Because MDA develops and fields assets continuously, it combines  developmental testing with operational testing. Due to the complexity, scale, safety constraints, and cost involved, MDA is  unable to conduct a sufficient number of flight tests to fully understand  the performance of the system. One such grouping is the annual performance  assessment, a system-level end-to-end simulation that assesses the  performance of the BMDS configuration as it exists in the field. MDA however was only able to conduct two, as  shown in figure 1. GMD was unable to conduct either of its planned intercept attempts  during fiscal year 2008 – FTG-04 and FTG-05. According to MDA no more  CE-I EKV flight tests have been approved. Poor Target Missile Performance Continues to Hamper BMDS Testing

Problems with the reliability and availability of targets (which are  themselves ballistic missiles) have increasingly affected BMDS  development and testing since 2006. Specifically, the reduced  productivity of testing has delayed understanding the overall performance  of BMDS, production and fielding have in some cases gotten ahead of  testing, and declarations of capabilities ready for fielding have been made  based on fewer tests and less modeling and simulation than planned. Production and Fielding Proceed Despite Delays in Testing and Assessments

Testing problems have contributed to a concurrent development,  manufacturing and fielding strategy in which assets are produced and  fielded before they are fully demonstrated through testing and modeling. For example, although a test of the ability of the SM-3 Block 1A missile to  engage and intercept a long range ballistic target was delayed until the  third quarter of fiscal year 2009, MDA purchased 20 of the missiles in fiscal  year 2008 ahead of schedule. Review of BMDS Modeling and Testing Holds Promise, but Must Anticipate Contingences

MDA has undertaken a three-phase review of the entire BMDS modeling,  simulation, and test program. According to MDA, the three phases involve  identifying critical variables that have not been proven to date,  determining what test scenarios are needed to collect the data, and  developing an affordable and prioritized schedule of flight and ground  tests. Nonetheless, the review appears to offer a  sound approach for closing the gaps that exist between testing, modeling,  and simulation. In  addition to linking the critical modeling and simulation variables with test  events, the review will have to address the factors that have limited the  productivity of the current test approach, such as the availability and  performance of targets. An important  consideration in this regard is for modeling, simulation, and testing events  to be re-synchronized so that they properly inform decisions on producing,  fielding, and declaring assets operational. Contingency plans could then  be formed for adjusting the pace of these decisions should shortfalls occur  in modeling, simulation, or testing. MDA has indicated that this new approach to testing will take time to  implement, with partial implementation in fiscal year 2010 and full  implementation not occurring until fiscal year 2011. Therefore, MDA must  manage the transition to the new testing approach. In particular, the  ambitious fiscal year 2009 flight test plan may need to be reassessed with  the goal of establishing a robust series of tests that can withstand some  delays without causing wholesale changes to the test plan during the  transition. In the mean time, MDA will have to be prudent in making  decisions to produce and field additional assets. Our annual report on missile defense is in draft and with DOD for  comment. It will be issued in final by March 13, 2009.
Why GAO Did This Study

The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) has spent about $56 billion and will spend about $50 billion more through 2013 to develop a Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS). This testimony is based on two reviews GAO was directed to conduct in 2008. In addition to our annual review assessing the annual cost, testing, schedule, and performance progress MDA made in developing BMDS, we have also reported on MDA's targets program. In this testimony we discuss (1) the productivity of MDA's recent test program, (2) the consequences of the testing shortfalls, and (3) key factors that should be considered as MDA revises its approach to testing. GAO assessed contractor cost, schedule, and performance; tests completed; and the assets fielded during 2008. GAO also reviewed pertinent sections of the U.S. Code, acquisition policy, and the activities of a new missile defense board.

What GAO Found

The scale, complexity, cost and safety associated with testing the missile defense system constitute a unique challenge for MDA, test agencies and other oversight organizations. This challenge is heightened by the fact that missile defense assets are developed, produced, and fielded concurrently. Overall, during fiscal year 2008, testing has been less productive than planned. While MDA completed several key tests that demonstrated enhanced performance of BMDS, all elements of the system had test delays and shortfalls, in part due to problems with the availability and performance of target missiles. GMD in particular was unable to conduct either of its two planned intercept attempts in fiscal year 2008. While it did subsequently conduct one in December 2008, it was not able to achieve all primary objectives because the target failed to release its countermeasures. As a result, aspects of the fielded ground-launched kill vehicles may not be demonstrated since no more flight tests have been approved. Target missiles continue as a persistent problem in fiscal year 2008 as poor target performance caused several tests to either fail in part or in whole. Testing shortfalls have had several consequences. First, they have delayed the validation of models and simulations, which are needed to assess the system's overall performance. As a result, the performance of the fielded BMDS as a whole cannot yet be determined. Second, the production and fielding of assets has continued and in some cases has gotten ahead of testing. For example, enhanced Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicles will now be produced and delivered before they are flight tested. Third, MDA has relied on a reduced basis--fewer test, model, and simulation results--to declare capabilities as operational in the field. MDA has undertaken a three-phase review of the entire BMDS test program that involves identifying critical variables that have not been proven to date, determining what test scenarios are needed to collect the data, and developing an affordable, prioritized schedule of flight and ground tests. This review, as long as it continues to involve test and evaluation organizations, appears to offer a sound approach for closing the gaps that exist between testing, modeling, and simulation. Critical to being able to implement the approach will be addressing the factors that have limited the productivity of the current test approach, such as the availability and performance of targets. An additional consideration in a new testing approach must be to ensure that assets are sufficiently tested before they are produced and fielded. An important consideration in this regard is for modeling, simulation, and testing events to be re-synchronized so that they properly inform decisions on producing, fielding, and declaring assets operational. Contingency plans could then be formed for adjusting the pace of these decisions should shortfalls occur in modeling, simulation, or testing. Because MDA has indicated implementation will take time, managing the transition may need to include reassessing the ambitious fiscal year 2009 test plan. In the mean time, MDA will have to be prudent in making decisions to produce and field assets.