While the Army National Guard performs both  federal and state missions, the Guard is organized, trained, and equipped  for its federal missions, and these take priority over state missions. Declining Preparedness from High Pace of Operations Signifies A Need to Reexamine the Army National Guard’s Business Model

As we previously reported, the high number of Army National Guard  forces used to support overseas and homeland missions since September  11, 2001, has resulted in decreased preparedness of nondeployed Guard  forces which suggests the need to reassess DOD’s business model for the  Army National Guard. Because its units did not have all the resources they needed to  deploy at the outset of current operations, the Army National Guard has  had to transfer personnel and equipment from nondeploying units to  prepare deploying units. Critical Equipment Shortages Have Degraded the Readiness of Nondeployed Army National Guard Units for Future Overseas and Domestic Missions

Increasing equipment shortages among nondeployed Army National Guard  units illustrate the need for DOD to reexamine its equipping strategy and  business model for the Army National Guard. Compounding the equipment shortages that have  developed because most Army National Guard units are still structured  with lesser amounts of equipment than they need to deploy, Army National  Guard units have left more than 64,000 equipment items valued at over  $1.2 billion in Iraq for use by follow-on forces; however, the Army has not  developed replacement plans for this equipment as required by DOD  policy. Equipment Status of Nondeployed Units Has Worsened in Recent Months due to Challenges in Supporting Overseas Operations with Current Inventory Levels

While most Army National Guard combat units are typically provided from  65 to 79 percent of the equipment they would need for their wartime  missions, for recent operations, combatant commanders have required  units to deploy with 90 to100 percent of the equipment they are expected  to need and with equipment that is compatible with active Army units. Retaining Army National Guard Equipment Overseas without Plans for Replacement Hinders the Guard’s Ability to Prepare and Train Units

To address equipment requirements for current overseas operations, the  Army now requires units, in both the active and reserve components, to  leave certain essential items that are in short supply in Iraq for follow-on  units to use, but it has not developed plans to replace Army National  Guard equipment as DOD policy requires. As of July 2005, the National Guard Bureau  estimates that the Army Material Command was only tracking about 45  percent of the over 64,000 equipment items the Army National Guard units  have left in theater. As a result, the Guard  does not know when or whether its equipment will be returned, which  challenges its ability to prepare and train for future missions. DOD and Army Have Some Initiatives to Improve Future Readiness of Army National Guard Forces but Has Not Developed Detailed Implementation and Funding Plans

DOD, and the Army have recognized the need to transform the Army  National Guard to meet the new threats of the 21st century and support  civil authorities, and are undertaking some initiatives to improve the  Guard’s organization and readiness for these missions. In addition, while DOD has produced a strategy for  homeland defense and civil support in June 2005, it has not yet completed  a plan to implement that strategy, including clarifying the Army National  Guard’s role and assessing what capabilities the Guard will require for  domestic missions, as we previously recommended. In our report, we recommend that DOD develop and  submit to the Congress a plan for the effective integration of the Army  National Guard into the Army’s rotational force model and modular  initiatives. The  current status of the Army’s equipment inventory is one symptom of the  much larger problem of an outdated business model. Further, it is not  clear that these initiatives will result in a comprehensive and integrated  strategy for ensuring that the Army National Guard is well prepared for  overseas missions, homeland security needs, and state missions such as  responding to natural disasters.
Why GAO Did This Study

Since September 2001, the National Guard has experienced the largest activation of its members since World War II. Currently, over 30 percent of the Army forces now in Iraq are Army National Guard members, and Guard forces have also carried out various homeland security and large-scale disaster response roles. However, continued heavy use of the Guard forces has raised concerns about whether it can successfully perform and sustain both missions over time. In the short term, the National Guard is seeking additional funding for emergency equipment. GAO was asked to comment on (1) the changing role of the Army National Guard, (2) whether the Army National Guard has the equipment it needs to sustain federal and state missions, and (3) the extent to which DOD has strategies and plans to improve the Army National Guard's business model for the future.

What GAO Found

The heavy reliance on National Guard forces for overseas and homeland missions since September 2001 has resulted in readiness problems which suggest that the current business model for the Army National Guard is not sustainable over time. Therefore, the business model should be reexamined in light of the current and expected national security environment, homeland security needs, and fiscal challenges the nation faces in the 21st century. Under post-Cold War planning assumptions, the Army National Guard was organized as a strategic reserve to be used primarily in the later stages of a conflict after receiving additional personnel, equipment and training. Therefore, in peacetime Army National Guard units did not have all the equipment and personnel they would need to perform their wartime missions. However, over 70,000 Guard personnel are now deployed for federal missions, with thousands more activated to respond to recent natural disasters. To provide ready forces, the Guard transferred large numbers of personnel and equipment among units, thereby exacerbating existing personnel and equipment shortages of non-deployed units. As a result, the preparedness of non-deployed units for future missions is declining. The need to reexamine the business model for the Army National Guard is illustrated by growing equipment shortages. As of July 2005, the Army National Guard had transferred over 101,000 equipment items to units deploying overseas, exhausting its inventory of some critical items, such as radios and generators, in non-deployed units. Nondeployed Guard units now face significant equipment shortfalls because: (1) prior to 2001, most Army National Guard units were equipped with 65 to 79 percent of their required war-time items and (2) Guard units returning from overseas operations have left equipment, such as radios and trucks for follow-on forces. The Army National Guard estimates that its units left over 64,000 items valued at over $1.2 billion overseas. However, the Army cannot account for over half of these items and does not have a plan to replace them, as DOD policy requires. Nondeployed Guard units now have only about one-third of the equipment they need for their overseas missions, which hampers their ability to prepare for future missions and conduct domestic operations. Without a plan and funding strategy that addresses the Guard's equipment needs for all its missions, DOD and Congress do not have assurance that the Army has an affordable plan to improve the Guard's equipment readiness. DOD is taking some steps to adapt to the new security environment and balance the Army National Guard's overseas and homeland missions. For example, the Army has embarked on reorganization to a modular, rotational force. Also, DOD issued a strategy for homeland defense and civil support in June 2005. However, until DOD develops an equipping plan and funding strategy to implement its initiatives, Congress and DOD will not have assurance that these changes will create a new business model that can sustain the Army National Guard affordably and effectively for the full range of its future missions.