Before the end of the U.S. underground nuclear testing program in 1992,  developing and maintaining the nuclear stockpile were largely  accomplished by a continual cycle of weapon design, weapon testing,  and the incorporation of lessons learned in the next design. In contrast, the Enhanced Surveillance Program was established in  the mid-1990s to assist in surveillance and evaluation of the stockpile  primarily by identifying aging signs, developing aging models to predict  the impact of aging on the stockpile, and developing diagnostic tools. Component and Material Testing. Finally, NNSA uses  information from the aging studies in the national security laboratory  directors’ annual assessment of the condition of the stockpile. Computational modeling. On the basis of its aging studies and other  data, the Enhanced Surveillance Program develops computational  models to predict the impacts of aging on weapons components and  materials. In addition, the 2007 initiative project plan  stated that the Enhanced Surveillance Program would continue to assess  the viability of diagnostic tools in support of Core Surveillance. NNSA Did Not Fully Implement Its 2007 Vision for the Enhanced Surveillance Program and Has Not Developed a Long- Term Strategy for the Program

NNSA implemented some aspects of its 2007 initiative but did not fully  implement its envisioned role for the Enhanced Surveillance Program and  has not developed a long-term strategy for the program. NNSA has  substantially reduced the program’s funding since 2007 and recently  refocused some of its RDT&E programs on multiple weapon life- extension efforts and supporting efforts. Funding dropped to approximately $38 million in  fiscal year 2015, a reduction of more than 50 percent from fiscal year  2007. NNSA also delayed some key Enhanced Surveillance Program activities  during this time. These evaluations—which NNSA viewed as an important  part of the Enhanced Surveillance Program when it was being managed  as a campaign, according to an NNSA official—were initiated in fiscal  year 2007 and originally estimated to be completed by 2012. Enhanced Surveillance Program officials  continue to focus on year-to-year management of the program under  reduced funding levels to maintain key stockpile assessment capabilities,  such as supporting Core Surveillance activities, the annual assessment  process, and LEPs. Specifically, our April 2013 report found that for  technology-related efforts, without a long-term strategy that provides an  overall picture of what an agency is investing in, it is difficult for Congress  and other decision makers to understand up front what they are funding  and what benefits they can expect. Our body of work has shown that these  requirements also can serve as leading practices for strategic planning at  lower levels within federal agencies, such as NNSA, to assist with  planning for individual programs or initiatives that are particularly  challenging. The  Enhanced Surveillance Program has general long-term goals, such as  “developing tools and information useful to ensure the stockpile is healthy  and reliable.” However, the program’s long-term goals do not provide  outcomes that are measurable or that encompass the entirety of the  program. For example, the program’s goals for  fiscal year 2015 included “develop, validate and deploy improved  predictive capabilities and diagnostics to assess performance and lifetime  for nuclear and non-nuclear materials.” By managing work on an annual  basis, longer-term work—such as technology development projects  extended over several years—may receive a lower priority and thus,  according to NNSA officials, may not be funded. For example, rather  than expanding the program, NNSA budgeted reduced funding for it, and  the program did not complete the proposed evaluations of the effects of  aging on nonnuclear components and materials. This  includes the Enhanced Surveillance Program. A new long-term  strategy for the program that incorporates outcome-oriented strategic  goals, addresses management challenges and identifies resources  needed to achieve these goals, and develops and uses performance  measures to track progress in achieving goals would allow the agency to  better inform long-term planning and management decision making for  the program. Recommendation for Executive Action

To help ensure that NNSA can better inform long-term planning and  management decision making as well as to ensure that the Enhanced  Surveillance Program complements NNSA’s other efforts to assess the  nuclear weapons stockpile, we recommend that the NNSA Administrator  develop a long-term strategy for the Enhanced Surveillance Program that  incorporates outcome-oriented strategic goals, addresses management  challenges and identifies resources needed to achieve these goals, and  develops and uses performance measures to track progress in achieving  these goals. The Administrator noted that the  agency estimated completing a long-term strategy for the program by  June 2017.
Why GAO Did This Study

DOE participates in the annual process to assess the safety and reliability of the U.S. nuclear stockpile, which is now made up largely of weapons that are beyond their original design lifetimes. In 2007, faced with a mounting backlog of required tests, DOE's NNSA announced plans to use its Enhanced Surveillance Program for a more cost-effective surveillance approach under its 2007 Surveillance Transformation initiative. Under this initiative, predictive models were to assess the impact of aging on weapons in the stockpile without having to dismantle them as the agency has done in the past.
The Senate Report accompanying the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015 included a provision that GAO review the status of the Enhanced Surveillance Program. This report assesses the extent to which NNSA implemented the vision for the Enhanced Surveillance Program from its 2007 initiative and developed a long-term strategy for the program. GAO reviewed NNSA plans and budget and other documents; interviewed agency officials; and discussed surveillance issues with members of a group of nationally known scientists who advise the government and who reviewed the program in September 2013.

What GAO Found

The Department of Energy's (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) did not fully implement the Enhanced Surveillance Program as envisioned in the agency's 2007 Surveillance Transformation Project (2007 initiative) and has not developed a long-term strategy for the program. Surveillance is the process of inspecting a weapon through various tests of the weapon as a whole, the weapon's components, and the weapon's materials to determine whether they are meeting performance expectations, through dismantling the weapon or through the use of diagnostic tools. As called for in its 2007 initiative, NNSA took steps to improve the management of the overall surveillance program, which primarily tests dismantled weapons and their components, but the agency did not increase the role of the Enhanced Surveillance Program, as envisioned. The program develops computational models to predict the impact of stockpile aging; identifies aging signs; and develops diagnostic tools. Under the 2007 initiative, NNSA was to conduct more Enhanced Surveillance Program evaluations using computer models to predict the impacts of aging on specific weapon components—especially nonnuclear components and materials—and to assess the validity of more diagnostic tools. Instead of expanding the program's role, NNSA reduced program funding by more than 50 percent from fiscal year 2007 to fiscal year 2015. NNSA also delayed some key activities and reduced the program's scope during this time. For example, NNSA did not complete its proposed evaluations of the impact of aging on nonnuclear components and materials. These evaluations, originally estimated to be completed by 2012, were dropped as program goals in fiscal year 2016, according to NNSA officials and contractor representatives.
In fiscal year 2016, NNSA broadly refocused the Enhanced Surveillance Program on multiple nuclear weapon life-extension efforts and supporting activities but has not developed a corresponding long-term strategy for the program. Instead, program officials have focused on developing general long-term goals and managing the program on a year-to-year basis under reduced funding levels to maintain key stockpile assessment capabilities. These general goals, however, do not provide measureable outcomes or encompass the entirety of the program. In addition, as GAO's previous work has shown, managing longer term work, such as multiyear technology development projects, on an annual basis makes it difficult for Congress and other decision makers to understand up front what they are funding and what benefits they can expect. As a result, these projects may receive a lower priority and may not be consistently funded. GAO's body of work has identified a number of leading practices in federal strategic planning that include defining strategic goals, defining strategies and resources for achieving these goals, and developing and using performance measures to track progress in achieving these goals and to inform management decision making. A new strategy for the Enhanced Surveillance Program that incorporates outcome-oriented strategic goals, addresses management challenges and identifies resources needed to achieve these goals, and develops and uses performance measures to track progress in achieving goals would allow the agency to better inform long-term planning and management decision making for the program as well as help ensure that it complements NNSA's other efforts to assess the nuclear weapons stockpile.

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that the NNSA Administrator develop a long-term strategy for the Enhanced Surveillance Program that incorporates leading practices. NNSA concurred with GAO's recommendation and estimated completion of a long-term strategy by June 2017.