In addition, the number of  sectors that the system is to be deployed to has been reduced from three  to two, and the stringency of the system performance measures that the  deployed system is to meet has been reduced. According to program  officials, the decreases are due to poorly defined requirements and  limitations in the capabilities of commercially available system  components. The result will be a deployed and operational system that,  like Project 28, does not live up to user expectations and provides less  mission support than was envisioned. As a result, the requirement in the radar specification was also  deviated. As of September  2008, the initial Block 1 deployment was to span three border patrol  sectors: Tucson, Yuma, and El Paso—a total of 655 miles. However, plans for the next increment have not  been developed. For example, the system will meet its  detection and identification performance requirements if it identifies   70 percent of the 70 percent of items that it detects, thus producing a   49 percent probability of identifying items of interest that cross the border. Without having a reliable schedule, it is  unlikely that actual program execution will track to plans, thus increasing  the risk of cost, schedule, and performance shortfalls. Second, the schedule does  not include key activities to be performed by the government. However, this Block 1 cost estimate is not reliable because it does not  sufficiently possess any of the above four characteristics. Further, the estimate has not been updated with  actual cost data available from the contractor. Program officials attributed these limitations in the cost estimate’s  comprehensiveness, documentation, accuracy, and credibility to a range of  factors, including competing program office priorities and the  department’s limited cost estimating capabilities. For example, program  officials stated that the DHS Cost Analysis Division did not prepare an  independent estimate because it did not have, among other things, the  people and tools needed to do so. However, it has not effectively implemented these processes. Key Block 1 Requirements Have Not Been Adequately Developed and Managed

Well-defined and managed requirements are essential to successfully  acquiring large-scale systems, like SBInet. Risk Management Approach Has Been Adequately Defined

According to relevant guidance, effective risk management includes  defining a process that, among other things, proactively identifies and  analyzes risks on the basis of likelihood of occurrence and impact, assigns  ownership, provides for mitigation, and monitors status. Conclusions

DHS has yet to demonstrate that its proposed SBInet solution is a cost- effective course of action, and thus whether the considerable time and  money being invested to acquire and deploy it is a wise and prudent use of  limited resources. Because of SBInet’s decreased scope, uncertain timing, unclear costs  relative to benefits, and limited life cycle management discipline and rigor,  in combination with its size and mission importance, the program  represents a risky undertaking. With respect to the first condition, we further recommend that the  Secretary of Homeland Security direct the Commissioner of U.S. Customs  and Border Protection to have the SBI Executive Director make it a  program priority to ensure that  the integrated master schedule for delivering Block 1 capabilities to TUS-1  and AJO-1 is revised to address the key schedule estimating practices  discussed in this report; the currently defined Block 1 requirements, including key performance  parameters, are independently validated as complete, verifiable, and  affordable and any limitations found in the requirements are addressed; the Systems Engineering Plan is revised to include or reference  documentation templates for key artifacts required at milestone gate  reviews;   all parent requirements that have been closed are supported by evidence  of the closure of all corresponding and associated child requirements; and   all significant risks facing the program are captured, mitigated, tracked,  and periodically reported to DHS and congressional decision makers. With respect to the second condition, we further recommend that the  Secretary of Homeland Security direct the Commissioner of U.S. Customs  and Border Protection to have the SBI Executive Director make it a  program priority to ensure that    a life cycle cost estimate for any incremental block of SBInet capabilities  that is to include capabilities and cover locations beyond those associated  with the TUS-1 and AJO-1 deployments is developed in a manner that  reflects the four characteristics of a reliable estimate discussed in this  report;   a forecast of the qualitative and quantitative benefits to be derived from  any such incremental block of SBInet over its useful life, or reasons why  such forecasts are not currently possible, are developed and documented; the estimated life cycle costs and benefits and associated net present value  of any such incremental block of SBInet capabilities, or reasons why such  an economic analysis cannot be performed, are prepared and documented;  and the results of these analyses, or the documented reasons why such  analyses cannot be provided, are provided to the Commissioner of U.S.  Customs and Border Protection and the DHS Acquisition Review Board. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

Our objectives were to determine the extent to which the Department of  Homeland Security (DHS) has (1) defined the scope of its proposed Secure  Border Initiative Network (SBInet) solution, (2) developed a reliable  schedule for delivering this solution, (3) demonstrated the cost- effectiveness of this solution, (4) acquired this solution in accordance with  key life cycle management processes, and (5) addressed our recent SBInet  recommendations.
Why GAO Did This Study

The technology component of the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Secure Border Initiative (SBI), referred to as SBInet, is to put observing systems along our nation's borders and provide Border Patrol command centers with the imagery and related tools and information needed in deciding whether to deploy agents. SBInet is being acquired and deployed in incremental blocks of capability, with the first block to cost about $1.3 billion. Because of the program's importance, size, and challenges, GAO was asked to, among other things, determine the extent to which DHS has (1) defined the scope of its proposed SBInet solution, (2) developed a reliable schedule for this solution, (3) demonstrated the cost-effectiveness of this solution, and (4) acquired the solution using key management processes. To do this, GAO compared key program documentation to relevant guidance and industry practices.

What GAO Found

DHS has defined the scope of the first incremental block of SBInet capabilities; however, these capabilities have continued to shrink from what the department previously committed to deliver. For example, the geographical "footprint" of the initially deployed capability has been reduced from three border sectors spanning about 655 miles to two sectors spanning about 387 miles. Further, the stringency of the performance capabilities has been relaxed, to the point that, for example, system performance will be deemed acceptable if it identifies less than 50 percent of items of interest that cross the border. The result is a system that is unlikely to live up to expectations. DHS has not developed a reliable integrated master schedule for delivering the first block of SBInet. Specifically, the schedule does not sufficiently comply with seven of nine key practices that relevant guidance states are important to having a reliable schedule. For example, the schedule does not adequately capture all necessary activities, assign resources to them, and reflect schedule risks. As a result, it is unclear when the first block will be completed, and continued delays are likely. DHS has also not demonstrated the cost-effectiveness of this first system block. In particular, it has not reliably estimated the costs of this block over its entire life cycle. To do so requires DHS to ensure that the estimate meets key practices that relevant guidance states are important to having an estimate that is comprehensive, well-documented, accurate, and credible. However, DHS's cost estimate for the initial block does not sufficiently possess any of these characteristics. Further, DHS has yet to identify expected benefits from the initial block, whether quantitative or qualitative, and analyze them relative to costs. As a result, it does not know whether its planned investment will produce mission value commensurate with costs. DHS has also not acquired the initial SBInet block in accordance with key life cycle management processes. While processes associated with, among other things, requirements development and management and risk management, have been adequately defined, they have not been adequately implemented. For example, key risks have not been captured in the risk management repository and thus have not been proactively mitigated. As a result, DHS is at increased risk of delivering a system that does not perform as intended. SBInet's decreasing scope, uncertain timing, unclear value proposition, and limited life cycle management discipline and rigor are due to a range of factors, including limitations in both defined requirements and the capabilities of commercially available system components, as well as the need to address competing program priorities, such as meeting aggressive system deployment milestones. As a result, it remains unclear whether the department's pursuit of SBInet is a cost effective course of action, and if it is, that it will produce expected results on time and within budget.