More Public Diplomacy Resources Shifting to Muslim- Majority Countries

Since September 11, State has expanded its efforts in Muslim-majority  countries that are considered strategically important in the war on  terrorism. State has also launched a number of new initiatives targeting  broader, younger audiences—particularly in predominantly Muslim  countries— that include expanding exchange programs targeting citizens  of Muslim countries, informing foreign publics about U.S. policies in the  war on terrorism, and demonstrating that Americans and Muslims share  certain values. The BBG has also targeted recent initiatives to support the  war on terrorism, including Radio Sawa in the Middle East; the  Afghanistan Radio Network; and the new Radio Farda service to Iran. State Has Increased Resources and Programs in the Middle East

Since September 11, 2001, the State Department has increased its  resources and launched various new initiatives in predominantly Muslim  countries. In contrast to State, the BBG  has a strategic plan that focuses on a market-based approach to increasing  audience size in priority markets. Furthermore, there is no interagency  strategy to guide State’s and all federal agencies’ communication efforts  and thus ensure consistent messages to overseas audiences. In addition,  State and the BBG lacked adequate measures of progress toward reaching  its public diplomacy goals. Since our report, State and the Board have  focused on improving their performance measures. State Does Not Have an Integrated Strategy to Guide its Operations but BBG Does

After September 11, State acknowledged the lack of, and need for, a  strategy that integrates all of its diverse public diplomacy activities and  directs them toward common objectives, but to date, that strategy is still in  the development stage. State Lacks Measures of Progress Toward Public Diplomacy Goals

Mr. Chairman, in addition to deficiencies in public diplomacy strategies,  we found that State is not systematically and comprehensively measuring  progress toward its public diplomacy goals. BBG Has Made Progress in Measuring Performance

In conducting our work on the BBG strategic plan, we found that the plan  did not include a single goal or related program objective designed to  gauge progress toward increasing audience size, even though its strategy  focuses on the need to reach large audiences in priority markets. A Number of Internal Challenges Hamper U.S. Public Diplomacy Activities

Mr. Chairman, I have discussed the expansion of U.S. public diplomacy  resources to areas of the world thought to breed terrorist activities and the  need for a more cohesive, integrated U.S. public diplomacy strategy with  measurable indicators of progress. The Board’s key challenge  in executing its strategy is how to generate large audiences while dealing  with a number of media market, organizational, and resources issues. This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the  United States.
Why GAO Did This Study

The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, were a dramatic reminder of the importance of our need to cultivate a better public opinion of the United States abroad. Yet recent opinion research indicates that foreign publics, especially in countries with large Muslim populations, view the United States unfavorably. GAO issued two studies in 2003 that examined changes in U.S. public diplomacy resources and programs since September 11 within the State Department (State) and the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG); the U.S. government's strategies for its public diplomacy programs and how it measures their effectiveness; and the challenges that remain in executing U.S. public diplomacy efforts. Although the studies did not focus exclusively on the Middle East, they identified systemic problems that would apply to public diplomacy activities there.

What GAO Found

Since September 11, State has expanded its public diplomacy efforts in Muslim-majority countries considered to be of strategic importance in the war on terrorism. It significantly increased resources in South Asia and the Near East and launched new initiatives targeting broader, younger audiences--particularly in predominantly Muslim countries. Also since September 11, the BBG has initiated several new programs focused on attracting larger audiences in priority markets, including Radio Sawa and Arabic language television in the Middle East, the Afghanistan Radio Network, and Radio Farda in Iran. State and BBG have increased their efforts to support the war on terrorism. However, State does not have a strategy that integrates all of its diverse public diplomacy activities and directs them toward common objectives. In addition, we found that while the BBG did have a strategic plan, the plan lacked a long-term strategic goal or related program objective to gauge the Board's success in increasing audience size, the key focus of its plan. Furthermore, there is no interagency strategy to guide State's, BBG's, and all federal agencies' communication efforts and thus ensure consistent messages to overseas audiences. In addition to strategy deficiencies, we found that State and the BBG were not systematically and comprehensively measuring progress toward the goals of reaching broader audiences and increasing publics' understanding about the United States. In addition to weaknesses in planning and performance measurement, State and BBG face several internal challenges in carrying out their programs. Challenges at State include insufficient public diplomacy resources and a lack of officers with foreign language proficiency. The BBG also faces a number of media market, organizational, and resource challenges that may hamper its efforts to generate large audiences in priority markets.