	Focus and Scope of This Report

The U.S.-led effort to end permanently Afghanistan's role as a base for anti-western Islamicterrorists requires not only the defeat of the Taliban-which has been achieved through American,allied, and Afghan military action, but also the reconstruction of a stable, effective and ideologicallymoderate Afghan state. Otherwise, the country could again become a base for terrorism. Congress has strongly supported American involvement in supporting the fledgling government headed by Karzai, and many of the several dozen Members of Congress who have visitedAfghanistan have advocated more U.S. aid than is currently planned, the more prompt delivery ofaid to the Karzai administration, and an expanded U.S. role in peacekeeping. Current Framework for the Reconstruction of a Stable and Moderate Afghan State

Achieving the goal of a stable and moderate Afghanistan depends on the establishment of apolitical process that has at least the tacit support of the major organized ethnic and tribal groups andcontenders for power, as well as ordinary Afghans who are simply seeking some kind of peace andnormalcy in their lives. Outcome of the June 2002 Emergency Loya Jirga

Another important milestone was achieved in June 2002 with the generally successful conclusion of an Emergency Loya Jirga ("Grand Council"), which confirmed Karzai as head of aTransitional Administration charged with organizing an effective government, supervising thedrafting of a constitution, and preparing the country for national elections in December 2002. Osama bin Laden's role dates from late1980s, when he and a number of other private Saudis attempted to promote their radical version ofSunni Islam among the Afghan mujahidin . During 1993 and 1994 Hekmatyar's forces pounded much of Kabul to rubble with rockets, reducingthe population from about 2 million at the end of the Soviet occupation period to less than 500,000. Sources of Legitimacy. Likewise, an important obstacle to ethnic harmony-the collapse of Pashtun political cohesivenessand the related sense of being dispossessed-is unlikely to be solved by the adjustment of cabinetposts, since the Tajiks will not willingly give up effective control of the key ministries concernedwith defense, internal security, and foreign affairs. (35) The Bush Administration has allocated about$311.3 million for humanitarian assistance to Afghanistan for FY 2002, which began October 1,2001. Appendix I: Bonn Agreements on Afghanistan

AGREEMENT ON PROVISIONAL ARRANGEMENTS IN AFGHANISTAN PENDING THE RE-ESTABLISHMENT OF PERMANENT GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS
The participants in the UN Talks on Afghanistan, 
In the presence of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Afghanistan, 
Determined to end the tragic conflict in Afghanistan and promote national reconciliation, lasting peace, stability and respect for human rights in the country,
Reaffirming the independence, national sovereignty and territorial integrity of Afghanistan, 
Acknowledging the right of the people of Afghanistan to freely determine their own political future in accordance with the principles of Islam, democracy, pluralism and social justice,
Expressing their appreciation to the Afghan mujahidin who, over the years, have defended the independence, territorial integrity and national unity of the country and have played a major role inthe struggle against terrorism and oppression, and whose sacrifice has now made them both heroesof jihad and champions of peace, stability and reconstruction of their beloved homeland,Afghanistan,
Aware that the unstable situation in Afghanistan requires the implementation of emergency interim arrangements and expressing their deep appreciation to His Excellency ProfessorBurhanuddin Rabbani for his readiness to transfer power to an interim authority which is to beestablished pursuant to this agreement,
Recognizing the need to ensure broad representation in these interim arrangements of all segments of the Afghan population, including groups that have not been adequately represented atthe UN Talks on Afghanistan, 
Noting that these interim arrangements are intended as a first step toward the establishment of a broad-based, gender-sensitive, multi-ethnic and fully representative government, and are notintended to remain in place beyond the specified period of time,
Recognizing that some time may be required for a new Afghan security force to be fully constituted and functional and that therefore other security provisions detailed in Annex I to thisagreement must meanwhile be put in place,
Considering that the United Nations, as the internationally recognized impartial institution, has a particularly important role to play, detailed in Annex II to this agreement, in the period prior to theestablishment of permanent institutions in Afghanistan,
Have agreed as follows: 
THE INTERIM AUTHORITY 
I. Interim Administration 
A.
The U.S.-led effort to end Afghanistan's role as host to Osama bin Laden and other anti-western Islamic terrorists requires not only the defeat of the Taliban but also the reconstruction of a stable,effective, and ideologically moderate Afghan state. Otherwise, the country could continue to be apotential base for terrorism and a source of regional instability. An important milestone wasachieved in June 2002 with the generally successful conclusion of an Emergency Loya Jirga ("grandcouncil"), which confirmed Hamid Karzai, an ethnic Pashtun member of the western educated elitewith family ties to the former king as head of a Transitional Administration. Karzai, who previouslyheaded an Interim Administration formed in December 2001, is charged with organizing agovernment, supervising the drafting of a constitution, and preparing for national elections to be heldin December 2003.
The Loya Jirga failed to satisfy many of the participants, especially Pashtuns, who feel under-represented in distribution of cabinet ministries, but more than 1,500 Afghans from all ethnicgroups and walks of life had an opportunity to vent long pent up feelings and engage in free flowingdebate about the country's future. Karzai has gained the nominal support of major regional warlords,but his authority remains dependent on support from the militarily powerful ethnic Tajik minorityand his status as a broadly acceptable figure who can attract international assistance.
The Bush Administration and the Congress have indicated strong support for humanitarian relief and reconstruction, but the nature of the longer term U.S. role remains to be determined. Asof mid-2002, the Administration remained focused on the military campaign and resistant toextensive participation in "nation building," a stance some in Congress say is too limited. In reality,U.S. forces have repeatedly played a de facto peacekeeping role in defusing conflicts among Afghanallies, and have sometimes become embroiled in local power struggles. Some Afghan warlords havebeen accused of causing mistaken attacks on civilians or pro-Karzai groups by providing falseintelligence to American forces.
Major obstacles to the goal of a stable and ideologically moderate Afghan state include: long-standing power aspirations of rival tribal and ethnic groups; the long-term decline of Afghanstate institutions that began with the Communist/Soviet occupation decade of 1979-89, andaccelerated under the Taliban; the recent rapid increase in opium production and local powerstruggles for control of the lucrative drug trade; and the resiliency of politicized Islam, as promotedboth by the Taliban and other radical Islamist parties, which retains appeal to many Afghans.
A stable and ideologically moderate Afghanistan is unlikely to be constructed without significant near-term aid to reestablish security, relieve immediate economic distress, and provide alternateemployment for former combatants, and extensive and long-term reconstruction support frombilateral and multilateral aid donors. To date, aid actually delivered to the Kabul administration hasbeen much less than promised. A stable Afghanistan also require that neighboring countries playa constructive role, or - at a minimum - avoid interfering in the country's internal affairs.