To achieve its goals, US-VISIT is  to collect, maintain, and share information on certain foreign  nationals who enter and exit the United States; detect fraudulent  travel documents, verify traveler identity, and determine traveler  admissibility through the use of biometrics; facilitate information  sharing and coordination within the immigration and border  management community; and identify foreign nationals who (1)  have overstayed or violated the terms of their admission; (2) may be  eligible to receive, extend, or adjust their immigration status; or (3)  should be apprehended or detained by law enforcement officials. The scope of the program includes the pre-entry, entry, status, and  exit of hundreds of millions of foreign national travelers who enter  and leave the United States at over 300 air, sea, and land POEs. The department has  requested $462 million in fiscal year 2008 for the program. US-VISIT Entry Is Operating at Most POEs

A biometrically enabled US-VISIT entry capability is operating at  most POEs. For example, as of June 15, 2007, it had more than 7,600 biometric  hits in primary entry resulting in more than 1,500 people having  adverse actions, such as denial of entry, taken against them. Despite Expending Considerable Time and Resources, US-VISIT Exit Is Not Operational

Over the last few years, DHS has devoted considerable time and  resources towards establishing an operational exit capability at air,  sea, and land POEs. Notwithstanding this considerable investment of time and  resources, DHS still does not have an operational exit capability. Our prior reports have raised a number of concerns about DHS’s  management of US-VISIT’s exit efforts. As we and others have reported, the absence of a biometric exit  capability raises questions about what meaningful US-VISIT data are  available to DHS components, such as ICE. Without this exit  capability, DHS cannot ensure the integrity of the immigration  system by identifying and removing those people who have  overstayed their original period of admission—a stated goal of  US-VISIT. Further, ICE’s efforts to ensure the integrity of the  immigration system could be degraded if it continues to spend its  limited resources on investigating potential visa violators who have  already left the country. Nonetheless, DHS continued to operate the exit  pilots. Based on the department’s latest available documentation, it intends  to spend $27.3 million ($7.3 million in fiscal year 2007 funding and  $20 million in fiscal year 2006 carryover funding) on air and sea exit  capabilities. However, it has not produced either the plans or the  analyses that adequately define and justify how it intends to invest  these funds. Rather, it has only generally described near-term  deployment plans for biometric exit capabilities at air and sea POEs,  and acknowledged that a near-term biometric solution for land  POEs is not possible. Moreover, no exit program plans are available that define what will  be done, by what entities, and at what cost to define, acquire,  deliver, deploy, and operate this capability, including plans  describing expected system capabilities, defining measurable  outcomes (benefits and results), identifying key stakeholder (e.g.,  airlines) roles/responsibilities and buy-in, and coordinating and  aligning with related programs. If this does not change, there is no reason to expect that  DHS’s newly launched efforts to deliver an air and sea exit solution  will produce results different from its past efforts—namely, no  operational exit solution despite many years and hundreds of  millions of dollars of investment. More importantly, the continued  absence of an exit capability will hinder DHS’s ability to effectively  and efficiently perform its border security and immigration  enforcement mission. Hence, it is important that DHS approach its  latest attempt to deploy its exit capabilities in the kind of rigorous  and disciplined fashion that we have previously recommended.
Why GAO Did This Study

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has spent and continues to invest hundreds of millions of dollars each year in its U.S. Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology (US-VISIT) program to collect, maintain, and share information on selected foreign nationals who enter and exit the United States at over 300 air, sea, and land ports of entry (POEs). The program uses biometric identifiers (digital finger scans and photographs) to screen people against watch lists and to verify that a visitor is the person who was issued a visa or other travel document. GAO's testimony addresses the status of US-VISIT entry and exit capabilities and DHS's management of past and future exit efforts. In developing its testimony, GAO drew from eight prior reports on US-VISIT as well as ongoing work for the committee.

What GAO Found

After investing about $1.3 billion over 4 years, DHS has delivered essentially one-half of US-VISIT, meaning that biometrically enabled entry capabilities are operating at almost 300 air, sea, and land POEs but comparable exit capabilities are not. To the department's credit, operational entry capabilities have reportedly produced results, including more than 1,500 people having adverse actions, such as denial of entry, taken against them. However, DHS still does not have the other half of US-VISIT (an operational exit capability) despite the fact that its funding plans have allocated about one-quarter of a billion dollars since 2003 to exit-related efforts. During this time, GAO has continued to cite weaknesses in how DHS is managing US-VISIT in general, and the exit side of US-VISIT in particular, and has made numerous recommendations aimed at better ensuring that the program delivers clearly defined and adequately justified capabilities and benefits on time and within budget. The prospects for successfully delivering an operational exit solution are as uncertain today as they were 4 years ago. The department's latest available documentation indicates that little has changed in how DHS is approaching its definition and justification of future US-VISIT exit efforts. Specifically, DHS has indicated that it intends to spend $27.3 million ($7.3 million in fiscal year 2007 funding and $20 million in fiscal year 2006 carryover funding) on air and sea exit capabilities. However, it has not produced either plans or analyses that adequately define and justify how it intends to invest these funds. Rather, it has only described in general terms near-term deployment plans for biometric exit capabilities at air and sea POEs, and acknowledged that a near-term biometric solution for land POEs is not possible. Beyond this high-level schedule, no other exit program plans are available that define what will be done by what entities and at what cost. In the absence of more detailed plans and justification governing its exit intentions, it is unlikely that the department's latest efforts to deliver near-term air and sea exit capabilities will produce results different from the past. Therefore, the prospects for having operational exit capabilities continue to be unclear. Moreover, the longer the department goes without exit capabilities, the more its ability to effectively and efficiently perform its border security and immigration enforcement missions will suffer. Among other things, this means that DHS cannot ensure the integrity of the immigration system by identifying and removing those people who have overstayed their original period of admission, which is a stated goal of US-VISIT. Further, DHS immigration and customs enforcement entities will continue to spend limited resources on investigating potential visa violators who have already left the country.