State, DOD, and Justice Provide Assistance to Security Forces in the Philippines, Indonesia, and Thailand

State, DOD, and Justice allocated a total of approximately $265.7 million to  train and equip security forces in the Philippines, Thailand, and Indonesia  in fiscal years 2001 to 2004. Weak Management Controls on U.S. Assistance to Foreign Security Forces Allowed Violations of State’s Policy on Human Rights Restrictions to Occur

We found no evidence that the three posts we visited vetted an estimated  6,935 law enforcement officials trained with State assistance between fiscal  years 2001 and 2004. The trainees included 32 Indonesian police from a  notorious special-forces police unit that was prohibited from receiving U.S.  training funds under State policy because of the unit’s prior human rights  abuses. We found better evidence of vetting in DOD-implemented training  programs. Laws and State Policy Restrict U.S. Assistance to Foreign Security Forces

Each of the annual Foreign Operations Appropriations Acts since 1998 has  included a provision, commonly referred to as the “Leahy Amendment,”  that restricts the provision of assistance appropriated in these acts to any  foreign security unit for which State has determined there is credible  evidence that the unit has committed gross violations of human rights,  unless certain conditions have been met. State Issued New Guidance to Improve Vetting Practices in February 2005

State issued new guidance in February 2005 intended to improve the  efficiency of the human rights vetting process. U.S. Government Lacks an Integrated National Security Assistance Strategy Covering All U.S. Training and Assistance Provided to Foreign Security Forces

The U.S. government lacks a clear and coherent multiyear national security  assistance strategy, making it difficult to assess progress in achieving  stated U.S. foreign policy goals, such as stemming terrorism, promoting  regional stability, and demonstrating respect for human rights. The  strategy does not, however, identify how resources will be allocated to  accomplish objectives, how programs will be combined at the country level  to achieve objectives, or how security assistance programs will be  coordinated with other U.S. government agencies. For example,  DOD’s annual country-specific security assistance plans for the Philippines,  Indonesia, and Thailand meet some objectives of the act because they are  consistent with the National Security Strategy of the United States, include  some discussion of DOD-implemented assistance to foreign security forces  and how the assistance will be combined and contribute to achieving  certain “end states.” Similarly, DOD’s Theater Security Cooperation Plans  (TSCP) are prepared by DOD’s unified commands and include regional  security assistance and other activities for the current year, plus the next 2  fiscal years. As a result, State and Congress will be  deprived of an important source of information for making future resource  allocations and program decisions. The documents, which  State identified as representing a national security assistance strategy, met  only two of nine objectives that the law urged State to address in crafting  this strategy. We found the data sufficiently  reliable for representing the nature and extent of program funding. GAO Comments

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Why GAO Did This Study

The executive branch has bolstered assistance to the Philippines, Indonesia, and Thailand to contribute to U.S. foreign policy and security goals. To further human rights goals, Congress restricts certain security assistance funds from being provided to any units of foreign security forces when credible evidence exists that units have committed gross violations of human rights. GAO (1) describes the nature and extent of U.S. assistance to foreign security forces in the Philippines, Indonesia, and Thailand, (2) assesses the controls used to achieve compliance with human rights restrictions on U.S. funding to foreign security forces in these countries, and (3) assesses the U.S. government's national security assistance strategy.

What GAO Found

The United States allocated about $265.7 million in assistance from fiscal years 2001 to 2004 to equip and train security forces in the Philippines, Thailand, and Indonesia. U.S. law restricts the provision of funds to units of foreign security forces when the Department of State has credible evidence that the unit has committed gross violations of human rights. Agency guidance extends these restrictions to individuals of foreign security forces and requires posts to establish procedures to vet candidates for U.S. sponsored training for possible violations. However, we found no evidence that U.S. officials vetted an estimated 6,900 foreign security trainees--about 4,000 Indonesian, 1,200 Filipino, and 1,700 Thai police--trained by Justice with State law enforcement assistance between fiscal years 2001 through 2004. These candidates included a total of 32 Indonesian individuals trained over time from a notorious special-forces police unit previously prohibited under State policy from receiving U.S. training funds because of the unit's prior human rights abuses. We found better evidence of vetting in training programs managed by DOD. State issued new guidance in February 2005 intended to improve the human rights vetting process and establish a database of human rights abuse allegations. State has not produced a clear and coherent national security assistance strategy that meets objectives that Congress urged State to address in 2000 legislation. As a result, State and Congress may be deprived of the information needed to make future decisions about these programs. State's 2003 strategy met only two of nine objectives in the law. Among other shortfalls, the strategy did not identify how programs would be combined at the country level to achieve objectives or be coordinated with other U.S. government agencies. Several State and DOD planning documents, while not collectively providing a complete national security assistance strategy, address some of the legislation's objectives.