The Department’s Processes to Fulfill Urgent Needs Have Evolved

Over the past two decades, the fulfillment of urgent needs has evolved as a  set of complex processes—within the Joint Staff, the Office of the  Secretary of Defense (OSD), each of the military services, as well as the  combatant commands—to rapidly develop, equip, and field solutions and  critical capabilities to the warfighter. In  addition, our analysis identified multiple entities with a role in responding  to similar types of urgently needed capabilities, such as ISR and counter- IED, resulting in the potential for duplication of efforts. On the basis of DOD’s  and our analysis, we have identified at least 31 entities that play a  significant role in the various urgent needs processes. For  example:    Both the Army and the Marine Corps continue to develop their own  counter-IED mine rollers with full or partial JIEDDO funding. DOD Does Not Have Comprehensive Guidance and Full Visibility to Effectively Manage and Oversee Its Urgent Needs

DOD has taken several steps to improve the management and oversight of  its urgent needs. DOD Does Not Have a Comprehensive Policy for Guiding All Parts of the Process for Addressing Warfighters’ Urgent Needs Requests

Despite these actions, DOD does not have departmentwide guidance that  provides a common departmentwide approach for how all urgent needs  are to be addressed. According to federal  best practices reported in GAO’s Standards for Internal Control in the  Federal Government, management is responsible for developing detailed  policies, procedures, and practices to help program managers achieve  desired results through effective stewardship of public resources. At present, the department has not established a senior-level focal  point to (1) lead the department’s efforts to fulfill validated urgent needs  requirements, (2) develop and implement DOD-wide policy on the  processing of urgent needs or rapid acquisition, or (3) maintain full  visibility over its urgent needs efforts and the costs of those efforts. Opportunities Exist for Consolidating Urgent Needs Processes and Entities

In addition to not having a comprehensive approach for managing and  overseeing its urgent needs efforts, DOD has not conducted a  comprehensive evaluation of its urgent needs processes and entities to  identify opportunities for consolidation. DOD Has Not Comprehensively Evaluated Opportunities for Consolidation across the Department

Despite various reports by the Defense Science Board, GAO, and others— that raised concerns about the numbers and roles of the various entities  and processes involved and the potential of overlap and duplication—DOD  has not comprehensively evaluated opportunities for consolidation across  the department. Until the department comprehensively evaluates its strategic  direction on urgent needs, it will be unaware of opportunities for  consolidation across the department as well as opportunities for improved  coordination, or other actions to achieve savings or increased efficiencies  in its fulfillment of urgent needs. Furthermore, GAO’s Business Process  Reengineering Assessment Guide establishes that a comprehensive  analysis of alternative processes should include a performance-based, risk- adjusted analysis of benefits and costs for each alternative. Without  DOD-wide guidance on the department’s urgent needs processes and a  focal point to lead its overall efforts on urgent operational needs and to act  as an advocate within the department for issues related to the  department’s ability to rapidly respond to urgent needs, DOD is likely to  continue to risk duplicative, overlapping, and fragmented efforts, which  contributes to inefficiency and loss of potential financial savings. Recommendations for Executive Action

To promote a more comprehensive approach to planning, management,  and oversight of the department’s fulfillment of urgent operational needs,  we recommend that the Secretary of Defense take the following five  actions:    Direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and  Logistics to develop and promulgate DOD-wide guidance across all urgent  needs processes that  establishes baseline policy for the fulfillment of urgent operational  needs;  clearly defines common terms as well as the roles, responsibilities, and  authorities of the OSD, Joint Chiefs of Staff, combatant commands,  and military services for all phases of the urgent needs process,  including, but not limited to, generation, validation, funding, execution,  tracking, and management of the transition, termination, or transfer  process and that incorporates all available expedited acquisition  procedures;    designates a focal point within the Office of the Under Secretary of  Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (such as the Rapid  Fielding Directorate, or other entity as deemed appropriate) with the  appropriate authority and resources, dedicated to leading the  department’s urgent needs efforts, including, but not limited to: (1)  acting as an advocate within the department for issues related to  DOD’s ability to rapidly respond to urgent needs; (2) improving  visibility across all urgent needs entities and processes; and (3)  ensuring tools and mechanisms are used to track, monitor, and  manage the status of urgent needs, from validation through the  transition, including a formal feedback mechanism or channel for  military services to provide feedback on how well fielded solutions  met urgent needs; and    directs the DOD Components to establish minimum processes and  requirements for each of the above phases of the process.
Why GAO Did This Study

Forces in Iraq and Afghanistan have faced significant risks of mission failure and loss of life due to rapidly changing enemy threats. In response, the Department of Defense (DOD) established urgent operational needs processes to rapidly develop, modify, and field new capabilities, such as intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) technology, and counter-improvised explosive devices (IED) systems. However, GAO, the Defense Science Board, and others have raised concerns about the effectiveness, efficiency, and oversight of DOD's various urgent needs processes. GAO conducted this review to determine (1) what various entities exist within DOD for responding to urgent operational needs, and the extent to which there is fragmentation, overlap, or duplication; (2) the extent to which DOD has a comprehensive approach for managing and overseeing its urgent needs activities; and (3) the extent to which DOD has evaluated the potential for consolidations. To conduct this review, GAO examined DOD's urgent needs processes and collected and analyzed data from urgent needs entities.

What GAO Found

Over the past two decades, the fulfillment of urgent needs has evolved as a set of complex processes within the Joint Staff, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, each of the military services, and the combatant commands to rapidly develop, equip, and field solutions and critical capabilities to the warfighter. GAO identified at least 31 entities that manage urgent needs and expedite the development of solutions to address them. Moreover, GAO found that some overlap exists. For example, there are numerous points of entry for the warfighter to submit a request for an urgently needed capability, including through the Joint Staff and each military service. Additionally, several entities have focused on developing solutions for the same subject areas, such as counter-IED and ISR capabilities, potentially resulting in duplication of efforts. For example, both the Army and the Marine Corps had their own separate efforts to develop counter-IED mine rollers. DOD has taken steps to improve its fulfillment of urgent needs, but the department does not have a comprehensive approach to manage and oversee the breadth of its activities to address capability gaps identified by warfighters in-theater. Steps DOD has taken include developing policy to guide joint urgent need efforts and working to establish a senior oversight council to help synchronize DOD's efforts. Federal internal control standards require detailed policies, procedures, and practices to help program managers achieve desired results through effective stewardship of public resources. However, DOD does not have a comprehensive, DOD-wide policy that establishes a baseline and provides a common approach for how all joint and military service urgent needs are to be addressed. Moreover, DOD lacks visibility over the full range of its urgent needs efforts. For example, DOD cannot readily identify the cost of its departmentwide urgent needs efforts, which is at least $76.9 billion based on GAO's analysis. Additionally, DOD does not have a senior-level focal point to lead the department's efforts to fulfill validated urgent needs requirements. Without DOD-wide guidance and a focal point to lead its efforts, DOD risks having duplicative, overlapping, and fragmented efforts, which can result in avoidable costs. DOD also has not comprehensively evaluated opportunities for consolidation across the department. GAO's Business Process Reengineering Assessment Guide establishes that such a comprehensive analysis of alternative processes should be performed, to include a performance-based, risk-adjusted analysis of benefits and costs for each alternative. In an effort to examine various ways the department might improve its fulfillment of urgent needs, GAO identified and analyzed several potential consolidation options, ranging from consolidation of all DOD urgent needs entities to more limited consolidation of key functions. Until DOD comprehensively evaluates its strategic direction on urgent needs, it will be unaware of opportunities for consolidation as well as opportunities for increased efficiencies in its fulfillment of urgent needs.

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that DOD develop comprehensive guidance that, among other things, defines roles, responsibilities, and authorities across the department and designates a focal point to lead urgent needs efforts. GAO also recommends that DOD evaluate potential options for consolidation. DOD concurred with the recommendations.