CSI is a program that aims to identify and examine U.S.-bound cargo  container shipments that could pose a high risk of concealing WMDs or  other terrorist contraband by reviewing advanced cargo information about  the shipments. In addition to the CSI ports where CBP placed targeters, CBP  also entered into arrangements with Australia and New Zealand to  remotely target U.S.-bound cargo container shipments from the United  States. CBP partially  concurred with the recommendations but did not implement them. DHS Has Developed Models to Assess Foreign Port Risks, but CBP Has Not Assessed Whether Its CSI Locations Remain Valid

The Coast Guard and CBP, DHS components with maritime security  responsibilities, have developed models to assess the risks of foreign  ports and the cargo carried by vessels from these ports. The Coast Guard Has Developed a Model to Regularly Assess Risks of Foreign Ports and Inform Operational Decisions

The Coast Guard has developed a risk-informed model as part of its IPS  program to regularly assess the potential threat foreign ports pose to the  maritime supply chain and make operational decisions regarding foreign  ports’ security measures. The Coast Guard  updates its risk model annually. CBP Considered Risk in Establishing Some CSI Ports, but Has Not Assessed Whether CSI Currently Covers the Riskiest Ports

			CBP Selected Initial CSI Ports Largely on the Basis of Volume and Used More Risk Factors when Expanding CSI Locations

In 2002, CBP selected the initial 23 CSI ports largely on the basis of the  volume of U.S.-bound container cargo, but increased the number of risk  factors in selecting additional ports as it expanded the CSI program  beginning in 2003. Comparing the CSI ports with the results shows that CSI did not  have a presence at about half of the ports CBP considered higher risk,  and about one-fifth of the existing CSI ports were at lower-risk locations. Because the CSI program depends on the willingness of sovereign host  countries to participate in the program, there are challenges to  implementing CSI and CBP efforts to negotiate with other countries to  expand the CSI program, and these efforts have not always been  successful. CBP has not assessed the risk of foreign ports that ship cargo to the  United States for its CSI program since completing the CSI expansion  analysis in 2005. In particular, the officials stated that (1)  removing CSI from a country might negatively affect political relations with  the host government, and (2) uncertain CSI funding in future years could  make it difficult for CBP to make plans to close lower-risk CSI ports and  open new CSI ports at higher-risk locations. DHS Has Taken Steps to Improve the Efficiency and Effectiveness of Its Maritime Container Security Programs, but Faces Constraints

DHS, through the Coast Guard and CBP, has taken a number of steps to  improve the efficiency and effectiveness of its maritime security programs  to reduce global supply chain risks. CBP has  continued its efforts to expand or refine its C-TPAT and CSI programs,  but faces host country political and legal constraints. In addition to prioritizing resources through its IPS risk model, the Coast  Guard has worked with foreign governments to mutually recognize each  other’s maritime security programs, which can more efficiently use IPS  resources and reduce risks. To help foreign countries establish AEO programs, CBP officials stated  that the C-TPAT program provides training and technical assistance for  foreign Customs agencies that request technical assistance. Further, according to CBP and  government officials in one country, a national law precludes the  transmission of electronic scanned images other than to host government  Customs officials. As a result, CSI targeters must be present at each CSI  port in order to view the scanned container images. Periodically  assessing the risk level of cargo shipped from foreign ports and using the  results of these risk assessments to inform any future expansion of CSI to  additional locations as well as determining whether changes need to be  made to existing CSI ports would help ensure that CBP is allocating its  resources to provide the greatest possible coverage of high-risk cargo to  best mitigate the risk of importing WMD or other terrorist contraband into  the United States through the maritime supply chain. Recommendations for Executive Action

To better ensure the effectiveness of the CSI program, we recommend  that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct the Commissioner of U.S.  Customs and Border Protection to periodically assess the supply chain  security risks from all foreign ports that ship cargo to the United States  and use the results of these risk assessments to (1) inform any future  expansion of CSI to additional locations and (2) determine whether  changes need to be made to existing CSI ports and make adjustments as  appropriate and feasible.
Why GAO Did This Study

Foreign ports and the cargo carried by vessels from these ports are critical to the U.S. economy, but can be exploited by terrorists. Within DHS, CBP and the Coast Guard are responsible for maritime security. Through CSI, CBP identifies and examines U.S.-bound cargo that may conceal WMD, and through C-TPAT, CBP partners with international trade community members to secure the flow of U.S.-bound goods. Under the IPS program, Coast Guard officials visit foreign ports to assess compliance with security standards. GAO was asked to review DHS's maritime security programs. This report addresses (1) the extent to which DHS has assessed the foreign ports that pose the greatest risk to the global supply chain and focused its maritime container security programs to address those risks, and (2) actions DHS has taken to help ensure the efficiency and effectiveness of its maritime security programs. GAO analyzed DHS risk models and maritime security program strategies, met with program officials, and visited six foreign countries selected on the basis of participation in CSI, varied cargo shipment risk levels, and other factors.

What GAO Found

Department of Homeland Security (DHS) components have developed models to assess the risks of foreign ports and cargo, but not all components have applied risk management principles to assess whether maritime security programs cover the riskiest ports. The U.S. Coast Guard uses its risk model to inform operational decisions for its International Port Security (IPS) program and annually updates its assessment. In contrast, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) has not regularly assessed ports for risks to cargo under its Container Security Initiative (CSI) program. CBP's selection of the initial 23 CSI ports was primarily based on the volume of U.S.-bound containers, but beginning in 2003, CBP considered more threat information when it expanded the number of CSI ports. CBP has not assessed the risk posed by foreign ports that ship cargo to the United States for its CSI program since 2005. In 2009, CBP developed a model that ranked 356 potential expansion ports for a related program on the basis of risk, but it was never implemented because of budget cuts. By applying CBP's risk model to fiscal year 2012 cargo shipment data, GAO found that CSI did not have a presence at about half of the ports CBP considered high risk, and about one fifth of the existing CSI ports were at lower risk locations. Since the CSI program depends on cooperation from sovereign host countries, there are challenges to implementing CSI in new foreign locations, and CBP's negotiations with other countries have not always succeeded. For example, CBP officials said it is difficult to close CSI ports and open new ports because removing CSI from a country might negatively affect U.S. relations with the host government. However, periodically assessing the risk level of cargo shipped from foreign ports and using the results to inform any future expansion of CSI to additional locations, as well as determine whether changes need to be made to existing CSI ports, would help ensure that CBP is allocating its resources to provide the greatest possible coverage of high-risk cargo to best mitigate the risk of importing weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or other terrorist contraband into the United States through the maritime supply chain.
DHS has taken steps to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of its maritime security programs, but faces host country political and legal constraints. The Coast Guard has implemented a risk-informed model that prioritizes the countries to visit and assist. Also, the Coast Guard and CBP have made arrangements with foreign government entities to mutually recognize inspections of each other's ports and maritime supply chains through the IPS and Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT) programs. CBP has also utilized technological improvements to target some U.S.-bound cargo shipments remotely from the United States to reduce CSI staff in foreign countries. However, CBP faces political and legal constraints in host countries. For example, according to CBP and government officials in one country, a national law precludes the transmission of electronic scanned images other than to host government Customs officials. As a result, CSI officials must be present at each CSI port in that country to view the scanned images. Further, in some ports, CBP has made efforts to expand the scope of its CSI targeting to include contraband other than WMD, but that is subject to approval by the host governments.

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that CBP periodically assess the supply chain security risks from foreign ports that ship cargo to the United States and use the results to inform any future expansion of CSI and determine whether changes need to be made to existing CSI ports. DHS concurred with GAO's recommendation.