Federal requirements currently address security at some U.S. chemical  facilities. DHS Has Taken Actions to Develop a Plan for Protecting the Chemical Sector, Assess Facilities’ Vulnerabilities, and Interact with the Industry and Other Federal Agencies

DHS is developing a plan for protecting the chemical sector that will  establish a framework for reducing the overall vulnerability of the sector  in partnership with the industry and state and local authorities. DHS officials  told us that the final plan—which they now expect to complete and  release in the fall of 2006—will reflect the basic principles and content  described in the draft plan. On the basis of our review of the draft plan and  discussions with DHS officials, the final plan will, among other things, (1)  present background information on the sector; (2) describe the process  DHS will use to develop an inventory of chemical sector assets; (3)  describe DHS’s efforts to identify and assess chemical facilities’  vulnerabilities and plans to prioritize these efforts on the basis of the  vulnerability assessments; (4) outline the protective programs that will be  created to prevent, deter, mitigate, and recover from attacks on chemical  facilities, and describe how DHS will work with private sector and  government entities to implement these programs; (5) explain the  performance metrics DHS will use to measure the effectiveness of DHS  and industry security efforts; and (6) outline the department’s challenges  in coordinating the efforts of the chemical sector. Finally, DHS has implemented a number of programs to assist the private  sector and local communities in reducing vulnerabilities. DHS also coordinates with EPA and other federal  agencies through a government coordinating council. Other industry associations have encouraged their members to address  security by a variety of means. Despite industry  associations’ efforts to encourage or require members to voluntarily  address security, the extent of participation in the industry’s voluntary  initiatives is unclear. Chemical industry officials told us they face a number of challenges in  preparing facilities against a terrorist attack. Industry stakeholders also cited the need for  guidance on what level of security is adequate. DHS Needs Additional Authority to Ensure That Chemical Facilities Are Addressing Security Issues

Existing laws give DHS limited authority to address chemical sector  security, but DHS currently lacks specific authority to require all high-risk  facilities to assess their vulnerabilities and take corrective actions, where  needed. As a result, DHS cannot ensure that all high-risk facilities  are assessing their vulnerability to terrorist attacks and taking corrective  action, where necessary. DHS has concluded that its existing patchwork of authorities does not  permit it to regulate the chemical industry effectively, and that the  Congress should enact federal requirements for chemical facilities. Stakeholders’ Views on Safer Technologies Requirement in Chemical Security Legislation Are Mixed

While many stakeholders—including representatives from industry,  research centers, and government—agreed on the need for additional  legislation that would place federal security requirements on chemical  facilities, they expressed divergent views on whether such legislation  should require the use of inherently safer technologies. On this basis,  DHS has concluded—as we did in 2003 and again in January 2006—that its  existing authorities do not allow it to effectively regulate chemical sector  security. Furthermore, implementing inherently safer  technologies potentially could lessen the consequences of a terrorist  attack by reducing the chemical risks present at facilities, thereby making  facilities less attractive targets. However, substituting safer technologies  can be prohibitively expensive and can shift risks onto other facilities or  the transportation sector. 2360,  making appropriations for DHS for fiscal year 2006, directed DHS to    submit a report to the Senate and House Committees on Appropriations by  February 10, 2006, describing (1) the resources needed to implement  mandatory security requirements for the chemical sector and to create a  system for auditing and ensuring compliance with the security standards  and (2) the security requirements and any reasons why the requirements  should differ from those already in place for chemical facilities that  operate in a port zone;   complete vulnerability assessments of the highest risk U.S. chemical  facilities by December 2006, giving preference to facilities that, if attacked,  pose the greatest threat to human life and the economy; and    complete a national security strategy for the chemical sector by February  10, 2006.
Why GAO Did This Study

Terrorist attacks on U.S. chemical facilities could damage public health and the economy. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) coordinates federal efforts to protect these facilities from attacks. GAO was asked to provide a statement for the record based on its report Homeland Security: DHS Is Taking Steps to Enhance Security at Chemical Facilities, but Additional Authority Is Needed ( GAO-06-150 , January 27, 2006), GAO reviewed (1) DHS's actions to develop a strategy to protect chemical plants, assist with the industry's security efforts, and coordinate with other federal agencies, (2) industry security initiatives, (3) DHS's authorities and the need for additional security legislation, and (4) stakeholders' views on any requirements to use safer technologies.

What GAO Found

DHS is developing a Chemical Sector-Specific Plan, which is intended to, among other things, describe DHS's ongoing efforts and future plans to coordinate with federal, state, and local agencies and the private sector; identify chemical facilities to include in the sector, assess their vulnerabilities, and prioritize them; and develop programs to prevent, deter, mitigate, and recover from attacks on chemical facilities. DHS officials told GAO that they now expect to complete and release the plan in the fall of 2006. In addition, DHS has taken a number of actions to protect the chemical sector from terrorist attacks. DHS identified 3,400 facilities that, if attacked, could pose the greatest hazard to human life and health and has initiated programs to assist the industry and local communities in protecting chemical plants. DHS also coordinates with the Chemical Sector Coordinating Council, an industry-led group that acts as a liaison for the chemical sector, and with EPA and other federal agencies. The chemical industry is voluntarily addressing plant security, but faces challenges. Some industry associations require member companies to assess plants' vulnerabilities, develop and implement mitigation plans, and have a third party verify that security measures were implemented. Other associations have developed guidelines and other tools to encourage their members to address security. Industry officials said that high costs and limited guidance on how much security is adequate create challenges in preparing facilities against terrorism. Because existing laws provide DHS with only limited authority to address security at chemical facilities, it has relied primarily on the industry's voluntary security efforts. However, the extent to which companies are addressing security is unclear. DHS does not have the authority to require chemical facilities to assess their vulnerabilities and implement security measures. Therefore, DHS cannot ensure that facilities are taking these actions. DHS has stated that its existing authorities do not permit it to effectively regulate the chemical industry, and that the Congress should enact federal requirements for chemical facilities. Many stakeholders agreed--as GAO concluded in 2003 and again in January 2006--that additional legislation placing federal security requirements on chemical facilities is needed. Stakeholders had mixed views on whether any chemical security legislation should require plants to substitute safer chemicals and processes, which could lessen the potential consequences of an attack, but could be costly or infeasible for some plants. DHS has stated that safer practices may make facilities less attractive to terrorist attack, but may shift risks rather than eliminate them. Environmental groups told GAO that they favored including or considering inherently safer technologies in any federal requirements, but most industry officials GAO contacted opposed a requirement to use safer technologies because they may shift risks or be prohibitively expensive.