Since its establishment AFRICOM has increased its footprint on the  continent to support the command’s missions of building African partner  defense capabilities, responding to crises, and deterring transnational  threats in order to promote regional security. In tandem with AFRICOM’s  growing footprint there has been a continued reliance on contractors to  provide, among other things, logistical, transportation, and intelligence  support to the command’s missions. AFRICOM Has Established an Organizational Structure to Manage, Plan for, and Assess OCS, but Some Subordinate Commands Have Not Done So

AFRICOM established a formal OCS structure with dedicated  personnel—including an OCS Integration Cell—at the headquarters level  to serve as the central coordination point to integrate OCS in all  directorates, and to manage, plan for, and assess OCS. AFRICOM’s OCS Integration Cell has also taken steps to manage OCS  at its subordinate commands by conducting staff assistance visits to  enhance OCS capabilities. Most AFRICOM Subordinate Commands Have Not Established an OCS Organizational Structure

With the exception of U.S. Army Africa, AFRICOM’s subordinate  commands, including service component and joint force commands,  generally lack formal organizational structures with personnel dedicated  to OCS. While U.S. According to Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa  contracting officials, applying OCS concepts such as establishing an OCS  Integration Cell at Camp Lemonnier would be helpful to avoid duplication  of work and increased costs. However, AFRICOM officials stated that no subordinate command had  processes in place to ensure that contractor personnel were being  included in SPOT—a contractor accountability database—at the time of  the assessment, and that AFRICOM contractor personnel accountability  guidance was unclear about when the commands were required to  account for contractor personnel, and what types of contractor personnel  to include. Without clearly defined assessment standards for the scorecard,  AFRICOM cannot accurately assess the OCS actions taken by  subordinate commands. However, AFRICOM does not have a complete  picture of the number of contractor personnel supporting its operations in  the region. AFRICOM uses two primary sources—daily personnel status  reports and SPOT, a DOD contractor personnel accountability  database—to collect contractor personnel accountability information, but  neither source provides comprehensive accountability or visibility of DOD  contractor personnel on the continent because the total number of local  national contractor personnel are not being included in either, and  because the numbers of U.S. citizen and third country national contractor  personnel vary between the two. AFRICOM Conducts Limited Vetting of Contractors and Contractor Employees and Does Not Have Guidance to Apply Additional Risk-Based Measures

AFRICOM conducts some limited vetting of potential contractors, also  referred to as vendors, but it has not established a foreign vendor vetting  process or cell that would preemptively identify vendors who support  criminal, terrorist, or other sanctioned organizations. However, these AFRICOM forward operating sites were  not incorporating additional screening measures, such as biometric  screening or counterintelligence interviews, according to the specific risks  at each site. As a result, AFRICOM is at risk of not exercising the  appropriate level of vendor vetting or contractor employee screening on  the African continent. However, the guidance does not require the establishment  of a vendor vetting cell or specify under what conditions it would be  appropriate. Without having a  foreign vendor vetting process in place, it will be difficult for AFRICOM to  recognize and thereby avoid instances of contracting with the enemy. AFRICOM officials stated that all DOD sites in the AFRICOM area of  responsibility conduct background investigations for non-U.S. contractors  who require base access. To ensure that AFRICOM applies a risk-based approach to contractor  employee screening in Africa, we recommend that the Secretary of  Defense take the following action:
Direct AFRICOM to complete and issue guidance that specifies the  standard of contractor employee screening for forward operating sites,  based on factors such as the number of DOD personnel on base, type  of operations, and local security threat. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

The objectives of our review were to determine the extent to which  AFRICOM: (1) has an organizational structure in place to manage, plan  for, and assess operational contract support; (2) accounts for contractor  personnel in its area of responsibility; and (3) vets non-U.S. contractors  and contractor employees.
Why GAO Did This Study

Since its establishment in 2008, AFRICOM has increased its footprint in Africa to support its mission—building African partner capabilities and deterring threats to regional security. In tandem with AFRICOM's growing footprint will be a continued reliance on contractors to support the command's operations. Accordingly, AFRICOM and subordinate commands must be able to plan for and integrate OCS during operations. House Report 113-446 included a provision for GAO to review OCS in Africa.
This report examines the extent to which AFRICOM (1) has an organizational structure in place to manage, plan for, and assess OCS; (2) accounts for contractor personnel; and (3) vets non-U.S. contractors and contractor employees. To conduct this work, GAO evaluated AFRICOM's OCS organizational structures and conducted site visits to Djibouti, Niger, and Uganda to collect information on accountability and vetting processes. GAO selected these locations based on the types of contractor employees represented, among other factors.

What GAO Found

U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) has established a formal operational contract support (OCS) organizational structure at its headquarters to serve as the central coordination point to manage, plan for, and assess OCS. However, except for U.S. Army Africa, AFRICOM's subordinate commands do not have OCS organizational structures with dedicated personnel to manage OCS. Officials from AFRICOM's subordinate commands stated that applying OCS concepts would be helpful to avoid duplication of work and increased costs. One structure that the Department of Defense (DOD) has introduced is an OCS Integration Cell, an entity with dedicated personnel to provide staff integration and promote coordination on OCS issues; such a cell could help identify and address gaps at AFRICOM's commands, especially in a joint environment like Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa, where contracting officials stated that some military tenants have arrived without informing responsible officials about the number of contractors accompanying them. AFRICOM has also developed a scorecard to assess OCS management capabilities at the subordinate commands against certain standards, but these assessments have not always been accurate because the standards have not been clearly defined or consistently applied. Without clearly defined assessment standards, AFRICOM cannot accurately assess the OCS actions taken by subordinate commands.
AFRICOM does not have a complete picture of the number of contractor personnel supporting its operations in the region. AFRICOM uses two primary sources—daily personnel status reports and the Synchronized Predeployment and Operational Tracker, a DOD contractor personnel accountability database—to collect contractor personnel accountability information, but neither source provides comprehensive accountability or visibility of DOD contractor personnel on the continent because the total number of local national contractor personnel are not being included in either, and the numbers of U.S. citizen and third country national contractor personnel vary between the two. Without clear guidance on how to comprehensively account for contractor personnel, it will be difficult for AFRICOM to ensure that it has full visibility over who is supporting its operations.
AFRICOM conducts some limited vetting of potential non-U.S. contractors, also referred to as vendors, but it has not established a foreign vendor vetting process or cell that would preemptively identify vendors who support terrorist or other prohibited organizations. AFRICOM has not yet established a foreign vendor vetting cell because while DOD guidance discusses the benefit of a cell, it does not require it or specify under what conditions it would be appropriate. Additionally, DOD sites in Africa use background investigations to determine the trustworthiness of contractor employees with access to DOD facilities. However, not all AFRICOM sites are incorporating additional screening measures, such as biometric screening or counterintelligence interviews, based on the specific risks at each site. As a result, AFRICOM is at risk of not exercising the appropriate level of vendor vetting or contractor employee screening on the African continent to protect DOD personnel from insider threats.

What GAO Recommends

GAO made recommendations to DOD regarding types of contractor personnel to account for, foreign vendor vetting process development, and guidance for contractor accountability and employee screening, among others. DOD generally concurred, but did not concur that AFRICOM should develop contractor accountability guidance because it was in the process of doing so. GAO continues to believe the recommendations are valid, as discussed in this report.