1). A 1997 memorandum of agreement (MOA) between these entities  defines the roles and responsibilities for each of these stakeholders in  protecting federal courthouses and the federal framework for securing  courthouses. AOUSC Is Able to Identify Security Concerns across the Courthouse Portfolio, While the Marshals Service and FPS Are Able to Identify Concerns at the Individual Building Level

		AOUSC Develops Portfolio-Wide Information About Security Concerns

Identifying security concerns at federal courthouses is critical to managing  the risk to those courthouses. Marshals Service and FPS Identify Building-Specific Security Concerns That Cannot Readily Be Tracked across the Portfolio of Courthouses

The Marshals Service and FPS also identify security concerns at  individual courthouse facilities, focused on their respective missions, but  unlike AOUSC, they do not currently collect this information in a way that  it can be readily compared across the portfolio of courthouses to gauge  the overall concerns with these buildings. The Marshals Service is taking  steps to improve the information it collects; however, these steps may not  enable it to understand concerns portfolio-wide as defined by our risk  management framework, because of the reasons discussed below. The improvements that both agencies are making to their information on  security concerns are promising but may not provide the portfolio-wide  information that decision makers need to make risk-informed decisions. CSP Shows Potential for Enhancing Security at Federal Courthouses, but Greater Transparency and Collaboration Could Improve the Program

		Officials at CSP Locations Cite Improvements in Security as a Result of the Program

Congress provided $20 million in obligational authority for the CSP in the  Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2012 and also provided obligational  authority for the program for fiscal years 2013, 2015, and 2016, which  GSA has designated for 11 projects in 10 locations. In addition to transparency improvements related to the selection  process, federal stakeholders have enhanced their collaboration during  CSP project execution. Further Opportunities to Improve Transparency and Collaboration of the CSP

Although federal stakeholders have taken the aforementioned positive  steps to improve CSP, not all of the issues with transparency and  collaboration have been addressed, in particular:
Key stakeholders were not clear on the eligibility of particular locations  for a CSP project and how to suggest locations for consideration. Key stakeholders hold varying views about how collaborative the  process to select CSP projects has been. By developing  approaches to provide stakeholders information that clearly describes  how all selection criteria are to be applied, how to put forth a location for  consideration, what specific costs are eligible for funding within a project,  how collaboration is to occur during project selection and execution, and  when and how to include all relevant agencies in each phase of the  project, stakeholders could be better assured that they all have the same  understanding of how the program is supposed to work, that the program  is addressing the most urgent needs and that the expertise of all  government stakeholders is being used to help ensure that the program is  as efficient as possible. Further, information that  agencies already collect is not readily shared with the other agencies. Federal Stakeholders Do Not Have an Effective Structure for Addressing Security Issues

We found that GSA, AOUSC, the Marshals Service, and FPS did not  routinely meet to address courthouse security problems at a national level  where decision-making authority exists. In fact, Marshals Service and  AOUSC officials said that there was no working group or forum where the  four agencies could discuss issues relevant to courthouse security at the  national level where decision-making authority exits. The  CSP was designed to be a less costly alternative to building new federal  courthouses and provides a way to add key security features. GSA agreed with our recommendations to improve CSP documentation  to improve transparency and collaboration and to establish a national- level working group or similar forum to meet regularly to address  courthouse security concerns. After the  law enforcement sensitive/limited official use version of this report was  issued, AOUSC provided additional information about actions it has taken  in response to this recommendation, including implementing of a  communications plan for all new CSP concept studies and ensuring that  all stakeholders are included in CSP concept, design, and construction  meetings. What actions, if any, could federal agencies take to improve  courthouse security? For each of the six site visit locations that  have had or will have a CSP project, we (1) toured the facility to observe  security concerns and how these concerns were (or will be) addressed in  a CSP project; (2) reviewed documentation including CSP concept plans,  security assessments and scores, and other reports indicating security  concerns; and (3) interviewed local officials from the General Services  Administration (GSA), Marshals Service, and FPS as well as local  judiciary officials, to obtain their views about physical security concerns  prior to the projects and how these concerns have or will be addressed by  the CSP, and about courthouse security concerns in general.
Why GAO Did This Study

The variety of civil and criminal cases tried in 400-plus federal courthouses can pose security risks. The CSP was started in 2012 and was designed to be a less costly alternative to building new federal courthouses by adding key security features to existing courthouses. Congress has provided $20 million in obligational authority for the program in each of the fiscal years that it has been funded.
GAO was asked to review physical security at federal courthouses. This report discusses (1) the extent to which federal stakeholders have identified security concerns; (2) how the CSP addresses courthouse security concerns; and (3) what actions federal agencies could take, if any, to improve courthouse security. GAO reviewed agency documents, AOUSC security scores, and interviewed officials from the Marshals Service, FPS, GSA, and AOUSC. GAO also visited eight courthouses to include six locations selected for CSP projects, and two that were considered but not selected. Although these site visits cannot be generalized to all CSP project locations or all federal courthouses, they provide insight into federal agencies' practices to secure courthouses.

What GAO Found

Three federal agencies—the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts (AOUSC), the U.S. Marshals Service (Marshals Service), and the Federal Protective Service (FPS)—collect information about security concerns at federal courthouses related to the agencies' respective missions. However, only AOUSC develops information that can be used to understand security concerns across the courthouse portfolio. In contrast, the Marshals Service and FPS collect information on security concerns on a building-by-building basis in varied ways, but the manner in which the information is collected prevents it from being used to understand portfolio-wide security concerns. This is inconsistent with GAO's risk management framework. Both agencies are taking steps to improve their information, but it is not clear whether these improvements will provide the portfolio-wide information stakeholders need to make risk-informed decisions.
The General Services Administration (GSA) has initiated 11 projects at 10 courthouse locations nationwide, as part of its Judiciary Capital Security Program (CSP); two projects have been completed. Local officials said that these projects have already improved or will improve security at the selected courthouses once completed. CSP improvements have been aimed at separating the paths of judges, prisoners, and the public, so that trial participants only meet in the courtroom. Transparency and collaboration issues have emerged among federal stakeholders as the program has been implemented. For example, not all key stakeholders GAO spoke to were clear on the eligibility of specific locations for CSP projects and varied in their views about how collaborative the process to select CSP projects has been. Although stakeholders have taken some steps to improve CSP transparency and collaboration as the program has evolved, some issues remain. Taking additional steps to improve documentation of decision-making and sharing this document with stakeholders could further enhance transparency and collaboration and better assure that all of the agencies and policy makers have the same understanding of how the program is supposed to work, that it is addressing the most urgent courthouse security needs, and that the expertise of all stakeholders is being used to ensure program efficiency.
GAO found that agencies could take additional actions to enhance security at federal courthouses by addressing a related GAO open recommendation, and establishing a formal mechanism such as a working group or forum to enhance coordination and information sharing. Specifically, in 2011, GAO recommended that the agencies update a 1997 memorandum of agreement to clarify their roles and responsibilities. This action has not been done although FPS has taken some steps to start the process. In addition, GAO found that GSA, AOUSC, the Marshals Service, and FPS had not routinely met to address courthouse security issues at a national level where decision-making authority exists. This lack of a formal meeting mechanism inhibits their ability to communicate regularly about their roles and responsibilities and share information about security concerns.
This is a public version of a law enforcement sensitive/limited official use report issued in October 2016.

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that (1) the Marshals Service and FPS improve the courthouse security information they collect; (2) GSA and AOUSC improve the CSP's transparency and collaboration through better documentation; and (3) GSA establish a working group or other forum to enhance coordination. The agencies concurred with GAO's recommendations.