The NDAA for fiscal year 2011 required that State, DOD, and USAID  jointly develop a plan to transition the activities of the Task Force to State,  with a focus on potentially transitioning activities to USAID. The plan,  which was to be submitted to Congress at the same time as the  President’s fiscal year 2012 budget, was to describe (1) the Task Force’s  activities in Afghanistan in fiscal year 2011; (2) the Task Force’s activities  in fiscal year 2011 that USAID will continue in fiscal year 2012, including  those activities that may be merged with similar USAID efforts; (3) any of  the Task Force’s fiscal year 2011 activities that USAID will not continue  and the reasons; and (4) those actions that may be necessary to  transition Task Force activities that will be continued by USAID in fiscal  year 2012. To identify factors to  consider in planning for any transition of Task Force capabilities from  DOD to USAID, we interviewed DOD, State, and USAID senior-level  policy officials in Afghanistan and Washington, D.C. We obtained their  views on the respective capabilities and operational approaches of the  Task Force and USAID and reviewed relevant and available  documentation. As a result, we identified five factors to consider in  planning for any transition, which generally relate to how these agencies  conduct their respective activities. In particular, USAID  officials noted that in addition to other activities, USAID focuses more  broadly on efforts to improve the environment for investments whereas  the Task Force focuses on brokering specific investment deals. Specifically, the Task Force was designed to be a small, flat, flexible  organization that generally conducts short-term initiatives in various  sectors of the Afghan economy. USAID funding and staffing. USAID’s fiscal year 2011 budget and fiscal  year 2012 budget request did not take into account any needs to support  Task Force activities. While both USAID and the  Task Force facilitate private investment, the nature and focus of their  interactions with investors differ. For example, the Task Force identifies  and provides direct logistical and consultative support to U.S. and non- U.S. potential investors. Because the Task Force is involved in various efforts to spur  private investment, senior-level DOD, State, and USAID officials in  Afghanistan have stated that a transition in the near term may negatively  impact these efforts, which are deemed essential for the transition of U.S.  forces out of Afghanistan. The Task Force Has Not Documented Specific Guidelines for Managing Activities, and Its Information-Sharing Efforts in Afghanistan Are Focused on Senior-Level Officials and Are Not Integrated into Existing Mechanisms

To guide Task Force activities, DOD’s senior leadership and the Task  Force Director have provided high-level, general direction to Task Force  activities; however, the Task Force has not developed written guidance to  be used by its personnel in managing Task Force projects. While mechanisms such as interagency working groups exist in  Afghanistan for agencies involved in development activities to share  information, the Task Force does not routinely participate in these  mechanisms nor have DOD, State, and USAID determined how to  integrate the Task Force into these information-sharing efforts. The Task Force was also required to share information on  its activities and projects in Afghanistan as part of the Commander’s  Emergency Response Program (CERP). To support U.S. goals in Afghanistan,  DOD’s Task Force and USAID both undertake efforts that promote  economic development, including facilitating private sector investment. Without formally defined project  management guidance, the Task Force does not have the framework  needed to ensure a standard operating approach and consistent project  management. Without an agreed- upon approach to more fully integrate the Task Force into existing  information-sharing mechanisms in Afghanistan, DOD, State, USAID, and  other agencies will not be in a position to fully leverage and coordinate  their respective capabilities and efforts in support of achieving U.S.  economic development goals. Recommendations for Executive Action

To ensure effective project management, oversight, and accountability,  we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Task Force to  develop written guidance that documents, as appropriate, its  management processes and practices, including elements such as  criteria for project selection, requirements for establishing metrics and  project documentation, and project monitoring and evaluation processes. In addition, USAID stated that our report notes that the  Task Force has an advantage over USAID because it has greater  flexibility to visit project sites and access to the military. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

We began our review of the Department of Defense’s (DOD) Task Force  for Business and Stability Operations (Task Force) under the authority of  the Comptroller General of the United States to conduct work on his own  initiative. This report (1) identifies factors to consider in  planning any transition of Task Force capabilities to the U.S. Agency for  International Development (USAID) and (2) evaluates the extent to which  the Task Force had established guidance to manage its activities and  shared information with other U.S. civilian agencies.
Why GAO Did This Study

The Departments of Defense (DOD) and State (State) and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and others are involved in economic development activities in Iraq and Afghanistan. In June 2006, DOD established the Task Force for Business and Stability Operations (Task Force) to support its related efforts. The National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2011 required that DOD, State, and USAID jointly develop a plan to transition Task Force activities to State, with a focus on potentially transitioning activities to USAID. Under the authority of the Comptroller General of the United States to conduct work on his own initiative and with additional congressional direction, GAO identified (1) factors to consider in planning any transition of Task Force activities and (2) the extent to which the Task Force established guidance to manage its activities and has shared information with other federal agencies. GAO analyzed documents and interviewed multiple agency officials in Washington, D.C., Iraq, and Afghanistan.

What GAO Found

As of June 2011, DOD, State, and USAID officials were discussing options for transitioning Task Force activities and preparing a response to the fiscal year 2011 NDAA requirements. Based on interviews with senior officials and a review of available data, GAO identified five factors to consider in planning for any transition of Task Force activities to USAID, which generally relate to how these agencies conduct their respective activities. First, although both the Task Force and USAID work to promote economic development, they generally take different approaches. The Task Force is a small, flat, flexible organization that generally conducts short-term initiatives, while USAID is a large agency that conducts short- and long-term projects. USAID officials noted that in addition to other activities, it focuses on efforts to improve the environment for investments whereas the Task Force focuses on brokering specific investment deals. Second, as part of DOD, Task Force employees are not subject to the same movement restrictions as USAID employees and have greater flexibility to visit project sites and access to military assets. Third, funding and staffing plans would need to be developed. For example, USAID's fiscal year 2011 budget and 2012 budget request did not take into account any needs to support Task Force activities. Fourth, while both agencies facilitate private sector investment, the nature and focus of their interactions with investors differ. For example, the Task Force actively identifies potential U.S. and non-U.S. investors and arranges meetings and provides logistical support for them, whereas USAID typically sponsors conferences to provide opportunities for prospective investors to share information. Given these differences, State and USAID officials agreed that the same type of private investment activities conducted by the Task Force may not continue at USAID. Last, the timing of a transition and impact on U.S. objectives will need to be considered. DOD, State, and USAID officials noted that because Task Force activities are important to supporting the U.S. goal of attracting investors, a transition in the near term may negatively impact these efforts. While DOD and the Task Force have provided high-level direction for Task Force activities, the Task Force has not developed written project management guidance to be used by its personnel in managing Task Force projects. Such guidance could include important elements, such as project selection criteria, requirements to establish metrics, and monitoring and evaluation processes. As a result, the Task Force does not have the framework needed to ensure a standard operating approach, accountability, and consistent project management. The Task Force has generally focused its information-sharing efforts on senior officials in Afghanistan whereas efforts at the project management level have been more ad hoc. Mechanisms such as working groups exist for agencies involved in development activities to share information. However, the Task Force does not routinely participate, and DOD, State, and USAID have not identified how best to integrate the Task Force to share information on its activities. As a result, the U.S. government may not be positioned to fully leverage and coordinate its respective capabilities and efforts in support of achieving U.S. goals.

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that the Task Force develop written project management guidance and that DOD, State, and USAID develop an approach to integrate the Task Force into information-sharing mechanisms. DOD partially concurred with the first recommendation. The three agencies generally concurred with the second.