Congressional Support for An "Asian" Missile Defense Capability

Since the mid-1990s, Congress has supported the development of a missile defense capability to protect forward-deployed U.S. forces in the Asia-Pacific area, regional allies, and Taiwan fromshort- and medium-range missiles, a goal that requires some level of Japanese support--if onlyhosting U.S. missile defense forces. First, the relevanttechnologies are applicable across the whole range of BMD threats. Another concept is to deploy a sea-basedsystem in the Sea of Japan with a capability to intercept North Korean intercontinental missiles intheir assent, or "boost" phase, when they are most vulnerable. This report discusses and analyses the Administration's approach to missile defense and itsimplications for U.S.-Japan cooperation on missile defense, but the report's point of departure is thetraditional delineation of types of anti-missile systems based on the characteristics of the specificballistic missile threats that they seek to counter. Even though some of the technology being developed in the NTW program would berelevant to the defense against strategic missiles, the design characteristics for Standard SM-3interceptor missile being developed for the NTW are deficient in speed and range for the task ofintercepting an ICBM. Both were intended to defend against short- and medium-range ballisticmissiles, but at different points in their flight path. Less than a year later, in August 1999, the U.S. and Japanese governments signed amemorandum of understanding (MOU) covering a five-year program of joint research anddevelopment on the then U.S. Navy Theater Wide (NTW) ballistic missile defense program, butJapan has made no decision about acquisition of a missile defense capability and currentconstitutional interpretations appear to rule out the integration of any such Japanese capability withthat of the U.S. Navy. Approach to Missile Defense on U.S.-Japan Cooperation

The decision of the Bush Administration in the Summer of 2001 to eliminate the distinctionbetween national missile defense and other BMD programs, and to redesignate the NTW project asthe sea-based "mid-course" defense element of a seamless BMD capability, has created additionaluncertainty in Japan about the benefits and constitutionality of participating in joint missile defensetechnology research. Japanese Participation in NTW/Sea-Based Midcourse Interceptor Missile
Possible U.S. Request for Expanded Cooperation. Japanese Perspectives on TMD

Because of the implications for Japan's relations with the United States and the People'sRepublic of China, which opposes many aspects of U.S.-Japan defense cooperation, the issues ofwhether Japan will acquire a missile defense capability and the extent to which such capabilitywould be integrated with that of the U.S. Navy, have assumed major national policy significance forTokyo. ABM Treaty. Japan was not a party to the treaty but has regarded the agreement as a fundamental pillar ofnuclear stability. Ban on Collective Defense. From this perspective, Article 9 is viewed as a kindof Talisman protecting Japan from the revival of militarism. Because a BMD system deployed in Japan could help protect U.S. troopsstationed in Japan, as well as Japanese lives and assets, many in the Congress and the ExecutiveBranch, and among the U.S. public, tend to see Japan's participation in BMD as a fully warrantedexercise in alliance burden-sharing. These could be critical issues in the case of an integrated U.S.-JapaneseBMD capability. Several of these foreign policy issues are trilateral rather than bilateral. For different reasons, neitherof these alternatives to the political status quo has been enthusiastic about missile defensecooperation with the United States.
The issue of missile defense cooperation with Japan intersects with several issues of directconcern to Congress, ranging from support for developing a capability to protect U.S. regionalforces, Asia-Pacific allies, and Taiwan, from Chinese short- and medium-range missiles, tocountering a possible future threat to U.S. territory from long-range missiles developed by NorthKorea. Japan's current participation in the U.S. ballistic missile defense (BMD) program dates fromAugust 1999, when the Japanese government agreed to conduct cooperative research on fourcomponents of the interceptor missile being developed for the then U.S. Navy Theater-Wide (NTW)anti-missile system--a sea-based "upper tier" (exo-atmospheric) capability against short- andmedium-range missiles up to 3,500 kilometers.
In the spring of 2001, the Administration changed the context of the cooperative researcheffort when it reorganized and redirected the U.S. missile defense program to emphasize theemployment of specific technologies across the entire spectrum of missile defense challenges, butespecially to gain a limited, near-term capability to defeat missile attacks on U.S. territory by "rogue"states. The Pentagon redesignated the NTW program as the Sea-Based Midcourse System, with agoal of developing a capability for attacking missiles of all ranges in the initial or middle phases oftheir flight path. This change added to an already complex list of Japanese policy concerns, byputting Japan in the position of possibly cooperating in the development of technology that couldbecome part of an American national missile defense capability -- a step that many Japanese see astransgressing a constitutional ban on "collective defense."
Thus far, the Administration's program change has not deterred Japan from cooperativeresearch on missile defense, but the policy shift has unsettled Japanese leaders and created additionalpolitical obstacles to bilateral BMD cooperation. The new U.S. approach has been criticized in theJapanese press and the Diet (parliament), both because of the potential violation of the implied banon "collective defense" contained in Article 9 of Japan's U.S.-imposed "Peace Constitution," and alsobecause the Bush initiative requires the United States to withdraw from the U.S.-RussianAnti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty, which Tokyo has long regarded as an important element ofstrategic stability. An integrated U.S.-Japan BMD capability aimed at protecting third countrieswould raise the same constitutional issues.
Japan has not made a decision regarding the acquisition of a missile defense capability. Japanese policymakers and defense firms generally are enthusiastic about missile defensecooperation, but the political parties, the media, and the general public are split over the issue. Proponents view BMD cooperation as a means to counter a perceived North Korean missile threat,and perhaps a Chinese threat as well. Other Japanese are fearful of aggravating relations with Chinaor triggering an Asian missile race. Even groups in Japan favoring BMD cooperation are concernedabout the large costs associated with the still-unproven technology. The popular Koizumiadministration seems inclined to finesse the constitutional issue, if possible. Japan's future stancewill likely depend on regional developments and how the issue plays out in the currently unstablepolitical environment.