However, the  Afghan government would not allow the use of herbicides. 3) had not been in place long enough to determine whether they  had contributed toward the overall goal of significantly reducing poppy  cultivation, drug production, and drug trafficking. Because the teams were not fully fielded, they were unable to  work as intended with provincial officials to coordinate alternative  livelihoods projects, assist with eradication verification as planned, or  coordinate public information projects to discourage poppy growing. State transferred $2 million to the Department of Justice to continue to  pay for U.S. prosecutors from the Criminal Division’s Senior Federal  Prosecutors’ Program to provide legal and legislative assistance. U.S. Counternarcotics Programs Face Several Challenges

The deteriorating security situation and the lack of Afghan capacity,  including governmental institutions, are tremendous challenges to  reducing illicit drug production and trafficking. During the 2005-2006 growing season, eradication forces and alternative  livelihoods personnel were attacked several times and in some cases  killed, slowing or preventing their efforts. Afghan Infrastructure, Human Capital, and Government Institutional Capacities Are Limited

Reducing opium cultivation and drug trafficking in Afghanistan will take at  least a decade, in part because of the need to address Afghanistan’s lack of  infrastructure, human capital, and government capacity. USAID and State Made Efforts to Oversee the Use of Funds, but Lack of Information and Security Limited Some Efforts

In an effort to prevent counternarcotics funds from assisting terrorists,  drug traffickers, or human rights violators in Afghanistan, USAID and State  required that grantees sign antiterrorism and antitrafficking certifications,  financial agreements contain antiterrorism and antitrafficking clauses, and  Afghan security personnel receiving training be vetted for associations  with prohibited activities when applicable. However, a lack of official  records and reliable information limited efforts to vet Afghan nationals. In  addition, although USAID and State made efforts to monitor ongoing  projects to ascertain their status, security concerns and poor  infrastructure limited the agencies’ monitoring of sites outside Kabul. Concluding Observations

Despite significant efforts by USAID and State, the deteriorating security  situation in Afghanistan threatens the success of the U.S. counternarcotics  goal of significantly reducing illicit drug cultivation, production, and  trafficking. They  reported some accomplishments in each of the strategy’s five pillars;  nevertheless, the opium poppy crop in 2006 grew by over 50 percent,  reaching a record amount. Agency Comments

We provided a draft of this report for review and comment to State,  USAID, Defense, and Justice. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

To examine the U.S. Agency for International Development’s (USAID) and  Department of State’s (State) progress in implementing counternarcotics  programs, projects, and activities under each pillar, and the factors, if any,  limiting implementation, we reviewed pertinent USAID and State planning,  funding, and reporting documents for their counternarcotics programs in  Afghanistan. In addition, we met with cognizant officials from Departments  of Defense (Defense), Justice (Justice), and State; USAID; and Drug  Enforcement Administration (DEA) in Washington, D.C. and Kabul,  Afghanistan. To examine USAID’s and State’s efforts to ensure that the fiscal year 2005  counternarcotics funds were used for intended purposes, we reviewed the  contracts, grants, and other financial agreements by which these funds  were obligated and expended.
Why GAO Did This Study

The prevalence of opium poppy cultivation and drug trafficking in Afghanistan imperils the stability of its government and threatens to turn the conflict-ridden nation once again into a safe haven for traffickers and terrorists. To combat the drug trade, the U.S. government developed a counternarcotics strategy consisting of five pillars--alternative livelihoods, elimination and eradication, interdiction, law enforcement and justice, and public information. The Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act of 2005 directed GAO to examine the use of all fiscal year 2005 funds administered by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and Department of State (State) for Afghan counternarcotics programs. To comply with this mandate, we examined progress under each counternarcotics pillar, challenges faced, and efforts to ensure that funds were used for intended purposes. To address these objectives, GAO reviewed pertinent USAID and State documents and met with cognizant U.S. and international officials in Washington, D.C., and Afghanistan. GAO makes no recommendations in this report. USAID, State, Department of Defense, and Department of Justice were provided a draft of this report, but did not provide formal comments.

What GAO Found

USAID and State received about $532 million fiscal year 2005 funds and initiated a number of projects under each counternarcotics pillar, but delays in implementation limited progress. For example, State's provision of aircraft enhanced the mobility of eradicators, but coordination difficulties between Afghan officials and security forces delayed the eradicators' fielding. Despite increased eradication and other U.S. efforts, the poppy crop grew by 50 percent in 2006 to a record level. However, many projects have not been in place long enough to assess progress toward the overall goal of significantly reducing drug cultivation, production, and trafficking. For example, projects to provide rural credit and to field teams to discourage poppy cultivation were not in place prior to the 2005-2006 growing season. The worsening security situation and the lack of Afghan capacity are tremendous challenges to the success of U.S. counternarcotics programs in Afghanistan. The security situation continues to decline; during the 2005-2006 growing season, eradicators were attacked several times and alternative livelihoods project personnel were killed. Moreover, due to Afghanistan's lack of infrastructure, educated populace, and functioning governmental institutions, significantly reducing poppy cultivation and drug trafficking is expected to take at least a decade. USAID and State have made efforts to oversee the use of funds, including the use of self certifications, contract clauses, and vetting, when applicable. However, a lack of official records and reliable information limited efforts to vet Afghan nationals. In addition, although USAID and State have made efforts to monitor ongoing projects, security concerns and poor infrastructure limited site visits.