1). 2). Many Domestic and Foreign Research Reactors Are Still Using Weapons-Usable Uranium Even Though They Could Operate on Low Enriched Uranium

According to Argonne’s analysis, conversion to LEU fuel is technically  feasible for 35 of the 66 research reactors worldwide that still use HEU  fuel. Eight U.S. research reactors, including 6 university reactors, could  convert to LEU fuel, but according to DOE officials, DOE has not provided  the funding to convert them. According to Argonne officials, of the 20 foreign  research reactors that currently use U.S.-origin HEU fuel, 14 do not have  plans to convert to LEU because they generally have a sufficient supply of  HEU and either do not want to incur the additional cost of conversion or do  not have the necessary funding. According to  Argonne officials, only 1 of 7 Russian-supplied research reactors that could  use LEU fuel is scheduled to convert. Technical Setbacks in Developing New Fuels Limit Progress in Converting the Largest Remaining Research Reactors

Technical setbacks in developing new LEU fuels have postponed the  conversion of 31 research reactors worldwide that cannot use currently  available LEU fuels until 2010 at the earliest. As a result, Argonne has delayed completion of dispersion  fuel until 2010 and may recommend that DOE cancel further development  altogether if solutions cannot be found. Additional testing could reveal problems that have not yet  surfaced. Using Low Enriched Uranium for Medical Isotope Production Is Feasible, but Concerns over Cost Could Limit Its Use

The reactor conversion program has demonstrated the potential for using  LEU to produce medical isotopes on a small scale, but large-scale  producers are concerned that the cost of conversion could be prohibitive. With assistance from the reactor conversion program, one reactor in  Argentina used for the production of medical isotopes converted from HEU  to LEU in 2003. DOE and NRC Are Addressing Security at Foreign and Domestic Research Reactors

Research reactor operators at most reactors we visited said that security  had been improved because of DOE or NRC efforts. However, DOE and  NRC have recognized the need to further improve security at research  reactors throughout the world, including in the United States, and are  engaged in separate efforts to assess research reactor security and its  effectiveness. We also observed areas where further improvement could be made. Recommendations for Executive Action

In order to further reduce the use of HEU in research reactors in the United  States and abroad, we recommend that the Secretary of Energy and the  Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration take the  following three actions:  consider placing a higher priority on converting the six remaining  university research reactors in the United States that can use currently  available LEU fuel;  once a reactor has been converted, place a high priority on removing the  HEU fuel and transporting it to the appropriate DOE facility; and  evaluate the costs and benefits of providing additional incentives to  foreign research reactors that use U.S.-origin HEU fuel to convert to  LEU, particularly to reactor operators that are willing to convert but do  not have sufficient funding to do so. In its comments, State questioned DOE’s cost estimate for converting U.S.  research reactors where conversion to LEU fuel is currently feasible. However, we did  not evaluate the effectiveness of the security at research reactors or DOE  and NRC efforts to improve security. 3.) This category does not include the cost of  purchasing LEU fuel for research reactors. Development of LEU for medical isotope production includes activities  associated with testing and analyzing LEU materials to replace HEU in  the production of medical isotopes.
Why GAO Did This Study

Nuclear research reactors worldwide use highly enriched uranium (HEU) as fuel and for the production of medical isotopes. Because HEU can also be used in nuclear weapons, the Department of Energy's (DOE) Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactors program is developing low enriched uranium (LEU), which would be very difficult to use in weapons, to replace HEU. To date, 39 of the 105 research reactors in the United States and abroad targeted by DOE have converted to LEU fuel. GAO was asked to examine (1) the status of the remaining research reactors in converting to LEU fuel, (2) DOE's progress in developing new LEU fuels for reactors where conversion is not yet technically feasible, (3) DOE's progress in developing LEU for the production of medical isotopes, and (4) the status of DOE and Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) efforts to improve security at research reactors.

What GAO Found

Currently, conversion to LEU fuel is technically feasible for 35 of the 66 research reactors in DOE's program that still use HEU fuel, but most do not have plans to convert. In the United States, 8 research reactors, including 6 university research reactors, have not converted because DOE has not provided the necessary funding. Of the 20 foreign research reactors that use U.S.-origin HEU fuel, 14 do not have plans to convert because they have a sufficient supply of HEU fuel and either do not want to incur the additional cost of conversion or do not have the necessary funding. Finally, only 1 of 7 Russian-supplied research reactors that could use LEU fuel is scheduled to convert. Conversion to LEU fuel is not technically feasible for 31 research reactors worldwide that still use HEU fuel. DOE has experienced technical setbacks in fuel development that have postponed the conversion of the 31 reactors until 2010 at the earliest. One fuel failed unexpectedly in testing, and DOE may cancel further development, depending on the results of additional tests. Initial testing of another LEU fuel produced positive results, but additional testing is required and the fuel will not be developed until 2010 at the earliest. Separately from the development of LEU fuel, DOE is developing LEU to replace HEU in the production of medical isotopes. DOE has not yet completed the work that would enable conversion of large-scale medical isotope production to LEU. One reactor has converted to LEU for smallscale production. However, large-scale producers are concerned that the cost of converting to LEU could be prohibitive. DOE and NRC have taken steps to improve security at foreign and U.S. research reactors. While operators at most research reactors we visited said that security had been upgraded through DOE or NRC efforts, we observed areas where further improvements could be made. Recognizing the possible need for further improvements, DOE and NRC are engaged in separate efforts to assess and improve security.