	ICE Does Not Have a Process to Identify and Assess Risks Posed by Schools in SEVP

ICE has not developed and implemented a process to identify and  analyze program risks since assuming responsibility for SEVP in 2003,  making it difficult for ICE to determine the potential security and fraud  risks across the more than 10,000 SEVP-certified schools and to identify  actions that could help mitigate these risks. Furthermore, various  cases of school fraud have demonstrated vulnerabilities in the  management and oversight of SEVP-certified schools. We reported that  SEVP faces two primary challenges to identifying and assessing risks  posed by schools: (1) it does not evaluate program data on prior and  suspected instances of school fraud and noncompliance, and (2) it does  not obtain and assess information from CTCEU and ICE field office  school investigations and outreach events. For example, according to investigators in  one ICE field office, CTCEU was hampered in pursuing a criminal  investigation because SEVP officials did not obtain a signed attestation  statement within the I-17 application from a school official stating that the  official agreed to comply with rules and regulations. To address these issues, we recommended that ICE develop and  implement a process to identify and assess risks in SEVP, including  evaluating prior and suspected cases of school noncompliance and fraud  to identify potential trends, and obtaining and assessing information from  CTCEU and ICE field office investigative and outreach efforts. Weaknesses in ICE’s Monitoring and Oversight of SEVP- Certified Schools Contribute to Security and Fraud Vulnerabilities

ICE has not consistently implemented existing internal control procedures  for SEVP in four areas: (1) initial verification of evidence submitted in lieu  of accreditation, (2) recordkeeping to ensure schools’ continued eligibility,  (3) ongoing compliance monitoring of school licensing and accreditation  status, and (4) certification of schools offering flight training. In  addition, weaknesses in managing and sharing key information with  CTCEU impede SEVP’s prevention and detection of school fraud. The  following summarizes these key findings and recommendations we made  to address these issues. We recommended that ICE consistently  implement procedures for ensuring schools’ eligibility, including  consistently verifying “in lieu of” letters. We reported that  ICE had not consistently maintained certain evidence of selected schools’  eligibility for the program. The Border Security Act required recertification for  all SEVP-certified schools by May 2004 and every 2 years thereafter. ICE has not  consistently followed the standard operating procedures that govern the  communication and coordination process among SEVP, CTCEU, and ICE  field offices. Thus, we recommended that ICE revise its standard  operating procedure to specify which information to share among  stakeholders during criminal investigations. In addition, contact  points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may  be found on the last page of this statement. This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the  United States.
Why GAO Did This Study

This testimony discusses the findings from our June 2012 report assessing U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s (ICE) oversight of the Student and Exchange Visitor Program (SEVP). ICE, within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), is responsible for managing SEVP, including ensuring that foreign students studying in the United States comply with the terms of their admission into the country. ICE also certifies schools as authorized to accept foreign students in academic and vocational programs. As of January 2012, more than 850,000 active foreign students were enrolled at over 10,000 certified schools in the United States. In addition, ICE manages the Student and Exchange Visitor Information System (SEVIS), which assists the agency in tracking and monitoring certified schools, as well as approved students. We reported in April 2011 on the need for close monitoring and oversight of foreign students, and that some schools have attempted to exploit the immigration system by knowingly reporting that foreign students were fulfilling their visa requirements when they were not attending school or attending intermittently.
Schools interested in accepting foreign students on F and M visas must petition for SEVP certification by submitting a Form I-17 to ICE. Once this certification is achieved, schools issue Forms I-20 for students, which enable them to apply for nonimmigrant student status. The Border Security Act requires DHS to confirm, every 2 years, SEVP-certified schools’ continued eligibility and compliance with the program’s requirements. During the initial petition and recertification processes, a school must provide ICE with evidence of its legitimacy and its eligibility, such as designated school officials’ attestation statements that both the school and officials intend to comply with program rules and regulations.
This testimony summarizes the key findings of our report on ICE’s management of SEVP, which was publicly released last week. Like that report, this statement will address ICE’s efforts to (1) identify and assess risks in SEVP, and (2) develop and implement procedures to prevent and detect fraud during the initial certification process and once schools begin accepting foreign students.

What GAO Found

In summary, we reported that ICE does not have a process to identify and assess risks posed by schools in SEVP. Specifically, SEVP (1) does not evaluate program data on prior and suspected instances of school fraud and noncompliance, and (2) does not obtain and assess information from CTCEU and ICE field office school investigations and outreach events. Moreover, weaknesses in ICE’s monitoring and oversight of SEVP-certified schools contribute to security and fraud vulnerabilities. For example, ICE has not consistently implemented internal control procedures for SEVP in the initial verification of evidence submitted in lieu of accreditation. In addition, ICE has not consistently followed the standard operating procedures that govern the communication and coordination process among SEVP, CTCEU, and ICE field offices.
We recommended that ICE, among other things, identify and assess program risks; consistently implement procedures for ensuring schools’ eligibility; and, revise its standard operating procedure to specify which information to share among stakeholders during criminal investigations. ICE concurred with all the recommendations we made to address these challenges and has actions planned or under way to address them.