The Rocky Flats Plant (CO) manufactured pits on a large scale during the Cold War until production halted in 1989. It took until FY2007 for the United States to produce even a small quantity, 11 pits per year (ppy), for the stockpile. While some pits in older weapons were made of uranium and plutonium ("composite pits"), modern pits use only plutonium because much less of that material is required to generate a given explosive force, permitting nuclear weapons to be smaller and lighter. That radioactive element increases the radiation dose to workers and is an impurity to weapons-grade plutonium. Accordingly, plutonium must be purified for use in new pits. Since the figure of 80 ppy was based on LANL's presumed pit production capacity using PF-4 and CMRR-NF (an existing building and one that has been deferred for at least five years), not on a strategic analysis of military needs, and since the range cited is 50 to 80 ppy, a capacity of less than 80 ppy might suffice. The Radiological Laboratory/Utility/ Office Building (RLUOB) figures in several options below and is discussed in " Existing Buildings at Los Alamos for Plutonium Work ." The fraction, in turn, is based on (1) the Airborne Release Fraction (ARF), the fraction of the MAR that the postulated fire could release into the air; (2) the Leak Path Factor (LPF), the fraction of ARF that actually escapes from the building into the air; some of it would be trapped, such as by the collapse of the building; and (3) the Respirable Fraction (RF), the fraction of the plutonium oxide particles released into the atmosphere that are of a size (3 microns or less) that could readily be inhaled and lodge in the lungs, where they would cause biological damage and, quite possibly, lung cancers; larger particles would fall to the ground or would be trapped in the nose. Table C-1 shows amounts of plutonium in various hazard and security categories. As a Radiological Facility, it is permitted to hold 26 grams (g) of WGPu. It has 19,500 square feet (sf) of laboratory space, as compared to 22,500 sf of lab space planned for the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement Nuclear Facility (CMRR-NF), a building planned but not built, as described in " A Sisyphean History: Failed Efforts to Construct a Building to Restore Pit Production ," below. DOE initially considered restarting operations at Rocky Flats, but ultimately decided not to. However, Congress appropriated no funds for CMRR-NF for FY2013. Other nuclear weapons complex sites are under consideration for involvement, including [Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Nevada National Security Site, Waste Isolation Pilot Plant], and perhaps [Savannah River Site]. Also at issue is the need for this facility. As such, this work requires high security and high MAR. Therefore, the most efficient use of PF-4 is for tasks requiring high MAR and high security. Low SC/High HC: Producing 80 ppy would require casting more hemishells, increasing MAR substantially. The report also considered performing Pu-238 work at Idaho National Laboratory (INL) or Savannah River Site (SRS). If it is deemed desirable to do as much plutonium work as possible at LANL, what about a deeper look at other LANL options, starting with an existing building …

			Option 8. Regulations limit the quantity of WGPu that RLUOB can hold to the volume of two nickels . Option 10. RLUOB might collapse in an earthquake. Build Modules Connected to PF-4 for High-MAR Plutonium Work

Los Alamos's preferred approach to the plutonium strategy is a three-part plan: maximize use of RLUOB, repurpose space in PF-4, and build modules linked to PF-4. Would moving it out free enough MAR and space for PF-4, especially in conjunction with RLUOB, to do the added pit work needed to reach 80 ppy? Is it needed now? This would involve many actions. Differing time horizons between Congress and NNSA, and between political and technical imperatives, cause problems . There are costs and risks to doing nothing . A facility can be safe without being compliant . The political system is more flexible than the regulatory system . Even so, while the regulator can present costs and benefits, only the political system has the authority, ability, and culture to decide which tradeoffs are worth making, and to offer regulatory relief. There are several potential paths forward: Several options discussed in this report have the potential to produce 80 ppy, resolve the Pu-238 issue, and permit other plutonium activities, all at relatively modest cost, in a relatively short time, with no new buildings, and with minimal environmental impact. Determining the cost, schedule, feasibility, and other characteristics of these options would require detailed study. A critical point is that legislation trumps regulation: since regulations, orders, and standards derive their authority from statutes, statutes can mandate changes in them. Department of Energy Organization Act of 1977, 42 U.S.C. Establishment of Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB): 42 U.S.C. By performing AC tasks best suited for hoods in RLUOB and AC tasks that can be performed in gloveboxes in PF-4, by studying how to maximize efficient use of space for AC, and perhaps by using two shifts per day instead of one, it seems likely that a configuration of PF-4 plus RLUOB with 1,000 g WGPu would have the space both to fabricate 80 ppy and to provide the AC necessary to support that level of production.
A "pit" is the plutonium core of a nuclear weapon. Until 1989, the Rocky Flats Plant (CO) mass-produced pits. Since then, the United States has made at most 11 pits per year (ppy). U.S. policy is to maintain existing nuclear weapons. To do this, the Department of Defense states that it needs the Department of Energy (DOE), which maintains U.S. nuclear weapons, to produce 50-80 ppy by 2030. While some argue that few if any new pits are needed, at least for decades, this report focuses on options to reach 80 ppy.
Pit production involves precisely forming plutonium—a hazardous, radioactive, physically quirky metal. Production requires supporting tasks, such as analytical chemistry (AC), which monitors the chemical composition of plutonium in each pit.
With Rocky Flats closed, DOE established a small-scale pit manufacturing capability at PF-4, a building at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL). DOE also proposed higher-capacity facilities; none came to fruition. In 2005, Congress rejected the Modern Pit Facility, viewing as excessive the capacity range DOE studied, 125-450 ppy. In 2012, the Administration "deferred" construction of the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement Nuclear Facility (CMRR-NF) on grounds of availability of interim alternatives and affordability.
Nonetheless, options remain:
Build CMRR-NF. Congress mandated it in the FY2013 cycle, but provided no funds for it then, and permitted consideration of an alternative in the FY2014 cycle. Remove from PF-4 tasks not requiring high MAR and security. Casting pits uses much plutonium that an accident might release ("Material At Risk," MAR) and requires high security. Making 80 ppy would require freeing more MAR and floor space in PF-4 for casting. Provide regulatory relief so RLUOB could hold 1,000 grams of plutonium with few changes to the building. AC for 80 ppy needs much floor space but not high MAR or high security. Several options involve LANL's Radiological Laboratory/Utility/Office Building (RLUOB). Regulations permit it to hold 26 grams of weapons-grade plutonium, the volume of two nickels; AC for 80 ppy would require 500 to 1,000 grams and perhaps space elsewhere. Augmenting RLUOB to hold the latter amounts within regulations would be costly even though the radiation dose if the building collapsed would be very low. Regulatory relief would save time and money, but would raise concerns about compliance with regulations. A complementary option is to perform some AC at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory or Savannah River Site. Move plutonium-238 work to Idaho National Laboratory or Savannah River Site. Fabricating plutonium-238 into power sources for space probes entails high MAR, but not high security because it is not used in pits. Moving it would free MAR and floor space in PF-4. At issue is whether to conduct all plutonium work at LANL, the plutonium "center of excellence." Build concrete "modules" connected to PF-4. This would enable high-MAR work to move out of PF-4, so PF-4 and modules could do the needed pit work. At issue: are modules needed, at what cost, and when.
Several options have the potential to produce 80 ppy and permit other plutonium activities at relatively modest cost, in a relatively short time, with no new buildings, and with minimal environmental impact. Determining their desirability and feasibility would require detailed study.
Observations include:
Differing time horizons between Congress and DOE, and between political and technical imperatives, cause problems. Doing nothing entails costs and risks. Keeping a 1950s-era building open while options are explored exposes workers to a relatively high risk of death in an earthquake. Congress may wish to consider limiting a building's permitted plutonium quantity by estimated dose instead of MAR. A facility can be safe even if it is not compliant with regulations. The political system is more flexible than the regulatory system. Regulations derive their authority from statutes. Regulators, bound by these statutes, cannot make cost-benefit tradeoffs regarding compliance. In contrast, the political system has the authority, ability, and culture to decide which tradeoffs are worth making.