Specifically, we examined (1) the basis for program requirements and (2) the rates of inventory fill and maintenance condition of prepositioned stocks and the reliability of this readiness data. The Army’s brigade sets in Kuwait, Qatar, Korea, and afloat reflect the current two-war strategy, but Army officials have expressed a need to reevaluate the requirements for three brigade sets in Europe. The readiness of the afloat, Korea, and Qatar sets is improving, and despite present shortages these sets could provide a significant combat capability, if needed. Readiness is declining in the European sets, and the Army has no immediate plans to fill equipment shortages caused by the transfer of equipment to support troops in, or returning from, Bosnia. The Army has recognized these problems with its programs and has begun taking steps to correct them, but it may be several years before the problems are fully resolved and it can reliably assess the readiness of its prepositioning programs. Thus, the Army reports that this set is at a high level of readiness. Air Force Prepositioning Programs Have Poorly Defined Requirements and Incomplete Readiness Information

The Air Force does not have precise requirements established for its prepositioned bare base and vehicle programs. Because the Air Force has not assessed the infrastructure available in the region, current requirements are based on worst-case scenarios that assume the Air Force must provide virtually all of the living and operating facilities required by deploying forces and will not have any other sources of supply for housing, food, or laundry requirements. In addition, the Air Force is storing over 900 general purpose and specialty vehicles in Europe but has no current requirements for these vehicles to be stored there. The Air Force Has Not Determined Valid Requirements for the Vehicle Program

The Air Force has not precisely defined requirements for its prepositioned vehicle program. However, much of the Air Force’s vehicle fleet is aging and in poor condition. Over 40 percent of these vehicles were not mission capable as of July 1998. Specifically, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Army to reevaluate the requirements for European prepositioning, including whether the current brigade set configurations best meet the envisioned missions; take steps to ensure that the operational projects requirements meet operational needs and are prioritized in accordance with DOD’s current wartime strategy; complete ongoing efforts to improve the processes used to determine sustainment requirements and work with other DOD stakeholders to determine what stocks will be available from the industrial base and host nations; develop reliable reports of inventory fill and maintenance conditions for the operational projects and sustainment programs so that their readiness can be reliably measured; and dispose of unneeded stocks. Matter for Congressional Consideration

To reliably assess DOD’s readiness status and evaluate its future budget requests, the Congress may wish to consider having the Secretary of Defense periodically report on (1) the progress by DOD, the Army, and the Air Force to address the recommendations made in this report and (2) the impact of any shortages that remain after requirements and reporting problems are addressed, including how DOD and the services would mitigate shortages in the event of a major conflict.
Why GAO Did This Study

Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the readiness of the Department of Defense (DOD) prepositioning programs, focusing on the: (1) basis for the program requirements; and (2) rates of inventory fill and maintenance condition of prepositioned stocks and the reliability of this readiness data.

What GAO Found

GAO noted that: (1) the Army and Air Force have poorly defined, outdated, or otherwise questionable requirements in the major programs that GAO reviewed; (2) the Army and Air Force have reported significant shortages and poor maintenance conditions in their prepositioning programs; (3) reliable data to assess inventory fill and maintenance condition was unavailable; (4) while the services are taking steps to address the requirements and reporting problems, it may be several years before these problems are resolved and readiness can be reliably assessed; (5) the positioning of the Army's brigade sets in Kuwait, Qatar, Korea, and afloat supports the current two-war strategy; (6) the three brigade sets in Europe are in a state of flux, and the Army recognizes the need to revisit and evaluate the requirements for those sets; (7) the Kuwait set is at a high level of readiness, and the sets afloat, in Korea, and in Qatar are improving as additional equipment is added to these sets; (8) the readiness of the European sets is declining and the Army has no immediate plans to fill equipment shortages caused by the transfer of equipment to units in, or returning from, Bosnia; (9) the Army has not determined valid requirements for its operational projects and sustainment programs; (10) the Army is reviewing these programs to establish requirements; (11) until the Army establishes valid requirements and improves inventory reporting, their readiness cannot be reliably and comprehensively assessed; (12) the Air Force has not determined precise requirements for its bare base and vehicle programs; (13) in the Persian Gulf, the Air Force has not completed the detailed planning at each of its planned operating locations to determine what infrastructure and vehicles would be available to deploying forces; (14) current requirements are based on a worst-case scenario that assumes the Air Force must provide virtually all the facilities and vehicles it would need should a major war occur; (15) in Europe, the Air Force is storing over 900 vehicles but has no current requirements for the vehicles to be stored there; (16) in the vehicle program, the Air Force does not have reliable, comprehensive reports of inventories on hand or their maintenance condition; (17) at one location visited, GAO found that over 40 percent of Air Force's aging vehicles were in poor condition and would require repair before being used; and (18) until the Air Force determines requirements for these programs and improves reporting, the impact of shortfalls and poor maintenance conditions will be difficult to discern.