Depending on the  passenger, this document review can occur at three separate time frames  during the process of flying internationally, as follows: (1) the State  Department reviews the travel documents in advance of travel for  passengers who are required to obtain a visa in advance of their travel, (2)  air carrier personnel review passengers’ travel documents for authenticity  upon check-in for flights, and (3) CBP officers review passenger travel  documents either upon the passengers’ arrival in the United States or, in  some cases, prior to their departure for the United States. This step is a risk targeting process that occurs for international  flights traveling to or from the United States. TSA has named this prospective  prescreening program Secure Flight. As we have reported in our prior work on Secure Flight, currently only air  carriers—and not the U.S. government—match passenger information  against the No Fly and Selectee Lists to prescreen passengers on domestic  flights. DHS is Taking Steps to Strengthen the Current International Passenger Prescreening Process

CBP has several efforts under way to strengthen certain international  passenger prescreening processes. The pilot program  has been tested in several foreign airports, and CBP is negotiating with  other countries to expand it elsewhere and to make certain IAP sites  permanent. According to CBP  officials, CLP’s purpose is to enhance border security by providing  technical assistance and training to air carrier staff on the identification of  improperly documented passengers destined for the United States. DHS Intends to Align International and Domestic Prescreening Programs, but DHS Has Not Yet Made All Key Policy Decisions

A second effort that CBP has under way to strengthen the international  passenger prescreening process involves the alignment of the U.S.  government’s international and domestic aviation prescreening programs,  which are being developed separately by CBP and TSA, respectively. In discussions  with us, CBP and TSA officials stated that these coordination efforts were  continuing, but they did not provide any documentation of how such  matters were being resolved or when they planned for the programs to be  aligned. CBP Has Not Fully Disclosed its Use of Personal Information during the Prescreening Process

One additional issue requires consideration, as well, in the context of  DHS’s efforts to strengthen the passenger prescreening process. Because CBP’s development and operation of its international passenger  prescreening process has not been accompanied by the publication of  Privacy Act notices or E-Government Act privacy impact assessments that  fully describe the use of personal data and the steps taken to protect  privacy, the public may not be aware of the different ways that their  information is being used or protected, as required by law. If these two prescreening efforts are not effectively  coordinated with each other, air carriers and other stakeholders could  be unnecessarily inconvenienced and experience potentially avoidable  costs. Recommendations for Executive Action

To strengthen CBP’s international aviation passenger prescreening  process, in our November 2006 report we recommended that the Secretary  of the Department of Homeland Security take or direct the Commissioner  of Customs and Border Protection to take the following three actions:    To more fully incorporate risk management principles into the  planning, implementation, and evaluation of the IAP pilot, CBP should  (1) prepare a strategic plan that identifies the risks, goals, objectives,  and performance measures for the IAP pilot, and (2) conduct program  evaluations that measure the performance of the pilot IAP sites against  predetermined goals and performance measures. It focuses on only  certain elements of the current international aviation passenger  prescreening process as well as only some of the actions that DHS is  taking or has planned to strengthen prescreening procedures. More  specifically the report’s content is limited to certain issues related to:  the implementation of the Immigration Advisory Program (IAP), a CBP  program that assesses risk levels for certain passengers in overseas  locations;     aligning international and domestic passenger prescreening programs;   ensuring that compliance with privacy laws is fully achieved with  respect to information collected to conduct international passenger  prescreening. Terrorist Watch List Screening: Efforts to Help Reduce Adverse Effects  on the Public. Aviation Security: Management Challenges Remain for the  Transportation Security Administration’s Secure Flight Program.
Why GAO Did This Study

Passenger prescreening--a process that includes matching passengers' identifying information against records extracted from the U.S. government terrorist watch list--is one of several security measures in place to help ensure the safety of commercial flights traveling to or from the United States. DHS has several efforts underway to strengthen international aviation passenger prescreening. This report focuses on certain elements of the passenger prescreening process as well as some of the actions that DHS is taking or has planned to strengthen prescreening procedures. This report is a limited version of the original November 2006 report as various agencies that we reviewed deemed some of the information in the original report to be security sensitive. GAO's work included interviewing officials and assessing relevant documentation from federal agencies, U.S. and foreign air carriers, industry groups, and several foreign countries.

What GAO Found

Customs and Border Protection (CBP), the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) agency responsible for international passenger prescreening, has planned or is taking several actions designed to strengthen the aviation passenger prescreening process. One such effort involves CBP stationing U.S. personnel overseas to evaluate the authenticity of the travel documents of certain high-risk passengers prior to boarding U.S.-bound flights. Under this pilot program, called the Immigration Advisory Program (IAP), CBP officers personally interview some passengers deemed to be high-risk and evaluate the authenticity and completeness of these passengers' travel documents. IAP officers also provide technical assistance and training to air carrier staff on the identification of improperly documented passengers destined for the United States. The IAP has been tested at several foreign airports and CBP is negotiating with other countries to expand it elsewhere and to make certain IAP sites permanent. Successful implementation of the IAP rests, in part, on CBP clearly defining the goals and objectives of the program through the development of a strategic plan. A second aviation passenger prescreening effort designed to strengthen the passenger prescreening process is intended to align international passenger prescreening with a similar program (currently under development) for prescreening passengers on domestic flights. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA)--a separate agency within DHS--is developing a domestic passenger prescreening program called Secure Flight. If CBP's international prescreening program and TSA's Secure Flight program are not effectively aligned once Secure Flight becomes operational, this could result in separate implementation requirements for air carriers and increased costs for both air carriers and the government. CBP and TSA officials stated that they are taking steps to coordinate their prescreening efforts, but they have not yet made all key policy decisions. In addition to these efforts to strengthen certain international aviation passenger prescreening procedures, one other issue requires consideration in the context of these efforts. This issue involves DHS providing the traveling public with assurances of privacy protection as required by federal privacy law. Federal privacy law requires agencies to inform the public about how the government uses their personal information. Although CBP officials have stated that they have taken and are continuing to take steps to comply with these requirements, the current prescreening process allows passenger information to be used in multiple prescreening procedures and transferred among various CBP prescreening systems in ways that are not fully explained in CBP's privacy disclosures. If CBP does not issue all appropriate disclosures, the traveling public will not be fully aware of how their personal information is being used during the passenger prescreening process.