According to the Department of  Justice, under current law, inclusion on a terrorist watch list is not a stand- alone factor that would prohibit a person from receiving or possessing a  firearm. However, the Attorney General and the FBI ultimately are  responsible for managing the overall NICS program. Of this total, 35  transactions were allowed to proceed because the background checks  found no prohibiting information, such as felony convictions or illegal  immigrant status, as shown in table 2. FBI counterterrorism officials  told us that receiving all available personal identifying information and  other details from terrorism-related NICS transactions could be useful in  conducting investigations. Justice  noted, however, that information about a NICS transaction can be shared  with law enforcement agents or other government agencies in the  legitimate pursuit of establishing a match between the prospective gun  buyer and a VGTOF record and in the search for information that could  prohibit the firearm transfer. Also, most state agency officials told us they were not  aware of any restrictions or specific FBI guidance on the types of  information that could or could not be shared with counterterrorism  officials. As part of routine state audits the FBI conducts every 3 years, the FBI  plans to assess the states’ handling of terrorism-related NICS transactions. The primary purpose of the revised procedures is  to better ensure that known or suspected members of terrorist  organizations who have disqualifying factors do not receive firearms in  violation of federal or state law. However, our work  revealed that federal and state procedures for handling terrorism-related  NICS transactions do not clearly address the specific types of information  that can or should be routinely provided to counterterrorism officials or  the sources from which such information can be obtained. However, given  that these NICS background checks involve known or suspected terrorists  who could pose homeland security risks, more frequent FBI oversight or  centralized management is needed. Further, more  frequent FBI oversight or centralized management would help address  other types of issues we identified—such as several states’ delays in  implementing procedures and one state’s mishandling of a terrorism- related NICS transaction. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

	Objectives

Our overall objective was to review how the Federal Bureau of  Investigation’s (FBI) National Instant Criminal Background Check System  (NICS) handles checks of prospective firearms purchasers that hit on and  are confirmed to match terrorist watch list records. How many NICS transactions have resulted in valid matches with  terrorist watch list records? For valid matches, what are federal and state procedures for sharing  NICS-related information with federal counterterrorism officials? Number of NICS Transactions with Valid Matches to Terrorist Watch List Records

To determine the number of NICS transactions that resulted in valid  matches with terrorist records in VGTOF—during the period February 3  through June 30, 2004—we interviewed officials from the FBI’s NICS  Section and reviewed FBI data. FBI Monitoring of the States’ Handling of NICS Transactions and Issues Encountered by State Agencies

To determine the extent to which the FBI has monitored the states’  handling of NICS transactions involving VGTOF records, we interviewed  officials from the Department of Justice’s Office of Legal Policy, the FBI’s  NICS Section, and state agencies.
Why GAO Did This Study

Membership in a terrorist organization does not prohibit a person from owning a gun under current law. Thus, during presale screening of prospective firearms purchasers, the National Instant Criminal Background Check System historically did not utilize terrorist watch list records. However, for homeland security and other purposes, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and applicable state agencies began receiving notices (effective February 3, 2004) when such screening involved watch lists records. GAO determined (1) how many checks have resulted in valid matches with terrorist watch list records, (2) procedures for providing federal counterterrorism officials relevant information from valid-match background checks, and (3) the extent to which the FBI monitors or audits the states' handling of such checks.

What GAO Found

During the period GAO reviewed--February 3 through June 30, 2004--a total of 44 firearm-related background checks handled by the FBI and applicable state agencies resulted in valid matches with terrorist watch list records. Of this total, 35 transactions were allowed to proceed because the background checks found no prohibiting information, such as felony convictions, illegal immigrant status, or other disqualifying factors. Federal and state procedures--developed and disseminated under the Department of Justice's direction--do not address the specific types of information from valid-match background checks that can or should be provided to federal counterterrorism officials or the sources from which such information can be obtained. Justice officials told GAO that information from the background check system is not to be used for general law enforcement purposes but can be shared with law enforcement agents or other government agencies in the legitimate pursuit of establishing a match between the prospective gun buyer and a terrorist watch list record and in the search for information that could prohibit the firearm transfer. Most state agency personnel GAO contacted were not aware of any restrictions or limitations on providing valid-match information to counterterrorism officials. FBI counterterrorism officials told GAO that routinely receiving all available personal identifying information and other details from valid-match background checks could be useful in conducting investigations. As part of routine audits the FBI conducts every 3 years, the Bureau plans to assess the states' handling of firearm-related background checks involving terrorist watch list records. However, given that these background checks involve known or suspected terrorists who could pose homeland security risks, more frequent FBI oversight or centralized management would help ensure that suspected terrorists who have disqualifying factors do not obtain firearms in violation of the law. The Attorney General and the FBI ultimately are responsible for managing the background check system, although they have yet to assess the states' compliance with applicable procedures for handling terrorism-related checks. Also, more frequent FBI oversight or centralized management would help address other types of issues GAO identified--such as several states' delays in implementing procedures and one state's mishandling of a terrorism-related background check.