DOE Has Overstated the Progress Made on Key Performance Measures, Raising Doubts about the IPP Program’s Nonproliferation Benefits

DOE has not accurately portrayed the IPP program’s progress, according  to our analysis of two key measures used to assess the program’s  performance—the number of WMD scientists receiving DOE support and  the number of long-term, private sector jobs created. Officials at 10 of the   22 Russian and Ukrainian institutes we interviewed said that IPP program  funds have allowed their institutes to recruit, hire, and retain younger  scientists. DOE reported that these   32 commercial successes had helped create or support 2,790 new private  sector jobs for former weapon scientists in Russia and other countries. DOE Has Not Developed an Exit Strategy for the IPP Program, but Instead Has Expanded Efforts to Iraq and Libya and Is Using the Program to Support the Department’s Global Nuclear Energy Partnership

Russian government officials, representatives of Russian and Ukrainian  institutes, and individuals at U.S. companies raised questions about the  continuing need for the IPP program, particularly in Russia, whose  economy has improved in recent years. Specifically:    A senior Russian Atomic Energy Agency official told us in July 2007 that  the IPP program is no longer relevant because Russia’s economy is strong  and its scientists no longer pose a proliferation risk. DOE has not developed criteria to determine when scientists, institutes, or  countries should be “graduated” from the IPP program, and DOE officials  believe that there is a continued need to engage Russian scientists. In  contrast, State has already assessed participating institutes and developed  a strategy—using a range of factors, such as the institute’s ability to pay  salaries regularly and to attract funding from other sources—to graduate  certain institutes from its Science Centers program. DOE Expanded IPP Efforts to Iraq and Libya and Is Working with Its Global Nuclear Energy Partnership to Maintain the IPP Program’s Relevance

DOE recently expanded its scientist assistance efforts on two fronts: DOE  began providing assistance to scientists in Iraq and Libya, and the IPP  program is working with DOE’s Office of Nuclear Energy to develop IPP  projects that support GNEP—a DOE-led international effort to expand the  use of civilian nuclear power. Multiple DOE and Contractor Reviews and Delays in Project Implementation Contribute to the IPP Program’s Large Balances of Unspent Program Funds

In every fiscal year since 1998, DOE has carried over unspent funds in  excess of the amount that the Congress provided for the IPP program,  primarily because of DOE and its contractors’ lengthy and multilayered  review and approval processes for paying former Soviet weapons  scientists for IPP-related work and long delays in implementing some IPP  projects. For example, as of September 2007, DOE had carried over about   $30 million in unspent funds—$2 million more than the $28 million that the  Congress had appropriated for the IPP program in fiscal year 2007. According to officials from U.S.  industry partners, national laboratories, and Russian and Ukrainian  institutes, some IPP projects experience long implementation delays. To address a number of management issues that need to be resolved so  that the IPP program operates more effectively, we recommend that the  Secretary of Energy, working with the Administrator of the National  Nuclear Security Administration, immediately take the following eight  actions:    establish a more rigorous, objective, and well-documented process for  verifying the WMD backgrounds and experiences of participating foreign  scientists;   develop more reliable data on the commercialization results of IPP  projects, such as the number of jobs created;    amend IPP program guidance to include a clear definition of what  constitutes a commercially successful IPP project;   seek explicit congressional authorization to expand IPP efforts outside of  the former Soviet Union; for IPP efforts in Libya, ensure compliance with the statutory restriction  on the percentage of IPP program funds spent on oversight activities at the  DOE national laboratories to no more than 35 percent;   develop clear and specific guidance for IPP projects that are intended to    streamline the process through which foreign scientists receive IPP funds  by eliminating unnecessary layers of review; and   seek to reduce the large balances of unspent funds associated with the IPP  program and adjust future budget requests accordingly. We also assessed State’s planned exit strategy for its  Science Centers program. 2. GAO Comments

1. 2. 3. Although DOE claims to have received additional information  from this institute to corroborate the number of jobs reported to have  been created, DOE did not provide this information to us. 6. DOE asserted that we did not include  endorsements of the program in our draft report. In our view, this is contrary to the original  intent of the program, which was to reduce the proliferation risk posed  by Soviet-era weapons scientists.
Why GAO Did This Study

To address concerns about unemployed or underemployed Soviet-era weapons scientists in Russia and other countries, the Department of Energy (DOE) established the Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention (IPP) program in 1994 to engage former Soviet weapons scientists in nonmilitary work in the short term and create private sector jobs for these scientists in the long term. GAO assessed (1) DOE's reported accomplishments for the IPP program, (2) DOE's exit strategy for the program, and (3) the extent to which the program has experienced annual carryovers of unspent funds and the reasons for any such carryovers. To address these issues, GAO analyzed DOE policies, plans, and budgets and interviewed key program officials and representatives from 22 Russian and Ukrainian institutes.

What GAO Found

DOE has overstated accomplishments for the 2 critical measures it uses to assess the IPP program's progress and performance--the number of scientists receiving DOE support and the number of long-term, private sector jobs created. First, although DOE claims to have engaged over 16,770 scientists in Russia and other countries, this total includes both scientists with and without weapons-related experience. GAO's analysis of 97 IPP projects involving about 6,450 scientists showed that more than half did not claim to possess any weapons-related experience. Furthermore, officials from 10 Russian and Ukrainian institutes told GAO that the IPP program helps them attract, recruit, and retain younger scientists who might otherwise emigrate to the United States or other western countries and contributes to the continued operation of their facilities. This is contrary to the original intent of the program, which was to reduce the proliferation risk posed by Soviet-era weapons scientists. Second, although DOE asserts that the IPP program helped create 2,790 long-term, private sector jobs for former weapons scientists, the credibility of this number is uncertain because DOE relies on "good-faith" reporting from U.S. industry partners and foreign institutes on the number of jobs created and does not independently verify the number of jobs reported to have been created. DOE has not developed an exit strategy for the IPP program, even though officials from the Russian government, Russian and Ukrainian institutes, and U.S. companies raised questions about the continuing need for the program. Importantly, a senior Russian Atomic Energy Agency official told GAO that the IPP program is no longer relevant because Russia's economy is strong and its scientists no longer pose a proliferation risk. DOE has not developed criteria to determine when scientists, institutes, or countries should "graduate" from the program. In contrast, the Department of State (State), which supports a similar program to assist Soviet-era weapons scientists, has assessed participating institutes and developed a strategy to graduate certain institutes from its program. Instead of finding ways to phase out the IPP program, DOE has recently expanded the program to include new countries and areas. Specifically, in 2004, DOE began providing assistance to scientists in Iraq and Libya. In addition, the IPP program is working with DOE's Office of Nuclear Energy to develop projects that support the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership--a DOE-led international effort to expand the use of civilian nuclear power. In every fiscal year since 1998, DOE carried over unspent funds in excess of the amount that the Congress provided for the program. For example, as of September 2007, DOE carried over about $30 million in unspent funds--$2 million more than the $28 million that the Congress had appropriated for the IPP program in fiscal year 2007. Two main factors have contributed to this recurring problem--lengthy review and approval processes for paying former Soviet weapons scientists and delays in implementing some IPP projects.