	DHS and CBP Have Established Collaborative Mechanisms Along the Southwest Border, but Could Strengthen Coordination of Predator B UAS Operations

		DHS and CBP Have Implemented a Variety of Collaborative Mechanisms to Coordinate Border Security Efforts

DHS and its components have used various mechanisms over time to  coordinate border security operations. We  found that through these collaborative mechanisms, DHS and CBP had  coordinated border security efforts in information sharing, resource  targeting and prioritization, and leveraging of assets. Additionally, DHS has used these task forces to coordinate  various border security activities, such as use of Predator B UAS, as we  reported in February 2017 and discuss below. Specifically, participants identified three barriers that most frequently  hindered effective collaboration within their mechanisms: (1) resource  constraints, (2) rotation of key personnel, and (3) lack of leadership buy- in. For example, officials from 11 of 12  partner agencies we interviewed reported coordination challenges related  to the STC and ACTT, such as limited resource commitments by  participating agencies and lack of common objectives. We  recommended that DHS establish written agreements for some of these  coordination mechanisms and a strategic-level oversight mechanism to  monitor interagency collaboration. DHS and CBP Could Strengthen Efforts to Assess Use of Resources and Programs to Secure the Border

		Border Patrol Could Benefit From Improving Its Methodology to Assess Effectiveness of its Consequence Delivery System Program

In January 2017, we reported that Border Patrol agents use the CDS to  classify each alien apprehended illegally crossing the border and then  apply one or more post-apprehension consequences determined to be  the most effective and efficient to discourage recidivism, that is, further  apprehensions for illegal cross-border activity. Specifically, Border Patrol’s methodology  for calculating recidivism—the percent of aliens apprehended multiple  times along the southwest border within a fiscal year—does not account  for an alien’s apprehension history over multiple years. To better inform the effectiveness of CDS implementation and border  security efforts, we recommended that, among other things, (1) Border  Patrol strengthen the methodology for calculating recidivism, such as by  using an alien’s apprehension history beyond one fiscal year and  excluding aliens for whom there is no record of removal; and (2) the  Assistant Secretary of ICE and Commissioner of CBP collaborate on  sharing immigration enforcement and removal data to help Border Patrol  account for the removal status of apprehended aliens in its recidivism rate  measure. However, CBP has not developed metrics  that systematically use these data, among other data it collects, to assess  the contributions of its pedestrian and vehicle border fencing to its  mission. Developing metrics to assess the  contributions of fencing to border security operations could better position  CBP to make resource allocation decisions with the best information  available to inform competing mission priorities and investments. To ensure that Border Patrol has the best available information to inform  future investments and resource allocation decisions among tactical  infrastructure and other assets Border Patrol deploys for border security,  we recommended, among other things, that Border Patrol develop  metrics to assess the contributions of pedestrian and vehicle fencing to  border security along the southwest border using the data Border Patrol  already collects and apply this information, as appropriate, when making  investment and resource allocation decisions. CBP Has Taken Actions to Assess the Effectiveness of Its Predator B UAS and Aerostats for Border Security, but Could Improve Its Data Collection Efforts

In February 2017, we found that CBP has taken actions to assess the  effectiveness of its Predator B UAS and tactical aerostats for border  security, but could improve its data collection efforts. We also found that CBP has not  updated its guidance for collecting and recording mission information in  its data collection system to include new data elements added since  2014, and does not have instructions for recording mission information  such as asset assists. We reported that  updating guidance and fully training users, consistent with internal control  standards, would help CBP better ensure the quality of data it uses to  assess effectiveness. Border Security: DHS Surveillance Technology Unmanned Aerial  Systems and Other Assets. Border Security: Progress and Challenges in DHS’s Efforts to Implement  and Assess Infrastructure and Technology. Border Security: Opportunities Exist to Strengthen Collaborative  Mechanisms along the Southwest Border. This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the  United States.
Why GAO Did This Study

Securing U.S. borders is the responsibility of DHS, in collaboration with other federal, state, local, and tribal entities. Within DHS, CBP is the lead agency for border security and is responsible for, among other things, keeping terrorists and their weapons, criminals and their contraband, and inadmissible aliens out of the country. In recent years, GAO has reported on a variety of DHS collaborative mechanisms and efforts to assess its use of border security resources.
This statement addresses (1) DHS's efforts to implement collaborative mechanisms along the southwest border and (2) DHS's efforts to assess its use of resources and programs to secure the southwest border. This statement is based on GAO reports and testimonies issued from September 2013 through February 2017 that examined DHS efforts to enhance border security and assess the effectiveness of its border security operations. GAO's reports and testimonies incorporated information GAO obtained by examining DHS collaborative mechanisms, reviewing CBP policies and procedures for coordinating use of assets, analyzing DHS data related to enforcement programs, and interviewing relevant DHS officials.

What GAO Found

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and its U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) have implemented various mechanisms along the southern U.S. border to coordinate security operations, but could strengthen coordination of Predator B unmanned aerial system (UAS) operations to conduct border security efforts. In September 2013, GAO reported that DHS and CBP used collaborative mechanisms along the southwest border—including interagency Border Enforcement Security Task Forces and Regional Coordinating Mechanisms—to coordinate information sharing, target and prioritize resources, and leverage assets. GAO interviewed participants from the various mechanisms who provided perspective on successful collaboration, such as establishing positive working relationships, sharing resources, and sharing information. Participants also identified barriers, such as resource constraints, rotation of key personnel, and lack of leadership buy-in. GAO recommended that DHS take steps to improve its visibility over field collaborative mechanisms. DHS concurred and collected data related to the mechanisms' operations. Further, as GAO reported in June 2014, officials involved with mechanisms along the southwest border cited limited resource commitments by participating agencies and a lack of common objectives. Among other things, GAO recommended that DHS establish written interagency agreements with mechanism partners, and DHS concurred. Lastly, in February 2017, GAO reported that DHS and CBP had established mechanisms to coordinate Predator B UAS operations but could better document their coordination procedures. GAO made recommendations for DHS and CBP to improve coordination of UAS operations, and DHS concurred.
GAO recently reported that DHS and CBP could strengthen efforts to assess their use of resources and programs to secure the southwest border. For example, in February 2017, GAO reported that CBP does not record mission data consistently across all operational centers for its Predator B UAS, limiting CBP's ability to assess program effectiveness. In addition, CBP has not updated its guidance for collecting and recording mission information in its data collection system since 2014. Updating guidance consistent with internal control standards would help CBP better ensure the quality of data it uses to assess effectiveness. In January 2017, GAO found that methodological weaknesses limit the usefulness for assessing the effectiveness of CBP's Border Patrol Consequence Delivery System. Specifically, Border Patrol's methodology for calculating recidivism—the percent of aliens apprehended multiple times along the southwest border within a fiscal year—does not account for an alien's apprehension history over multiple years. Border Patrol could strengthen the methodology for calculating recidivism by using an alien's apprehension history beyond one fiscal year. Finally, CBP has not developed metrics that systematically use the data it collects to assess the contributions of its pedestrian and vehicle border fencing to its mission. Developing metrics to assess the contributions of fencing to border security operations could better position CBP to make resource allocation decisions with the best information available to inform competing mission priorities and investments. GAO made recommendations to DHS and CBP to update guidance, strengthen its recidivism calculation methodology, and develop metrics, and DHS generally concurred.

What GAO Recommends

GAO has previously made numerous recommendations to DHS to improve the function of collaborative mechanisms and use of resources for border security, and DHS has generally agreed. DHS has taken actions or described planned actions to address the recommendations, which GAO will continue to monitor.