	Background

The Packard Commission, tasked by President Reagan to review defense  management and organization, made a number of recommendations to  improve the way DOD acquires weapon systems, including the need to  establish “unambiguous authority for overall acquisition policy, clear  accountability for acquisition execution, and plain lines of command for  those with program management responsibilities.” Following the  commission’s recommendations, the Goldwater-Nichols Department of  Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 was enacted.the Act created the position of the Under Secretary of Defense for  Acquisition, now known as Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,  Technology, and Logistics (USD(AT&L)); established the military  departments as the force providers to the combatant commanders; and  mandated responsibility for acquisition to each respective military  department. Also, the President issued a directive that directed  implementation of another Packard Commission recommendation, to  establish a more streamlined acquisition chain of command in DOD. The  reporting chain, which remains in place today, runs upward from a  program manager, through a program executive officer (PEO), to the  service acquisition executive (SAE), and to the defense acquisition  executive (DAE), which is USD (AT&L). Studies Recommended Expanding Service Chiefs Role in Acquisition to Varying Degrees, but Potential Effect on Improving Acquisition Outcomes Is Unclear

Five of the six studies we reviewed recommended an expanded role for  the service chiefs in acquisitions, often citing this as a means to improve  the integration of the acquisition, requirements, and resourcing  processes, as well as improve authority and accountability for DOD  acquisition programs. Also, three of  the studies expressed concerns that the service chiefs are not sufficiently  involved because the services had gone too far in their implementation of  the Goldwater-Nichols Act and removed the service chiefs from the  acquisition decision process. When we talked to the authors of this  study, they stated that the current framework for the acquisition chain of  command does not need to be changed but that the service chief’s  involvement and authority should be enhanced throughout. Similarly,  another study recommended that service chiefs be more engaged and  accountable within the current acquisition process through the  strengthening of partnerships between requirements, acquisition, and  resource leaders. The other three studies called for changing the current  chain of command structure by making adjustments such as inserting the  service chief over program managers and program executive officers. While studies have advocated for a stronger role for the service chiefs in  the acquisition chain of command, they provide little evidence or support  that this would in fact improve program outcomes. Study authors we  interviewed were unsure of the effects on the acquisition process of more  involvement from the service chiefs. GAO previously  found that strong leadership is key to stable and successful acquisition  programs. Other studies discussed the  need to fix unrealistic and changing requirements, optimistic cost and    schedule estimates, and issues with the current budgeting process. DOD and Military Department Policies Provide Service Chiefs Multiple Opportunities for Involvement in Oversight and Management of Acquisitions

DOD and military department requirements and acquisition policies define  several decision points, reviews, and mechanisms in which the service  chiefs or their supporting staff offices can participate in the management  and oversight of acquisition programs. As major defense acquisitions programs progress through the  requirements and acquisition processes, there are several key stages  where DOD-level reviews and approvals are required. Each military  department uses a tiered requirements development and approval  process supported by acquisition and other functional offices. Acquisition Planning and Execution within the Military Departments

Although responsibility and authority for major defense acquisition  programs generally resides with the service or defense acquisition  executives, DOD and military department acquisition policies provide  opportunities for continued service chief involvement beyond  requirements definition, throughout the life cycle of a program. For example, each of  the services has an acquisition review board comprised of senior leaders  that assess programs and advise the service acquisition executive on  milestone decisions. Once an acquisition program has been established and enters into  systems development, the military services conduct regular reviews to  monitor the program’s progress in achieving cost, schedule, and  performance targets and to resolve any issues that may occur. Existing  policies and processes for planning and executing acquisition programs  provide multiple opportunities for the service chiefs to be involved in  managing acquisition programs and to help ensure programs meet cost,  schedule, and performance targets. Agency Comments

We are not making recommendations in this report.
Why GAO Did This Study

Nearly three decades ago, Congress enacted the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act. As GAO has found, the act sought to strengthen civilian control over the acquisition function in DOD and establish a more streamlined chain of command for developing and procuring weapon systems. The reporting chain, which remains in effect today, runs upward from a program manager, through a program executive officer, to a service acquisition executive, and to the defense acquisition executive.
Many acquisition reform studies have identified a need for increased accountability in DOD's acquisition management chain of command. The Senate Armed Services Committee Report accompanying the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014 mandated that GAO review DOD's acquisition chain of command. This report examines (1) findings and recommendations made by studies that assessed the role of the military service chiefs; and (2) how current DOD and military department policies define the roles and responsibilities of the service chiefs in acquisition management.
To do this work, GAO analyzed the findings and recommendations of six studies that discuss DOD acquisition chain of command issues and interviewed authors from the three most recently published studies. GAO also analyzed DOD and military department acquisition and requirements policies and guidance, and interviewed DOD officials.

What GAO Found

Five of the six studies GAO reviewed recommended an expanded role for the military service chiefs in acquisition management, often citing this as a means to improve the integration of the requirements and acquisition processes that support a weapon system's development. Three studies expressed concerns that the services have gone too far in their implementation of the Goldwater-Nichols Act and removed the service chiefs from the acquisition process. However, the studies provided little evidence or support that such a change would in fact improve program outcomes. Studies varied on the degree to which and ways in which service chiefs should be involved in the acquisition process. While two studies advocated strengthening service chief's roles and responsibilities within the current structure, three studies called for changing the current chain of command structure by making adjustments such as inserting the service chiefs above program executive officers. Authors GAO interviewed were uncertain what effect incorporating the chiefs of staff into the acquisition chain of command would have on individual programs. These authors noted that service chief involvement does not guarantee success for a weapon system program and, in fact, pointed to examples of past programs that had significant service chief involvement, but poor outcomes. Finally, the authors we interviewed agreed that strong leadership is essential to acquisition success, but all six studies identified other factors that need to be addressed in acquisition programs such as unrealistic and changing requirements, optimistic cost and schedule estimates, and issues with the current budgeting process.
DOD and military department policies provide the service chiefs multiple opportunities to be involved in the management and oversight of major defense acquisition programs. Although responsibility and authority differ for the two distinct processes of requirements and acquisitions, multiple reviews, milestone decision points, and mechanisms are in place for these two processes to work together in planning and executing programs. Within each military department, the service chiefs and their staffs lead the development of operational requirements and are supported by acquisition officials to help ensure that requirements are feasible and affordable. Similarly, as acquisition programs progress through key phases of planning, development, and production, opportunities exist for continued chief of staff involvement beyond requirements development. For example, the offices of the service chiefs participate in senior-level acquisition review boards that assess proposed programs and advise the service acquisition executive at key milestone decision points. Once a program has been established and development has begun, additional opportunities remain for service chiefs to monitor progress and help resolve any issues that may occur. For example, military departments are required to hold annual configuration steering board meetings to discuss tradeoffs between requirements and cost and schedule delays.

What GAO Recommends

GAO is not making recommendations.