Finally, it assigns individual personnel to its ships. In February 2002, the Navy  increased the Navy Standard Workweek from 67 to 70 hours. For example, it replaced some classes that were  formerly led by instructors with computer-based training. The Navy Lacks a Firm Analytical Basis for Some of Its Reductions to Cruiser and Destroyer Crew Sizes

Since 2001, the Navy has reduced the requirements and actual numbers of  enlisted personnel aboard its guided-missile cruisers and guided-missile  destroyers. The Navy made these adjustments based on its optimal  manning initiative as well as a decision to change certain standards it uses  to translate estimated workload into workforce requirements. Additionally,  we were told by shipboard personnel that in-port workload is increasing,  which raises questions about the Navy’s assumption that workload while a  ship is underway exceeds in-port workload. For example, when  decreasing the Productivity Allowance, the Navy did not conduct the type  of analysis called for in its instruction, such as job task analysis or  engineering studies, to verify this change. The Navy Has Evaluated Some Aspects of Its Training Changes but Lacks Performance Measures and Data to Fully Evaluate the Impact of These Changes

The Navy has made significant changes to its training programs and has  evaluated some aspects of these changes, specifically, those related to cost  and training time, but lacks the performance measures and data necessary  to fully evaluate the impact changes to training have had on trainees’ job  performance and the time required for personnel to achieve various  qualifications. For example, Navy training officials we spoke with  stated that the changes to training have resulted in improvements such as  decreases in class length and overall training cost. Officials also  estimated that since implementing these new methods of training for  surface warfare officers, the Navy has saved about $50 million annually. While important, these metrics do not enable the Navy to determine how  its training programs are affecting key aspects, such as the trainees’ job  performance, knowledge, skills, and abilities once they report to their  ships. Many of these leaders said that those sailors and officers who did not  receive classroom instruction but instead were taught using new methods,  such as computer-based training, required more on-the-job training when  they arrived on board than those who had received classroom instruction. The time  required for personnel to achieve watchstation and warfare qualifications  is a potential metric the Navy could use to measure the effects of changes  of its training programs. Without undertaking certain types of analysis—such as job  task analysis and engineering studies—or testing the validity of its long- standing assumptions, such as whether at-sea workload exceeds in-port  workload, the Navy will not have all the information it needs to measure  the workload of its ships and translate that workload into workforce  requirements. Without performing additional analysis to determine that  the standards and assumptions it uses to determine personnel  requirements are valid, the Navy cannot be assured that its ship crews are  appropriately sized to accomplish necessary tasks and maintain the  material readiness of ships both at sea and in port on a daily basis. Overall, without an  analysis of assumptions and standards used to reduce ship crew sizes— and without outcome-based performance metrics to evaluate the impact of  training program changes—the Navy cannot be assured that the sizes of its  ship crews are sufficient to operate and maintain its ships and cannot fully  determine the effectiveness of the training changes it has implemented and  whether further adjustments are necessary. Appendix II: Distribution of Enlisted and Officer Pay Grades, Fiscal Years 2001 to 2009

The House Armed Services Committee, in its report accompanying the  National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, directed GAO to  compare shipboard rank/rate distributions over time and analyze  underlying reasons for any changes and their impact on ship capabilities  for selected ship types. Appendix III: Scope and Methodology

To assess the extent to which the Navy used valid assumptions and  standards in determining crew sizes for cruisers and destroyers, we  analyzed various Navy documents and instructions related to determining  crew sizes, including Office of the Chief of Naval Operations Instruction  1000.16K, Navy Total Force Manpower Policies Procedures in order to  identify the steps required in the Navy’s process to determine crew sizes.
Why GAO Did This Study

Since 2000, the Navy has undertaken a number of initiatives to achieve greater efficiencies and reduce costs. For example, it has reduced crew sizes on some of its surface ships and has moved from instructor-led to more computer-based training. In House Report 111-166, which accompanied the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, the House Armed Services Committee directed GAO to review the training, size, composition, and capabilities of the Navy's ship crews. This report assesses the extent to which the Navy (1) used valid assumptions and standards in determining crew sizes for cruisers and destroyers, and (2) has measured the impact of changes to its training programs, including on the time it takes personnel to achieve various qualifications. To do so, GAO analyzed Navy procedures for determining crew size compared to guidance, analyzed current Navy metrics to measure training impact, and interviewed relevant officials and conducted visits to 11 ships.

What GAO Found

Since 2001, in an effort to achieve greater efficiencies and reduce costs, the Navy has reduced the requirements and size of crews for some types of ships. For example, from fiscal years 2001 to 2009, enlisted requirements declined by about 20 percent and crew sizes declined by about 16 percent on cruisers and destroyers. The Navy made these reductions based on an initiative it referred to as optimal manning as well as a decision to change certain standards it uses to translate estimated workload into workforce requirements. During pilot tests and the implementation of its optimal manning initiative, the Navy considered several elements, such as job task analysis and work studies, called for in its guidance. However, it analyzed only at-sea workload data because of a long-standing Navy assumption that at-sea workload exceeds in-port workload. While best practices require that valid and reliable data are used to assess workforce requirements, the Navy has not tested the validity of its assumption for excluding in-port data. Additionally, GAO was told by shipboard personnel that in-port workload has been increasing. Furthermore, when changing standards, such as increasing the standard workweek from 67 to 70 hours, the Navy did not conduct the types of analysis called for in its guidance to verify that these changes were warranted. Without performing additional analysis to determine that the assumption and standards it uses to determine personnel requirements are valid, the Navy cannot be assured that it has appropriately sized crews to maintain material readiness and accomplish necessary tasks aboard its ships. The Navy has made significant changes to its training programs and evaluated some aspects of these changes, specifically those related to cost and training time. However, it lacks outcome-based performance measures and complete data necessary to fully evaluate the impact changes to training have had on trainees' job performance and the time required for personnel to achieve various qualifications. For example, in 2003, the Navy replaced its 6-month division officer course with computer-based training and officials told GAO that this change has resulted in decreases in class length and saved the Navy about $50 million annually. While important, these input and output-based metrics do not enable the Navy to determine how its training programs are affecting the level of the trainees' job performance, knowledge, skills, and abilities once they report to their ships. The time it takes for personnel to achieve qualification standards is a potential metric the Navy could use to evaluate its training programs, however data on actual qualification times, while improving, are incomplete. GAO met with leaders from 11 different ships who told GAO that the sailors and officers taught using new methods such as computer-based training, required more on-the-job training when they arrived onboard than those who had previously received classroom instruction. They also noted that because of reductions in crew sizes, there are fewer personnel available to provide this on-the-job training. Without additional outcome-based performance measures to supplement its current metrics, the Navy cannot fully determine the effectiveness of the training changes it has implemented and whether further adjustments are necessary.