Several Factors Have Contributed to the Increase in Cocaine Seizures and Disruptions

Cocaine seizures and disruptions in the transit zone have increased over  two-thirds from calendar year 2000 to calendar year 2004. JIATF-South and  other cognizant agency officials pointed to a number of factors that  contributed to the increases, such as better intelligence on cocaine  movements that allow JIATF-South to target specific cocaine shipments;  the introduction of armed helicopters increasing the capability to interdict  cocaine shipments on go-fast boats; and increased cooperation from  nations in the region, which has led to more efficient use of resources. Cocaine Seizures and Disruptions Have Increased

Cocaine seizures and disruptions have increased about 68 percent since  calendar year 2000. Availability of Assets Provided for Interdiction Operations Have Varied Since Fiscal Year 2000

Overall, since fiscal year 2000, the availability of U.S. and allied assets  provided for detecting and disrupting drug trafficking activities in the  transit zone has varied. On-station ship days peaked in fiscal year 2001 and  flight hours peaked in fiscal year 2002, but both have declined since then,  primarily because Defense has provided fewer assets. Declines in Defense  assets in recent years were mostly offset by additional ship days and  aircraft hours provided by the Coast Guard, CBP, and allied nations. Nevertheless,  according to JIATF-South, it cannot detect many of the known maritime  cocaine movements reported in the western Caribbean Sea and the eastern  Pacific Ocean because it cannot get ships or aircraft to the suspected  movement in time. JIATF-South officials attribute the recent  declines primarily to the reduced availability of U.S. Navy P-3 maritime  patrol aircraft because of structural problems. Challenges in Maintaining Interdiction Operations

While the United States has increased the number of seizures and  disruptions in the transit zone since 2000, the Coast Guard, CBP, and  Defense face several challenges in maintaining the current level of assets  provided for transit zone interdiction operations. In addition, the readiness rates of older Coast Guard  ships, which support interdiction operations in the transit zone, have  declined since fiscal year 2000, and the surface radar system on its long- range surveillance aircraft is often inoperable. Agencies’ Performance Measures Vary and Data for Assessing Performance Are Problematic

The Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 requires federal  agencies to develop performance measures to assess progress in achieving  their goals, and to communicate their results to the Congress. The Coast Guard’s performance measures related to the transit zone set  specific goals to reduce the flow of cocaine. Data for Assessing Transit Zone Interdiction Operations and Drug Use in the United States Are Problematic

Data for assessing U.S. interdiction operations in the transit zone and  relating the results to the U.S. National Drug Control Strategy’s priority of  disrupting the illicit drug market and to its overall goal of reducing drug  usage in the United States are problematic. As a result of the disparity between the estimated cocaine supply and  demand, the interagency group stated that a precise estimate of cocaine  flow was not possible for 2004, and that “a range of possible amounts was  more intellectually and analytically honest.” The group estimated that  between 325 and 675 metric tons of cocaine flowed towards the United  States in 2004, but such a wide range is not useful for assessing transit zone  interdiction efforts. ONDCP Has Not Fully Addressed Prior Recommendations for Improving Drug Data Collection and Analysis

In a 2001 report prepared for ONDCP, the National Research Council  concluded that the United States had neither the data systems nor the  research infrastructure needed to assess the effectiveness of drug control  enforcement policies. Homeland Security did not state when it will complete this  effort. According to ONDCP  officials, they have not been completed. Scope and Methodology

Overall, to examine the status of U.S. interdiction assets and progress made  in disrupting drug trafficking in the transit zone, we focused on U.S. (1)  efforts to interdict cocaine because nearly all the cocaine entering the  United States comes from South America and (2) operations in the western  Caribbean Sea and the eastern Pacific Ocean because the United States has  positioned most of its interdiction assets in these areas. We discussed these matters with  cognizant law enforcement and military authorities at Defense, Department  of Homeland Security, Department of Justice, and headquarters in  Washington, D.C. We also discussed operational challenges with   Coast Guard officials at their base in Jacksonville, Florida, where the  Coast Guard stations armed helicopters used in interdiction operations;   CBP officials at their base in Jacksonville, Florida, where CPB stations  P-3 maritime patrol aircraft used in interdiction operations;   DEA officials in Miami, Florida, and Nassau, Bahamas, who manage an  ongoing drug interdiction program in the waters around the Bahamas  called “Operation Bahamas, and Turks and Caicos;”
JIATF-South officials in Key West, Florida, including the Commander;  representatives from the Coast Guard, CBP, Defense, and other U.S.  agencies; as well as the liaison officers from France, the Netherlands,  and the United Kingdom; and  Justice officials with the U.S. Attorney’s offices in Tampa and Sarasota,  Florida, directly involved in the Panama Express operation.
Why GAO Did This Study

One of the U.S. National Drug Control Strategy's priorities is to disrupt the illicit drug market. To this end, the Departments of Defense and Homeland Security provide ships and aircraft to disrupt the flow of illicit drugs, primarily cocaine, shipped from South America through the Caribbean Sea and eastern Pacific Ocean--an area known as the transit zone. The Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) oversees the U.S. anti-drug strategy. The Joint Interagency Task Force-South (JIATF-South) directs most transit zone operations. We examined U.S. efforts to interdict maritime movements of cocaine. We analyzed the (1) changes in cocaine seizures and disruptions since calendar year 2000, (2) trends in interdiction assets provided since fiscal year 2000, (3) challenges to maintaining transit zone interdiction operations, and (4) performance measures the agencies use to assess their progress.

What GAO Found

Cocaine seizures and disruptions in the transit zone have increased about 68 percent since calendar year 2000--from 117 metric tons in 2000 to 196 metric tons in 2004. About two-thirds of the disruptions were in the western Caribbean Sea and eastern Pacific Ocean where the United States has most of its interdiction assets. JIATF-South and other cognizant officials attribute the increase to improved interagency cooperation and intelligence, the introduction of armed helicopters to stop go-fast boats, and increased cooperation from nations in the region. Since fiscal year 2000, the availability of assets--ships and aircraft--to disrupt drug trafficking in the transit zone have varied. On-station ship days peaked in fiscal year 2001 and flight hours peaked in 2002, but both have generally declined since then, primarily because the Department of Defense has provided fewer assets. Declines in Defense assets have been largely offset by the Coast Guard, Customs and Border Protection (CBP), and certain allied nations. Nevertheless, in recent years, JIATF-South has detected less than one-third of the "known and actionable" maritime illicit drug movements in the western Caribbean Sea and eastern Pacific Ocean. Yet, once detected, over 80 percent of the drug movements were disrupted. Various factors pose challenges to maintaining the current level of transit zone interdiction operations. The reduced availability of the U.S. Navy's P-3 maritime patrol aircraft due to structural problems will degrade the U.S. capability to detect suspect maritime movements, readiness rates of older Coast Guard ships have declined since fiscal year 2000, and the surface radar system on the Coast Guard's long-range surveillance aircraft is often inoperable. Coast Guard and CBP officials also noted that they may not be able to sustain their level of assets in light of budget constraints and other homeland security priorities that may arise. These officials expressed concern that the long-term implications of likely declines in transit zone assets have not been addressed. The Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 requires agencies to develop performance measures to assess progress in achieving their goals. The Coast Guard's measures relate to reducing cocaine flow through the transit zone, CBP's planned measures are not specific to the transit zone, and Defense's planned measures focus on the number of disruptions of cocaine movements. But data that would help in assessing transit zone interdiction operations are problematic. For instance, in its assessment for 2004, ONDCP reported that between 325 metric tons and 675 metric tons of cocaine may be moving towards the United States. Such a wide range is not useful for assessing transit zone interdiction operations. In addition, data on U.S. drug usage are difficult to obtain and often cannot be generalized to the United States. In a 2001 report for ONDCP, the National Research Council made similar observations and recommended ways to improve the collection and analysis of illicit drug data, but ONDCP has not fully addressed them.