Based on a synthesis of the published views of current and former senior intelligence officials, the reports of three independent commissions, and a Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) publication that addressed the issue of national intelligence estimating, an objective NIE should meet the following standards: quantify the certainty level of its key judgments by using percentages or “bettors’ odds,” where feasible, and avoid overstating the certainty of judgments; identify explicitly its assumptions and judgments; develop and explore “alternative futures:” less likely (but not impossible) scenarios that would dramatically change the estimate if they occurred; allow dissenting views on predictions or interpretations; and note explicitly what the IC does not know when the information gaps could have significant consequences for the issues under consideration. NIE 95-19 Overstated Certainty of Its Main Judgment

The main judgment of NIE 95-19 was worded with clear (100 percent) certainty. We believe this level of certainty was overstated, based on the caveats and intelligence gaps noted in NIE 95-19. NIE 95-19 Had Additional Analytic Shortcomings

NIE 95-19 did not (1) quantify the certainty level of nearly all of its key judgments, (2) identify explicitly its critical assumptions, and (3) develop alternative futures. However, in accordance with standards for producing objective NIEs, NIE 95-19 acknowledged dissenting views from several agencies and also explicitly noted what information the IC does not know that bears upon the foreign missile threat. Differences and Similarities Between NIE 95-19 and 1993 NIEs

NIE 95-19 worded its judgments on foreign missile threats very differently than did the 1993 NIEs, even though the judgments in all three NIEs were not inconsistent with each other. That is, while the judgments were not synonymous, upon careful reading they did not contradict each other. However, whereas NIE 95-19’s main judgment was that there will be no new missile threats to the contiguous 48 states during the next 15 years, two studies estimated some possibility—“low” and “quite low”—of such missile threats. We did not attempt to independently evaluate foreign missile threats to the United States.
Why GAO Did This Study

Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO analyzed the soundness of certain national intelligence estimates (NIE) on the threat to the United States from foreign missile systems, focusing on comparing the content and conclusions of NIE 95-19, which analyzed emerging threats to North America during the next 15 years, with the content and conclusions of two previous NIEs prepared in 1993.

What GAO Found

GAO found that: (1) the main judgment of NIE 95-19, that no country, other than the major declared nuclear powers, will develop or otherwise acquire a ballistic missile in the next 15 years that could threaten the contiguous 48 states or Canada, was worded with clear, 100-percent certainty; (2) GAO believes this level was overstated, based on the caveats and the intelligence gaps noted in NIE 95-19; (3) NIE 95-19 had additional analytic shortcomings, since it did not: (a) quantify the certainty level of nearly all of its key judgments; (b) identify explicitly its critical assumptions; and (c) develop alternative futures; (4) however, in accordance with standards for producing objective NIEs, NIE 95-19 acknowledged dissenting views from several agencies and also explicitly noted what information the U.S. intelligence community does not know that bears upon the foreign missile threat; (5) the 1993 NIEs met more of the standards than NIE 95-19 did; and (6) NIE 95-19 worded its judgments on foreign missile threats very differently than did the 1993 NIEs, even though the judgments in all three NIEs were not inconsistent with each other, that is, while the judgments were not synonymous, upon careful reading they did not contradict each other.