For example, in the appropriate  circumstance, an agency could authorize an informant to purchase illegal  drugs from someone who is the target of a drug-trafficking investigation. Five Agencies’ Policies Do Not Include All Requirements in the Guidelines

DOJ and DHS component agencies’ policies in our review generally  address a majority of the Guidelines’ requirements for vetting potential  informants; however, about half of those policies are not fully consistent  with the provisions for overseeing informants’ illegal activities. Without such documentation, if an  informant engages in an activity that exceeds the scope of the  authorization, the agency may not be able to demonstrate that the  informant’s actions were not authorized, thereby limiting the agency’s  ability to prosecute the informant for the unauthorized illegal activity. Thus, these agencies’ monitoring processes, do not verify  compliance with these provisions in the Guidelines. Additionally, these agencies have  developed administrative evaluation tools, such as standardized forms  that correspond with their respective policy requirements, to help  ensure that agents capture necessary information when vetting an  informant. Confidential informant coordinators. Field office–based inspection programs. DEA, ICE, and USSS Do Not Have Reasonable Assurance That They Are Following the Guidelines for Overseeing Informants’ Illegal Activities

As noted above, DEA, the FBI, ICE, and USSS have monitoring  processes in place to help ensure compliance with their respective  policies on handling informants. As a result, agencies may not have reasonable  assurance that agents are complying with provisions in the Guidelines for  overseeing informants’ illegal activities. Conclusions

The use of confidential informants is an important law enforcement tool  that supports investigations and prosecutions, but because informants  often have criminal histories, it is important for agencies to have  procedures that address the associated risks. The Attorney General’s  Guidelines established procedures to help ensure that agencies exercise  their authorities—especially for vetting the suitability of an informant and  authorizing the informant to conduct otherwise illegal activities— appropriately and with adequate oversight of informants. Recommendations for Executive Action

To help ensure that agencies’ policies and oversight are fully consistent  with The Attorney General’s Guidelines Regarding the Use of Confidential  Informants, we recommend that  the Administrator of DEA and the Director of USMS, with assistance  and oversight from the DOJ Criminal Division, update their agencies’  respective policies and corresponding monitoring processes to  explicitly address the Guidelines’ provisions on oversight of  informants’ illegal activities;   the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security provide  oversight and guidance to ensure that DHS agencies comply with the  Guidelines; and  the Assistant Secretary of ICE and the Commandant of USCG update  their respective agencies’ informant policies and corresponding  monitoring processes to explicitly address the Guidelines’ provisions  on oversight of informants’ illegal activities. In  their comments, DOJ and DHS concurred with our recommendations and  described actions under way or planned to address them. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

For this report, we reviewed the policies and processes for the eight  Department of Justice (DOJ) and Department of Homeland Security  (DHS) component agencies that used confidential informants in fiscal  year 2013, the most recent year for which data were available. The DOJ  agencies included in our review are the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco,  Firearms and Explosives (ATF); the U.S Drug Enforcement Administration  (DEA); the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI); and the U.S. Marshals  Service (USMS). The DHS agencies are U.S. Customs and Border  Protection (CBP), U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), the  U.S. Coast Guard (USCG), and the U.S. Secret Service (USSS). To determine the extent to which DOJ and DHS component agencies’  policies include procedures outlined in The Attorney General’s  Guidelines, we assessed the eight agencies’ informant policies against  provisions in the Guidelines regarding vetting informants or overseeing  informants’ illegal activities.
Why GAO Did This Study

Federal law enforcement components used more than 16,000 confidential informants in fiscal year 2013 as part of criminal investigations. Informants can be critical to an investigation, but without appropriate oversight, problems can occur that undermine the credibility of the informant's role in an investigation. The Attorney General's Guidelines sets forth procedures on the management of informants, including vetting potential informants and overseeing informants' illegal activities that components authorize to support an investigation.
GAO was asked to review the use of confidential informants. GAO reviewed the extent to which (1) DOJ and DHS components' policies address the Guidelines for vetting informants and overseeing their illegal activities and (2) selected components have monitoring processes to ensure compliance with the Guidelines.
GAO reviewed components' documented policies and monitoring processes and interviewed agency officials about their practices. GAO visited components' field offices in three locations chosen based on the numbers of informants overseen, among other factors.

What GAO Found

Some components within the Departments of Justice (DOJ) and Homeland Security (DHS) do not fully address procedures outlined in The Attorney General's Guidelines (the Guidelines)—which established procedures to help ensure that components exercise their authorities regarding the use of informants appropriately and with adequate oversight. Eight components within DOJ and DHS—the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives; the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA); the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI); the U.S. Marshals Service (USMS); U.S. Customs and Border Protection; U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE); the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG); and the U.S. Secret Service (USSS)—have policies in place that generally address the procedures outlined in the Guidelines for vetting a confidential informant.
However, five of the eight components' policies are not fully consistent with the Guidelines' provisions for overseeing informants' illegal activities. For example, the Guidelines require agencies to document certain information when authorizing an informant to participate in an activity that would otherwise be considered illegal (e.g., purchasing illegal drugs from someone who is the target of a drug-trafficking investigation). DEA, USMS, ICE, USCG, and USSS do not fully address the requirements to provide the informant with written instructions about the authorized activity and require signed acknowledgment from the informant. Without such documentation, if an informant engages in an activity that exceeds the scope of the authorization, the agency may not be able to demonstrate that the informant's actions were not authorized, thereby limiting the agency's ability to prosecute the informant for the unauthorized illegal activity.
The DOJ and DHS components that oversaw the most informants in fiscal year 2013—the FBI, DEA, ICE, and USSS—have monitoring processes in place to help ensure that agents are complying with their respective components' policies. Such monitoring activities include supervisory reviews, as well as headquarters inspections and self-inspections within the field offices. These agencies also use administrative tools, such as standardized forms, that cover the requirements in their policies and help ensure that agents capture necessary information. However, as noted above, some components' policies do not fully address the procedures in the Guidelines, and as a result, the components' monitoring processes likewise do not assess compliance with those procedures in the Guidelines. Consequently, agencies may not have reasonable assurance that they are complying with procedures established in the Guidelines to address the risks associated with using informants.
This is a public version of a sensitive report that GAO issued in March 2015. It does not include details that ICE deemed law enforcement sensitive.

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that DOJ and DHS and their components take actions to update components' policies and monitoring processes to improve handling and oversight of confidential informants. DOJ and DHS concurred with our recommendations.