Further, DOD is not well positioned to demonstrate to  Congress how it considered risks and made difficult trade-offs among its  capabilities to balance investments within future budgets, given the  nation’s fiscal challenges. According to senior DOD officials,  these areas identified for post-QDR study were generally complex and  involved multiple organizations, such as developing interoperable strategic  communications. Weaknesses in Assessment of Force Structure, Personnel Requirements, and Risk Limited the QDR’s Usefulness in Linking Force Structure to the Defense Strategy and Addressing Affordability Challenges

Weaknesses in the assessment of three key areas—force structure,  personnel requirements, and risk—significantly limited the review’s  usefulness in reassessing the force structure best suited to implement the  defense strategy at low-to-moderate level of risk, which is a key  requirement of the review. Since DOD did not conduct a comprehensive,  data-driven assessment of force structure alternatives during the QDR, it is  not in the best position to assure itself or Congress that it has identified  the force best suited to execute the national defense strategy. DOD Did Not Conduct a Thorough Review of Personnel Requirements

Although DOD concluded in the 2006 QDR report that the size of today’s  forces—both the active and reserve components across all four military  services—was appropriate to meet current and projected operational  demands, it did not provide a clear analytical basis for its conclusion. Without  performing a comprehensive analysis of the number of personnel it needs,  DOD cannot ensure that its military and civilian personnel levels reflect  the number of personnel needed to execute the defense strategy. DOD Did Not Conduct an Analytically Sound Risk Assessment of Its Proposed Force Structure

During the 2006 QDR, the risk assessments conducted by the Secretary of  Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff did not fully apply  DOD’s risk management framework to demonstrate how risks associated  with its proposed force structure were evaluated. Further, DOD may be unable to demonstrate how it will manage  risk within current and expected resource levels. Without an analytically  based risk assessment, DOD may not be able to prioritize and focus the  nation’s investments to combat 21st century security threats efficiently  and wisely. Options to improve the  usefulness of future QDRs include (1) clarifying expectations for how the  QDR should address the budget plan, (2) eliminating some reporting  elements for the QDR legislation that could be addressed in different  reports, (3) eliminating some reporting elements in the QDR legislation for  issues that may no longer be as relevant due to changes in the security  environment, and (4) establishing an independent advisory group to work  with DOD prior to and during the QDR to provide alternative perspectives  and analyses. Sustained DOD leadership facilitated decision making, and extensive  collaboration with interagency partners and allies provided a range of  perspectives on threats and capabilities. As a result of this change in  demand since the 2006 QDR, according to DOD’s comments, DOD has  responded by increasing Army and Marine Corps end strength. To determine whether changes to the QDR legislation could improve the  usefulness of future reviews including any changes needed to better reflect  the security conditions of the 21st century, we examined a wide variety of  studies that discussed the strengths and weaknesses of DOD’s 2006 QDR  and prior reviews. (b) Conduct of review.—Each quadrennial defense review shall be  conducted so as—  (1) to delineate a national defense strategy consistent with the most  recent National Security Strategy prescribed by the President pursuant  to section 108 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C.404a);  (2) to define sufficient force structure, force modernization plans,  infrastructure, budget plan, and other elements of the defense program  of the United States associated with that national defense strategy that  would be required to execute successfully the full range of missions  called for in that national defense strategy;  (3) to identify (A) the budget plan that would be required to provide  sufficient resources to execute successfully the full range of missions  called for in that national defense strategy at a low-to-moderate level  of risk, and (B) any additional resources (beyond those programmed in  the current future-years defense program) required to achieve such a  level of risk; and  (c) Assessment of risk.—The assessment of risk for the purposes of  subsection (b) shall be undertaken by the Secretary of Defense in  consultation with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Why GAO Did This Study

The Department of Defense (DOD) is required by law to conduct a comprehensive examination of the national defense strategy, force structure, modernization plans, infrastructure, and budget every 4 years including an assessment of the force structure best suited to implement the defense strategy at low-to-moderate level of risk. The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), completed in February 2006, represents the first comprehensive review that DOD had undertaken since the military forces have been engaged in operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. GAO was asked to assess (1) the strengths and weaknesses of DOD's approach and methodology for the 2006 QDR and (2) what changes, if any, in the QDR legislation could improve the usefulness of the report, including any changes that would better reflect 21st century security conditions. To conduct its review, GAO analyzed DOD's methodology, QDR study guidance, and results from key analyses and also obtained views of defense analysts within and outside of DOD.

What GAO Found

DOD's approach and methodology for the 2006 QDR had several strengths, but several weaknesses significantly limited the review's usefulness in addressing force structure, personnel requirements, and risk associated with executing the national defense strategy. Key strengths of the QDR included sustained involvement of senior DOD officials, extensive collaboration with interagency partners and allied countries, and a database to track implementation of initiatives. However, GAO found weaknesses in three key areas. First, DOD did not conduct a comprehensive, integrated assessment of different options for organizing and sizing its forces to provide needed capabilities. Without such an assessment, DOD is not well positioned to balance capability needs and risks within future budgets, given the nation's fiscal challenges. Second, DOD did not provide a clear analytical basis for its conclusion that it had the appropriate number of personnel to meet current and projected demands. During its review, DOD did not consider changing personnel levels and instead focused on altering the skill mix. However, a year after the QDR report was issued, DOD announced plans to increase Army and Marine Corps personnel by 92,000. Without performing a comprehensive analysis of the number of personnel it needs, DOD cannot provide an analytical basis that its military and civilian personnel levels reflect the number of personnel needed to execute the defense strategy. Third, the risk assessments conducted by the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which are required by the QDR legislation, did not fully apply DOD's risk management framework because DOD had not developed assessment tools to measure risk. Without a sound analytical approach to assessing risk, DOD may not be able to demonstrate how it will manage risk within current and expected resource levels. As a result, DOD is not in the best position to demonstrate that it has identified the force structure best suited to implement the defense strategy at low-to-moderate risk. Through discussions with DOD officials and defense analysts, GAO has identified several options for refining the QDR legislative language that Congress could consider to improve the usefulness of future QDRs, including changes to encourage DOD to focus on high priority strategic issues and better reflect security conditions of the 21st century. Congress could consider options to clarify its expectations regarding what budget information DOD should include in the QDR and eliminate reporting elements for issues that could be addressed in different reports. For example, the requirement to assess revisions to the unified command plan is also required and reported under other legislation. Further, some reporting elements such as how resources would be shifted between two conflicts could be eliminated in light of DOD's new planning approach that focuses on capabilities to meet a range of threats rather than on the allocation of forces for specific adversaries. GAO also presents an option to have an advisory group work with DOD prior to and during the QDR to provide DOD with alternative perspectives and analyses.