Issues for Congress

Security force assistance is an overarching concept that ties into several interests of Congress, including security assistance, security cooperation, foreign military financing, foreign military sales, foreign affairs, foreign aid, overseas contingency operations, and legislative authorities associated with training foreign forces (Foreign Assistance Act, P.L. 87-195; 22 U.S.C. 2151). SFA is considered key to engaging underdeveloped, undergoverned nations in a preventive context linked to counterterrorism strategy. SFA is central to U.S. strategy for ensuring that Afghanistan and Iraq will be responsible for their own future stability and security. This is done by developing foreign security forces that are competent, capable, committed, and confident, not only in the eyes of U.S. (and potentially coalition) forces and the host nation government, but more critically, in the eyes of that nation's population, as well as in the eyes of prospective opponents. Although SFA is considered a "whole-of-government" activity, this report focuses primarily on the military aspect of training, advising, and assisting. Combatant Commanders' Theater Security Cooperation Plans10

As described earlier, while the U.S. military services (Army, Navy, Air Force, Marines) organize, train, and equip to meet SFA mission requirements, it is the combatant commanders who carry out the operations in their respective theaters. How SFA Fits into U.S. Strategy and Administration Policy

		Historical Evolution of Training Foreign Forces

Historically, responsibility for training, advising, and assisting foreign forces has rested with the U.S. military's Special Operations Forces (SOF). SFA in Current and Previous National Security Strategies

The premise that weak and failing states pose a national security threat is supported by many audiences. SFA Linkage to Iraq and Afghanistan Strategies

In both Iraq and Afghanistan, the strategy of the United States is to create conditions for withdrawal from these countries and leave an environment wherein these nations can provide for their own security. This mechanism is widely endorsed by regional combatant commanders for conducting security force assistance effectively within the legislative restrictions for training foreign forces (see page 61 " Do Legislative Authorities Restrict Conducting SFA? These are referred to as direct and indirect approaches. Department of Defense's Means to Conduct SFA

In testimony before the House and Senate Armed Services Committees, Secretary of Defense Gates, service chiefs, and regional combatant commanders have been asked what steps are being taken to build a larger pool of SFA-oriented trainers within the services. The challenge for the services has been to facilitate the organizing, training, and equipping of their own forces to meet this demand. Prominent SOF Training Activities

Some notable recent SFA missions by U.S. SOF that have elicited congressional interest include the training of counterterrorism forces in Yemen, development of indigenous SOF forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, training of the Frontier Corps in Pakistan, training of forces in Mali against the illicit trafficking of weapons, drugs, and people, and training of armed forces of the Philippines to counter Muslim insurgent groups in Mindanao. As such, Naval Special Warfare Forces do not have units specifically dedicated to training foreign forces. SAF/IA has outlined its role in support of the Air Force's strategic engagement imperatives, as described in its Global Partnership Strategy:
This strategy utilizes a capabilities-based approach to identify the specific ways and means to utilize in relations with a specific country in support of the CCDR objectives. Additionally, some analysts believe that investing in these aircraft and personnel to conduct SFA or building partner capacity is a misguided effort. It has consistently been an issue raised by combatant commanders in congressional hearings (see Appendix A ). SFA) missions. Global Security Contingency Fund: A DOD/DOS Proposal for Pooled Funds

One potential means for revised authorities was recently introduced. (a) REPORT REQUIRED.—Not later than March 1, 2010, the President shall transmit to the congressional committees specified in subsection (b) a report on the following:
(1) The relationship between authorities of the Department of Defense to conduct security cooperation programs to train and equip, or otherwise build the capacity of, foreign military forces and security assistance authorities of the Department of State and other foreign assistance agencies to provide assistance to train and equip, or otherwise build the capacity of, foreign military forces, including the distinction, if any, between the purposes of such authorities, the processes to generate requirements to satisfy the purposes of such authorities, and the contribution such authorities make to the core missions of each such department and agency. Doing so has also given the U.S. Armed Forces opportunities to train with and learn from their counterparts.
Historically, the U.S. military's Special Operations Forces (SOF) have had primary responsibility for training, advising, and assisting foreign military forces. Today, although this mission has not been completely relegated to conventional forces, the National Security Strategies of the current and previous administrations direct the U.S. military services (Army, Navy, Air Force, Marines) to organize, train, and equip themselves to carry out these activities on a larger scale with conventional (non-SOF) forces. This responsibility in its broad sense of building the capacity of partner states has been termed "security force assistance" (SFA).
SFA ties into several interests of Congress, including security assistance, security cooperation, foreign military financing, foreign military sales, foreign affairs, foreign aid, overseas contingency operations, and legislative authorities associated with training foreign forces (Foreign Assistance Act, P.L. 87-195; 22 U.S.C. 2151).
Of significant interest to Congress in the near term is the ability of U.S. military forces to train their counterparts in Afghanistan and Iraq. The Obama Administration position, endorsed for the most part by Congress, is that developing competent forces in these countries is pivotal to coalition mission success and to protecting U.S. national interests. SFA is part of the U.S. strategic goal of having Iraq and Afghanistan responsible for their own security. Congress has supported the Department of Defense's agenda for training Afghani forces; however, some Members are skeptical of the new Iraqi government's commitment to developing its own security forces.
Each of the military services has undertaken to organize, train, and equip themselves for SFA. However, while SOF have units specifically dedicated to a long-term role in SFA, the conventional forces services do not. Each of the services does have Security Cooperation and Security Assistance organizations that are dedicated to SFA activities, although they do not have SFA in their titles. The services also standardize training for deploying forces to support combatant commanders in their SFA mission. This effort to "train the trainers," although an object of consistent inquiry in congressional hearings, has been endorsed in testimony by combatant commanders.
Along with its role in the current Afghanistan and Iraq wars, SFA is directly linked to counterterrorism strategy and is key to engaging underdeveloped and undergoverned nations (often referred to as "weak or fragile states") in a preventive national security strategy. Regional combatant commanders apply this preventive strategy through authorities provided in the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA). The SFA authorizations in the NDAA are often criticized as being disjointed and cumbersome, creating significant challenges to effective SFA employment. The Departments of Defense and State have presented a proposal for pooled funding to alleviate some of these challenges. The proposed Global Security Contingency Fund would be a shared resource requiring authorization by both departments. This would be similar to the temporary authorization known as "1206 global train and equip" authorization.
The training, organizing, and equipping of U.S. forces to conduct SFA competes for scarce fiscal and personnel resources among the services. Some critics of SFA attest that committing to this capability within the services detracts from their ability to conduct traditional combat roles. Others suggest that building the security capacity of weak and failed states is a misguided effort.
This report provides the following elements:
An overview of the SFA rationale, focused primarily on Department of Defense support for and relations with foreign security forces. Description of the possible employment of U.S. conventional forces and platforms in support of the SFA mission (see "SFA in Current and Previous National Security Strategies"). Exploration of current operations in Afghanistan and Iraq (see "SFA Linkage to Iraq and Afghanistan Strategies"). Resident training capability in U.S. forces as a tool for geographic combatant commanders. Issues Congress may consider ("Do Legislative Authorities Restrict Conducting SFA?")
The report summarizes congressional reaction to SFA proposals and provides a detailed account of the issues raised by SFA concepts and programs.
A glossary is also provided (see Glossary, page 57).