	The Overall Personnel Security Clearance Process

Multiple executive-branch agencies have key roles and responsibilities for  different steps of the federal government’s personnel security clearance  process. Investigators—often contractors—from Federal  Investigative Services within the Office of Personnel Management (OPM)  conduct these investigations for most of the federal government using  federal investigative standards and OPM internal guidance as criteria for  collecting background information on applicants. OPM provides the  resulting investigative reports to the requesting agencies for their internal  adjudicators, who use the information along with the federal adjudicative  guidelines to determine whether an applicant is eligible for a personnel  security clearance. In 2007, DOD and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence  (ODNI) formed the Joint Security Clearance Process Reform Team,  known as the Joint Reform Team, to improve the security clearance  process government-wide. Steps in the Personnel Security Clearance Process

In the first step of the personnel security clearance process, executive  branch officials determine the requirements of a federal civilian position,  including assessing the risk and sensitivity level associated with that  position, to determine whether it requires access to classified information  and, if required, the level of access. We recommended that the DNI issue policy and  guidance for the determination, review, and validation of requirements,  and ODNI concurred with those recommendations, stating that it  recognized the need to issue or clarify policy. Currently, OPM and ODNI  are in the process of issuing a joint revision to the regulations guiding  requirements determination. Once an applicant is selected for a position that requires a personnel  security clearance, the applicant must obtain a security clearance in order  to gain access to classified information. Once an individual has obtained a personnel security clearance and as  long as they remain in a position that requires access to classified  national security information, that individual is reinvestigated periodically  at intervals that are dependent on the level of security clearance. For  example, top secret clearance holders are reinvestigated every 5 years,  and secret clearance holders are reinvestigated every 10 years. To  promote oversight and positive outcomes, such as maximizing the  likelihood that individuals who are security risks will be scrutinized more  closely, we have emphasized, since the late 1990s, the need to build  and monitor quality throughout the personnel security clearance process. However, we have previously reported that executive branch agencies  have not fully developed and implemented metrics to measure quality in  key aspects of the personnel security clearance process, including: (1)  investigative reports; (2) adjudicative files; and (3) the reciprocity of  personnel security clearances, which is an agency’s acceptance of a  background investigation or clearance determination completed by any  authorized investigative or adjudicative executive branch agency. For example, in May 2009 we  reported that, with respect to DOD initial top secret clearances  adjudicated in July 2008, documentation was incomplete for most OPM  investigative reports. We independently estimated that 87 percent of  about 3,500 investigative reports that DOD adjudicators used to make  clearance decisions were missing at least one type of documentation  required by federal investigative standards. We also estimated that 12 percent of the 3,500 investigative  reports did not contain a required personal subject interview. As a result of  the incompleteness of OPM’s investigative reports on DOD personnel, we  recommended in May 2009 that OPM measure the frequency with which  its investigative reports meet federal investigative standards, so that the  executive branch can identify the factors leading to incomplete reports  and take corrective actions. For example, we  estimated in our 2009 review that 22 percent of the adjudicative files for  about 3,500 initial top secret clearances that were adjudicated favorably  did not contain all the required documentation, even though DOD  regulations require that adjudicators maintain a record of each favorable  and unfavorable adjudication decision and document the rationale for  granting clearance eligibility to applicants with security concerns revealed  during the investigation. In November 2009, DOD subsequently issued a  memorandum that established a tool to measure the frequency with which  adjudicative files meet the requirements of DOD regulation. Specifically,  the DOD memorandum stated that it would use a tool called the Review  of Adjudication Documentation Accuracy and Rationales, or RADAR, to  gather specific information about adjudication processes at the  adjudication facilities and assess the quality of adjudicative  documentation. In following up on our 2009 recommendations, as of  2012, a DOD official stated that RADAR had been used in fiscal year  2010 to evaluate some adjudications, but was not used in fiscal year 2011  due to funding shortfalls. DOD restarted the use of RADAR in fiscal year  2012. We also noted DOD’s efforts to develop and  implement tools to evaluate the quality of investigations and  adjudications. Failing to do so increases the  risk of damaging, unauthorized disclosures of classified information.
Why GAO Did This Study

A high-quality personnel security clearance process is necessary to minimize the associated risks of unauthorized disclosures of classified information and to help ensure that information about individuals with criminal activity or other questionable behavior is identified and assessed as part of the process for granting or retaining clearances. Personnel security clearances allow individuals access to classified information that, through unauthorized disclosure, can in some cases cause exceptionally grave damage to U.S. national security. In 2012, the DNI reported that more than 4.9 million federal government and contractor employees held or were eligible to hold a security clearance. GAO has reported that the federal government spent over $1 billion to conduct background investigations (in support of security clearances and suitability determinations--the consideration of character and conduct for federal employment) in fiscal year 2011.
This testimony addresses the (1) overall security clearance process, including roles and responsibilities; and (2) extent that executive branch agencies have metrics to help determine the quality of the security clearance process. This testimony is based on GAO work issued between 2008 and 2013 on DOD's personnel security clearance program and governmentwide suitability and security clearance reform efforts. As part of that work, GAO (1) reviewed statutes, federal guidance, and processes, (2) examined agency data on the timeliness and quality of investigations and adjudications, (3) assessed reform efforts, and (4) reviewed samples of case files for DOD personnel.

What GAO Found

Multiple executive branch agencies are responsible for different steps of the multi-phased personnel security clearance process that includes: determination of whether a position requires a clearance, application submission, investigation, and adjudication. Agency officials must first determine whether a federal civilian position requires access to classified information. The Director of National Intelligence (DNI) and the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) are in the process of issuing a joint revision to the regulations guiding this step in response to GAO's 2012 recommendation that the DNI issue policy and guidance for the determination, review, and validation of requirements. After an individual has been selected for a federal civilian position that requires a personnel security clearance and the individual submits an application for a clearance, investigators--often contractors--from OPM conduct background investigations for most executive branch agencies. Adjudicators from requesting agencies use the information from these investigations and consider federal adjudicative guidelines to determine whether an applicant is eligible for a clearance. Further, individuals are subject to reinvestigations at intervals that are dependent on the level of security clearance. For example, top secret and secret clearance holders are to be reinvestigated every 5 years and 10 years, respectively.
Executive branch agencies have not fully developed and implemented metrics to measure quality throughout the personnel security clearance process. For more than a decade, GAO has emphasized the need to build and monitor quality throughout the personnel security clearance process to promote oversight and positive outcomes such as maximizing the likelihood that individuals who are security risks will be scrutinized more closely. For example, GAO reported in May 2009 that, with respect to initial top secret clearances adjudicated in July 2008 for the Department of Defense (DOD), documentation was incomplete for most of OPM's investigative reports. GAO independently estimated that 87 percent of about 3,500 investigative reports that DOD adjudicators used to make clearance eligibility decisions were missing some required documentation, such as the verification of all of the applicant's employment. GAO also estimated that 12 percent of the 3,500 reports did not contain the required personal subject interview. In 2009, GAO recommended that OPM measure the frequency with which its investigative reports met federal investigative standards in order to improve the quality of investigation documentation. As of August 2013, however, OPM had not implemented this recommendation. GAO's 2009 report also identified issues with the quality of DOD adjudications. Specifically, GAO estimated that 22 percent of about 3,500 initial top secret clearances that were adjudicated favorably did not contain all the required documentation. As a result, in 2009 GAO recommended that DOD measure the frequency with which adjudicative files meet requirements. In November 2009, DOD issued a memorandum that established a tool called the Review of Adjudication Documentation Accuracy and Rationales (RADAR) to measure the frequency with which adjudicative files meet the requirements of DOD regulation. According to a DOD official, RADAR had been used in fiscal year 2010 to evaluate some adjudications, but was not used in fiscal year 2011 due to funding shortfalls. DOD restarted the use of RADAR in fiscal year 2012.