Early Deploying Units Lack Required Equipment

During the Gulf War, units and individuals often deployed without all the chemical and biological detection, decontamination, and protective equipment they needed to operate in a contaminated environment. Numerous other activities also dependent on operation and maintenance funding are being given a higher priority than chemical defense equipment by all the early deploying active Army divisions we visited. Research and Development Progress Is Slower Than Planned

At the beginning of the Gulf War, U.S. forces were vulnerable because the services lacked such things as (1) effective mobile systems for detecting and reporting chemical or biological agents; (2) a decontaminate solution suitable for use in sensitive interior areas of aircraft, ships, and vehicles; and (3) a suitable method for decontaminating large areas such as ports and airfields. Since the Gulf War, the services have acted to improve their chemical and biological training. Conclusions

Although DOD has improved chemical and biological defense capability since the Gulf War, many problems of the type experienced during this war continue to exist. Recommendations

We could not determine whether increased emphasis on chemical and biological warfare defense is warranted at the expense of other priorities. Direct the Secretary of the Army and the Commandant of the Marine Corps to ensure that all combat training centers routinely emphasize and include chemical and biological training, and that this training is conducted in a realistic manner. Our objectives were to determine (1) DOD’s actions to address chemical and biological warfare defense problems identified during the Gulf War and (2) the current preparedness of these forces to operate in a contaminated environment. To determine the preparedness of U.S. ground forces to operate in a chemical or biological environment, we focused on three areas: the availability of critical chemical and biological defense equipment, such as protective suits, masks, and alarms; the adequacy of chemical and biological training, including the extent to which tasks are conducted in joint and service training; and the availability of medical countermeasures to prevent and treat chemical and biological casualties, including supplies of critical vaccines and medical procedures to decontaminate and evacuate casualties. 4.
Why GAO Did This Study

Pursuant to a legislative requirement, GAO reviewed U.S. chemical and biological warfare defense capabilities, focusing on: (1) the chemical and biological warfare defense problems identified during the Gulf War; and (2) the preparedness of early-deploying ground forces to survive and fight in a chemically or biologically contaminated environment.

What GAO Found

GAO found that: (1) the Department of Defense (DOD) has taken steps to improve the readiness of U.S. forces to operate in chemically or biologically contaminated environments, but equipment, training, and medical shortcomings persist and could cause needless casualties and a degradation of U.S. combat capability; (2) during the Gulf War, many early-deploying units did not have all of the chemical and biological detection, decontamination, and protective equipment they needed; (3) the services continue to place lower emphasis on chemical and biological defense activities than on other high-priority activities; (4) research and development efforts to improve the detection and decontamination of biological and chemical agents have progressed slower than planned because of other priorities and personnel shortages; (5) the Army and Marine Corps have acted to improve their biological and chemical training, but many problems encountered during the Gulf War persist; (6) there was little biological or chemical defense training included in joint training exercises because regional commanders in chief (CINC) believe that this training is the responsibility of the individual services and have assigned other types of training a higher priority; (7) medical units often lack adequate biological agent vaccine stocks and immunization plans, appropriate defense equipment, and sufficient instruction on how equipment is to be used; and (8) the lower emphasis the services give to chemical and biological defense activities is reflected in the funding, staffing, monitoring, and mission priority levels dedicated to these activities.