  Tactical nonstandard equipment, which is commercially acquired or  nondevelopmental equipment that is rapidly acquired and fielded  outside the normal Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution  System and acquisition processes, in order to bridge capability gaps  and meet urgent warfighter needs. According to Army officials, all equipment—standard and nonstandard— must be out of Iraq by December 31, 2011. Army Has Policies for Disposition of Nontactical Nonstandard Equipment

		Army Has Plans and Processes for the Disposition of Nontactical Nonstandard Equipment

As part of the Iraqi drawdown effort, excess nonstandard equipment that  is no longer needed in Iraq is either redistributed in the CENTCOM  theater, disposed of, provided to other nations through foreign military  sales, or packaged for retrograde to a variety of Defense Logistics  Agency Distribution Depots or Sierra Army Depot in the United States. As with Army units,  excess nontactical nonstandard equipment is shipped in “as is” condition. According to this message, the intent is to  extend the use of that equipment where appropriate. Moreover, the April 2011 message calls for the establishment of an  executive forum to review and determine the final disposition of excess  nonstandard equipment stored at Sierra Army Depot for more than 180  days that has not been identified for reuse. In this way unnecessary transportation  costs will be avoided. The CDRT process enables the Army to identify capabilities, most of  which involve tactical nonstandard equipment that has been rapidly  fielded, that are performing well in the CENTCOM theater and then to  assess whether the capability should be retained in the Army’s current  and future force. Lack of Oversight for Tactical Nonstandard Equipment Impairs Capabilities Development for Rapid Transition Process and May Inhibit Future Funding Estimates

The effectiveness of the Army’s CDRT process is also inhibited by the  lack of a system to track, monitor, and manage this equipment, which, in  turn, may be attributed to the absence of a single focal point with the  appropriate authority to oversee the fielding and disposition of tactical  nonstandard equipment. According to federal best practices reported in GAO’s Standards for  Internal Control in the Federal Government, management is responsible  for developing detailed policies, procedures, and practices to help  program managers achieve desired results through effective stewardship  of public resources. Army Has Finalized Disposition Plans for Its MRAP Fleet, but Its Cost Estimates Are Incomplete and Do Not Follow Best Practices

		Army Has Finalized Detailed Disposition Plans for Its MRAP Fleet

The Army has recently transitioned MRAPs from nonstandard to standard  items of equipment and published detailed disposition plans outlining how  the vehicles will be integrated into the Army’s force structure. Recommendations for Executive Action

To facilitate the Army’s ability to efficiently evaluate, integrate, and  provide for the disposition of its nonstandard equipment being  retrograded from Iraq, and supply DOD decision makers and Congress  with accurate estimates of the future costs of these systems, we  recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the  Army to take the following three actions:  finalize decisions about the future status of tactical nonstandard  equipment, fund those items deemed as enduring capabilities in the  Army base budget if applicable, and provide Congress with its plans  for and estimates on future funding for or costs associated with any  equipment the Army will continue to use in theater that will not  become enduring capabilities;    designate a senior-level focal point within the Department of the Army  with the appropriate authority and resources to manage the service’s  effort in overseeing the disposition of its tactical nonstandard  equipment to include the implementation of a servicewide means to  track, monitor, and manage this equipment; and    undertake a thorough total life-cycle cost estimate for integrating  MRAPs into its ground vehicle fleet in accordance with DOD, OMB,  and GAO guidance and include costs for training, upgrades,  standardization, and military construction and    use this estimate to assess the affordability of its current plans  and make adjustments to those plans if warranted; and    provide the total life-cycle cost for integrating MRAPs into its  ground vehicle fleet to Congress. Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD partially concurred with  our first recommendation, did not concur with our second  recommendation, and concurred with our third recommendation. Army officials familiar with the CDRT process have stated that the Army  has yet to make definitive and difficult decisions about the majority of the  material capabilities considered by CDRT and it cannot afford to sustain  this equipment without overseas contingency operations funds. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

To determine the extent to which the Army has plans and processes for  the disposition of nontactical nonstandard equipment no longer needed in  Iraq, we reviewed and analyzed relevant documents, including various  Army messages that address the procedures for requisitioning  retrograded nonstandard equipment from Iraq.
Why GAO Did This Study

As of March 2011, the Army had over $4 billion worth of nonstandard equipment in Iraq--that is equipment not included on units' standard list of authorized equipment. Concurrently, the Department of Defense (DOD) has acquired over $44 billion worth of Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles (MRAP), most of which have been allocated to the Army. This equipment must be withdrawn from Iraq by December 31, 2011. GAO examined the extent to which the Army has plans and processes for the disposition of (1) nontactical nonstandard equipment; (2) tactical nonstandard equipment; and (3) MRAPs that are no longer needed in Iraq. In performing this review, GAO analyzed relevant documents, interviewed Army officials, and visited Sierra Army Depot, where most nontactical nonstandard equipment is shipped once it leaves Iraq.

What GAO Found

The Army has plans and processes for the disposition of nontactical nonstandard equipment (e.g., durable goods that are used to provide services for soldiers), and recently created a policy regarding the length of storage time. Excess nontactical nonstandard equipment is either redistributed in the U.S Central Command theater, disposed of, provided to other nations through foreign military sales or other means, or shipped to depots in the United States. In April 2011, the Army issued two messages that updated its procedures for requisitioning excess nonstandard equipment stored at Sierra Army Depot and created a forum to determine its final disposition instructions. The intent was also to extend use of this equipment by making it available to Army units; when an item is deemed not operational, to dispose of it in theater; and to enter these instructions in a disposition database so they will no longer be shipped back to the United States. The Army would then avoid unnecessary transportation costs. The Army has not made disposition decisions for most of its tactical nonstandard equipment (i.e., commercially acquired or non-developmental equipment rapidly acquired and fielded outside the normal budgeting and acquisition process), and its disposition process is impaired by a lack of visibility over this equipment and the absence of a focal point to manage this equipment. The Capabilities Development for Rapid Transition process enables the Army to assess tactical nonstandard equipment already in use in the U.S. Central Command theater and determine whether it should be retained for the Army's current and future force and subsequently funded in the Army's base budget. However, the decision about most of the equipment considered by the process is to continue to fund it with overseas contingency operations funds. In addition, the Army has no system to track, monitor, and manage its inventory of tactical nonstandard equipment and has no single focal point to oversee this equipment. Best practices as cited in GAO's Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government call for effective stewardship of resources by developing detailed policies, procedures, and practices. Although the Army has plans for the disposition of its MRAP fleet, its cost estimates are incomplete and do not follow cost-estimating best practices. The Army conducted a study to effectively guide its integration of MRAPs into its force structure. The selected option placed the majority of MRAPs in prepositioned stocks. However, this study did not incorporate analyses of future costs based on Department of Defense, Office of Management and Budget, and GAO cost-estimating guidance providing best practices; nor did it delineate total costs for sustainment of its MRAP fleet or when those costs would be incurred. Without such information, decision makers lack the perspective necessary to make asset-management and budgetary decisions. Although Army officials stated that they are working toward providing an estimate of future MRAP costs, this has not yet been completed.

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense direct Army authorities to (1) finalize decisions about the future status of tactical nonstandard equipment; (2) designate a focal point to oversee this equipment; and (3) undertake a thorough life-cycle cost estimate for its MRAPs. DOD concurred with our third recommendation, partially concurred with our first, and did not concur with the second. Given DOD's lack of visibility over tactical nonstandard equipment, GAO continues to believe a focal point is needed.