	Introduction

Article III of the Constitution defines the proper scope of the federal courts' jurisdiction as limited to adjudicating "Cases" and "Controversies." The Supreme Court has articulated several legal doctrines emanating from Article III that restrict when federal courts will adjudicate disputes, such as standing, ripeness, mootness, and the prohibition against issuing advisory opinions. One justiciability concept is the "political question" doctrine—according to which federal courts will not adjudicate certain controversies because their resolution is more proper within the political branches. Because the doctrine implicates the separation of powers, application of the political question doctrine has sparked controversy. For example, the doctrine has regularly been invoked in federal courts in cases concerning foreign policy. Understanding exactly when the doctrine applies, however, can be difficult. Origins of the Political Question Doctrine

The origins of the political question doctrine can be traced back to Chief Justice Marshall's opinion in Marbury v. Madison . The Court thus ruled that the Equal Protection claim was justiciable, and outlined six matters that could present political questions in other circumstances:
[1] a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or [2] a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or [3] the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or [4] the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or [5] an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or [6] the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question. In addition, the Court in Baker noted that cases implicating foreign policy could frequently pose political questions, and explained that in such cases the Court engages in a "a discriminating analysis of the particular question posed, in terms of the history of its management by the political branches, of its susceptibility to judicial handling in the light of its nature and posture in the specific case, and of the possible consequences of judicial action." It characterized the political question doctrine as "essentially a function of the separation of powers"; but the factors it listed nonetheless appear to include both constitutional and prudential considerations. This "new political question doctrine" permitted the court to decline to adjudicate a case "regardless whether the court would actually have to decide a political question in order to resolve it." This reasoning appears to be buttressed by courts' conclusion that foreign policy decisions are committed to the political branches. Narrowing the Scope of the Doctrine

		Zivotofsky v. Clinton

Recently, in Zivotofsky v. Clinton , the Court rejected application of the political question doctrine to a plaintiff's statutory claim, and harnessed an interpretive approach that may have narrowed the doctrine's scope. Instead, Zivotofsky requests that the courts enforce a specific statutory right"; which required the Court to determine if the plaintiff interpreted the statute correctly, and whether the statute was constitutional.
Article III of the Constitution restricts the jurisdiction of federal courts to deciding actual "Cases" and "Controversies." The Supreme Court has articulated several "justiciability" doctrines emanating from Article III that restrict when federal courts will adjudicate disputes. One justiciability concept is the political question doctrine, according to which federal courts will not adjudicate certain controversies because their resolution is more proper within the political branches. Because of the potential implications for the separation of powers when courts decline to adjudicate certain issues, application of the political question doctrine has sparked controversy. Because there is no precise test for when a court should find a political question, however, understanding exactly when the doctrine applies can be difficult.
The doctrine's origins can be traced to Chief Justice Marshall's opinion in Marbury v. Madison; but its modern application stems from Baker v. Carr, which provides six independent factors that can present political questions. These factors encompass both constitutional and prudential considerations, but the Court has not clearly explained how they are to be applied. Further, commentators have disagreed about the doctrine's foundation: some see political questions as limited to constitutional grants of authority to a coordinate branch of government, while others see the doctrine as a tool for courts to avoid adjudicating an issue best resolved outside of the judicial branch. Supreme Court case law after Baker fails to resolve the matter. The Court has historically applied the doctrine in a small but disparate number of cases, without applying clear rules for lower courts to follow. Possibly as a result of the murky nature of the doctrine, it has regularly been invoked in lower federal courts in cases concerning foreign policy.
However, a recent Supreme Court case, Zivotofsky v. Clinton, appears to have narrowed the scope of the political question doctrine. In a suit seeking the vindication of a statutory right in the foreign affairs context, the Court reversed a lower court's finding that the case posed a political question. The Court explained that the proper analysis in such a situation begins not by asking whether adjudicating the case would require review of the foreign policy decisions of the political branches, but instead examining whether the plaintiff correctly interpreted the statute, followed by determining whether the statute was constitutional.
The Court's opinion appears to restrict the types of claims that can pose political questions, and seems to encourage courts to decide more statutory claims on the merits. In turn, the decision could lead to increased judicial resolution of controversies concerning the separation of powers, rather than resolutions between the political branches themselves.