While military forces are considered indispensable for establishinginitial security and often are also used to maintain law and order in peacekeeping and related"stability" or "stabilization" operations designed to normalize conditions in post-conflict and post-interventionenvironments, their use is often controversial. (4) While its provisions were left largely unimplemented by the Clinton Administration, (5) the directiveremains in effect under the Bush Administration, which has begun implementing some measures.The other was the United Nations' August 2000 "Brahimi Panel" report, (6) which dealt with problemsof U.N. peacekeeping operations in general, but also contained four specific recommendations toaddress problems with the U.N. civilian police system, particularly in the areas of recruitment,training, and deployment of international civilian police personnel. 2616 ; (2) the diversification of international police forces ascurrently constituted, including the establishment of units of police with military skills (i.e.,"constabulary forces") to handle hostile situations such as crowd control (as is suggested for NATOunder H.R. This report maybe updated if warranted. Some analysts urge the eventual deployment of sizable contingents of international civilian policeto Afghanistan (where the United States, Germany, and the United Kingdom are now working torecreate an indigenous police force) to Iraq (where the United States and Jordan are doing the same),and to Haiti. Thesegaps can be particularly troublesome in situations where not all parties to the conflict are dedicatedto peace or where criminal networks have taken root, and where local authority has been removedor replaced by an international intervention. In these cases, the police deployed often lack the necessary skills to handle the situation,in particular the military skills needed to carry out constabulary functions in hostile situations, andinvestigative and intelligence-gathering skills to deal with organized crime. The third is the institution gap , where the indigenous law enforcement system lacks adequate numbers of honest and efficient judicial and penal personnel, as well as sound judicialand penal institutions, and thus are unable to effectively follow-up to police work with prosecutionand punishment necessary for sustainable security. Member States contribute police personnel on a voluntary basis, following a United Nations Security Council resolutionauthorizing a peacekeeping operation. While asserting that the"training and preparedness of individuals and units being supplied to coalition peace operationsshould remain a national responsibility," PDD-71 recognized that "international organizations orother organizing bodies may need to supplement national training from time to time." Although many U.N. Manyanalysts emphasize a continued need to improve the current system, even though perceptions aboutthe U.S. civilian police program have become more positive with ongoing improvements over thelast few years. Police capabilities would include both civil status and police forces, capable ofperforming constabulary functions. 1414: Reform of U.N. Increase International Capability for Constabulary Forces. ( H.R. Most recently, in a bookpublished by the United States Institute for Peace, Perito outlines a comprehensive proposal forintegrating military and civilian personnel to form a "U.S. force for stability" that would constitutepart of U.S. intervention forces (86) In a lessextensive work on the same subject, Perito and a co-author stated that this proposal constitutes "a new approach topost-conflict intervention" that wouldclose security gaps and break the cycle of impunity caused by a law enforcement authority vacuumin the post-conflict period. If, as with the U.S. military reserve component, law enforcement and rule of lawpersonnel are to commit to deploy immediately when called, they may require the type of benefits(i.e., pension, salaries for regular training) such as members of the U.S. military reserve componentreceive.
One of the most crucial and difficult tasks in peacekeeping and related stability operations is creating a secure and stable environment, both for the foreign peacekeepers and for the indigenouspopulation. During the past decade, the United States and the international community have triedvarious approaches to providing that security. Most of these approaches have included the use ofUnited Nations International Civilian Police (UNCIVPOL), whose forces are contributed on a caseby case basis by U.N. Member states. (While other countries usually contribute police personnelfrom their own national forces, the United States contracts those it contributes through a privatecorporation.) In a few cases, such as Afghanistan and Iraq at this time, coalition and U.S. militaryforces, and not the United Nations, train and work with indigenous police forces to provide security.
Despite continuing improvements over the past decade, the current system has several drawbacks. UNCIVPOL has been unable to provide an adequate number of well-trained policemenfor individual operations and to deploy them rapidly. Their police forces experience a lack ofconsistency in the type and levels of training and a shortage of needed skills. Military forces, on theother hand, are usually not trained to deal effectively with police situations. These deficiencies leadto three gaps that impede the establishment of law and order, particularly those cases where not allparties to the conflict are dedicated to peace or where criminal networks have taken root. The firstis the deployment gap, when international police are not available as quickly as needed. The secondis the enforcement gap, where those deployed lack necessary skills, in particular combined militaryand policing "constabulary" skills, as well as investigative and intelligence-gathering skills to dealwith organized crime. The third is the institution gap, where competent judicial and penal personnelare needed to provide follow-up services to police work.
Policymakers have long recognized these problems. In February 2000, the Clinton Administration sought to remedy them through Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 71's broadpolicy reforms and guidelines. Although it did not allocate or request the necessary resources foreffective implementation, the Bush Administration is implementing some provisions. In August2000, the U.N. Brahimi Panel report proposed several remedies to improve the U.N. civilian policesystem, as did another report by contributing nations. Some are being implemented.
Three pending bills would address policing and related capabilities for peacekeeping and stability operations. H.R. 1414 would establish a rapidly deployable U.N. civilianpolice corps. H.R. 2616 calls for NATO to establish a security component to be usedin post-conflict reconstruction environments and a U.S. police reserve for use in internationaloperations. S. 2127 provides for the United States to develop a corps of rapidlydeployable personnel, of which rule of law personnel may be a part. Related options recommendedby experts include improving training, increasing international constabulary capabilities, anddeveloping a "stability force" to supplement police with judicial and prison personnel. This reportmay be updated if warranted.