	Background

		Cyclone Nargis Severely Affected More than 3 Million Burmese

Cyclone Nargis left nearly 140,000 people dead or missing, up to 800,000  displaced, and roughly 2.4 million severely affected. One U.S. official  reported that the Burmese military set up a logistics center in Rangoon  and delivered some relief supplies. The current U.S. sanctions against Burma limit, among other things, the  export of financial services by U.S. persons or from the United States to  Burma and new U.S. investment in Burma. Agencies Obligated About $335 Million in Assistance to Burma after Cyclone Nargis

In response to the humanitarian crisis in Burma following Cyclone Nargis,  UN and U.S. agencies obligated roughly $334.8 million in assistance, as  of March 2011. U.S. Government Responded to Cyclone Nargis with Nearly $85 Million in Assistance

In response to Cyclone Nargis, the U.S. government obligated $84.6  million since May 2008—$74.9 million for emergency response activities  and $9.7 million for longer-term recovery assistance. USAID Has Taken Actions to Help Ensure Funds Have Been Used As Intended, but Has Some Monitoring Weaknesses

		USAID Took Actions Prior to Delivery of Assistance

Prior to delivery of assistance, USAID took several actions to help ensure  that funds were used as intended and did not benefit sanctioned entities. Under the terms of the licenses, USAID and its grantees had to  continue to ensure that U.S. funding did not benefit sanctioned entities in  Burma.   Food aid. USAID’s Monitoring Includes Limited Financial Oversight and Relies on External Audits, but Staff Were Not Aware of Relevant Audit Findings

USAID’s monitoring activities, including their limited number of site visits,  involve little financial oversight, which is to help ensure funds are used as  intended. Organizations Responding to Cyclone Nargis Experienced Similar Challenges and Developed Lessons Learned

Our analysis of 16 evaluative reports from NGOs, governments, and UN  agencies as well as interviews with U.S., UN, and NGO officials found  that organizations responding to Cyclone Nargis experienced similar  challenges in four main categories: access to affected populations,  coordination among responding organizations, implementation of  assistance, and in-country disaster response capacity. Reports mentioned  the physical distance between the locations and the limited, and  unreliable, telecommunication services in the delta, as some of the  reasons contributing to the communication challenges. Recommendations for Executive Action

We recommend that the Administrator of USAID direct the appropriate  mission and offices to improve management of grants related to Burma  by taking actions, such as:    enhancing financial monitoring of agreements by including periodic  reviews of grantee internal controls, transactions, and disbursement  records;    providing grantees with specific guidance on the approval process for  international travel requests, and ensuring that USAID staff monitor  grantees’ expenditures for compliance with related laws, regulations,  and grant agreements, including international travel;  reinforcing the requirement for staff to formally document site visits to  grantees; and    ensuring all relevant offices are made aware of audit findings in a  timely manner. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

	UN and U.S. Assistance

To describe assistance provided by UN and U.S. agencies in response to  Cyclone Nargis, we reviewed documents, including grants, cooperative  agreements, and progress reports, from UN agencies, the U.S. Agency  for International Development (USAID), Department of Defense (DOD),  Department of State (State), and nongovernmental organizations (NGO). We report UN agency obligations. For example, DOD-procured water bottles were  heavy and difficult to transport and medical supplies had instructions  printed in non-Burmese languages. Responders cited the improvement of in-country emergency  preparedness and response capacity through personnel training and local  engagement as critical. USAID issued recommendations to address the lessons  learned from many of these challenges. Restrictions Limit Work with Burmese Government

USAID officials also said that U.S. restrictions limiting their ability to work  with the Burmese government made it difficult to coordinate U.S.  response and recovery activities. This was not the case in  Burma and it created difficulties for the team. Conflicting  agendas resulted in coordination difficulties related to the  appropriateness, timing, procurement, and distribution of aid. USAID’s after action report also cited numerous  challenges related to information management. and  UN agencies said that they found little evidence that assistance had  been misused,” USAID said no misuse of resources has been  encountered.
Why GAO Did This Study

Cyclone Nargis hit Burma's impoverished Irrawaddy Delta on May 2, 2008, leaving nearly 140,000 people dead or missing and severely affecting about 2.4 million others, according to the UN. The Burmese military government initially blocked most access to the affected region; however, amid international pressure, it slowly began allowing international aid workers entry into the region. Since 1997, the United States has imposed sanctions to prohibit, among other things, the exportation of financial services to Burma and transactions with Burmese officials. In response to a congressional mandate, GAO (1) described the assistance UN and U.S. agencies have provided in response to Cyclone Nargis, (2) assessed USAID actions to help ensure funds are used as intended and do not benefit sanctioned entities, and (3) described the challenges responders experienced and the lessons learned. GAO reviewed financial and program documents; interviewed U.S., UN, and nongovernmental organization (NGO) officials; and traveled to Thailand and Burma.

What GAO Found

UN and U.S. agencies provided about $335 million for emergency response and recovery activities after Cyclone Nargis. Of that total, 11 UN agencies obligated roughly $288 million for assistance in various sectors, including food, health, water and sanitation, and agriculture. The U.S. government provided about $38 million of the UN's total as part of its roughly $85 million in obligations for emergency response and longer-term recovery activities. Of the $85 million U.S. response, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), which led U.S. efforts, obligated about $72 million. The Department of Defense obligated about $13 million to procure and deliver emergency relief supplies. USAID took actions to help ensure U.S. funds were used as intended and did not benefit sanctioned entities, but had some monitoring weaknesses. USAID took actions prior to the delivery of assistance, including selecting partners experienced in working with USAID and in Burma and providing extra guidance to help ensure funds were not misused. To monitor assistance, USAID has conducted some site visits. However, USAID's monitoring contains little financial oversight and we found that two grantees charged USAID for unapproved international travel. Also, in some cases site visits were not sufficiently documented. USAID relies on external audits of grantees, but relevant USAID staff were not aware of audit findings related to one grantee's cash payments to villagers in Burma. The grantee subsequently addressed the audit findings. Lastly, U.S. and UN agencies said they examined reports of misuse of assistance in their programs and found no evidence that assistance had been misused. GAO's review of 16 after-action reports from donors, NGOs, and UN agencies, showed that those responding to Cyclone Nargis experienced similar challenges and developed lessons learned in four main areas: access, coordination, implementation, and limited in-country disaster response capacity. Responders found it difficult to reach affected areas because the Burmese government limited their travel and the infrastructure was poor. Responders also had difficulty coordinating between headquarters and field offices for several reasons, including limited telecommunication services. A U.S. report highlighted coordination challenges amongst U.S. agencies, stating that agencies' conflicting agendas resulted in difficulties related to the appropriateness, timing, procurement, and distribution of aid. Implementation challenges include supplies that were incompatible with local conditions, such as medicines with instructions printed in non-Burmese languages and difficulties monitoring aid. Capacity challenges included a lack of experienced disaster specialists in Burma, which resulted in nonqualified individuals being placed in positions out of necessity. To address some of these challenges, reports suggested that organizations increase support staff and use the same reporting systems. Other reports prioritized involving local communities in decision making and improving emergency preparedness and local response capacity.

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that the Administrator of USAID (1) take four actions to improve the management of grants related to Burma, including enhancing financial monitoring and reinforcing the requirement to document site visits, and (2) review the questionable costs for international travel GAO identified. USAID concurred with GAO's recommendations.