The U.S. government's core goals for the war have remained unchanged since March 2009: to disrupt, dismantle and defeat al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and to prevent their return. In November 2010, at the NATO Lisbon Summit, the governments of the United States, the other NATO Allies, and Afghanistan expressed support for the full transition of lead responsibility for security to Afghans by the end of 2014. In early 2011, General David Petraeus, Commander of NATO's International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, in a letter to the ISAF troops, credited the hard work of the force, together with its Afghan partners, for "halting a downward security spiral in much of the country and to reversing it in some areas of great importance." Elements of the debate that continue to attract attention include 
refining U.S. national interests in Afghanistan and the region, and a desired end-state based on those interests; determining which diplomatic, economic, and military approaches to adopt, what resources to commit to support those approaches, and how those approaches ought to evolve over time; helping marshal a coordinated application of international efforts in Afghanistan; and prioritizing the Afghanistan war versus other U.S. national security imperatives in the context of a constrained fiscal environment. On October 7, 2001, following the refusal of the Taliban regime to cease harboring al Qaeda, the U.S. government launched military operations in Afghanistan, with the stated purpose of disrupting the use of Afghanistan as a terrorist base of operations and of attacking the military capability of the Taliban regime. These include—in addition to the insurgent groups—the Afghan government, NATO, the U.S. government and other bilateral partners, and key regional leaders and neighboring states including Pakistan. U.S. Strategy in 2011

In early 2011, the Obama Administration was reportedly at work on several related initiatives—further refining a description of desired conditions that ought to pertain in Afghanistan in 2014, and drafting a basic vision for the long-term U.S.-Afghan strategic partnership, to prepare for talks with the Afghan government. President Karzai has repeatedly pledged to put a stop to corruption. The Process is based on the theme of "Afghan leadership, Afghan ownership." Yet critical policy debates remain unresolved. The appropriate role of the international community—its nature and extent—in supporting Afghan anti-corruption efforts. U.S. Troop Drawdowns

President Obama has committed the United States to begin a "responsible drawdown" of U.S. forces from Afghanistan. Some suggest that progress made in developing the capacity and capability of Afghan security forces and governing structures may be able to compensate, to some extent, for slower progress against safe havens, by giving the Afghan state greater resistance to insurgent incursions.
In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States launched and led military operations in Afghanistan in order to end the ability of the Taliban regime to provide safe haven to al Qaeda and to put a stop to al Qaeda's use of the territory of Afghanistan as a base of operations for terrorist activities. Many observers argue that in succeeding years, as U.S. and world attention shifted sharply to the war in Iraq, the Afghan war became the "other war" and suffered from neglect. The Obama Administration, however, has made the war in Afghanistan a higher priority, by giving it early attention, regularly conducting strategy reviews, and making significant additional commitments of civilian and military resources. By early 2011, senior leaders, including the Commander of NATO's International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), General David Petraeus, were pointing to discrete progress on the ground, though noting that such progress was still "fragile and reversible."
In late 2010, NATO and the Afghan government agreed to pursue a key medium-term goal: the transition of lead responsibility for security to Afghans throughout the country by the end of 2014. The U.S. government has stated its intention to begin drawing down some U.S. forces from Afghanistan in July 2011, and also to maintain a long-term strategic partnership with Afghanistan beyond 2014.
Strategic vision for Afghanistan is still, many would argue, a work in progress. President Karzai has consistently stressed the theme of "Afghan leadership, Afghan ownership." President Obama has consistently stressed the core goals of the United States: to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and to prevent their return. Yet for the U.S. government, fundamental issues remain unresolved. These include
determining the minimum essential conditions required for Afghanistan itself to be able to sustain stability with relatively limited international support; defining the appropriate combination of U.S. efforts, together with other international resources, over time, required to achieve those minimum conditions; and balancing U.S. national security interests in Afghanistan and the region against other imperatives, in a constrained fiscal environment.
This report, which will be updated as events warrant, describes and analyzes
the key players in the war in Afghanistan; the strategic outlooks of the Afghan government, the U.S. government, and NATO; the threats to the security and stability of the Afghan state and its people; the major facets of the current effort: security, governance and anti-corruption, development, reconciliation and reintegration, and transition; mechanisms in place to measure progress; and critical issues that Congress may wish to consider further.