To determine the extent to which NNSA is able to meet current and future  nuclear weapons stockpile requirements for tritium, we reviewed NNSA’s  tritium production plans as well as requirements documents prepared by  DOD and NNSA, such as the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review. As the commercial reactor  produces power, the TPBARs are irradiated, controlling the nuclear  reaction while simultaneously producing tritium. However, to  date, these plans have not been actively coordinated with NRC, which  ultimately must approve any modifications to reactor operations. Tritium is Still Permeating at Higher-Than-Expected Rates From TPBARs Into the Reactor Coolant at TVA’s Watts Bar 1 Reactor

NNSA has been unable to solve the technical challenges it has been  experiencing producing tritium. NNSA and TVA Are Developing Plans to Increase Tritium Production but Have Not Actively Coordinated These Plans With NRC

Faced with significantly lower tritium production than originally planned  due to tritium permeation, NNSA and TVA have been developing plans to  increase the number of TPBARs being irradiated at Watts Bar 1 during  each reactor fueling cycle as well as the number of reactors irradiating  TPBARs, according to NNSA and TVA officials. According to NNSA officials, NNSA is meeting current requirements  through a combination of harvesting tritium obtained from dismantled  nuclear warheads and producing lower-than-planned amounts of tritium  through the irradiation of TPBARs in the Watts Bar 1 reactor. Although the number of nuclear weapons in the U.S. stockpile is  decreasing, these reductions are unlikely to result in a significant decrease  to tritium requirements. To date, NNSA has not had to use tritium in the reserve it maintains. However, according to NNSA officials, use of some of the tritium reserve  in the relatively near future may be necessary if NNSA is unable to  increase tritium production beyond its current level of 240 TPBARs being  irradiated in a single reactor. Nevertheless,  NNSA officials told us that they were confident that NNSA will be able to  meet tritium requirements in the future without substantially reducing the  nation’s tritium reserve and are not considering alternative ways of  producing tritium for the stockpile. NNSA Could Not Provide Us With Evidence That It Adhered to the Appropriate Contracting Procedures for the Tritium Readiness Program and is Accumulating Large Amounts of Unexpended Funding

Although NNSA has attempted to ensure a reliable long-term supply of  tritium, our review found two problems with NNSA’s management of the  Tritium Readiness Program. First, NNSA was unable to provide us with  evidence about its adherence to the appropriate contracting procedures  when purchasing components and services for the Tritium Readiness  Program. Second, because of, among other things, the contract structure  NNSA has entered into with suppliers of components and services for the  Tritium Readiness Program, program funds are being expended much  more slowly than planned. As a result, the program is accumulating large  unexpended funding balances beyond thresholds established by DOE. However, to ensure  large amounts of unexpended funding do not accumulate that could be  better used for other purposes, DOE has established thresholds of  acceptable levels of unexpended funds that may be carried over from one  fiscal year to the next. While large unexpended funding balances do not necessarily indicate that  the tritium program is being mismanaged, the fact that they have been  increasing indicates that NNSA is requesting more funding than it needs on  an annual basis—funds that could be appropriated for other purposes. Conclusions

NNSA’s inability to overcome the technical challenges and meet its  original tritium production goals has raised serious questions about the  agency’s ability to provide a reliable source of tritium to maintain the  nation’s nuclear weapons stockpile in the future. Recommendations for Executive Action

To increase confidence in the nation’s continued ability to produce a  reliable supply of tritium in the future and to improve the management of  NNSA’s Tritium Readiness Program, we recommend that the Secretary of  Energy direct the Administrator of NNSA to take the following four  actions:  In cooperation with TVA and NRC, develop a comprehensive plan to  manage releases of tritium from TVA’s Watts Bar 1 and any other reactors  chosen to irradiate TPBARs in the future. Ensure NNSA’s future budget requests account for the large unexpended  balances in the Tritium Readiness Program and better reflect the amount  of funding the program is able to spend annually. In its comments, NNSA generally agreed with the facts in the report and  the recommendations.
Why GAO Did This Study

The National Nuclear Security Administration's (NNSA) Tritium Readiness Program aims to establish an assured domestic source of tritium--a key isotope used in nuclear weapons--in order to maintain the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile. Because tritium decays at a rate of 5.5 percent annually, it must be periodically replenished in the stockpile. However, since 2003, NNSA's efforts to produce tritium have been hampered by technical challenges. In this context, GAO was asked to (1) determine the extent to which NNSA has been able to overcome technical challenges producing tritium, (2) determine the extent to which NNSA is able to meet current and future nuclear weapons stockpile requirements for tritium, and (3) assess the management of NNSA's Tritium Readiness Program. To do this, GAO visited facilities involved in tritium production and reviewed tritium requirements established by NNSA and the Department of Defense, among other things.

What GAO Found

NNSA has been unable to overcome the technical challenges it has experienced producing tritium. To produce tritium, stainless steel rods containing lithium aluminate and zirconium --called tritium-producing burnable absorber rods (TPBAR)--are irradiated in the Tennessee Valley Authority's (TVA) Watts Bar 1 commercial nuclear power reactor. Despite redesigns of several components within the TPBARS, tritium is still leaking--or "permeating"--out of the TPBARs into the reactor's coolant water at higher-than-expected rates. Because the quantities of tritium in the reactor coolant are approaching regulatory limits, TVA has been significantly restricting the number of TPBARs that it will allow NNSA to irradiate in each 18-month reactor fueling cycle, and, consequently, NNSA has not been producing as much tritium as it planned. NNSA and TVA officials are continuing to develop plans to increase the number of TPBARs that will be irradiated, as well as, if necessary, the number of reactors participating in the program. However, these plans have not been coordinated with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), which ultimately must approve any changes to the operation of the TVA reactors. NNSA currently meets the nuclear weapons stockpile requirements for tritium, but its ability to do so in the future is in doubt. NNSA officials told us that they will be able to meet future requirements through a combination of harvesting tritium obtained from dismantled nuclear warheads and irradiating TPBARs. Although the number of nuclear weapons in the U.S. stockpile is decreasing, these reductions are unlikely to result in a significant decrease of tritium requirements and will not eliminate the need for a reliable source of new tritium because of the need to periodically replenish it in the remaining nuclear weapons stockpile due to tritium's decay. While NNSA has not, to date, been required to use tritium from a reserve that it maintains, use of this reserve in the relatively near future may be necessary if NNSA is unable to increase tritium production beyond its current level. Although NNSA has attempted to ensure a reliable long-term supply of tritium, GAO's review found two problems with NNSA's management of the Tritium Readiness Program. First, NNSA could not provide us with evidence that it adhered to the appropriate contracting procedures when purchasing components and services for the program. Second, due to, among other things, the way the program's contracts with its suppliers are structured, the program is spending its funds more slowly than planned and is accumulating large unexpended balances. The program is subject to thresholds established by the Department of Energy of acceptable levels of unexpended funds that may be carried over from one fiscal year to the next. However, the program exceeded these thresholds by more than $48 million in 2008 and by more than $39 million in 2009. While large unexpended balances are not necessarily an indication that the program is being mismanaged, it does indicate that the program is requesting more funding than it needs on an annual basis--funds that could be appropriated for other purposes.

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that NNSA develop a plan to manage tritium releases from reactors, analyze alternatives to its current tritium production strategy, ensure its contracting complies with appropriate contracting procedures, and ensure its future budget requests account for the program's large unexpended balances. NNSA generally agreed with our recommendations.