	FPS Faces Challenges in Protecting Federal Facilities and Is Taking Some Actions to Address Them

		FPS Has Begun to Develop a Risk Management Approach to Protecting Federal Facilities

In 2008, we reported that FPS does not use a comprehensive risk  management approach that links threats and vulnerabilities to resource  requirements. Without a risk management approach that identifies threats  and vulnerabilities and the resources required to achieve FPS’s security  goals, there is only limited assurance that programs will be prioritized and  resources will be allocated to address existing and potential security  threats in an efficient and effective manner. In response to our recommendations in this area, FPS began developing a  new system referred to as the Risk Assessment Management Program  (RAMP). This system is designed to be a central database for capturing  and managing facility security information, including the risks posed to  federal facilities and the countermeasures in place to mitigate risk. FPS Has Taken Some Steps to Improve Oversight of the Contract Guard Program

We reported in July 2009 and April 2010 that FPS faces challenges in  ensuring that many of the 15,000 contract security guards that FPS relies  on to help protect federal facilities have the required training and  certification to be deployed at federal facilities. We also identified  substantial security vulnerabilities related to FPS’s guard program. FPS also took a number of immediate actions to  address concerns raised about contract guard management in our July  2009 contract guard report. For example, since July 2009, FPS has  increased its penetration tests in some regions and the number of guard  inspections it conducts at federal facilities in some metropolitan areas. FPS agreed  with this recommendation but has not yet implemented it. While FPS has recently increased the size of its workforce as mandated by  Congress, we reported in our 2009 report that FPS has operated without a  human capital plan. We recommended that FPS develop a human capital  plan to guide its current and future workforce planning efforts. We have  identified human capital management as a high-risk issue throughout the  federal government, including within DHS. FPS  concurred with this recommendation and has drafted a workforce analysis  plan but has not yet fully developed or implemented a human capital plan. FPS Faces Limitations in Assessing Its Performance

We have reported that FPS is limited in its ability to assess the  effectiveness of its efforts to protect federal facilities. Facility Security Committee Structure Hampers Protection of Federal Facilities

FPS’s ability to protect federal facilities under the control or custody of  GSA is further complicated by the FSC structure. For example, FSCs have operated since 1995  without guidelines, policies, or procedures that outline how they should  operate, make decisions, or establish accountability. Each FSC consists of a representative from each of the tenant agencies in  the facility and is responsible for addressing security issues at its  respective facility and approving the implementation of security  countermeasures recommended by FPS. However, we reported in November 2009 that the tenant agency  representatives generally do not have any security knowledge or  experience but are expected to make security decisions for their  respective agencies. We also reported that some of the FSC tenant agency  representatives also do not have the authority to commit their respective  organizations to fund security countermeasures. Moreover, no actions have been taken on these issues since we identified  them in our November 2009 report. As such, these weaknesses continue to  result in ad hoc security and increased risk at some federal facilities. Recommendation for Executive Action

GAO recommends that the Secretary of DHS direct the Under Secretary of  NPPD and the Director of FPS to work in consultation with GSA and ISC  to develop and implement procedures that, among other things, outline the  FSCs’ organizational structure, operations, decision-making authority, and  accountability. DHS  concurred with the recommendation in this report.
Why GAO Did This Study

To accomplish its mission of protecting about 9,000 federal facilities, the Federal Protective Service (FPS) currently has a budget of about $1 billion, about 1,225 full-time employees, and about 15,000 contract security guards. However, protecting federal facilities and their occupants from a potential terrorist attack or other acts of violence remains a daunting challenge for the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Federal Protective Service. GAO has issued numerous reports on FPS's efforts to protect the General Services Administration's (GSA) facilities. This report (1) recaps the major challenges we reported that FPS faces in protecting federal facilities and discusses FPS's efforts to address them and (2) identifies an additional challenge that FPS faces related to the facility security committees (FSC), which are responsible for addressing security issues at federal facilities. This report is based primarily on our previous work and recent FPS interviews.

What GAO Found

Since 2007, we have reported that FPS faces significant challenges with protecting federal facilities, and in response FPS has recently started to take steps to address some of them. In 2008, we reported that FPS does not use a risk management approach that links threats and vulnerabilities to resource requirements. Without a risk management approach that identifies threats and vulnerabilities and the resources required to achieve FPS's security goals, there is limited assurance that programs will be prioritized and resources will be allocated to address existing and potential security threats in an efficient and effective manner. FPS recently began implementing a new system referred to as the Risk Assessment Management Program (RAMP). This system is designed to be a central database for capturing and managing facility security information, including the risks posed to federal facilities and the countermeasures that are in place to mitigate risk. FPS expects that RAMP will enhance its approach to assessing risk, managing human capital, and measuring performance. Our July 2009 report on FPS's contract guard program also identified a number of challenges that the agency faces in managing its contract guard program, including ensuring that the 15,000 guards that are responsible for helping to protect federal facilities have the required training and certification to be deployed at a federal facility. In response to our report, FPS took a number of immediate actions with respect to contract guard management. For example, FPS has increased the number of guard inspections it conducts at federal facilities in some metropolitan areas and revised its guard training. We have not reviewed whether these actions are sufficient to fulfill our recommendations. Another area of continuing concern is that FPS continues to operate without a human capital plan and does not have an accurate estimate of its current and future workforce needs. In our July 2009 report, we recommended that FPS develop a human capital plan to guide its current and future workforce planning efforts. While FPS agreed with this recommendation, it has not yet fully developed or implemented a human capital plan. As we reported in 2009, FPS's ability to protect GSA facilities is further complicated by the FSC structure. Each FSC includes FPS, GSA, and a tenant agency representative and is responsible for addressing security issues at its respective facility and approving the funding and implementation of security countermeasures recommended by FPS. However, there are several weaknesses with the FSC. First, FSCs have operated since 1995 without procedures that outline how they should operate or make decisions, or that establish accountability. Second, the tenant agency representatives to the FSC generally do not have any security knowledge or experience but are expected to make security decisions for their respective agencies. Third, many of the FSC tenant agency representatives also do not have the authority to commit their respective organizations to fund security countermeasures. No actions have been taken on these issues since our 2009 report, and thus these weaknesses continue to result in ad hoc security and increased risk at some federal facilities.

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that the Secretary of DHS direct the Director of FPS to work in consultation with other representatives of the FSC to develop and implement procedures that, among other things, outline the committees' organization structure, operations, and accountability. DHS concurred with GAO's recommendation.