As noted in figure 2, during the week ending March 3, 2015, 28 percent of  passengers nationwide received expedited screening were issued TSA  PreTM boarding passes, but were provided expedited screening in a  standard screening lane, meaning that they did not have to remove their  shoes, belts, and light outerwear, but they had to divest their liquids, gels,  and laptops. TSA Uses Three Methods to Assess Risk for Participation in Expedited Screening

As we found in 2014, TSA determines a passenger’s eligibility for or  opportunity to experience expedited screening at the airport using one of  three risk assessment methods. Passenger Eligibility based on TSA PreTM Lists of Known Travelers

TSA has determined that the individuals included on the TSA PreTM lists  of known travelers are low risk by virtue of their membership in a specific  group or based on group vetting requirements. TSA determined that active duty military members  were low risk and appropriate candidates to receive expedited screening  because the Department of Defense administers common background  checks of its members. Passenger Eligibility Based on Real Time Threat Assessments Using Managed Inclusion Process

As we found in December 2014, Managed Inclusion is designed to  provide expedited screening to passengers not deemed low risk prior to  arriving at the airport. In  addition, TSA developed Managed Inclusion to improve the efficiency of  dedicated TSA PreTM screening lanes as well as to help TSA reach its  internal goal of providing expedited screening to at least 25 percent of  passengers by the end of calendar year 2013. Specifically, these layers include  (1) the Secure Flight vetting TSA performs to identify high-risk  passengers required to undergo enhanced screening at the checkpoint  and to ensure these passengers are not directed to TSA PreTM  expedited screening lanes, (2) a randomization process that TSA uses to  include passengers into TSA PreTM screening lanes who otherwise were  not eligible for expedited screening, (3) BDOs who observe passengers  and look for certain high-risk behaviors, (4) canine teams and ETD  devices that help ensure that passengers have not handled explosive  materials prior to travel, and (5) an unpredictable screening process  involving walk-through metal detectors in expedited screening lanes that  randomly select a percentage of passengers for additional screening. In our November 2013 report on TSA’s behavior  detection and analysis program, we concluded that although TSA had  taken several positive steps to validate the scientific basis and strengthen  program management of behavior detection and analysis program, TSA  had not demonstrated that BDOs can reliably and effectively identify high- risk passengers who may pose a threat to the U.S. aviation system. Further we analyzed the extent to which TSA deployed  canine teams using a risk-based approach and determined their  effectiveness prior to deployment. As a result of this work, we  recommended in January 2013, among other things, that TSA take  actions to comprehensively assess the effectiveness of canine teams. TSA Has Not Tested the Overall Effectiveness of the Managed Inclusion Process

As we reported in December 2014, according to TSA, it designed the  Managed Inclusion process using a layered approach to security when  providing expedited screening to passengers via Managed Inclusion. We reported in  2014 that according to officials, TSA anticipated that testing would begin  in October 2014 and estimated that testing could take 12 to 18 months to  complete. TSA scheduled a pilot for testing BDOs  which was set to begin October 2014 and run through May 2015. Further,  the schedule TSA provided indicates that a proof of concept for Canine  Covert Testing was scheduled for November 2014 and that operational  testing of canines was scheduled to begin in June 2015 and be  completed in March 2016. We have previously reported on challenges TSA has faced in designing  studies and protocols to test the effectiveness of security systems and  programs in accordance with established methodological practices. In our December 2014 report we concluded that ensuring the planned  effectiveness testing of the Managed Inclusion process adheres to  established evaluation design practices would help TSA provide  reasonable assurance that the effectiveness testing will yield reliable  results. As a result, we recommended that to ensure that TSA’s  planned testing yields reliable results, the TSA Administrator take steps to  ensure that TSA’s planned effectiveness testing of the Managed Inclusion  process adheres to established evaluation design practices. DHS  concurred with our recommendations and began taking steps to ensure  that its planned effectiveness testing of the Managed Inclusion process  adheres to established evaluation practices.
Why GAO Did This Study

In 2011, TSA began providing expedited screening to selected passengers and has expanded the availability of such screening to increasing numbers of passengers as part of its overall emphasis on risk-based security. Passengers who qualify for expedited screening enjoy varying levels of benefits, including not having to remove their shoes, light outerwear, jackets, belts, liquids, gels and laptops for X-ray screening at airport security checkpoints. By determining passenger risk prior to travel, TSA intended to focus its screening resources on higher-risk passengers while expediting screening for lower-risk passengers. Further, TSA developed the Managed Inclusion process, designed to provide expedited screening to passengers not deemed low risk prior to arriving at the airport.
This testimony addresses (1) how TSA assesses the risk of passengers to determine their eligibility to receive expedited screening and (2) the extent to which TSA determined the effectiveness of its Managed Inclusion process. This statement is based on a report GAO issued in December 2014 and selected updates from March 2015. Among other things, GAO analyzed TSA policies and procedures and interviewed TSA security officials.

What GAO Found

The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) implemented its expedited screening program—known as TSA Pre✓ TM —in 2011.TSA uses the following methods to assess whether a passenger is low risk and therefore eligible for expedited screening.
(1) Approved TSA Pre✓ TM lists of known travelers —These lists are comprised of individuals whom TSA has determined to be low risk by virtue of their membership in a specific group, such as active duty military members, or based on group vetting requirements.
(2) Automated TSA Pre✓ TM risk assessments of all passengers —Using these assessments, TSA assigns passengers scores based upon information available to TSA to identify low risk passengers eligible for expedited screening for a specific flight prior to the passengers' arrival at the airport.
(3) Real-time threat assessments through Managed Inclusion —These assessments use several layers of security, including procedures that randomly select passengers for expedited screening, behavior detection officers who observe passengers to identify high-risk behaviors, and either passenger screening canine teams or explosives trace detection devices to help ensure that passengers selected for expedited screening have not handled explosive material. TSA developed Managed Inclusion as a tool to improve the efficiency of dedicated TSA Pre✓ TM screening lanes as well as to help TSA reach its internal goal of providing expedited screening to at least 25 percent of passengers by the end of calendar year 2013.
TSA has tested the effectiveness of individual Managed Inclusion security layers and determined that each layer provides effective security. However, GAO has previously identified challenges in several of the layers used in the Managed Inclusion process, raising concerns regarding their effectiveness. For example, in November 2013, GAO found that TSA had not demonstrated that behavioral indicators can be used to reliably and effectively identify passengers who may pose a threat to aviation security. TSA is taking steps to revise and test the behavior detection program, but the issue remains open. In December 2014, GAO reported that TSA planned to begin testing Managed Inclusion as an overall system in October 2014 and TSA estimated that testing could take 12 to 18 months to complete. GAO has previously reported on challenges TSA has faced in designing studies to test the security effectiveness of other programs in accordance with established methodological practices such as ensuring an adequate sample size or randomly selecting items in a study to ensure the results can be generalizable—key features of established evaluation design practices. In March 2015, TSA officials noted that a pilot for testing behavior detection officers was scheduled to run from October 2014 through May 2015, and testing of canines was scheduled to begin in June 2015 and be completed in March 2016. Ensuring its planned testing of the Managed Inclusion process adheres to established evaluation design practices will help TSA provide reasonable assurance that the testing will yield reliable results.

What GAO Recommends

In its December 2014 report, GAO recommended that TSA take steps to ensure and document that its planned testing of the Managed Inclusion process adheres to established evaluation design practices. DHS concurred with GAO's recommendation and is taking action to address it.