Nonmilitary assistance efforts are implemented by USAID, Justice, and,  State, which oversee a diverse range of social, economic, and justice  initiatives. In January 2007, the government of Colombia announced a 6-year follow- on strategy, the PCCP. Colombia’s security climate has improved as  a result of progress in a number of areas, but U.S. and Colombian officials  cautioned that current programs must be maintained for several years  before security gains can be considered irreversible. Drug Reduction Goal Was Not Fully Achieved

From 2000 to 2006, estimated opium poppy cultivation and heroin  production declined about 50 percent, but coca cultivation and cocaine  production increased over the period. To put Colombia’s 6-year drug  reduction goal in perspective, we note that although U.S. funding for Plan  Colombia was approved in July 2000, many U.S.-supported programs to  increase the Colombian military and police capacity to eradicate drug  crops and disrupt the production and distribution of heroin and cocaine  did not become operational until 2001 and later. 8 through 10)  reported by the government of Colombia. U.S. Assistance Promotes Colombian Military and Police Counternarcotics and Security Objectives

State and Defense provided nearly $4.9 billion from fiscal years 2000 to  2008 to the Colombian military and police to support Plan Colombia’s  counternarcotics and security objectives (see table 2). This support has led to a range of accomplishments since 2000 including  increasing the cost of doing business for both coca farmers and drug  traffickers by eradicating illicit drug crops and seizing finished product;  destroying hydrochloride laboratories; demobilizing, capturing, and killing  thousands of combatants; and the capture or killing of several high-profile  leaders of FARC and other illegal armed groups. Army Ground Forces

Since fiscal year 2000, State and Defense have provided over $104 million  to advise, train, and equip Colombian ground forces, which grew by almost   50 percent during this period. U.S. funded counternarcotics efforts, which focused on aerial spraying, did  not achieve Plan Colombia’s overarching goal of reducing the cultivation,  production, and distribution of cocaine by 50 percent, in part because coca  farmers responded with a series of effective countermeasures. U.S. Nonmilitary Assistance Promotes Social and Economic Progress and the Rule of Law, but Is Not Directly Linked to Reductions in Drug Production

Since fiscal year 2000, the United States has provided nearly $1.3 billion  for nonmilitary assistance to Colombia, focusing on the promotion of (1)  economic and social progress and (2) the rule of law, including judicial  reform. To support social and economic progress, the largest share of U.S.  nonmilitary assistance has gone toward alternative development, which  has been a key element of U.S. counternarcotics assistance and has  bettered the lives of hundreds of thousands of Colombians. Other social  programs have assisted thousands of internally displaced persons (IDPs)  and more than 30,000 former combatants. For  example, the geographic areas where alternative development programs  operate are limited by security concerns, and programs have not  demonstrated a clear link to reductions in illicit drug cultivation and  production. In response to this guidance and budget cuts to fiscal year 2008 military  assistance to Colombia instituted by Congress, State and Defense have  accelerated efforts to nationalize or partly nationalize the five major  Colombian military and National Police aviation programs supported by  the United States. Specifically, we examined (1) the progress  made toward Plan Colombia’s drug reduction and enhanced security  objectives; (2) program support provided to the Colombian military and  National Police, including specific results and related challenges; (3)  nonmilitary program support provided to Colombia, including specific  results and related challenges; and (4) the status of U.S. and Colombian  efforts to nationalize U.S. assistance and the challenges, if any, these  efforts face. At the U.S. Embassy in Bogotá, Colombia, we met with U.S.  officials with the Narcotics Affairs Section, the U.S. Military Group, and  the Drug Enforcement Administration, as well as U.S.-funded contractor  representatives assisting with the Colombian Army Aviation Brigade, the  National Police Air Service, and the police aerial eradication program. However, the fact  that the majority of coca is cultivated outside of USAID’s economic  corridors poses challenges for USAID’s strategic goal of reducing the  production of illegal drugs. 4. 6. State Department: State Has Initiated a More Systematic Approach for  Managing Its Aviation Fleet.
Why GAO Did This Study

In September 1999, the government of Colombia announced a strategy, known as "Plan Colombia," to (1) reduce the production of illicit drugs (primarily cocaine) by 50 percent in 6 years and (2) improve security in Colombia by re-claiming control of areas held by illegal armed groups. Since fiscal year 2000, the United States has provided over $6 billion to support Plan Colombia. The Departments of State, Defense, and Justice and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) manage the assistance. GAO examined (1) the progress made toward Plan Colombia's drug reduction and enhanced security objectives, (2) the results of U.S. aid for the military and police, (3) the results of U.S. aid for non-military programs, and (4) the status of efforts to "nationalize" or transfer operations and funding responsibilities for U.S.-supported programs to Colombia.

What GAO Found

Plan Colombia's goal of reducing the cultivation, processing, and distribution of illegal narcotics by 50 percent in 6 years was not fully achieved. From 2000 to 2006, opium poppy cultivation and heroin production declined about 50 percent, while coca cultivation and cocaine production levels increased by about 15 and 4 percent, respectively. These increases, in part, can be explained by measures taken by coca farmers to counter U.S. and Colombian eradication efforts. Colombia has improved its security climate through systematic military and police engagements with illegal armed groups and by degrading these groups' finances. U.S. Embassy Bogot? officials cautioned that these security gains will not be irreversible until illegal armed groups can no longer threaten the stability of the government of Colombia, but become a law enforcement problem requiring only police attention. Since fiscal year 2000, State and Defense provided nearly $4.9 billion to the Colombian military and National Police. Notably, over 130 U.S.-funded helicopters have provided the air mobility needed to rapidly move Colombian counternarcotics and counterinsurgency forces. U.S. advisors, training, equipment, and intelligence assistance have also helped professionalize Colombia's military and police forces, which have recorded a number of achievements including the aerial and manual eradication of hundreds of thousands of hectares of coca, the seizure of tons of cocaine, and the capture or killing of a number of illegal armed group leaders and thousands of combatants. However, these efforts face several challenges, including countermeasures taken by coca farmers to combat U.S. and Colombian eradication efforts. Since fiscal year 2000, State, Justice, and USAID have provided nearly $1.3 billion for a wide range of social, economic, and justice sector programs. These programs have had a range of accomplishments, including aiding internally displaced persons and reforming Colombia's justice sector. But some efforts have been slow in achieving their objectives while others are difficult to assess. For example, the largest share of U.S. non-military assistance has gone towards alternative development, which has provided hundreds of thousands of Colombians legal economic alternatives to the illicit drug trade. But, alternative development is not provided in most areas where coca is cultivated and USAID does not assess how such programs relate to its strategic goals of reducing the production of illicit drugs or achieving sustainable results. In response to congressional direction in 2005 and budget cuts in fiscal year 2008, State and the other U.S. departments and agencies have accelerated their nationalization efforts, with State focusing on Colombian military and National Police aviation programs. One aviation program has been nationalized and two are in transition, with the largest--the Army Aviation Brigade--slated for turnover by 2012. Two National Police aviation programs have no turnover dates established. State, Defense, Justice, and USAID each have their own approaches to nationalization, with different timelines and objectives that have not been coordinated to promote potential efficiencies.