Section 620M of the Foreign Assistance Act prohibits the United States  from providing assistance under the Foreign Assistance Act or the Arms  Export Control Act to any unit of a foreign country’s security forces if the  Secretary of State has credible information that such unit has committed  a gross violation of human rights. U.S. Agencies Have Disbursed or Committed Most of the $671 Million Allocated for Security- Related Assistance Programs for Lebanon in Fiscal Years 2009 through 2013

The United States allocated $671 million for security-related assistance  for Lebanon from fiscal year 2009 through fiscal year 2013. Of these total  allocated funds, $477 million, or 71 percent, had been disbursed or  committed by the end of fiscal year 2013. Nearly all of the allocations  made in fiscal years 2009 through 2011 had been disbursed or  committed. For  the largest program, Foreign Military Financing, DOD had committed  about $352 million of the $481 million allocated from fiscal years 2009  through 2013. DOD and State Monitor End Use of Equipment Transferred to Lebanese Security Forces, but Gaps in Documentation and Security Checks May Limit Efforts to Safeguard Some Equipment

DOD and State conduct end-use monitoring for equipment each has  provided or authorized for sale to Lebanese security forces, but gaps in  implementation of procedures may limit efforts to safeguard some  equipment. DOD annually inventories sensitive equipment by serial  number, as required by its policy; however, U.S. embassy officials in  Beirut have not always used DOD’s required checklists to document  compliance with security safeguards and accountability procedures. With respect to enhanced end-use monitoring, DSCA’s policy manual for  end-use monitoring, the Security Assistance Management Manual, and  the associated standard operating procedures for Beirut require DOD  officials annually to  conduct a physical inventory of 100 percent of designated defense  articles,  conduct physical security checks of facilities where the equipment is  kept, and use and maintain records of equipment-specific checklists that outline  the physical security requirements for Lebanese facilities that store  the equipment. Use of the checklists would help  ensure that DOD officials document compliance with physical security  requirements for defense items transferred to the LAF. However, State did not provide support this  statement. While INL officials annually inventory all equipment INL has provided to  the ISF, INL may not be ensuring that the ISF is implementing  recommended physical security safeguards for defense articles because  INL lacks procedures to identify defense articles and the recommended  safeguards for storing them. On the basis of our cross-check analysis of a sample of names from six  training rosters against INVEST data, we estimated that State vetted for  potential human rights violations all Lebanese students who attended  security forces training from October 10, 2010, through April 30, 2013. Therefore, we estimate that 100 percent of  the 7,104 Lebanese students that attended U.S. training during that  period were vetted for human rights violations through INVEST before  they received training (see table 3). Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

The objectives of this review were to assess the extent to which the U.S.  government (1) disbursed or committed funds allocated for Lebanese  security forces in fiscal years 2009 through 2013, (2) implemented end- use monitoring for equipment transferred to Lebanese security forces,  and (3) vetted Lebanese recipients of U.S. security-related training for  human rights violations. To address these objectives, we obtained  funding data from the Department of Defense (DOD) and the Department  of State (State) on programs that provide security-related assistance to  Lebanon. We interviewed U.S. officials in Washington, D.C.; at the U.S.  Central Command in Tampa, Florida; and at the U.S. Embassy in Beirut,  Lebanon, as well as officials of the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) and  Internal Security Forces (ISF) in Beirut, Lebanon.
Why GAO Did This Study

Since 2009, the United States has allocated $671 million in security-related assistance for Lebanon to train, modernize, and equip the Lebanese Armed Forces and Internal Security Forces. The U.S. government established end-use monitoring programs to ensure that defense equipment is safeguarded. The Foreign Assistance Act prohibits certain assistance to any unit of foreign security forces if the Secretary of State has credible information that such a unit has committed a gross violation of human rights. GAO was asked to examine U.S. security-related assistance for Lebanon.
This report assesses the extent to which the U.S. government (1) disbursed or committed funds allocated for Lebanese security forces in fiscal years 2009 through 2013, (2) implemented end-use monitoring for equipment transferred to Lebanese security forces, and (3) vetted Lebanese recipients of U.S. security-related training for human rights violations. To address these objectives, GAO reviewed laws and regulations, analyzed agency data, and interviewed officials in Washington, D.C., and Beirut, Lebanon.

What GAO Found

The United States allocated $671 million for Lebanese security forces from fiscal year 2009 through fiscal year 2013. Of these total allocated funds, $477 million, or 71 percent, had been disbursed or committed by the end of fiscal year 2013. Nearly all of the allocations made in fiscal years 2009 through 2011 had been disbursed or committed. For the largest program, Foreign Military Financing, the Department of Defense (DOD) had committed about $352 million of the $481 million allocated in fiscal years 2009 through 2013.
Consistent with end-use monitoring requirements, DOD and the Department of State (State) conduct annual inventories for equipment transferred to Lebanese security forces. However, GAO found gaps in efforts to document and monitor physical security of some U.S. equipment transferred to Lebanese security forces that may weaken efforts to safeguard physical security of some equipment. First, while DOD annually inventories sensitive equipment by serial number, as required by its policy, U.S embassy officials in Beirut have not always used DOD's required checklists to document compliance with physical security safeguards. Second, State did not fully document 4 of the 10 end-use monitoring checks it conducted in fiscal years 2011 and 2012 for defense equipment the Lebanese government purchased commercially. State end-use monitoring guidance requires that specific information be documented and maintained for all such checks. Third, while State conducts an annual inventory of the equipment it transfers to the Lebanese security forces, State may not be ensuring that the recipients of defense articles implement recommended physical security safeguards because State lacks procedures to identify defense articles and any recommended safeguards for storing them.
Examples of Items Subject to End-Use Monitoring in Lebanon
GAO estimates that State vetted 100 percent of the Lebanese students that attended U.S.-funded security-related training from October 10, 2010, through April 30, 2013, for human rights violations. On the basis of a cross-check analysis of vetting data and a sample of names from six training rosters, GAO estimates that State vetted all of the 7,104 Lebanese students that attended training during that period.

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that DOD ensure U.S. officials use required checklists to confirm Lebanese facilities' compliance with required safeguards, and that State maintain proper documentation of end-use checks and establish formal procedures to ensure that bureaus identify defense articles and any recommended physical security safeguards for storing them. DOD and State concurred.