To assess what controls TSA put in place to help ensure uniform and  timely review of air carrier requests to deploy electric stun devices on  board commercial aircraft, we reviewed TSA’s handling of these requests  and compared this process to our Standards for Internal Control in the  Federal Government. Although various federal and  other organizations have reviewed the health effects that electric stun  devices have on individuals, studies have not been conducted in an in- flight environment. NIJ concluded that the use of these devices in  accordance with appropriate policies and training may be an effective  means for flight deck crews to thwart an attack. Similarly, in a report to  Congress issued in May 2003, TSA generally concurred with NIJ’s  conclusion and further concluded that commercial aviation security may  be enhanced through deployment of these devices. However, some susceptible  populations such as the elderly and those who have a sustained history of  alcohol and illicit drug use may be at greater risk for negative outcomes. Federal Reviews Conclude Electric Stun Devices May Enhance Commercial Aviation Security, but Supporting Analysis Is Limited

In its April 2002 report, NIJ concluded that electric stun devices, used in  accordance with appropriate policies and training, may have the potential  to allow flight deck crews to thwart an attack while an aircraft is in  flight—i.e. However, the report did not  include any empirical testing of electric stun devices in an aircraft setting  to demonstrate how they would enhance security. TSA Has Not Established Internal Controls to Help Ensure Uniform and Timely Review Regarding Requests for Use of Electric Stun Devices

TSA has not established processes and procedures for reviewing requests  from air carriers to deploy electric stun devices on board their aircraft that  include (1) well defined key areas of authority and responsibility,   (2) clearly communicated information regarding decision-making criteria  to TSA decision makers and their external stakeholders, and (3) a records  system to account for handling of requests and supporting  documentation—three key internal controls called for by the Standards for  Internal Control in the Federal Government. Specifically, without a well-defined  organizational area or individual with responsibility for receiving and  reviewing requests, TSA cannot be a responsive and effective partner with  private sector air carriers. Without established and  clearly communicated information regarding decision-making criteria,  within TSA and for its external stakeholders, TSA lacks reasonable  assurance that its decision making will be uniform, consistent, and  compatible with its mission. Recommendations for Executive Action

In order to help ensure TSA’s review and approval process for the use of  any less-than-lethal weapons, including electric stun devices, is  responsive, uniform, accountable, consistently applied and serves the  public interest, we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security  direct the Assistant Secretary, Transportation Security Administration, to  take the following two actions, should commercial air carrier interest in  deploying these devices resume:    Ensure that there is sufficiently reliable research supporting the use of  less-than-lethal devices being requested that, at a minimum, address the  appropriateness of their usage in the unique aircraft environment,  including passenger safety, how the use of these devices would enhance  security, and the effects of these devices on the safe operation of the  aircraft.
Why GAO Did This Study

The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has authority to approve air carrier requests to deploy less-than-lethal weapons, including electric stun devices, onboard commercial aircraft to thwart an attack. Since the terrorist attacks of 2001, one air carrier received approval to deploy electric stun devices. To address concerns regarding reports of injuries after the use of these devices and to ensure that the impacts of these devices onboard aircraft have been fully evaluated, this report answers the following: (1) What analyses has the federal government conducted to assess the safety and effectiveness of these devices onboard commercial aircraft? (2) What controls does TSA have in place to help ensure uniform and timely review of air carrier requests to deploy these devices onboard commercial aircraft?

What GAO Found

The Transportation Security Administration and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) have conducted reviews addressing the effect of electric stun devices on aircraft. Plus, various federal as well as other organizations examined the health effects that electric stun devices have on individuals. But, no studies of health effects have been conducted in an in-flight environment. Moreover, according to NIJ, although electric stun devices have been used successfully many times to subdue suspects, certain compromised populations, such as the elderly and those with a history drug and alcohol abuse, may be at risk for negative outcomes. In April 2002, NIJ concluded that the use of electric stun devices in accordance with appropriate policies and training may be an effective means for flight deck crews to thwart an attack but should not be deployed without further testing. Similarly, in a 2003 report to Congress, TSA generally concurred with NIJ's conclusions. But, neither review included in-flight testing or empirical testing of these devices that would demonstrate that they would enhance security. TSA's position is that empirical data, particularly in an aircraft environment, is necessary to determine if these devices can be used safely and effectively. TSA lacks key internal controls, to help ensure uniformity in decision making and a transparent process to review requests to deploy electric stun devices onboard commercial aircraft. Specifically, TSA (1) lacks a well-defined organizational area with responsibility to receive and review requests, (2) has not established formal criteria for decision making to approve requests and has not communicated criteria to external stakeholders, and (3) maintained little documentation of its decision making and activities to account for its handling of past requests. Without clearly defined approval criteria and a point of contact, TSA cannot reasonably assure that its decision making is uniform and consistent, nor can it provide a transparent request and approval process for air carriers.