Pre-Katrina Preparations Did Not Fully Address the Military Capabilities Needed during a Catastrophic Natural Disaster

Prior to Hurricane Katrina, disaster plans and training exercises involving  the military were insufficient, and did not incorporate lessons learned  from past catastrophes to fully delineate the military capabilities that  could be needed to respond to a catastrophic natural disaster. Moreover, disaster plans had not been tested and refined with a robust  exercise program. As a result of the inadequate plans—and the lack of  realistic exercises to test those plans—a lack of understanding existed  within the military and among federal, state, and local responders as to the  types of assistance and capabilities that the military might provide, the  timing of this assistance, and the respective contributions of the active- duty and National Guard components. DOD’s Supporting Plan Lacked Details About the Military Response to Catastrophic Natural Disasters

While the military’s approach to planning is well defined, prior to  Hurricane Katrina, DOD did not develop a detailed plan to account for the  full range of tasks and missions the military could need to provide in the  event of a catastrophe. In general, a feasible plan would anticipate the  personnel and resources that might be required in response to a  catastrophic event. Moreover,  the functional plan did not establish time frames for the response. Prior to Katrina, the Mississippi and Louisiana National Guard plans were  not synchronized with DOD’s plans, and they were also inadequate for a  catastrophe of Katrina’s magnitude. The Military’s Response to Hurricane Katrina was Massive but Faced Several Challenges

Even though there was a lack of detailed planning, the military mounted a  massive response to Hurricane Katrina that saved many lives and greatly  assisted recovery efforts, but several factors affected this response. During  the response to Katrina, a number of interrelated factors affected the  military’s ability to leverage its resources to gain situational awareness and  effectively organize and execute its response efforts. Some factors that  affected the military response were: a lack of timely damage assessments,  communications difficulties, problems integrating the use and capabilities  of active-duty and National Guard forces, uncoordinated search and  rescue efforts, and challenges with the significant logistics functions that  FEMA unexpectedly turned over to DOD. Active-duty  forces were alerted prior to landfall and the initial buildup of active-duty  forces shown in figure 1 reflects the deployment of key active-duty  capabilities such as aviation, medical, and engineering forces. Growing  concerns about the magnitude of the disaster prompted DOD to deploy  large active-duty ground units beginning on September 3, 2005, 5 days after  Katrina’s landfall. In addition, some  National Guard responders were short of equipment. DOD Has Begun Taking Actions to Address Catastrophic Disaster Response Problems, Some of Which are Complex and Long-standing

DOD is aware of disaster response problems described in this report and is  beginning to take actions to address the lessons learned from Hurricane  Katrina and to prepare for the next catastrophic event. While it is too early to fully evaluate the  effectiveness of these ongoing and planned actions, many appear to hold  promise for improving future responses. Substantial  improvement to the military’s disaster and catastrophe response will  require sustained attention from management at the highest levels of DOD  and from key officials across the government. Many of the problems encountered during  the Katrina response were also reported after Hurricane Andrew in 1992. Without urgent  and detailed attention to improve planning, the military and federal  government risk being unprepared for the next catastrophe. Joint Force Headquarters, Jackson, Ms.
To assess the extent to which pre-Katrina plans and training exercises  reflected the military assistance that might be required during a  catastrophic, domestic, natural disaster, we analyzed planning and  directive documents related to military support to civil authority, such as  the Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support, and the Military  Support and Assistance to Civil Authorities directives, and state plans.
Why GAO Did This Study

Hurricane Katrina was one of the largest natural disasters in U.S. history. Despite a large deployment of resources at all levels, many have regarded the federal response as inadequate. GAO has a body of ongoing work that covers the federal government's preparedness and response to hurricanes Katrina and Rita. Due to widespread congressional interest, this review was performed under the Comptroller General's authority. It examined (1) the extent to which pre-Katrina plans and training exercises reflected the military assistance that might be required during a catastrophic, domestic, natural disaster, (2) the military support provided in response to Katrina and factors that affected that response, and (3) the actions the military is taking to address lessons learned from Katrina and to prepare for the next catastrophe.

What GAO Found

The military mounted a massive response to Hurricane Katrina that saved many lives and greatly assisted recovery efforts but many lessons are emerging. Prior to Hurricane Katrina, disaster plans and exercises did not incorporate lessons learned from past catastrophes to fully delineate the military capabilities needed to respond to a catastrophe. For example, the government's National Response Plan made little distinction between the military response to a smaller regional disaster and its response to a catastrophic natural disaster. In addition, DOD's emergency response plan for providing military assistance to civil authorities during disasters lacked adequate detail. The plan did not: account for the full range of assistance that might be provided by DOD, divide tasks between the National Guard and the federal responders, or establish response time frames. National Guard state plans were also inadequate and did not account for the level of outside assistance that would be needed during a catastrophe, and they were not synchronized with federal plans. Moreover, plans had not been tested with a robust exercise program. None of the exercises that were conducted prior to Katrina called for a major deployment of DOD capabilities in response to a catastrophic hurricane. As a result, a lack of understanding exists within the military and among federal, state, and local responders as to the types of assistance and capabilities that DOD might provide in the event of a catastrophe, the timing of this assistance, and the respective contributions of the active-duty and National Guard forces. Despite the lack of planning, the military took proactive steps and responded with about 50,000 National Guard and 20,000 active federal personnel. Based on its June 2005 civil support strategy, DOD relied heavily on the Guard during the initial response. Active duty forces were alerted prior to landfall and key capabilities such as aviation, medical, and engineering forces were initially deployed. Growing concerns about the magnitude of the disaster prompted DOD to deploy large, active ground units to supplement the Guard beginning about 5 days after landfall. Several factors affected the military's ability to gain situational awareness and organize and execute its response, including a lack of timely damage assessments, communications difficulties, force integration problems, uncoordinated search and rescue efforts, and unexpected logistics responsibilities. Without detailed plans to address these factors, DOD and the federal government risk being unprepared for the next catastrophe. DOD is examining the lessons learned from its own reviews and those of the White House and the Congress, and it is beginning to take actions to address the lessons and prepare for the next catastrophe. It is too early to evaluate DOD's actions, but many appear to hold promise. However, some issues identified after Katrina such as damage assessments are long-standing problems that were identified by GAO after Hurricane Andrew in 1992. They will be difficult to address because they are complex and cut across agency boundaries. Thus, substantial improvement will require sustained attention from the highest management levels in DOD, and across the government.