Intelligence Community Reports Uncertainties regarding Key Aspects of Chemical and Biological Threat

The intelligence community is struggling with the changing security  environment, including gaining agreement on issues such as how best to  provide decision makers with a more candid recognition of the significant  uncertainties in its ability to assess the chemical and biological threat. Generally, the two primary chemical and biological threats facing DOD  installations are from adversarial nations using missiles with chemical or  biological warheads and from terrorists using explosive devices or other  means to release and spread chemical or biological agents. Such uncertainty  raises questions about the operational impact that might be sustained  during an attack and the actual threat posed by our adversaries, and is  thus critical information for officials making risk management decisions  on investments to protect U.S. forces. However, while the intelligence  community has been able to work together and issue a new 2006 National  Intelligence Estimate assessing and recognizing the uncertainties in the  biological warfare threat to help decision makers, it has not been able to  issue a revised national intelligence estimate on the chemical warfare  threat since 2002. For example, while DOD guidance encourages  the use of collective protection, it does not prescribe specific criteria to  guide strategic decisions on its use. Similarly, we also found collective  protection equipment shortages and inconsistent guidance affected some  major expeditionary warfighting assets, such as infantry units, naval  vessels, and medical units. The intelligence uncertainties and vague and  inconsistent guidance all combine to make it difficult for commanders to  make clear risk management assessments of the need for collective  protection and the risks of not providing it. Moreover, two-thirds of the critical sites in high threat areas did not  receive collective protection. While collective protection was limited in all commands, it was also not  consistently fielded in high threat areas. The Air Force provided all 10 of the critical sites on its  air bases in this country with collective protection, but critical air bases in  another nearby country did not have collective protection despite also  being in range of missile attack by the hostile neighbor. 2). 3). In a 2004 report, we recommended that  DOD designate a single authority with responsibility for unifying and  coordinating installation protection policies. However, despite DOD’s  agreement with that recommendation it has not yet implemented it. For example, the combatant commanders have  no programs of their own to fund improvements at overseas facilities  important to their warfighting needs. To ensure that the problems in the overall installation protection and  collective protection policies and programs do not continue to place  military personnel and operations at increased risk and undercut the  efficiency and effectiveness of DOD resource allocations, we are  recommending that the Secretary of Defense—as part of the ongoing  reorganization—take the following four actions to ensure better  coordination and integration of these activities and clearer guidance on  key operating concepts. To help ensure clear and consistent guidance in the chemical and  biological collective protection program, we are recommending that the  Secretary of Defense    direct the Joint Staff and military services to develop clear and  consistent criteria to guide overarching strategic decisions on the use  of collective protection at DOD facilities, including issues such as  whether decisions on the need for collective protection should be  prescribed or left to commanders’ discretion, the use of integrated  overpressure and filtration systems versus portable structures, and  what mission functions must be protected, and     direct the Joint Staff and military services to review their current  policies and, where appropriate, develop consistent requirements on  when collective protection is required for medical units, and naval,  ground, and air forces. We encourage DOD to make this recommendation directly to  the Director of National Intelligence. Our method of  quantifying the critical sites counted the number of individual buildings  identified as critical sites on DOD installations, when identified separately  by DOD officials. To determine the levels of collective protection provided to major  expeditionary warfighting assets, such as ground forces, naval vessels, and  aircraft, we reviewed DOD’s Annual Report on Chemical and Biological  Defense Programs and interviewed contractors and officials from each  service component, the Tank and Automotive Command, and the Joint  Program Executive Office for Chemical and Biological Defense to obtain  detailed listings of the type and amount of collective protection equipment  currently fielded by each service component. To examine DOD’s framework for managing overall installation protection  activities and for prioritizing critical installations for funding, we reviewed  applicable regulations, policies, and prior GAO and DOD reports and  interviewed officials from a variety of DOD offices responsible for  program management and oversight.
Why GAO Did This Study

For the military to operate in environments contaminated by chemical and biological warfare agents, the Department of Defense (DOD) has developed collective protection equipment to provide a protected environment for group activities. GAO previously reported persistent problems in providing collective protection for U.S. forces in high threat areas overseas. In this report, GAO examined (1) current intelligence assessments of chemical and biological threats, (2) the extent to which DOD has provided collective protection at critical overseas facilities and major expeditionary warfighting assets, and (3) DOD's framework for managing installation protection policies and prioritizing critical installations for funding. In conducting this review, GAO developed criteria to identify critical sites in the absence of a DOD priority listing of such sites in overseas high threat areas--areas at high risk of terrorist or missile attack.

What GAO Found

The intelligence community is struggling with the changing security environment and communicating the uncertainties in the quality of chemical and biological threat information. Generally, the two key chemical and biological threats facing DOD forces are from hostile nations using missiles, or terrorist groups (e.g., Al Qaeda) using devices to release chemical or biological agents. DOD expects these threats to grow. The intelligence community has recognized the need to communicate more candidly about the uncertainties in intelligence regarding the type and amount of agents, the number of missiles likely armed with chemical and biological warheads, and the method of dissemination. Communicating these uncertainties helps in understanding the actual threat posed by our adversaries and in making risk management decisions on investments. However, while the intelligence community, under the Director of National Intelligence, has issued a new 2006 intelligence estimate regarding the uncertainties in the biological warfare threat, it has not issued an update on the chemical warfare threat since 2002 due to evolving assessment and communication policies. Despite the growing threat, collective protection at both critical overseas facilities and in some major expeditionary warfighting assets (e.g., infantry units, naval vessels, and medical units) is limited and inconsistent. Nearly 80 percent of overseas sites identified as critical by combatant commanders based on criteria GAO provided them, did not have collective protection equipment--including about two-thirds of the critical sites in high threat areas. At the same time, GAO found problems such as often vague and inconsistent guidance on the use of collective protection. DOD guidance encourages the use of collective protection but does not prescribe specific standards to guide strategic decisions on its use. Military service guidance, except the Air Force, was also vague and inconsistent on key issues such as (1) whether decisions on the need for the equipment should be left to local commanders' discretion, (2) when the various types of collective protection are most appropriate, and (3) what functions need to be protected. Thus, commanders have difficulty determining the need for collective protection. DOD's framework for managing collective protection and other related installation protection policies and activities is fragmented, which affects DOD's ability to ensure that collective protection resources are allocated efficiently and effectively. Prior GAO and DOD reports have highlighted continuing problems with fragmented policies and operating concepts among the many and varied programs and organizations involved. These problems result in unresolved conflict about issues, such as which critical facilities should receive priority for funding improvements, and make it difficult for DOD to balance competing warfighting and other needs and ensure that funding resources are prudently allocated. Previously, GAO and others have recommended DOD designate a single authority to integrate and coordinate installation protection policies and activities, and DOD agreed. However, despite a new ongoing reorganization, it has not yet done so.