Proponents argue that reforms to rationalize interagency collaboration on foreign missions will not only enhance performance, but also save money by streamlining processes, facilitating cooperation, and reducing duplication. Some reform proposals are relevant to legislation currently before Congress, in particular the Interagency Personnel Rotation Act of 2011, which provides for interagency rotations by U.S. government personnel in national security agencies, and the Contingency Operations Oversight and Interagency Enhancement Act of 2011, as well as the recently approved Global Security Contingency Fund, providing an integrated State Department-Department of Defense budget for certain types of security assistance. The FY2012 NDAA ( P.L. Nonetheless, despite a growing sense of a need for interagency reform to address multiple systemic problems, there is little agreement on the solutions. This report starts with a brief history of the impetus for interagency reform during the 1990s and 2000s, and a sketch of Clinton, Bush, and Obama Administration measures and initiatives, followed by a discussion of key problems in the context of the current interagency structure. The report concludes with a discussion of four broad overarching questions: (1) is interagency reform necessary for missions abroad; (2) which proposals are considered highest priority; (3) can interagency reform produce cost savings; and (4) must congressional reform accompany other national security measures? Soon after, the terrorist attacks on the United States of September 11, 2001 (9/11), put the problems of interagency cooperation at home and abroad in bold relief for many policymakers and analysts. The 2010 QDDR, undertaken by the Obama Administration without a statutory requirement, embraced a number of the proposals (or variations of those proposals) for national security reform that have been advocated over the past decade. The three most commonly cited factors responsible for perceived inefficiency and ineffectiveness of interagency efforts abroad are:
Inadequate civilian strategic planning and interagency operational planning capabilities and processes; Structural weaknesses in the U.S. government system for conducting missions abroad including (1) department-centric organizations resulting in the tendency for "stove-piping," with each agency reporting up and down through its own chain of command and responsibility for coordination placed on an overburdened White House; (2) insufficient civilian resources, including personnel, discouraging domestically oriented agencies from directing funds and personnel away from core missions; (3) inadequate mechanisms to foster information sharing within and among agencies; and (4) insufficient leadership authority, either de jure or de facto, at the headquarters and field level; and Personnel who are not trained for interagency missions, possessing little, if any, familiarity with the missions, capabilities, and cultures of other departments and agencies. The term "National Security Council" is sometimes used to encompass the council itself, as well as NSC directorates and staff. But these coordinators do not have the power to compel interagency cooperation. Create Interagency Personnel Policies and Mechanisms? Prioritize and Improve George W. Bush Administration Initiatives

Some policymakers may view support for the efforts begun by the Bush Administration as a priority. Brookings/CSIS 2010 —Brookings Institution and Center for Strategic and International Studies. DSB 2004 —Defense Science Board, Summer Study on Transition to and from Hostilities , December 2004. Appendix B deals with proposals to improve strategy-making, planning, and budgeting. The act also provides that the NSC, "for the purpose of more effectively coordinating the policies and functions of the departments and agencies of the Government relating to the national security," shall "consider policies on matters of common interest to the departments and agencies of the Government concerned with the national security, and to make recommendations to the President in connection therewith." In December 2011, Congress provided authority for the GSCF in the FY2012 National Defense Authorization Act (Section 1207, H.R. 1540 , P.L. 112-81 , signed into law December 31, 2011). Several of the studies surveyed recommend a wide variety of ways to enhance the State Department's ability to lead, coordinate, and conduct interagency missions and activities. H.R. Legislation currently before Congress, the Interagency Personnel Rotation Act of 2011 ( S. 1268 and H.R.
Within the past two decades, prominent foreign policy organizations and foreign policy experts have perceived serious deficiencies in the authorities, organizations, and personnel used to conduct interagency missions that prevent the United States from exercising its power to full advantage. For the 112th Congress, proposals to address these problems may be of interest for their perceived potential not only to enhance performance, but also to save money by streamlining processes, encouraging interagency cooperation, and reducing duplication. These proposals also provide context for current and recent legislation, including the Interagency Personnel Rotation Act of 2011 (S. 1268 and H.R. 2314) and the Contingency Operations Oversight and Interagency Enhancement Act of 2011 (H.R. 3660), as well as the new Global Security Contingency Fund contained in the FY2012 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA, Section 1207, H.R. 1540, P.L. 112-81, signed into law December 31, 2011). The FY2012 NDAA requires the President to submit to Congress a "whole-of-government" implementation plan.
Despite a growing perception during the 1990s that reforms were needed to foster interagency cooperation in missions abroad, it was not until the terrorist attacks on the United States of September 11, 2001, during the presidency of George W. Bush, and subsequent U.S. military interventions that the need became urgent enough to result in significant changes. The earlier first steps of the Clinton Administration toward interagency reform were in short order embraced and then expanded by the Bush Administration, which also implemented reforms of its own. The Barack H. Obama Administration has endorsed these changes and undertaken some of its own.
Three problems with the current interagency cooperation system are most commonly cited. These are (1) a government-wide lack of strategic planning and interagency operational planning capabilities among civilian agencies; (2) a variety of structural deficiencies in the U.S. government for conducting missions abroad that lead to a tendency for "stove-piping" responses, with each agency operating independently, and to civilian agencies' reluctance to divert scarce resources, including personnel, from their core missions to interagency missions; and (3) personnel who are not trained for interagency missions and often unfamiliar with the missions, capabilities, and cultures of other agencies.
This report draws on over three dozen studies with recommendations to improve the current national security system. The studies surveyed include three prepared by the Project on National Security Reform, with comprehensive recommendations, four prepared or co-sponsored by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), and two by RAND in conjunction with the American Academy of Diplomats, as well as reports by the Council on Foreign Relations, the Defense Science Board, the National Defense University, and others. This report draws from these studies, as well as a few articles, for recommendations to improve strategy-making, planning, and budgeting; to improve institutional authorities, structures, and arrangements; and to create interagency personnel policies and mechanisms.
As the breadth and variety of the recommendations indicate, there is no consensus on how to fix the perceived problems. Nor is there agreement among policymakers on a number of overarching questions: whether interagency reform is necessary for missions abroad, which proposals are considered highest priority, whether reforms would save money, and whether reform of congressional organization or procedures must accompany other national security reform measures.