U.S. In response, the U.S.  government made counternarcotics a top U.S. priority and developed a  strategy in 2004 to reduce poppy cultivation, drug production, and  trafficking, shifting the emphasis of the United States’ agricultural  assistance programs in Afghanistan from food security programs to  counternarcotics-related ADP. As part of its counternarcotics efforts,  beginning in 2005, USAID awarded most of its new agricultural funds to  alternative-development programs (ADP)—to (1) increase agricultural  productivity, (2) accelerate economic growth, and (3) eliminate illicit drug  cultivation. Further, the Administration  noted that economic growth and new job creation were critical to U.S.  counterinsurgency efforts in Afghanistan because they provide licit  alternatives to narcotics- and insurgent-related activities and connect  people to their government. Gaps Exist in USAID’s Efforts to Plan, Monitor, and Evaluate Agricultural Programs in Afghanistan

USAID’s Automated Directives System establishes performance  management and evaluation procedures that USAID expects its staff to  follow in planning, monitoring, and evaluating its agricultural assistance  programs in Afghanistan. The Mission PMP did not include plans for evaluations  and special studies for the high-level objective that the eight programs  included in this review supported; but according to USAID, the agency has  planned evaluations for seven of the eight agricultural programs included  in this review during fiscal year 2010. However, we found that USAID had not always  approved these plans and did not require implementing partners to set  targets for each of their indicators, which are needed to assess program  performance. Some USAID officials in Afghanistan told us that they reviewed  the information reported in implementing partners’ quarterly reports in  efforts to analyze and interpret a program’s performance for the eight  programs in our review, although they could not provide any  documentation of their efforts to analyze and interpret program  performance. We are uncertain of the extent to which USAID used the 2007 evaluation to  adapt current programs and plan future programs. Additionally, although USAID requires implementing partners to  submit information on indicators, targets, and results, as previously noted,  not all indicators had established targets to allow for performance  assessments. As figure 8 shows, six of the eight programs we reviewed did  not meet their performance targets in the most recent year for which  information was reported on performance targets. For the two programs  that met all their targets, we found, as previously discussed, that they did  not establish targets for several indicators and, thus, we could not fully  assess performance for those indicators. We also found that the three  longest-running programs in our review showed declines in performance  over time. We measured performance for the eight agricultural programs in  our review by comparing annual results against annual targets reported by  USAID’s implementing partners. Specifically, USAID has cited the  security environment in Afghanistan as a severe impediment to its ability to  monitor projects. USAID Faces Challenges to Maintaining Institutional Knowledge

USAID has not taken steps to mitigate challenges to maintaining  institutional knowledge, a problem exacerbated by high staff turnover. USAID officials noted  that a lack of documentation and knowledge transfer may have contributed  to the loss of institutional knowledge. Recommendations for Executive Action

To enhance the performance management of USAID’s agricultural  programs in Afghanistan, we recommend the Administrator of USAID take  steps to  ensure the approval of implementing partner performance indicators;  ensure that implementing partners establish targets for all performance   consistently analyze and interpret program data, such as determining  the extent to which annual targets are met;   make use of results from evaluations of its agricultural programs; and  address preservation of institutional knowledge. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

This review assesses (1) how the United States has changed the focus of its  agricultural efforts in Afghanistan since 2002, (2) USAID’s performance  management and evaluation efforts of agricultural programs in  Afghanistan, (3) the extent to which USAID’s agricultural programs in  Afghanistan met targets, and (4) USAID’s efforts to mitigate challenges in  implementing agricultural programs in Afghanistan. As of the end of fiscal year 2009, these  eight programs accounted for 69 percent of total USAID agricultural  assistance disbursements, with one program accounting for 18 percent of  all disbursements. 4.
Why GAO Did This Study

Eighty percent of Afghans are dependent on agriculture for their livelihoods. Agricultural assistance is a key U.S. contribution to Afghanistan's reconstruction efforts. Since 2002, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) has awarded about $1.4 billion for agricultural programs to increase agricultural productivity, accelerate economic growth, and eliminate illicit drug cultivation. This report (1) describes the change in U.S. focus on agricultural assistance since 2002, (2) assesses USAID's performance management and evaluation of its agricultural programs, (3) analyzes the extent to which certain programs met targets, and (4) addresses efforts to mitigate implementation challenges. GAO reviewed USAID documents; analyzed program data; and interviewed program implementers and USAID officials in Washington, D.C., and Afghanistan. GAO has prepared this report as part of its ongoing efforts to monitor key aspects of U.S. efforts in Afghanistan.

What GAO Found

The United States' focus in providing agricultural assistance to Afghanistan shifted from food security programs in 2002 to counternarcotics-related alternative-development programs in 2005. This focus on providing farmers with alternatives to growing opium poppy lasted through 2008. In 2009, the Administration shifted the focus of its agricultural strategy in Afghanistan from counternarcotics to counterinsurgency, noting that economic growth and new job creation were critical to U.S. efforts in Afghanistan because they provide alternatives to narcotics- and insurgent-related activities. USAID's Automated Directives System established planning, monitoring, and evaluation procedures that USAID was expected to follow in Afghanistan. USAID planning efforts prior to 2009 largely follow these procedures. However, since the end of 2008, USAID has operated without a required Mission performance management plan for Afghanistan. In addition, USAID did not approve all implementing partner monitoring plans for the eight USAID agricultural programs, which represented about 75 percent of all USAID agricultural awards since 2002. USAID also did not assure all indicators had targets. USAID undertook efforts to monitor agricultural programs, but due to security concerns could not consistently verify reported data. USAID did not consistently analyze and interpret or document program performance for these eight programs, active between 2007 and 2009, on which our review focused. In the absence of this analysis, USAID did not document decisions linking program performance to changes made to the duration or funding of programs. USAID conducted one evaluation covering three of the eight programs, but the extent to which or whether USAID used the evaluation to enhance current or future programs is unclear. We found that the eight agricultural programs we reviewed did not always establish or achieve their targets for each performance indicator. USAID requires implementing partners to submit information on indicators, targets, and results. We measured performance for the eight programs by comparing annual results against annual targets and determining the extent to which targets were met. Six of the eight programs did not meet their performance targets in the most recent year for which targets were reported. For the two programs that met all their targets, we found they failed to establish targets for several indicators and, thus, we could not fully assess performance for those indicators. We also found that the three longest-running programs in our review showed declines in performance from fiscal years 2006 to 2008. USAID faces several challenges to implementing its agricultural programs in Afghanistan, such as the security environment, and has taken steps to mitigate other challenges, such as working to improve Afghan government capacity. However, while USAID's lack of documentation and high staff turnover have hampered USAID's ability to maintain institutional knowledge, the agency has not taken steps to address this challenge.

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that the USAID Administrator take a number of steps to enhance performance planning, monitoring and evaluation, and knowledge transfer procedures. USAID agreed with our recommendations, highlighted ongoing efforts to improve in these areas, and noted the high-threat environment in which they are operating.