NORAD also conducts air  patrols in U.S. airspace. Violations of Restricted Airspace

Our review of an FAA database found about 3,400 reported violations of  restricted airspace from September 12, 2001, to December 31, 2004, most  of which were committed by general aviation pilots. According to FAA,  violations occur because (1) pilots may divert from their planned flight  path to avoid bad weather, or may make navigational errors and  consequently enter restricted airspace; (2) FAA may establish airspace  restrictions with little warning, and pilots already in the air may be  unaware of the new restrictions; or (3) pilots may not check for notices of  new restrictions as required by FAA and may consequently enter restricted  airspace without authorization. In addition, terrorists might deliberately  enter restricted airspace to observe the government’s response or to carry  out an attack. The agencies have established the National Capital Region  Coordination Center to enhance the effectiveness of air security and air  defense operations in the national capital region. However, it  is important to recognize that it may not be possible to prevent all  restricted airspace violations or to deter all attacks. Consequently, the interagency  management of the response to airspace violations could benefit from  filling gaps in policies and procedures. We also identified gaps in TSA’s  risk assessment of the aviation sector. As a result, TSA lacks assurance  that some airport managers have taken reasonable steps to enhance  security. TSA has reviewed some general aviation airports for  vulnerabilities and developed risk assessment tools to enable managers to  conduct self-assessments. Specifically, the  agencies do not have:    an organization in charge,   interagency policies and procedures,    protocols for information sharing, and    common definitions of restricted airspace violations. Because the interagency  process to manage the response to restricted airspace violations is a time- critical operation, the implications of not having well-developed policies,  procedures, information sharing protocols, and common definitions are  serious. To identify the actions taken individually or in coordinated fashion to  secure U.S. airspace and aviation and to mitigate the threat since  September 11, 2001, we interviewed officials at the National Capital  Region Coordination Center; the headquarters of NORAD and its  Continental U.S. NORAD Region and the three continental U.S. based air  defense sectors, TSA, FAA, and Air Combat Command; and the Air and  Marine Operations Center.
Why GAO Did This Study

Securing and defending U.S. airspace is an interagency mission that depends on close interagency coordination and information sharing. GAO was asked to review (1) the threat assessment for U.S. aviation, (2) violations of restricted airspace since September 11, 2001, (3) agencies' individual or coordinated steps to secure U.S. aviation, and (4) interagency policies and procedures to manage the response to restricted airspace violations. GAO will issue a classified report responding to this request later this year. To keep this testimony unclassified, GAO focused on the latter three questions.

What GAO Found

The Federal Aviation Administration reported about 3,400 violations of restricted airspace from September 12, 2001, to December 31, 2004, most of which were committed by general aviation pilots. Violations can occur because (1) pilots may divert from their flight plan to avoid bad weather, (2) the Administration may establish newly restricted airspace with little warning, and pilots in the air may be unaware of the new restrictions, or (3) pilots do not check for notices of restrictions, as required. Also, terrorists may deliberately enter restricted airspace to test the government's response or carry out an attack. Federal agencies have acted individually or have coordinated to enhance aviation security. For example, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) established a national operations center that disseminates operational- and intelligence-related information, and has enhanced passenger and checked baggage screening, secured cockpit doors, and assessed the risk to some, but not all, commercial airports. Also, few general aviation airport owners have conducted risk assessments. The North American Aerospace Defense Command's mission was expanded to include monitoring domestic air traffic and conducting air patrols. Collectively, the agencies are operating the National Capital Region Coordination Center to secure the National Capital Region. GAO identified gaps in the simultaneous, time-critical, multi-agency response to airspace violations. While it may not be possible to prevent all violations or deter all attacks, GAO identified some gaps in policies and procedures. Specifically, the agencies were operating without (1) an organization in the lead, (2) fully developed interagency policies and procedures for the airspace violations response teleconferencing system, (3) information sharing protocols and procedures, or (4) accepted definitions of a violation. As a result, opportunities may be missed to enhance the security of U.S. aviation.