Federal Agencies Use a Layered Security Strategy to Identify and Address Foreign Seafarer Risks; Opportunities Exist for CBP to Enhance Inspection Methods

		State Department Screens Seafarers Applying for Visas

The State Department’s visa adjudication process is the first layer of  security implemented by federal agencies to prevent terrorists, certain  criminals, or otherwise inadmissible aliens from gaining entry into the  United States. Within DHS, CBP and Coast Guard Conduct Advance-Screening, Inspections, and Enforcement Operations

			Before Vessel’s Arrival, CBP and Coast Guard Screen Manifests and Assess Risks

Before a commercial vessel’s arrival, both CBP and Coast Guard are to  receive and screen advance information on commercial vessels scheduled  to arrive at U.S. ports. CBP conducts almost all cargo vessel admissibility inspections on board  the vessel without the benefit of tools—such as mobile passport readers— for electronically verifying a seafarer’s identity or immigration status. DHS has recommended that DHS components electronically verify all  immigration status determinations. A CBP headquarters official  reported that the primary challenge in deploying mobile biometrics  readers or other tools for electronically verifying the identity of seafarers  is a lack of available connectivity to network communications in the  maritime environment. However, according to the  DHS S&T proposal, it is expected to take several years before this  technology can be made available for use by DHS agencies, such as CBP. DHS Faces Challenges in Ensuring Absconder and Deserter Records Are Accurate and Reliable and Has Not Adjusted Related Civil Monetary Penalties, as Required by Law

		DHS Lacks Accurate and Reliable Data on Absconder and Deserter Incidents

CBP has primary responsibility for identifying and reporting absconder  and deserter incidents at U.S. seaports—both to Coast Guard and other  federal and local law enforcement stakeholders—and for tracking them in  CBP database systems. Because of these variances, CBP’s data  are of undetermined reliability. As a result, although DHS has  identified illegal entry into the United States as a great concern, it is  unclear how reliable the department’s records of such events are for  determining the extent of the activity and informing its strategic and  tactical planning for addressing it. CBP has not met legal requirements for adjusting these civil penalties for  inflation. For fiscal years 2005 through 2009, CBP reported assessing civil  monetary penalties in 320 cases involving a total of 508 individual  seafarers. CBP and the Department of Justice (DOJ) share responsibility for issuing  regulations pertaining to these civil penalties. ILO 185 Implementation Is Limited; the United States Has Not Ratified Convention Due to Visa Requirement Concern

		As of January 2011, ILO 185 Is Not Widely Ratified or Implemented, and Key ILO Mechanisms to Promote Compliance Are Not in Place

International implementation of ILO 185 has been limited to date—since  its adoption in 2003 18 countries representing approximately 30 percent of  the global seafarer supply have ratified it, and of that number, only 4 have  been confirmed to issue ILO 185 seafarers’ identity documents (SIDs),  according to a senior ILO official and an ILO meeting document. U.S. Voted to Adopt ILO 185, but Did Not Ratify Due to Visa Provisions

As of January 2011, the United States had not ratified ILO 185 largely due  to concerns over a provision for facilitating visa-free shore leave for  foreign seafarers arriving in U.S. seaports with ILO 185 credentials. While CBP and DOJ reported  taking steps to meet requirements for inflation adjustment, the agencies  have not developed a plan including timelines for issuing required  regulation. We recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security:    direct the Commissioner of CBP to assess the national-security and other  risks faced by CBP in the absence of technology to provide electronic  verification as part of CBP’s admissibility inspections for cargo vessel  seafarers and identify options for addressing these risks and their costs;    direct the Commandant of the Coast Guard and Commissioner of CBP to:    determine the reasons that absconder and deserter data varies between  headquarters and field units, and between the Coast Guard and CBP  and determine any actions necessary to address any variance; and  jointly establish an interagency process for sharing and reconciling  records of absconder and deserter incidents occurring at U.S. seaports. Regarding our recommendation that the Secretary of Homeland Security  and the Attorney General of the United States develop a plan with  timelines for issuing regulations, as required by the Inflation Adjustment  Act, to adjust civil monetary penalties associated with violations of the  Immigration and Nationality Act involving foreign seafarers gaining illegal  entry into the United States and provide this plan to Congress, both DHS  and DOJ concurred. However, it remains important that the two departments develop a  plan with timelines for completing these actions and provide this  information to Congress. Maritime Security: DHS Progress and Challenges in Key Areas of Port  Security. 9, 2010.
Why GAO Did This Study

The State Department and two components of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and the Coast Guard, are responsible for preventing illegal immigration at U.S. seaports and identifying individuals who are potential security risks. The International Labor Organization (ILO) adopted the Seafarers' Identity Documents Convention (ILO 185) to establish an international framework of seafarer identification documents and reduce their vulnerability to fraud and exploitation. GAO was asked to examine (1) measures federal agencies take to address risks posed by foreign seafarers and the challenges, if any, DHS faces; (2) the challenges, if any, DHS faces in tracking illegal entries by foreign seafarers and how it enforces penalties; and (3) the implementation status of ILO 185. GAO reviewed relevant requirements and agency documents on maritime security, interviewed federal and industry officials, and visited seven seaports based on volume of seafarer arrivals. The visits provided insights, but were not projectable to all seaports.

What GAO Found

Federal agencies use a layered security strategy to address foreign seafarer risks, but opportunities exist to enhance DHS seafarer inspection methods. Federal actions include: (1) State Department screening of seafarer non-immigrant visa applicants overseas and (2) DHS advance screening of commercial vessels' seafarer manifests and admissibility inspections of all arriving seafarers. CBP conducts cargo vessel admissibility inspections on board the vessel without the benefit of tools to electronically verify a seafarer's identity or immigration status because of a lack of available connectivity to network communications in the maritime environment. DHS has prioritized the acquisition of a mobile version of this technology capability but expects it to take several years before the technology is developed and available. CBP agrees that obtaining this capability is important but has not assessed the risks of not having it. Until CBP obtains the capability, identifying the risks and options to address them could better position CBP in preventing illegal immigration at seaports. DHS faces challenges in ensuring it has reliable data on illegal entries by foreign seafarers at U.S. seaports and has not adjusted related civil monetary penalties. First, both CBP and Coast Guard track the frequency of absconder (a seafarer CBP has ordered detained on board a vessel in port, but who departs a vessel without permission) and deserter (a seafarer CBP grants permission to leave a vessel, but who does not return when required) incidents at U.S. seaports, but the records of these incidents varied considerably. The Coast Guard reported 73 percent more absconders and almost double the deserters compared to CBP for fiscal years 2005 through 2009. As a result, the data DHS uses to inform its strategic and tactical plans are of undetermined reliability. Second, CBP is responsible for imposing civil monetary penalties on vessel operators whose seafarers illegally enter the United States; however, as of December 2010, CBP and DOJ had not met legal requirements for adjusting the penalties for inflation. Officials reported taking steps to meet these requirements, but have not developed a plan with timelines for doing so. Such a plan would better position CBP and DOJ to demonstrate progress to comply with legal requirements. International implementation of ILO 185 has been limited--18 countries, representing 30 percent of the global seafarer supply, have ratified ILO 185--and key ILO mechanisms to promote compliance are not expected to be in place until later this year. As of January 2011, the United States had not ratified ILO 185 largely due to concerns over a provision for facilitating visa-free shore leave for foreign seafarers. Perspectives varied among the four federal agencies GAO interviewed within DHS and the departments of State, Transportation, and Labor. Within DHS, the Coast Guard reported that it supported U.S. ratification, while CBP stated that ILO 185's lack of oversight did not serve U.S. law enforcement interests. The U.S. has recently undertaken an interagency review to consider ratification but has no timeline for completion.

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that DHS assess risks of not electronically verifying cargo vessel seafarers for admissibility, identify reasons for absconder and deserter data variances, and, with the Department of Justice (DOJ), develop a plan with timelines to adjust civil monetary penalties for inflation. DHS and DOJ concurred with GAO's recommendations.