1.) The most common reasons that the remaining  two-thirds of the individuals left the program without a job were that the  individual refused services, failed to cooperate, or could not be located or  contacted. State VR agencies collectively purchased more than $1.3 billion  in services for all individuals who exited the program in fiscal year 2003,  two-thirds of which was used to provide services to individuals exiting  with employment. Employment, earnings, and the amount of purchased  services received while in the VR program varied significantly by  individuals’ type of disability and other characteristics. In addition, the  state VR agencies varied substantially in the employment rates they  achieved, the characteristics of individuals they served, their frequency of  providing certain services, and their service expenditures. One-Third of Individuals Exited the VR Program Nationwide with Employment in Fiscal Year 2003

Of the more than 650,000 individuals exiting the VR program in fiscal year  2003, one-third (217,557) obtained a new job or maintained their existing  job for at least 90 days after receiving customized services. 2.) Of those who exited without employment in fiscal year 2003,  most did so because they refused services or failed to cooperate with their  VR counselor (46 percent of the time) or could not be located or contacted   (24 percent). 5.) Education’s VR Performance Measures Are Not Comprehensive, and Its Monitoring of State VR Agencies’ Performance Has Not Resulted in Timely Feedback

Education’s VR performance measures are not comprehensive in that they  count only individuals exiting VR programs and fail to measure key  populations. Moreover, the targets Education sets for performance do not  take into consideration regional differences in VR populations or allow for  comparisons across workforce programs. Education’s monitoring  reports—state VR agencies’ primary source of feedback—are frequently  late and based on data that are more than 2 years old. As a result, state VR  agencies are not getting the kind of timely feedback they need to improve  the efficiency and effectiveness of their programs. Education’s recent  decision as part of its restructuring efforts to eliminate its regional VR  offices, which had conducted most of the monitoring of state VR agencies,  has made the details of the future monitoring process unclear. Education Does Not Effectively Monitor and Manage the Performance of State VR Agencies

In monitoring and managing the performance of state VR agencies,  Education does not provide timely feedback, censure poorly performing  agencies, or take full advantage of opportunities to promote the sharing of  best practices among state VR agencies. Education  also uses its Web site to disseminate information on best practices. Further, its  performance measures do not take into account demographic and  economic variations among states. Copies of this report are being sent to the Department of Education,  appropriate congressional committees, and other interested parties. To further determine the extent to which state VR agencies assist  individuals in achieving employment as well as the extent to which  Education monitors and measures performance to manage this  decentralized VR program, we interviewed key program officials at  Education’s headquarters and each regional office responsible for  monitoring the state VR agencies.
Why GAO Did This Study

The Department of Education (Education) provides more than $2.5 billion annually to the states for a federal-state vocational rehabilitation (VR) program to help individuals with disabilities become employed. This program is among a large number of federal programs intended to assist people with disabilities. In 2003 GAO placed federal disability programs on its list of high-risk programs because many of these programs have not kept up with scientific advances and economic and social changes. GAO prepared this report under the Comptroller General's authority as part of an effort to assist policy makers in determining how federal disability programs could more effectively meet the needs of individuals with disabilities and addressed it to each committee of jurisdiction. In this report, GAO assesses the (1) extent to which state VR agencies assist individuals in achieving employment, and (2) performance measures and monitoring practices Education uses to manage this decentralized program and achieve legislative goals.

What GAO Found

Of the more than 650,000 individuals exiting the state VR programs in fiscal year 2003, one-third (217,557) obtained a new job or maintained their existing job for at least 90 days after receiving services. Education's data showed that the remaining two-thirds exited the VR program without employment most often because the individual refused services or failed to cooperate with the VR counselor (46 percent of the time) or could not be located or contacted (24 percent). The VR program purchased more than $1.3 billion in services for all individuals who exited the program in fiscal year 2003, two-thirds of which were used to provide services to individuals exiting with employment. Employment, earnings, and the amount of purchased services received while in the VR program varied significantly by individuals' disability type and other characteristics. In addition, state VR agencies varied substantially in the employment rates they achieved, the characteristics of individuals they served, their frequency of providing certain services, and their service expenditures. Education's performance measures are not comprehensive, and its monitoring of state VR agencies has not resulted in timely feedback. Education does not comprehensively measure the performance of certain key populations, such as students transitioning from school to work, and tracks only the individuals who exit the program, not those still receiving services. In addition, Education's performance measures do not take into consideration all the variation among the state VR agencies or allow for comparisons with other workforce programs. Education's monitoring reports, which are its primary means of providing feedback to state VR agencies, are frequently late and based on data that are more than 2 years old. Consequently, state VR agencies do not receive the timely feedback needed to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of their programs. In managing the performance of the VR program, Education also does not censure poorly performing state VR agencies, reward strong performance, or take full advantage of opportunities to disseminate best practices. Education recently decided to eliminate its regional offices, which conducted most of the monitoring of state VR agencies, making the details of the future monitoring process unclear.