Progress Requires Strong Host Government Commitment and Sustained U.S. Assistance

Alternative development progress in Bolivia and Peru has required a  lasting host government commitment to a broader set of counternarcotics  measures and years of sustained U.S. assistance to support these efforts. Alternative development  activities in both poppy- and coca-growing areas are just beginning. After funding for Plan Colombia was approved in July 2000, USAID began  planning for alternative development in Colombia’s coca-growing areas. The experiences in Bolivia  and Peru demonstrate the need for host government control and security in project areas; effective interdiction operations; and careful coordination of eradication, interdiction, and alternative  development efforts. However, the Colombian government does not control large parts of the  coca-growing areas, limiting its ability to carry out sustained interdiction  operations, and the Colombian government’s ability to effectively  coordinate eradication and alternative development activities remains  uncertain. The U.S. Agency for International  Development (USAID) has funded four alternative development projects  in Bolivia since 1983.
What GAO Found

Since the early 1970's, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) has helped Bolivian and Peruvian growers of illicit crops find legal ways to earn a living. The experiences in Bolivia and Peru indicate that effective alternative development demands a strong host government commitment to a comprehensive array of counternarcotics measures and years of sustained U.S. assistance. Chief among the specific lessons for Colombia are that progress requires host government control of drug-growing areas and a political will to interdict drug trafficking and forcibly eradicate illicit crops as well as a carefully coordinated approach to these efforts. USAID began targeting Colombia's poppy-growing areas in 2000 and expanded its program to include coca-growing areas in 2001, but most activities will not begin in earnest until 2002. The experiences in Bolivia and Peru suggest that alternative development in Colombia will not be successful unless the Colombian government controls coca-growing areas, has the capacity to carry out sustained interdiction operations, and the ability to effectively coordinate eradication and alternative development activities.