Scanning Rates at Larger SFI Ports Have Been Far Short of 100 Percent

While CBP has been able to scan a majority of U.S.-bound cargo  containers from three comparatively low-volume ports participating in the  SFI program, at two higher volume ports—which constitute approximately  17 percent of containers arriving in the United States—it has been able to  scan no more than 5 percent of U.S.-bound cargo containers, on average,  most of which were scanned after they were determined to be high risk by  CBP officers as part of the CSI program, according to CBP officials. However, as of yet, CBP has not made arrangements to expand  operations at these ports. CBP officials maintain that this strategy, combined with a  plan to gather additional cargo container information, would enhance  container security. The  strategic trade corridor strategy selected by the Secretary focuses cargo  container scanning efforts on a limited number of ports where CBP has  determined SFI will help mitigate the greatest risk of potential WMD from  entering the United States. According to DHS and CBP officials, they have not developed  a plan to achieve 100 percent scanning by July 2012 because challenges  encountered thus far in implementing the SFI program indicate that  implementation of 100 percent scanning worldwide by the 2012 deadline  will be difficult to achieve. DHS Plans to Grant Blanket Extensions to Ports Unable to Meet the 2012 Deadline

DHS acknowledged it will not be able to meet the July 2012 deadline for  full-scale implementation of the 9/11 Act’s scanning requirement and will  need to grant extensions to those foreign ports unable to meet the  scanning deadline in order to maintain the flow of trade and comply with  the 9/11 Act prohibition on allowing containers that have not been scanned  to enter the United States. CBP Has Not Developed an Estimate of Complete U.S. CBP officials  stated that they have not developed a more comprehensive cost estimate  because DHS has not specified a clear path forward for the program. If participation is diminished, this could constitute  a cost (e.g., reduced implementation and effectiveness of other programs),  which would be one element to consider in any cost-benefit analysis. The scanning  requirement differs from existing container security programs because it  requires CBP to scan all containers before performing analysis to  determine their potential risk level. The 100 Percent Scanning Requirement May Hinder the Continued Operation of CBP’s Existing Container Security Programs

Our work has indicated that the 100 percent scanning requirement is a  departure from existing container security programs built on bilateral  partnerships with foreign governments and the private sector. Foreign terminal operators have also expressed concerns regarding the  lack of a clear path forward for the SFI program. Recommendations for Executive Action

To better position DHS to implement the cargo container scanning  provisions of the SAFE Port and 9/11 Acts, improve container security  programs, and better inform Congress, we recommend that the Secretary  of Homeland Security, working with the CBP Commissioner, in  consultation with the Secretaries of Energy and State as appropriate, take  the following actions:    conduct a feasibility analysis of implementing the 100 percent scanning  requirement of all U.S.-bound cargo containers in light of the  challenges faced at the initial SFI ports;    develop more comprehensive cost estimates for achieving the  requirement to scan 100 percent of U.S.-bound cargo containers,  consistent with best practices for implementing, operating, and  maintaining U.S. government programs;    conduct a cost-benefit analysis (to include all significant economic  costs) of different alternatives for achieving the 100 percent scanning  requirement, to include as appropriate, other alternatives short of  achieving 100 percent scanning, to enhance container security, and to  address the impact that 100 percent scanning may have on other  container security programs; and    provide the results of the feasibility analysis, U.S. program cost  estimates, and cost-benefit analysis outlined above to Congress, along  with various cost-effective alternatives to implementing the 100 percent  scanning requirement, as appropriate. It also  noted that its report determined that these conditions would not likely  exist at all ports shipping to the United States. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

Our objectives were to identify (1) what progress U.S. Customs and  Border Protection (CBP) has made toward implementing 100 percent  scanning at the initial ports participating in the Secure Freight Initiative  (SFI) program; (2) what planning efforts CBP has made to address the  requirement to scan all U.S.-bound cargo containers by July 2012; (3) the  estimated costs to date of the SFI program, and to what extent future  implementation costs have been estimated; and (4) what challenges, if any,  CBP faces in integrating the 100 percent scanning requirement with its  existing container security programs. To  assess CBP’s progress implementing SFI at individual ports, we compared  data on the number of containers scanned to the total volume of U.S.- bound containers at each SFI port, to the requirement set forth in the 9/11  Act.
Why GAO Did This Study

U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is responsible for, among other things, the security of cargo containers shipped to the United States. In fiscal year 2008, 611 ports shipped a total of 9.8 million containers to the country. The 9/11 Commission Act (9/11 Act) requires 100 percent of U.S.-bound cargo containers to be scanned by 2012, and CBP has begun implementing the Secure Freight Initiative (SFI) to address this requirement. GAO was requested to assess CBP's efforts to implement the 9/11 Act requirement. This report addresses (1) CBP's progress at the initial ports participating in the SFI program, (2) CBP plans to implement SFI, (3) the extent to which CBP has estimated costs and conducted a cost-benefit analysis of 100 percent scanning, and (4) any challenges to integrating 100 percent scanning with existing container security programs. GAO reviewed operating procedures for the SFI ports and analyzed cost data. GAO also visited six of the seven original SFI ports and spoke to officials from CBP, foreign governments, and private industry.

What GAO Found

CBP has made limited progress in scanning containers at the initial ports participating in the SFI program, leaving the feasibility of 100 percent scanning largely unproven. Since the inception of the SFI program, CBP has not been able to achieve 100 percent scanning at any participating port. While CBP has been able to scan a majority of the U.S.-bound cargo containers at the comparatively low volume ports, it has not achieved sustained scanning rates above five percent at the comparatively larger ports. CBP has not developed a plan to scan 100 percent of U.S.-bound container cargo by 2012, but has a strategy to expand SFI to select ports where it will mitigate the greatest risk of WMD entering the United States. CBP does not have a plan to scan cargo containers at all ports because, according to agency officials, challenges encountered thus far in implementing SFI indicate that doing so worldwide will be difficult to achieve. However, CBP has not conducted a feasibility analysis of expanding 100 percent scanning, as required by the SAFE Port Act. Such an analysis could help both CBP and Congress determine the most effective way forward to enhance container security. Recognizing that its strategy will not meet the requirement to scan all U.S.-bound cargo containers, DHS plans to issue a blanket extension to all foreign ports by July 2012 to be in compliance with the 9/11 Act. DHS officials acknowledged that they may revisit this plan before the July 2012 deadline. CBP, while identifying some SFI program costs, has not developed a complete estimate of U.S. program costs because of the lack of a decision on a clear path forward. CBP has also not conducted any cost-benefit analysis which would include other economic costs, including those borne outside the United States, which would be important to any analysis of alternatives to achieving the 100 percent scanning requirement. While uncertainties exist, a cost estimate and cost-benefit analysis, consistent with federal best practices, could assist DHS and CBP in better communicating the magnitude of the costs and benefits to Congress and in designing a clear path forward for enhancing cargo container security. CPB faces a number of potential challenges in integrating the 100 percent scanning requirement into its existing container security programs. The 100 percent scanning requirement is a departure from existing container security programs in that it requires that all containers be scanned before CBP determines their potential risk level. Senior CBP officials and international trading partners say this change differs from CBP's current risk-based approach based on international supply chain security standards. Our work also indicates that the 100 percent scanning requirement could present challenges to the continued operation of existing container security programs--depending upon how the SFI program is implemented and 100 percent scanning is achieved. Some foreign governments have stated they may adopt a reciprocal requirement that all U.S. origin containers be scanned, which would present additional challenges at domestic U.S. ports.