In other cases, the FBI will rely on the screening  agency and other law enforcement agencies—such as U.S. Immigration  and Customs Enforcement—to respond and collect information. Figure 1  presents a general overview of the process used to resolve encounters  with individuals on the terrorist watch list. In accordance with Homeland  Security Presidential Directive 6, TSC’s watch list is to contain information  about individuals “known or appropriately suspected to be or have been  engaged in conduct constituting, in preparation for, in aid of, or related to  terrorism.” In implementing this directive, the National Counterterrorism  Center and the FBI strive to ensure that individuals who are reasonably  suspected of having possible links to terrorism—in addition to individuals  with known links—are nominated for inclusion on the watch list. Because individuals can  be added to the list based on reasonable suspicion, inclusion on the list  does not automatically prohibit an individual from, for example, obtaining  a visa or entering the United States when the person is identified by a  screening agency. Rather, when an individual on the list is encountered,  agency officials are to assess the threat the person poses to determine  what action to take, if any. Agencies Have Had Approximately 53,000 Encounters with Individuals on the Watch List, and Outcomes Indicate the List Has Helped to Combat Terrorism

From December 2003 (when TSC began operations) through May 2007,  screening and law enforcement agencies encountered individuals who  were positively matched to watch list records approximately 53,000 times,  according TSC data. Our analysis of  data on the outcomes of encounters revealed that agencies took a range of  actions, such as arresting individuals, denying others entry into the United  States, and most commonly, releasing the individuals following  questioning and information gathering. Potential Vulnerabilities in Agency Screening Processes and Agency Efforts to Address Them

The principal screening agencies whose missions most frequently and  directly involve interactions with travelers do not check against all records  in TSC’s consolidated watch list because screening against certain records  (1) may not be needed to support the respective agency’s mission, (2) may  not be possible due to the requirements of computer programs used to  check individuals against watch list records, or (3) may not be  operationally feasible. Rather, each day, TSC exports applicable records  from the consolidated watch list to federal government databases that  agencies use to screen individuals for mission-related concerns. For example, U.S. Customs and  Border Protection has encountered situations where it identified the  subject of a watch list record after the individual had been processed at a  port of entry and admitted into the United States. Also, TSC has ongoing initiatives  to help reduce instances of individuals on the watch list passing  undetected through agency screening, including efforts to improve  computerized name-matching programs. However, many critical infrastructure components  are not using watch list records. A primary reason why screening opportunities remain untapped is because  the government lacks an up-to-date strategy and implementation plan— supported by a clearly defined leadership or governance structure—for  enhancing the effectiveness of terrorist-related screening, consistent with  presidential directives. These plan elements, which were prescribed by  presidential directives, are crucial for coordinated and comprehensive use  of terrorist-related screening data, as they provide a platform to establish  governmentwide priorities for screening, assess progress toward policy  goals and intended outcomes, ensure that any needed changes are  implemented, and respond to issues that hinder effectiveness. Such optimization should include development of  guidelines to support private sector screening processes that have a  substantial bearing on homeland security, as well as development of an  up-to-date strategy and implementation plan for using terrorist-related  information.
Why GAO Did This Study

The Federal Bureau of Investigation's (FBI) Terrorist Screening Center (TSC) maintains a consolidated watch list of known or appropriately suspected terrorists and sends records from the list to agencies to support terrorism-related screening. This testimony discusses (1) standards for including individuals on the list, (2) the outcomes of encounters with individuals on the list, (3) potential vulnerabilities in screening processes and efforts to address them, and (4) actions taken to promote effective terrorism-related screening. This statement is based on GAO's report (GAO-08-110). To accomplish the objectives, GAO reviewed documentation obtained from and interviewed officials at TSC, the FBI, the National Counterterrorism Center, the Department of Homeland Security, and other agencies that perform terrorism-related screening.

What GAO Found

The FBI and the intelligence community use standards of reasonableness to evaluate individuals for nomination to the consolidated terrorist watch list. In general, individuals who are reasonably suspected of having possible links to terrorism--in addition to individuals with known links--are to be nominated. As such, being on the list does not automatically prohibit, for example, the issuance of a visa or entry into the United States. Rather, when an individual on the list is encountered, agency officials are to assess the threat the person poses to determine what action to take, if any. As of May 2007, the consolidated watch list contained approximately 755,000 records. From December 2003 through May 2007, screening and law enforcement agencies encountered individuals who were positively matched to watch list records approximately 53,000 times. Many individuals were matched multiple times. The outcomes of these encounters reflect an array of actions, such as arrests; denials of entry into the United States; and, most often, questioning and release. Within the federal community, there is general agreement that the watch list has helped to combat terrorism by (1) providing screening and law enforcement agencies with information to help them respond appropriately during encounters and (2) helping law enforcement and intelligence agencies track individuals on the watch list and collect information about them for use in conducting investigations and in assessing threats. Regarding potential vulnerabilities, TSC sends records daily from the watch list to screening agencies. However, some records are not sent, partly because screening against them may not be needed to support the respective agency's mission or may not be possible due to the requirements of computer programs used to check individuals against watch list records. Also, some subjects of watch list records have passed undetected through agency screening processes and were not identified, for example, until after they had boarded and flew on an aircraft or were processed at a port of entry and admitted into the United States. TSC and other federal agencies have ongoing initiatives to help reduce these potential vulnerabilities, including efforts to improve computerized name-matching programs and the quality of watch list data. Although the federal government has made progress in promoting effective terrorism-related screening, additional screening opportunities remain untapped--within the federal sector, as well as within critical infrastructure components of the private sector. This situation exists partly because the government lacks an up-to-date strategy and implementation plan for optimizing use of the terrorist watch list. Also lacking are clear lines of authority and responsibility. An up-to-date strategy and implementation plan, supported by a clearly defined leadership or governance structure, would provide a platform to establish governmentwide screening priorities, assess progress toward policy goals and intended outcomes, consider factors related to privacy and civil liberties, ensure that any needed changes are implemented, and respond to issues that hinder effectiveness.