Some protections are available in statutes passed in recent years, including the IntelligenceCommunity Whistleblower Protection Act of 1998. Members of Congress regularly express a need toobtain information from employees within the agency, without seeking the approval of the agencyhead. (49) 
The IG statute provided that nothing in the section "shall be construed to authorize the publicdisclosure of information which is (A) specifically prohibited from disclosure by any other provisionof law; (B) specifically required by Executive order to be protected from disclosure in the interestof national defense or national security or in the conduct of foreign affairs; or (C) a part of anongoing criminal investigation." This type of agency defense had been developedby the Supreme Court in Mt. (112) 
In the Whistleblower Protection Act (WPA) of 1989, Congress found that federal employeeswho make protected disclosures "serve the public interest by assisting in the elimination of fraud,waste, abuse, and unnecessary Government expenditures." (114) The WPA incorporates the exemptions for national securityinformation included in the 1978 statute. Agency heads would not have theauthority to block disclosures by agency employees to Congress. The statutory language lists six findings: "(1) national security is a shared responsibilityrequiring joint efforts and mutual respect by Congress and the President; (2) the principles of comitybetween the branches of Government apply to the handling of national security information; (3)Congress, as a co-equal branch of Government, is empowered by the Constitution to serve as a checkon the executive branch; in that capacity, it has a "need to know" of allegations of wrongdoing withinthe executive branch, including allegations of wrongdoing in the Intelligence Community; (4) nobasis in law exists for requiring prior authorization of disclosures to the intelligence committees ofCongress by employees of the executive branch of classified information about wrongdoing withinthe Intelligence Community; (5) the risk of reprisal perceived by employees and contractors of theIntelligence Community for reporting serious or flagrant problems to Congress may have impairedthe flow of information needed by the intelligence committees to carry out oversight responsibilities;and (6) to encourage such reporting, an additional procedure should be established that provides ameans for such employees and contractors to report to Congress while safeguarding the classifiedinformation involved in such reporting." Conclusions

To perform its legislative and constitutional functions, Congress depends on information(domestic and national security) available from the executive branch. Balancing this legislative need for information with the protection of sensitive nationalsecurity information remains a continuing policy issue. Agency heads provide Congress with information,but some Members of Congress have also expressed a need to receive information directly fromrank-and-file employees within an agency. Whistleblowers have helped uncover agencywrongdoing, illegalities, waste, and corruption. The interest of Congress in maintaining an openchannel with agency employees is demonstrated through such statutes as Lloyd-LaFollette, theappropriations riders on the nondisclosure policy, the Military Whistleblower Protection Act, andthe Intelligence Community Whistleblower Act. Initially it was known as the Project on Military Procurement.
To discharge its constitutional duties, Congress depends on information obtained from theexecutive branch. Domestic and national security information is provided through agency reportsand direct communications from department heads, but lawmakers also receive information directlyfrom employees within the agencies. They take the initiative in notifying Congress, its committees,and Members of Congress about alleged agency illegalities, corruption, and waste within the agency. This type of information comes from a group known as whistleblowers.
Through such techniques as "gag orders" and nondisclosure agreements, Presidents haveattempted to block agency employees from coming directly to Congress. In response, Congress hasenacted legislation in an effort to assure the uninterrupted flow of domestic and national securityinformation to lawmakers and their staffs. Members of Congress have made it clear they do not wantto depend solely on information provided by agency heads. Overall, the issue has been how toprotect employees who are willing to alert Congress about agency wrongdoing.
The first procedures enacted to protect agency whistleblowers appeared in the Civil ServiceReform of 1978. It also contained language that excluded protections to whistleblowers who workin federal agencies involved in intelligence and counterintelligence. In 1989, Congress passed theWhistleblower Protection Act in an effort to strengthen statutory protections for federal employeeswho assist in the elimination of fraud, waste, abuse, illegality, and corruption. That statute continuedthe exemption for national security information. It did not authorize the disclosure of anyinformation by an agency or any person that is (1) specifically prohibited from disclosure by anyother provision of law, or (2) "specifically required by Executive order to be kept secret in theinterest of national defense or the conduct of foreign affairs."
Several statutes apply expressly to national security information. Congress has passed aseries of laws known collectively as the Military Whistleblowers Protection Act, under whichmembers of the military may give information to Members of Congress. It also passed theIntelligence Community Whistleblower Protection Act of 1998 to encourage the reporting toCongress of wrongdoing within the intelligence agencies. In crafting this legislation, Congress hassought to balance its need for information with national security requirements, giving intelligencecommunity whistleblowers access to Congress only through the intelligence committees. For legalanalysis see CRS Report 97-787, Whistleblower Protections for Federal Employees , by L. PaigeWhitaker and Michael Schmerling.
This report will be updated as events warrant.