The DHS Office of Policy consolidated the study  groups’ recommendations into a draft QHSR report and obtained and  incorporated feedback on the draft report from other federal agencies and  stakeholder groups, including the stakeholders listed in the 9/11  Commission Act, with which DHS was to consult in conducting the  QHSR. DHS issued the final QHSR report in February 2010. In obtaining input from these stakeholders, DHS used a variety of  mechanisms, such as multiagency working groups, solicitation of  homeland security research papers, and a web-based forum, referred to  as the National Dialogue, as shown in table 1. We obtained comments from 63 stakeholders who DHS consulted with  through these mechanisms. Time Constraints, Nonfederal Stakeholder Participation, and Definition of Stakeholders’ Roles Hindered QHSR Consultations

DHS consulted with a range of stakeholders through various  mechanisms, but DHS officials and stakeholders identified challenges  that hindered DHS’s consultation efforts in conducting the QHSR. In response to our request for comments on  the QHSR process, 16 stakeholders noted concerns regarding the time  frames they had for providing input into the QHSR or BUR. Nine DHS  stakeholders, for example, responded that in their view, the limited time  available for development of the QHSR did not allow DHS to have as  broad and deep an engagement with stakeholders as DHS could have  experienced if more time had been allotted to stakeholder consultations. However, the department faced challenges in obtaining  feedback from nonfederal stakeholders. In responding to our request for comments, 9 stakeholders commented  that DHS consultations with nonfederal stakeholders, such as state, local,  and private sector representatives, could be enhanced. Given the significant role that state and local governments and the private  sector play in homeland security efforts, which is acknowledged by DHS  in the QHSR report, examining mechanisms, such as those proposed by  QHSR stakeholders or used by components, could help DHS include a  broader segment of these representatives during the QHSR process and  better position DHS to consider and incorporate, as appropriate,  nonfederal concerns and capabilities related to homeland security in the  next QHSR. DHS  officials stated that DHS solicited comments from other federal  departments and state, local, and tribal governments on the role and  responsibility descriptions for each of these entities listed in the QHSR  report. DHS Plans to Implement a National Risk Assessment as Part of the Next QHSR

Through the QHSR, DHS identified various threats confronting homeland  security but did not conduct a risk assessment for the QHSR. DHS has called for the use of national risk assessments for homeland  security but did not conduct such an assessment as part of the 2010  QHSR. DHS officials stated that at the time DHS conducted the QHSR,  DHS did not have a well-developed methodology or the analytical  resources to complete a national risk assessment that would include  likelihood and consequence assessments. In recognition of a need to develop a national risk assessment  methodology, the QHSR National Risk Assessment Study Group was  created as part of the QHSR process. DHS Developed BUR Monitoring Mechanisms and Measures but Could Strengthen Its Prioritization Efforts by Using Risk Information

		DHS Prioritized Its BUR Initiatives but Could Benefit from Considering Risk Information in Future Efforts

DHS considered various factors in identifying high-priority BUR initiatives  for implementation in fiscal year 2012 but did not include risk information  as one of these factors. First, the  implementation mechanisms or initiatives to be prioritized based on risk  information should be comparable in terms of the nature of the risks  addressed. Consideration of risk information could help  strengthen DHS’s prioritization of mechanisms for implementing the  QHSR, including determining which initiatives or programs should be  implemented in the short or longer term and the resources required for  implementation. 4). Recommendations for Executive Action

To strengthen DHS’s planning, management, and execution of the next  QHSR, we recommend that the DHS Assistant Secretary for Policy take  the following three actions:    Provide more time for consulting with stakeholders during the QHSR  process to help ensure that stakeholders are provided the time  needed to review QHSR documents and provide input into the review,  and build this time into the department’s project planning for the next  QHSR. Appendix II: Scope and Methodology

The objectives for this report were to evaluate the extent to which the  Department of Homeland Security (DHS) (1) consulted with stakeholders  in developing the Quadrennial Homeland Security Review (QHSR)  strategy; (2) conducted a national risk assessment to develop the QHSR;  and (3) developed priorities, plans, monitoring mechanisms, and  performance measures for implementing the QHSR and Bottom-Up  Review (BUR) initiatives.
Why GAO Did This Study

The United States continues to face a range of evolving threats, such as the 2010 attempted attack on the nation's air cargo system, that underscore why homeland security planning efforts are crucial to the security of the nation. The Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 required the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to provide a comprehensive examination of the U.S. homeland security strategy every 4 years. In response, DHS issued its first Quadrennial Homeland Security Review (QHSR) report in February 2010 and a Bottom-Up Review (BUR) report in July 2010, to identify initiatives to implement the QHSR. As requested, this report addresses the extent to which DHS (1) consulted with stakeholders in developing the QHSR, (2) conducted a national risk assessment, and (3) developed priorities, plans, monitoring mechanisms, and performance measures for implementing the QHSR and BUR initiatives. GAO analyzed relevant statutes and DHS documents on the QHSR and BUR processes and, in response to a request for comments on the processes, received comments from 63 of the 85 federal and nonfederal stakeholders it contacted. Their responses are not generalizable, but provided perspectives on the processes.

What GAO Found

DHS solicited input from various stakeholder groups in conducting the first QHSR, but DHS officials, stakeholders GAO contacted, and other reviewers of the QHSR noted concerns with time frames provided for stakeholder consultations and outreach to nonfederal stakeholders. DHS consulted with stakeholders--federal agencies; department and component officials; state, local, and tribal governments; the private sector; academics; and policy experts-- through various mechanisms, such as the solicitation of papers to help frame the QHSR and a web-based discussion forum. DHS and these stakeholders identified benefits from these consultations, such as DHS receiving varied perspectives. However, stakeholders also identified challenges in the consultation process. Sixteen of 63 stakeholders who provided comments to GAO noted concerns about the time frames for providing input into the QHSR or BUR. Nine DHS stakeholders, for example, responded that the limited time available for development of the QHSR did not allow DHS to have as deep an engagement with stakeholders. Further, 9 other stakeholders commented that DHS consultations with nonfederal stakeholders, such as state, local, and private sector entities, could be enhanced by including more of these stakeholders in QHSR consultations. In addition, reports on the QHSR by the National Academy of Public Administration, which administered DHS's web-based discussion forum, and a DHS advisory committee comprised of nonfederal representatives noted that DHS could provide more time and strengthen nonfederal outreach during stakeholder consultations. By providing more time for obtaining feedback and examining mechanisms to obtain nonfederal stakeholders' input, DHS could strengthen its management of stakeholder consultations and be better positioned to review and incorporate, as appropriate, stakeholders' input during future reviews. DHS identified threats confronting homeland security in the 2010 QHSR report, such as high-consequence weapons of mass destruction and illicit trafficking, but did not conduct a national risk assessment for the QHSR. DHS officials stated that at the time DHS conducted the QHSR, DHS did not have a well-developed methodology or the analytical resources to complete a national risk assessment that would include likelihood and consequence assessments--key elements of a national risk assessment. To develop an approach to national risk assessments, DHS created a study group as part of the QHSR process that developed a national risk assessment methodology. DHS officials plan to implement a national risk assessment in advance of the next QHSR, which DHS anticipates conducting in fiscal year 2013. DHS developed priorities, plans, monitoring mechanisms, and performance measures, but did not consider risk information in making its prioritization efforts. DHS considered various factors in identifying high-priority BUR initiatives for implementation in fiscal year 2012 but did not include risk information as one of these factors, as called for in GAO's prior work and DHS's risk management guidance, because of differences among the initiatives that made it difficult to compare risks across them, among other things. Consideration of risk information during future implementation efforts could help strengthen DHS's prioritization of mechanisms for implementing the QHSR, including assisting in determinations of which initiatives should be implemented in the short or longer term.

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that for future reviews, DHS provide the time needed for stakeholder consultations, explore options for consulting with nonfederal stakeholders, and examine how risk information could be considered in prioritizing QHSR initiatives. DHS concurred with our recommendations.