	Background

		FMD Is a Highly Contagious Animal Disease

FMD is a highly contagious animal disease. Plum Island Animal Disease Center

Plum Island is a federally owned 840-acre island off the northeastern tip of  Long Island, New York. The North  American Foot-and-Mouth Disease Vaccine Bank is also located on Plum  Island. Evidence That FMD Work Can Be Conducted Safely on the U.S. Mainland Is Lacking

We found that DHS has neither conducted nor commissioned any study to  determine whether FMD work can be done safely on the U.S. mainland. In particular, the study  1.  did not assess the history of releases of FMD virus or other dangerous  2.  did not address in detail the issues related to large animal work in BSL- 3 Ag facilities, and  3.  was inaccurate in comparing other countries’ FMD work experience  with that of the United States. Consequently, we believe DHS  does not have evidence to conclude that FMD work can be done safely on  the U.S. mainland. The proposed U.S. sites are potentially more  likely to pose a risk, given their closer proximity to susceptible animal  populations. The 2002 study used the U.K. Pirbright facility as an example of a  precedent for allowing FMD work on the mainland. This fact  highlights the risks of release from a laboratory that is in close proximity  to susceptible animals and provides the best evidence in favor of an island  location. Given That Releases Can Occur from Any Biocontainment Facility, an Island Location Can Provide Additional Protection

While location confers no advantage in preventing a release, location can  help prevent the spread of FMD virus and a resulting disease outbreak, if  there is a release. This was because of the facility’s island location. The Economic Consequences of an FMD Outbreak in the United States Could Be Significant

While humans cannot become infected with FMD through contact with  infected animals or through eating products of diseased animals, still, FMD  can have economic consequences, as recent outbreaks in the United  Kingdom have demonstrated. Although estimates vary, experts agree that  the economic consequences of an FMD outbreak on the U.S. mainland  could be significant, especially for red meat producers whose animals  would be at risk for diseases, depending on how and where such an  outbreak occurred. The economic effects of an FMD outbreak would depend on the  characteristics of the outbreak and how producers, consumers, and the  government responded to it. Given the non-zero risk of a release  from any biocontainment facility, most of the experts we spoke with told  us that an island location can provide additional protection. Instead, in proposing to move FMD virus  to the mainland, DHS relied on a 2002 USDA study that addressed a  different question. That study does not clearly support the conclusion that  FMD work can be done safely on the mainland. An island location can help prevent the spread of FMD virus along  terrestrial routes, such as by vehicles splashed with contaminated mud,  and may also reduce airborne transmission. Historically, the United States  and other countries as well have seen the benefit of an island location,  with its combination of remoteness from susceptible species and a  permanent water barrier. Although FMD has no human-health implications, recent outbreaks in the  United Kingdom have demonstrated its economic consequences. Estimates for the United States vary but would depend on the  characteristics of the outbreak and how producers, consumers, and the  government responded to it.
Why GAO Did This Study

DHS is proposing to move foot-and mouth disease (FMD) research from its current location at the Plum Island Animal Disease Center--located on a federally owned island off the northern tip of Long Island, New York--and potentially onto the United States mainland. FMD is the most highly infectious animal disease that is known. Nearly 100 percent of exposed animals become infected. A single outbreak of FMD on the U.S. mainland could have significant economic consequences. Concerns have been raised about moving FMD research off its island location and onto the U.S. mainland--where it would be in closer proximity to susceptible animal populations--as opposed to building a new facility on the island. GAO was asked to evaluate the evidence DHS used to support its decision that FMD work can be done safely on the U.S. mainland, whether an island location provides any additional protection over and above that provided by modern high containment laboratories on the mainland, and the economic consequences of an FMD outbreak on the U.S. mainland. In preparing this testimony, GAO interviewed officials from DHS and USDA, talked with experts in FMD and high-containment laboratories worldwide, and reviewed studies on FMD, high-containment laboratories, and the economic consequences of FMD outbreaks. GAO also visited the Plum Island Animal Disease Center and other animal biocontainment laboratories in other countries.

What GAO Found

GAO found that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)has neither conducted nor commissioned any study to determine whether work on foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) can be done safely on the U.S. mainland. Instead, in deciding that work with FMD can be done safely on the mainland, DHS relied on a 2002 U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) study that addressed a different question. The study did not assess the past history of releases of FMD virus or other dangerous pathogens in the United States or elsewhere. It did not address in detail the issues of containment related to large animal work in BSL-3 Ag facilities. It was inaccurate in comparing other countries' FMD work experience with that of the United States. Therefore, GAO believes DHS does not have evidence to conclude that FMD work can be done safely on the U.S. mainland. While location, in general, confers no advantage in preventing a release, location can help prevent the spread of pathogens and, thus, a resulting disease outbreak if there is a release. Given that there is always some risk of a release from any biocontainment facility, most experts GAO spoke with said that an island location can provide additional protection. An island location can help prevent the spread of FMD virus along terrestrial routes, such as from vehicles splashed with contaminated mud, and may also reduce airborne transmission. Some other countries besides the United States have historically seen the benefit of an island location, with its remoteness from susceptible species and permanent water barriers. A recent release from the Pirbright facility--located in a farming community on the mainland of the United Kingdom--highlights the risks of a release from a laboratory that is in close proximity to the susceptible animals and provides the best evidence in favor of an island location. FMD has no health implications for humans, but it can have significant economic consequences, as recent outbreaks in the United Kingdom have demonstrated. The economic effects of an FMD outbreak in the United States, however, would depend on the characteristics of the outbreak and how producers, consumers, and the government responded to it. Although estimates vary, experts agree that the economic consequences of an FMD outbreak on the U.S. mainland could be significant, especially for red meat producers whose animals would be at risk for diseases, depending on how and where such an outbreak occurred.