To ensure its effective implementation, the plan, among other things, established that
UNHCR, with the financial support of the donor community, would be in charge of continuing liaison and coordination with concerned governments and intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations to implement the agreement;
UNHCR was to participate in the refugee status determination process in an observer and advisory capacity; and
UNHCR would be responsible for (1) providing training to first-asylum country officials to help ensure fairness and consistency in the screening process; (2) coordinating the timely resettlement of those found to be refugees; and (3) administering a safe, dignified repatriation program for those found to be nonrefugees. About 75,500 had returned to Vietnam. On the basis of available documentation, it appears these cases were reasonably adjudicated. Indonesia’s Procedures and Criteria Consistent With CPA Guidelines

Both Indonesian government and UNHCR officials stated that refugee screening procedures were generally carried out under UNHCR guidelines, in accordance with internationally accepted refugee status determination criteria. Corruption Apparent in Indonesia’s Screening Process

Rumors of corruption began appearing in Indonesia at the inception of the status determination process. The allegations included assertions that asylum seekers with genuine refugee claims were screened out due to their inability to met corruption demands. And, residents in the camp indicated that corruption existed. Monitoring Efforts Identified No Evidence of Persecution Among Returnees

Both UNHCR and British monitoring officials told us they had found no evidence of persecution among the returnee population. It received substantially less in contributions, expending an estimated $444 million in Special Program (CPA) and General Program (regional) funds between 1989 and 1995. Table 4 shows U.S. contributions of $150.83 million to UNHCR’s General and Special Programs in support of the CPA during fiscal years 1990-96. To obtain an understanding of the program and its alleged weaknesses, we interviewed UNHCR officials currently involved in the CPA program and numerous officials who had first-hand knowledge of the status determination process from their tours of duty in Geneva and the countries of first-asylum during the early stages of the CPA. However, UNHCR’s case files contained the Hong Kong authorities’ decisions and the stated reasons for them; the asylum seekers’ biographical profiles; written appeals of first-instance screening decisions by the asylum seekers and/or their UNHCR-provided or private legal counsellors; and statements by UNHCR officials reviewing the cases for mandate status. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) was to participate in the process in an observer and advisory capacity and was to institute a comprehensive regional training program for the national officials involved in the process. However, according to Hong Kong government documents, it became increasingly clear during the mid-1980s that the large majority of arriving Vietnamese migrants did not have a well-founded fear of persecution in Vietnam and thus were not entitled to refugee status. We also noted errors. However, we believe the process was generally implemented in accordance with CPA guidelines. Hong Kong’s Procedures and Criteria Were Consistent With CPA Guidance

We interviewed UNHCR and Hong Kong government officials and reviewed various documents they provided us in developing a description of Hong Kong’s refugee screening procedures. Asylum Seeker Screening Process in Indonesia

Refugee screening in Indonesia was a two-phased process that met basic international structural screening standards but did not contain some of the checks and balances we found in the Hong Kong process. However, an independent observer with long experience at Galang told us UNHCR provided the asylum seekers ample information on the screening process and that asylum seekers were well prepared for the screening process. GAO Comments

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Why GAO Did This Study

Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the implementation of the Comprehensive Plan of Action (CPA) for the resettlement of asylum seekers from Vietnam and southeast Asia, focusing on: (1) whether Hong Kong and Indonesia implemented CPA refugee status determination procedures in accordance with international standards and criteria; (2) alleged corruption in the program; (3) whether asylum seekers who returned to Vietnam encountered persecution; and (4) U.S. and United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees' (UNHCR) costs associated with CPA implementation.

What GAO Found

GAO found that: (1) the CPA agreement stipulated that the first-asylum countries' refugee screening procedures be carried out in accordance with established international criteria and procedures; (2) GAO's examination in Hong Kong and Indonesia indicated that both programs met the CPA's basic structural requirements for refugee adjudication criteria and screening procedures; (3) GAO believes Hong Kong's screening process contained sufficient checks and balances to provide reasonable assurances that asylum seekers' cases could be heard and errors could be identified and corrected; (4) Hong Kong government and UNHCR officials acknowledged screening errors, but officials told GAO they had worked to correct the errors and that the process had improved over time; (5) GAO believes the Hong Kong government and UNHCR officials' screening decisions appeared to be reasonable in 9 of the 10 cases GAO examined; (6) in Indonesia, GAO believes the large majority of asylum seekers with strong claims for refugee status were screened in, due in part to UNHCR's heavy involvement in the screening process; (7) the process in Indonesia provided for both first-instance screening and an appeals procedure involving Indonesian authorities and UNHCR legal consultants; however, few asylum seekers received individual legal assistance; (8) according to UNHCR, it concentrated its efforts in Indonesia on trying to ensure that those with well-founded refugee claims were screened in; (9) rumors of corruption in Indonesia's screening process began at the inception of the screening process; (10) reports, files, and documents provided to GAO by nongovernmental organizations, advocacy groups, former asylum seekers, UNHCR, and other knowledgeable sources indicated widespread corruption in the Indonesia process; (11) GAO did not conduct an independent investigation of allegations of corruption, but, on the basis of documentation available to GAO, discussions with UNHCR officials in Geneva and Indonesia, and UNHCR reviews of the process in 1995, it appeared that corruption was likely; (12) UNHCR monitors in Vietnam have reported that they found no evidence of persecution of returned asylum seekers by Vietnamese authorities; (13) UNHCR had implemented a comprehensive monitoring program that provides reasonable assurance that returnees were not persecuted; (14) UNHCR spent an estimated $444 million on the CPA from 1989 through 1995, excluding unpaid obligations of $139 million in Hong Kong; (15) U.S. contributions to UNHCR for the CPA during the period were an estimated $151 million; and (16) the United States also contributed about $9 million to voluntary agencies in support of CPA activities.