As with other parts of the report, this section has many elements that are the subject of vigorous debate and remain fully or partially outside public knowledge. CRS does not claim that it has confirmed independently any sources cited within this report that attribute specific positions or views to Israeli, U.S., or other officials. The remainder of this report is unchanged from the version published on March 28, 2012. Twice in its history, Israel has conducted air strikes aimed at preventing a regional actor from acquiring a nuclear weapons capability—destroying Iraq's Tammuz-Osirak reactor in 1981 and a presumed reactor under construction at Al Kibar near Deir al Zur in Syria in 2007. For Congress, the potential impact—short- and long-term—of an Israeli decision regarding Iran and its implementation is a critical issue of concern. What effect might an attack have on a potential Iranian decision to weaponize its nuclear program? Yet, even some Israeli officials who generally avoid characterizing the threat of a nuclear-weapons-capable Iran as existential describe it as still presenting unacceptably high risks. The Israeli Decisionmaking Process108

Several factors may influence any Israeli political decision relating to a possible strike on Iranian nuclear facilities. These include, but are not limited to, the views and interactions of Israeli decisionmakers; the public debate in Israel, the stances and anticipated responses of U.S., regional, and international actors; estimates of the effects of a possible strike; and the anticipated Iranian response regionally and internationally. It is unclear how influential security officials' views would be in a decision on a strike. Israeli leaders' perspectives about the possible effects of a strike on U.S. political and material assistance to Israel, possible negative security consequences for the United States from a potential Iranian retaliation, and the probability of future U.S. military action to prevent a nuclear-armed Iran may, among other considerations, influence the Israeli decisionmaking process
An Israeli journalist wrote in March 2012 that Israel did not ask permission when it acted to prevent Saddam Hussein and Bashar al Asad from obtaining nuclear weapons, but that "the [Obama] administration can credibly counter that in neither case did Israeli unilateralism threaten to draw America into an armed conflict, as it does now." Not all Israeli assessments agree, however. Potential Factors in an Israeli Decision: Estimated Effects of a Possible Strike

		Effect on Iran's Nuclear Program204

Another major consideration for Israeli decisionmakers is the ultimate impact of an Israeli military strike on Iran's existing nuclear program. An Israeli strike on Iran could raise significant questions for Members of Congress, both short- and long-term. These include, but are not limited to, the following: 
How might a strike affect options and debate regarding short-term and long-term U.S. relations and security cooperation with, and foreign assistance to, Israel and other regional countries? Would an Israeli strike on Iranian nuclear facilities be considered self-defense? Why or why not? What would be the legal and policy implications either way? How might a strike affect the implementation of existing sanctions legislation on Iran or options and debate over new legislation on the subject? How might Congress consult with the Obama Administration on and provide oversight with respect to various political and military options?
Several published reports indicate that top Israeli decisionmakers are seriously considering whether to order a military strike on Iran's nuclear facilities, and if so, when. Twice in Israel's history, it has conducted air strikes aimed at halting or delaying what Israeli policymakers believed to be efforts to acquire nuclear weapons by a Middle Eastern state—destroying Iraq's Osirak reactor in 1981 and a facility the Israelis identified as a reactor under construction in Syria in 2007. Today, Israeli officials generally view the prospect of a nuclear-armed Iran as an unacceptable threat to Israeli security—with some describing it as an existential threat. This report analyzes key factors that may influence Israeli political decisions relating to a possible strike on Iranian nuclear facilities. These include, but are not limited to, the views of and relationships among Israeli leaders; the views of the Israeli public; U.S., regional, and international stances and responses as perceived and anticipated by Israel; Israeli estimates of the potential effectiveness and risks of a possible strike; and responses Israeli leaders anticipate from Iran and Iranian-allied actors—including Hezbollah and Hamas—regionally and internationally.
For Congress, the potential impact—short- and long-term—of an Israeli decision regarding Iran and its implementation is a critical issue of concern. By all accounts, such an attack could have considerable regional and global security, political, and economic repercussions, not least for the United States, Israel, and their bilateral relationship. It is unclear what the ultimate effect of a strike would be on the likelihood of Iran acquiring nuclear weapons. The current Israeli government, President Barack Obama, and many Members of Congress have similar concerns about Iran's nuclear program. They appear to have a range of views on how best to address those shared concerns. Iran maintains that its nuclear program is solely for peaceful, civilian energy and research purposes, and U.S. intelligence assessments say that Iran has not made a decision to build nuclear weapons. However, Iran continues to enrich uranium in militarily hardened sites and questions remain about its nuclear weapons capabilities and intentions.
Short- and long-term questions for Members of Congress to consider regarding a possible Israeli decision to strike Iranian nuclear facilities militarily might include, but are not limited to, the following:
How might an Israeli strike affect options and debate regarding short-term and long-term U.S. relations and security cooperation with, and foreign assistance to, Israel and other regional countries? Would an Israeli strike be considered self-defense? Why or why not? What would be the legal and policy implications either way? How might a strike affect the implementation of existing sanctions legislation on Iran or options and debate over new legislation on the subject? How might Congress consult with the Obama Administration on and provide oversight with respect to various political and military options?
This report has many aspects that are the subject of vigorous debate and remain fully or partially outside public knowledge. CRS does not claim to independently confirm any sources cited within this report that attribute specific positions or views to various Israeli, U.S., or other officials.
This is an update of a report dated March 28, 2012. However, the only updated material is the initial section entitled "Developments from Late March to September 2012."