	NNSA and DOD Have Not Established Clear, Long-Term Requirements for the Nuclear Weapons Stockpile

The United States’ nuclear weapons stockpile comprises nine nuclear  weapons types, all of which were designed during the Cold War. In May 2008, we reported that, over the past few years, NNSA  and DOD have considered a variety of scenarios for the future  composition of the nuclear stockpile that would be based on different  stockpile sizes and the degree to which the stockpile would incorporate  new RRW designs. NNSA Has Had Difficulty Developing Realistic Cost Estimates for Large, Complex Projects

Once a decision is made about the size and composition of the stockpile,  NNSA should develop accurate estimates of the costs of transforming the  nuclear weapons complex. In September 2007, a contractor provided  NNSA with a range of cost estimates for over 10 different Complex  Transformation alternatives. As a result, the contractor  stated that its estimates should not be used to predict a budget-level  project cost. For example, in March  2007, we found that 8 of the 12 major construction projects that DOE and  NNSA were managing had exceeded their initial cost estimates. In  addition, NNSA’s cost estimate for constructing the Chemistry and  Metallurgy Research Replacement Facility has more than doubled—from  $838 million to over $2 billion—since our April 2006 testimony. Finally, the preliminary results of our ongoing  review of NNSA’s Life Extension Program for this Subcommittee show  that NNSA’s cost estimate for refurbishing each B61 nuclear bomb has  doubled since 2002. NNSA Will Need to Develop a Transformation Plan with Clear, Realistic Milestones

NNSA does not expect to issue a record of decision on Complex  Transformation until later this year. We expect that once NNSA makes this decision, NNSA will put forward a  transformation plan with specific milestones to implement its decision. Without such a plan, NNSA will have no way to evaluate its progress, and  the Congress will have no way to hold NNSA accountable. However, over the past decade, we have repeatedly documented problems  with NNSA’s process for planning and managing its activities. However, in February 2006, we  reported similar problems with how NNSA is managing the  implementation and reliability of the nuclear stockpile. These programs are  responsible for setting the requirements for the computer codes and  experimental data needed to assess and certify the safety and reliability of  nuclear warheads. It was our view that the Office of  Transformation should (1) report directly to the Administrator of NNSA;  (2) be given sufficient authority to conduct its studies and implement its  recommendations; and (3) be held accountable for creating real change  within the weapons complex. In 2006, NNSA created an Office of Transformation to oversee its Complex  Transformation efforts. This office has been involved in overseeing early  activities associated with Complex Transformation, such as the issuance  of the December 2007 draft report on the potential environmental impacts  of alternative Complex Transformation actions. In this respect, we are concerned that the Office of  Transformation may not have sufficient authority to set transformation  priorities for all of NNSA, specifically as they affect nuclear  nonproliferation programs. Because NNSA’s ultimate decision on the path  forward for Complex Transformation has not yet been made, it remains to  be seen whether the office has sufficient authority to enforce  transformation decisions or whether it will be held accountable within  NNSA for these decisions.
Why GAO Did This Study

Over the past several years, a serious effort has begun to comprehensively reevaluate how the United States maintains its nuclear deterrent and what the nation's approach should be for transforming its aging nuclear weapons complex. The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), a separately organized agency within the Department of Energy (DOE), is responsible for overseeing this weapons complex, which comprises three nuclear weapons design laboratories, four production plants, and the Nevada Test Site. In December 2007, NNSA issued a draft report on potential environmental impacts of alternative actions to transform the nuclear weapons complex, which NNSA refers to as Complex Transformation. NNSA's preferred action is to establish a number of "distributed centers of excellence" at sites within the existing nuclear weapons complex, including the Los Alamos National Laboratory for plutonium capabilities, the Y-12 Plant for uranium capabilities, and the Pantex Plant for weapons assembly, disassembly, and high explosives manufacturing. NNSA would continue to operate these facilities to maintain and refurbish the existing nuclear weapons stockpile as it makes the transition to a smaller, more responsive infrastructure. GAO was asked to discuss NNSA's Complex Transformation proposal. This testimony is based on previous GAO work.

What GAO Found

Transforming the nuclear weapons complex will be a daunting task. In April 2006 testimony before the Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development, House Committee on Appropriations, GAO identified four actions that, in its view, were critical to successfully achieving the transformation of the complex. On the basis of completed and ongoing GAO work on NNSA's management of the nuclear weapons complex, GAO remains concerned about NNSA's and the Department of Defense's (DOD) ability to carefully and fully implement these four actions. For this reason, GAO believes that the Congress must remain vigilant in its oversight of Complex Transformation. Specifically, NNSA and DOD have not established clear, long-term requirements for the nuclear weapons stockpile. While NNSA and DOD have considered a variety of scenarios for the future composition of the nuclear weapons stockpile, no requirements have been issued. It is GAO's view that NNSA will not be able to develop accurate cost estimates or plans for Complex Transformation until stockpile requirements are known. Further, recent GAO work found that the absence of stockpile requirements is affecting NNSA's plans for manufacturing a critical nuclear weapon component. NNSA has had difficulty developing realistic cost estimates for large, complex projects. In September 2007, a contractor provided NNSA with a range of cost estimates for over 10 different Complex Transformation alternatives. However, the contractor stated that (1) its analysis was based on rough order-of-magnitude estimates and (2) NNSA should not use its cost estimates to predict budget-level project costs. In addition, in March 2007 GAO reported that 8 of 12 major construction projects being managed by DOE and NNSA had exceeded their initial cost estimates. NNSA will need to develop a transformation plan with clear, realistic milestones. GAO expects that once NNSA decides the path forward for Complex Transformation later this year, NNSA will put forward such a plan. However, GAO has repeatedly documented problems with NNSA's ability to implement its plans. For example, in February 2006 GAO reported problems with the planning documents that NNSA was using to manage the implementation of its new approach for assessing and certifying the safety and reliability of the nuclear stockpile. Successful transformation requires strong leadership. In 2006, NNSA created an Office of Transformation to oversee its Complex Transformation activities. However, GAO is concerned that the Office of Transformation may not have sufficient authority to set transformation priorities for all of NNSA, specifically as they affect nuclear nonproliferation programs.