	Introduction

China (officially known as the People's Republic of China, PRC) is building a modern and regionally powerful military with a limited but growing capability for conducting operations away from China's immediate periphery. The question of how the United States should respond to China's military modernization effort is a central issue in U.S. defense planning and foreign policy. Congress's decisions on this issue could affect U.S. defense strategy, budgets, plans, and programs, and the U.S. defense industrial base. The short war with Vietnam in 1979 was China's last major conflict, and the PLA has not been involved in sustained combat since the Korean War (1950-1953) and the brief border war with India (1962). China's Military Modernization

China has engaged in a sustained and broad effort to transform the PLA from an infantry-heavy, low-technology, ground forces-centric military into a high-technology, networked force with an increasing emphasis on joint operations and naval and air power projection. Quantity

China's military modernization efforts have emphasized quality over quantity, in both equipment and personnel. China's Intentions for Its Military

The intentions of China's leaders regarding their use of the PLA are a key factor, alongside the PLA's capabilities, in assessing the Chinese military. There appears to be agreement among many American China-watchers that Beijing's main reason for strengthening the PLA is first to ensure the Communist Party's survival in power and then to defend China's "territorial integrity," primarily its claim to Taiwan. Experts believe that other reasons for China's military modernization are its ambitions to become the leading regional power in a more multipolar East Asia and to defend China's expanding economic interests, including shipping lanes. China is also investing heavily in developing a number of different UAV (unmanned aerial vehicle) platforms. Alongside modernization of aircraft, the PLA has invested in improvements to its air defenses. The main areas of investment have been submarines, large multi-mission surface vessels, aircraft carriers, and arming PLAN vessels with modern anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs). Weaknesses and Limitations

The rapid improvement in the overall capability of the PLA has been the main narrative of outside observers for many years, but persistent weaknesses and limitations hamper the PLA's effectiveness. By its own assessments, the PLA has weaknesses in training, jointness, administration, human capital, force development, and logistics. From 2005 through 2014, the official military budget increased at an average rate of 9.5% per year, after adjusting for inflation. Congress has restricted U.S.-China mil-mil contacts through legislation. Responses to China's Changing Military Capability

As China's military capabilities have improved after the end of the Cold War, the U.S. government appears to have addressed this development in a variety of ways. Differing geographic scope of responsibilities. In addition to legislation, Congress influences U.S. policies toward the PRC and the PLA through budget allocations, hearings, and public statements. 101-246 , Section 902), the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for FY2000 ( P.L. Report ing on U.S. defense policy responses. FY2013 NDAA: Section 1271 requests coverage of numerous additional topics: China's electronic warfare capabilities and details on the number of malicious cyber incidents originating from China against DOD infrastructure; China's space and counter-space programs; nuclear program; anti-access and area denial capabilities; command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) modernization program; navy and paramilitary and maritime law enforcement vessels, including their response to U.S. naval activities; military-to-military relationships with other countries; any significant sale or transfer of military hardware, expertise, and technology from China, and any significant assistance to and from "any selling state with military-related research and development programs in China."
China is building a modern and regionally powerful military with a limited but growing capability for conducting operations away from China's immediate periphery. The question of how the United States should respond to China's military modernization effort is a central issue in U.S. defense planning and foreign policy. Congress's decisions on this issue could affect U.S. defense strategy, budgets, plans, and programs, and the U.S. defense industrial base.
China has engaged in a sustained and broad effort over more than 25 years to transform its military, the People's Liberation Army (PLA), from an infantry-heavy, low-technology military into a high-technology, networked force with an increasing emphasis on joint operations and naval and air power. China has emphasized quality over quantity during this modernization: the number of military personnel and certain platforms (e.g., aircraft, tanks, certain vessels) has declined even as overall capabilities have improved.
From 2005 through 2014, China's official military budget increased at an average rate of 9.5% per year in real terms, allowing the PLA to improve its capabilities in many dimensions. PLA naval forces feature quieter submarines, large surface combatants with improved air defenses and long-range anti-ship cruise missiles, and a nascent aircraft carrier program. New air power capabilities include modern fighter aircraft, more supporting platforms, and a variety of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) in production and under development. The PLA has increased the number and accuracy of its ballistic missiles for both nuclear and conventional strike missions. China has launched numerous satellites for military communications, surveillance, and navigation, and also has developed a variety of counter-space capabilities. The cyber operations of the PLA are harder to characterize, but reports indicate that China has invested heavily in this area.
Despite the acquisition of modern equipment, the PLA has weaknesses and limitations that constrain the effectiveness of its operations, including training, jointness, human capital, and logistics. The short war with Vietnam in 1979 was China's last major conflict, and the PLA has not been involved in sustained combat since the Korean War (1950-1953) and a limited border war with India (1962). Although PLA planning and force posture is concentrated on contingencies in China's periphery, including the East China Sea and South China Sea, since the late 2000s the PLA has expanded the geographic scope of its operations.
Many American China-watchers assert that China's main reason for strengthening the PLA is to ensure that the status of Taiwan is resolved on terms favorable to Beijing. Experts believe that other reasons for China's military modernization are to weaken the U.S. network of alliances and to become the leading regional power in a more multipolar East Asia. Experts emphasize the improvements in China's anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities—modern aircraft, vessels, and missiles that can prevent opposing militaries from operating freely in the skies and seas near China, and can prevent reinforcements from arriving.
Congress could choose to address the issue of China's changing military capabilities through hearings, authorizing and policy legislation, defense budget allocations, and other means. Some examples of past legislation with significant, continuing impacts include the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act; the 1991 law prohibiting U.S. arms exports to China; and the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for FY2000, which sets guidelines for U.S.-China military-to-military contacts. In recent hearings, resolutions, and laws, especially NDAAs, Congress has provided prescriptions and guidance regarding U.S. policy toward Asia-Pacific security issues. Budget allocations for specific U.S. defense programs might also be tied to assessments of China's military capabilities and intentions.