As shown in table 1, DOD had more than 3,000 unmanned aircraft as of  February 2006, compared to fewer than 50 unmanned aircraft in 2000. Furthermore, DOD’s 2006 QDR published in February 2006 validates the  importance of unmanned systems. In  particular, the QDR report highlighted the department’s plans to expand  investment in unmanned systems and their use in military operations. Combat Successes Realized, but Challenges Remain

DOD has experienced a high level of mission success using UAS in combat  operations, but faces some operational challenges that could hamper joint  operations. While DOD has taken initial steps to address these  challenges, limited progress has been made and the effectiveness of these  actions cannot be adequately assessed until they are fully implemented. In operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, U.S. forces  have used a variety of UAS, such as the Predator, Raven, and Shadow, in  integral roles on intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and offensive  strike joint or service-specific missions. Key challenges identified in ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan relate to interoperability, the availability of communications bandwidth, and managing UAS and manned systems in the same airspace. The services are also initiating efforts to improve  interoperability. DOD’s progress includes an update to its roadmap and the  establishment of new oversight bodies to facilitate planning and coordination regarding the development, procurement, and use of UAS. Despite our prior recommendations on the subject, DOD’s updated  roadmap still lacks key planning elements such as a clear link between  goals, capabilities, plans, funding priorities, and needs. While DOD intends for these entities to play a role in  guiding service UAS acquisition, planning, prioritization, and execution of unmanned air systems, it is also unclear to what extent they will be able to influence the services because none of the entities are chartered with the  authority to direct the military services to adopt any of their suggestions. While it also describes  desired capabilities for UAS, operational issues or challenges based on  ongoing operations, and service-specific acquisition plans, it does not  provide a clear link among the goals, desired capabilities, and plans, nor  does it sufficiently address the interrelationship among service plans to  each other and how they promote joint operations, opportunities for joint  endeavors, and investment priorities and related funding needs. We continue to believe that a  strategic plan is needed to better position DOD to validate requirements,  evaluate services plans, integrate service efforts, and establish program  and funding priorities. Without a strategic plan, Congress may not have all the information it needs to evaluate DOD’s UAS funding requests. Furthermore, a strategic plan and oversight framework would help DOD  assure that service plans for developing UAS anticipate and potentially minimize the types of challenges that are emerging today, particularly in  the areas of interoperability, bandwidth, and airspace integration. Unmanned Aircraft Programs Provide Lessons Learned for Future Systems to Craft Better and Less Risky Acquisition Strategies

While there have been successes on the battlefield, UAS development programs have exhibited similar problems as other major weapon systems  that began an acquisition program too early, with many uncertainties about requirements and funding, and immature technologies, design, and  production. Unmanned systems have also experienced similar outcomes— changing requirements, cost growth, delays in delivery, performance shortfalls, and reliability and support problems. Key lessons that can be applied to J-UCAS and other future systems  include maintaining disciplined leadership support and direction similar to that  experienced early in Global Hawk from the Under Secretary of Defense  for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics and with the Predator’s Task  Force Arnold (a senior group of Air Force leaders that helped the  program maintain a tight focus on program requirements and  direction); establishing a clear business case that justifies initial investments and  constrains individual program requirements to match available resources based on proven technologies, engineering knowledge, and time available before committing to system development and  demonstration; implementing an incremental acquisition strategy preferred by defense  policy and best practices that separates technology development from  product development and minimizes concurrency between testing and  production; establishing and enforcing controls that require knowledge and demonstrations to ensure that appropriate knowledge is captured and  used at critical decision junctures before moving programs forward and investing more money; and managing according to realistic funding requirements that fully resource product development and production based on a cost estimate that has been informed by proven technologies and a preliminary design. Future Direction of DOD’s UAS Acquisitions

Frequent changes to J-UCAS and recent budget actions raise some  questions about the department’s priorities and future direction for  unmanned aircraft systems, which a strategic plan would help address. Concerns have also been raised about possible duplication of DOD unmanned aircraft systems as the services look to expand individual fleets. The joint decision of the Air Force and Army to develop a  memorandum of understanding on the Predator and Warrior programs is  encouraging and could be a model for inhibiting duplication and fostering  synergy of efforts.
Why GAO Did This Study

The current generation of unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) has been in development for defense applications since the 1980's. As of February 2006, the Department of Defense (DOD) had more than 3,000 unmanned aircraft, about 2,000 of which are supporting ongoing operations in Iraq. DOD's 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review validates the importance of unmanned systems and establishes plans to significantly expand investment in unmanned systems and their use in military operations over the next several years. The Congress has been particularly interested in DOD's approach to determining UAS needs and managing the growing number of UAS programs. This testimony addresses GAO's prior work and preliminary observations on (1) the operational successes and challenges U.S. forces are experiencing with UAS in combat operations, and the extent to which DOD has taken steps to address challenges; (2) DOD's progress in establishing a strategic plan and oversight framework to guide joint and service-specific UAS development efforts and related investment decisions; and (3) our assessment of the Global Hawk and Predator programs' business cases and acquisition strategies and the lessons learned that can be applied to the Joint Unmanned Combat Air Systems program.

What GAO Found

DOD has experienced a high level of mission successes with UAS, but continues to face challenges in fully maximizing the use of these assets. In operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, U.S. forces have used UAS for intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and offensive strike missions in support of joint and service-specific operations. As the numbers of UAS operating in the same airspace as manned aircraft grows, DOD continues to face operational challenges related to interoperability, availability of communications bandwidth, and airspace integration. While DOD and the services have taken some positive initial steps to address these challenges, such as issuing guidance and developing initiatives to improve interoperability, limited progress has been made and the effectiveness of these efforts cannot be adequately assessed until they are fully implemented. While DOD continues to request funds to support service plans for acquiring UAS, it still lacks a viable strategic plan to guide UAS development and investment decisions. Since GAO last reported, DOD established new oversight bodies and updated its UAS Roadmap, but it is too early to tell how the new entities will interrelate and whether they will be able to influence service plans. Also, the updated roadmap identifies broad goals, desired capabilities, and service acquisition plans, but lacks critical elements, such as a clear link among goals, capabilities, and plans, opportunities for joint endeavors, and funding priorities and needs. Until DOD develops a strategic plan, it will not be well positioned to validate requirements, evaluate and integrate services plans, and establish program and funding priorities, nor will Congress have all the information it needs to evaluate funding requests. Such a plan would also help DOD anticipate and minimize the types of challenges that are being experienced today. While there have been successes on the battlefield, UAS development programs have shared many of the same problems as other major weapon systems that begin an acquisition program too early, with many uncertainties about requirements, funding, and immature technology, design, and production. Unmanned systems have also experienced similar outcomes--changing requirements, cost growth, delays in delivery, performance shortfalls, and reliability and support problems. Future acquisition programscan learn from past efforts to craft better and less risky acquisition plans. Key steps conducive to success include preparing a comprehensive business case, adopting a knowledge-based and incremental acquisition strategy, and sustaining disciplined leadership and direction. Frequent changes to the Joint Unmanned Combat Air Systems technology demonstration program and recent budget actions raise some questions about the Department's priorities and future directions for UAS. Concerns have also been raised about possible duplication of systems as the services look to expand individual fleets. Ongoing Army and Air Force efforts to coordinate the Warrior and Predator programs are encouraging and could be a model for limiting duplication and fostering jointness and interoperability.