The use of unmanned aircraft systems in military operations has increased  rapidly since the fall of 2001, with some notable successes. The Global Hawk, Predator, and Joint  Unmanned Combat Air Systems are DOD’s three largest unmanned aircraft  programs in terms of cost. Global Hawk and Predator Had Common Beginnings, but Different Acquisition Strategies Have Yielded Different Outcomes

While the Global Hawk and Predator both began as successful advanced  concept technology demonstration (ACTD) programs, they have since  adopted different strategies in system development that have led to  different outcomes. The Global Hawk adopted a riskier acquisition  strategy that has led to significant cost, schedule, and performance  problems. Support to the warfighter is the program’s top priority. Total  program acquisition and procurement unit costs have increased 73 percent  and 35 percent, respectively, and aircraft quantities decreased by 19  percent. The Predator program overall has experienced fewer cost, schedule, and  performance problems than the Global Hawk program has experienced. Its decisions have been more consistent  with DOD’s acquisition policy preferences. J-UCAS Program Can Benefit from Lessons Learned by Global Hawk and Predator Programs

J-UCAS represents the next generation of unmanned aircraft. Since the pre-acquisition program was initiated in 2003, it has  experienced funding cuts and leadership changes. Regardless of  future organization, DOD still has the opportunity to learn from the  lessons of the Global Hawk and Predator programs to develop the  knowledge needed to prepare solid and feasible business cases to support  advanced unmanned aircraft acquisitions. Key lessons that can be  applied to J-UCAS and its offspring include    maintaining disciplined leadership support and direction similar to that  experienced early in Global Hawk from the Under Secretary of Defense  for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics and with the Predator’s Task  Force Arnold;    establishing a clear business case that constrains individual program  requirements to match available resources based on proven  technologies and engineering knowledge before committing to system  development and demonstration;    establishing an incremental acquisition strategy that separates  technology development from product development and minimizes  concurrency between testing and production;    establishing and enforcing controls that require knowledge and  demonstrations to ensure that appropriate knowledge is captured and  used at critical decision junctures before moving programs forward  and investing more money; and    managing according to realistic funding requirements that fully  resource product development and production based on a cost  estimate that has been informed by proven technologies and a  preliminary design. However, given the magnitude of the  program’s continuing changes and challenges discussed in this report, we  are concerned that these efforts will fall short. The Quadrennial Defense  Review calls for restructuring J-UCAS into a Navy effort to develop an  unmanned carrier-based aircraft, while the Air Force will consider J-UCAS  technologies and accomplishments in its efforts to develop a new, land- based long-range strike capability. Figure 2 compares the salient performance characteristics of these  unmanned aircraft systems. Defense Acquisitions: DOD’s Revised Policy Emphasizes Best Practices,  but More Controls Are Needed.
Why GAO Did This Study

Through 2011, the Department of Defense (DOD) plans to spend $20 billion to significantly increase its inventory of unmanned aircraft systems, which are providing new intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and strike capabilities to U.S. combat forces--including those in Iraq and Afghanistan. Despite their success on the battlefield, DOD's unmanned aircraft programs have experienced cost and schedule overruns and performance shortfalls. Given the sizable planned investment in these systems, GAO was asked to review DOD's three largest unmanned aircraft programs in terms of cost. Specifically, GAO assessed the Global Hawk and Predator programs' acquisition strategies and identified lessons from these two programs that can be applied to the Joint Unmanned Combat Air Systems (J-UCAS) program, the next generation of unmanned aircraft.

What GAO Found

While the Global Hawk and Predator both began as successful demonstration programs, they adopted different acquisition strategies that have led to different outcomes. With substantial overlap in development, testing, and production, the Global Hawk program has experienced serious cost, schedule, and performance problems. As a result, since the approved start of system development, planned quantities of the Global Hawk have decreased 19 percent, and acquisition unit costs have increased 75 percent. In contrast, the Predator program adopted a more structured acquisition strategy that uses an incremental, or evolutionary, approach to development--an approach more consistent with DOD's revised acquisition policy preferences and commercial best practices. While the Predator program has experienced some problems, the program's cost growth and schedule delays have been relatively minor, and testing of prototypes in operational environments has already begun. Since its inception as a joint program in 2003, the J-UCAS program has experienced funding cuts and leadership changes, and the recent Quadrennial Defense Review has directed another restructuring into a Navy program to develop a carrier-based unmanned combat air system. Regardless of these setbacks and the program's future organization, DOD still has the opportunity to learn from the lessons of the Global Hawk and Predator programs. Until DOD develops the knowledge needed to prepare solid and feasible business cases to support the acquisition of J-UCAS and other advanced unmanned aircraft systems, it will continue to risk cost and schedule overruns and delaying fielding capabilities to the warfighter.