Federal employees may  undergo different levels of security screening at a federal building  depending on a variety of security-related factors unique to that building. FPS and USMS Face a Range of Challenges with Security Screening

FPS and USMS experience a range of challenges in their efforts to  provide effective security screening. These challenges include: (1) building characteristics and location that  may limit security options; (2) balancing security and public access; (3)  operating with limited resources; (4) working with multiple federal tenants;  and (5) effectively informing the public of prohibited items. Balancing Security and Public Access

Striking an appropriate balance between providing security at federal  buildings, and facilitating the public’s access to government offices for  services and other business transactions, continues to be a major  challenge, as we have reported in the past. FPS and USMS Have Taken Steps to Assess Screening, but Each Lacks a Strategic Approach for Using the Data Collected to Improve Performance

Both FPS and USMS have taken steps to assess their security screening  efforts such as conducting covert and intrusion tests and collecting data  on prohibited items. However, in fiscal years 2012 and  2013, for example, USMS data showed that court security officers passed  92 percent of intrusion tests on security screening. Although USMS tests  more frequently than FPS, it has been unable to meet its intrusion-test  frequency requirement per building each year. Overall, FPS and USMS may  use the results of covert and intrusion tests to address problems at the  individual building or FPS region or USMS district level, to some degree,  but they do not readily use the results to strategically assess performance  nationwide. Without a more  strategic approach to assessing performance, both FPS and USMS are  not well-positioned to improve security screening, identify trends and  lessons learned, and address the aforementioned challenges related to  screening in a complex security environment. In addition to testing security-screening procedures, FPS and USMS also  require protective security officers and court security officers to document  prohibited items identified during the screening process. In addition, we found  that in October 2012, FPS reduced the number of screening scenarios  that can be used for covert testing. For example, USMS reported that the intrusion-test passage rate for  security-screening tests improved from 83 percent in fiscal year 2010, to  91 percent in fiscal year 2011, and to 92 percent in fiscal years 2012 and  2013. Data on Prohibited Items Show Wide Variations in the Number of Items Detected across Buildings

As discussed earlier, aside from their efforts to conduct covert and  intrusion screening tests, FPS and USMS both collect data on prohibited  items that are detected through the screening process. For example, FPS  reported that in 2013, protective security officers detected approximately  700,000 prohibited items. The  benefits of using performance data in this manner are reflected in ISC  guidance, as well as key practices in security and internal control  standards that GAO has developed. Recommendations for Executive Action

We are making two recommendations—one to the Secretary of the  Department of Homeland Security and one to the Attorney General:  We recommend that the Secretary of the Department of Homeland  Security direct FPS to develop and implement a strategy for using covert- testing data and data on prohibited items to improve FPS’s security- screening efforts. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

This report focuses on security screening at General Services  Administration (GSA) buildings. To determine challenges federal entities face in their efforts to prevent  prohibited items and individuals who may pose a security threat from  entering GSA buildings, we interviewed GSA headquarters officials, FPS  and USMS officials responsible for security issues at the headquarters  level, FPS regional and USMS district level officials, and also officials at  the building level for our 11 selected GSA buildings. To determine actions federal entities have taken to assess the  effectiveness of their screening efforts and the results of these efforts, we  compared FPS’s and USMS’s efforts to comply with the Interagency  Security Committee’s (ISC) standards, including The Risk Management  Process for Federal Facilities and the Items Prohibited from Federal  Facilities. For example, we reviewed FPS  and USMS’s data on prohibited items from fiscal years 2004 through  2013.
Why GAO Did This Study

FPS and USMS conduct building security screening at thousands of GSA buildings across the country. Given continued concerns related to the security of federal buildings, GAO was asked to examine the: (1) challenges federal entities face in their efforts to prevent prohibited items and individuals who may pose a security threat from entering GSA buildings and (2) actions federal entities have taken to assess the effectiveness of their screening efforts, and the results of those actions. GAO conducted site visits to 11 selected buildings in three metropolitan areas based on a variety of criteria, including security level, agency officials' recommendations, and for FPS, possible inconsistencies in its data on prohibited items, and other factors. GAO analyzed FPS's and USMS's data, reviewed relevant documentation, and interviewed FPS and USMS officials in headquarters and the field.

What GAO Found

The Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Federal Protective Service (FPS) and the Department of Justice's (DOJ) United States Marshals Service (USMS) experience a range of challenges in their efforts to provide effective security screening, including:
Building characteristics and location may limit security options : many General Services Administration (GSA) buildings were designed and constructed before security screening became a priority.
Balancing security and public access : striking an appropriate balance between facilitating the public's access to government services and providing adequate security can be difficult, for example, when there is a high volume of visitors.
Operating with limited resources : some FPS protective security officers are not fully trained to conduct security screening, and FPS and USMS may have limited funding for additional training or additional security officers.
Working with multiple federal tenants : many tenant stakeholders at multi-tenant GSA buildings have differing needs and priorities that may not always align when trying to build consensus for security-screening decisions.
To assess security-screening efforts, both FPS and USMS have taken steps such as conducting covert and intrusion tests and collecting data on prohibited items. From fiscal years 2011 to 2013, FPS data show that protective security officers passed covert tests on security-screening procedures at a low rate. In October 2012, FPS reduced the number of screening scenarios used for covert testing, but has since reinstated some of them. USMS data show that court security officers passed intrusion tests on security screening at a higher rate. For example, USMS reported that court security officers passed 83 percent of intrusion tests on security screening in fiscal year 2010, 91 percent in fiscal year 2011, and 92 percent in fiscal years 2012 and 2013. Although USMS tests more frequently than FPS, it has not met its intrusion-test frequency requirement per building each year. In addition, FPS's and USMS's data on prohibited items show wide variations in the number of items identified across buildings. For example, FPS reported it had detected approximately 700,000 prohibited items in 2013; however, FPS data showed that there were 295 buildings with no reported data on prohibited items from fiscal years 2004 through 2013. While FPS and USMS may use the results of covert and intrusion tests to address problems at the individual building or FPS region or USMS district level, to some degree, they do not use the results to strategically assess performance nationwide. The benefits of using data in this manner are reflected in the Interagency Security Committee's (ISC) guidance, as well as key practices in security and internal control standards GAO has developed. Without a more strategic approach to assessing performance, both FPS and USMS are not well positioned to improve security screening nationwide, identify trends and lessons learned, and address the aforementioned challenges related to screening in a complex security environment.

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that FPS and USMS each develop and implement a strategy for using covert and intrusion testing, and prohibited-items data to improve security-screening efforts. Specifically, for FPS, the strategy would, among other things, help determine which covert testing scenarios to use. For USMS, the strategy would, among other things, help determine the appropriate frequency of intrusion testing. DHS and DOJ concurred with GAO's recommendations.