Accordingly, deploying radiation detection equipment at the U.S.  border is part of DHS’s strategy for addressing the threat of nuclear and  radiological terrorism. Fla.
OFTD is responsible for conducting covert operations at U.S. ports of  entry and checkpoints to test the capabilities for detecting and interdicting  nuclear and radiological materials smuggled into the United States, as  well as testing capabilities in foreign locations. Covert Operations Provide Limited Assessments of Capabilities to Detect and Interdict Smuggled Nuclear and Radiological Materials

		Covert Operations Assessed Detection and Interdiction Capabilities at Certain Locations and Showed Varying Rates of Success

OFTD conducted 144 covert operations at air, land, and sea ports of  entry, checkpoints, and other sites to assess capabilities to detect and  interdict nuclear and radiological material smuggled across the border  between fiscal years 2006 and 2013, as shown in table 1.OFTD’s covert operations were conducted using radiological materials;  however, OFTD officials said they conducted one or two tests using  special nuclear material surrogates—radiation test sources with  characteristics similar to those of SNM—each year. Covert Operations May Not Sufficiently Account for the Most Critical Nuclear Materials, Potential High- Risk Locations, or Key Nuclear and Radiological Detection Technology

CBP has not conducted a risk assessment that could inform the decision- making process for prioritizing the materials, locations, and technologies  to be tested through covert operations. DHS policy requires that  components with limited resources make risk-informed decisions. However, CBP’s methodology  for choosing locations was not clearly linked to these differences  in capability and federal investment. OFTD has issued three periodic  reports that summarize results from covert operations testing capabilities  to detect and interdict nuclear and radiological materials smuggled across  the border ports of entry: (1) the Summary Report of OFTD Seaport  Assessments for fiscal years 2007 through 2008; (2) the Comprehensive  Report on Radiation Testing, which summarized the results of covert  operations conducted at air, land, and sea ports of entry from fiscal years  2009 through 2011; and (3) the Comprehensive Report on Radiation  Testing, which summarized the results of covert operations conducted at  air, land, and sea ports of entry from fiscal years 2012 and 2013. OFTD officials stated that they have not yet issued a report on results of  covert operations conducted at checkpoints and are in the process of  developing the report recommendations. By assessing risk to prioritize the most dangerous materials,  most vulnerable locations, and most critical equipment for testing through  covert operations, DHS could better inform its decisions on how to  expend its limited resources effectively, consistent with the department’s  risk management policies. In addition, establishing appropriate reporting  time frames of covert operations results, and developing a mechanism to  track whether ports of entry and checkpoints have implemented corrective  actions, could help CBP ensure accountability and inform management  decision making on the need for further investments or actions to protect  U.S. borders from these potential consequences. To help ensure that CBP has the information necessary to provide  oversight and accountability for implementing corrective actions to  address weaknesses identified by covert operations we recommend that  the Commissioner of CBP: determine time frames for OFTD reporting of covert operation results  and status of corrective actions necessary to timely address border  security weaknesses and work with OFTD to address any barriers to  meeting these time frames, and develop a mechanism to track the corrective actions taken to address  all weaknesses identified through covert operations at the ports of  entry and checkpoints. We  provided a draft of this report with redacted sensitive information to DHS  for a sensitivity review. Appendix II: U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s Operational Field Testing Division (OFTD) Steps for Conducting a Covert Operation

1.
Why GAO Did This Study

Preventing terrorists from smuggling nuclear or radiological materials into the United States is a top national priority. To address this threat, DHS has deployed radiation detection equipment and trained staff to use it. CBP conducts covert operations to test capabilities for detecting and interdicting nuclear and radiological materials at air, land, and sea ports of entry into the United States as well as checkpoints. GAO was asked to review CBP's covert testing operations. This report assesses the extent to which (1) CBP covert operations assess capabilities at air, land, and sea ports and checkpoints to detect and interdict nuclear and radiological material smuggled across the border and (2) CBP reports its covert operations results and provides oversight to ensure that corrective actions are implemented. GAO analyzed documents, such as test summaries, directives, and planning and guidance papers and interviewed DHS, CBP, and Domestic Nuclear Detection Office officials. This is a public version of a sensitive report that GAO issued in July 2014. Information that DHS deemed sensitive has been redacted.

What GAO Found

The Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) covert operations provide limited assessment of capabilities to detect and interdict the smuggling of nuclear and radiological materials into the United States. DHS's U.S. Customs and Border Protection's (CBP) Operational Field Testing Division (OFTD) conducted 144 covert operations at 86 locations from fiscal years 2006 through 2013, selecting its locations from a total of 655 U.S. air, land, and sea port facilities; checkpoints; and certain international locations. These operations allowed OFTD to assess capabilities for detecting and interdicting—or intercepting—nuclear and radiological materials at locations tested. Results showed differences in the rate of success for interdicting smuggled nuclear and radiological materials across facility types. CBP had a $1 million budget for covert operations of various activities—including nuclear and radiological testing—covering fiscal years 2009 through 2013, and DHS policy requires that components with limited resources make risk-informed decisions. However, CBP testing does not inform capabilities across all border locations, and CBP has not conducted a risk assessment that could inform and prioritize the locations, materials, and technologies to be tested through covert operations. Given limited resources, assessing risk to prioritize the most dangerous materials, most vulnerable locations, and most critical equipment for testing through covert operations, DHS could better inform its decisions on how to expend its limited resources effectively, consistent with the department's risk management policies.
OFTD has not issued reports annually as planned on covert operation results and recommendations, limiting CBP oversight for improving capabilities to detect and interdict smuggling at the border. OFTD has issued three reports on the results of its covert operations at U.S. ports of entry since 2007. However, OFTD officials stated that because of resource constraints, reports have not been timely and do not include the results of covert tests conducted at checkpoints. Furthermore, OFTD tracks the status of corrective actions taken to address recommendations in these reports; however, CBP does not track corrective actions identified from their individual covert operations that were not included in these reports. Establishing appropriate time frames for reporting of covert operations results and addressing barriers to meeting these time frames would help enhance CBP's accountability for its covert testing operations. Further, developing a mechanism to track whether ports of entry and checkpoints have implemented corrective actions could help inform management decision making on the need for further investments in equipment or personnel training to protect U.S. borders.

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that DHS inform priorities for covert operations by using an assessment of risk, determining time frames for reporting results, addressing barriers for meeting time frames, and developing a mechanism to track corrective actions. DHS concurred with GAO's recommendations.