(2) The recommendations of the9/11 Commission, as they relate to strategy content and implementation, appear consistent with, andsupportive of, the National Strategy. (20) 

	The 9/11 Commission Report

On July 22, 2004, the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States["9/11 Commission"] issued its final report. (25) 
On December 17, 2004, President Bush signed the Intelligence Reform and Prevention Actof 2004 ( S. 2845 , P.L. 108-458 ) establishing the position of National IntelligenceDirector (a position separate from that of the CIA Director) to serve as the President's principalintelligence advisor, overseeing and coordinating the foreign and domestic activities of theintelligence community. Established as well is a National Counterterrorism Center designed toserve as a central knowledge bank for information about known and suspected terrorists and tocoordinate and monitor counterterrorism plans and activities of all government agencies. The Centerwill also be responsible for preparing the daily terrorism threat report for the President. (33) 
Some, however, see certain Commission recommendations as incomplete, if not flawed. They suggest that the Commission is often focused on the "last war" and not a future one, and likenthe Commission's recommendations to picking the "low hanging fruit on the tree while avoidinggoing after the higher -- more difficult to reach, yet richer -- clusters." (34) For example, theCommission, as its first recommendation, suggests identifying and prioritizing terrorist sanctuarieswith a focus on failed states. Some assert, however, that terrorists increasingly return to theirpolitically stable home countries for sanctuary where they blend into local communities, where theirtraining camps are in civilian housing complexes, and where their bomb factories are in privateresidences. (35) 
A number of the Commission's recommendations fall within the category of preventing thegrowth of Islamist extremism and both the 2003 National Strategy and the 9/11 Commission Reportto a large degree equate the terrorist threat with al Qaeda and affiliated groups. Another issuecentral to combating Islamist extremism, not addressed in the 2003 National Strategy or the 9/11Commission recommendations, is that of confronting incitement to terrorism when promoted,countenanced, or facilitated by the action, or inaction, of nation states.
On July 22, 2004 the 9/11 Commission released its final report. The report calls for changesto be made by the executive branch and Congress to more effectively protect our nation in an ageof modern terrorism and provides forty-one concrete recommendations. Generally, therecommendations of the 9/11 Commission as they relate to strategy content and implementationappear consistent with, and supportive of, the National Strategy. Few question the 9/11 CommissionReport's overarching premise that U.S. counter-terrorism structure, strategy, and implementation canbe improved.
Some, however, see certain Commission recommendations as incomplete, if not flawed. They suggest that the Commission is often focused on the "last war" and not a future one and suggestthat the Commission consciously avoids tackling some of the more complex, yet pressing issues. For example, the Commission, as its first recommendation, stresses the need for identifying andprioritizing terrorist sanctuaries with a focus on failed states. Some assert, however, that terroristsare increasingly returning to their politically stable home countries for sanctuary where they blendinto local communities, where their training camps are in civilian housing complexes, and wheretheir bomb factories are in private residences. Although a number of the Commission'srecommendations fall within the category of preventing the growth of Islamic extremism, noneaddresses directly the issue of confronting incitement to terrorism when promoted, countenanced,or facilitated by the action -- or inaction -- of nation states.
With terrorists able to change targets, tactics, and weapons on short notice, many argue thata successful counterterrorism strategy and institutional structures will need similar flexibility. Thedegree to which such flexibility will be built into strategy, and into any new institutional structuresrecommend by the 9/11 Commission, is yet to be determined.
On December 17, 2004, President Bush signed the Intelligence Reform and Prevention Actof 2004 ( S. 2845 , P.L. 108-458 ) establishing the position of National IntelligenceDirector (a position separate from that of the CIA Director) to serve as the President's principalintelligence advisor, overseeing and coordinating the foreign and domestic activities of theintelligence community. Established as well is a National Counterterrorism Center designed toserve as a central knowledge bank for information about known and suspected terrorists and tocoordinate and monitor counterterrorism plans and activities of all government agencies. The Centerwill also be responsible for preparing the daily terrorism threat report for the President.