Although DOE Has Improved the Security of Many Sites Worldwide, It Has Not Developed a Long- Term Plan to Sustain the Improvements, and Many Dangerous Radiological Sources Remain Unsecured

DOE has improved the security of hundreds of sites that contain  radiological sources in more than 40 countries since the program’s  inception in 2002. However, despite these achievements, such as removing  dangerous sources from a waste storage facility in Chechnya, many of the  high-risk and most dangerous sources remain unsecured, particularly in  Russia. In 2003, when DOE decided to  broaden the program’s scope beyond the former Soviet Union, it also  expanded the types of sites that required security upgrades. As a result, as  of September 2006, almost 70 percent of all sites secured were medical  facilities, which generally contain one radiological source. In addition,  DOE’s program does not address the transportation of radiological  sources from one location to another, a security measure that DOE and  international officials have identified as the most vulnerable link in the  radiological supply chain. DOE has experienced numerous problems and  challenges implementing its program to secure radiological sources  worldwide, including a lack of cooperation from host country officials. Finally, DOE has not developed an adequate plan to ensure that countries  receiving security upgrades will be able to sustain them once installed. However, PNNL and Sandia National Laboratory  officials told us that the measurement used by DOE does not demonstrate  how the program is reducing threats posed to U.S. national security  interests. Transportation of High-Risk Sources Is a Critical Gap in DOE’s Program

Although IAEA officials told us that transportation of high-risk radiological  sources is the most vulnerable part of the nuclear and radiological supply  chain, DOE determined that source transport is generally outside the  scope of the program. As  a result, some projects were delayed, and in some extreme cases, DOE  was unable to implement its program at all. DOE Has Spent Approximately $108 Million to Secure Radiological Sources Worldwide, but Future Program Funding Is Uncertain because of an Increased Emphasis on Securing Special Nuclear Materials

As of August 31, 2006, DOE spent approximately $108 million to  implement the IRTR program. This money was spent to, among other  things, conduct vulnerability assessments at a variety of sites containing  radiological sources and to install physical security upgrades at these  sites, such as hardened windows and doors, motion sensors and  surveillance cameras. However, one-fourth of total expenditures—about  $26.5 million—paid for program planning activities such as development  of program guidance documents, hiring private consultants, and  conducting studies. A majority of this money—$68 million—was spent to (1)  physically secure sites containing radiological sources; (2) locate, recover,  and dispose of lost or abandoned sources; and (3) help countries draft  laws and regulations to increase security and accounting of sources. In  addition, DOE provided $13.5 million to IAEA to support activities to  strengthen controls over radiological sources in IAEA member states. IAEA established the fund,  which consists of voluntary budget contributions from other countries,  after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. To offset anticipated shortfalls in funding, DOE plans to seek international  contributions to secure radiological sources in other countries. Since we reported on this matter in 2003, DOE has  involved State and NRC in its international radiological threat reduction  activities more often and has increased information-sharing with the  agencies. However, DOE has not always integrated its efforts efficiently  and coordinated efforts among the agencies have been inconsistent. DOE has improved coordination with  IAEA to strengthen controls over other countries’ radiological sources and  has developed bilateral and multilateral partnerships with IAEA member  states to improve their regulatory infrastructures. However, significant gaps in information-sharing between DOE  and IAEA, and with the European Commission, have impeded DOE’s  ability to target the most vulnerable sites for security improvements and to  avoid possible duplication of efforts. An example of improved U.S.  coordination is the interagency effort to establish a radiological source  regulatory infrastructure in Iraq. Since 2003, with the support of DOE and  NRC, State has led the effort to establish the Iraq Radioactive Source  Regulatory Authority (IRSRA) and develop a radiological regulatory  infrastructure in Iraq. We also recommended that  DOE take the lead in developing a comprehensive governmentwide plan to  strengthen controls over sources in other countries. DOE’s Efforts Have Not Been Well-Coordinated within the Department, and Program Overlap Has Led to Inefficiencies

The 2004 consultant report also concluded that DOE had not adequately  coordinated the activities of multiple programs within DOE that are  responsible for securing radiological and nuclear materials in other  countries. Finally, we found coordination problems between IRTR and the U.S.  Radiological Threat Reduction program, which is primarily responsible for  domestic source recovery efforts, including repatriating U.S.-origin  radiological sources in other countries. The sources were no longer in use  and were inadequately secured. Despite Some Improvements, Critical Information-Sharing Gaps between DOE and IAEA Have Impeded DOE’s Efforts to Target the Highest Priority Sites for Security Upgrades

DOE has improved coordination with IAEA in recent years to strengthen  controls over other countries’ radiological sources and has developed  several successful bilateral and multilateral partnerships with countries  around the world to support and share the agency’s international efforts. Recommendations for Executive Action

To help ensure that DOE’s program focuses on securing the highest  priority radiological sources and sites, we recommend that the Secretary  of Energy and the Administrator of the National Nuclear Security  Administration take the following two actions:    Limit the number of hospitals and clinics containing radiological sources  that receive security upgrades to only those deemed as the highest-risk,  and   To the extent possible, accelerate efforts to remove as many RTGs in  Russia and, as an interim measure, improve the security of those  remaining until they can be removed from service. Furthermore, we recommend that Secretary of Energy and the  Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration take the  following seven actions to improve program management:    Develop a long-term sustainability plan for security upgrades that  includes, among other things, future resources required to implement such  a plan;   Reevaluate program activities and eliminate those that do not directly  contribute to securing the highest priority radiological sources in other  countries;   Conduct an analysis to determine the projected costs associated with  increased security upgrades in light of newly proposed threat protection  criteria and limit the number sites to receive increased security upgrades  until such an analysis has been completed;   Establish meaningful performance measurements that demonstrate real  risk reduction and go beyond a quantitative listing of the number countries  and sites that have received physical security upgrades;   Apply a more rigorous approach to foreign contractor selection to help  reduce potential project delays in the future;   Seek assurances from recipient countries that plans are in place to  maintain security-related equipment and facilities funded by the United  States; and   Develop strategies to encourage cost sharing with recipient countries,  including Russia and EU accession countries. To assess current and planned program costs of U.S. programs that  provide assistance to secure radiological sources in other countries, we  reviewed budget documents from DOE and NRC detailing program  expenditures from fiscal year 2002 through fiscal year 2006.
Why GAO Did This Study

Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, U.S. and international experts raised concerns that unsecured radiological sources were vulnerable to theft and posed a significant security threat to the United States and the international community. Radioactive material is encapsulated or sealed in metal to prevent its dispersal and is commonly called a sealed radiological source. Sealed radiological sources are used worldwide for many legitimate purposes, such as medical, industrial, and agricultural applications. However, the total number of these sources in use worldwide is unknown because many countries do not systematically account for them. It is estimated that thousands of these sources have been lost, stolen, or abandoned--commonly referred to as orphan sources. If certain types of these sources were obtained by terrorists, they could be used to produce a simple and crude, but potentially dangerous, weapon--known as a radiological dispersion device, or dirty bomb. In 2001, a congressional report directed DOE to use a portion of its fiscal year 2002 supplemental appropriation to address the threat posed by dirty bombs. In response to the congressional requirement, the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) established the Radiological Threat Reduction Task Force to identify, recover, and secure vulnerable, high-risk radiological sources, budgeting $20.6 million for the program in fiscal year 2002. The program initially focused on securing sources in the countries of the former Soviet Union (FSU) because DOE officials determined this region had the greatest number of vulnerable sources. In 2003, at the direction of the Secretary of Energy, DOE expanded the scope of the program to secure sealed sources worldwide, ultimately establishing the International Radiological Threat Reduction (IRTR) Program. The program's primary objective is to protect U.S. national security interests by (1) implementing rapid physical security upgrades at vulnerable sites containing radioactive sources; (2) locating, recovering, and consolidating lost or abandoned high-risk radioactive sources; and (3) supporting the development of the infrastructure necessary to sustain security enhancements and supporting regulatory controls, including the development of regional partnerships to leverage international resources. In addition, DOE has established a program to recover sealed sources produced and distributed in the United States, known as the U.S. Radiological Threat Reduction program. Part of this program's mission is to recover U.S.-origin sources on a case-by-case basis that were supplied by DOE to other countries under the Atoms for Peace program. The IRTR program is administered by NNSA with support from multiple national laboratories. The national laboratories' responsibilities include (1) assessing the physical security requirements of countries participating in the program, (2) recommending specific upgrades to strengthen radiological source security, and (3) ensuring that recommended upgrades are properly installed. In 2003, we issued a report at Congress' request focusing on U.S. and international efforts to secure sealed radiological sources. We recommended, among other things, that the Secretary of Energy take the lead in developing a comprehensive plan to strengthen controls over other countries' sealed sources. This report (1) assesses the progress the Department of Energy (DOE) has made in implementing its program to help other countries secure their sealed radiological sources, (2) identifies DOE's current and planned program costs, and (3) describes DOE's coordination with other U.S. agencies and international organizations to secure radiological sources in other countries.

What GAO Found

DOE has improved the security of hundreds of sites that contain radiological sources in more than 40 countries since the program's inception in 2002. However, many of the highest-risk and most dangerous sources still remain unsecured, particularly in Russia. In 2003, when DOE decided to broaden the program's scope beyond the former Soviet Union, it also expanded the types of sites that required security upgrades. As a result, as of September 2006, almost 70 percent of all sites secured were medical facilities, which generally contain one radiological source. Several DOE and national laboratory officials with whom we spoke questioned the benefit of upgrading such a large number of medical facilities, while higher priority sites--such as waste storage facilities and Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generators (RTGs)--remained unsecured. In addition, DOE's program does not address the transportation of radiological sources from one location to another, a security measure that DOE and international officials have identified as the most vulnerable link in the radiological supply chain. DOE has experienced numerous problems and challenges implementing its program to secure radiological sources worldwide, including a lack of cooperation from some countries and access to sites with dangerous material. Furthermore, some high-risk countries have not given DOE permission to undertake security upgrades at all. Finally, DOE has not developed a plan to ensure that countries receiving security upgrades will be able to sustain them over the long term. From its inception in 2002 through August 31, 2006, DOE spent approximately $108 million to implement its program to secure radiological sources worldwide. A majority of the funds spent--$68 million--was to (1) conduct vulnerability assessments at a variety of sites containing radiological sources; (2) install physical security upgrades at these sites, such as hardened windows and doors, motion sensors and surveillance cameras; and (3) help countries draft laws and regulations to increase security and accounting of sources. In addition, DOE provided $13.5 million to IAEA to support activities to strengthen controls over radiological sources in IAEA member states. The remainder, or $26.5 million, paid for program planning activities such as developing program guidance documents, hiring private consultants, and conducting studies. To offset anticipated shortfalls in funding, DOE plans to obtain international contributions from other countries but efforts to date have produced limited results. DOE has improved coordination with the Department of State (State) and the Nuclear Regulatory Agency (NRC) to secure radiological sources worldwide. Since we reported on this matter in 2003, DOE has involved State and NRC in its international radiological threat reduction activities more often and has increased information-sharing with the agencies. Additionally, DOE and NRC supported a State-led interagency effort to establish the Iraq Radioactive Source Regulatory Authority and develop a radiological regulatory infrastructure in Iraq. However, DOE has not always integrated its nuclear regulatory development efforts efficiently. In addition, DOE has not adequately coordinated the activities of multiple programs within the agency responsible for securing radiological and nuclear materials in other countries. DOE has generally improved coordination with IAEA to strengthen controls over other countries' radiological sources and has developed bilateral and multilateral partnerships with IAEA member states to improve their regulatory infrastructures. However, significant gaps in information-sharing between DOE and IAEA, and with the EC, have impeded DOE's ability to target the most vulnerable sites for security improvements and to avoid possible duplication of efforts.