	Introduction

On January 22, 2002, the Congressional Research Service sponsored a seminar on the possiblelessons for U.S. policy from the experiences of other countries in handling their own terrorismchallenges. Although this seminar was held over two and a half years ago, several of the topics of discussion and speakers' points of view are relevant to the recommendations made by the report ofthe 9/11 Commission issued in July 2004. The remainder ofthe text is unchanged from the original publication of July 24, 2002. One of the most controversial topics of discussion at the CRS seminar was the utility ofsuch reforms. Other speakers and discussants raised several considerations as towhy this finding may have been true: (1) terrorists may have intensified their activities as they foundreforms counterproductive to their objectives; (2) if negotiations were going on they might haveintensified activities to produce more concessions; (3) the government was unable to deliver thedegree of reform needed or had undertaken reforms too late; (4) other government actions, such asstopping people on the streets, may have undermined the positive effects of reform; or simply (5)that the time frame covered by the study (four to eleven years, depending on the case) may have notbeen long enough to demonstrate the true results of reforms. CRS speakers pointed to international cooperation ashelpful in controlling sources of support for terrorist acts, in particular financing and arms. Participants and Topics

There were three speakers. Several speakers warned, in various contexts, that policymakers needed to think several steps ahead in formulatinganti-terrorism policies, in order to avoid unintended consequences that could make a bad situationworse. Issues in Dealing with Terrorist Organizations

		Attrition: Targeting Members and Leaders

In his review of his five country comparative study, Hewitt stated that the only policy tool that significantly reduced levels of terrorist violence was what he called a "model of attrition," i.e., thearrest, internment or killing of terrorists. "Arrests and the rule of law do seem to be the most effective long-term way,"according to Probst. Weighing an Assassination Policy. Responding to a question on the issue of targeting leaders of terrorist organizations for assassination, Crenshawlisted common perceptions of the pros and cons of such a policy. An advantage, she said, was thatassassinations could be an efficient means to cripple an organization by removing the leadership orthe people with key skills, and relatively more humane than using a massive military response inwhich many innocent people might be killed. First, Crenshaw argued that it would be hard to avoid mistakes. Third, she raised the possibility that the targets would not be as critical to the organization as believed, and that their elimination might not end the threat. (3)

		The Difficulties of Negotiations

A discussion on the utility of negotiations underscored the extreme difficulties of bringing negotiations to a successful conclusion. Two suggestions were made for improving the possibilities of successfully concluding negotiations. Simultaneous anti-corruption, education, and cultural measuresshould be undertaken to guarantees that a process "is moving towards co-existence." Utility of Reforms

Hewitt's most contentious findings were that reforms and accommodation did not lead to the cessation of terrorism. He also found that "improving economic conditions doesn't have any effect on the levelof terrorism." Potential for Long-term Change. Crenshaw thought that one lesson to be learned from the experiences of European liberal democracies with domestic terrorism in the 1970s and 1980s was that despite policies "that clampeddown pretty severely on terrorism...civil liberties did survive." One theme that reoccurred throughout the seminar was the degree to which the United States can control the factors that promote international terrorism, particularly in the current situation indealing with the multi-pronged threat of Islamist terrorism. Gopin argued for a joint, multidisciplinary effort between policy analysts and the academic field of anti-terrorism.
Participants in a CRS seminar on the possible lessons to be learned from other countries' experiences in dealing with terrorism, generally agreed on three things. First, terrorism is a used bya wide variety of groups for a wide variety of ends. Second, the current threat that the United Statesfaces from Islamist terrorism is most likely long-term. And third, policymakers must think throughanti-terrorist actions in order to avoid consequences that may be worse than the original problem. Much of the seminar discussion focused on matters that two and a half years later became thesubject of 9/11 Commission recommendations. A revised introduction highlights the discussionsummarized in this report that is relevant to Commission recommendations. The remainder of thereport has not been changed.
Discussions during the three hour seminar, held on January 22, 2002, centered on the relative utility of three main policy tools: (1) targeting members and leaders for arrest and assassination, oras speaker Christopher Hewitt labeled it, the "model of attrition," (2) negotiations, and (3) reforms. Hewitt, who has studied the effectiveness of anti-terrorism policies in five countries said that theonly one that showed clear results was a "model of attrition," i.e., that arrest, internment, or killingof terrorists is the most effective means to significantly reduce levels of terrorist violence. SpeakerMartha Crenshaw weighed the pros and cons of targeted assassinations, noting that for her thedisadvantages -- principally the difficulty of avoiding mistakes and the possibility thatassassinations would just encourage others to take the place of those killed -- outweighed theadvantages -- principally that it was relatively more humane than a massive military response.
The most controversial subject was the utility of political and economic reforms in countries that harbor terrorists. Many questions were raised about Hewitt's finding that improving economicconditions did not have any effect on levels of terrorism, and that fairly extensive political reformsmight decrease, but did not end terrorism. Some raised the possibility that long-term educationalreforms, and other methods of changing perceptions, might have more success.
The difficulties of achieving negotiated settlements to end terrorism were examined. Participants suggested ways to increase the chances for successful outcomes. These includedinternational support for legitimate core issues in order to increase support for negotiations,international participation in the negotiations; and the adoption of measures that would isolateterrorists, including steps to increase the rule of law, and anti-corruption, educational, and culturalprograms.
The utility of controlling supporting structures for terrorism and restricting civil liberties were also discussed. Speakers noted that international cooperation is necessary to control arms and fundsthat usually flow from abroad.
(This seminar was made possible in part by a grant from the Charles H. Revson Foundation.)