Moreover, since the SEC could exercise no regulatory supervision over the application of the Exchange rules that permitted or required wire-service termination, there was no potential for conflict between the securities regulatory scheme and enforcement of the antitrust laws. From a Securities Law Perspective

The Securities and Exchange Commission administers a comprehensive body of securities regulation statutes, including the Securities Act of 1933 (15 U.S.C. Credit Suisse Securities v. Billing13

Credit Suisse gave the Court the opportunity—not exercised since 1981 —to reiterate and apply its previously stated standards for granting implied antitrust immunity. An antitrust suit (originally a class action) was filed by a group of IPO purchasers against the underwriters of those issues (10 major investment banks) alleging conspiracy, price fixing-related, and tying violations of § 1 of the Sherman Act. At first glance, this system of agreement by the issuer and all of the major underwriters of size and pricing of the offering does appear, in fact, to be antitrust-violative price manipulation. We believe it fair to conclude that, where conduct at the core or the marketing of new securities is at issue; where securities regulators proceed with great care to distinguish the encouraged and permissible from the forbidden; where the threat to antitrust lawsuits, through error and disincentive, could seriously alter underwriter conduct in undesirable ways, to allow an antitrust lawsuit would threaten serious harm to the efficient functioning of the securities markets. Given (1) Congress's expressed concern that securities markets become and remain stable, (2) the continued oversight and actions of a single expert regulatory agency versus the probability of diverse and possibly conflicting decisions by nonexpert judges in the event of securities/antitrust lawsuits, and (3) the likelihood of conflict between the mandates of antitrust law and allowable activities under the securities laws, the Court found that "the securities laws are 'clearly incompatible' with the application of the antitrust laws." Accordingly, implied immunity from prosecution under the antitrust laws is accorded to participants in securities markets. Justice Thomas's dissent found fault with the Court's assertion that the securities acts were silent on whether the antitrust laws should be applicable to entities in the securities industry. He noted that both the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 state, in "savings clauses," that their remedies "shall be in addition to any and all other rights and remedies that may exist at law or in equity":
Therefore, both statutes explicitly save the very remedies the Court holds to be impliedly precluded.
In Credit Suisse Securities v. Billing, the Supreme Court examined whether entities in a heavily regulated industry are necessarily entitled to immunity from prosecution under the federal antitrust laws simply by virtue of their regulated status. The Court had previously ruled that, absent a specific congressional mandate, such immunity may be granted only by findings either of "clear repugnance" between the regulatory scheme and enforcement of the antitrust laws, or sufficiently pervasive regulation of an industry as would be disrupted by application of the antitrust laws; the Credit Suisse opinion reaffirms that reasoning. A class of securities investors alleged that they had paid artificially inflated prices for certain securities because of purportedly antitrust-violative actions taken by the underwriters of some initial public offerings (IPOs). The challenged practices included the formation of syndicates; requiring purchasers of IPOs to make future purchases ("laddering"); and requiring purchasers to buy other, less desirable securities ("tying"). In response, defendants/appellants asserted that they were immune to prosecution under the antitrust laws because of the pervasive regulation of the securities industry by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), which administers a comprehensive system of regulation including major parts of the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. The SEC, they argued, should be the sole arbiter of the validity of their actions, notwithstanding that Congress had not expressly so provided in the applicable legislation. Although the district court, which agreed with the underwriters, dismissed the case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed after a lengthy discussion of Supreme Court case law in the area. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, accepting the "pervasive regulation of the securities industry" argument. Specifically, it found that the conduct at issue was "at the core of marketing new securities," noted that "securities regulators proceed with great care to distinguish the encouraged and permissible from the forbidden," and concluded, therefore, "that the securities laws are 'clearly incompatible with the application of the antitrust laws in this context." This report will not be updated.