	Available Evidence Does Not Support Whether Behavioral Indicators Can Be Used to Identify Aviation Security Threats

In November 2013, we reported that (1) peer-reviewed, published  research we reviewed did not support whether nonverbal behavioral  indicators can be used to reliably identify deception, (2) methodological  issues limited the usefulness of DHS’s April 2011 SPOT validation study,  and (3) variation in referral rates raised questions about the use of  indicators. Published Research on Behavioral Indicators

In November 2013, we reported that our review of meta-analyses (studies  that analyze other studies and synthesize their findings) that included  findings from over 400 studies related to detecting deception conducted  over the past 60 years, other academic and government studies, and  interviews with experts in the field, called into question the use of  behavior observation techniques, that is, human observation unaided by  technology, as a means for reliably detecting deception. The meta- analyses we reviewed collectively found that the ability of human  observers to accurately identify deceptive behavior based on behavioral  cues or indicators is the same as or slightly better than chance (54  percent). We also reported on other studies that do not support the use  of behavioral indicators to identify mal-intent or threats to aviation. DHS’s Validation Study

Further, in November 2013, we found that DHS’s April 2011 validation  study does not demonstrate effectiveness of the SPOT behavioral  indicators because of methodological weaknesses. The validation study  found, among other things, that some SPOT indicators were predictive of  outcomes that represent high-risk passengers, and that SPOT  procedures, which rely on the SPOT behavioral indicators, were more  effective than a random selection protocol implemented by BDOs in  identifying outcomes that represent high-risk passengers. While the April  2011 SPOT validation study is a useful initial step and, in part, addressed  issues raised in our May 2010 report, methodological weaknesses limit its  usefulness. Specifically, as we reported in November 2013, these  weaknesses include, among other things, the use of potentially unreliable  data and issues related to one of the study’s outcome measures. Without the data needed to assess the effectiveness of behavior  detection activities or the SPOT program, we reported in November 2013  that TSA uses SPOT referral, LEO referral, and arrest statistics to help  track the program’s activities. As a result, the impact of  behavior detection activities on TSA’s overall security program is  unknown.
Why GAO Did This Study

This testimony discusses GAO's November 2013 report assessing the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Transportation Security Administration's (TSA) behavior detection activities, specifically the Screening of Passengers by Observation Technique (SPOT) program. The recent events at Los Angeles International Airport provide an unfortunate reminder of TSA's continued importance in providing security for the traveling public. TSA's behavior detection activities, in particular the SPOT program, are intended to identify high-risk passengers based on behavioral indicators that indicate mal-intent. In October 2003, TSA began testing the SPOT program, and by fiscal year 2012, about 3,000 behavior detection officers (BDO) had been deployed to 176 of the more than 450 TSA-regulated airports in the United States. TSA has expended a total of approximately $900 million on the program since it was fully deployed in 2007. This testimony highlights the key findings of GAO's November 8, 2013, report on TSA's behavior detection activities. Specifically, like the report, this statement will address (1) the extent to which available evidence supports the use of behavioral indicators to identify aviation security threats, and (2) whether TSA has data necessary to assess the effectiveness of the SPOT program in identifying threats to aviation security.

What GAO Found

In November 2013, GAO reported that (1) peer-reviewed, published research we reviewed did not support whether nonverbal behavioral indicators can be used to reliably identify deception, (2) methodological issues limited the usefulness of DHS's April 2011 SPOT validation study, and (3) variation in referral rates raised questions about the use of indicators. GAO reported that its review of meta-analyses (studies that analyze other studies and synthesize their findings) that included findings from over 400 studies related to detecting deception conducted over the past 60 years, other academic and government studies, and interviews with experts in the field, called into question the use of behavior observation techniques, that is, human observation unaided by technology, as a means for reliably detecting deception. The meta-analyses GAO reviewed collectively found that the ability of human observers to accurately identify deceptive behavior based on behavioral cues or indicators is the same as or slightly better than chance (54 percent). GAO also reported on other studies that do not support the use of behavioral indicators to identify mal-intent or threats to aviation.
GAO found that DHS's April 2011 validation study does not demonstrate effectiveness of the SPOT behavioral indicators because of methodological weaknesses. The validation study found, among other things, that some SPOT indicators were predictive of outcomes that represent high-risk passengers, and that SPOT procedures, which rely on the SPOT behavioral indicators, were more effective than a random selection protocol implemented by BDOs in identifying outcomes that represent high-risk passengers. While the April 2011 SPOT validation study is a useful initial step and, in part, addressed issues raised in GAO's May 2010 report, methodological weaknesses limit its usefulness. Specifically, as GAO reported in November 2013, these weaknesses include, among other things, the use of potentially unreliable data and issues related to one of the study's outcome measures.