Therefore, NCTC did not send the nomination to TSC. 2010 Guidance Addresses Weaknesses in Nominations Process, but Agencies Face Challenges in Managing Increased Volumes of Information

		Changes to Watchlisting Guidance and Impacts on Agencies

The July 2010 Watchlisting Guidance includes changes that were  intended to address weaknesses in the nominations process that were  exposed by the December 2009 attempted attack and to clarify how  agencies are to nominate individuals to the watchlist. Since the December 25, 2009, attempted attack, agencies involved in the  watchlist nominations process have pursued staffing, technology, working  groups, and other solutions to strengthen the process and manage  increasing volumes of information. The Number of Individuals on the Watchlist and Aviation-Related Subsets Increased after the Attempted Attack

Immediately after the December 2009 attempted attack, federal agencies  took steps that resulted in an increase in the number of individuals in the  TSDB and its aviation-related subsets—the No Fly and Selectee lists— based on new intelligence and threat information. Also, upon completion of this initiative, the number of U.S. persons on the  No Fly List more than doubled and the number of U.S. persons on the  Selectee List increased by about 10 percent. For example, TSA  actions have resulted in more individuals being denied boarding aircraft or  subjected to enhanced screening before boarding. State took actions to revoke  hundreds of U.S. visas immediately after the attempted attack because it  determined that the individuals could present an immediate threat. TSA Has Encountered More Individuals on the No Fly and Selectee Lists and Is Screening against More Watchlist Records

			No Fly and Selectee List Encounters

After the attempted attack, TSA continued implementation of the Secure  Flight program, which enabled TSA to assume direct responsibility for  determining if individuals are matches to the No Fly or Selectee lists from  air carriers. Appendix III contains additional  information on how Secure Flight has reduced the likelihood of  passengers being misidentified as being on the watchlist and related  inconveniences. Upon arrival at a  U.S. port of entry, CBP would inspect the passengers and determine their  admissibility. Routinely assessing these outcomes and impacts governmentwide could  help decision makers determine if the watchlist is achieving its intended  results without having unintended consequences or needs further  revisions. Since the  guidance was approved, agencies have expressed concerns about the  increasing volumes of information and related challenges in processing  this information. Recommendations for Executive Action

To help inform future efforts to strengthen watchlisting and screening  processes, we recommend that the Assistant to the President for  Homeland Security and Counterterrorism establish mechanisms or use  existing interagency bodies to routinely assess how the watchlisting guidance has impacted the watchlisting  community—including its capacity to submit and process nominations  in accordance with provisions in the guidance—and whether any  adjustments to agency programs or the guidance are needed, and whether use of the watchlist during agency screening processes is  achieving intended results, including whether the overall outcomes  and impacts of screening on agency resources and the traveling  public are acceptable and manageable or if adjustments to agency  programs or the watchlisting guidance are needed. The CIA did not provide any  comments. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

	Objectives

Our reporting objectives were to determine (1) the actions the federal  government has taken since the December 25, 2009, attempted attack to  strengthen the watchlist nominations process, the extent to which  departments and agencies are experiencing challenges in implementing  revised watchlisting guidance, and the extent to which agencies are  assessing impacts of the actions they have taken; (2) how the  composition of the watchlist has changed as a result of actions taken by  departments and agencies after the attempted attack; and (3) how  screening and law enforcement agencies are addressing vulnerabilities  exposed by the attempted attack as well as the outcomes of related  screening, and to what extent federal agencies are assessing the impacts  of this screening. Screening and Law Enforcement Agency Actions

To identify how screening and law enforcement agencies have addressed  vulnerabilities exposed by the attempted attack and how they are  assessing the outcomes and impacts of screening or vetting, we focused  on the departments and agencies that use the watchlist to screen  individuals traveling to the United States—the Transportation Security  Administration (TSA), which screens passengers before they board  aircraft; U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), which inspects  travelers to determine their admissibility into the United States; and State,  which screens individuals who apply for U.S. visas. We obtained data—generally for 2009 and 2010 but in some  cases through May 2011—on how often these agencies have  encountered individuals on the watchlist and the outcomes of these  encounters to help determine what impact changes in agency screening  or vetting procedures has had on operations and the traveling public,  among other things. We issued a classified report on this work in December 2011. Figure 2 provides an overview of the process used to nominate  individuals for inclusion in the TSDB.
Why GAO Did This Study

The December 25, 2009, attempted bombing of Northwest Flight 253 exposed weaknesses in how the federal government nominated individuals to the terrorist watchlist and gaps in how agencies used the list to screen individuals to determine if they posed a security threat. In response, the President tasked agencies to take corrective actions. GAO was asked to assess (1) government actions since the incident to strengthen the nominations process, (2) how the composition of the watchlist has changed based on these actions, and (3) how agencies are addressing gaps in screening processes. GAO analyzed government reports, the guidance used by agencies to nominate individuals to the watchlist, data on the volumes of nominations from January 2009 through May 2011, the composition of the list, and the outcomes of screening agency programs. GAO also interviewed officials from intelligence, law enforcement, and screening agencies to discuss changes to policies, guidance, and processes and related impacts on agency operations and the traveling public, among other things. This report is a public version of the classified report that GAO issued in December 2011 and omits certain information, such as details on the nominations guidance and the specific outcomes of screening processes.

What GAO Found

In July 2010, the federal government finalized guidance to address weaknesses in the watchlist nominations process that were exposed by the December 2009 attempted attack and to clarify how agencies are to nominate individuals to the watchlist. The nominating agencies GAO contacted expressed concerns about the increasing volumes of information and related challenges in processing this information. Nevertheless, nominating agencies are sending more information for inclusion in the terrorist watchlist after the attempted attack than before the attempted attack. Agencies are also pursuing staffing, technology, and other solutions to address challenges in processing the volumes of information. In 2011, an interagency policy committee began an initiative to assess the initial impacts the guidance has had on nominating agencies, but did not provide details on whether such assessments would be routinely conducted in the future. Routine assessments could help the government determine the extent to which impacts are acceptable and manageable from a policy perspective and inform future efforts to strengthen the nominations process.
After the attempted attack, federal agencies took steps to reassess the threat posed by certain individuals already identified in government databases and either add them to the watchlist or change their watchlist status, which included adding individuals to the watchlist’s aviation-related subset lists. For example, the number of U.S. persons (U.S. citizens and lawful permanent residents) on the subset No Fly List the government uses to deny individuals the boarding of aircraft more than doubled after the attempted attack.
Screening agencies are addressing gaps in processes that were exposed by the attempted attack. For example, based on the growth of lists used to screen aviation passengers and continued implementation of Secure Flight—which enabled the Transportation Security Administration to assume direct responsibility for conducting watchlist screening from air carriers—more individuals have been denied boarding aircraft or subjected to additional physical screening before boarding. Secure Flight has also reduced the likelihood of passengers being misidentified as being on the watchlist and has allowed agencies to use a broader set of watchlist records during screening. U.S. Customs and Border Protection has built upon its practice of evaluating individuals before they board flights to the United States, resulting in hundreds more non-U.S. persons on the watchlist being kept off flights because the agency determined they would likely be deemed inadmissible upon arrival at a U.S. airport. The Department of State revoked hundreds of visas shortly after the attempted attack because it determined that the individuals could present an immediate threat to the United States. These actions are intended to enhance homeland security, but have also impacted agency resources and the traveling public. An interagency policy committee is also assessing the outcomes and impacts of these actions, but it did not provide details on this effort. Routine assessments could help decision makers and Congress determine if the watchlist is achieving its intended outcomes and help information future efforts.

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism ensure that the outcomes and impacts of agencies’ actions to strengthen nominations and screening processes are routinely assessed. Technical comments were provided and incorporated.