroyed (see fig. 6). IOM further reported  that the returnee families it assessed listed fuel as one of the highest  priority needs. International Community Is Addressing Impediments That Iraqis Face; However, the Extent to Which These Efforts Result in Reintegration Is Not Measured, and Officials Reported Insufficient Iraqi Government Commitment and Capacity

Although international and nongovernmental organizations and U.S. and  Iraqi governments have taken action to address the impediments that Iraqi  IDPs and refugees face to return and reintegration, the extent to which  these efforts will result in reintegration (i.e., sustainable returns) is  unknown. Moreover, the Iraqi government has made limited  progress due to the lack of uniform government support and capacity,  according to international community officials. International and Nongovernmental Organizations Have Initiated Projects Addressing Conditions That Impede Returns and Reintegration, but the Effect on Reintegration Is Not Consistently Measured

International and nongovernmental organizations, supported by U.S. and  other donor funding, have initiated many projects to address impediments  to returns and reintegration of displaced Iraqis. Iraq, the United States, and the UN Lack Integrated Plans for Reintegrating Displaced Iraqis

Iraq, the United States, and other members of the international community  lack an integrated plan for reintegrating displaced Iraqis because Iraqi  MODM planning efforts stalled due to limitations of authority, capacity,  and broader Iraqi government support; the UN’s strategy and plans have  primarily focused on assistance to the most vulnerable Iraqis and have not  specifically focused on reintegration; and the current U.S. government  strategy has not been made publicly available. Also,  an unclassified version of the current U.S. strategy has not been developed  and made public. In addition, the UN has not  integrated data from UNHCR into its new Inter-Agency Information  Analysis Unit, which was established to provide a central point for  collecting and assessing needs-based data, according to a senior IAU  official. Lack of an Integrated Strategy Has Hindered Stakeholder Coordination and Efficiency

Without an integrated strategy, it is difficult for stakeholders to effectively  delineate roles and responsibilities and establish coordination and  oversight mechanisms for effective and efficient implementation. One area with significant potential for overlap is the establishment of  numerous assistance centers and mobile units across Iraq to register or  assist returnees, IDPs, and vulnerable Iraqis. Recommendations for Executive Action

To enhance the ability of the Iraqi and U.S. governments, international  organizations, and NGOs to effectively plan and integrate their efforts to  assist and reintegrate displaced Iraqis, we recommend that the Secretary  of State and the USAID Administrator work with the appropriate  international organizations to assist the Iraqi government in developing an  international strategy that addresses impediments to return and prepares  for and facilitates the return and reintegration of displaced Iraqis. To ensure that the U.S. and Iraqi governments, other donors, international  organizations, and implementing partners have the best data available  regarding the numbers and needs of IDPs, returnees, and other vulnerable  Iraqis, in the most efficient manner, we recommend that the Secretary of  State encourage UNHCR to share its raw data and methodology with the  IAU and take advantage of IAU expertise and coordinated efforts. State and USAID also agreed with our  recommendation regarding the need to work with UNHCR and other  implementing partners to take inventory of and assess the various  assistance, return, and registration centers and mobile units to determine  and achieve an optimal framework. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

To examine efforts to reintegrate displaced Iraqis, we reviewed (1) the  conditions in Iraq that pose a challenge to their reintegration; (2) the  actions that the United States, Iraq, and other members of the  international community have taken to address these conditions and  reintegration; and (3) the extent to which the United States, Iraq, and other  members of the international community have an effective strategy for  reintegrating displaced Iraqis.
Why GAO Did This Study

The estimated number of Iraqis who have been internally displaced since February 2006 is about 1.6 million, and numerous Iraqis are in neighboring countries. Tens of thousands of Iraqi families have returned home and the number is slowly increasing. GAO examined (1) conditions in Iraq that pose a challenge to the reintegration of displaced Iraqis, (2) actions the international community is taking to address these conditions and reintegration, and (3) the extent to which the international community has an effective reintegration strategy. GAO analyzed reports and data, met with officials from the U.S. and Iraqi governments and international and nongovernmental organizations, and did fieldwork in Geneva and Baghdad.

What GAO Found

Several issues impede the return and reintegration of displaced Iraqis. Although the overall security situation in Iraq has improved since 2006, the actual and perceived threat across governorates and neighborhoods continues to impede Iraqi returns and reintegration. Problems in securing property restitution or compensation and shelter have made it difficult to return and reintegrate. The International Organization for Migration (IOM) reported that 43 percent of the internally displaced that it surveyed did not have access to their homes, primarily because their property was occupied or destroyed. IOM also reported that one-third of the heads of returnee families it assessed were unemployed. Iraq continues to lack adequate access to essential services--that is, food, water, sanitation, electricity, health services, and education. Moreover, insufficient government capacity and commitment cross over each of the problem areas and serve as a deterrent to returns and reintegration. The international community has taken action to address the impediments that displaced Iraqis face, but the extent to which these efforts will result in reintegration of displaced Iraqis is uncertain. International and nongovernmental organizations, supported by U.S. and other donor funding, have initiated projects. However, the extent to which these projects specifically target and affect reintegration is not consistently measured. The Iraqi government has initiated efforts to encourage returns and reintegration. However, progress in this area has been limited due to insufficient commitment and capacity, according to international and U.S. officials. Iraq, the United States, and other members of the international community do not have an integrated international strategy for the reintegration of displaced Iraqis. The international community lacks integrated plans because Iraqi Ministry of Displacement and Migration planning efforts stalled due to limitations of authority, capacity, and broader Iraqi government support, according to U.S. and international officials; the United Nation's (UN) strategy and plans have not specifically focused on reintegration; and an unclassified version of the current U.S. government strategy has not been made publicly available. This situation has hindered efforts to efficiently assess the needs of internally displaced Iraqis and returnees. Moreover, the international community has not yet reached an agreement on goals and expected outcomes for reintegration. Also, the UN has not integrated data on returnee needs from the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) into its new Inter-Agency Information and Analysis Unit (IAU), which was established to provide a central point for collecting and assessing data, and UNHCR is not taking advantage of IAU resources and coordination efforts. Furthermore, it is difficult for stakeholders to effectively delineate roles and responsibilities and establish coordination and oversight mechanisms. One area with significant potential for inefficiencies is in the establishment and operation of numerous assistance centers and mobile units across Iraq by various entities to assist returnees, the internally displaced, and other vulnerable Iraqis.

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that (1) the Secretary of State (State) and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) Administrator assist Iraq in developing an effective integrated international strategy for reintegrating displaced Iraqis; (2) State and USAID make publicly available an unclassified version of the current U.S. strategy; (3) State encourage UNHCR to share primary data collected and take advantage of the IAU efforts; and (4) State and USAID work with UNHCR and others to inventory and assess the operations of the various assistance centers to determine and achieve an optimal framework. The Department of State and USAID concurred with our recommendations.