On May 30, 1997, following a meeting in Sintra, Portugal, the council’s Steering Board supported the more vigorous U.S. approach, issuing a statement, known as the Sintra Declaration, that confirmed the Steering Board’s long-term commitment to the peace process in Bosnia and reaffirmed that the international community would not tolerate a resumption of hostilities by anyone in the country in the future; emphasized that Bosnia and Herzegovina will remain a united and sovereign country, consisting of two multiethnic entities, and that the international community will not tolerate any attempts at ethnic partition, in fact or in law, by anyone; demanded that Bosnia’s political leaders and national and entity governments significantly accelerate their work toward implementing the Dayton Agreement; set specific, near-term dates by which Bosnia’s political leaders and government institutions would have to accomplish specific tasks, such as pass citizenship and passport laws, that would link the country’s ethnic groups and their separate areas of control; and, in some cases, described diplomatic consequences if the parties did not accomplish the tasks by the specified date; acknowledged the High Representative’s authority to regulate Bosnia’s media, specifically to curtail or suspend any media network or program whose output is in persistent and blatant contravention of either the spirit or letter of the Dayton Agreement; and reemphasized that providing economic assistance to Bosnia would be conditioned at the municipal level on the parties’ complying with the Dayton Agreement, particularly those provisions dealing with surrendering indictees to the war crimes tribunal and accepting the peaceful return of refugees and displaced persons to their prewar homes. Beginning in mid-1997, SFOR began to more actively support implementation of the civilian aspects of the peace operation. Our specific objectives were to determine what progress had been made in achieving the operation’s objectives since mid-1997. To do so, we focused on the operation’s four key goals, which are to create conditions that allow Bosnia’s political leaders to (1) provide a secure environment for the people of Bosnia; (2) create a unified, democratic country, to include the surrendering of indictees to the war crimes tribunal; (3) ensure the rights of people to return to their prewar homes; and (4) rebuild the economy. Despite the progress made, the country remained a long way from achieving the overall objective: Most multiethnic institutions at all levels of government were largely not functioning or were functioning only as a result of heavy international involvement, the vast majority of Bosnian Serbs and Croats and their political leaders still wanted to be separate from Bosnia, and the human rights situation remained poor and ethnic intolerance strong. This intransigence is due in large part to hard-line Bosnian Croat leaders. 4.1). The plan recognized the difficulty of returning people to their homes across ethnic lines and therefore established a low estimate for minority returns, which was exceeded during the year. 5.1). 6.2). After the election of the new, moderate Republika Srpska government, the U.S. government pledged to provide increased assistance to Republika Srpska. However, as noted in the Executive Summary and throughout the report, this progress was achieved largely because of intense international pressure and involvement, the momentum for continued progress is not self-sustaining, and conditions will have to improve significantly before international military forces could substantially draw down. It is widely accepted in the international community that, even with the accelerated pace of implementing the agreement, it will likely be some time before these conditions are realized.
Why GAO Did This Study

Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO updated its review of the Bosnia peace operation, focusing on the progress made since mid-1997 in achieving the operation's objectives.

What GAO Found

GAO noted that: (1) the actions taken by the international community starting in mid-1997 accelerated the pace of progress toward reaching the Dayton Agreement's objectives; (2) during this period, with the military situation remaining stable, some advancements were made in providing security for the people of Bosnia, creating a democratic environment, establishing multiethnic institutions at all levels of government, arresting those indicted for war crimes, returning people to their prewar homes across ethnic lines, and rebuilding the infrastructure and revitalizing the economy; (3) moreover, there has been a weakening of hard-line Bosnian Serb control over police and the media and the election of a new, moderate Prime Minister in Republika Srpska; (4) however, the goal of a self-sustaining peace process in Bosnia remains elusive, primarily due to the continued intransigence of Bosnia's political leaders; (5) almost all of the results were achieved only with intense international involvement and pressure, both political and military; (6) for example, the High Representative imposed numerous temporary solutions when Bosnia's political leaders could not reach agreement; (7) further, a substantial NATO-led force is still needed to provide security for the civil aspects of the operation; (8) conditions will have to improve significantly before international military forces could substantially draw down; even with the accelerated pace of implementing the agreement, it will likely be some time before these conditions are realized; and (9) Bosnia for all intents and purposes lacks functioning, multiethnic governments at all levels; the majority of those indicted for war crimes remain at large; about 1.4 million people have not yet been resettled as Bosnia's political leaders continue to prevent people from returning to their homes across ethnic lines; and few economic links have been reestablished among Bosnia's ethnic groups or between its two entities.