Today,  even young children need a SSN to obtain medical coverage, be claimed on  their parents’ income tax return, or establish eligibility for other  government or financial benefits. In fiscal year 2004, SSA issued approximately 5.5 million original SSNs and  12.4 million replacement cards, of which roughly 4.2 million originals and  2.3 million replacements were for U.S.-born children under age 18, as  shown in table 1. SSA also has specific  policies for issuing replacement cards to children. Majority of SSNs Are Issued to Children through SSA’s Enumeration at Birth Process

In 2004, SSA issued roughly 90 percent of SSNs to children through its  EAB program. For those parents choosing to participate in the program, SSA  guidance states that hospital representatives should provide parents with a  receipt as proof of their SSN request. Once SSA receives the data, its automated system ensures that the EAB  data are complete and scans for keying errors. To apply for the SSN, parents complete a SSN application and submit at  least two documents as evidence of their child’s age, identity, and  citizenship as well as evidence of their own identity. In addition to processing original SSNs, SSA field offices also issue  replacement SSN cards if a card is lost or stolen. SSA requires that the applicant provide  only proof of identity for both the parent and the child. Several Weaknesses Could Affect the Integrity and Efficiency of SSA’s Enumeration Processes

Despite SSA’s efforts in recent years to improve its enumeration  processes, several weaknesses persist, including a lack of EAB program  oversight and outreach, inefficient birth verification procedures, and other  vulnerabilities that could adversely affect the integrity and efficiency of  SSA’s processes. SSA Lacks a Nationwide Capability to Perform Birth Verifications

SSA currently lacks a nationwide capability to quickly and efficiently  perform required birth verifications for children whose parents apply for a  SSN through an SSA field office, although a prior SSA pilot project proved  successful in providing enhanced verification capabilities. This act gave SSA 1 year to  implement regulations for independently verifying the birth documents of  all SSN applicants except for EAB and limited the issuance of SSN  replacement cards to 3 annually and 10 over an individual’s lifetime. Because SSA does not conduct  comprehensive integrity reviews of vital statistics agencies or require that  these agencies conduct similar reviews of hospitals, SSA lacks information  to assess its potential exposure to error or fraud, identify aspects of the  birth registration process that are most problematic, and develop  safeguards to ensure the integrity of the data it relies on to enumerate  millions of children. Finally, as our audit work and previous engagements show, SSA’s  processes for verifying the birth records of children under age 1 and its  policies for issuing replacement cards expose the agency to fraud. The  recently passed Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004  includes specific requirements to address these weaknesses. Establish a mechanism to better coordinate with external audit  agencies that periodically conduct reviews of states’ birth registration  and certification processes. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

The Chairman of the Senate Committee on Finance asked us to document  the Social Security Administration’s (SSA) current processes and internal  controls for issuing Social Security numbers (SSN) and replacement cards  to U.S.-born children under the age of 18 and identify any weaknesses that  may affect SSA’s ability to ensure the integrity of the SSN and the  efficiency of enumeration processes. We identified two processes—Enumeration at Birth (EAB), a program set  up to let parents request their child’s SSN through hospitals and vital  statistics agencies, and another that requires application through SSA field  offices.
Why GAO Did This Study

In fiscal year 2004, the Social Security Administration (SSA) issued about 4.2 million original Social Security numbers (SSN) and 2 million SSN replacement cards to U.S.-born children. Despite its narrowly intended purpose, today, young children need a SSN to be claimed on their parent's income tax return or to apply for certain government benefits. Because children's SSNs, like all SSNs, are vulnerable to theft and misuse, the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Finance requested that GAO (1) document SSA's current processes and internal controls for issuing SSNs to U.S.-born children under the age of 18 and (2) identify any weaknesses that may affect SSA's ability to ensure the integrity of the SSN and the efficiency of enumeration processes.

What GAO Found

SSA has two processes for issuing SSNs to U.S.-born children--one that allows parents to request SSNs through a hospital during birth registration and one that permits them to apply through SSA field offices--both of which include various internal control mechanisms. Today, SSA issues the majority of SSNs to children through its Enumeration at Birth (EAB) program. Participating hospitals forward the SSN request and other birth registration data to vital statistics agencies, which then send it to SSA. SSA's automated system ensures that the data are complete and mails the SSN to the parent. Parents may also request SSNs through SSA field offices by mail or in person. This process requires parents to present proof of the child's age, identity, and citizenship as well as proof of their own identity. As fraud prevention measures, SSA also interviews children 12 and older and verifies documents with a third party for those over age 1. If a child's SSN card is lost or stolen, parents may also apply for a replacement card. SSA requires proof of identification for both the parent and the child to obtain such cards. Despite SSA's efforts to improve its enumeration processes, weaknesses persist in EAB program oversight and outreach, manual birth verification procedures, and other vulnerabilities that could adversely affect the integrity of SSA's processes. Federal internal control standards state that agencies should assess and mitigate risk to their programs. However, SSA does not conduct comprehensive integrity reviews, or coordinate with external auditing agencies to ensure that vital statistics agencies and hospitals are properly collecting and protecting enumeration data for children. In addition, SSA lacks a nationwide capability to efficiently verify birth certificates for children whose parents apply through SSA field offices, although a prior SSA pilot proved successful in providing such verifications. Further, SSA lacks a policy for securing and tracking birth certificates once manual verifications are complete, making these documents vulnerable to misuse. Finally, SSA's policies for verifying birth certificates of children under age 1 and for issuing replacement SSN cards, which allow for up to 52 cards annually, remain weak and could expose the program to fraud. The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 will assist SSA in protecting the integrity of the SSN by requiring the agency to verify birth documents for all SSN applicants, except for EAB purposes, and limit the issuance of SSN replacement cards.