VWP Requirements

To qualify for the VWP a country must    offer reciprocal visa-free travel privileges to U.S. citizens;    have had a refusal rate of less than 3 percent for the previous fiscal year  for its nationals who apply for business and tourism visas; issue machine-readable passports to its citizens;   enter into an agreement with the United States to report or make available  through Interpol or other means as designated by the Secretary of  Homeland Security information about the theft or loss of passports;   accept the repatriation of any citizen, former citizen, or national against  whom a final order of removal is issued no later than 3 weeks after the  order is issued;   enter into an agreement with the United States to share information  regarding whether citizens and nationals of that country traveling to the  United States represents a threat to U.S. security or welfare; and   be determined not to compromise the law enforcement (including  immigration enforcement) or security interests of the United States by its  inclusion in the program. To be eligible to travel without a visa under the program, nationals of VWP  countries must    have received an authorization to travel under the VWP through ESTA;    have a valid passport issued by the participating country and be a national    seek entry for 90 days or less as a temporary visitor for business or    have been determined by CBP at the U.S. port of entry to represent no  threat to the welfare, health, safety, or security of the United States;   have complied with conditions of any previous admission under the  program (for example, individuals must not have overstayed the 90-day  limit during prior visits under the VWP); if entering by air or sea, possess a return trip ticket to any foreign  destination issued by a carrier that has signed an agreement with the U.S.  government to participate in the program, and must have arrived in the  United States aboard such a carrier; and if entering by land, have proof of financial solvency and a domicile abroad  to which they intend to return. DHS Implemented ESTA to Meet Mandated Requirement but Has Not Fully Analyzed Risks from Noncompliance

DHS has implemented ESTA to meet the 9/11 Act requirement intended to  enhance program security and has taken steps to minimize the burden on  travelers to the United States added by the new requirement, but it has not  fully analyzed the risks of carrier and passenger noncompliance with the  requirement. Moreover, most travel industry officials we interviewed in six VWP  countries praised DHS’s widespread ESTA outreach efforts, reasonable  implementation time frames, and responsiveness to feedback but  expressed dissatisfaction over ESTA fees. Also, although carriers complied  with the ESTA requirement to verify ESTA approval for almost 98 percent  of VWP passengers before boarding them in 2010, DHS does not have a  target completion date for a review to identify potential security risks  associated with the small percentage of cases of traveler and carrier  noncompliance with the ESTA requirement. When an  applicant submits an ESTA application, DHS systems evaluate the  applicant’s biographical information and responses to VWP eligibility  questions. DHS Made Efforts to Minimize Burden of ESTA Requirement

In developing and implementing ESTA, DHS has taken steps to minimize  the burden associated with ESTA’s use. ESTA approval for program participants  generally remains valid for 2 years. According to travel industry officials in the six VWP countries we  visited, this change has simplified travel for many travelers, especially  business travelers who travel several times each year. In 2010, about 2 percent—364,086 VWP passengers—were boarded  without verified ESTA approval. Only Half of VWP Countries Have Entered Into All Required Information- Sharing Agreements

Although DHS and partners at State and Justice have made progress in  negotiating information-sharing agreements with VWP countries, required  by the 9/11 Act, only half of the countries have entered into all required  agreements. In coordination with State and  Justice, DHS also outlined measures short of termination that may be  applied to VWP countries not meeting their compliance date. HSPD-6 Agreement

HSPD-6 agreements establish a procedure between the United States and  partner countries to share watchlist information about known or  suspected terrorists. Our current review shows that DHS has not completed  the latest biennial reports for 50 percent, or 18 of the 36 VWP countries in  a timely manner. Also, over half of those reports are more than 1 year  overdue. In the case of two countries, DHS was unable to demonstrate that  they had completed reports in over 4 years. DHS  cited a number of reasons for the reporting delays, including a lack of  resources needed to complete timely reports. In addition, DHS officials  said that they sometimes intentionally delayed report completion for two  reasons: (1) because they frequently did not receive DNI intelligence  assessments in a timely manner and needed to review these before  completing VWP country biennial reports or (2) in order to incorporate  anticipated developments in the status of information-sharing agreement  negotiations with a VWP country. Recommendations for Executive Action

To ensure that DHS can identify and mitigate potential security risks  associated with the VWP, we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland  Security take the following two actions:    establish time frames for the regular review and documentation of cases of  VWP passengers traveling to a U.S. port of entry without verified ESTA  approval, and take steps to address delays in the biennial country review process so that  the mandated country reports can be completed on time. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

To assess the implementation of the Electronic System for Travel  Authorization (ESTA), we reviewed relevant documentation, including  2006 and 2008 GAO reports evaluating the Visa Waiver Program (VWP) and  statistics on program applicants and travelers.
Why GAO Did This Study

The Visa Waiver Program (VWP) allows eligible nationals from 36 member countries to travel to the United States for tourism or business for 90 days or less without a visa. In 2007, Congress required the Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with the Secretary of State, to implement an automated electronic travel authorization system to determine, prior to travel, applicants' eligibility to travel to the United States under the VWP. Congress also required all VWP member countries to enter into an agreement with the United States to share information on whether citizens and nationals of that country traveling to the United States represent a security threat. In 2002, Congress mandated that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) review, at least every 2 years, the security risks posed by each VWP country's participation in the program. In this report, GAO evaluates (1) DHS's implementation of an electronic system for travel authorization; (2) U.S. agencies' progress in negotiating informationsharing agreements; and (3) DHS's timeliness in issuing biennial reports. GAO reviewed relevant documents and interviewed U.S., foreign government, and travel industry officials in six VWP countries.

What GAO Found

DHS has implemented the Electronic System for Travel Authorization (ESTA) and has taken steps to minimize the burden associated with the new program requirement. However, DHS has not fully evaluated security risks related to the small percentage of VWP travelers without verified ESTA approval. DHS requires applicants for VWP travel to submit biographical information and answers to eligibility questions through ESTA prior to travel. Travelers whose ESTA applications are denied can apply for a U.S. visa. In developing and implementing ESTA, DHS has made efforts to minimize the burden imposed by the new requirement. For example, although travelers formerly filled out a VWP application form for each journey to the United States, ESTA approval is generally valid for 2 years. Most travel industry officials GAO interviewed in six VWP countries praised DHS's widespread ESTA outreach efforts, reasonable implementation time frames, and responsiveness to feedback, but expressed dissatisfaction with the costs associated with ESTA. In 2010, airlines complied with the requirement to verify ESTA approval for almost 98 percent of VWP passengers prior to boarding, but the remaining 2 percent-- about 364,000 travelers--traveled under the VWP without verified ESTA approval. DHS has not yet completed a review of these cases to know to what extent they pose a risk to the program. To meet the legislative requirement, DHS requires that VWP countries enter into three information-sharing agreements with the United States; however, only half of the countries have fully complied with this requirement and many of the signed agreements have not been implemented. Half of the countries have entered into agreements to share watchlist information about known or suspected terrorists and to provide access to biographical, biometric, and criminal history data. By contrast, almost all of the 36 VWP countries have entered into an agreement to report lost and stolen passports. DHS, with the support of interagency partners, has established a compliance schedule requiring the last of the VWP countries to finalize these agreements by June 2012. Although termination from the VWP is one potential consequence for countries not complying with the information-sharing agreement requirement, U.S. officials have described it as undesirable. DHS, in coordination with State and Justice, has developed measures short of termination that could be applied to countries not meeting their compliance date. DHS has not completed half of the most recent biennial reports on VWP countries' security risks in a timely manner. According to officials, DHS assesses, among other things, counterterrorism capabilities and immigration programs. However, DHS has not completed the latest biennial reports for 18 of the 36 VWP countries in a timely manner, and over half of these reports are more than 1 year overdue. Further, in the case of two countries, DHS was unable to demonstrate that it had completed reports in the last 4 years. DHS cited a number of reasons for the reporting delays. For example, DHS officials said that they intentionally delayed report completion because they frequently did not receive mandated intelligence assessments in a timely manner and needed to review these before completing VWP country biennial reports.

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that DHS establish time frames for the regular review of cases of ESTA noncompliance and take steps to address delays in the biennial review process. DHS concurred with the report's recommendations.