The Army is changing the missions of some Army organizations and  retraining soldiers to produce more soldiers and units with high-demand  skills. The Army does not plan to make any decision  on full-time support resource levels until after this study is completed in  September 2009. lization  As a result of the challenges faced in achieving desired personnel  readiness levels, the Army and its reserve components have had to  continue taking steps to improve individual and unit readiness late in the  force-generation cycle and after mobilization. Such steps include  addressing medical and dental issues and transferring personnel from  nondeployed to deploying units to fill shortages. Despite the magnitude of the Army’s projected investment in its reserve  components, until operational demand eases, it seems unlikely that the  Army will be able to achieve DOD’s goal of a sustainable mobilization  cycle for its reserve forces or fully implement the train-mobilize-deploy  model. The Army Has Estimated and Budgeted for Some Costs to Transition Its Reserve Components to an Operational Force, but Has Not yet Finalized an Implementation Plan and Funding Strategy

The Army has estimated and budgeted for some costs that relate to the  transition of its reserve components to an operational force, but the full  cost of the transition remains uncertain and could vary widely from the  initial estimates depending on Army decisions. However,  the Army continued to examine the estimates for pre- and  postmobilization validation, training support, and installation support. The most recent Army estimates show a cost range from $12.7  billion to $27 billion over a 6-year period. The Army Plans to Include the Majority of Estimated Transition Costs in Its Fiscal Year 2012 to 2017 Projected Spending Plans, but It Has Not Finalized an Implementation Plan and a Funding Strategy for Achieving Its Goals

According to Army officials, The Fiscal Year 2010 President’s Budget  Request includes some funding that supports the reserves’ operational  role, but the Army plans to include the majority of funding for transition  costs in its fiscal year 2012-2017 projected spending plans after it obtains  more information on the resources needed to support the operational role. Additionally, best  practices for strategic planning have shown that effective and efficient  operations require detailed plans outlining major implementation tasks,  defined metrics and timelines to measure progress, a comprehensive and  realistic funding strategy, and communication of key information to  decision makers. States Use Mutual Support Agreements to Mitigate Effects of National Guard Deployments, although Some Domestic Requirements Remain Undefined

The deployment of National Guard units as a federal operational force has  reduced their availability for domestic missions, but the effect on the  states remains unclear because states have mitigated shortfalls through  mutual support agreements and requirements for some domestic missions,  such as responding to large multistate events, remain undefined. Complete a cost estimate for the transition that, at a minimum, should    a clear definition of what costs the Army does and does not consider to be  related to the transition to an operational force;    estimates for key cost drivers; and  identification of any uncertainties in the estimates due to pending changes  to the reserve components’ force structure, personnel, training, and  equipping strategies or other decisions that may affect costs, and updates  to the plan as these decisions are made. To identify the extent to which the Army has made progress but faces  challenges in modifying the force structure, manning, and equipping  strategies of its reserve components to meet the requirements of the  operational role, we reviewed prior GAO work, reports of the Commission  on the National Guard and Reserves, reports to Congress on related  initiatives and issues, current Army plans and policy documents, including  the Army Campaign Plan, Army Structure Memorandums, Army Forces  Command’s concept plan for Army Initiative 4 (transition the reserve  components to an operational force), Army Forces Command’s 4 + 1 Army  National Guard Brigade Combat Team Comprehensive Review, the  National Guard and Reserve Equipment Report, DOD Directive 1200.17,  Managing the Reserve Components as an Operational Force, and  Headquarters Department of the Army Execution Order 150-18 Reserve  Component Deployment Expeditionary Force Pre- and Post-Mobilization  Training Strategy. To determine the effect of the National Guard’s federal operational role on  its availability to state governors for domestic missions, we reviewed  relevant sections of Titles 10 and 32 of the U.S. Code, and DOD directives  regarding management of the reserve components as an operational force  and National Guard homeland defense activities. Reserve Forces: An Integrated Plan is Needed to Address Army Reserve  Personnel and Equipment Shortages.
Why GAO Did This Study

Since September 11, 2001, the Army has heavily used its reserve components--the Army National Guard and Army Reserve--for ongoing operations even though they were envisioned and resourced to be strategic reserves. A congressional commission, the Department of Defense (DOD), and the Army have concluded the Army will need to continue to use its reserve components as an operational force. The transition will require changes to force structure as well as manning and equipping strategies that could cost billions of dollars. The 2009 Defense Authorization Act directed GAO to study this transition. This report provides additional information on (1) progress and challenges the Army faces, (2) to what extent the Army has estimated costs for the transition and included them in its projected spending plans, and (3) the effect of the operational role on the Guard's availability to state governors for domestic missions. GAO examined planning, policy, and budget documents, and relevant sections of Titles 10 and 32 of the U.S. Code; and met with DOD, Army, reserve component, and state officials.

What GAO Found

The Army is changing the organization and missions of some of its reserve units to provide more operational forces, and is increasing their personnel and equipment, but faces challenges in achieving the predictable and sustainable mobilization cycle envisioned for an operational force, primarily due to the high pace of operations. The Army is reorganizing its reserve units to match their active counterparts, is changing the missions of some units, has made plans to add over 9,000 personnel by 2013, and has requested almost $23 billion for reserve equipment since 2003. To guide the transition, DOD has established principles and policies, such as a 1-year limit on reserve mobilizations, and set a goal of providing reservists 5 years between mobilizations. However, heavy operational demands have meant that many reservists have had significantly less than 5 years between mobilizations. To make the most of the limited mobilization time available, DOD directed the services to provide sufficient resources to support reserve forces to be nearly ready to deploy before mobilization. In the past, reserve component forces often required significant time after mobilization to prepare individuals and units for deployment. However, the Army is continuing to need to improve readiness after mobilization by addressing medical and dental issues, or transferring personnel and equipment from nondeployed units to fill shortfalls. Until demand eases, it seems unlikely that the Army will be able to achieve the mobilization cycle it initially envisioned for the reserves. The Army developed initial cost estimates for transitioning its reserve components to an operational role, but has not budgeted for most of the costs it identified. A 2008 estimate identified costs of about $24 billion over a 6-year period from 2010 to 2015 to increase full-time support personnel, training days, recruiting and retention incentives, and installation support, among others. However, because the Army has not yet established the specific equipping, manning, and training levels required of an operational reserve, it is difficult to assess the estimate's validity. The Army established a task force to develop an implementation plan for the transition, and Army leadership is currently reviewing a draft plan and awaiting the results of other studies, such as a review of full-time support needs. However, pending the results of these studies and agreement on an implementation plan, the Army does not expect to budget for such costs until 2012. Best practices have shown that effective and efficient operations require detailed plans outlining major implementation tasks, metrics and timelines to measure success, and a comprehensive and realistic funding strategy. Until the Army finalizes an implementation plan and fully estimates the transition costs, and includes these costs in its projected spending plans, it will be difficult to assess the Army's progress in transitioning its reserve component to a sustainable operational force. The operational role has reduced the Guard's availability for domestic missions, but the effect on the states remains unclear because states mitigate shortfalls with mutual support agreements and requirements for some domestic missions remain undefined.