DOE’s directive, Identifying Classified Information, is the  department’s comprehensive guide to classifying, declassifying, marking,  and protecting information, documents, and material. DOE Training, Guidance, and Oversight Programs Have Been Effective over Time, but a Recent Change in Oversight Responsibility Has Created Uncertainty

DOE’s Office of Classification’s systematic training, comprehensive  guidance, and rigorous oversight programs had a largely successful history  of ensuring that information was classified and declassified according to  established criteria. However, since responsibility  for classification oversight was shifted from the Office of Classification to  the Office of Security Evaluations in October 2005, the pace of oversight  was interrupted—creating uncertainty about how oversight will be  performed and whether it will continue to be effective. In September 2005, the Information Security Oversight Office reviewed  DOE’s classification program just prior to the shift in responsibility for  classification oversight. Since October  2005, the Office of Security Evaluations has completed one inspection of  two offices at the Pantex Site in Texas and another inspection of four  offices at the Savannah River Site is under way. In April 2006, Office of  Security Evaluations officials provided us plans for performing additional  oversight inspections for the remainder of 2006. These plans included  inspections evaluating classification activity at eight DOE offices at three  additional sites. Classification oversight has been incorporated into larger  oversight efforts on physical security at DOE sites. According to the Director of the Office of Security Evaluations, the  procedures for conducting future oversight are still evolving—including  the numbers of sites to be inspected and the depth of analysis to be  performed. DOE Internal Reviews Found Very Few Documents Have Been Misclassified, but Document Selection Procedures Are Not Consistent and Lack Transparency

On the basis of reviews of over 12,000 classified documents totaling nearly  a quarter million pages at 34 sites between 2000 and 2005, DOE officials  have found that very few documents are misclassified. Office of  Classification inspectors found 20 documents had been misclassified, an  error rate of about one-sixth of 1 percent. Most misclassified documents remained classified, just not at the  appropriate level or category. Of greater concern would be documents that  should be classified but mistakenly are not. When mistakenly not  classified, such documents may end up in libraries or on DOE Web sites  where they could reveal sensitive RD and FRD to the public. While DOE’s extensive document reviews provided depth and rigor to its  oversight inspections, two notable shortcomings in this process were (1)  the inconsistent way that inspectors gained access to the many documents  they would review and (2) the failure to adequately disclose these  procedures in their reports. If the oversight inspections planned for the  remainder of 2006 are effectively completed, it will demonstrate  resumption in the pace of oversight conducted prior to October 2005. However, if these inspections are not completed, or are not as  comprehensive, then the extent and depth of oversight will be diminished  and may result in DOE classification activities becoming less reliable and  more prone to misclassification. Recommendations for Executive Action

To help ensure that DOE classification activities remain effective and  result in documents that are classified and declassified according to  established criteria, we recommend that the Secretary of Energy take the  following three actions:  ensure that the classified information oversight program provides  oversight to a similar number of DOE sites, as it did before October 2005,  and provides a similar depth of analysis;  strengthen the review of classified documents by applying selection  procedures that more randomly identify documents for review; and   disclose the selection procedures used for documents for review in future  classification inspection reports.
Why GAO Did This Study

In recent years, the Congress has become increasingly concerned that federal agencies are misclassifying information. Classified information is material containing national defense or foreign policy information determined by the U.S. government to require protection for reasons of national security. GAO was asked to assess the extent to which (1) DOE's training, guidance, and oversight ensure that information is classified and declassified according to established criteria and (2) DOE has found documents to be misclassified.

What GAO Found

DOE's Office of Classification's systematic training, comprehensive guidance, and rigorous oversight programs had a largely successful history of ensuring that information was classified and declassified according to established criteria. However, an October 2005 shift in responsibility for classification oversight to the Office of Security Evaluations has created uncertainty about whether a high level of performance in oversight will be sustained. Specifically, prior to this shift, the Office of Classification had performed 34 inspections of classification programs at DOE sites since 2000. These inspections reviewed whether DOE sites complied with agency classification policies and procedures. After the October 2005 shift, however, the pace of this oversight was interrupted as classification oversight activities ceased until February 2006. So far in 2006, one classification oversight report has been completed for two offices at DOE's Pantex Site in Texas, and work on a second report is under way at four offices at the Savannah River Site in South Carolina. More oversight inspections evaluating classification activity at eight DOE offices are planned for the remainder of 2006. In addition, according to the Director of the Office of Security Evaluations, the procedures for conducting future oversight are still evolving--including the numbers of sites to be inspected and the depth of analysis to be performed. If the oversight inspections planned for the remainder of 2006 are completed, it will demonstrate resumption in the pace of oversight conducted prior to October 2005. However, if these inspections are not completed, or are not as comprehensive as in the past, the extent and depth of oversight will be diminished and may result in DOE classification activities becoming less reliable and more prone to misclassification. On the basis of reviews of classified documents performed during its 34 oversight inspections, the Office of Classification believes that very few of DOE's documents had been misclassified. The department's review of more than 12,000 documents between 2000 and 2005 uncovered 20 documents that had been misclassified--less than one-sixth of 1 percent. DOE officials believe that its misclassification rate is reasonable given the large volume of documents processed. Most misclassified documents remained classified, just not at the appropriate level or category. Of greater concern are the several documents that should have been classified but mistakenly were not. When mistakenly not classified, such documents may end up in libraries or on DOE Web sites where they could reveal classified information to the public. The only notable shortcomings we identified in these inspections were the inconsistent way the Office of Classification teams selected the classified documents for review and a failure to adequately disclose these procedures in their reports. Inspection teams had unfettered access when selecting documents to review at some sites, but at others they only reviewed documents from collections preselected by site officials. Office of Classification reports do not disclose how documents were selected for review.