We found in  our 1981 report that having field safety and health personnel solely within  the program offices at DOE nuclear facilities did not allow for independent  oversight, particularly with respect to overseeing the implementation of  nuclear safety policies by the program offices. HSS Lacks Basic Information about Nuclear Facilities, Has Gaps in Its Site Inspection Schedule, and Does Not Routinely Ensure That Its Findings Are Effectively Addressed

HSS has the authority to and does conduct periodic environment, safety,  and health program inspections of DOE sites with high-hazard nuclear  facilities, but there are several limitations in its review functions. In addition, HSS has not taken primary responsibility for  preventing recurring nuclear safety violations because DOE views its role  as secondary to the program offices. DOE shifted its position on the need for a site presence for its independent  oversight office in 1999. Nearly all of the shortcomings in HSS with respect to our  elements of effective independent oversight of nuclear safety are primarily  attributable to DOE’s desire to strengthen the oversight of the program  offices by concentrating the necessary responsibilities and technical  resources within them. Such actions would  include giving HSS the responsibilities, technical resources, and policy  guidance necessary to  1.  review the safety basis for new nuclear facilities and significant  modifications to existing facilities to ensure there are no safety  concerns;  2.  monitor the safety basis status of high-hazard nuclear facilities and  ensure that all such facilities operate under current nuclear safety  requirements, including the appropriate use of Justifications for  Continued Operations;  3. increase a presence at DOE sites with nuclear facilities to provide  more frequent observations of nuclear safety, provide more  independent information to facilitate any necessary enforcement  actions, and more routine monitoring of the effectiveness of corrective  actions taken in response to HSS findings of deficiency;  4.  ensure that enforcement actions are strengthened to prevent recurring  violations of the nuclear safety requirements; and  5.  establish public access to unclassified appraisal reports. First, DOE commented that by  focusing on HSS’s responsibilities in isolation rather than as one element  of DOE’s approach to nuclear safety, the draft report appeared to be based  on the incorrect premise that DOE program and site offices are inherently  ineffective and that all DOE oversight must be performed by HSS. HSS is a  critical component of DOE’s self-regulation approach because it is the  only DOE safety office intended to be independent of the program offices,  which carry out the department’s mission responsibilities. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

In our review, we examined 1) the extent to which the Office of Health,  Safety and Security (HSS) meets the elements of effective independent  nuclear safety oversight and (2) the factors contributing to any identified  shortcomings with respect to these five elements. To examine the extent to which HSS, as currently structured, meets the  elements of effective independent nuclear safety oversight, we assessed  the oversight and enforcement practices of HSS and its predecessor  offices against our criteria for (1) independence; (2) technical expertise;  (3) ability to perform reviews and have findings effectively addressed; (4)  enforcement; and (5) public access to facility information. What is the operational status of ? For example, DOE stated that they placed these  technical experts in the authority to help the program offices review and  approve their nuclear facility safety basis, in part because of the challenge  to get some sites to upgrade the safety basis of these nuclear facilities. DOE is incorrect in stating that we did not provide a complete and  accurate picture of HSS’s role in corrective actions. This is incorrect. 31.
Why GAO Did This Study

The Department of Energy (DOE) oversees contractors that operate more than 200 "high-hazard" nuclear facilities, where an accident could have serious consequences for workers and the public. DOE is charged with regulating the safety of these facilities. A key part of DOE's self-regulation is the Office of Health, Safety and Security (HSS), which develops, oversees, and helps enforce nuclear safety policies. This is the only DOE safety office intended to be independent of the program offices, which carry out mission responsibilities. This report examines (1) the extent to which HSS meets GAO's elements of effective independent nuclear safety oversight and (2) the factors contributing to any identified shortcomings with respect to these elements. GAO reviewed relevant DOE policies, interviewed officials and outside safety experts, and surveyed DOE sites to determine the number and status of nuclear facilities. GAO also assessed oversight practices against the criteria for independent oversight GAO developed based on a series of reports on DOE nuclear safety and discussions with nuclear safety experts.

What GAO Found

HSS falls short of fully meeting GAO's elements of effective independent oversight of nuclear safety: independence, technical expertise, ability to perform reviews and have findings effectively addressed, enforcement, and public access to facility information. For example, HSS's ability to function independently is limited because it has no role in reviewing the "safety basis"--a technical analysis that helps ensure safe design and operation of these facilities--for new high-hazard nuclear facilities and because it has no personnel at DOE sites to provide independent safety observations. In addition, although HSS conducts periodic site inspections and identifies deficiencies that must be addressed, there are gaps in its inspection schedule and it lacks useful information on the status of the safety basis of all nuclear facilities. For example, HSS was not aware that 31 of the 205 facilities did not have a safety basis that meets requirements established in 2001. Finally, while HSS uses its authority to enforce nuclear safety requirements, its actions have not reduced the occurrence of over one-third of the most commonly reported violations in the last 3 years, although this is a priority for HSS. These shortcomings are largely attributable to DOE's decision that some responsibilities and resources of HSS and prior oversight offices more appropriately reside in the program offices. For example, DOE decided in 1999 to eliminate independent oversight personnel at its sites because they were deemed redundant and less effective than oversight by the program offices. DOE also decided in forming HSS in 2006 that its involvement in reviewing facility safety basis documents was not necessary because this is done by the program offices and adequately assessed by HSS during periodic site inspections. Moreover, DOE views HSS's role as secondary to the program offices in addressing recurring nuclear safety violations. Nearly all these shortcomings are in part caused by DOE's desire to strengthen oversight by the program offices, with HSS providing assistance to them in accomplishing their responsibilities. In the absence of external regulation, DOE needs HSS to be more involved in nuclear safety oversight because a key objective of independent oversight is to avoid the potential conflicts of interest that are inherent in program office oversight.