In peacetime—when a reservist is training or  performing military duty not related to a contingency operation—certain  thresholds are imposed at particular points in service before a reservist is  eligible to receive the same compensation as a member of the active  component. Basic military compensation, in constant dollars, remained fairly  steady during the 1990s but has increased in recent years. For example, an enlisted member in pay grade E-4 who is married with  no other dependents (family size 2) earned $3,156 per month in basic  military compensation in fiscal year 2003, compared with $2,656 per month  in fiscal year 1999, or a 19 percent increase. In addition to increases in basic military compensation, other pay policies  and protections may help to mitigate reservists’ financial hardship during  deployment. We found that DOD lacked sufficient information on the  magnitude, the causes, and the effects of income change to determine the  need for compensation programs targeting reservists who meet three  criteria: (1) fill critical wartime specialties, (2) experience high degrees of  income loss when on extended periods of active duty, and (3) demonstrate  that income loss is a significant factor in their retention decisions. This survey was conducted before the  mobilizations occurring after September 11, 2001. DOD has tabulated the survey results and expects to issue a report with its  analysis of the results by July 2004. Notable improvements have  been made to the health care benefits for reservists and their families. As we have previously reported, given the federal government’s growing  deficits, it is critical that the Congress give adequate consideration to the  longer term costs and implications of legislative proposals to further  enhance military pay and benefits before they are enacted into law. For  example, proposals to enhance reserve retirement should be considered in  this context. Selective Reenlistment Bonus Program

While we have not specifically reviewed the use of reenlistment bonuses  for reservists, our work has shown that DOD could improve the  management and oversight of the SRB program with more  methodologically rigorous evaluations. The SRB program is intended to  help the services retain enlisted personnel in critical occupational  specialties, such as linguists and information technology specialists. Concerned about missing their overall retention goals in the late 1990s, all  the services expanded their use of SRBs to help retain more active duty  enlisted personnel. As a result of the services’  expanded use of SRBs for active duty personnel, the cost of the program  more than doubled—from $308 million in fiscal year 1997 to $791 million  in fiscal year 2002. Despite increased use of the SRB program, DOD has  cited continued retention problems in specialized occupations such as air  traffic controller, linguist, and information technology specialist. On the basis of our work, we recommended that the Secretary of Defense  direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness to  (1) retain the requirement for an annual review of the SRB program and  (2) develop a consistent set of methodologically sound procedures and  metrics for reviewing the effectiveness and efficiency of all aspects of  each service’s SRB program administration. DOD concurred with the  recommendations but has not yet taken actions to address them. Mail Delivery

Mail can be a morale booster for troops fighting overseas and for their  families at home. In the report, we will assess (1) the timeliness of  mail delivery to troops stationed in the Gulf Region, (2) how mail delivery  issues and problems experienced during Operation Iraqi Freedom  compare to those during Operations Desert Shield/Storm, and (3) efforts  to identify actions to resolve problems for future contingencies. Timeliness

The timeliness of the mail delivery to troops serving in Operation Iraqi  Freedom cannot be accurately determined because DOD does not have a  reliable, accurate system in place to measure timeliness. Even though the data shows otherwise,  military postal officials acknowledge that mail delivery to troops serving in  Operation Iraqi Freedom was not timely. Comparison With Operations Desert Shield/Storm

Despite differences in operational theaters and an effort by postal planners  to incorporate Operations Desert Shield/Storm experiences into the  planning for Operation Iraqi Freedom, many of the same problems were  encountered. Efforts to Resolve Postal Problems

No single entity has been officially tasked to resolve the long-standing  postal problems seen again during Operation Iraqi Freedom.
Why GAO Did This Study

Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the U.S. military has deployed high numbers of active duty and reserve troops to fight the global war on terrorism and for Operation Iraqi Freedom. Ensuring that U.S. military forces are adequately compensated and that the morale of deployed troops remains high have been priorities for the Congress and the Department of Defense (DOD). In response to congressional mandates, GAO has reviewed a number of issues concerning military personnel. For this hearing, GAO was asked to provide the results of its work on military compensation for National Guard and Reserve personnel and on the Selective Reenlistment Bonus (SRB) program, a tool DOD can use to enhance retention of military personnel in critical occupational specialties. In addition, GAO was asked to provide its preliminary views, based on ongoing work, concerning mail delivery to troops stationed in the Middle East.

What GAO Found

Reservists who are called to active duty to support a contingency operation are eligible to receive the same pay and benefits as members of the active component. Moreover, in constant dollars, basic military compensation has increased in recent years. For instance, an enlisted reservist in pay grade E-4 who is married with no other dependents and who is called to active duty experienced a 19 percent increase in basic military compensation between fiscal years 1999 and 2003. Despite these increases, income loss is a concern to many reservists, although DOD has lacked timely, sufficient information to assess the full scope and nature of this problem. Benefits for reserve personnel have also improved, notably in the area of health care. As GAO has previously reported, given the federal government's growing deficits, it is critical that the Congress give adequate consideration to the longer term costs and implications of legislative proposals to further enhance military pay and benefits before they are enacted into law. For example, proposals to enhance reserve retirement should be considered in this context. Although GAO has not specifically reviewed the use of SRBs to enhance reserve retention, GAO has noted shortcomings in DOD's management and oversight of the SRB program for active duty personnel. GAO's observations of this program may be helpful in making decisions for the use of SRBs for reservists. Concerned about missing their overall retention goals in the late 1990s, all the services expanded their use of SRBs to help retain more active duty enlisted personnel in a broader range of military specialties, even though the program was intended to help the services meet retention problems in selected critical specialties. As a result, the cost of the program more than doubled in just 5 years--from $308 million in fiscal year 1997 to $791 million in fiscal year 2002. However, the effectiveness and efficiency of SRBs in targeting bonuses to improve retention in selected critical occupations is unknown. DOD has not conducted a rigorous review of the SRB program. DOD concurred with GAO's recommendations to institute more effective controls to assess the progress of the SRB program, but has not taken action as yet. Mail can be a morale booster for troops fighting overseas and for their families at home. GAO has been reviewing mail delivery to deployed troops and expects to issue a report soon. GAO's preliminary findings show that mail delivery continues to be hampered by many of the same problems encountered during the first Gulf War. First, DOD does not have a reliable accurate system in place to measure timeliness. Second, despite differences in operational theaters and efforts by DOD postal planners to incorporate lessons learned into planning for Operation Iraqi Freedom, postal operations faced many of the same problems, such as inadequate postal facilities, equipment, and transportation. Third, DOD has not officially tasked any entity to resolve the long-standing postal problems experienced during contingency operations. GAO plans to make several recommendations to improve DOD's mail delivery to deployed troops.