	Overview of CRA Purpose, Procedures, and Requirements

Congressional oversight of rulemaking using the CRA can be an important  and useful tool for monitoring the regulatory process and balancing and  accommodating the concerns of American citizens and businesses with  the effects of federal agencies’ rules. CRA seeks to accomplish this by giving Congress  an opportunity to review most rules before they take effect and to  disapprove those found to be too burdensome, excessive, inappropriate,  duplicative, or otherwise objectionable. Under CRA, two  types of rules, major and nonmajor, must be submitted to both Houses of  Congress and GAO before they can take effect. CRA specifies that the determination of what rules are  major is to be made by the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs  (OIRA) of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). Major rules  cannot be effective until 60 days after publication in the Federal Register  or submission to Congress and GAO, whichever is later. CRA established a procedure by which members of Congress may  disapprove agencies’ rules by introducing a resolution of disapproval that,  if adopted by both Houses of Congress and signed by the President, can  nullify an agency’s rule. Members of  Congress seldom have attempted to use this disapproval process. GAO’s Role and Activities under CRA

GAO’s only stated role under CRA is to provide Congress with a report on  each major rule concerning GAO’s assessment of the promulgating federal  agency’s “compliance with the procedural steps” required by various acts  and executive orders governing the regulatory process. We conduct an annual review to determine whether  all final rules covered by the Act and published in the Federal Register  have been filed with the Congress and us. Although we reported that agencies’ compliance with CRA requirements  was inconsistent during the first years after CRA’s enactment, compliance  improved over time. Trends in Presidential and Congressional Review of Rulemaking

Agencies and GAO have provided Congress a considerable amount of  information about forthcoming rules in response to CRA. However,  as we found in our review of the information generated on federal  mandates under UMRA, the benefits of compiling and making information  available on potential federal actions should not be underestimated. Further, as we also found regarding UMRA, the availability of procedures  for congressional disapproval may have some deterrent effect. Still, as I noted in my testimony before this Subcommittee last November,  efforts to enhance presidential oversight of agencies’ rulemaking appear to  have been more significant and widely employed in recent years than  similar efforts to enhance congressional oversight. Some recent legislative proposals have focused on expanding the  information and analysis available to Congress on pending rules, while  others focus on enhancing the mechanisms that Congress could employ  for its own review—and potential disapproval—of agencies’ rules.
Why GAO Did This Study

This year marks the 10th anniversary of the Congressional Review Act (CRA). Congressional oversight of rulemaking using the CRA can be an important and useful tool for monitoring the regulatory process and balancing and accommodating the concerns of American citizens and businesses with the effects of federal agencies' rules. This statement provides an overview of the purpose and provisions of CRA; GAO's role and activities in fulfilling its responsibilities under the Act; and trends on CRA within the broader context of developments in presidential and congressional oversight of federal agencies' rulemaking.

What GAO Found

CRA gives Congress an opportunity to review most rules before they take effect and to disapprove those found to be too burdensome, excessive, inappropriate, duplicative, or otherwise objectionable. Under CRA, two types of rules, major and nonmajor, must be submitted to both Houses of Congress and GAO before they can take effect. The Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) of the Office of Management and Budget specifies which rules are designated as major rules based on criteria set out in the CRA. Major rules cannot be effective until 60 days after publication in the Federal Register or submission to Congress and GAO, whichever is later. Congress may disapprove agencies' rules by introducing a resolution of disapproval that, if adopted by both Houses of Congress and signed by the President, can nullify an agency's rule. Members of Congress seldom have attempted to use this process. GAO's role under CRA is to provide Congress with a report on each major rule concerning GAO's assessment of the promulgating federal agency's compliance with the procedural steps required by various acts and executive orders governing the regulatory process. GAO compiles information on the rules it receives under CRA in a database containing basic information about major and nonmajor rules. GAO also conducts an annual review to determine whether all final rules covered by the Act and published in the Federal Register have been filed with the Congress and GAO. Although we reported that agencies' compliance with CRA requirements was inconsistent during the first years after CRA's enactment, compliance improved over time. There have been a limited number of CRA joint resolutions, but the benefits of compiling and making information available on potential federal actions should not be underestimated. The procedures for congressional disapproval also may have some deterrent effect. Efforts to enhance presidential oversight of agencies' rulemaking appear to have been more significant and widely employed in recent years than similar efforts to enhance congressional oversight. Some recent legislative proposals have focused on expanding the information and analysis available to Congress on pending rules, while others focus on enhancing the mechanisms that Congress could employ for its own review--and potential disapproval--of agencies' rules.