DOD relies on four active components—the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and  Air Force—and four reserve and two National Guard components—the  Army National Guard, Army Reserve, Navy Reserve, Marine Corps Reserve,  Air National Guard, and Air Force Reserve—to meet its mission. In order to meet  legislatively mandated authorized personnel levels, DOD must balance  accessions and losses. DOD’s Components Met Most Aggregate Recruiting and Retention Goals in the Past 6 Fiscal Years, but Recent Trends Prompt Concerns

While DOD’s active, reserve, and National Guard components met most of  their aggregate recruiting and retention goals in the past 6 fiscal years, they  faced greater recruiting difficulties in fiscal year 2005. DOD previously reported that over half of today’s youth between  the ages of 16 and 21 are not qualified to serve in the military because they  fail to meet the military’s entry standards. Delayed Entry Program

All of the active components are experiencing shrinking numbers of new  recruits in their delayed entry programs. Components Have Exceeded Authorized Personnel Levels for Some Occupational Specialties and Experienced Shortages in Others

All components exceeded authorized personnel levels for some  occupational specialties and did not meet others. First, what is the cost to the taxpayer to retain thousands  more personnel than necessary in consistently overfilled occupational  specialties? Second, how can DOD components continue to effectively  execute their mission with consistently underfilled occupational  specialties? However, because DOD lacks information from the  components on all over- and underfilled occupational specialties, including  reasons why these occupational specialties are over- and underfilled, it  cannot address these questions and develop a plan to assist the  components in addressing the root causes of its recruiting and retention  challenges. Certain Occupational Specialties Have Been Consistently Over- or Underfilled Compared to Their Authorized Personnel Levels

Of nearly 1,500 enlisted occupational specialties across DOD, about 19  percent were consistently overfilled and about 41 percent were  consistently underfilled from fiscal years 2000 through 2005, as shown in  figure 2. At the  same time, DOD was not able to fill over 112,000 positions in consistently  underfilled occupational specialties. We believe that consistently over- and underfilled occupational specialties  are a systemic problem for DOD that raises questions about the validity of  occupational specialty authorizations. Components Provide Limited Justifications to DOD on Financial Incentives Given to Servicemembers in Overfilled Occupational Specialties

Although we found that the components regularly offered financial  incentives to servicemembers in consistently underfilled occupational  specialties, we also found that each of the active duty components  provided enlistment bonuses, selective reenlistment bonuses, or both to  servicemembers in consistently overfilled occupational specialties. By  not requiring the components to fully justify their rationale for providing  incentives to servicemembers in the consistently over- and underfilled  occupational specialties, OUSD lacks the information needed to provide  assurance to the Secretary of Defense and Congress that the amount of  funding spent on recruiting and retention efforts is appropriately and  effectively targeted to occupational specialties for which the components  have the greatest need. While there  may be valid reasons for providing these incentives to some  servicemembers in these occupational specialities, DOD does not require  the components to fully justify their decisions on financial incentives,  which restricts the department’s ability to provide assurance to the  Secretary of Defense, Congress, and the taxpayer that the increasing  funding spent on recruiting and retention is appropriately and effectively  targeted to occupational specialties for which components have the  greatest need. Recommendations for Executive Action

To provide greater understanding of the recruiting and retention issues and  improve the department’s oversight for these issues, we recommend that  the Secretary of Defense direct the Under Secretary of Defense for  Personnel and Readiness, in concert with the Assistant Secretary of  Defense for Reserve Affairs, to take the following two actions:  Require the 10 components to  report annually on all (not just critical) over- and underfilled  occupational specialties,  provide an analysis of why occupational specialties are over- and   report annually on and justify their use of enlistment and  reenlistment bonuses provided to servicemembers in occupational  specialties that exceed their authorized personnel levels. In prior work, we determined that it costs the  federal government about $103,000 annually, on average, to compensate  each enlisted active duty servicemember in fiscal year 2004; thus we  believe each individual serving in an occupational specialty that is over the  authorized personnel level represents a significant cost to the government. To determine the extent to which the active duty, reserve, and National  Guard components met their aggregate recruiting and retention goals, we  compared accession and reenlistment goals to their actual figures for fiscal  years 2000 through 2005.
Why GAO Did This Study

The Department of Defense (DOD) must recruit and retain hundreds of thousands of servicemembers each year to carry out its missions, including providing support in connection with events such as Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. In addition to meeting legislatively mandated aggregate personnel levels, each military component must also meet its authorized personnel requirements for each occupational specialty. DOD reports that over half of today's youth cannot meet the military's entry standards for education, aptitude, health, moral character, or other requirements, making recruiting a significant challenge. GAO, under the Comptroller General's authority (1) assessed the extent to which DOD's active, reserve, and National Guard components met their enlisted aggregate recruiting and retention goals; (2) assessed the extent to which the components met their authorized personnel levels for enlisted occupational specialties; and (3) analyzed the steps DOD has taken to address recruiting and retention challenges.

What GAO Found

DOD's active, reserve, and National Guard components met most aggregate recruiting and retention goals for enlisted personnel from fiscal years (FY) 2000-2004. However, for FY 2005, 5 of 10 components--the Army, Army Reserve, Army National Guard, Air National Guard, and Navy Reserve--missed their recruiting goals by 8 to 20 percent. Most of the components met their aggregate retention goals for FY 2000-2004, but the Navy experienced shortages in FY 2005 of up to 8 percent. Also, factors such as the shrinking numbers of new recruits in delayed entry programs and the use of stop loss, which delays servicemembers from leaving active duty, indicate that the components may experience future recruiting challenges. All components exceeded authorized personnel levels for some occupational specialties and did not meet others. Specifically, GAO found that 19 percent of DOD's 1,484 occupational specialties were consistently overfilled and 41 percent were consistently underfilled from FY 2000-2005. While the components offered reasons why occupational specialties may be over- or underfilled, GAO believes that consistently over- and underfilled occupational specialties are a systemic problem for DOD that raises two critical questions. First, what is the cost to the taxpayer to retain thousands more personnel than necessary in consistently overfilled occupational specialties? Second, how can DOD components continue to effectively execute their mission with consistently underfilled occupational specialties? In FY 2005, almost 31,000 more servicemembers than authorized served in occupational specialties that have been consistently overfilled. GAO determined that it costs the federal government about $103,000 annually, on average, to compensate each enlisted active duty servicemember in FY 2004. In contrast, DOD was unable to fill over 112,000 positions in consistently underfilled occupational specialties, raising concerns about the validity of the authorized personnel levels. DOD requires the active components to report on critical occupational specialties for recruiting and retention, which amounts to at most 16 percent of their 625 specialties. However, DOD does not require them to report on their noncritical occupational specialties, and does not require the reserve or National Guard components to report on any of their 859 specialties. Consequently, DOD does not have the necessary information to develop an effective plan to address the root causes of the components' recruiting and retention challenges. DOD has taken steps to enhance recruiting and retention, but lacks information on financial incentives provided for certain occupational specialties. GAO found that the components offered financial incentives to servicemembers in consistently overfilled occupational specialties. However, because DOD only requires the components to provide minimal justification for their use of financial incentives, it lacks the information needed to provide assurance to the Secretary of Defense, Congress, and the taxpayer that the increasing amount of funding spent on recruiting and retention is appropriately and effectively targeted to occupational specialties for which the components have the greatest need.