Under the traditional training strategy, all training was focused on a unit’s  primary missions and units were to be deployed to perform their primary  missions. The Army Faces Challenges in Executing Its Reserve Component Training Strategy

The Army is able to effectively execute the portion of its reserve  component training strategy that calls for training units on their assigned  missions, but faces challenges in effectively executing the portion of the  strategy that calls for training units on their primary missions. Conditions for Effective Unit Training Occur Late in the Cycle

The Army currently prioritizes its available training resources and time to  support units that are preparing to deploy for ongoing operations. As a  result, unit training for assigned missions, which is conducted in the later  stages of the Army’s 5-year training cycle, is generally effective. Third, units that are training for primary  missions during the early stages of the cycle also experience personnel  and equipment shortages, often because they are tasked to give up  personnel and equipment to support deploying units. Furthermore, training support is  limited during the early years of the cycle. DOD’s Mobilization Policy Has Presented Challenges as the Army Trains and Deploys Its Reserve Component Forces

While DOD’s 12-month mobilization policy has not hindered the Army’s  overall ability to train its reserve component forces and has reduced the  length of deployments, it has not fully achieved its intended purpose of  reducing stress on the force by providing predictability. While the policy has led to shorter deployments, it has also  caused units to mobilize and deploy more frequently, and units are also  spending more time away from home in training when not mobilized. Because units must  spend part of their mobilization periods training for their assigned  missions, they are actually deployed for only part of the time that they are  mobilized. It shows that 12-month  deployments, which were typical under the previous policy, result in 3  deployments over a 36-month period. More Deployments Result in Less Time at Home to Conduct Training

As previously noted, the Army’s reserve component strategy calls for  reserve component units to have 4 years of training between deployments,  but the 12-month mobilization policy, with its associated shorter  deployments and more frequent mobilizations, has led to situations where  units do not have 4 years available to conduct training. The Air Force deployment model groups occupational specialties into 5  different “tempo bands” based on ongoing operational requirements. The Air Force expects  this model to increase predictability for its forces. Reserve Component Forces Assigned Missions in Support of Ongoing Operations Have Access to the Training Needed, But Constraints Delay and Limit Training Opportunities for Some Forces

In accordance with DOD Directive 1200.17, which directs the Secretaries  of the military departments to ensure that facilities and training areas are  available to support reserve component training requirements, reserve  component forces are generally receiving the access to training facilities  that is necessary to prepare them for their assigned missions. In addressing its capacity shortages, the Army has given priority  access to personnel and units that have established mobilization dates or  assigned missions. As a result, active and reserve component forces  without assigned missions often experience delays in gaining access to  training needed to prepare them for their primary missions. For example:    The Army has developed a database, which is intended to account for  both active and reserve component individual training facilities under  a “One Army School” system. Recommendations for Executive Action

To improve the Army’s training strategy and DOD’s mobilization policy for  Army reserve component personnel, we recommend that the Secretary of  Defense take the following three actions:  To better ensure the Army has an executable strategy for effectively  training its reserve component forces, we recommend the Secretary of  Defense direct the Secretary of the Army to reevaluate and adjust its  reserve component training strategy to fully account for the factors that  limit the effectiveness of unit training for primary missions in the early  years of the 5-year cycle. To assess the extent to which mobilization and deployment laws,  regulations, goals, and policies impact the Army’s ability to train and  employ Reserve Component forces, we reviewed laws, regulations, goals,  and policies that impact the way the Army trains and employs its reserve  component forces such as relevant sections of Titles 10 and 32 of the U.S.  Code and DOD’s January 2007 mobilization policy.
Why GAO Did This Study

The Army's strategy for training its reserve component calls for units to conduct training on the primary missions for which they were organized and designed as well as the missions units are assigned in support of ongoing operations. The training is to be conducted over a 5-year cycle with a focus on primary missions during the early years and assigned missions during the later years. In response to mandates, GAO assessed the extent to which (1) the Army is able to execute its strategy for training reserve component forces for their primary and assigned missions; (2) mobilization and deployment laws, regulations, goals, and policies impact the Army's ability to train and employ these forces; and (3) access to military schools and skill training facilities and ranges affects the preparation of reserve component forces. To address these objectives, GAO analyzed relevant training strategies and policies, laws, and data and surveyed 22 Army reserve component units returning from deployments in the past 12 months.

What GAO Found

The Army is able to execute the portion of its reserve component training strategy that calls for units to effectively train for their assigned missions in support of ongoing operations, but faces challenges in executing the portion of the strategy that calls for units to effectively train on primary missions. Unit training for assigned missions, which is conducted in the later years of the 5-year training cycle, is generally effective because the Army prioritizes its available resources to support units that are preparing to deploy for ongoing operations--units receive increased training time; mission requirements and personnel levels are stabilized; and personnel and equipment shortages are addressed while support is increased. Conversely, units training for their primary missions in the early years of the cycle receive less time to train and experience equipment and personnel shortages, which adversely affect teamwork and unit cohesion. Also, support for their training is limited. These challenges limit the effectiveness of primary mission training and could impact their ability to conduct their primary missions within the current strategy's time frames. While DOD's current 12-month mobilization policy has not hindered the Army's overall ability to train its reserve component forces and has reduced the length of deployments, it has not fully achieved its intended purpose of reducing stress on the force by providing predictability to soldiers. Because units must spend part of their mobilization periods in training, they are actually deploying for about 10 months under this 12-month mobilization policy, whereas they typically deployed for periods of 12 to 15 months under the previous policy. Under the current policy, the Army's reserve component forces are deploying more frequently and spending more time away from home in training when they are not mobilized. Moreover, unit leaders and personnel GAO interviewed said that the 12-month mobilization policy has decreased predictability and increased stress for individuals. GAO noted alternate approaches that can improve predictability. For example, the Air Force recently developed a deployment model categorizing five grouped occupational specialties based on operational requirements and length of time home between deployments. The model is intended to increase predictability for its forces and thus reduce their stress. Reserve component forces are generally receiving access to training facilities necessary to prepare them for their assigned missions, but the Army lacks capacity to prepare all of its forces for the full range of training requirements. In addressing capacity shortages, the Army has given priority to deploying units and personnel. As a result, active and reserve component forces without assigned missions often experience delays in accessing training for their primary missions. Although the Army is reviewing some aspects of its training capacity, it has not fully identified its training requirements and capacity and therefore will not have a sound basis for prioritizing available resources and cannot be assured that the initiatives it has under way will fully address gaps in its training capacity.