Full-time medics have also been assigned to the Brigade. The complete status of all corrective actions is included in appendixes I through V.

	Army Oversight Needs Improvement to Preserve Key Corrective Actions

If the Army is to sustain the key corrective actions instituted after the accident in the future, it must institutionalize them. One important way to achieve this objective is to expand the focus of formal Army inspections to include testing or observing the key safety controls to determine whether they are working effectively. Priority for Officer Staffing Increased, but Enlisted Personnel Levels Are Lower Than Brigade Requests

The Army plans to staff the Ranger Training Brigade at the required 90-percent level by February 1997 and submitted its plan for doing so to Congress in November 1996. Increased Officer Staffing Competes With Army Priorities for Allocating Personnel Shortages

Officer shortages, such as those experienced by the Ranger Training Brigade, are not unique. Army policy is that units that are first to fight are first to be resourced. Although there is a higher level of attention to safety, for the most part, the safety cell organization established is no change from the oversight practice that was in place at the time of the accident. Current Brigade Approach Mirrors Existing Army Policy

The act required the Army to establish an organizational entity known as a safety cell at each of the three phases of Ranger training, ensure that safety cell personnel at each location have sufficient continuity and experience in that area to understand local conditions and their potential effect on training safety, and assign sufficient numbers of safety cell personnel to serve as advisers to the officers in charge at each location in making daily “go” and “no-go” decisions on training. The act, however, did not establish specific criteria to guide decisions on the makeup of a safety cell. Even so, we noted that the personnel in these positions have limited continuity and experience in the local training areas. For example, the Brigade and battalion commanders normally rotate to new units every 2 years and enlisted personnel every 3 to 3.5 years. Because of the need for long-term continuity and other considerations, the Infantry Center and Brigade are considering requesting that four civilian and seven military personnel be added to the Brigade’s authorized personnel to serve as safety cell members. The Department said that the Brigade has identified the critical safety controls and the Secretary of the Army has directed that the chain of command and the Army Inspector General conduct periodic inspections of the Brigade to ensure that the safety controls and corrective actions are effective. Scope and Methodology

To determine the status and implementation of corrective actions taken to improve Ranger training safety, we received briefings from Brigade officials, reviewed reports covering the Army’s investigation of the Ranger students’ deaths, observed each Ranger battalion’s training facilities, interviewed Army investigating officers and Brigade and battalion commanders and instructors, reviewed training safety controls and inspection procedures, and observed the site where the deaths occurred. 8. 9. 12. 4. 6. 7. Air, water surface, and ground evacuation procedures have been planned and rehearsed. 4. Develop a system to check packing list for medevac helicopters. 10. 2. Status of Actions to Increase Personnel Staffing

	1. 2. 3. Required by the Fiscal Year 1996 National Defense Authorization Act.
Why GAO Did This Study

Pursuant to a legislative requirement, GAO reviewed the Army's investigation of the February 1995 accident in which four Army Ranger Training Brigade students died while training in a Florida swamp, focusing on the: (1) status of all of the Army's corrective actions; (2) adequacy of Army oversight to ensure that the corrective actions instituted after the accident will be sustained in the future; (3) Army's progress in implementing the Fiscal Year 1996 National Defense Authorization Act's mandate to increase Brigade staffing to 90 percent of requirements; and (4) Army's progress in establishing safety cell organizations at the Brigade.

What GAO Found

GAO found that: (1) the Ranger Training Brigade has completed most of the corrective actions recommended by the Army; (2) the Brigade has improved safety by developing systems to better monitor and predict swamp conditions, and improved command and control by revising its procedures to move training exercises outside high-risk areas of the swamp, eliminate discretion to deviate from planned exercise locations, and incorporate the latest guidance on training safety; (3) evacuation procedures have been revised and rehearsed, new medevac helicopters and refueling capacity have been obtained, and medics have been assigned directly to the Brigade; (4) if the Army is to sustain the key corrective actions taken after the accident in the future, the actions must become institutionalized; (5) if the important corrective actions are to become institutionalized, formal Army inspections will have to be expanded to include testing or observing to determine whether they are working effectively; (6) the Army plans to fully staff the Ranger Training Brigade at the mandated 90-percent level by February 1997; (7) although the Army raised the Brigade's staffing priority subsequent to GAO's field work, high-risk training units generally are not recognized in Army personnel staffing priorities; (8) the Brigade's long-term ability to sustain the required number of officers may be hindered by competition with Army priorities given to units who are first to fight and with other important noncombatant units; (9) currently, members of the Ranger Training Brigade and battalion chains of command serve as the safety cell organization established pursuant to the act; (10) the act did not establish specific criteria to guide decisions on the makeup of a safety cell, and the option chosen by the Army represents little change from the safety oversight practice that was in place at the time of the accident; (11) personnel in these positions have limited experience in the local training areas due to the Army's policy of rotating them to new units every 2 or 3 years; and (12) the Army Infantry Center is considering requesting authorization for additional civilian and military positions to serve as full-time safety cell members.