	Scope and Methodology

To address our objectives, among other things, we interviewed DOJ’s  Criminal Division, Justice Management Division, FBI, and EOUSA officials;  reviewed FBI’s and EOUSA’s policies and guidance for classifying cases;  researched terrorism definitions in the United States Code and Code of  Federal Regulations; compared FBI and EOUSA conviction data for fiscal  years 1997 through 2002; and reviewed conviction data included in DOJ’s  Fiscal Years 2000 and 2001 Performance Reports and similar data the 94  USAO districts had reported to EOUSA for fiscal year 2002. The FBI classified a case as  terrorism-related based on the overall violation being investigated. DOJ Used the FBI’s Terrorism-Related Statistics in Its 2000 Performance Report but Has Since Switched to Reporting EOUSA Statistics

In its Fiscal Year 2000 Performance Report provided to the Congress,  DOJ used the FBI’s number of terrorism-related investigations and  convictions. In response to concerns raised by the Philadelphia Inquirer article and to  avoid any misinterpretation of DOJ’s statistics, beginning with the Fiscal  Year 2001 Performance Report, DOJ switched from using the FBI’s  statistics to using the statistics reported by EOUSA, according to DOJ  officials. We found  documentation to support the FBI’s terrorism-related classifications for all  28 convictions. DOJ Lacks Internal Controls to Ensure Reliability of EOUSA Terrorism-Related Statistics

Federal internal control standards require agencies to implement adequate  controls over information processing. However,  during the course of our engagement, we discovered that DOJ does not  have sufficient management oversight and internal controls in place to  ensure the accuracy and reliability of terrorism-related conviction  statistics included in its annual performance reports. These  132 cases did not result in terrorism-related convictions. Without reliable terrorism-related conviction data, DOJ and the Congress’s  ability to accurately assess terrorism-related performance outcomes of our  criminal justice system and the results of efforts to combat terrorism will  be limited. In addition, these  discrepancies identify the need for improvements in management  oversight and internal controls to better ensure the accuracy of USAO  terrorism-related performance data. Recommendation for Executive Action

To improve the accuracy and reliability of terrorism-related conviction  statistics reported by DOJ in its annual performance reports, we  recommend that the Attorney General, in accordance with federal internal  control standards, implement a formal system to oversee and validate the  accuracy of case classification and conviction data entered in LIONS by  the various USAO districts.
Why GAO Did This Study

In accordance with the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993, the Department of Justice (DOJ) provides Congress and the public with an annual performance report. These reports serve as an important measure of DOJ's progress related to its strategic goals and objectives, including statistics on its Fiscal Year 2000 Performance Report. We were asked to review the accuracy of DOJ's terrorism-related conviction statistics. Among other objectives, in this report we (1) identify how DOJ develops its terrorism-related conviction statistics and (2) assess whether DOJ has sufficient management oversight and internal controls in place to ensure the accuracy of terrorism-related statistics included in its annual performance reports.

What GAO Found

Beginning in fiscal year 2001, DOJ switched from using the FBI's terrorism-related conviction statistics to using those of the Executive Office of U.S. Attorneys (EOUSA) for its annual performance report. This change was in response to concerns raised by a newspaper article's allegation that DOJ had inflated terrorism statistics in its Fiscal Year 2000 Performance report. It was also part of an effort to report conviction statistics that would be less likely to be misinterpreted, according to DOJ officials. The FBI historically classified more convictions than EOUSA as terrorism-related because it used a different classification system and included convictions obtained in international, federal, and state courts. EOUSA only included federal convictions. Our review of a sample of cases investigated and classified by the FBI as terrorism-related, including U.S. Attorney Office (USAO) cases covered by the article, found documentation to support the terrorism-related classification for these cases. As for the accuracy and reliability of EOUSA's terrorism-related statistics included in its annual performance reports, we found that DOJ does not have sufficient management oversight and internal controls in place, as required by federal internal control standards, to ensure the accuracy and reliability of its terrorism-related conviction statistics. At least 132 of the 288 USAO cases (about 46 percent) were misclassified as resulting in terrorism-related convictions in fiscal year 2002. Without the implementation of adequate management oversight and internal controls to ensure accurate and reliable terrorism-related performance outcomes of the U.S. criminal justice system will be limited.