Agencies Have Spent About $178 Million to Provide Radiation Detection Equipment to 36 Countries, but Future Spending Requirements for Some Programs Are Uncertain

Since fiscal year 1994, DOE, DOD, and State have spent about $178 million  to provide radiation detection equipment to 36 countries as part of the  overall U.S. effort to combat nuclear smuggling. The Threat of Corruption, Technological Limitations, Maintenance Problems, and Site Infrastructure Issues Challenge U.S. Programs to Combat Nuclear Smuggling

U.S. programs that provide radiation detection equipment to foreign  governments face a number of challenges that affect the installation and  effective operation of radiation detection equipment, including: the threat  of corruption of border security officials in some foreign countries,  technical limitations of radiation detection equipment previously deployed  by State and other agencies, inadequate maintenance of some handheld  equipment, and the lack of infrastructure necessary to operate radiation  detection equipment and harsh environmental conditions at some border  sites. DOE, DOD, and State officials told us they are concerned that corrupt  foreign border security personnel could compromise the effectiveness of  U.S.-funded radiation detection equipment by either turning off equipment  or ignoring alarms. In addition, DOD  and State also include anticorruption courses as part of the radiation  detection training they provide to foreign border security personnel. Some Border Crossings Remain More Vulnerable to Nuclear Smuggling Because DOE Has Not Upgraded Less Sophisticated Equipment Installed by Other U.S. Agencies

In 2002, DOE assumed responsibility for maintaining some radiation  detection equipment previously installed by State and other U.S. agencies  in 23 countries in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. However,  its ability to carry out its role as lead interagency coordinator is limited by  deficiencies in the strategic plan for interagency coordination and by its  lack of a comprehensive list of all U.S. radiation detection assistance. Additionally, State has not  maintained accurate information on the operational status and location of  all radiation detection equipment provided by U.S. programs. State Coordinates U.S. Radiation Detection Equipment Assistance through an Interagency Working Group and In- Country Advisors

As the lead coordinator of U.S. radiation detection equipment assistance  overseas, State has taken some steps to coordinate the efforts of U.S.  programs that provide this type of assistance to foreign countries. Without the development of a  comprehensive interagency list of U.S.-funded radiation detection  equipment, program managers at DOE, DOD, and State cannot accurately  assess the equipment needs of countries where they plan to provide  assistance, may unknowingly provide duplicative sets of equipment, and  cannot determine if the equipment is being used for its intended purpose or  is in need of maintenance and repair. While in Macedonia, we interviewed Macedonian  officials and toured one border site where radiation detection equipment  had previously been provided by the International Atomic Energy Agency  and the Department of State. Once these portal monitors are installed  in fiscal year 2006, DOE will maintain the equipment within its Second  Line of Defense “Core” program.
Why GAO Did This Study

According to the International Atomic Energy Agency, between 1993 and 2004, there were 662 confirmed cases of illicit trafficking in nuclear and radiological materials. Three U.S. agencies, the Departments of Energy (DOE), Defense (DOD), and State (State), have programs that provide radiation detection equipment and training to border security personnel in other countries. GAO examined the (1) progress U.S. programs have made in providing radiation detection equipment to foreign governments, including the current and expected costs of these programs; (2) challenges U.S. programs face in this effort; and (3) steps being taken to coordinate U.S. efforts to combat nuclear smuggling in other countries.

What GAO Found

Since fiscal year 1994, DOE, DOD, and State have provided radiation detection equipment to 36 countries as part of the overall U.S. effort to combat nuclear smuggling. Through the end of fiscal year 2005, these agencies had spent about $178 million on this assistance through seven different programs. Primary among these programs is DOE's Second Line of Defense "Core" program, which has installed equipment mostly in Russia since 1998. U.S. efforts to install and effectively operate radiation detection equipment in other countries face a number of challenges including: corruption of some foreign border security officials, technical limitations of some radiation detection equipment, inadequate maintenance of some equipment, and the lack of supporting infrastructure at some border sites. DOE, DOD, and State officials told us they are concerned that corrupt foreign border security personnel could compromise the effectiveness of U.S.-funded radiation detection equipment by either turning off equipment or ignoring alarms. In addition, State and other agencies have installed equipment at some sites that is less effective than equipment installed by DOE. Since 2002, DOE has maintained the equipment but has only upgraded one site. As a result, these border sites are more vulnerable to nuclear smuggling than sites with more sophisticated equipment. Further, while DOE assumed responsibility for maintaining most U.S.-funded equipment, some handheld equipment provided by State and DOD has not been maintained. Lastly, many border sites are located in remote areas that often lack infrastructure essential to operate radiation detection equipment. As the lead interagency coordinator of all U.S. radiation detection equipment assistance overseas, State has taken some steps to coordinate U.S. efforts. However, its ability to carry out its role as lead coordinator is limited by shortcomings in the strategic plan for interagency coordination. Additionally, State has not maintained an interagency master list of all U.S.-funded radiation detection equipment overseas. Without such a list, program managers at DOE, DOD, and State cannot accurately assess if equipment is operational and being used as intended; determine the equipment needs of countries where they plan to provide assistance; or detect if an agency has unknowingly supplied duplicative equipment.