U.S. Efforts to Provide Radiation Detection Equipment to Other Countries Face Corruption, Maintenance, and Coordination Challenges

One of the main U.S. efforts providing radiation detection equipment to  foreign governments is DOE’s Second Line of Defense program, which  began installing equipment at key sites in Russia in 1998. According to  DOE, through the end of fiscal year 2005, the program had spent about  $130 million to complete installations at 83 sites, mostly in Russia. Ultimately, DOE plans to install radiation detection equipment at a total of  about 350 sites in 31 countries by 2012 at a total cost of about $570 million. In addition to DOE’s efforts, other U.S. agencies also have programs that  provide radiation detection equipment and training to foreign  governments. However, these agencies face a number of challenges that could  compromise their programs’ effectiveness, including (1) corruption of  foreign border security officials, (2) technical limitations of equipment at  some foreign sites, (3) problems with maintenance of handheld equipment,  and (4) the lack of infrastructure and harsh environmental conditions at  some border sites. We also reported that State’s ability to carry out its role as lead  interagency coordinator of U.S. radiation detection equipment assistance  has been limited by deficiencies in its strategic plan for interagency  coordination and by its lack of a comprehensive list of all U.S. radiation  detection equipment assistance. For example, according to information we received from program  managers at DOE, DOD, and State, more than 7,000 pieces of handheld  radiation detection equipment had been provided to 36 foreign countries  through the end of fiscal year 2005. DHS Has Made Progress in Deploying Radiation Detection Equipment at U.S. Ports of Entry, but Concerns Remain

Through December 2005, DHS had installed about 670 radiation portal  monitors nationwide— about 22 percent of the portal monitors DHS plans  to deploy—at international mail and express courier facilities, land border  crossings, and seaports in the United States. DHS plans to  deploy 3,034 portal monitors by September 2009 at a cost of $1.3 billion. However, the final costs and deployment schedule are highly uncertain  because of delays in releasing appropriated funds to contractors,  difficulties in negotiating with seaport operators, and uncertainties in the  type and cost of radiation detection equipment DHS plans to deploy. CBP’s guidance does  not specifically require officers to open containers and inspect their  interiors, even when their external examination cannot unambiguously  resolve the alarm. We found  that CBP inspectors lack access to NRC license data that could be used to  authenticate a license at the border. Related GAO Products

Combating Nuclear Smuggling: DHS Has Made Progress in Deploying  Radiation Detection Equipment at U.S. Ports of Entry, but Concerns  Remain. Container Security: Current Efforts to Detect Nuclear Materials, New  Initiatives, and Challenges. Nuclear Nonproliferation: U.S. Efforts to Combat Nuclear Smuggling. This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the  United States.
Why GAO Did This Study

GAO is releasing two reports today on U.S. efforts to combat nuclear smuggling in foreign countries and in the United States. Together with the March 2005 report on the Department of Energy's Megaports Initiative, these reports represent GAO's analysis of the U.S. effort to deploy radiation detection equipment worldwide. In my testimony, I will discuss (1) the progress made and challenges faced by the Departments of Energy (DOE), Defense (DOD), and State in providing radiation detection equipment to foreign countries and (2) the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) efforts to install radiation detection equipment at U.S. ports of entry and challenges it faces.

What GAO Found

Regarding the deployment of radiation detection equipment in foreign countries, DOE, DOD, and State have spent about $178 million since fiscal year 1994 to provide equipment and related training to 36 countries. For example, through the end of fiscal year 2005, DOE's Second Line of Defense program had completed installation of equipment at 83 sites, mostly in Russia. However, these agencies face a number of challenges that could compromise their efforts, including corruption of foreign border security officials, technical limitations and inadequate maintenance of some equipment, and the lack of supporting infrastructure at some border sites. To address these challenges, U.S. agencies plan to take a number of steps, including combating corruption by installing multitiered communications systems that establish redundant layers of accountability for alarm response. State coordinates U.S. programs to limit overlap and duplication of effort. However, State's ability to carry out this role has been limited by deficiencies in its interagency strategic plan and its lack of a comprehensive list of all U.S. radiation detection equipment provided to other countries. Domestically, DHS had installed about 670 radiation portal monitors through December 2005 and provided complementary handheld radiation detection equipment at U.S. ports of entry at a cost of about $286 million. DHS plans to install a total of 3,034 radiation portal monitors by the end of fiscal year 2009 at a total cost of $1.3 billion. However, the final costs and deployment schedule are highly uncertain because of delays in releasing appropriated funds to contractors, difficulties in negotiating with seaport operators, and uncertainties in the type and cost of radiation detection equipment DHS plans to deploy. Overall, GAO found that U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) officers have made progress in using radiation detection equipment correctly and adhering to inspection guidelines, but CBP's secondary inspection procedures could be improved. For example, GAO recommended that DHS require its officers to open containers and inspect them for nuclear and radioactive materials when they cannot make a determination from an external inspection and that DHS work with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to institute procedures by which inspectors can validate NRC licenses at U.S. ports of entry.