EOD Forces Grew to Meet Wartime and Other Demands, but DOD Does Not Have Data Needed to Develop Funding Strategy to Support Future EOD Force Plans

To meet increased demands for EOD personnel, the services increased  the size of their EOD forces. Based on available data, we determined that  the services grew from about 3,600 personnel in 2002 to about 6,200 in  2012—an almost 72 percent increase. The services anticipate that even  as forces withdraw from recent operations the need for EOD forces will  continue, so they intend to maintain their larger size. However, the  respective services’ abilities to identify and track spending on EOD  activities vary, so DOD does not have complete information on EOD  spending. The House Armed Services Committee directed DOD to  establish a consolidated budget justification display fully identifying the  services’ baseline EOD budgets, but DOD has not done so. The Navy and  Air Force now have program element codes that enable service officials  to identify and evaluate the appropriate level of spending on their EOD  capabilities. However, the Army’s and Marine Corps’ lack of complete  data on the costs of their current EOD forces negatively affects their  efforts to develop viable funding plans for supporting their EOD capability  into the future. Until the services have information on current spending as  well as justification for their future funding needs, service and DOD  leadership will be unable to effectively identify resource needs, weigh  priorities, and assess budget trade-offs within anticipated declining  resources. EOD Forces Have Worked Together in Joint Operations, but DOD Has Not Developed Joint EOD Doctrine to Guide Effective Employment of the Capability

EOD forces have operated jointly in Iraq and Afghanistan to fulfill  battlefield requirements, and the services have jointly developed  guidance on tactics, techniques, and procedures for EOD forces, but  DOD has not fully institutionalized the guidance through joint EOD  doctrine in the form of a Joint Publication. Joint doctrine facilitates planning for and execution of operations, and it  establishes a link between what must be accomplished and the  capabilities for doing so by providing information on how joint forces can  achieve military strategic and operational objectives in support of national  strategic objectives. Another study reported on some combat unit commanders’  limited awareness of EOD capabilities during overseas combat  operations. Non-EOD personnel in combat units did not always understand  EOD protocols or capabilities. Although several organizations have  responsibilities for some EOD functions, no one entity has been  designated as the focal point on joint doctrine or operational issues. In addition, joint EOD doctrine could provide a  basis for planning and identifying capability requirements for future  operations. Having joint doctrine that is developed and approved by the  Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as authoritative guidance would  enhance DOD’s EOD forces’ ability to operate in an effective manner and  better position the military services to identify capability gaps in meeting  service, joint, and interagency requirements; to invest in priority needs;  and to mitigate risks. Recommendations for Executive Action

We recommend that the Secretary of Defense take the following two  actions:
To improve the Army’s and Marine Corps’ ability to ensure adequate  support of their EOD forces within expected budgets, direct the  Secretaries of the Army and the Navy to collect data on costs  associated with supporting their current EOD forces. To enhance the future employment of EOD forces in joint combat  operations, direct the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to develop  joint EOD doctrine that would guide combatant commanders’ planning  and clarify joint operational roles and responsibilities. To determine the extent to which DOD and the services have identified  funding to resource EOD forces to meet anticipated future requirements,  we collected and analyzed available EOD funding data from each of the  services for fiscal years 2010 through 2012.
Why GAO Did This Study

DOD has relied heavily on the critical skills and capabilities of EOD forces to counter the threat from improvised explosive devices on battlefields in Iraq and Afghanistan. The House Armed Services Committee directed DOD to submit a report on EOD force structure planning and directed GAO to review DOD's force structure plan. DOD's report provided little detail. GAO examined to what extent (1) DOD and the services have addressed increased demands for the EOD capability and identified funding to meet future requirements; and (2) DOD has developed guidance for employing the EOD capability effectively in joint operations. GAO evaluated DOD's report and EOD guidance; analyzed data on EOD missions, personnel, and funding; and interviewed DOD and service officials to gain perspectives from EOD personnel and managers.

What GAO Found

Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) forces grew over the past 10 years to meet wartime and other needs, but the Department of Defense (DOD) does not have the data needed to develop a funding strategy to support future EOD force plans. To meet increased demands for EOD personnel, the services increased their EOD forces from about 3,600 personnel in 2002 to about 6,200 in 2012. Anticipating that the need for EOD will continue as forces withdraw from ongoing operations, the services intend to maintain their larger size. The Navy and Air Force have data on the baseline costs for some or all of their EOD activities, but the Army and Marine Corps do not have complete data on spending for EOD activities. Therefore, DOD does not have complete data on service spending on EOD activities needed to determine the costs of its current EOD capability and to provide a basis for future joint planning. Until all the services have complete information on spending, service and DOD leadership will be unable to effectively identify resource needs, weigh priorities, and assess budget trade-offs.
EOD forces from all four services have worked together in Iraq and Afghanistan and the services have developed guidance on tactics and procedures for EOD forces, but challenges persist because DOD has not institutionalized joint EOD doctrine through a joint publication. Joint doctrine facilitates planning for operations and establishes a link between what must be accomplished and the capabilities for doing so. DOD studies have noted commanders' limited awareness of EOD capabilities during combat operations, and EOD personnel reported challenges they attributed to non-EOD forces' lack of understanding of EOD operations. Several DOD organizations have responsibilities for some EOD functions, but no entity has been designated as the focal point for joint EOD doctrine. Joint doctrine could help leaders identify EOD capability requirements and better position combatant commanders in their use of EOD forces in future operations. Joint doctrine that is developed and approved as authoritative guidance would enhance the EOD forces' ability to operate in an effective manner, and would better position the services to identify capability gaps in meeting service, joint, and interagency requirements; to invest in priority needs; and to mitigate risks.

What GAO Recommends

To better enable DOD to plan for funding EOD mission requirements and enhance future use of EOD forces in joint combat operations, GAO recommends that DOD direct (1) the Secretaries of the Army and the Navy to collect data on current Army and Marine Corps EOD funding, and (2) the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to develop joint EOD doctrine that would guide combatant commanders' planning and clarify joint operational roles and responsibilities. In oral comments on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with the recommendations.