	Background

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration Authorization Act of  2010 directed NASA to, among another things, develop a Space Launch  System as a follow-on to the Space Shuttle and as a key component in  expanding human presence beyond low-Earth orbit. The first version of the SLS that NASA is  developing is a 70-mt launch vehicle known as Block I. NASA has  committed to conduct two test flights of the Block I vehicle—the first in  2018 and the second in 2021. Specifically,  we reported in July 2014 that NASA had yet to establish baselines that  matched the SLS program’s cost and schedule resources with the  requirement to develop the SLS and launch the first flight test in  December 2017 at the required confidence level of 70 percent. NASA  policy generally requires a 70 percent joint confidence level—a  calculation NASA uses to estimate the probable success of a program  meeting its cost and schedule targets—for a program to proceed with final  design and fabrication. At that time, the agency’s funding plan for  SLS was insufficient to match requirements to resources for the  December 2017 flight test at the 70 percent joint confidence level and the  agency’s options for matching resources to requirements were largely  limited to increasing program funding, delaying the schedule, or accepting  a reduced confidence level for the initial flight test. In our July 2014 report we recommended, among other things, that NASA  develop baselines for SLS based on matching cost and schedule  resources to requirements that would result in a level of risk  commensurate with its policies. NASA concurred with our findings and  recommendations. In August 2014, NASA established formal cost and  schedule baselines for the SLS program at the 70 percent joint  confidence level for a committed launch readiness date of November  2018. Nevertheless, the program plans to continue to pursue an initial  capability of SLS by December 2017 as an internal goal and has  calculated a joint cost and schedule confidence level of 30 percent  associated with that date. As illustrated by table 1 below, the SLS and GSDO programs are  pursuing ambitious and varying target dates for the EM-1 test flight. In  addition, the Orion program is currently tracking and reporting to  December 2017. With the Orion and GSDO  programs likely unable to meet the December 2017 date, NASA risks  exhausting limited human exploration resources to achieve an aggressive  SLS program schedule when those resources may be needed to resolve  other issues within the human exploration effort. NASA’s SLS and Orion Programs Are Making Progress, but the Orion Program Is Facing Technical Challenges

We reported in July 2014 that NASA’s metrics indicated the SLS program  was on track to meet many of its design goals for demonstrating the initial  capability of SLS. The Orion program just completed its first experimental test flight—EFT-1. Data  from this flight are required to address several significant risks that the  Orion program is currently tracking that must be addressed before  humans can be flown on Orion. For example,  during parachute testing, NASA discovered that when only two of the  three main parachutes are deployed, they begin to swing past each other  creating a “pendulum” effect. This effect could cause the capsule to  increase speed and to hit the water at an angle that may damage the  capsule thereby endangering the crew. Further, NASA faces choices  between differing design solutions to resolve cracking issues discovered  during manufacturing of the heat shield that protects the capsule during  re-entry. Both the parachute and heat shield challenges must  be resolved before EM-2 because each represents a significant risk to  crew safety. NASA’s Human Exploration Programs’ Long-Term Missions and Affordability Are Uncertain

NASA has yet to address our concerns regarding mission planning or life- cycle cost estimates.
Why GAO Did This Study

NASA is undertaking a trio of closely related programs to continue human space exploration beyond low-Earth orbit: the SLS vehicle; the Orion capsule, which will launch atop the SLS and carry astronauts; and GSDO, the supporting ground systems. As a whole, the efforts represent NASA's largest exploration investment over the next decade, approaching $23 billion, to demonstrate initial capabilities.
In May 2014, GAO found that NASA's preliminary life-cycle cost estimates for human exploration were incomplete and recommended that NASA establish life-cycle cost and schedule baselines for each upgraded block of SLS, Orion, and GSDO; NASA partially concurred. In July 2014, GAO issued a report on SLS's progress toward its first test flight and recommended that NASA match SLS's resources to its requirements and define specific missions beyond the second test flight, among other actions. NASA concurred with these recommendations.
This testimony is based on GAO's May 2014 report ( GAO-14-385 ), July 2014 report ( GAO-14-631 ), and ongoing audit work related to SLS and Orion. It discusses NASA's efforts to match resources to requirements for the SLS program and developmental challenges facing the SLS and Orion programs. To conduct this work, GAO reviewed relevant design, development, cost, and schedule documents and interviewed program officials.

What GAO Found

In 2014, GAO reported on a number of issues related to the National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA) human exploration programs: the Space Launch System (SLS) vehicle, the Orion Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle (Orion), and the Ground Systems Development and Operations (GSDO). For example, in July 2014, GAO found that NASA had not matched resources to requirements for the SLS program and was pursuing an aggressive development schedule—a situation compounded by the agency's reluctance to request funding commensurate with the program's needs. In August 2014, NASA established formal cost and schedule baselines for the SLS program at the agency-required 70 percent joint cost and schedule confidence level (JCL), which satisfied one recommendation from GAO's July 2014 report. The JCL is a calculation NASA uses to estimate the probable success of a program meeting its cost and schedule targets. To satisfy the 70 percent JCL requirement, the SLS program delayed its committed launch readiness date for its first test flight from December 2017 to November 2018. The program is still pursuing December 2017 as an internal goal, or target date, for the test flight, even though NASA calculated the JCL associated with launching SLS on this date at 30 percent. Moreover, neither the Orion nor GSDO program expects to be ready for the December 2017 launch date. With these programs likely unable to meet the December 2017 date, NASA risks exhausting limited human exploration resources to achieve an accelerated SLS program schedule when those resources may be needed to resolve challenges on other human exploration programs.
In addition, GAO's ongoing work has found that the Orion program is facing significant technical and funding issues. Orion just completed its first test flight, and data from this flight is required to address several risks that must be resolved before the second test flight in 2021 because they represent risks to crew safety. For example, during parachute testing, NASA discovered that when only two of the three main parachutes are deployed, they begin to swing past each other creating a “pendulum” effect. This effect could cause the capsule to increase speed and to hit the water at an angle that may damage the capsule, thereby endangering the crew. In addition, data from the test is necessary to inform NASA's design solution to address heat shield cracking issues, which NASA has been working to resolve since August 2013. The heat shield is integral to crew safety during re-entry.