1.1.) The Army’s risk assessment depends largely on the assumptions and model inputs that were adopted for TAA 2003. This is consistent with defense guidance. However, TAA 2003 found that about 79,000 of the more than 188,000 support force positions required in the first 30 days of the first MRC do not arrive on time because the Army lacks sufficient numbers of active support forces to meet these requirements and must rely on reserve forces instead. Only 12 percent of the support forces needed in the second MRC are active, compared with 47 percent in the first MRC. High reliance on reserves for use in the second MRC may not entail greater risk assuming there is adequate warning time and mobilization has already occurred. The same risk of late arrival would apply if mobilization was delayed. Finally, TAA results reveal that the Army will have few active support forces—about 12 percent of total support forces required—available to support the second MRC and that 19,200 required active support positions in existing units are not authorized to be filled. For example, although the Army used assumptions established by defense guidance, determining the implications of less favorable conditions, such as delayed call-up of reserves, would provide the Army with additional information on which to base its assessment of risk; rerun TAA models with the required force to assess the impact of force size on mobility requirements; and determine how support units resident within the eight National Guard divisions, TDA military personnel, contractor personnel, and DOD civilians can be used to fill some support force requirements. The Army has reviewed some TDA functions and identified a potential to reduce its TDA by up to 4,000 military positions as a result of its initial streamlining efforts. The Army is evaluating several options to consolidate its major commands, which could further reduce TDA requirements for active military personnel and introduce more efficient business practices. The Assistant Secretary’s office is also increasing its review of major commands’ requirements determination processes. Recommendations

To improve the management and allocation of personnel resources to the institutional Army, we recommend that the Secretary of the Army report to the Secretary of Defense the Army’s long-standing problem with implementing workload-based analysis as a material weakness under the Federal Managers’ Financial Integrity Act to maintain visibility of the issue and ensure action is taken and closely monitor the military positions the Army plans to save as the result of Force XXI initiatives and have a contingency plan in place in the event that these savings do not materialize. A Smaller Active Army Support Force Does Not Appear Feasible at This Time, but a Smaller Combat and TDA Force May Be Possible in the Future

Reducing active Army support forces does not appear feasible now based on TAA 2003 results, which show that the Army cannot meet its early deployment needs. Conclusions

OSD did not support its plan to reduce the Army’s active end strength with detailed analysis. However, given the risks the Army has accepted in its active support forces, we do not believe it is feasible for the Army to reduce its active support forces at this time. The Quadrennial Defense Review provides an opportunity for such new concepts to be considered.
Why GAO Did This Study

Pursuant to a legislative requirement, GAO reviewed how the Army determines its support force requirements, and the results of its most recent process for allocating support forces, known as Total Army Analysis (TAA) 2003.

What GAO Found

GAO found that: (1) it does not appear feasible to have a smaller active Army support force at this time, but a smaller active combat force and institutional force may be possible in the future; (2) a smaller active support force today would certainly increase the Army's risk of carrying out current defense policy; (3) current initiatives being explored by the Army regarding its institutional force could lead to greater efficiencies and thus a smaller active force; (4) improvements in the requirements determination process for both support forces and institutional forces could provide greater assurance that the size and composition of the Army is appropriate to meet war-fighting needs; (5) on the basis of TAA 2003 results, the Army believes it can deploy sufficient support forces to meet the requirements of two nearly simultaneous major regional conflicts (MRC) with moderate risk; (6) because it lacks adequate active support forces and must rely on reserve forces that take more time to be readied to deploy, an estimated 79,000 support forces needed in the first 30 days would arrive late; (7) support forces needed for the second conflict would consist of only 12 percent active forces; (8) high reliance on reserves for use in the second MRC may entail risk if the second MRC occurs without warning, or if mobilization is delayed; (9) existing active support units are short another 19,200 required positions and some required support units exist only on paper; (10) TAA 2003 had some limitations and the Army's risk assessment depends largely on the assumptions and model inputs that were adopted for TAA 2003; (11) the Army used many favorable assumptions that, although consistent with defense guidance, understated risk; (12) the Army's recent efforts to streamline the institutional active Army by identifying better ways to organize and adopt more efficient business practices have identified up to 4,000 military positions that the Army plans to use to offset active support shortfalls; (13) the Army may reduce the number of major commands, which could result in some additional force savings in the future; (14) however, the Army's efforts to make its institutional force more efficient and potentially smaller are hampered by long-standing weaknesses in its process to determine institutional force requirements; (15) GAO's analysis indicates that the Department of Defense (DOD) has not supported its proposal to reduce the active Army to 475,000 by 1999 with sound analysis; and (16) DOD has an opportunity to explore these and other alternatives during its Quadrennial Defense Review.