DOD Has Not Conducted a Risk Assessment on Foreign Encroachment at Its Test and Training Ranges

DOD has not conducted a risk assessment that includes prioritizing  ranges based on mission criticality, determining their vulnerabilities to  foreign encroachment, and assessing the degree to which foreign  encroachment could pose a threat to the mission of the ranges. In addition, the services do not have guidance on how to  conduct such an assessment because the issue of foreign encroachment  is new. However, DOD has resolved similar challenges in the past. Specifically, Navy and Air Force  headquarters officials as well as officials from all four of the ranges in our  review told us that they had concerns about the number of investment- related projects by foreign entities occurring near their respective  ranges—projects that they stated could pose potential security threats. DOD officials stated that  given the uncertainty surrounding this issue, a risk assessment would be  beneficial. Without guidance  from DOD for the services to follow in conducting a risk assessment that  establishes a time frame for completion, identifies critical ranges, and  then assesses vulnerabilities and threats to these ranges, DOD may not  be able to determine what, if any, negative impact foreign encroachment  may be having on its test or training ranges. DOD Does Not Have Sufficient Information to Fully Identify Instances of Foreign Encroachment near Its Domestic Test and Training Ranges

DOD does not have information that officials say they need, such as the  ownership of companies conducting business on federally managed land  near DOD’s ranges, to determine if specific transactions on federally  owned or managed land pose a threat to ranges. Further, DOD officials have identified some possible  sources or methods for obtaining this information but have not formally  collaborated with other federal agencies on how to gather this  information. Leading practices state that agencies can  enhance and sustain collaborative efforts by engaging in several  practices that are necessary for a collaborative working relationship. Such information could include,  for example, identification of any parent companies or whether a U.S.- based entity is owned or controlled by a foreign entity. Further, Federal Aviation Administration  officials told us that while they have a process for collecting  information about proposed structures that are more than 200 feet in  height or are within certain distances of airports or runways, this  process is designed to support the agency’s mission of maintaining a  safe and efficient aerospace system, not to collect the information that  DOD would need to help identify instances of foreign encroachment  on its ranges. DOD has had some success in obtaining information that could be used  to identify activities that could provide opportunities for foreign  encroachment, but has not discussed options for obtaining additional  information with other federal agencies. Without  engaging potential sources of information on commercial activities near  its ranges, DOD is hindered in its efforts to determine if a project could  present a threat to test or training range activities. Recommendations for Executive Action

To improve the ability of the Department of Defense and the military  departments to manage the potential for foreign encroachment near their  test and training ranges, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense, in  consultation with the military departments, develop and implement  guidance for assessing risks to test and training ranges from foreign  encroachment in particular, to include: determining the criticality and vulnerability of DOD’s ranges and the  level of the threat; and a time frame for completion of risk assessments. Agency Comments

In a written response on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with both  recommendations. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

To determine the extent to which DOD has conducted a risk assessment  to identify the existence and extent of any threats posed by foreign  encroachment to its domestic air, land, and sea test and training ranges,  we reviewed statutes, regulations, and guidance pertaining to federal  agencies’ oversight of transactions by private entities on air, land, and  sea. To determine the extent to which DOD has obtained information on  specific transactions near test and training ranges that it needs to  determine if these transactions pose a threat to the range, we interviewed  officials from OSD and the military service headquarters, as well as  military department intelligence agencies, the Defense Intelligence  Agency, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
Why GAO Did This Study

For many years, DOD has reported that it faces challenges in carrying out realistic training because of the cumulative result of outside influences—such as urban growth and endangered species habitat—that DOD refers to as encroachment. In January 2014, DOD reported concerns with security encroachment by foreign entities conducting business near its test and training ranges.
GAO was mandated by the House Armed Services Committee report accompanying a bill for the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014 to review encroachment on DOD's test and training ranges. This report examines the extent to which DOD has (1) conducted a risk assessment to identify the existence and extent of any threats of foreign encroachment and (2) obtained information needed on specific transactions to determine if they pose a threat. GAO reviewed statutes, regulations, and guidance on federal agency oversight of transactions on federal land. GAO interviewed DOD and service officials, as well as officials from other federal agencies identified by DOD as having a role in such transactions.

What GAO Found

The Department of Defense (DOD) has not conducted a risk assessment that includes prioritizing test and training ranges based on mission criticality, determining their vulnerabilities to foreign encroachment (i.e., foreign entities acquiring assets, such as mines or energy projects, or otherwise conducting business transactions near test and training ranges), and assessing the degree to which foreign encroachment could pose a threat to the mission of the range. Some DOD officials stated that they are concerned about foreign encroachment, which may provide an opportunity for persistent surveillance of DOD test and training activities. However, DOD has not prioritized its ranges or assessed such threats because, among other things, there is no clear guidance on how to conduct assessments of the risks and threats posed by foreign encroachment. Some DOD officials told GAO they have considered conducting such assessments, but DOD has not issued guidance directing the services to conduct these assessments. Officials from the Navy and the Air Force stated that given the unique nature of each range, it would be difficult to assess their criticality. However, Navy officials stated that they had expected to issue guidance for conducting risk assessments sometime in 2015. Without clear guidance from DOD for the services to follow in conducting a risk assessment, DOD may not be able to determine what, if any, negative impact foreign encroachment may be having on its test or training ranges.
DOD has not obtained sufficient information on commercial activity being conducted near test and training ranges in the level of detail officials say they need—such as if a U.S.-based entity is owned or controlled by a foreign entity—to determine if specific transactions on federally owned or managed land in proximity to ranges pose a threat to the range. Such information is generally not collected by other agencies with responsibilities for these transactions because, in some cases, legal, regulatory, or resource challenges may prevent them from collecting information that is unrelated to their agencies' missions. For example, the Federal Aviation Administration collects information about proposed structures that are more than 200 feet in height to support the agency's mission of maintaining a safe and efficient aerospace system, but does not collect information on the ownership of the companies building the structures because it is beyond the scope of its mission. DOD has identified some potential sources of information, but it has not formally collaborated with other federal agencies on how to gather this information. Leading practices state that agencies can enhance and sustain collaboration by engaging in several practices, including addressing needs and leveraging resources and agreeing on roles and responsibilities. Without engaging potential sources of information on commercial activities near its ranges, DOD is hindered in its efforts to determine if a project could present a threat to test or training range activities.

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that DOD (1) develop and implement guidance for conducting a risk assessment on foreign encroachment and (2) collaborate with other federal agencies to obtain additional information on transactions near ranges. In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with both recommendations.