Improvements in Networked Forces and the Use of Precision Weapons Central to Increased Combat Power

DOD officials cite improvements in networking the force and in the use of  precision weapons as primary reasons for the overwhelming combat  power demonstrated in recent operations. Network-centric operating  concepts, particularly in surveillance and command and control systems,  have created unprecedented battlefield situation awareness for  commanders and their forces, yet the full extent to which operations have  been affected is unclear. Technologies enhancing the use of precision- guided weapons have also provided military commanders with increased  flexibility and accuracy in bombing operations. Shared Situation Awareness Speeds Command and Control

DOD officials indicate that the improved ability to share a broad view of  the battlefield and communicate quickly with all elements of the force has  compressed the time required for analysis and decision making in  bombing operations, increasing lethality significantly. An official from DOD’s Office of Force  Transformation told us that the office is conducting a series of case  studies of operations in Afghanistan and Iraq and exercises at the National  Training Center and elsewhere to better understand these effects. Precision Weapons Provide Increased Flexibility

Precision weapons reduce limitations created by poor weather and  visibility, enable bombing operations from higher and safer altitudes, and  allow aircraft to be used in new ways. This analysis found that the percentage of attacks  resulting in damage or destruction to fixed targets increased by   12 percentage points from Kosovo to Afghanistan. However, four interrelated areas stood out as key barriers to  continued progress: (1) the lack of standardized, interoperable systems  and equipment; (2) DOD’s continuing difficulty in obtaining timely, high  quality assessments of the effects of bombing operations; (3) the absence  of a unified battlefield data collection system to provide standardized  measures and baseline data on the efficiency and effectiveness of bombing  operations; and (4) the lack of high quality, realistic training to help  personnel at all levels understand and adapt to changes in the operating  environment brought about by the move to a highly networked force using  advanced technologies. Notwithstanding these advances, the full impact of these changes is still  emerging and is not fully understood. Recommendations for Executive Action

To ensure continuing evolution of the capabilities demonstrated in recent  conflicts, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Joint  Staff, the Joint Forces Command and other unified commands, and the  military departments to take the following four actions:  identify the primary information required for bombing operations, such as  targeting and battle damage assessments, ensure that planned  interoperability enhancements provide the standardized definitions,  mission reporting formats, and other necessary instructions for this  information to be used by all unified commands during joint combat  operations, and determine whether this standardized information can  replace that used by the individual services;  formulate a plan to provide sufficient numbers of personnel trained in  battle damage assessment procedures when they are needed for combat  operations and include in the plan the following: incentives for personnel  to take the existing joint training on damage assessment, development of a  system to be used by the Joint Forces Command to track and mobilize  personnel who have received damage assessment training for use during  surge situations, and development of guidance on the appropriate use of  effects-based, probabilistic, and other nontraditional concepts in assessing  battle damages;    develop a unified battlefield information system that provides for the  identification and collection of data on key, standardized measures of  bombing operations needed to assess the basic efficiency and  effectiveness of such operations, for use by all unified commands; and    develop a joint operations training capability that provides commanders  and staffs with a realistic simulation of the increased pace of operations  and other emerging changes to the combat operating environment. We  conducted these discussions to gain a detailed understanding of the  results of our analyses and officials’ perspectives on the impact of the  changing strategy on operations in Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq and the  key barriers to continued progress in implementing the new strategy. U.S.
Why GAO Did This Study

Recent U.S. combat operations in Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq benefited from new Department of Defense (DOD) strategies and technologies, such as improvements in force networks and increased use of precision weapons, designed to address changes in the security environment resulting from the continuing terrorist threat and the advent of the information age. Based on the authority of the Comptroller General, GAO reviewed these conflicts, with a focus on bombing operations, to gain insight into the changes being implemented by DOD. This report focuses on (1) assessing the impact on operational effectiveness of improvements in force networks and in the use of precision weapons and (2) identifying key barriers to continued progress.

What GAO Found

Improvements in force networks and in the use of precision weapons are clearly primary reasons for the overwhelming combat power demonstrated in recent operations. However, the full extent to which operations have been speeded up or otherwise affected is unclear because DOD does not have detailed measures of these effects. Enhancements to networked operations, such as improved sensors and surveillance mechanisms, and more integrated command and control centers, have improved DOD's ability to share a broad view of the battlefield and communicate quickly with all elements of the force--reducing the time required for analysis and decision making in combat operations. However, recognizing that the full impact of these changes is unclear, DOD is conducting a series of case studies to better understand the effects of networked operations. Improvements in force networks have also been enhanced by the use of precision-guided weapons and associated technologies. These improvements not only provide commanders with greatly increased flexibility, such as the ability to conduct bombing operations in poor weather and from higher and safer altitudes, but also increase the accuracy of bombing operations. GAO's analysis found that the percentage of attacks resulting in damage or destruction to targets increased markedly between operations in Kosovo and those in Afghanistan. Notwithstanding these improvements, certain barriers inhibit continued progress in implementing the new strategy. Four interrelated areas stand out as key: (1) a lack of standardized, interoperable systems and equipment, which reduces effectiveness by requiring operations to be slowed to manually reconcile information from multiple systems and limiting access to needed capabilities among military services; (2) continuing difficulties in obtaining timely, high quality analyses of bombing damages, which can slow ground advances and negate other improvements in the speed of operations; (3) the absence of a unified battlefield information system to provide standardized measures and baseline data on bombing effectiveness, which creates confusion about the success of new tactics and technologies, about assumptions used in battlefield simulation programs, and about procurement decisions; and (4) the lack of high quality, realistic training to help personnel at all levels understand and adapt to the increased flow of information, more centralized management, and other changes in the operating environment brought about by the strategic changes.