3. DOE, NRC, and State Are Not Able to Fully Account for U.S. Nuclear Material Located at Foreign Facilities

DOE, NRC, and State are not able to fully account for U.S. nuclear  material overseas that is subject to nuclear cooperation agreement terms  because the agreements do not stipulate systematic reporting of such  information, and there is no U.S. policy to pursue or obtain such  information. U.S. Nuclear Cooperation Agreements Generally Require That Partners Report Inventory Information upon Request, but DOE and NRC Have Not Systematically Sought Such Data

Section 123 of the AEA, as amended, does not require nuclear  cooperation agreements to contain provisions stipulating that partners  report information on the amount, status, or location (facility) of special  nuclear material subject to the agreement terms. NRC and DOE could not fully account for U.S. exports of HEU in  response to a congressional mandate that the agencies report on the  current location and disposition of U.S. HEU overseas. DOE, NRC, and State Do Not Have Access Rights to Monitor and Evaluate That U.S. Nuclear Material Located at Foreign Facilities Is Adequately Protected

Nuclear cooperation agreements do not contain specific access rights  that enable DOE, NRC, or State to monitor and evaluate the physical  security of U.S. nuclear material overseas, and the United States relies  on partners to maintain adequate security. However,  the interagency physical protection teams have neither systematically  visited countries believed to be holding Category I quantities of U.S.  nuclear material, nor have they systematically revisited facilities  determined to not be meeting IAEA security guidelines in a timely  manner. In addition, we reviewed U.S. agencies’ records of these and other  physical protection visits and found that, over the 17-year period from  1994 through 2010, U.S. interagency physical protection teams made 55  visits. DOE Seeks to Increase Security or Remove Vulnerable U.S. Nuclear Material at Partner Facilities but Faces Challenges

DOE has taken steps to improve security at a number of facilities  overseas that hold U.S. nuclear material. Specifically, GTRI can only bring certain types of nuclear material back to  the United States that have an approved disposition pathway and meet  the program’s eligibility criteria. GTRI officials told us that, of the  approximately 17,500 kilograms of HEU it estimates was exported from  the United States, the majority—12,400 kilograms—is currently not  eligible for return to the United States. GTRI officials stated that these reactors are in Germany, France, and  Japan, and that the material has been deemed to be adequately  protected. GTRI reported that the other approximately 2,000 kilograms of  transferred U.S. nuclear material is located primarily in EURATOM  member countries and is either currently in use or adequately protected. Currently, annual reconciliations with five partners  are undertaken. To help federal agencies better understand where U.S. nuclear material is  currently located overseas, we recommend that the Secretary of State,  working with the Secretary of Energy and the Chairman of the Nuclear  Regulatory Commission, take the following four actions to strengthen  controls over U.S. nuclear material subject to these agreements:    determine, for those partners with which the United States has  transferred material but does not have annual inventory reconciliation,  a baseline inventory of weapon-usable U.S. nuclear material, and  establish a process for conducting annual reconciliations of  inventories of nuclear material on a facility-by-facility basis;   establish for those partners with which the United States has an  annual inventory reconciliation, reporting on a facility-by-facility basis  for weapon-usable material where possible; facilitate visits to sites that U.S. physical protection teams have not  visited that are believed to be holding U.S. Category I nuclear  material; and seek to include measures that provide for physical protection access  rights in new or renewed nuclear cooperation agreements so that U.S.  interagency physical protection teams may in the future obtain access  when necessary to verify that U.S. nuclear materials are adequately  protected. DOE, NRC, and  State disagreed with GAO in three general areas of the report. We are  particularly concerned that NRC and DOE, in response to a 1992  mandate by Congress, could only account for the location and  disposition of about 1,160 kilograms out of an estimated 17,500  kilograms of U.S.-exported HEU. To assess DOE’s and other U.S. agencies’ efforts to monitor and  evaluate the physical security conditions of U.S. nuclear material  overseas subject to nuclear cooperation agreement terms and describe  DOE’s activities to secure or remove potentially vulnerable U.S. nuclear  material at partner facilities, we reviewed all U.S. nuclear cooperation  agreements in force, as well as other U.S. statutes, and IAEA’s security  guidelines, “The Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear  Facilities,” INFCIRC/225/Rev.4, and other relevant international  conventions to determine the extent to which such laws and international  conventions provide for DOE and U.S. agencies to monitor and evaluate  the physical security of transferred U.S. nuclear material subject to U.S.  nuclear cooperation agreement terms.
Why GAO Did This Study

The United States has exported special nuclear material, including enriched uranium, and source material such as natural uranium under nuclear cooperation agreements. The United States has 27 nuclear cooperation agreements for peaceful civilian cooperation. Under the U.S. Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (AEA), as amended, partners are required to guarantee the physical protection of U.S. nuclear material. GAO was asked to (1) assess U.S. agency efforts to account for U.S. nuclear material overseas, (2) assess the Department of Energy's (DOE) and U.S. agencies' efforts to evaluate the security of U.S. material overseas, and (3) describe DOE's activities to secure or remove potentially vulnerable U.S. nuclear material at partner facilities. GAO analyzed agency records and interviewed DOE, Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), Department of State (State), and partner country officials. This report summarizes GAO's classified report issued in June 2011.

What GAO Found

DOE, NRC, and State are not able to fully account for U.S. nuclear material overseas that is subject to nuclear cooperation agreement terms because the agreements do not stipulate systematic reporting of such information, and there is no U.S. policy to pursue or obtain such information. U.S. nuclear cooperation agreements generally require that partners report inventory information upon request, however, DOE and NRC have not systematically sought such data. DOE and NRC do not have a comprehensive, detailed, current inventory of U.S. nuclear material--including weapon-usable material such as highly enriched uranium (HEU) and separated plutonium--overseas that includes the country, facility, and quantity of material. In addition, NRC and DOE could not fully account for the current location and disposition of U.S. HEU overseas in response to a 1992 congressional mandate. U.S. agencies, in a 1993 report produced in response to the mandate, were able to verify the location of 1,160 kilograms out of 17,500 kilograms of U.S. HEU estimated to have been exported. DOE, NRC, and State have established annual inventory reconciliations with five U.S. partners, but not the others it has transferred material to or trades with. Nuclear cooperation agreements do not contain specific access rights that enable DOE, NRC, or State to monitor and evaluate the physical security of U.S. nuclear material overseas, and the United States relies on its partners to maintain adequate security. In the absence of access rights, DOE's Office of Nonproliferation and International Security, NRC, and State have conducted physical protection visits to monitor and evaluate the physical security of U.S. nuclear material at facilities overseas when permitted. However, the agencies have not systematically visited countries believed to be holding the highest proliferation risk quantities of U.S. nuclear material, or systematically revisited facilities not meeting international physical security guidelines in a timely manner. Of the 55 visits made from 1994 through 2010, U.S. teams found that countries met international security guidelines approximately 50 percent of the time. DOE has taken steps to improve security at a number of facilities overseas that hold U.S. nuclear material but faces constraints. DOE's Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) removes U.S. nuclear material from vulnerable facilities overseas but can only bring back materials that have an approved disposition pathway and meet the program's eligibility criteria. GTRI officials told GAO that, of the approximately 17,500 kilograms of HEU exported from the United States, 12,400 kilograms are currently not eligible for return to the United States. Specifically, GTRI reported that over 10,000 kilograms of U.S. HEU are believed to be in fuels from reactors in Germany, France, and Japan that have no disposition pathways in the United States and are adequately protected. In addition, according to GTRI, 2,000 kilograms of transferred U.S. HEU are located primarily in European Atomic Energy Community countries and are currently in use or adequately protected. GAO suggests, among other things, that Congress consider directing DOE and NRC to compile an inventory of U.S. nuclear material overseas. DOE, NRC, and State generally disagreed with GAO's recommendations, including that they conduct annual inventory reconciliations with all partners, stating they were unnecessary. GAO continues to believe that its recommendations could help improve the accountability of U.S. nuclear material in foreign countries.