NNSA has recently decided to: (1) delay later UPF phases, (2)  assess options other than the UPF for enriched uranium operations at the  Y-12 plant, (3) change a key technological requirement for the UPF, and  (4) develop a strategy for how NNSA will maintain the Y-12 plant’s  uranium capabilities into the future. In late January 2014, NNSA  decided to consider alternatives from its baseline uranium purification  technology—which was to be part of UPF Phase I scope and had  been under development since 2005—to a new technology, according  to the UPF Federal Project Director. NNSA believes the new  technology will require less space in the UPF and be more efficient to  operate. Key aspects that are to be considered during the  strategy’s development include, among other things: (1) an evaluation  of the uranium purification capabilities and the throughput needed to  support requirements for life extension programs and nuclear fuel for  the U.S. Navy; (2) an evaluation of the alternatives to the UPF that  prioritizes replacement capabilities by risk to nuclear safety, security,  and mission continuity; (3) an identification of existing infrastructure as  a bridging strategy until replacement capability is available in new  infrastructure. A draft of the strategy is due to the Deputy  Administrator by early April 2014. DOE took this action in  response to our March 2007 report that recommended that DOE  develop a consistent approach to assess the extent to which new  technologies have been demonstrated to work as intended in a project  before starting construction.which is the least mature; through TRL 4, in which the technology is  validated in a laboratory environment; to TRL 9—the highest maturity  level, where the technology as a total system is fully developed,  integrated, and functioning successfully in project operations. New Technologies Planned for the UPF Face Five Additional Risks

Since our November 2010 report, we identified five additional risks  associated with using new technologies in the UPF. The August  2013 independent peer review team report raised concerns with  microwave casting—a process that uses microwave energy to melt  and cast uranium metal into various shapes—as it is planned to be  integrated in the UPF’s casting system.official, the casting system planned for the UPF will employ uranium  processing technology, equipment, and steps that are substantially  different than the casting system currently used at the Y-12 plant. As such, the  independent review team concluded that microwave casting has not  been demonstrated in a relevant environment—a key requirement to  reach TRL 6. However, a key  insulation material planned for use in the entombment control failed  an important series of performance tests in fiscal year 2013. According to UPF contractor representatives, this failure and the need  to identify and test an alternative insulation material is now the  project’s most significant technology development risk and the primary  reason why the special casting technology is currently assessed to be  at TRL 3. Transition risks if NNSA switches to a new uranium purification  technology. For  example, NNSA officials said that changing to DER/ER would require a  complete redesign of the processing areas and their equipment and may  require adding new support utilities and that the UPF facility would have  to revise its nuclear safety analysis. Assurance risks that the agile machining technology will work as  intended before making key project decisions. According to NNSA officials and UPF contractor representatives,  NNSA has primarily funded UPF technology development activities  from the Y-12 plant-directed research and development (PDRD)  program, which requires projects from every part of the Y-12 plant to  compete for funding. For fiscal  year 2014, 19 projects were considered priority by the UPF project  team, but NNSA did not fund 7 of these projects. NNSA Is Taking Some Actions to Address Identified Risks

NNSA is currently taking some actions to address three of the five UPF  technology risks we have identified. However, NNSA officials said that this June 2014 date is optimistic  and may not be met. It is too soon to determine if the Uranium  Infrastructure Strategy that NNSA is currently developing and  scheduled to issue in draft form in early April 2014 will address this  issue. As part of this  corrective action plan, the UPF Assistant Project Manager for  Technology is responsible for determining which technology  development activities should be funded directly with UPF project  funds and is to prepare a cost estimate for those activities. If  NNSA completes these planned actions, we believe that the agency  may have taken appropriate actions to address this risk. We will  continue to monitor NNSA’s progress in addressing these risks as part of  our UPF critical decisions reviews as directed by the Fiscal Year 2013  National Defense Authorization Act. In addition, NNSA has not taken action to address the two  recommendations related to UPF technology development we made in  our November 2010 report: (1) that NNSA ensure that new technologies  reach the level of maturity called for by best practices prior to CDs being  made on the UPF project and (2) that the agency report to Congress any  decisions to approve cost and schedule performance baselines or to  begin construction of UPF without first having ensured that project  technologies are sufficiently mature. Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

We are not making any new recommendations in this report.
Why GAO Did This Study

NNSA conducts enriched uranium activities—including producing components for nuclear warheads and processing nuclear fuel for the U.S. Navy—at the Y-12 National Security Complex in Tennessee. NNSA has identified key shortcomings in the Y-12 plant's current uranium operations, including rising costs due to the facility's age. In 2004, NNSA decided to build a more modern facility—the UPF—which will use nine new technologies that may make enriched uranium activities safer and more efficient.
In November 2010, GAO reported on the UPF and identified risks associated with the use of new technologies ( GAO-11-103 ). The Fiscal Year 2013 National Defense Authorization Act mandated that GAO assess the UPF quarterly. This is the third report, and it assesses (1) additional technology risks, if any, since GAO's November 2010 report and (2) NNSA's actions to address any risks. GAO reviewed NNSA and contractor documents and interviewed NNSA officials and contractor personnel.
GAO is not making any new recommendations. However, NNSA should continue actions to address the two recommendations—which NNSA generally agreed with—in GAO's November 2010 report related to ensuring that technologies reach optimal levels of maturity prior to critical project decisions. In commenting on a draft of this report, NNSA said its current technology maturation guidance is adequate.

What GAO Found

GAO has identified five additional risks since its November 2010 report ( GAO-11-103 ) associated with using new technologies in the National Nuclear Security Administration's (NNSA) Uranium Processing Facility (UPF), which is to be built in three interrelated phases. These risks and the steps that NNSA is taking to address them include the following:
Technology integration risks . An August 2013 UPF independent peer review team concluded that the microwave casting technology—a process that uses microwave energy to melt and form uranium into various shapes—has not been demonstrated in a relevant environment, which is a requirement to reach a key technology maturity milestone. To address this risk, NNSA officials said they plan to accelerate the procurement and environmental testing of a microwave casting prototype.
Technology development risks . A key insulation material planned as a nuclear safety control during uranium casting failed a series of performance tests in fiscal year 2013. According to UPF contractor representatives, this risk is now the project's most significant technological risk. To address this risk, these representatives said they are trying to identify a replacement insulation material and exploring the use of a different safety control.
Technology transition risks . NNSA is currently evaluating an alternative technology to the UPF's baseline uranium purification technology, which has been under development since 2005. The alternative technology may generate less radioactive waste and may be more efficient to operate than the baseline technology. If NNSA switches technologies, NNSA officials said that the UPF contractor (1) will have to redesign the processing area and equipment; (2) may have to add utilities; and (3) will have to revise the UPF's nuclear safety analysis, creating the potential for further project risks.
Performance assurance risks . NNSA stopped development efforts on a key machining technology, which is part of the UPF's second phase. As a result, NNSA may not have optimal assurance that the technology will work as intended before starting construction. However, in January 2014, NNSA began (1) reevaluating alternatives to the UPF that may not include machining operations and (2) developing a uranium infrastructure strategy, which is a framework for how NNSA will maintain all uranium capabilities into the future. It is too soon to determine if the draft uranium strategy, scheduled to be issued in April 2014, will outline actions to address this risk.
Funding risk . Instead of using UPF project funds, NNSA has primarily funded UPF technology development activities from a limited research and development program. As a result of budget constraints in this program, for fiscal year 2014, 7 of the 19 technology projects the UPF contractor considered priority were not funded. Per a corrective action plan recently developed, the UPF Assistant Project Manager for Technology is responsible for determining which technology development activities should be funded directly with UPF project funds and is to prepare a cost estimate for those activities. This official said he expects to complete these estimates in March 2014.