In particular, many analysts agree that some countries need greaterprotection against terrorist access to weapons of mass destruction (WMD) on their territories. Thereport of the 9/11 Commission called for continued support for threat reduction assistance to keepWMD away from terrorist groups. He then noted uncertainties aboutthe WMD programs of Iraq, Iran, Syria, Libya and North Korea. This paper takes CTR programs as a starting point and analyzes their potential application to India and Pakistan. The paper distinguishes betweenassistance oriented toward making nuclear weapons more secure, and assistance oriented towardmaking nuclear material more secure. Section 1601 in Title XVI states thatit shall be the policy of the United States, consistent with its obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferationof Nuclear Weapons, to encourage and work with India and Pakistan to achieve thefollowing by September 2003: 
nuclear test moratorium
commitment not to deploy nuclear weapons or ballistic missiles that couldcarry nuclear weapons and to restrain the ranges and types of missiles developed ordeployed
agreement by both countries to align their export controls with internationalnonproliferation regimes
establishment of export control system for sensitive dual-use items, technology,technical information and material used in the design, development, or production of WMD andballistic missiles
bilateral meetings between senior Indian and Pakistani officials to discusssecurity issues and establish confidence-building measures with respect to nuclear policies and programs. In the 108th Congress, the FY2004 National Defense Authorization Act ( P.L. 1308) authorized the Bush Administration to spend $50 million of unobligated funds from theCooperative Threat Reduction Program in states outside the former Soviet Union. Although the legislationremained in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, it is likely to be introduced again in the 109thCongress. Cooperative Threat Reduction

Congress enacted the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program in 1991,addressing, in Senator Lugar's words, "the dominant international proliferation danger: the massivenuclear, chemical and biological weapons infrastructure of the former Soviet Union." (8)

		CTR as Precedent

The Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, at its inception, was a novel approach to a novel problem. Although some of the kinds of assistance and measures undertaken in theCTR program are clearly applicable to India and Pakistan, the circumstances that have led to thedevelopment of a similar nuclear terrorist threat are quite different. Both Indiaand Pakistan have been active in discussions on expanding the Convention. Pakistan has IAEA safeguards on a few facilities. Media reported that Pakistan had moved nuclearweapons components to several undisclosed locations. Khan. And, reportedly, Pakistan shared that design with Libya. New military cooperation and sharing of information on terrorism and in other areas may buildtrust between the United States and Pakistan and between the United States and India. Agreements for Cooperation. As noted above, assistance ofthis kind has been provided under IAEA auspices. Certifications

In 1991, the legislation that created the Nunn-Lugar program stipulated that U.S. assistance in destroying nuclear and other weapons may not be provided to the Soviet Union, any of its republicsor successor entities unless the President certifies to the Congress that the proposed recipient iscommitted to:
making a substantial investment of its resources for dismantling or destroying such weapons;
forgo any military modernization that exceeds legitimate defense requirementsor is designed to replace destroyed WMD;
forgo the use of fissile materials and other components from destroyed nuclearweapons in new nuclear weapons;
facilitate U.S. verification of weapons destruction that uses U.S.money;
comply with all relevant arms control agreements; and
observe internationally recognized human rights, including the protection ofminorities.
Since India and Pakistan tested nuclear weapons in 1998, there has been a debate on whether the United States should provide assistance in making those weapons safer and more secure. In thewake of September 11, 2001, interest in this kind of assistance has grown for several reasons: thepossibility of terrorists gaining access to Pakistan's nuclear weapons seems higher, the U.S. militaryis forging new relationships with both Pakistan and India in the war on terrorism, and heightenedtension in Kashmir in 2002 threatened to push both states closer to the brink of nuclear war. InOctober 2001, media reported that the United States was providing assistance to Pakistan to keepits weapons safe, although those reports have not been confirmed. Revelations in 2004 that Pakistaniscientist A.Q. Khan was selling nuclear technology (and reportedly a nuclear bomb design) to Iran,Libya, and North Korea also helped to renew interest in making, in particular, Pakistan's nuclearweapons program more secure from exploitation. The report of the 9/11 Commission also called forcontinued support for threat reduction assistance to keep weapons of mass destruction (WMD) awayfrom terrorist groups.
In the 108th Congress, the Nunn-Lugar Expansion Act (Section 1308 of FY2004 Defense Authorization Act, PL 108-136) allowed the Department of Defense to spend up to $50 million inunobligated funds on cooperative threat reduction (CTR) measures outside the former Soviet Union. In the 109th Congress, it is likely that similar legislation will be introduced again. The Bushadministration used $20 million of CTR funds to dismantle chemical weapons-related items inAlbania, but proponents of expanding CTR have mentioned many other countries as possiblerecipients: India, Pakistan, China, North Korea, Iraq, and Libya, to name a few.
This paper describes why Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) programs developed for the former Soviet Union are considered models for assistance elsewhere and their potential applicationin India and Pakistan. The paper considers the types of assistance provided under CTR and potentialconstraints on U.S. assistance in this area, including domestic and international legal and politicalrestrictions on cooperation with states outside the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT); the lowlevel of cooperation and transparency exhibited by India and Pakistan; lack of incentives for Indiaand Pakistan to pursue threat reduction measures; and potentially competing objectives of threatreduction and nuclear deterrence.
This report, which will be updated as events warrant, complements CRS Report RL32359 , Globalizing Cooperative Threat Reduction: A Survey of Options , and CRS Report RS21840(pdf) , Expanding Threat Reduction and Nonproliferation Programs: Concepts and Definitions .