Secure Flight Initially Identified Passengers on Terrorist Watchlists and Now Also Differentiates Passengers Based on Risk

Since January 2009, the Secure Flight program has changed from one  that identifies high-risk passengers by matching them against the No Fly  and Selectee Lists to one that assigns passengers a risk category: high  risk, low risk, or unknown risk.passengers as high risk if they are matched to watchlists of known or  suspected terrorists or other lists developed using certain high-risk  criteria, as low risk if they are deemed eligible for expedited screening  through TSA PreTM—a 2011 initiative to preapprove passengers for  expedited screening—or through the application of low-risk rules, and as  unknown risk if they do not fall within the other two risk categories. Through Secure Flight screening, TSA designates  passengers matching either rules-based list as selectees for enhanced  screening. Specifically, in April  2011, TSA began conducting watchlist matching against an Expanded  Selectee List that includes all records in the TSDB with a full name (first  name and surname) and full date of birth that meet the Terrorist  Screening Center’s reasonable suspicion standard to be considered a  known or suspected terrorist, but that are not already included on the No  Fly or Selectee List. TSA began using the Expanded Selectee List in  response to the December 25, 2009, attempted attack, as another  measure to secure civil aviation. In October 2013, TSA expanded the use of these  assessments to all passengers, not just frequent fliers, and also began  using other travel-related data to assess passengers. TSOs Have Made Errors in Implementing Secure Flight Screening Determinations at the Screening Checkpoint, and Additional Actions Could Reduce the Number of Screening Errors

Our analysis of TSA information from May 2012 through February 2014  found that TSOs have made errors in implementing Secure Flight risk  determinations at the screening checkpoint. However, TSA does not have a systematic process for  evaluating the root causes of screening errors at the checkpoint across  airports, which could allow TSA to identify trends across airports and  target nationwide efforts to address these issues. TDCs would no longer need to examine  passengers’ boarding passes to identify those who should receive  enhanced screening, which could reduce the potential for error. TSA Lacks Key Information to Determine whether the Secure Flight Program Is Achieving Its Goals

		Secure Flight Measures Do Not Fully Assess Progress toward Goals

Secure Flight has six program goals that are relevant to the results of  screening performed by the Secure Flight computer system and the  program analysts who review computer-generated matches, including the  following: goal 1: prevent individuals on the No Fly List from boarding an aircraft, goal 2: identify individuals on the Selectee List for enhanced goal 3: support TSA’s risk-based security mission by identifying high- risk passengers for appropriate security measures/actions and  identifying low-risk passengers for expedited screening, goal 4: minimize misidentification of individuals as potential threats to goal 5: incorporate additional risk-based security capabilities to  streamline processes and accommodate additional aviation  populations, and goal 6: protect passengers’ personal information from unauthorized  use and disclosure. However, Secure Flight has no measures to address the extent to which  Secure Flight is missing passengers who are actual matches to these lists  (see table 1). Likewise, with respect to its privacy-related goal, additional measures that  address other key points in the Secure Flight process in which passenger  records could be inappropriately accessed would allow Secure Flight to  more fully assess the extent to which it is meeting its goal of protecting  passenger information. all potential causes of these errors, and identify and implement sufficient  corrective actions. Recommendations for Executive Action

We recommend that the Transportation Security Administration’s  Administrator take the following four actions:  to further improve the implementation of Secure Flight risk  determinations at the screening checkpoint, develop a process for  regularly evaluating the root causes of screening errors across  airports so that corrective measures can be identified;  to address the root causes of screening errors at the checkpoint,  thereby strengthening checkpoint operations, implement the  corrective measures TSA identifies through a root cause evaluation  process;  to assess the progress of the Secure Flight program toward achieving  its goals, develop additional measures to address key performance  aspects related to each program goal, and ensure these measures  clearly identify the activities necessary to achieve progress toward the  goal; and  to provide Secure Flight program managers with timely and reliable  information on cases in which TSA learns of Secure Flight system  matching errors, develop a mechanism to systematically document  the number and causes of such cases, for the purpose of improving  program performance. Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

We provided a draft of this report to DHS and the Department of Justice  for their review and comment. DHS also concurred with our fourth recommendation, that TSA develop a  mechanism to systematically document the number and causes of cases  in which TSA learns that the Secure Flight system has made a matching  error. To what extent does the Transportation Security Administration (TSA)  ensure that Secure Flight screening determinations for passengers  are fully implemented at airport security checkpoints? In addition, to understand  new initiatives involving Secure Flight screening to identify low-risk  travelers, we spoke with Secure Flight program officials and with officials  in TSA’s Office of Risk Based Security who oversee TSA PreTM, a 2011  program that allows TSA to designate preapproved passengers as low  risk, and TSA Pre✓™ risk assessments, another initiative to identify  passengers as low risk for a specific flight. We evaluated TSA’s efforts  to document system matching errors against standards for information  and communications identified in GAO’s Standards for Internal Control in  the Federal Government.
Why GAO Did This Study

In 2009, DHS's TSA began using Secure Flight to screen passengers against high-risk lists. These lists, subsets of the TSDB—the U.S. government's consolidated list of known and suspected terrorists—included the No Fly List, to identify those who should be prohibited from boarding flights, and the Selectee List, to identify those who should receive enhanced screening at airport checkpoints.
GAO was asked to assess the current status of the program. This report examines (1) changes to the Secure Flight program since 2009, (2) TSA's efforts to ensure that Secure Flight's screening determinations for passengers are implemented at airport checkpoints, and (3) the extent to which program performance measures assess progress toward goals. GAO analyzed TSA data and documents—including checkpoint data from 2012 through 2014 and Secure Flight performance measures—and interviewed relevant DHS officials.

What GAO Found

Since 2009, Secure Flight has changed from a program that identifies passengers as high risk solely by matching them against the No Fly and Selectee Lists to one that assigns passengers a risk category: high risk, low risk, or unknown risk. In 2010, following the December 2009 attempted attack of a U.S.-bound flight, which exposed gaps in how agencies used watchlists to screen individuals, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) began using risk-based criteria to identify additional high-risk passengers who may not be in the Terrorist Screening Database (TSDB), but who should be designated as selectees for enhanced screening. Further, in 2011, TSA began screening against additional identities in the TSDB that are not already included on the No Fly or Selectee Lists. In addition, as part of TSA PreüTM, a 2011 program through which TSA designates passengers as low risk for expedited screening, TSA began screening against several new lists of preapproved low-risk travelers. TSA also began conducting TSA Pre✓™ risk assessments, an activity distinct from matching against lists that uses the Secure Flight system to assign passengers scores based upon travel-related data, for the purpose of identifying them as low risk for a specific flight.
TSA has processes in place to implement Secure Flight screening determinations at airport checkpoints, but could take steps to enhance these processes. TSA information from May 2012 through February 2014 indicates that screening personnel have made errors in implementing Secure Flight determinations at the checkpoint. However, TSA does not have a process for systematically evaluating the root causes of these screening errors. GAO's interviews with TSA officials at airports yielded examples of root causes TSA could identify and address. Evaluating the root causes of screening errors, and then implementing corrective measures, in accordance with federal internal control standards, to address those causes could allow TSA to strengthen security screening at airports.
Since 2009, Secure Flight has established program goals that reflect new program functions to identify additional types of high-risk and also low-risk passengers; however, current program performance measures do not allow Secure Flight to fully assess its progress toward achieving all of its goals. For example, Secure Flight does not have measures to assess the extent of system matching errors. Establishing additional performance measures that adequately indicate progress toward goals would allow Secure Flight to more fully assess the extent to which it is meeting program goals. Furthermore, TSA lacks timely and reliable information on all known cases of Secure Flight system matching errors. More systematic documentation of the number and causes of these cases, in accordance with federal internal control standards, would help TSA ensure Secure Flight is functioning as intended.
This is a public version of a sensitive report that GAO issued in July 2014. Information that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Department of Justice deemed sensitive has been removed.

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that TSA develop a process to regularly evaluate the root causes of screening errors at security checkpoints and implement measures to address these causes. GAO also recommends that TSA develop measures to address all aspects of performance related to program goals and develop a mechanism to systematically document the number and causes of Secure Flight system matching errors. DHS concurred with GAO's recommendations.