The Army Corps of Engineers is the Army’s construction agent and is  charged with contracting for infrastructure construction for the Army. The Army Has Developed Plans but Faces Complex Implementation Challenges

The Army has developed plans to accommodate growth of about 154,000  personnel at its domestic bases as a result of BRAC 2005, overseas  rebasing, and force modularity actions, but it faces several complex  challenges to the implementation of those plans and risks late provision of  needed infrastructure to adequately support arriving personnel. First,  Army plans are still evolving, and officials at the gaining bases we visited  did not agree with Army headquarters on personnel movements at their  bases. Third, competing  resource demands could lead to redirection of resources that would have  been used for infrastructure improvements to other priorities, as has  happened in the past. If this process delays these moves, it could jeopardize meeting  the statutory deadline. For example, construction of the new Maneuver Center of  Excellence at Fort Benning, Georgia, could be delayed because the  installation is required to account for endangered species protection  actions in its construction plans. Army Corps of Engineers Is at Risk of Not Meeting Construction Costs and Timing Goals

To meet the expected large volume and costs of facilities construction  associated with BRAC and the concurrent implementation of overseas  rebasing and modularity, most of which must be completed by the end of  fiscal year 2011, the Army Corps of Engineers has developed a strategy,  known as military construction transformation, intended to reduce   (1) construction costs by 15 percent and (2) construction time by 30  percent. These communities are in the process of identifying and  obtaining funding sources to finance these additional infrastructure  requirements, and they have several ways to finance these needs, including  seeking federal assistance. Nonetheless, given the evolving nature of the  Army’s growth projections, these communities have generally been  hindered in their ability to identify all of the costs for implementing  infrastructure expansion. These communities’ schools,  housing, transportation, and other infrastructure needs depend on the  number of new personnel to be assigned to their local bases. However, the  Army’s plans for relocating its personnel and families were evolving at the  time of our review. State-level or regional task forces have also been  formed in some states to assist communities surrounding bases in  managing the growth. For example, Fort Benning officials projected that student enrollment  would increase by about 10,000 through fiscal year 2011 as compared to a  November 2006 DOD report that estimates 600. At the time of our review,  these disparities remained unresolved. Recommendations for Executive Action

To better facilitate infrastructure planning, we recommend that the  Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Army to (1) determine  why there are differences between headquarters and gaining bases with  respect to the number of arriving and departing personnel and (2) ensure  that Army headquarters and base officials are collaborating to agree on  Army personnel movement plans so that base commanders and  surrounding communities can effectively plan for expected growth. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

To determine the challenges and associated risks the Army faces in  providing for timely infrastructure support at its major gaining bases  because of the combined effects of implementing the 2005 round of base  realignment and closures (BRAC), overseas rebasing, and Army force  modularity actions, we analyzed infrastructure-related planning  documentation and discussed planning and related funding efforts with  officials from various Army headquarters-level offices, four regional  Installation Management Command offices, and nine installations. In examining the plans and identifying challenges that  could place the Army at risk of not providing the necessary infrastructure  to accommodate incoming personnel in a timely manner, we focused our  efforts on key elements of the planning process, including planned  personnel restationing actions and synchronization of multiple actions  affecting particular installations, infrastructure requirements to include  quality of life facilities, and military construction plans and expected costs. To determine how communities surrounding the Army’s gaining bases  were planning for and funding the necessary infrastructure to support  incoming personnel and their families, we contacted community leaders  during our installation visits and discussed their relationships with  installation officials and steps they were taking to address community  infrastructure issues as a result of expected increased defense-driven  personnel growth and non-Department of Defense (DOD) growth in their  communities. Defense Infrastructure: DOD’s Overseas Infrastructure Master Plans  Continue to Evolve.
Why GAO Did This Study

The Army expects significant personnel growth, more than 50 percent in some cases, at 18 domestic bases through 2011 because of the effect of implementing base realignment and closure (BRAC), overseas force rebasing, and force modularity actions. This growth creates the need for additional support infrastructure at these bases and in nearby communities. Military construction costs of over $17 billion are expected for new personnel, and communities will incur infrastructure costs as well. GAO prepared this report under the Comptroller General's authority to conduct evaluations on his own initiative. It addresses (1) the challenges and associated risks the Army faces in providing for timely infrastructure support at its gaining installations and (2) how communities are planning and funding for infrastructure to support incoming personnel and their families. GAO analyzed personnel restationing numbers, discussed planning efforts with Army and community officials, and visited nine of the larger gaining bases and nearby communities.

What GAO Found

The Army has developed plans to accommodate the growth of about 154,000 personnel at its domestic bases, but it faces several complex implementation challenges that risk late provision of needed infrastructure to adequately support incoming personnel. First, Army plans continue to evolve, and Army headquarters and each of the nine gaining bases we visited were relying on different numbers of personnel movements and were not fully aware of the causes for the variances. For example, Fort Benning officials expected more than 6,000 additional soldiers and military students than Army headquarters planned. Because consistency in the relocation numbers is important for properly determining not only base infrastructure support needs but those of nearby communities as well, inconsistent numbers could lead to an improperly sized facilities' infrastructure. Second, the Army faces challenges in synchronizing personnel movements with planned newly constructed on-base infrastructure improvements. Any significant delays in implementing planned actions could place the Army at risk of not meeting BRAC statutory deadlines. Third, competing priorities could lead the Army to redirect resources planned for needed infrastructure improvements and operations to such priorities as current operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, as has happened in the past. However, such redirection of resources could undermine the Army's ability to complete infrastructure improvements in time to support personnel movements and to meet planned timelines. Fourth, the Army Corps of Engineers, the primary construction agent for the Army, must manage an unprecedented volume of construction, implement a new construction strategy designed to save construction costs and time, and complete infrastructure improvements within available resources and planned timelines. The Army recognizes these challenges and is refining its implementation plans to overcome these challenges. While communities surrounding growth bases GAO visited have generally proactively planned for anticipated growth, they have been hindered in fully identifying additional infrastructure requirements and associated costs by the evolving nature of the Army's plans and different interpretations of the plans. For example, while Army officials at Fort Benning, Georgia, project an influx of about 10,000 school-age children, the Department of Defense's (DOD) November 2006 figures project only about 600. At the time of our review, these disparities remained unresolved. Communities surrounding growth bases have their own unique infrastructure improvement needs, such as schools, housing, or transportation, based on (1) the number of personnel to actually move to the nearby base, (2) the community's current capacity in its area(s) of need, and (3) the community's own capacity to finance additional infrastructure requirements and the availability of federal or state assistance to finance these needs. Some communities had already sought federal and state assistance to help finance construction efforts at the time of GAO's review even though the evolving nature of the Army's planning prevented the communities from having reasonable assurance that they knew the full scope of their infrastructure requirements.