Individual Agencies Are Responsible for Developing and Maintaining OEPs, and the Majority of Selected Facilities’ OEPs Generally Reflect Federal Guidance

The federal agencies that occupy federal facilities are responsible for  preparing and maintaining OEPs; ISC, GSA, and FPS provide guidance  or assistance to the agencies in developing OEPs, and FPS can  periodically review OEPs. Agencies Are Responsible for OEPs with Assistance from ISC, GSA, and FPS

Ensuring that each of the approximately 9,600 GSA-owned and -leased  facilities protected by FPS has emergency plans to safely evacuate  occupants is a complex undertaking. According to  federal regulations, designated officials are responsible for developing,   In the event of  implementing, and maintaining the OEP for the facility.an emergency, the designated official is expected to initiate appropriate  action according to the OEP, including the evacuation and relocation of  facility occupants. GSA also plays a role in coordinating directly with facilities to provide  guidance on OEPs and participates in emergency planning efforts. FPS is responsible for assisting federal agencies with guidance, training,  exercises, and drills, and also conducts periodic facility security  assessments that include checking OEPs. Of the 20 facilities we visited, officials at 14 reported  using FPS guidance or feedback on their OEPs, for example, using the  FPS template as a base for their OEPs and officials at 5 facilities reported  using their own agency guidance for OEP development. Officials at  1 facility reported not using FPS or other agency guidance for OEP  development. According to FPS officials, recommendations about OEPs and evacuation  processes, such as suggestions to change assembly points in the event  of an evacuation, may be made during facility security assessments. The Majority of Selected Facilities’ OEPs Generally Reflect Federal Guidance

All 20 facilities we visited had written OEPs, as required by regulation,  which included evacuation procedures. We analyzed the extent to which the selected facilities’ OEPs  incorporated elements that should be in an OEP according to the ISC  2010 standard, which outlines 10 minimum elements:  1.  purpose and circumstances for activation,  2.  command officials and supporting personnel contact information,  3.  occupant life safety options (e.g., evacuation, shelter-in-place),  4.  local law enforcement and first responder response,  5.  special needs individuals (e.g., those with disabilities, or who are  7.  special facilities (e.g., child care centers),  8.  assembly and accountability,  9.  security during and after incident, and  10. training and exercises. Seven of the facilities did not address at least one  OEP element in the ISC 2010 standard in their OEPs or other documents. That an element was not in the plan or in related documents for 7 facilities  does not necessarily indicate potential vulnerabilities for these facilities  because other procedures or facility services may address the intent of  the OEP element. As another example, at 2 facilities where training or  exercises were not included in the OEPs, officials at both facilities (which  were housed in leased GSA space) said that building management  conducts drills and that they participate. We did observe some commonality in the 20 facility OEPs we reviewed,  based on facility characteristics such as security level, whether the facility  was GSA owned or leased, and occupant characteristics, as shown in  table 1. A Majority of Officials in Our Review Reported Responding to Challenges Identified during Their Facility Drills and Evacuations

Officials at 14 of 20 facilities in our review identified challenges, and all  but one reported responding to challenges they encountered in  developing and implementing emergency evacuation procedures. Officials at 6 facilities said that they did not identify any challenges. These officials said that they have since researched  proper earthquake procedures, and have revised or are in the process of  revising their OEPs accordingly. Officials at all but 1 facility provided additional detail regarding actions  they are taking to mitigate facility evacuation challenges. Officials at 10 of the 20 selected  facilities cited apathy as a challenge they encountered, such as  employees not participating in or responding quickly to drills; not  wanting to stop working or leave the building; not reporting to the  assembly area (e.g., going for a coffee break during an evacuation  drill); and not volunteering for emergency team responsibilities, such  as becoming a floor warden. Keeping emergency contact information updated. To address this challenge, officials at 6 facilities said they  review and update contact information at various points, such as  when staff leave; before drills; or on a daily, weekly, monthly, or  quarterly basis at different facilities. Emerging threats. DHS provided technical  comments, which were incorporated as appropriate. We are sending copies of this report to the Department of Homeland  Security, the Administrator of the General Services Administration,  selected congressional committees, and other interested parties. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

1.  who is responsible for ensuring that federal facilities have occupant  emergency plans (OEP) in place and the extent to which selected  facilities’ OEPs reflect federal guidance and  2.  evacuation challenges, if any, that selected facilities experienced and  what actions, if any, they reported taking to address these issues. We interviewed relevant senior  agency officials regarding their agencies’ role in ensuring federal facilities  have OEPs in place, including ISC officials in Washington, D.C.; officials  from FPS and GSA in their headquarters; and FPS and GSA officials in  the three field locations where we conducted site visits to selected federal  facilities, as described below. While the findings from our 20 case studies are not  generalizable to all GSA-owned and -leased facilities, they provide  specific examples of how selected facilities have addressed emergency  plan requirements and provide insights from a range of federal facilities.
Why GAO Did This Study

Recent emergencies, such as earthquakes in the nation's capital, have raised concerns about how prepared federal agencies are in the 9,600 facilities owned or leased by GSA and protected by the Department of Homeland Security's FPS to safely evacuate occupants in federal buildings. All federal agencies are required to prepare OEPs for their facilities, which describe actions agencies should take to plan for a safe evacuation during an emergency.
GAO was asked to provide information on how prepared GSA-owned and -leased facilities are to evacuate occupants during an emergency. This report describes (1) who is responsible for ensuring that federal facilities have OEPs in place and the extent to which selected facilities' OEPs reflect federal guidance, and (2) the evacuation challenges, if any, selected facilities experienced and what actions, if any, they reported taking to address these issues.
GAO reviewed federal regulations and guidance on OEPs, including documents from ISC, GSA, and FPS, which develop governmentwide physical security standards and policies, such as minimum elements for OEPs. GAO also reviewed OEPs and interviewed facility officials at 20 GSA-owned and -leased facilities, selected based on geographic dispersion, recent evacuations, and facility security level. While not generalizable to all GSA-owned and -leased facilities the results provided perspectives of varying facilities.
DHS written and technical comments were incorporated, as appropriate. GSA did not have any comments.

What GAO Found

Federal agencies occupying facilities owned or leased by the General Services Administration (GSA) are responsible for preparing and maintaining occupant emergency plans (OEP), with assistance or guidance from the Federal Protective Service (FPS) and others, and the majority of selected federal facilities' OEPs GAO reviewed reflect federal guidance. As required by federal regulations, all 20 selected facilities had OEPs and had designated officials, who are responsible for maintaining OEPs and initiating action according to the OEP in the event of an emergency, including the evacuation of facility occupants. Consistent with federal guidance, officials at 19 of the 20 selected facilities reported that they review and update OEPs at least annually, and officials at 1 facility said they were in the process of updating their OEP. When requested, FPS provides OEP guidance, such as templates to facility officials. Officials at 14 facilities reported using FPS guidance or feedback for their OEPs, officials at 1 facility reported not using FPS guidance, and officials at 5 facilities said they used their own agency's guidance. FPS also checks OEPs during periodic facility security assessments--conducted at least every 3 to 5 years-- to assess overall facility risk. GSA officials said they have a role in coordinating directly with facilities to provide guidance and feedback on OEPs, and to help facility officials plan drills and exercises. To assist agency officials as they develop OEPs that best fit individual facilities and agency needs, the Interagency Security Committee (ISC), a Department of Homeland Security-chaired policy development organization, in April 2010 identified 10 minimum elements, such as exercises or evacuating occupants with special needs, that should be addressed in an OEP. Thirteen of the 20 selected facilities addressed all 10 minimum elements in OEPs or related documents. Seven facilities' OEPs did not address at least 1 of the 10 elements; however, lack of an element does not necessarily indicate potential vulnerabilities for that facility because the intent of the element may be addressed by other procedures or modified based on facility characteristics. For example, evacuation exercises were not included in OEPs for 2 facilities located in leased GSA space; however, officials said they participate in drills conducted by building management. The 20 selected facility OEPs were unique to each facility and how OEPs addressed particular elements.
Officials at 14 of 20 facilities identified evacuation challenges. The most frequently cited challenges included employee apathy toward participating in drills, accounting for employees, and keeping contact information updated. Officials at all but one facility, which was updating its OEP, reported various ways they addressed evacuation challenges, including using technology such as entry scan systems and radios to track and communicate with employees and making evacuation training more interesting to employees. Other incidents and emerging threats also prompted officials to change OEPs or evacuation training. For example, during the 2011 Washington, D.C., earthquake, officials at selected facilities in the D.C. area said that the lack of employee training on earthquake procedures may have exposed employees to potential hazards when they self-evacuated. Officials reported revising their OEPs to include procedures for earthquakes. Recent shootings also prompted facility officials to revise their OEPs and participate in FPS awareness training on active shooter incidents. Officials at 6 facilities did not report challenges.