DOE Achieved Its Goals for Two of Four Key Activities

DOE achieved its goals for the initiative for the key activities of removing  or disposing of HEU and plutonium and downblending HEU; however, it  did not achieve its goals for upgrading the physical protection of HEU and  plutonium at vulnerable sites or for converting reactors and associated  facilities that use HEU to LEU. According to  GTRI records, over the course of the initiative (April 2009 through  December 2013), GTRI removed 1,581 kilograms of HEU and plutonium,  exceeding its goal of 1,201 kilograms as reported in DOE’s fiscal year  2010 budget request. Downblending HEU: DOE’s MPC&A exceeded its goal for downblending  2,700 kilograms of HEU. More specifically, DOE has developed the following goals since the  initiative ended in 2013:  Removing or disposing of HEU and plutonium: According to DOE  planning documents and information that department officials provided to  us, GTRI’s goal is to remove or dispose of an additional 1,029 kilograms  of fresh and spent HEU, as well as plutonium worldwide from 2014 to  December 2019. Converting reactors: DOE’s fiscal year 2015 budget request states that  GTRI’s goal is to convert 27 foreign research reactors and medical  isotope production facilities to LEU by the end of fiscal year 2019. Challenges May Hamper Agencies in Four Key Ways

We identified four challenges that may hamper DOE and other agencies’  abilities to meet their goals and maintain progress to secure HEU and  plutonium going forward: (1) access to some countries and sites may  continue to be a challenge, (2) DOE and other U.S. agencies have not  completed an inventory of U.S.-obligated plutonium overseas, (3) DOE  has not prioritized its inventory list of HEU at foreign locations for removal  or disposition, and (4) DOE and other agencies have not visited key sites  in more than 20 years to determine whether U.S.-origin material on-site is  adequately protected. DOE and Other U.S. DOE, NRC, and State did not agree with this  recommendation, but they have taken actions to partially implement it. However, as of May 2015, GTRI had neither provided GAO  with a detailed or specific prioritized list of nuclear materials for return as  noted in July 2014 and reaffirmed in January 2015, nor provided a time  frame for doing so. DOE and Other Agencies Have Not Visited Key Sites in More Than 20 Years to Determine Whether U.S.-Origin Material On-Site Is Adequately Protected

The fourth challenge that may hamper future progress is that DOE and  other agencies have not visited key sites to ascertain whether U.S.-origin  nuclear material is protected in accordance with international physical  security guidelines. As we recommended in September 2011, we continue to  believe that U.S. agencies should complete an inventory of all U.S.- obligated plutonium overseas to determine whether these nuclear  materials are vulnerable, as well as to determine the amounts and  locations of additional quantities of U.S.-obligated plutonium at worldwide  sites that could be addressed in future DOE efforts. DOE has taken steps to develop a methodology to select and prioritize  physical protection visits, as we had recommended in our September  2011 report. Recommendations for Executive Action

We are making two recommendations to ensure that the global initiative  to remove and secure vulnerable nuclear materials achieves its stated  goals of securing the most vulnerable nuclear materials and ensure that  U.S. agencies are able to secure as much vulnerable nuclear material as  possible:
To ensure that the most vulnerable nuclear materials are given priority  for removal or disposition, we recommend that the Secretary of  Energy complete the prioritization for removal or disposition of  inventories of identified nuclear materials at foreign locations,  including recently identified stocks of U.S.-origin HEU at foreign  locations, to determine priorities for efforts going forward. To ensure that Category I and Category II U.S.-origin nuclear material  is protected in accordance with international physical security  guidelines, we recommend that the Secretary of Energy work with  U.S. agencies by requesting and, where feasible, undertaking  physical protection visits at partner country sites that hold Category I  and Category II quantities of U.S.-obligated nuclear material that have  not been visited in more than 5 years—particularly those that have not  been visited in 20 or more years. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

This report: (1) assesses the extent to which the Department of Energy  (DOE) achieved its goals associated with the 2009 initiative’s four key  activities of removing, downblending, and upgrading the physical  protection of highly enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium, and  converting facilities that use HEU, and (2) examines DOE’s goals since  the end of the initiative associated with the four key activities and  identifies and assesses challenges, if any, that may limit DOE’s ability to  secure as much vulnerable nuclear material as possible. We interviewed officials from DOE, the Department of Defense (DOD),  the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), and the Department of State  (State) and discussed these issues with NSC officials to determine the  extent to which these agencies contributed to the initiative and their plans  going forward.
Why GAO Did This Study

In April 2009, President Obama announced an initiative to secure all vulnerable nuclear materials—such as those that could be stolen by terrorists and used to construct a nuclear device—within 4 years. DOE is primarily responsible for activities under this initiative, but the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), the Departments of Defense (DOD) and State, and the National Security Council (NSC) also have roles. GAO was asked to examine actions taken under this initiative.
This report (1) assesses the extent to which DOE achieved its goals for four key activities under the initiative and (2) examines DOE's goals going forward and assesses challenges that may limit its ability to secure additional vulnerable nuclear materials. GAO reviewed relevant documents and interviewed officials from DOE, NRC, DOD, and State, as well as discussed these issues with officials from NSC and selected foreign government agencies. This is a public version of a classified report GAO issued in August 2015.

What GAO Found

The Department of Energy (DOE) achieved goals for two of its four key activities under the President's 2009 initiative to secure all vulnerable nuclear materials within 4 years. Specifically, from April 2009 through December 2013, GAO's analysis of DOE's records found that DOE exceeded its goal for removing or disposing of 1,201 kilograms of highly enriched uranium (HEU) or plutonium by more than 400 kilograms, and it exceeded its goal of downblending (i.e., mixing HEU with either depleted or natural uranium, or low-enriched uranium (LEU), to produce a new product that has a lower concentration of uranium-235) 2,700 kilograms of HEU by an additional 2,200 kilograms. However, it missed its goal for providing physical protection upgrades at 43 buildings by 11 buildings and missed its goal of converting 34 foreign reactors to more proliferation-resistant LEU by 11 reactors. DOE officials said that political challenges, including access to key sites, and technical concerns such as delays in the development of LEU replacement fuels for certain high-performing nuclear reactors, complicated its efforts to achieve these goals.
DOE has developed new goals since the end of the 2009 initiative for efforts related to the initiative's four key activities. For example, DOE's goal is to remove or dispose of an additional 1,029 kilograms of fresh and spent HEU, as well as plutonium worldwide from 2014 to December 2019, and convert 27 foreign research reactors and medical isotope production facilities to LEU by the end of fiscal year 2019. However, GAO identified several challenges that may hamper future progress. For example, DOE and other U.S. agencies have not completed an inventory of U.S plutonium overseas as GAO previously recommended in September 2011. DOE and the other agencies did not agree with this recommendation, citing such an effort was impractical and unwarranted. Without such an inventory, the U.S. government is not able to identify where vulnerable weapons-usable materials such as plutonium reside. In addition, DOE has neither completed a prioritization of nuclear materials, including recently identified U.S.-origin HEU, at foreign locations for return or disposition to identify the most vulnerable material stocks to focus efforts on, nor established a time frame for doing so. Another challenge GAO identified is that DOE and other agencies have not visited key sites to determine whether U.S. nuclear material on-site is protected according to international physical security guidelines. Specifically, GAO identified 11 key sites that hold more than 3,500 kilograms of U.S.-origin HEU that DOE and other agencies have not visited in more than 20 years to determine whether they are protected according to international physical security guidelines. DOE has taken steps to develop a methodology for selecting and prioritizing physical protection visits but has not yet provided GAO with a time frame for prioritizing and conducting such visits. Without an assessment of the physical security conditions of U.S.-origin nuclear materials at sites containing key quantities of such material, it may be difficult to ensure that such materials are being adequately protected in accordance with international physical security guidelines, and that DOE and U.S. agencies are removing or disposing of the most vulnerable nuclear materials.

What GAO Recommends

GAO continues to believe that DOE and other U.S. agencies should complete an inventory of U.S. plutonium at worldwide sites as GAO recommended in September 2011. In this report, GAO recommends that DOE complete its prioritization of nuclear materials at foreign locations. GAO also recommends that DOE and other agencies visit sites containing key quantities of U.S nuclear materials that have not been visited in at least 5 years. DOE agreed with GAO's recommendations.