To address joint readiness, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff established the Joint Monthly Readiness Review (JMRR) in 1994. Specifically, we assessed whether (1) DOD plans to make improvements to SORTS, including adding specific readiness indicators; (2) the JMRR process has improved DOD’s ability to assess readiness; and (3) the quarterly readiness reports to Congress accurately reflect readiness information briefed to senior DOD officials and provide information needed for oversight of military readiness. To understand how DOD assesses and reports readiness at the joint and strategic levels, we met with cognizant officials at OSD, the Joint Staff, and the services to discuss the JMRR and SROC processes and the development of the quarterly readiness reports to Congress. However, we did not evaluate their assessment process. DOD’s Plans to Improve SORTS Will Not Address All Known Limitations

For more than a decade, audit and oversight organizations, including our office, have identified limitations to the SORTS unit readiness system. Additionally, the Joint Staff does not plan to add indicators to SORTS that were identified by a 1994 DOD-funded study as having potential value for monitoring readiness. According to DOD officials, further review of these indicators found that some were not appropriate for inclusion in a unit readiness database because they measure the readiness of forces at an aggregate level. DOD recently issued an implementation plan for responding to the new requirement in  10 U.S.C. 482 to include additional readiness indicators in the quarterly readiness reports to Congress. These upgrades, however, focus on improving the technical aspects of the database. Joint Review Has Expanded DOD’s Readiness Assessment Process

The Joint Monthly Readiness Review represents progress toward a more encompassing readiness measurement process. The review goes beyond the traditional unit perspective that was previously the focus of the readiness assessment system. It also has added a new dimension to DOD’s readiness assessment capability by including wartime scenarios, which are intended to provide insight into whether U.S. forces are ready for their most demanding missions as well as other threats. 3.1). Quarterly Reports Provide Vague Description of Readiness Problems and Remedial Actions

DOD’s quarterly reports to Congress provide only a vague description of readiness issues; consequently, they are not effective as a congressional oversight tool. The reports accurately reflect information from briefings to the Senior Readiness Oversight Council and present a highly summarized view of readiness, focusing on generalized strategic concerns. They are not intended to, and do not, highlight problems at the individual combatant command or unit level. 482 because they lack specific detail on the problems and planned remedial actions. As a result, the aggregated information in DOD’s quarterly report does not include specific deficiencies. To enhance the effectiveness of the quarterly readiness report as a congressional oversight tool, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense take steps to better fulfill the legislative reporting requirements under 10 U.S.C. 2.
Why GAO Did This Study

Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Department of Defense's (DOD) efforts to improve its readiness assessment and reporting process, focusing on whether: (1) DOD plans to make improvements to its unit readiness database, including adding specific readiness indicators; (2) a monthly review process instituted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff has improved DOD's ability to assess readiness; and (3) DOD's quarterly readiness reports to Congress accurately reflect readiness information briefed to senior DOD officials and provide information needed for oversight of military readiness.

What GAO Found

GAO noted that: (1) over the last few years, DOD has, on the whole, taken action to improve its readiness assessment system; (2) these improvements include technical enhancements to the unit readiness system as well as the establishment of formal DOD-wide forums for evaluating current readiness at the joint and strategic levels; (3) GAO believes these changes represent progress, however, limitations to DOD's unit readiness systems remain and may be reflected in DOD's readiness assessments; (4) additionally, DOD's quarterly reports to Congress provide only a vague description of readiness problems and remedial actions; consequently, they are not effective as a congressional oversight tool; (5) both the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the services have initiated various efforts to improve the technical aspects on the Status of Resources Training System; (6) however, these efforts will not address other known system limitations; (7) further, the Joint Chiefs of Staff currently does not plan to add indicators to the system that were identified by a 1994 DOD-funded study as having potential value for monitoring readiness; (8) the 1994 study did not recommend that the indicators be added to the unit readiness database, and Joint Chiefs of Staff officials said some of the unit indicators were not appropriate for inclusion in this database because they measure the readiness of forces at an aggregate level; (9) DOD recently issued an implementation plan for responding to the new requirements to include additional readiness indicators in the quarterly readiness reports to Congress; (10) the Joint Monthly Readiness Review has added a new dimension to DOD's capability to assess readiness because it goes beyond the traditional unit perspective that was previously the focus of the readiness assessment system; (11) the review also has expanded DOD's readiness assessment capability by following a recurring cycle, adding a joint perspective, incorporating wartime scenarios, and tracking and addressing deficiencies; (12) this review process, however, depends heavily on the judgment of military commanders; (13) DOD's quarterly readiness reports do not fulfill the legislative reporting requirements under 10 U.S.C. 482 because they lack specific detail on deficiencies and remedial actions; (14) as a result, these reports do not provide information needed for effective oversight of military readiness; (15) these reports accurately reflect information from briefings to the Senior Readiness Oversight Council and present a highly aggregated view of readiness; and (16) they are not intended to and do not highlight problems at the individual combatant command or unit level.