The Commerce and State Departments approved a total of 67 export licenses worth about $530 million for missile-related items for China for fiscal years 1990 through 1993. Thus, Commerce-identified dual-use missile technology exports totaled less than 1 percent of all exports requiring individual validated licenses to China. DOD Officials Are Concerned That They Do Not See All Commerce Department Missile Technology Applications

DOD officials have expressed concern that Commerce is not referring potential missile technology applications for interagency review. Licensing Process and Monitoring Controls Cannot Ensure That U.S. Exports to China Are Kept From Sensitive End Users

Licensing process controls for dual-use and missile technology export applications cannot ensure that U.S. proliferation-related dual-use and munitions exports to China, aside from separately monitored satellite exports, are kept from sensitive end users. U.S. Government Monitoring of China’s Compliance With MTCR Commitments and License Conditions

U.S. government officials believe that the U.S. government generally performs adequate monitoring of China’s compliance with the terms of its MTCR commitments not to export MTCR technology out of China. Effectiveness of U.S. Sanctions on China Is Uncertain

The effectiveness of U.S. sanctions on China is difficult to determine because, to date, no consensus on a definition of, or criteria for, measuring the effectiveness of proliferation sanctions imposed on China has been established. The 1993 proliferation sanctions have not yet resulted in China’s agreement to commit to the current MTCR Guidelines and Annex. The analysts provided some information on sensitive end users, but the Commerce Department, after a technical review of the data, said that the license applications did not involve restricted missile technology.
Why GAO Did This Study

Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and U.S. missile technology-related exports to the Peoples' Republic of China, focusing on the: (1) extent to which dual-use and missile technologies are exported to sensitive end-users; (2) U.S. government's ability to monitor China's compliance with the U.S.-China bilateral agreement; and (3) effectiveness of U.S. sanctions imposed on China.

What GAO Found

GAO found that: (1) for fiscal years 1990 through 1993, the U.S. government approved 67 export licenses worth about $530 million for missile-related technology items exported to China; (2) such export licenses accounted for less than one percent of all special licenses for exports to China; (3) the Department of Defense (DOD) is concerned that the Department of Commerce might not be identifying or seeking interagency concurrence on all potential missile-technology export license applications; (4) DOD does not have an interagency agreement with Commerce regarding which export applications should be referred for comments; (5) existing licensing procedures and monitoring controls cannot ensure that most missile-technology and dual-use exports are kept from sensitive end users, but controls on satellite-related exports appear to be adequate; (6) U.S. government agencies do not share all the information they have on sensitive end users in China; (7) the lack of Chinese cooperation has made end-use monitoring of export licenses only marginally effective; (8) Commerce does not require monitoring cooperation before it grants an export license; (9) although China has recently accepted more stringent MTCR requirements, it does not accept the revised MTCR guidelines and annex; and (10) there are no criteria for measuring the effectiveness of proliferation sanctions imposed on China.