We found that DOD did not have such a strategy. Upon completion of the ongoing TWV studies by the Army and Marine  Corps, and the Analysis of Alternatives for Joint Light Tactical Vehicles,  DOD will unite these efforts into a comprehensive strategy that dovetails  with the services’ equipping strategies. DOD’s Rapid Acquisition of M-ATVs Is Ahead of Schedule and No Major Performance Issues Have Been Identified to Date

DOD has acquired and fielded the M-ATV as quickly as possible in  response to an urgent need. No major issues have been  identified in subsequent testing and the vehicles appear to be performing  well in their operational environments. As of late August 2010, 7,488 vehicles had been delivered to the  government and 4,379 vehicles had been fielded to units in Afghanistan. Fielding is expected to be completed in December 2010. M-ATV Acquisition Cost

As of June 2010, the cost to acquire the M-ATV is estimated to be about  $12.5 billion through fiscal year 2024. JLTV Expected to Feature More Balanced Payload, Protection, and Performance Than Other Vehicles, but Transportability and Reliability Are Recognized Risks

A comparison of JLTV’s capabilities with those of the M-ATV and HMMWV  indicates the JLTV is expected to offer protection levels comparable to the  M-ATV at a weight nearer to the HMMWV. During the remainder of the  technology development phase, the task for the JLTV program will be to  determine, through the system engineering process, whether the proposed  requirements can be met with the resources expected to be available  including existing technologies. Such knowledge would include a  completed preliminary design review, evidence of robust system  engineering analyses, and a technology readiness assessment. If similar costs apply to JLTV, its procurement unit cost could  be in excess of $800,000. However, those  assumptions could be affected by several forthcoming decisions and  events, including those related to (1) the development of revised plans for  continued production of new HMMWVs or recapitalization of older  HMMWVs; (2) the availability of sufficient funds in the base budgets for  the operation and support of those MRAP vehicles to be integrated into  the service fleets; and (3) the extent to which the JLTV program can meet  cost, schedule, and performance expectations. Long-term Funding for MRAP and M-ATV Operations and Support

The second underlying tenet of the services’ TWV strategies involves the  planning for the integration of MRAP vehicles (including the M-ATV) into  the fleet mixes. Conclusions

The M-ATV program has been successful, delivering well-performing  vehicles early and at an estimated cost of $12.5 billion. JLTV is a well-structured  program with desirable features, such as a competitive technology  development phase with an incremental approach to fielding increasingly  capable vehicles. Unlike the M-ATV and MRAP, JLTV has demanding  requirements—to provide MRAP-like protection at HMMWV-like weight— that necessitate technological and engineering advances. The knowledge of what is achievable with JLTV should be in hand by late  fiscal year 2011. In so doing, the DOD-wide strategy can help  reconcile the aggregate affordability and other implications of these  programs with the competing demands of the department. Specifically,  any potential offsets between the MRAP vehicles and JLTVs, to the extent  they are supported by cost-benefit analyses, could save both acquisition  and support costs. Stage the timing of the DOD-wide TWV strategy so that it captures the  knowledge gained during the year from the JLTV technology development  phase, as well as from the decisions made on the HMMWV and MRAP  programs. Include in the strategy a cost-benefit analysis that could minimize the  collective acquisition and support costs of the various TWV programs, and  reduce the risk of unplanned overlap or duplication. On our recommendation that the JLTV program clearly demonstrate that it  has achieved a match between its requirements and available resources,  DOD concurred and noted that this is a Milestone B requirement. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

To determine the Department of Defense’s (DOD) strategy for and  progress in rapidly acquiring and fielding the Mine Resistant Ambush  Protected (MRAP) All Terrain Vehicle (M-ATV), we obtained and reviewed  program documents and held discussions with system developers,  acquisition officials, and contractor representatives. Using comparison data  provided by Army officials, we prepared a table comparing JLTV’s  expected features and cost with those of the M-ATV and current  generation High Mobility Multi-purpose Wheeled Vehicle. To determine the extent to which current plans for M-ATV and JLTV are  consistent with Army and Marine Corps tactical wheeled vehicle  investment strategies, we obtained and reviewed updated strategies and  held discussions with DOD, Army, and Marine Corps officials.
Why GAO Did This Study

The Department of Defense (DOD) is acquiring two new tactical wheeled vehicles (TWV): the Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) All Terrain Vehicle (M-ATV) and the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV). The $12.5 billion M-ATV is for use in Afghanistan; JLTV is the future replacement for vehicles like the High Mobility Multi-purpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV). GAO was asked to assess (1) DOD's progress in rapidly acquiring and fielding M-ATVs, (2) JLTV's expected features and cost compared to other TWV, and (3) the extent to which the current plans for M-ATV and JLTV are consistent with the services' TWV investment strategies. GAO reviewed documents and held discussions with key officials to determine program strategies, costs, performance, and anticipated features; and compared M-ATV and JLTV plans with service strategies.

What GAO Found

The M-ATV program has been successful, delivering well-performing vehicles ahead of schedule at an estimated cost of $12.5 billion. No major issues have been identified in testing and early fielding. In developing the M-ATV acquisition strategy, lessons learned from the acquisition of MRAPs in Iraq were applied. Like the earlier MRAPs, the M-ATVs did not require technology development, a key factor in the program's success. As of late August 2010, 7,488 vehicles had been delivered to the government and 4,379 had been fielded to units in Afghanistan. Fielding is expected to be completed in December 2010. The urgent need for these vehicles resulted in their fielding and testing at the same time; however, source selection testing was conducted, and no vehicles were fielded until their safety was verified. Jointly managed by the Army and Marine Corps, JLTV is expected to provide protection levels that are comparable to the M-ATV but without loss of payload or automotive performance. JLTV's acquisition costs are yet to be determined but are expected to be substantial. Unit costs could be over $800,000--somewhat less than M-ATV, with mission equipment making up more than half of the costs. Unlike M-ATV and earlier MRAPs, JLTV has demanding projected requirements that necessitate technological and engineering advances. Key challenges are whether the vehicle can provide the performance and reliability required yet stay within the weight limits for helicopter transport. Difficult tradeoffs in requirements may be necessary. At this point, it is a well-structured program with desirable features like a competitive technology development phase. This phase is scheduled to be completed by late fiscal year 2011, when DOD will decide if the program should enter the engineering and manufacturing development phase. That is the point where JLTV should clearly demonstrate that its projected requirements can be met with available resources. Evidence of that match would include a completed preliminary design review and a technology readiness assessment that shows all technologies to be fully mature. Current plans for M-ATV and JLTV dovetail with the objectives of the most recent Army and Marine Corps investment strategies. The implementation of those strategies, however, will be influenced by (1) the decision to continue producing new HMMWVs, recapitalize the existing HMMWV fleet, or both; (2) long-term funding for MRAP and M-ATV sustainment, and (3) specific cost and capabilities of JLTV. The departmentwide strategy for TWVs that DOD plans to prepare would benefit greatly from the resolution of these issues. To the extent this strategy captures the knowledge gained by the services, the strategy can reconcile the aggregate affordability and other implications of the various tactical wheeled vehicle programs with the competing demands of the department. For example, at this point, the service strategies consider MRAP vehicles to be additive to the force structure, not offsetting quantities of HMMWVs or JLTVs. Any potential offsets between the MRAP vehicles and JLTVs, to the extent they are supported by cost-benefit analyses, could save both acquisition and support costs.

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that DOD (1) ensure that the JLTV program clearly demonstrates a match between requirements and resources; (2) stage the timing of the DOD-wide TWV strategy so that it captures key knowledge; and (3) include in the strategy a cost-benefit analysis that could minimize the collective acquisition and support costs of the various TWV programs, and reduce the risk of unplanned overlap or duplication. DOD concurred with our recommendations.