In a press release committee leaders announced that "Among the purposes of this jointeffort is ascertaining why the Intelligence Community did not learn of the September 11th attacks inadvance, and to identify what, if anything, might be done to better the position [of] the IntelligenceCommunity to warn of and prevent future terrorist attacks and other threats of the 21st Century." As the Joint Inquiry completes it work and committee members draft their final report, onNovember 27, 2002 Congress passed the FY2003 Intelligence Authorization Act which establishes an independent commission with a charter to conduct a wide-ranging investigation and assessmentof the events surrounding the 9/11 attacks. The Joint Inquiry of the Intelligence Committees

In the immediate aftermath of September 11, 2001, there was widespread support for aninvestigation of the performance of relevant agencies would be necessary following, in part, theprecedent of the congressional investigation of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941. Difficulties over staffassignments complicated the Inquiry's early months. Public hearings, originally anticipated in May, werepostponed several times and finally began in mid-September. Attack preparations have been made. In addition, the need to prepare for trials led to a disinclination bythe FBI to cooperate with intelligence agencies out of concern that evidence might be tainted by alink with intelligence agencies and not usable in court proceedings. The Staff Director drew attention to the institutional "walls" that had been erected to govern the use of information acquired by intelligence and law enforcement agencies. Ms. Hill noted that former FBI Director Freehhad maintained that the Bureau had provided all available intelligence acquired by the Bureau to theCIA, but this was "an assertion that individuals at the working level at the CIA strongly contest...." (26) She concluded: "The events of September 11, 2001 have led to an almost universal acknowledgmentin the United States Government of the need for consolidating and streamlining collection, analysis,and dissemination of information concerning threats to the United States and its interests." Public Testimony by Witnesses

The public hearings conducted by the two intelligence committees provided an opportunity todescribe how intelligence and law enforcement agencies had reacted to the rise of radical Islamicterrorism in the 1990s and the attacks on Bin Laden's organization by the Clinton Administration(although covert operations were only briefly mentioned). There were no slip ups. They boarded the aircraft lawfully. An Independent Commission: Possible Issues

With the passage of the Intelligence Authorization Act for FY2003 ( P.L. 107-306 ) Congress approved the establishment of an independent commission to assess the background to theSeptember 2001 attacks. Another issue concerns the appropriate role of intelligence agencies in tracking terrorists who may conduct operations in the U.S. When, where, and under what circumstances should thegovernment collect intelligence about the activities of U.S. citizens? In describing procedures that may have affected the ability of governmentalofficials to gain advance notice of the terrorists' plans, the Inquiry focused on testimony thatsuggested available information in the possession of some agencies was not fully shared with othersin a timely manner. Thus far, a number of statutory changes have been enacted and a new Departmentof Homeland Security has been established.
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 led many to inquire whether there had been a failure by United States intelligence agencies to collect all available information about the plots that led tothe attacks, to analyze it properly, and disseminate it in time to protect the American public. Congressional intelligence committees responded by launching an unprecedented Joint Inquiry toinvestigate the Intelligence Community's record in regard to the 9/11 attacks and makerecommendations for further legislative action. The Joint Inquiry began its investigation in February2002 and held public hearings in September and October. Findings, conclusions, andrecommendations were made public in December 2002; release of the final report is anticipated in2003.
In public hearings, the Joint Inquiry's Staff Director traced salient aspects of the Inquiry's work and emphasized that, whereas the Intelligence Community provided ample warning of an impendingattack in mid-2001 against the U.S. by the Islamic terrorist group headed by Osama Bin Laden, theCommunity did not learn in advance the plans for the aircraft hijackings that occurred on September11.
The Joint Inquiry focused on several underlying problems. For a number of Constitutional, statutory, and organization reasons, information collected by intelligence agencies has historicallynot been routinely used for law enforcement purposes. Similarly, information collected inpreparation for trials has not been routinely forwarded to intelligence agencies. In an era in whichterrorists work abroad to launch attacks in the U.S., some have argued that the "walls" betweenintelligence and law enforcement have complicated the ability of any agency to put together acomplete picture of evolving plots. Explaining the complexity of this situation was a majorcontribution of the Inquiry, although the issue of breaching these "walls" remains complicated andcontroversial.
In addition, the Inquiry examined the role of the FBI. There were criticisms of the Bureau's ability to: process and store information; provide communications links between field offices andheadquarters; process applications for surveillance; and coordinate with intelligence agencies. Morefundamentally, the intelligence committees examined priorities that, prior to September 11, 2001,did not emphasize counterterrorism to the extent that has subsequently been considered necessary.
The Intelligence Authorization Act for FY2003 ( P.L. 107-306 ) establishes an independent commission to assess the role of agencies throughout the government with regard to the 9/11 attacks. This independent commission, to be headed by former New Jersey Governor Thomas H. Kean, willbuild upon the investigatory record of the Joint Inquiry, but might reach further to assessorganizational issues and the proper relationship of law enforcement and intelligence agencies. Thisreport will be updated as circumstances dictate.