Pursuant to that authority, the Executive entered into several trade agreements, including the U.S.-South Korea Free Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA), which was signed by officials for the two countries on June 30, 2007. The KORUS FTA is one of three agreements that were negotiated under the terms of the Trade Act of 2002 but have yet to be submitted to Congress for approval and implementation. 2010 Changes to the KORUS FTA

In the summer of 2010, the Obama Administration announced plans to reengage in talks with South Korea over aspects of the KORUS FTA, particularly its provisions involving market access for U.S. autos. The media has referred to these changes collectively as a "supplementary agreement" or "supplementary deal" to the KORUS FTA. That act mandates that legislation approving and implementing a free trade agreement that is entitled to consideration under the fast track procedures receive an up-or-down vote in Congress without amendment and with limited debate. In particular, the President must submit the implementing bill to Congress, and the implementing bill must contain three components:
a provision approving a trade agreement "entered into" in conformity with the Trade Act of 2002; a provision approving a statement of administrative action, if any, proposed to implement that agreement; and if changes to U.S. law are required to implement the trade agreement, provisions "repealing or amending existing laws or providing new statutory authority" that are "necessary or appropriate to implement" the agreement. Two requirements that may have negative implications for the fast track consideration of the KORUS FTA and its implementing bill are: (1) the requirement that the bill approve an agreement that was "entered into" before the July 1, 2007 deadline for fast track consideration; and (2) the requirement that any bill provisions repealing, amending, or enacting U.S. law be "necessary or appropriate" for the implementation of the 2007 agreement. There is historical precedent for treating supplemental agreements to a trade agreement as executive agreements when the supplemental agreements were signed after the expiration of TPA. As described below, if a Member objects to considering the KORUS FTA implementing bill under the fast track procedures, the bill's eligibility for TPA will be determined under the chamber's procedural rules and not by the Executive Branch. If a Member in either chamber raises an objection to the fast track consideration of the KORUS FTA and the bill is deemed ineligible for TPA under the Trade Act of 2002, then the bill will be considered under the regular procedures of that chamber. Under these procedures, the bill, like other pieces of legislation, might not be brought up for a vote or it might be amended. In particular, the implementing bill must: (1) approve the agreement that was "entered into" in 2007; and (2) include provisions enacting, amending, or repealing existing U.S. laws to the extent "necessary or appropriate" for the implementation of the agreement that was "entered into" in 2007. The NAFTA implementing bill did, however, include a provision authorizing U.S. participation in those side agreements. Although Members expressed concern about the use of the fast track procedures to consider the NAFTA implementing bill, no Member formally challenged the bill's eligibility for fast track consideration. To challenge the use of the fast track procedures in the consideration of the KORUS FTA implementing bill, a Member must raise an objection. At that point, the bill's eligibility for fast track consideration will be resolved by the chamber in which the objection was raised. Each chamber may waive, suspend, or repeal fast track authority for legislation implementing the KORUS FTA.
On June 30, 2007, U.S. and South Korean officials signed the Korea Free Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA) for their respective countries. It is one of three free trade agreements currently awaiting submission to Congress for approval and implementing legislation. In June 2010, the Obama Administration announced plans to seek Congress's approval for the KORUS FTA after first engaging in talks with South Korea over U.S. concerns with the agreement as signed, particularly over its provisions involving market access for U.S. autos. The results of these talks are memorialized in three February 10, 2011, documents, which have been collectively referred to as the "supplemental agreement" or "supplementary deal" to the 2007 KORUS FTA.
The Executive, in consultation with Congress, is expected to draft legislation approving and implementing the KORUS FTA and submit the resulting "implementing bill" to Congress during the first session of the 112th Congress. This legislation will be entitled to consideration in Congress under expedited ("fast track") legislative procedures if it satisfies the requirements of the Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act of 2002 (Trade Act of 2002). In particular, the implementing bill must: (1) approve the agreement "entered into" in 2007; and (2) include provisions enacting, amending, or repealing existing U.S. laws only to the extent that the provisions are "necessary or appropriate" for the implementation of the agreement "entered into" in 2007. Each chamber of Congress, acting independently of the other, has the authority to determine for itself whether the KORUS FTA implementing bill conforms with these requirements. To the extent either the House or the Senate finds that the bill satisfies the terms of the Trade Act of 2002, the bill will be entitled to receive an up-or-down vote without amendment and with limited debate in that chamber.
It is difficult to predict with certainty how the 2010 changes might affect Congress's decision to consider the KORUS FTA implementing bill under the fast track procedures. However, the effect of side agreements on the fast track eligibility of the implementing legislation for the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) may be instructive. In that case, the Executive concluded supplemental agreements to the trade agreement after the agreement was signed and trade promotion authority had expired. These agreements were treated as executive agreements, circumventing the need for their express approval by Congress, but the implementing bill nevertheless authorized U.S. participation in the two agreements. Arguably, the NAFTA supplemental agreements may be characterized as having received congressional approval.
Although Members expressed concern about the use of the fast track procedures to consider the NAFTA implementing bill, no Member formally challenged the bill's eligibility for fast track consideration. To challenge the use of the fast track procedures to consider the KORUS FTA implementing bill, a Member must raise an objection. The bill's eligibility for fast track consideration will then be resolved by the chamber in which the objection was raised. Either chamber may also decide, as an exercise of its rulemaking power, to waive, suspend, or repeal its grant of fast track authority.
If the KORUS FTA implementing bill is deemed ineligible for—or otherwise denied—fast track consideration, the bill, in its entirety, may be considered under the regular procedures of each chamber. Under these procedures, the bill, like other pieces of legislation, might not be brought up for a vote or might be passed with amendments. The Jordan Free Trade Agreement was statutorily implemented under regular procedures.