These missions  are managed by organizations within DOE and largely carried out by  M&O contractors at various DOE sites. To address this issue, in March 2010 the  Deputy Secretary of Energy announced a reform effort to revise DOE’s  safety and security directives and modify the department’s oversight  approach to “provide contractors with the flexibility to tailor and implement  safety and security programs without excessive federal oversight or  overly prescriptive departmental requirements.” In the memorandum  announcing this effort, the Deputy Secretary noted that burdensome  safety requirements were affecting the productivity of work at DOE’s sites  and that reducing this burden on contractors would lead to measurable  productivity improvement. In response to the Y-12 security incident and these findings, DOE and  NNSA took a number of immediate actions, including repairing security  equipment, reassigning key security personnel, and firing the Y-12  protective force contractor. As we and others have reported, DOE has a long  history of security breakdowns and an equally long history of instituting  responses and remedies to “fix” these problems. As noted in table 1,  10 years ago we reported on very similar problems, and since that time  DOE has undertaken numerous security initiatives to address them. DOE’s and NNSA’s work with nuclear materials  such as plutonium and highly enriched uranium, nuclear weapons and  their components, and large amounts of classified data require extremely  high security, however, as we and DOE have reported, NNSA and DOE  have a long history of poor security performance across the nuclear  security enterprise, most notably at Los Alamos and Livermore national  laboratories, as well as ongoing struggles to sustain security  improvements, including information security. DOE and NNSA’s Oversight of Safety Performance Continues to Face Challenges

DOE and NNSA have experienced significant safety problems at their  sites, and recent efforts to reform safety protocols and processes have  not demonstrated sustained improvements. As we testified in September  2012 before this Subcommittee, long-standing DOE and NNSA  management weaknesses have contributed to persistent safety problems  at NNSA’s national laboratories. For example, in October 2007, we  reported that nearly 60 serious accidents or near misses had occurred at  NNSA’s national laboratories since 2000. DOE has undertaken a number of reforms to address persistent safety  concerns. However,  as we noted in September 2012 before this Subcommittee, DOE’s safety  reforms did not fully address safety concerns that we, as well as others,  have identified in the areas of quality assurance, safety culture, and  federal oversight and, in fact, these reforms may have actually weakened  independent oversight. DOE and NNSA Have Made Progress but Further Improvements Needed on Project and Contract Management

A basic tenet of effective management is the ability to complete projects  on time and within budget. DOE has taken a number of actions to  improve management of projects, including those overseen by NNSA. DOE has made progress in managing nonmajor projects—those costing  less than $750—million and in recognition of this progress, we narrowed  the focus of our high-risk designation to major contracts and projects. In addition, in December 2012, we reported that EM and  NNSA were making some progress in managing the 71 nonmajor  construction and cleanup projects that we reviewed and are expected to  cost an estimated $10.1 billion in total. For example, we identified some  NNSA and EM nonmajor projects that used sound project management  practices, such as the application of effective acquisition strategies, to  help ensure the successful completion of these projects. More recently, in September 2011, NNSA estimated that  increases.the facility would cost from $4.2 billion to $6.5 billion to construct—a  nearly seven-fold cost increase from the original estimate. For example, in March 2009, we reported that NNSA and the  Department of Defense had not effectively managed cost, schedule, and  technical risks for the B61 nuclear bomb and the W76 nuclear warhead  refurbishments. We will continue to monitor DOE’s and NNSA’s implementation of actions  to resolve its safety, security, and contract and project management  difficulties and to assess the impact of these actions.
Why GAO Did This Study

DOE and NNSA are responsible for managing nuclear weapon- and nonproliferation-related national security activities in national laboratories and other sites and facilities, collectively known as the nuclear security enterprise. Major portions of NNSA's mission are largely carried out by contractors at each site. GAO has designated contract management of major projects (i.e., those $750 million or more) at DOE and NNSA as a high risk area. Progress has been made, but GAO continues to identify security and safety problems at DOE and NNSA sites as well as project and contract management problems related to cost and schedule overruns on major projects.
This testimony addresses DOE's and NNSA's oversight of (1) security performance, (2) safety performance, and (3) project and contract management in the nuclear security enterprise. It is based on prior GAO reports issued from August 2000 to December 2012.
DOE and NNSA continue to act on the numerous recommendations GAO has made to improve management of the nuclear security enterprise. GAO will continue to monitor DOE's and NNSA's implementation of these recommendations.

What GAO Found

The Department of Energy (DOE) and the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), a separately organized agency within DOE, continue to face challenges in ensuring that oversight of security activities is effective. For example, in July 2012, after three trespassers gained access to the protected security area directly adjacent to one of the nation's most critically important nuclear weapon-related facilities, the Y-12 National Security Complex, DOE and NNSA took a number of immediate actions. These actions included repairing security equipment, reassigning key security personnel, and firing the Y-12 protective force contractor. As GAO and others have reported, DOE has a long history of security breakdowns and an equally long history of instituting remedies to fix these problems. For example, 10 years ago, GAO reported on inconsistencies among NNSA sites on how they assess contractors' security activities and, since that time, DOE has undertaken security initiatives to address these issues. GAO is currently evaluating these security reform initiatives.
DOE and NNSA continue to face challenges in ensuring that oversight of safety performance activities is effective. DOE and NNSA have experienced significant safety problems at their sites, and recent efforts to reform safety protocols and processes have not demonstrated sustained improvements. Long-standing DOE and NNSA management weaknesses have contributed to persistent safety problems at NNSA's national laboratories. For example, in October 2007, GAO reported that nearly 60 serious accidents or near misses had occurred at NNSA's national laboratories since 2000. DOE has undertaken a number of reforms to address persistent safety concerns. For example, in March 2010, the Deputy Secretary of Energy announced a reform effort to revise DOE's safety and security directives. However, GAO reported in September 2012 that DOE's safety reforms did not fully address continuing safety concerns that GAO and others identified in the areas of quality assurance, safety culture, and federal oversight and, in fact, may have actually weakened independent oversight.
DOE and NNSA have made progress but need to make further improvements to their contract and project management efforts. DOE has made progress in managing nonmajor projects--those costing less than $750 million--and in recognition of this progress, GAO narrowed the focus of its high-risk designation of DOE's Office of Environmental Management (EM) and NNSA to major contracts and projects. Specifically, as GAO noted in its December 2012 report on 71 DOE EM and NNSA nonmajor projects, GAO found the use of some sound management practices that were helping ensure successful project completion. However, major projects continue to pose a challenge for DOE and NNSA. For example, in December 2012, GAO reported that the estimated cost to construct the Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant in Washington State had tripled to $12.3 billion since its inception in 2000, and the scheduled completion date had slipped by nearly a decade to 2019. Also, in March 2012, GAO reported that a now-deferred NNSA project to construct a new plutonium facility in Los Alamos, New Mexico, could cost as much as $5.8 billion, a nearly six-fold cost increase.