More Public Diplomacy Resources Shifting to Muslim- Majority Countries

Since September 11, 2001, State has expanded its efforts in Muslim- majority countries that are considered strategically important in the war  on terrorism. State has also launched a number of new initiatives  targeting broader, younger audiences—particularly in predominantly  Muslim countries—that include expanding exchange programs targeting  citizens of Muslim countries, informing foreign publics about U.S. policies  in the war on terrorism, and demonstrating that Americans and Muslims  share certain values. The BBG has also targeted recent initiatives to  support the war on terrorism, including Radio Sawa in the Middle East; the  Afghanistan Radio Network; and the new Radio Farda service to Iran. The 9/11 Commission recommended that the United States rely on such  programs and activities to vigorously defend our ideals abroad, just as the  United States did during the Cold War. State Has Increased Resources and Programs in the Middle East

Since September 11, 2001, the State Department has increased its  resources and launched various new initiatives in predominantly Muslim  countries. This program uses space in public libraries and other public  buildings abroad to provide information about the United States. In fiscal  year 2004, State is planning to establish 58 American Corners in the East  and South Asia. Planning Deficiencies, Inability to Gauge Progress Toward Goals Hinder U.S. Public Diplomacy Efforts

While the growth in programs to the Muslim world marks the recognition  of the need to increase diplomatic channels to this population, there still is  no interagency strategy to guide State’s and all federal agencies’  communication efforts and ensure consistent messages to overseas  audiences. We agree with the 9/11 Commission recommendation that the  U.S. government must define its message. In addition, we found that , although BBG has a strategic plan, the plan  lacks a long-term strategic goal or related program objective to gauge the  Board’s success in increasing audience size. Since  our report, however, the Board revised its strategic plan and has improved  its ability to gauge its program effectiveness measures by adding broadcast  credibility and audience awareness measures. The absence of an interagency strategy complicates  the task of conveying consistent messages and thus achieving mutually  reinforcing benefits. State Does Not Have an Integrated Strategy to Guide Public Diplomacy Operations

After September 11, State acknowledged the need for a strategy that  integrates all of its diverse public diplomacy activities and directs them  toward common objectives, but to date, that strategy is still in the  development stage. State Lacks Measures of Progress Toward Public Diplomacy Goals

We also found that State is not systematically and comprehensively  measuring progress toward its public diplomacy goals. First, the Board created a single strategic goal to focus on the key  objective of maximizing impact in priority areas of interest to the United  States and made audience size a key performance measure. A Number of Internal Challenges Hamper U.S. Public Diplomacy Activities

Mr. Chairman, I have discussed the expansion of U.S. public diplomacy  resources to areas of the world thought to breed terrorist activities and the  need for a more cohesive, integrated U.S. public diplomacy strategy with  measurable indicators of progress. The Board’s key challenge  in executing its strategy is how to generate large audiences while dealing  with a number of media market, organizational, and resources issues. Outdated Broadcast Services and Structure Pose Challenges to Expanding in Priority Markets

The Broadcasting Board of Governors has its own set of public diplomacy  challenges, key among them is how to gain large audiences in priority  markets while dealing with (1) a collection of outdated and  noncompetitive language services, (2) a disparate organizational structure  consisting of seven separate broadcast entities and a mix of federal agency  and grantee organizations that are managed by a part-time Board of  Governors, and (3) the resource challenge of broadcasting in 97 language  services to more than 125 broadcast markets worldwide.
Why GAO Did This Study

Polls taken in Islamic countries after 9/11 suggested that many or most people had a favorable view of the United States and its fight against terrorism. By 2003, opinion research indicated that foreign publics, especially in countries with large Muslim populations, viewed the United States unfavorably. GAO issued two studies in 2003 that examined (1) changes in U.S. public diplomacy resources and programs since September 11, 2001, within the State Department (State) and the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG); (2) the U.S. government's strategies for its public diplomacy programs and measures of effectiveness; and (3) the challenges that remain in executing U.S. public diplomacy efforts. GAO made several recommendations to State and the BBG to address planning and performance issues. Both agencies agreed with these recommendations and have made some progress in implementing them. On July 22, 2004, the 9/11 Commission released its report and recommendations. Two of the Commission's recommendations relate to the management of U.S. public diplomacy. For this testimony, GAO was asked to discuss its prior work as it relates to these recommendations.

What GAO Found

Since September 11, 2001, State has expanded its public diplomacy efforts in Muslim-majority countries considered to be of strategic importance in the war on terrorism. It significantly increased resources in South Asia and the Near East and launched new initiatives targeting broader, younger audiences--particularly in predominantly Muslim countries. These initiatives are consistent with the 9/11 Commission's recommendation that the United States rebuild its scholarship, library, and exchange programs overseas. Since 9/11, the BBG has initiated several new programs focused on attracting larger audiences in priority markets, including Radio Sawa and Arabic language television in the Middle East, the Afghanistan Radio Network, and Radio Farda in Iran. The 9/11 Commission report highlights these broadcast efforts and recommends that funding for such efforts be expanded. While State and BBG have increased their efforts to support the war on terrorism, we found that there is no interagency strategy to guide State's, BBG's, and other federal agencies' communication efforts. The absence of such a strategy complicates the task of conveying consistent messages to overseas audiences. Likewise, the 9/11 Commission recommended that the United States do a better job defining its public diplomacy message. In addition, we found that State does not have a strategy that integrates and aligns all its diverse public diplomacy activities. State, noting the need to fix the problem, recently established a new office of strategic planning for public diplomacy. The BBG did have a strategic plan, but the plan lacked a long-term strategic goal or related program objective to gauge the Board's success in increasing audience size, the key focus of its plan. We also found that State and the BBG were not systematically and comprehensively measuring progress toward the goals of reaching broader audiences and increasing publics' understanding about the United States. The BBG subsequently made audience size a key performance goal and added broadcaster credibility and plans to add other performance measures that GAO recommended. In addition, State and BBG face several internal challenges in carrying out their programs. Challenges at State include insufficient public diplomacy resources and a lack of officers with foreign language proficiency. State officials are trying to address staffing gaps through increased recruitment. The BBG also faces a number of media market, organizational, and resource challenges that may hamper its efforts to generate large audiences in priority markets. It has developed a number of solutions to address these challenges.