	Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

Our objectives were to (1) identify those Defense long-haul telecommunications networks operating outside of the common-user DISN, (2) evaluate the Department of Defense’s progress in implementing its policies for managing telecommunications services, which include: developing a comprehensive inventory of telecommunications equipment and services, reporting on telecommunications services acquired, trends, and costs, mandating the use of common-user networks, and developing a waiver process to grant exceptions from using common-user networks, and (3) evaluate Defense’s progress in developing performance measures for DISN to ensure effective and efficient use of the department’s telecommunications resources. As a result, Defense components operate many stovepiped telecommunications systems that are not interoperable and cannot share information across functional and organizational boundaries. In a previous review of the DISN program, we found that Defense was not doing enough to ensure that the program would be managed efficiently and effectively. In response, Defense agreed to establish measures for the program. In order to estimate the number and cost of networks that are operating outside of DISN, we conducted our own survey, which identified 87 such networks operated by the military services alone. DISA Does Not Have Data to Develop Required Reports on Telecommunications Acquisitions, Trends, and Costs

To ensure that a common-user network is efficiently and effectively managed, it is essential to closely monitor its acquisitions of telecommunications services, costs, and trends in usage, that is, the volumes and types of traffic it carries. However, it has not done so, and it lacks the data needed to begin developing such reports. Therefore, it cannot effectively report annually on acquisitions. Although it agreed to develop performance measures in response to that review, Defense has never developed measures for the DISN program. Conclusions

In the 7 years that it has been implementing the DISN program and striving to improve telecommunications management in the department, Defense has done very little to implement the basic management controls it believed were needed to ensure success. As a result, Defense has not achieved its goals for an interoperable telecommunications environment, cannot support any claims that the long-haul networks it operates are cost-effective, and cannot determine which independent long-haul networks should be replaced by common user networks such as DISN or FTS 2000/2001. Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

The Senior Civilian Official for the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence (ASD/C3I) provided written comments on a draft of this report. In its response, the department notes that it has: (1) established the Defense Information Systems Database (DISD) as a comprehensive inventory of long-haul telecommunications networks throughout Defense, (2) clarified existing policy by issuing an ASD/C3I memorandum dated May 5, 1997, that reaffirms DISA’s role as the sole manager and provider of long-haul telecommunications systems and services, (3) developed a process for determining how individual telecommunications requirements can best be satisfied, (4) developed a process for granting temporary waivers, and (5) begun the process of establishing performance metrics for DISN.
Why GAO Did This Study

Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Department of Defense's (DOD) efforts to implement the Defense Information Systems Network (DISN), focusing on: (1) those DOD long-haul telecommunications networks operating outside of the common-user DISN; (2) DOD's progress in implementing its policies for managing DISN; and (3) DOD's progress in developing performance measures for DISN, which DOD agreed to do in response to GAO's previous review of the DISN program.

What GAO Found

GAO noted that: (1) although DOD has been implementing the DISN program for 7 years, numerous networks continue to exist without the Defense Information Systems Agency's (DISA) knowledge; (2) GAO's survey found that the military services are operating at least 87 independent networks that support a variety of long-haul telecommunications requirements; (3) the services reported costs on 68 of these networks totalling more than $89 million annually; (4) DOD's inability to restrict the number of networks operating across the department stems from its failure to implement basic telecommunications management policies established at the beginning of the DISN program and its failure to develop objective performance measures for the program; (5) DISA has not developed a comprehensive inventory of telecommunications networks throughout DOD nor have the military services developed inventories of their own networks; (6) DISA has not reported on telecommunications acquisitions, trends (volumes and types of traffic) and costs throughout DOD, and it lacks the data to develop such reports; (7) DOD has not effectively enforced the use of common-user services, nor were Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence (ASD/C3I) officials clear on how enforcement would occur; (8) DOD has only recently begun to implement an interim waiver process to exempt DOD components from using common-user networks--a final process has yet to be implemented; (9) DOD has not developed performance measures for the DISN program even though it agreed with GAO's previous report that these measures were essential to ensuring DISN was efficiently and effectively managed; (10) by not implementing the above, DOD lacks the basic management controls to ensure that it can achieve its goal for an interoperable and cost-effective telecommunications environment; (11) specifically, it lacks a foundation for identifying stovepiped and redundant networks that are not interoperable and cannot share information, and replacing them with mandated common-user services; it lacks a basis for maximizing the efficiency and cost-effectiveness of DISN; it cannot quantify problems; and it cannot learn from mistakes; and (12) as a result, DOD's stated goals for DISN are at risk, and DOD cannot ensure that DISN is the most cost-effective solution to DOD's telecommunications service requirements.