FEMA also did not assign  responsibility to OSHA, or any other federal agency, for coordinating the  safety and health of nonfederal workers, except workers employed by  federal contractors. No One Collected Information on the Total Number of Response and Recovery Workers Deployed to the Gulf Coast, but 10 Federal Agencies Collected Data on Their Workers

No one, including OSHA, was assigned responsibility for collecting data on  the total number of response and recovery workers deployed to the Gulf  and no one collected it, but 10 federal agencies were able to provide  estimates of the number of federal workers they deployed to the Gulf for  specific points in time. However, only six of them tracked the number of  workers employed by their contractors. These  agencies estimated that their contractors had over 5,100 workers in the  Gulf Coast area on December 1, 2005, the month with the largest total  number. Some agencies provided their logs to OSHA, but the data they provided  were incomplete and unreliable, according to OSHA officials. Eleven Worker Fatalities Related to Hurricane Katrina Reported

OSHA and other agency officials identified 11 fatalities of workers  involved in response and recovery work for Hurricane Katrina from  September 2005 through June 2006, 9 of which occurred as a result of  work-related accidents. OSHA staff also assessed air, water, soil,  and noise hazards at many worksites. In addition, lack of awareness by other  agencies about OSHA’s role in a disaster further hindered its efforts. OSHA Was Only Partially Successful in Providing Training, Distributing Protective Gear, Serving Nonfederal Workers, and Providing Mental Health Services

			Some of OSHA’s Training Was Delayed, and Some Agencies Did Not Request Needed Training from OSHA Because They Did Not Realize It Was Available

Because OSHA and FEMA disagreed about the process for issuing the  mission assignment authorizing OSHA to receive reimbursement for its  safety and health training to workers, FEMA did not issue it until more  than 3 weeks after the hurricane hit the Gulf Coast. However, OSHA did  not coordinate with them to ensure that all workers in the Gulf area who  needed mental health services received them, and OSHA had difficulty  obtaining these services. As a  result, OSHA’s efforts were focused on providing assistance to federal  agencies and workers. Recommendations for Executive Action

In order to improve the ability to meet workers’ safety and health needs in  the event of a future disaster, the Secretaries of the Departments of Labor  and Homeland Security should direct the Administrators of OSHA and  FEMA to    clearly define the criteria to be used in deciding when OSHA will be  responsible for carrying out its duties under the Worker Safety and  Health Support Annex to the National Response Plan, including the  types and magnitude of disasters in which OSHA will be involved,  and    clearly define OSHA’s and FEMA’s roles under the Worker Safety  and Health Support Annex, including resolving the issue of how the  need for long-term medical monitoring of workers involved in the  response to future disasters will be met; and    proactively work to provide information to federal, state, and local  agencies about OSHA’s role in a disaster and the assistance it can  provide under the Worker Safety and Health Support Annex,  including seeking opportunities for OSHA to participate in  emergency preparedness exercises at federal, state, and local levels. In addition, the Secretary of the Department of Labor should direct OSHA  to    establish a process for collecting data on injuries and illnesses  sustained by workers who respond to disasters as defined in the  Worker Safety and Health Support Annex to the National Response  Plan, such as requiring employers to record injuries and illnesses on  logs maintained at each disaster work site and periodically submit  them to OSHA during the response;    use the information collected on injuries and illnesses to identify  safety and health hazards and analyze injury and illness trends; and    develop, implement, and monitor an incident personal protective  equipment program as defined in the Worker Safety and Health  Support Annex. 2. Although OSHA provides more detailed information about its action  during the response to Hurricane Katrina, our report mentions many of  these same activities. 3. We agree that OSHA, nor any other federal agency, was responsible for  collecting information on the number of workers deployed to the Gulf  area in response to Hurricane Katrina. GAO’s Preliminary Observations Regarding Preparedness and Response  to Hurricane Katrina and Rita.
Why GAO Did This Study

Concerns about the safety and health of workers involved in the response to Hurricane Katrina included their exposure to contaminated floodwaters and injuries from working around debris. The Department of Labor's Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) is responsible for coordinating federal efforts to protect the safety and health of workers involved in the response to large national disasters. Under the Comptroller General's authority, GAO initiated a number of Katrina-related reviews. For this review, GAO examined (1) what is known about the number of response and recovery workers deployed to the Gulf Coast in response to Hurricane Katrina; (2) the extent to which OSHA tracked injuries and illnesses sustained by these workers; and (3) how well OSHA met the safety and health needs of workers. To address these issues, GAO reviewed reports; analyzed data; interviewed federal, state, and local officials; and conducted site visits.

What GAO Found

No one, including OSHA,was responsible for collecting information on the total number of response and recovery workers deployed to the Gulf Coast in response to Hurricane Katrina and no one collected it, but 10 federal agencies provided estimates showing that, on October 1, 2005, the agencies had about 49,000 federal workers in the Gulf Coast area. In addition, six of these agencies estimated that their contractors had about 5,100 workers in the area on December 1, 2005, but the other four either did not track the number of workers employed by their contractors or did not employ contractors. Although OSHA was responsible for tracking the injuries and illnesses that federal response and recovery workers sustained during the response to Hurricane Katrina, the agency's efforts to collect it were delayed and it was unable to collect usable information. According to OSHA, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) must assign and fund specific responsibilities for each disaster. However, FEMA did not direct OSHA to collect injury and illness data until more than 3 weeks after the hurricane struck. OSHA attempted to collect the data, but the information federal agencies provided were incomplete and unreliable. OSHA and other agencies did track fatalities. They reported nine worker fatalities attributed to work-related accidents: three employees of federal contractors and six nonfederal workers or volunteers. OSHA provided assistance to many response and recovery workers who responded to Hurricane Katrina, but not all workers' safety and health needs were met. OSHA quickly established operations in the Gulf area; intervened in thousands of potentially hazardous situations; and assessed air, water, soil, and noise hazards at many work sites. However, disagreements between OSHA and FEMA about which agency was in charge of providing safety and health assistance to federal agencies and workers and how it would be provided delayed some of OSHA's efforts. Also, some agencies' lack of awareness about the role OSHA plays in a disaster further hindered its ability to provide assistance. As a result, OSHA did not fully meet workers' safety and health needs, particularly their need for training and protective equipment. OSHA also did not coordinate with the Department of Health and Human Services to ensure that workers had needed mental health services, and OSHA was not assigned responsibility for coordinating the needs of nonfederal workers, including state and local agency workers; many immigrants; and volunteers.