	Introduction

		Issue For Congress

The Bush Administration identified transformation as a major goal for the Department of Defense (DOD) soon after taking office, and initially justified many of its proposals for DOD on the grounds that they are needed for defense transformation. Although defense transformation is still discussed in administration defense-policy documents and budget-justification materials, the concept is now less prominent in discussions of U.S. defense policy and programs than it was during the earlier years of the Bush Administration. Overall Vision

In general, the Administration's vision for defense transformation calls for placing increased emphasis in U.S. defense planning on the following: irregular warfare (including terrorism, insurgencies, and civil war), potential catastrophic security threats (such as the possession and possible use of weapons of mass destruction by terrorists and rogue states), and potential disruptive events (such as the emergence of new technologies that could undermine current U.S. military advantages). The Administration's vision for defense transformation calls for shifting the U.S. military away from a reliance on massed forces, sheer quantity of firepower, military services operating in isolation from one another, and attrition-style warfare, and toward a greater reliance on joint (i.e., integrated multi-service) operations, NCW, effects-based operations (EBO), speed and agility, and precision application of firepower. How Might It Affect the Defense Industrial Base? Potential Oversight Issues for Congress

		Transformation Under DOD's New Leadership

One potential oversight issue for Congress relating to defense transformation is how much DOD will continue to emphasize transformation, and how DOD's overall vision for transformation might change, as a result of Robert Gates succeeding Donald Rumsfeld as Secretary of Defense in December 2006. Other observers were concerned that the Administration invoked the term transformation as an all-purpose rhetorical tool for justifying its various proposals for DOD, whether they relate to transformation or not, and for encouraging minimal debate on those proposals by tying the concept of transformation to the urgent need to fight the war on terrorism.
The Bush Administration identified transformation as a major goal for the Department of Defense (DOD) soon after taking office, and initially justified many of its proposals for DOD on the grounds that they were needed for defense transformation. Although defense transformation is still discussed in administration defense-policy documents and budget-justification materials, the concept is now less prominent in discussions of U.S. defense policy and programs than it was during the earlier years of the Bush Administration.
The Administration's vision for defense transformation calls for placing increased emphasis in U.S. defense planning on the following: irregular warfare, including terrorism, insurgencies, and civil war; potential catastrophic security threats, such as the possession and possible use of weapons of mass destruction by terrorists and rogue states; and potential disruptive events, such as the emergence of new technologies that could undermine current U.S. military advantages. The Administration's vision for defense transformation calls for shifting U.S. military forces toward a greater reliance on joint operations, network-centric warfare, effects-based operations, speed and agility, and precision application of firepower. Transformation could affect the defense industrial base by transferring funding from "legacy" systems to transformational systems, and from traditional DOD contractors to firms that previously have not done much defense work.
Potential oversight issues for Congress regarding defense transformation include the potential for DOD transformation plans to change as a result of Robert Gates succeeding Donald Rumsfeld as Secretary of Defense; the merits of certain elements of DOD's transformation plan; overall leadership and management of transformation; experiments and exercises conducted in support of transformation; measures for creating a culture of innovation viewed as necessary to support transformation; the adequacy of information provided to Congress regarding transformation-related initiatives; and whether the Administration has invoked the term transformation as an all-purpose rhetorical tool for justifying its various proposals for DOD. This report will be updated as events warrant.