	Background

The United States has assisted the Mexican government in its counternarcotics efforts since 1973, providing about $350 million in aid. Among other things, the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, requires the President to certify annually that major drug-producing and -transit countries are fully cooperating with the United States in their counternarcotics efforts. In 1997, the United States set the following objectives for evaluating Mexico’s counternarcotics cooperation as part of the 1998 certification process: (1) reducing the flow of drugs into the United States from Mexico, (2) disrupting and dismantling narco-trafficking organizations, (3) bringing fugitives to justice, (4) making progress in criminal justice and anticorruption reform, (5) improving money laundering and chemical diversion control, and (6) continuing improvement in cooperating with the United States. Some of the actions include (1) increasing counternarcotics cooperation with the United States; (2) initiating efforts to extradite Mexican criminals to the United States; (3) passing an organized crime law that enhanced the government’s authority against money laundering and illegal use and diversion of precursor and essential chemicals; and (4) implementing measures aimed at reducing corruption, such as increasing the role of Mexico’s military forces in law enforcement activities. Although no Mexican national has ever been surrendered to the United States on drug-related charges, since 1996 Mexico has approved the extradition of 4 of 27 Mexican nationals charged with drug-related offenses. In addition, there is no reporting requirement on currency leaving the country. Although all of Mexico’s actions are positive steps to reducing drug-related activities, there are still many issues that need to be resolved. For example,
U.S. and Mexican officials indicated that personnel shortages exist in the Special Prosecutor’s office and the special units; the special units face operational and support problems, including inadequate Mexican government funding for equipment, fuel, and salary supplements for personnel assigned to the units, and the lack of standard operating procedures;
U.S. law enforcement agents assigned to the Bilateral Task Forces cannot carry arms in Mexico; and
Mexico continues to have difficulty building competent law enforcement institutions because of low salaries and little job security. Planning and Coordination of U.S.-Provided Assistance

U.S.-provided assistance has enhanced the counternarcotics capabilities of Mexico’s military. However, the effectiveness and usefulness of some equipment provided or sold to Mexico is limited due to inadequate planning and coordination among U.S. agencies, particularly military agencies within DOD. As a result of this visit, the Mexican military agreed to accept U.S. counternarcotics assistance. DOD plans to provide about $13 million worth of counternarcotics assistance under section 1004 of the Defense Authorization Act of 1989 to Mexico’s military in fiscal year 1998. While some of the equipment has helped improve Mexico’s capabilities, some has been of limited usefulness. Additionally, inadequate logistics support to the Mexican military has hindered its efforts to reduce drug-related activities in Mexico. We believe that planning and coordination of U.S. counternarcotics assistance to Mexico could be improved. Performance Measures for U.S. and Mexican Drug Control Efforts

Without measures of effectiveness, it is difficult for U.S. decisionmakers to evaluate the progress that the United States and Mexico are making to reduce the flow of illegal drugs into the United States. We have previously noted the need for ONDCP to develop drug control plans that include performance measures to allow it to assess the effectiveness of antidrug programs.
Why GAO Did This Study

Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO discussed its work on the counternarcotics efforts of the United States in Mexico, focusing on the: (1) nature of the drug threat from Mexico and results of efforts to address this threat; (2) planning and coordination of U.S. counternarcotics assistance to the Mexican military; and (3) need to establish performance measures to assess the effectiveness of U.S. and Mexican counternarcotics efforts.

What GAO Found

GAO noted that: (1) Mexico is the principle transit country for cocaine entering the United States and, despite U.S. and Mexican counternarcotics efforts, the flow of illegal drugs into the United States from Mexico has not significantly diminished; (2) no country poses a more immediate narcotics threat to the United States than Mexico, according to the Department of State; (3) the 2,000-mile U.S.-Mexican border and the daunting volume of legitimate cross-border traffic provide near-limitless opportunities for smuggling illicit drugs, weapons, and proceeds of crime, and for escape by fugitives; (4) Mexico, with U.S. assistance, has taken steps to improve its capacity to reduce the flow of illegal drugs into the United States; (5) among other things, the Mexican government has taken action that could potentially lead to the extradition of drug criminals to the United States and passed new laws on organized crime, money laundering, and chemical control; (6) it has also instituted reforms in law enforcement agencies and expanded the role of the military in counternarcotics activities to reduce corruption--the most significant impediment to successfully diminishing drug-related activities; (7) while Mexico's actions represent positive steps, it is too early to determine their impact, and challenges to their full implementation remain; (8) no Mexico national has actually been surrendered to the United States on drug charges, new laws are not fully implemented, and building competent judicial and law enforcement institutions continues to be a major challenge; (9) since fiscal year 1996, Department of Defense (DOD) has provided the Mexican military with $76 million worth of equipment, training, and spare parts; (10) the Mexican military has used this equipment to improve its counternarcotics efforts; (11) however, due, in part, to inadequate planning and coordination within DOD, the assistance provided has been of limited effectiveness and usefulness; (12) improved planning and coordination could improve Mexico's counternarcotics effectiveness; (13) although the Mexican government has agreed to a series of actions to improve its counternarcotics capacity, and the United States has begun to provide a larger level of assistance, at the present time there is no system in place to assess their effectiveness; and (14) even though the United States and Mexico have recently issued a binational drug control strategy, it does not include performance measures.