	Background

In April 2003, we reported that watch lists were maintained by numerous  federal agencies and that the agencies did not have a consistent and  uniform approach to sharing information on individuals with possible links  to terrorism. During the 26- month period we studied—from December 2003 (when the Terrorist  Screening Center began operations) to January 2006—the center received  tens of thousands of screening-encounter referrals from frontline- screening agencies and determined that approximately half involved  misidentified persons with names the same as or similar to someone  whose name was contained on the terrorist watch list. Nonetheless, although the full universe of such misidentifications may be  substantial in absolute terms, the total number likely represents a small  fraction of all persons who are subject to terrorist watch list screening  procedures, as in the following examples:    U.S. Customs and Border Protection reported that its officers managed a  total of 431 million border crossings into the United States at land, air, and  sea ports of entry in fiscal year 2005. Misidentified Individuals Can Experience Delays and Other Effects

People who are misidentified to the terrorist watch list can be affected in  various ways, most commonly experiencing delays and related  inconveniences, including being subjected to more intensive questioning  and searches. Most Misidentifications Occur Because of Similarities to Names on the Terrorist Watch List; Agencies Are Attempting to Reduce the Incidence of Misidentifications or Otherwise Facilitate Individuals through the Screening Process

The most common cause of misidentifications is similarity of the names of  persons being checked to names on the Terrorist Screening Center’s  consolidated watch list, for which there is no complete remedy, but  agencies are taking actions to minimize the effect on frequently  misidentified persons. For instance, the computerized algorithms may account for  differences in names due to misspellings or transcription errors. Operationally, for each name that is screened against the watch list, the  computerized algorithm may return a list of possible matches. For instance, watch list records may be  based on intelligence gathered by electronic wire taps or other methods  that involve no opportunity to obtain biometric data. Nonetheless, center officials  anticipate that biometric information, if available, can be especially useful  for confirming matches to watch list records when individuals use false  identities or aliases. Most watch-list- related redress concerns usually involve misidentified persons— individuals who are not on the watch list but have name similarities with  known or suspected terrorists. To help ensure that opportunities for  redress are formally documented and that agency responsibilities are  clear, the Department of Justice is leading an effort to develop an  interagency memorandum of understanding. As mentioned previously, all aggrieved individuals may seek  redress, including persons who express concerns or complaints that they  are being misidentified and adversely affected because they have a name  similar to someone whose name is on the terrorist watch list and persons  who actually are on the terrorist watch list. According to Department of Justice officials, a final draft of the  memorandum of understanding is expected to be ready for interagency  clearances by fall 2006. Concluding Observations

Homeland security measures affect all travelers to some extent. We are not making recommendations at this time because the agencies  have ongoing efforts to improve data quality and otherwise either reduce  the number of misidentifications or mitigate their effects and to provide  more effective redress. The Department of Justice provided technical comments only, which we  incorporated in this report where appropriate. We will also  make copies available to others on request. To address concerns from misidentified and mistakenly listed persons,  what opportunities for redress have the Terrorist Screening Center and  frontline-screening agencies established? Major Reasons That Misidentifications Occur, and Actions the Terrorist Screening Center and Frontline-Screening Agencies Are Taking to Reduce the Number of Misidentified Persons or Expedite Them through the Screening Process

			Major Reasons That Misidentifications Occur

Regarding why misidentifications occur, our work focused on interviewing  officials at and reviewing documentation obtained from the Terrorist  Screening Center and three frontline-screening agencies—the  Transportation Security Administration, U.S. Customs and Border  Protection, and the Department of State. An  individual can voluntarily provide TSA with additional personal-identifying  information, which the agency will use to decide whether the person’s  name should be put on a cleared list—that is, a list that contains the names  and other personal-identifying information of individuals who have been  checked and cleared as being persons not on the No Fly and Selectee lists.
Why GAO Did This Study

A consolidated watch list managed by the FBI's Terrorist Screening Center (TSC) contains the names of known or suspected terrorists, both international and domestic. Various agencies whose missions require screening for links to terrorism use watch list records. For example, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) screens travelers at ports of entry. Because screening is based on names, it can result in misidentifications when persons not on the list have a name that resembles one on the list. Also, some names may be mistakenly included on the watch list. In either case, individuals can be negatively affected and may express concerns or seek agency action, or redress, to prevent future occurrences. This report addresses: (1) the extent to which the numbers of misidentified persons are known and how they could be affected, (2) the major reasons misidentifications occur and the actions agencies are taking to reduce them or minimize their effects, and (3) the opportunities for redress available to individuals with watch list-related concerns. In conducting work at TSC and the principal federal agencies that use watch list data, GAO reviewed standard operating procedures and other relevant documentation and interviewed responsible officials. GAO makes no recommendations at this time because the agencies have ongoing initiatives to improve data quality, reduce the number of misidentifications or mitigate their effects, and enhance redress efforts.

What GAO Found

Annually, millions of individuals--from international travelers to visa applicants--are screened for terrorism links against the watch list. At times, a person is misidentified because of name similarities, although the exact number is unknown. In some cases, agencies can verify the person is not a match by comparing birth dates or other data with watch list records, but agencies do not track the number. In other cases, they ask TSC for help. From December 2003 (when TSC began operations) to January 2006, agencies sent tens of thousands of names to TSC, and about half were misidentifications, according to TSC. While the total number of people misidentified may be substantial, it likely represents a fraction of all people screened. Even so, misidentifications can lead to delays, intensive questioning and searches, missed flights, or denied entry at the border. Misidentifications most commonly occur with names that are identical or similar to names on the watch list. To rapidly screen names against the watch list, agencies use computerized programs that account for differences due to misspellings and other variations. TSC has ongoing initiatives to improve computerized matching programs and the quality of watch list records. Also, CBP and the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) have established procedures designed to expedite frequently misidentified persons through screening, after confirming they are not on the watch list. Because security measures regrettably may cause personal inconveniences, TSA and CBP, with the support of TSC, provide opportunities for people who have been misidentified or mistakenly included on the watch list to seek redress. Most of these are misidentified persons who are not on the watch list but have a similar name and, therefore, may be repeatedly misidentified. Thus, TSA, for example, provides redress that relies heavily on efforts to expedite frequently misidentified persons through screening by allowing them to submit personal information that helps airlines more quickly determine that they are not on the watch list. If TSA and CBP cannot resolve questions from the public, they ask TSC for help. For 2005, TSC reported that it processed to completion 112 redress referrals and removed the names of 31 mistakenly listed persons from the watch list. To ensure that opportunities for redress are formally documented across agencies and that responsibilities are clear, the Justice Department is leading an effort to develop an interagency memorandum of understanding and expects a final draft to be ready for approval by fall 2006. TSC and frontline-screening-agency officials recognize that, after the agreement is finalized, the public needs to clearly understand how to express concerns and seek relief if negatively affected by screening. So, these officials have committed to making updated information on redress publicly available. GAO provided a draft copy of this report to the departments of Justice, Homeland Security, and State. They provided technical clarifications that GAO incorporated where appropriate.