They  typically use go-fast boats and fishing vessels to smuggle cocaine from  Colombia to Central America and Mexico en route to the United States. Overall, U.S. Assistance Has Enhanced International Cooperation in Disrupting Illegal Drug Markets

Since 2003, through U.S.-supported international counternarcotics  programs, the United States and the eight major drug transit countries we  reviewed, except Venezuela, have enhanced their cooperation in  combating drug trafficking, primarily through improvements in  investigations and intelligence gathering, maritime and land-based  operations, and prosecutions of drug traffickers. Measuring the results of a  wide variety of assistance programs across many countries over time is  difficult as U.S. agencies have compiled limited and inconsistent  performance data. With this support, several countries have  participated in short- and long-term maritime interdiction operations with  the United States and other countries since 2003. State/INL and USAID have supported  judicial reforms within some partner nations intended to make judicial  systems more fair, impartial, and efficient, and have strengthened the  capacity of prosecutors to work effectively within those systems on drug- related cases. Several Factors Impede the Effectiveness of the Counternarcotics Efforts

Several factors relating to U.S. assistance programs have impeded  international counternarcotics efforts in the transit zone. Partner nations  have limited resources to devote to counternarcotics efforts, and many  U.S.-supported counternarcotics initiatives are not self-sustaining but,  rather, are dependent on continued U.S. funding. Limited political support  of U.S.-funded initiatives, as well as corruption, have also kept these  nations from becoming full partners in the international counternarcotics  effort—a goal of U.S. assistance, according to State. In addition, the effect  of U.S. cargo container security assistance for the counternarcotics effort  has been limited. However, most of State/INL’s initiatives have not been effective, and DHS  has not routinely used its program of targeting and scanning cargo  containers overseas to detect illicit drugs. DHS, through CBP, has implemented the Container Security Initiative  (CSI) overseas, which may have potential for greater use in  counternarcotics operations. Recommendations for Executive Action

To link U.S.-funded initiatives in transit zone countries to the priority of  disrupting illicit drug markets and the goal of assisting nations to become  full and self-sustaining partners in the international counternarcotics  effort, we recommend that the Secretary of State, in consultation with the  Director of ONDCP, the Secretaries of Defense and Homeland Security,  the Attorney General, and the Administrator of USAID, report the results  of U.S.-funded counternarcotics initiatives more comprehensively and  consistently for each country in the annual International Narcotics  Control Strategy Report. We supplemented this data with information about trends in  drug trafficking, interdiction, and cooperation with transit zone countries  obtained from officials at JIATF-South. 2. 6. GAO Comments

1.
Why GAO Did This Study

Each year, criminal organizations transport hundreds of tons of illegal drugs from South America to the United States through a 6 million square mile "transit zone" including Central America, the Caribbean, the Gulf of Mexico, and the eastern Pacific Ocean. Since fiscal year 2003, the United States has provided over $950 million to support counternarcotics efforts in transit zone countries, which historically lacked the capacity to interdict drugs. GAO was asked to examine (1) how the United States has assisted transit zone countries in disrupting drug trafficking and (2) what factors have impeded these efforts. GAO analyzed relevant data, met with U.S. and foreign officials, and visited selected countries.

What GAO Found

U.S. government assistance has improved international counternarcotics cooperation with the eight major drug transit countries GAO reviewed, except Venezuela. First, assistance programs have helped partner nations gather, process, and share information and intelligence leading to arrests and drug seizures. Second, they have enabled these nations to participate in counternarcotics operations--both at sea and on land--by providing assets (such as interceptor boats and vehicles), logistical support, and training for police units. Third, U.S. assistance has helped strengthen the capacity of prosecutors to work more effectively on drug-related cases. Assessing the impact of such a wide variety of programs is difficult because some are indirectly related to drug interdiction, and because results reporting has been limited and inconsistent. Despite gains in international cooperation, several factors, including resource limitations and lack of political will, have impeded U.S. progress in helping governments become full and self-sustaining partners in the counternarcotics effort--a goal of U.S. assistance. These countries have limited resources to devote to this effort, and many initiatives are dependent on U.S. support. Programs to build maritime interdiction capacity have been particularly affected, as partner nations lack fuel and other resources needed to operate and maintain U.S.-provided boats. Limited political support, particularly in Venezuela, and corruption have also hindered U.S. counternarcotics efforts. In addition, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has implemented a Container Security Initiative (CSI) that targets and scans containers for weapons of mass destruction and terrorist contraband. But CSI has not routinely been used for illicit drug detection, despite its applicability for this purpose.