	Introduction

This report presents background information and potential issues for Congress on the question of whether to increase the Navy's force-level goal (i.e., the planned size of the Navy) to something more than the current goal of 308 ships. The Navy is currently conducting a new FSA, and some observers anticipate that this FSA will lead to a new Navy force-level goal for a fleet of more than 308 ships, although not necessarily 350 ships. The Navy's actual size in recent years has generally been in the range of 270 to 290 ships. Those who advocate increasing the planned size of the Navy to something more than 308 ships generally point to China's naval modernization effort; resurgent Russian naval activity, particularly in the Mediterranean Sea and the North Atlantic Ocean; and challenges that the Navy has sometimes faced, given the current total number of ships in the Navy, in meeting requests from the various regional U.S. military commanders for day-to-day in-region presence of forward-deployed Navy ships. A key potential reason for increasing the planned size of the Navy to something more than 308 ships would be to reestablish a larger U.S. Navy forward-deployed presence in the European theater, and particularly the Mediterranean, so as to respond to resurgent Russian naval activity in that area and increase U.S. capacity for responding to events in North Africa and the Middle East. The figure of 350 ships is by no means the only possibility for a Navy of more than 308 ships; fleets of more than 350 ships, or of fewer than 350 ships (but still more than 308), are also possible. In addition to proposals for a fleet of about 350 ships (or some other number higher than 308), there have also been proposals in recent years from other observers for fleets of less than 308 ships. Table 2 below presents a notional force structure for a Navy of about 350 ships. (It happens to total 349 ships.) The 349-ship fleet shown in Table 2 may be of value as one possible point of departure for discussing Navy force structure plans for fleets of more than 308 ships, and for understanding how proposals for future fleets of about 350 ships might depart from a proportional scaling up of the current 308-ship force-structure goal. Many combinations of about 350 ships other than the notional one shown in Table 2 are possible. As shown in the table, although the notional fleet of 349 ships includes 41 more ships than the current 308-ship force-structure goal, achieving this notional 349-ship fleet might require adding a total of 45 to 58 ships to the Navy's 30-year shipbuilding plan, or an average of about 1.5 to 1.9 additional ships per year over the 30-year period. Given current constraints on defense spending under the Budget Control Act of 2011 ( S. 365 / P.L. 112-25 of August 2, 2011) as amended, as well as the Navy's current share of the defense budget, the Navy faces challenges in achieving its currently planned 308-ship fleet, let alone a fleet of more than 308 ships. Using current procurement costs for Navy ships, procuring the additional 45 to 58 ships shown in Table 3 might require an average of roughly $3.5 billion to $4.0 billion per year in additional shipbuilding funding over the 30-year period. If current constraints on defense spending are not lifted or relaxed, achieving and maintaining a fleet of more than 308 ships could require reducing funding for other defense programs. Forward homeporting additional Navy ships in the Mediterranean could substantially reduce the number of additional ships the Navy would need to support a larger forward-deployed presence there. Although it can substantially reduce the number of ships needed to support a given level of forward-deployed presence, forward homeporting does not substantially change the number of ships needed for warfighting.
Current Navy plans call for achieving and maintaining a fleet of 308 ships of certain types and numbers. Some observers have advocated increasing the Navy's force-level goal to about 350 ships. The Navy is currently conducting a force structure assessment (FSA), and some observers anticipate that this FSA will lead to a new Navy force-level goal of more than 308 ships, although not necessarily 350 ships. The Navy's actual size in recent years has generally been in the range of 270 to 290 ships.
Those who advocate increasing the planned size of the Navy to something more than 308 ships generally point to China's naval modernization effort, resurgent Russian naval activity, and challenges that the Navy has sometimes faced in meeting requests from the various regional U.S. military commanders for day-to-day, in-region presence of forward-deployed Navy ships.
The figure of 350 ships is by no means the only possibility for a Navy of more than 308 ships; fleets of more than 350 ships, or of fewer than 350 ships (but still more than 308), are also possible. There have also been proposals in recent years from other observers for fleets of less than 308 ships.
For purposes of illustration, this CRS report presents a notional force structure for a Navy of about 350 ships. (It happens to total 349 ships.) This notional 349-ship fleet may be of value as one possible point of departure for discussing Navy force structure plans for fleets of more than 308 ships, and for understanding how proposals for future fleets of about 350 ships might depart from a proportional scaling up of the current 308-ship force-structure goal. Many combinations of about 350 ships other than the notional 349-ship force structure are possible.
Achieving and maintaining the notional 349-ship force structure might require adding a total of 45 to 58 ships to the Navy's FY2017 30-year shipbuilding plan, or an average of about 1.5 to 1.9 additional ships per year over the 30-year period. Using current procurement costs for Navy ships, procuring these additional 45 to 58 ships might require an average of roughly $3.5 billion to $4.0 billion per year in additional shipbuilding funding over the 30-year period.
Given current constraints on defense spending under the Budget Control Act of 2011 (S. 365/P.L. 112-25 of August 2, 2011) as amended, as well as the Navy's current share of the defense budget, the Navy faces challenges in achieving its currently planned 308-ship fleet, let alone a fleet of more than 308 ships. If current constraints on defense spending are not lifted or relaxed, achieving and maintaining a fleet of more than 308 ships could require reducing funding for other defense programs.
A key potential reason for increasing the planned size of the Navy to something more than 308 ships would be to reestablish a larger U.S. Navy forward-deployed presence in the European theater, and particularly the Mediterranean. Forward homeporting additional Navy ships in the Mediterranean could substantially reduce the number of additional ships that the Navy would need to support a larger forward-deployed presence there. Forward homeporting, however, does not substantially change the number of ships needed for warfighting, and it poses certain challenges, costs, and risks.
The question of whether to increase the planned size of the Navy to something more than 308 ships poses a number of potential oversight issues for Congress concerning factors such as
mission needs; the potential impacts on future required Navy force levels of unmanned vehicles, potential new fleet architectures, expanded use of forward homeporting, and contributions from allies and partner states; the potential costs of achieving and maintaining a fleet of more than 308 ships; and the potential impact of those costs on funding available for other defense programs.