	Leadership Commitment, Improved Timeliness, and Development of Metrics Were Key to Removal of DOD’s Security Clearance Program from GAO’s High-Risk List

Since we identified DOD’s Personnel Security Clearance program as a  high-risk area, DOD, in conjunction with Congress and other executive  agency leadership, took actions that resulted in significant progress  toward resolving problems we identified with the security clearance  program. In 2011, we removed DOD’s personnel security clearance  program from our high-risk list because of the agency’s progress in  improving timeliness and the development of tools and metrics to assess  quality, as well as DOD’s commitment to sustaining progress. Importantly,  congressional oversight and the committed leadership of the Suitability  and Security Clearance Performance Accountability Council  (Performance Accountability Council) –which has been responsible for  overseeing security clearance reform efforts since 2008—greatly  contributed to the progress of DOD and the governmentwide security  clearance reform. Top Leadership Demonstrated Commitment and Collaboration in Reforming Security Clearance Process

Leadership in Congress and the executive branch demonstrated  commitment to reforming the security clearance process to address  longstanding problems associated with the personnel security clearance  program. Figure 1 illustrates key  events related to the Suitability and Personnel Security Clearance Reform  Effort. Congressional legislation and oversight has helped focus attention and  sustain momentum to improve the processing of security clearances not  only for DOD but governmentwide. The Intelligence Reform and  Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA) established, among other  things, milestones for reducing the time to complete initial clearances. security clearance reform efforts. DOD Developed Assessment Tools and Performance Metrics and Improved Timeliness to Demonstrate Progress

One of DOD’s key actions that led to the removal of its personnel security  clearance program from our high-risk list was that DOD was able to  demonstrate its progress in having implemented corrective measures. Longstanding backlogs and delays in the clearance process led to our  initial designation of this area as high risk. In 2011, we reported that DOD processed 90 percent of initial clearances  in an average of 49 days for federal civilians, military, and industry  personnel and met the 60-day statutory timeliness objective for  processing all initial clearances in fiscal year 2010. Subsequently, DOD developed two quality tools to evaluate  completeness of documentation used to determine clearance eligibility. In addition to these assessment tools, in 2010 DOD,  OMB, ODNI, and OPM developed 15 metrics that assess the timeliness  and quality of investigations, adjudications, reciprocity, and automation. These metrics  represented positive developments that could contribute to greater  visibility over the clearance process. Building on the factors for reforming the security process  that we have reported in the past, continued leadership and attention,  such as continuing to monitor and update outcome-focused performance  measures, seeking opportunities to enhance efficiency and managing  costs, and ensuring a strong requirements determination process, may  enhance the security clearance reform effort. We  have also previously reported on the importance of continually assessing  and evaluating programs as a good business practice, including  evaluating metrics to help ensure that they are effective and updated  when necessary.the reform and that DOD and OPM complete implementation of the   As a result, it is important to sustain the momentum of  quality tools and metrics so that the executive branch can demonstrate  progress in improving the quality of investigations and adjudications. We found that agencies do not  consistently document the additional steps they have taken prior to  granting a reciprocal clearance. Given current fiscal constraints, identifying the long-term costs is critical  for decision-makers to compare and prioritize alternative proposals for  completing the transformation of the security clearance process. We most recently reported on two areas of  opportunity for which the executive branch may be able to identify  efficiencies: information technology and investigation and adjudication  case management and processes. Specifically, a sound requirements determination  process may help ensure that workload and costs are not higher than  necessary. Further, the Performance Accountability Council’s reformed  security clearance process identified determining if a position requires a  security clearance as the first step of the process. As of October 2010, the Director of National Intelligence  reported that 3.9 million federal employees (military and civilian) and  contractors hold security clearances. A change in the higher level of clearances being requested also increases  the investigative and adjudicative workloads.
Why GAO Did This Study

As of October 2010, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence reported that 3.9 million federal employees (military and civilians) and contractors hold security clearances. DOD comprises the vast majority of government security clearances. Longstanding backlogs and delays in the security clearance process led GAO to place the DODs Personnel Security Clearance Program on its high-risk list in 2005. Delays in issuing clearances can result in millions of dollars of additional cost to the federal government and could pose a national security risk. DOD and others have taken steps to address these issues and additional concerns with clearance documentation used to determine eligibility for a clearance. As a result, in 2011, GAO removed the program from its high-risk list.
This testimony addresses (1) the key actions that led GAO to remove DODs security clearance program from its high-risk list and (2) the additional actions that can enhance the security clearance reform efforts. This statement is based on prior GAO reports and testimonies on DODs personnel security clearance program and governmentwide suitability and security clearance reform efforts.

What GAO Found

Since GAO first identified the Department of Defenses (DOD) Personnel Security Clearance Program as a high-risk area, DOD, in conjunction with Congress and executive agency leadership, took actions that resulted in significant progress toward improving the processing of security clearances. Congress held more than 14 oversight hearings to help oversee key legislation, such as the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, which helped focus attention and sustain momentum of the governmentwide reform effort. In addition, the committed and collaborative efforts of DOD, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), Office of Management and Budget (OMB), and Office of Personnel Management (OPM) as leaders of the Suitability and Security Clearance Performance Accountability Council (Performance Accountability Council) demonstrated commitment to and created a vision for the reform effort, which led to significant improvements in the timeliness of processing security clearances. As a result, in 2011, GAO removed DODs Personnel Security Clearance Program from its high-risk list because of the agencys progress in improving timeliness, development of tools and metrics to assess quality, and commitment to sustaining progress. Specifically, GAO found that DOD met the 60-day statutory timeliness objective for processing initial clearances in fiscal year 2010 by processing 90 percent of its initial clearances in an average of 49 days. In addition, DOD developed two quality tools to evaluate completeness of investigation documentation and agencies' adjudication process regarding the basis for granting security clearances. Moreover, DOD, ODNI, OMB, and OPM developed and are in the process of implementing 15 metrics that assess the timeliness and quality of investigations, adjudications, reciprocity and automation of security clearances.
Even with the significant progress in recent years, sustained leadership attention to the following additional actions, on which GAO has previously reported, can enhance the security clearance reform efforts of executive branch agencies and the Performance Accountability Council:
Continue to implement, monitor, and update outcome-focused performance measures. The development of tools and metrics to monitor and track quality are positive steps, but full implementation of these tools and measures will enable the executive branch to demonstrate progress in quality improvements and contribute to greater visibility over the clearance process.
Seek opportunities to enhance efficiencies and manage costs related to the reform effort. Given the current fiscal constraints, identifying long-term funding requirements for the security clearance process is critical for the executive branch to sustain the reform effort. Further, the reform efforts are a venue to facilitate the identification of efficiencies in areas including information technology and investigation and adjudication case management processes.
Create a sound requirements process for determining which positions require clearances and level of clearances. A sound requirements determination process may help ensure that workload and costs are not higher than necessary by ensuring that clearances are only requested for positions when needed and that the appropriate clearance level is requested.