	Background

Since 2003, the United States has provided about $19.2 billion to develop  the Iraqi security forces, first under the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction  Fund (IRRF) and later through the Iraq Security Forces Fund (ISFF). DOD and MNF-I Have Not Specified Which DOD Equipment Accountability Procedures Apply to the Train-and-Equip Program for Iraq

As of July 2007, DOD and MNF-I had not specified which DOD equipment  accountability procedures, if any, apply to the train-and-equip program for  Iraq. Congress funded the train-and-equip program for Iraq under IRRF  and ISFF but outside traditional security assistance programs, which,  according to DOD officials, allowed DOD a large degree of flexibility in  managing the program. DOD officials  stated that, since the funding did not go through traditional security  assistance programs, the DOD accountability requirements normally  applicable to these programs—including the registration of small arms  transferred to foreign governments—did not apply. 2). First, until December 2005,  MNSTC-I did not maintain a centralized record of all equipment  distributed to Iraqi security forces. Second, MNSTC-I has not consistently  collected supporting documents that confirm the dates the equipment was  received, the quantities of equipment delivered, or the Iraqi units receiving  the equipment. At that time, they also attempted to recover past records. We identified  discrepancies between data reported by the former MNSTC-I commander  and MNSTC-I property book records (see fig. Our analysis of the  MNSTC-I property book records found that DOD and MNF-I cannot fully  account for at least 190,000 weapons reported as issued to Iraqi forces as  of September 22, 2005. According to MNSTC-I officials who rotated in country in June  2006, the command began to place greater emphasis on collecting  documentation of Iraqi receipt of equipment. Furthermore, the property books consist of extensive electronic  spreadsheets—the January 2007 property book records for the Ministry of  Defense contained 227 columns and 5,342 rows. MNSTC-I officials also have acknowledged that the spreadsheet system is  an inefficient management tool given the large size of the program, large  amount of data, and limited number of personnel available to maintain the  system. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

This report (1) examines the property accountability procedures that the  Department of Defense (DOD) and Multinational Force-Iraq (MNF-I) may  have applied to the U.S. train-and-equip program for Iraq and (2) assesses  whether DOD and MNF-I can account for the U.S.-funded equipment  issued to Iraqi security forces. We reviewed MNF-I’s accountability procedures for the U.S.-funded  equipment it has issued to the Iraqi security forces, and we reviewed  documentation from and interviewed current and former officials with the  U.S. Central Command, MNF-I, MNSTC-I, and MNC-I in Baghdad, Iraq;  Tampa, Florida; Washington, D.C.; and Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.
Why GAO Did This Study

Since 2003, the United States has provided about $19.2 billion to develop Iraqi security forces. The Department of Defense (DOD) recently requested an additional $2 billion to continue this effort. Components of the Multinational Force-Iraq (MNF-I), including the Multinational Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I), are responsible for implementing the U.S. program to train and equip Iraqi forces. This report (1) examines the property accountability procedures DOD and MNF-I applied to the U.S. train-and-equip program for Iraq and (2) assesses whether DOD and MNF-I can account for the U.S.-funded equipment issued to the Iraqi security forces. To accomplish these objectives, GAO reviewed MNSTC-I property books as of January 2007 and interviewed current and former officials from DOD and MNF-I.

What GAO Found

As of July 2007, DOD and MNF-I had not specified which DOD accountability procedures, if any, apply to the train-and-equip program for Iraq. Congress funded the train-and-equip program for Iraq outside traditional security assistance programs, providing DOD a large degree of flexibility in managing the program, according to DOD officials. These officials stated that since the funding did not go through traditional security assistance programs, the DOD accountability requirements normally applicable to these programs did not apply. Further, MNF-I does not currently have orders that comprehensively specify accountability procedures for equipment distributed to the Iraqi forces. DOD and MNF-I cannot fully account for Iraqi forces' receipt of U.S.-funded equipment. Two factors led to this lapse in accountability. First, MNSTC-I did not maintain a centralized record of all equipment distributed to Iraqi forces before December 2005. At that time, MNSTC-I established a property book system to track issuance of equipment to the Iraqi forces and attempted to recover past records. GAO found a discrepancy of at least 190,000 weapons between data reported by the former MNSTC-I commander and the property books. Former MNSTC-I officials stated that this lapse was due to insufficient staff and the lack of a fully operational distribution network, among other reasons. Second, since the beginning of the program, MNSTC-I has not consistently collected supporting records confirming the dates the equipment was received, the quantities of equipment delivered, or the Iraqi units receiving the items. Since June 2006, the command has placed greater emphasis on collecting the supporting documents. However, GAO's review of the January 2007 property books found continuing problems with missing and incomplete records. Further, the property books consist of extensive electronic spreadsheets, which are an inefficient management tool given the large amount of data and limited personnel to maintain the system.