	CBP’s Air Predeparture Programs Interdict High-Risk Air Travelers, but CBP Has Not Fully Assessed the Programs’ Performance

		CBP Identifies and Interdicts High-Risk Travelers before They Board U.S-Bound Flights

As we reported in January 2017, CBP electronically vets all travelers  before they board U.S.-bound flights and continues to do so until they  land at a U.S. port of entry. Through these vetting efforts, CBP seeks to  identify high-risk travelers from the millions of individuals who travel to the  United States each year. CBP’s Air Predeparture Programs Interdict High- Risk Travelers on U.S.- Bound Flights, but CBP Has Not Evaluated Overall Effectiveness of Air Predeparture Programs

As we reported in January 2017, throughout the travel process, CBP’s  predeparture programs use the results of NTC’s efforts to identify and  interdict high-risk individuals destined for the United States while they are  still overseas; however, we found that CBP had not evaluated the  effectiveness of its predeparture programs as a whole, including  implementing a system of performance measures and baselines to  assess whether the programs are achieving their stated goals. CBP operates three air predeparture programs that are responsible for all  U.S.-bound air travelers—Preclearance; the Immigration Advisory  Program (IAP) and Joint Security Program (JSP); and the regional carrier  liaison groups (RCLG). As we reported in January 2017, CBP data  indicated that these programs identified and ultimately interdicted  approximately 22,000 high-risk air travelers in fiscal year 2015, the most  recent data available at the time of our review. Preclearance. Therefore, we recommended that  CBP develop and implement a system of performance measures and  baselines for each program to help ensure that these programs are  achieving their intended goals. In response, CBP established  a working group to develop and implement a system of performance  measures and baselines to evaluate the effectiveness of CBP’s  predeparture programs. ICE Aims to Strengthen Screening of Visa Applicants through its Visa Security Program

The Homeland Security Act of 2002 authorized DHS to assign officers to  each diplomatic and consular post at which visas are issued, and also  authorized DHS to immediately assign personnel to Saudi Arabia to  review all visa applications prior to final adjudication. In March 2011, we reported, among other things, on DHS’s efforts to  expand VSP and challenges to VSP operations overseas. DHS did not  concur with this recommendation and stated that VSP captured all the  required performance metrics. We continue  to believe that without collecting comprehensive data on performance  measures, DHS cannot accurately demonstrate progress of VSP in  enhancing national security. DHS did not concur with our  recommendation and stated that ICE tracked case investigation hours  through its case management system, and that adding the metric to the  VSP tracking system would be redundant. However, we found at the time,  according to ICE documentation, that ICE could not accurately determine  the amount of time that VSP agents spent on investigative and visa  security activities because ICE did not distinguish between the hours  logged by VSP agents and hours logged by other ICE officials at posts  abroad and that ICE did not maintain accurate data on the time VSP  agents spent on visa security activities at posts. ICE did not take action to implement these recommendations and we  continue to believe that it needs to take steps to address issues we  identified. We have ongoing work assessing DHS, State, and other U.S.  agency efforts to strengthen the security of the visa process, including  oversight of VSP, in which we plan to follow up on the findings and  recommendations from our March 2011 report related to ICE’s efforts to  enhance VSP performance measurement, among other things. We plan  to report later this year on the results of this work. All VWP Countries Have Entered into Information Sharing Agreements or Equivalents, but Not All Are Sharing Information as Required

In May 2016, among other things, we reported that all 38 countries  participating in the VWP had entered into the three types of required  information-sharing agreements, or their equivalents, to (1) report lost and  stolen passports, (2) share identity information about known or suspected  terrorists, and (3) share criminal history information. In  May 2016, we recommended that DHS specify time frames for working  with VWP countries to institute the additional VWP security requirements,  including the requirement that the countries fully implement agreements  to share information about known or suspected terrorists through the  countries’ HSPD-6 arrangements and PCSC agreements with the United  States. DHS concurred with the recommendation and, as of April 2017,  reported that officials are continuing to work with VWP countries on time  frames for implementing program requirements.
Why GAO Did This Study

DHS seeks to identify and interdict travelers who are potential security threats to the United States, such as foreign fighters and potential terrorists, human traffickers, drug smugglers and otherwise inadmissible persons, at the earliest possible point in time. DHS also adjudicates petitions for certain visa categories and has certain responsibilities for strengthening the security of the visa process, including oversight of VSP and VWP. State manages the visa adjudication process for foreign nationals seeking admission to the United States.
This statement addresses (1) CBP programs aimed at preventing high-risk travelers from boarding U.S.-bound flights; (2) ICE's management of VSP; and (3) DHS's oversight of VWP. This statement is based on prior products GAO issued from March 2011 through January 2017, along with selected updates conducted in April 2017 to obtain information from DHS on actions it has taken to address prior GAO recommendations.

What GAO Found

In January 2017, GAO reported that the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) operates predeparture programs to help identify and interdict high-risk travelers before they board U.S.-bound flights. CBP officers inspect all U.S.-bound travelers on precleared flights at the 15 Preclearance locations and, if deemed inadmissible, a traveler will not be permitted to board the aircraft. CBP also operates nine Immigration Advisory Program and two Joint Security Program locations, as well as three Regional Carrier Liaison Groups, through which CBP may recommend that air carriers not permit identified high-risk travelers to board U.S.-bound flights. CBP data showed that it identified and interdicted over 22,000 high-risk air travelers through these programs in fiscal year 2015 (the most recent data available at the time of GAO's report). However, CBP had not fully evaluated the overall effectiveness of these programs using performance measures and baselines. CBP tracked some data, such as the number of travelers deemed inadmissible, but had not set baselines to determine if predeparture programs are achieving goals, consistent with best practices for performance measurement. GAO recommended that CBP develop and implement a system of performance measures and baselines to better position CBP to assess if the programs are achieving their goals. CBP concurred and has established a working group to develop such measures and baselines.
In March 2011, GAO reported on the Visa Security Program (VSP) through which DHS's U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) deploys personnel to certain U.S. overseas posts to review visa applications. Among other things, GAO found that ICE did not collect comprehensive data on all VSP performance measures or track the time officials spent on visa security activities. DHS did not concur with GAO's recommendations to address these limitations, stating that ICE collected data on all the required performance measures and tracked VSP case investigation hours. However, GAO continues to believe DHS needs to address these limitations. GAO has ongoing work assessing U.S. agencies' efforts to strengthen the security of the visa process, including oversight of VSP, in which GAO plans to follow up on the findings and recommendations from its March 2011 report related to ICE's efforts to enhance VSP performance measurement.
In May 2016, GAO reported on DHS's oversight of the Visa Waiver Program (VWP), which allows nationals from 38 countries to travel visa-free to the United States for business or pleasure for 90 days or less. GAO reported, among other things, that all 38 countries entered into required agreements, or their equivalents, to (1) report lost and stolen passports, (2) share identity information about known or suspected terrorists, and (3) share criminal history information. However, not all countries shared such information. In August 2015, DHS established a new requirement for VWP countries to implement the latter two agreements; however, DHS did not establish time frames for instituting the amended requirements. GAO recommended that DHS work with VWP countries to implement these agreements and DHS concurred. As of April 2017, DHS reported that officials are continuing to work with VWP countries on time frames for implementing program requirements.

What GAO Recommends

GAO previously made recommendations to improve evaluation of CBP's predeparture programs' performance and strengthen DHS's oversight of VSP and VWP. DHS agreed with GAO's recommendations related to CBP's predeparture programs and VWP. DHS did not agree with some of GAO's recommendations related to VSP. GAO has ongoing work related to, among other things, DHS's management and oversight of VSP and plans to report later this year on the results of this work.