	Introduction

On July 22, 2009, in Phuket, Thailand, Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton and representatives from the 10-member Association of Southeast Asian Nations' (ASEAN) signed the Instrument of Extension and the Instrument of Accession to ASEAN's Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC). The move came less than six months after she had announced, during a visit to Jakarta, that the Obama Administration would launch its formal interagency process to pursue accession. One of ASEAN's pillars, the TAC was first negotiated in 1976 and subsequently amended to allow non-regional countries to accede. The Administration's move is designed to symbolically boost the United States' standing in Southeast Asia by expanding the multilateral component of U.S. policy in the region. Following consultations with selective offices in the Senate, the Administration decided that accession would take the form of an executive agreement, which does not require Senate approval. Interests in the TAC, ASEAN, and Southeast Asia

		Motivations for and Reservations Against Acceding to the TAC

The Obama Administration's primary motivation for acceding to the TAC appears to have been to send a signal that the United States seeks to upgrade its presence in Southeast Asia. Accession to the TAC by non-members often is seen as a symbol of their commitment to engagement in Southeast Asia and the organization's emphasis on multilateral processes. Objections to joining the TAC included arguments that the TAC's emphasis on non-interference in domestic affairs (particularly in Articles 2, 10, and 13) would constrain U.S. freedom of action, particularly its ability to penalize Burma; a concern that the treaty would undermine U.S. security agreements with Asian allies, notably Japan, South Korea, and Australia; a belief that acceding would accord greater legitimacy to the ruling Burmese junta; a view that ASEAN is insufficiently "action-oriented"; and a belief that the TAC is an ineffectual, largely symbolic agreement. Interests in Southeast Asia

One of the world's largest regional groupings, ASEAN is Southeast Asia's primary multilateral organization. Its 10 member-nations include over 500 million people. Geographically, Southeast Asia includes some of the world's most critical sea lanes, including the Straits of Malacca, through which pass a large percentage of the world's trade. Indeed, one factor motivating the United States' increased engagement with ASEAN in the 2000s has been the desire to support Southeast Asia's political stature as China expands its influence in the region. U.S.-ASEAN Economic Relations

Collectively, ASEAN is a major U.S. trading partner. Over the same period, ASEAN has been the source for about 5%-6% of total U.S. imports. Arguably, U.S. accession to the TAC could have taken the form of a treaty, with accession being subject to the advice and consent of the Senate, or an executive agreement. Some States that have acceded to the TAC, including the United States, negotiated side letters that address the issues discussed in the following sections.
On July 22, 2009, during Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton's visit to Southeast Asia, the United States acceded to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations' (ASEAN) Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC), one of the 10-nation organization's core documents, as had been amended by the 1987 and 1998 TAC Protocols. The move came less than six months after Secretary of State Clinton announced in Jakarta that the Obama Administration would launch its formal interagency process to pursue accession. This report analyzes the legal and diplomatic issues involved with accession to the TAC.
ASEAN is Southeast Asia's primary multilateral organization. Its 10 member-nations include over 500 million people. Collectively, ASEAN is one of the United States' largest trading partners, constituting about 5%-6% of total U.S. trade. Geographically, Southeast Asia includes some of the world's most critical sea lanes, including the Straits of Malacca, through which pass a large percentage of the world's trade. The TAC was first negotiated in 1976 and subsequently amended to allow non-regional countries to accede. Fifteen countries have done so, including U.S. allies Japan, South Korea, and Australia, as well as China, Russia, and India.
Within ASEAN, accession to the TAC by non-members often is seen as a symbol of commitment to engagement in Southeast Asia, and to the organization's emphasis on multilateral processes. The United States is the last major Pacific power to have acceded. The fact that the United States was not a party to the TAC had been one of many pieces of evidence that Southeast Asian leaders cited in arguing that the United States neglected Southeast Asia generally, and ASEAN specifically. Southeast Asian leaders generally have welcomed the Obama Administration's move, which seems to be designed to boost the United States' standing in Southeast Asia by expanding the multilateral component of U.S. policy in the region. Some U.S. and Southeast Asian officials and analysts say that expanding U.S. engagement with ASEAN will help boost Southeast Asia's political stature, particularly as China seeks to continue expanding its influence in the region.
The major concern with accession is whether the TAC's emphasis on non-interference in other countries' domestic affairs will constrain U.S. freedom of action, particularly its ability to maintain or expand sanctions on Burma. Proponents of accession often note that Australia has imposed and expanded financial and travel restrictions on Burma since it acceded in 2005. Canberra's restrictions are far less extensive than the sanctions the United States maintains on Burma. The Administration and ASEAN negotiated and exchanged side letters designed to alleviate these concerns. Other objections to accession included arguments that it will accord greater legitimacy to the ruling Burmese junta; a view that ASEAN is insufficiently "action-oriented"; and a belief that the TAC is an untested, arguably ineffectual agreement.
One issue for U.S. policymakers was whether accession to the TAC should take the form of a treaty, subject to the advice and consent of the Senate, or whether the President already has sufficient authority to enter the TAC without further legislative action being necessary. Ultimately, after consulting with selective offices in the Senate, the Administration decided that accession would take the form of an executive agreement, which does not require Senate approval.