Agencies Committed or Disbursed More Than $6.4 Billion of the Almost $6.5 Billion Allocated for Egypt in Fiscal Years 2011-2015

Of the almost $6.5 billion in security-related assistance funds allocated for  Egypt in fiscal years 2011 through 2015, U.S. agencies had committed or  disbursed more than $6.4 billion, or almost 100 percent, as of September  30, 2015. Egypt has used FMF funding to purchase and sustain a  wide array of military systems, including major systems such as F-16  aircraft, Apache helicopters, and M1A1 tanks (see fig. DOD and State Completed End-Use Monitoring of U.S.- Provided Equipment but Faced Some Challenges Carrying Out These Efforts

DOD and State implemented end-use monitoring for equipment  transferred to Egyptian security forces; however, challenges associated  with obtaining Egyptian government cooperation sometimes hampered  these monitoring efforts, and a lack of agency documentation limited  accountability for some of them. DOD officials in Cairo also noted challenges in gaining access to an  Egyptian government storage facility for NVDs prior to 2015 to verify the  physical security for these items. DOD Completed Required Annual Physical Security Inspections for Sensitive Equipment Subject to Enhanced End-Use Monitoring in Fiscal Year 2015

Under Golden Sentry enhanced end-use monitoring, DOD personnel also  are required to conduct annual physical security inspections of storage  sites where sensitive equipment subject to enhanced end-use monitoring  is housed. Although State  has outreach programs to foster cooperation and compliance with Blue  Lantern checks, it did not conduct any such outreach in Egypt in fiscal  years 2011 through 2015. According to State officials, some of the delays in completing Blue  Lantern checks in Egypt were due to the Egyptian government’s slow  responses to State’s inquiries. According to State officials in Washington,  D.C., and Cairo, Egypt, as of November 2015, no Blue Lantern  outreach visit had been conducted in Egypt since 2008, prior to  Egypt’s political transitions in 2011 and 2013. U.S. Government Completed Some Human Rights Vetting in Egypt but Has Weaknesses or Gaps in Procedures, Documentation, and Policies

The U.S. government completed human rights vetting for 5,581 Egyptian  security forces before providing U.S.-funded training in fiscal year 2011  through March 31, 2015; however, our analysis of a sample of names  from training rosters of Egyptian security forces who received U.S.-funded  training shows that that the U.S. government did not complete all required  vetting prior to providing training, in violation of State’s and DOD’s  policies. State deemed our estimate of the  percentage of Egyptian security forces that were not vetted and some  aspects of the methodology we used to generate this estimate to be  sensitive but unclassified information. Various Factors Affected State’s Efforts to Ensure Compliance with the Leahy Laws

Various factors affected State’s implementation of the Leahy laws. State generally concurred with our recommendations. Additionally, State agreed with our  recommendation to develop time frames for establishing policies and  procedures to provide a more reasonable level of assurance that the  department is complying with the Leahy laws for recipients of equipment. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

The objectives of this review were to examine, for fiscal years 2011  through 2015, the extent to which the U.S. government (1) committed or  disbursed funds allocated for security-related assistance for Egypt, (2)  implemented end-use monitoring for equipment transferred to Egyptian  security forces, and (3) vetted Egyptian recipients of U.S. security-related  assistance for human rights concerns. To determine the extent to which the U.S. government implemented end- use monitoring for equipment transferred to Egyptian security forces, we  reviewed agency guidance, analyzed end-use monitoring data and  documentation, interviewed U.S. and Egyptian officials, and conducted  on-site inspections of military equipment during fieldwork to Egypt in June  2015. ensure that for each country the Department  of State has a current list of all security force  units receiving U.S. training, equipment, or  other types of assistance;  facilitate receipt by the Department of State  and U.S. embassies of information from  individuals and organizations outside the U.S.  government on gross violations of human  rights by security force units;  routinely request and obtain such information  from the Department of Defense, the Central  Intelligence Agency, and other U.S.  government sources;  ensure that such information is evaluated and  preserved;  ensure that when an individual is designated  to receive United States training, equipment,  or other types of assistance the individual’s  unit is vetted as well as the individual;  seek to identify the unit involved when  credible information of a gross violation exists  but the identity of the unit is lacking; and make publicly available, to the maximum  extent practicable, the identity of those units  for which no assistance shall be furnished  pursuant to the law.
Why GAO Did This Study

The U.S. government has allocated an average of about $1.3 billion annually in security assistance for Egypt in fiscal years 2011 through 2015. DOD and State have established end-use monitoring programs to ensure that military equipment transferred to foreign countries is safeguarded and used for its intended purposes. In addition, legal requirements, known as the Leahy laws, prohibit DOD- and State-funded assistance to units of foreign security forces if there is credible information that these forces have committed a gross violation of human rights.
This report examines, for fiscal years 2011 through 2015, the extent to which the U.S. government (1) committed or disbursed funds allocated for security-related assistance for Egypt, (2) implemented end-use monitoring for equipment transferred to Egyptian security forces, and (3) vetted Egyptian recipients of security-related assistance for human rights concerns. GAO analyzed U.S. agency data and documentation; conducted fieldwork in Egypt; and interviewed U.S. officials in Washington, D.C., and Cairo, Egypt. This is the public version of a sensitive but unclassified report issued in February 2016.

What GAO Found

U.S. agencies allocated approximately $6.5 billion for security-related assistance to Egypt in fiscal years 2011 through 2015. As of September 30, 2015, over $6.4 billion of the $6.5 billion total had been committed or disbursed. The majority of the funding (99.5 percent) was provided to Egypt through the Department of State's (State) Foreign Military Financing (FMF) account. The funds from this account were used to purchase and sustain a wide variety of military systems, including F-16 aircraft, Apache helicopters, and M1A1 tanks.
The Departments of Defense (DOD) and State implemented end-use monitoring for equipment transferred to Egyptian security forces, but challenges including obtaining Egyptian government cooperation hindered some efforts. DOD completed all required end-use monitoring inventories and physical security inspections of storage sites for missiles and night vision devices (NVD) in fiscal year 2015, but DOD lacked documentation showing that it completed physical security inspections for these sensitive items in prior years. Despite agreeing to give access, the Egyptian government prevented DOD officials from accessing a storage site to verify the physical security of some NVDs prior to 2015, according to DOD officials and documents. State conducted 12 end-use checks of U.S. equipment exported to Egypt in fiscal years 2011 to 2015, but State data indicate that the Egyptian government's incomplete and slow responses to some inquiries limited U.S. efforts to verify the use and security of certain equipment, including NVDs and riot-control items. Despite this lack of cooperation, since 2008, State has not used outreach programs in Egypt that are intended to facilitate host country cooperation and compliance with State's monitoring program. According to State officials, this was due to the small number of end-use checks conducted in Egypt and the lower priority assigned to Egypt than to other countries.
The U.S. government completed some, but not all, human rights vetting required by State policy before providing training or equipment to Egyptian security forces. State deemed GAO's estimate of the percentage of Egyptian security forces that were not vetted to be sensitive but unclassified information, which is excluded from this public report. Moreover, State has not established specific policies and procedures for vetting Egyptian security forces receiving equipment. Although State concurred with a 2011 GAO recommendation to implement equipment vetting, it has not established a time frame for such action. State currently attests in memos that it is in compliance with the Leahy law. However, without vetting policies and procedures, the U.S. government risks providing U.S. equipment to recipients in Egypt in violation of the Leahy laws.

What GAO Recommends

GAO is making six recommendations to strengthen State's implementation of end-use monitoring and human rights vetting, including utilizing its end-use monitoring outreach programs and developing time frames for establishing policies and procedures for equipment vetting. State generally agreed with these recommendations.