	Background

US-VISIT is a large, complex governmentwide program intended to    collect, maintain, and share information on certain foreign nationals  who enter and exit the United States;  identify foreign nationals who (1) have overstayed or violated the terms  of their visit; (2) can receive, extend, or adjust their immigration status;  or (3) should be apprehended or detained by law enforcement officials;    detect fraudulent travel documents, verify visitor identity, and  determine visitor admissibility through the use of biometrics (digital  fingerprints and a digital photograph); and  facilitate information sharing and coordination within the immigration  and border management community. We reported, for example, that the  program’s acquisition management process had not been established, and  that US-VISIT lacked a governance structure. Our  site visits, interviews with US-VISIT and CBP officials, and the work of  others suggest that both before and after US-VISIT entry capability was  installed at land POEs, these facilities faced a number of challenges— operational and physical—including space constraints complicated by the  logistics of processing high volumes of visitors and associated traffic  congestion. A Biometric Exit Capability is being Tested at Air and Sea POEs, But Operational Concerns Need to be Addressed

Although US-VISIT is pilot testing a biometric exit capability for air and  sea POEs, it is not currently available at all ports. The major constraint to performing biometric verification upon  exit at this time, in the US-VISIT Program Office’s view, is that the only  proven technology available would necessitate mirroring the processes  currently in use for US-VISIT at entry. The US-VISIT  Program Office concluded in January 2005 that the mirror-imaging  solution was “an infeasible alternative for numerous reasons, including but  not limited to, the additional staffing demands, new infrastructure  requirements, and potential trade and commerce impacts.”
US-VISIT officials told us that they anticipated that a biometric exit  process mirroring that used for entry could result in delays at land POEs  with heavy daily volumes of visitors. DHS was to have reported to Congress by June 2005 on how the agency  intended to fully implement a biometric entry/exit program. In February  2007, US-VISIT officials told us that this plan had been forwarded to the  Office of Management and Budget (OMB) for review. DHS Continues to Face Longstanding US-VISIT Management Challenges and Future Uncertainties

Our work and other best practice research have shown that applying  disciplined and rigorous management practices improves the likelihood of  delivering expected capabilities on time and within budget. Until these recommendations are fully  implemented, the program will be at greater risk of not optimally meeting  mission needs and falling short of meeting expectations. According to the program’s Chief Strategist, an immigration and border  management strategic plan was drafted in March 2005 to show how US- VISIT is aligned with DHS’s organizational mission and to define an overall  vision for immigration and border management. According to program officials, this future vision is to be  delivered through a number of planned mission capability enhancements. For example, over the last 4 years,  DHS has committed over $160 million to evaluate and operate exit pilots at  selected air, sea, and land POEs. Because US-VISIT will likely continue to  have an impact on land POE facilities as it evolves—especially as new  technology and equipment are introduced—it is important for US-VISIT  and CBP officials to have sufficient management controls for identifying  and reporting potential computer and other operational problems that  could affect the ability of US-VISIT entry capability to operate as intended. With respect to DHS’s effort to create an exit verification capability,  developing and deploying this capability at land POEs has posed a set of  challenges that are distinct from those associated with entry.
Why GAO Did This Study

This testimony summarizes GAO's work on the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) efforts to implement the U.S. Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology (US-VISIT) program at air, sea, and land ports of entry (POE). US-VISIT is designed to collect, maintain, and share data on selected foreign nationals entering and exiting the United States at air, sea, and land POEs. These data, including biometric identifiers like digital fingerprints, are to be used to screen persons against watch lists, verify identities, and record arrival and departure. This testimony addresses DHS's efforts to (1) implement US-VISIT entry capability, (2) implement US-VISIT exit capability, and (3) resolve longstanding management challenges that could impair DHS's ability to effectively implement the US-VISIT program. GAO analyzed DHS and US-VISIT documents, interviewed program officials, and visited 21 land POEs with varied traffic levels on both borders.

What GAO Found

DHS is operating US-VISIT entry capabilities at most POEs and has begun to work to move from 2 to 10 fingerprint biometric capabilities and expand electronic information sharing with stakeholders. Of particular note is the fact that a US-VISIT biometric-based entry screening capability is operating at 115 airports, 14 seaports, and 154 land POEs. While US-VISIT has improved DHS's ability to process visitors and verify identities upon entry, we found that management controls in place to identify and evaluate computer and other operational problems at land POEs were insufficient and inconsistently administered. Although US-VISIT has conducted various exit demonstration projects at a small number of POEs, a biometric exit capability is not currently available. According to program officials, this is due to a number of factors. For example, at this time the only proven technology available for biometric land exit verification would necessitate mirroring the processes currently in use for entry at these POEs, which would create costly staffing demands and infrastructure requirements, and introduce potential trade, commerce, and environmental impacts. Further, a pilot project to examine an alternative technology at land POEs did not produce a viable solution. By statute, DHS was to have reported to Congress by June 2005 on how it intended to fully implement a comprehensive, biometric entry/exit program, but DHS had not yet reported how it intended to do so, or use nonbiometric solutions. DHS continues to face longstanding US-VISIT management challenges and future uncertainties. For example, DHS had not articulated how US-VISIT is to strategically fit with other land border security initiatives and mandates and could not ensure that these programs work in harmony to meet mission goals and operate cost effectively. DHS had drafted a strategic plan defining an overall immigration and border management strategy but, as of February 2007, the plan was under review by the Office of Management and Budget. Further, critical acquisition management processes need to be established and followed to ensure that program capabilities and expected mission outcomes are delivered on time and within budget. These processes include effective project planning, requirements management, contract tracking and oversight, test management, and financial management. Until these issues are addressed, the risk of US-VISIT continuing to fall short of expectations is increased.