	Background

In its 2001 Nuclear Posture Review, DOD significantly expanded the range  of strategic capabilities to include not only the old Triad, which consisted  of nuclear-armed intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched  ballistic missiles, and strategic bombers, but also conventional and  nonkinetic offensive strike and defensive capabilities. DOD Has Not Fully Identified Projected New Triad Spending in the FYDP

DOD has not fully identified the projected spending for New Triad in the  FYDP to date. The FYDP is one of the principal  tools available to help inform DOD and Congress about resource data  relating to these efforts. DOD has also identified and directed resources for some New Triad  programs. A long-term investment approach is an important tool in an  organization’s decision-making process to define direction, establish  priorities, assist with current and future budgets, and plan the actions  needed to achieve goals. DOD has not identified a  specific date for when this will occur. DOD Does Not Plan to Develop a New Triad Long-term Investment Approach Until Concepts Mature

In its Nuclear Posture Review Implementation Plan, DOD states a need  for a long-term investment strategy for the New Triad, and according to the  plan, intends to conduct a study to evaluate options for preparing an  integrated, long-term investment strategy for strike capabilities, defensive  capabilities, and infrastructure when nonnuclear strike and missile defense  concepts are mature. DOD is likely  to face significant affordability challenges in the long term as some existing  nuclear weapons platforms begin reaching the end of their expected  service lives within the next 15 years and as missile defense capabilities are  expanding. Moreover, without an overarching and integrated long-term investment  approach for the New Triad, information on affordability challenges, future  funding priorities, and requirements beyond the current FYDP is not fully  known. Recommendations for Executive Action

To strengthen DOD’s implementation of the New Triad and provide greater  transparency of resources that are being applied to developing, acquiring,  and sustaining the needed capabilities, we recommend that the Secretary  of Defense take the following four actions:  Direct the Director, Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation, in  consultation with the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), to  (1) develop and obtain approval of a comprehensive list of program  elements in the FYDP, which support activities for developing,  acquiring, and sustaining New Triad capabilities; (2) modify the FYDP to  establish a virtual major force program for the New Triad by creating  new data fields that would clearly identify and allow aggregation of New  Triad-related program elements to provide increased visibility of the  resources allocated for New Triad activities; and (3) report each year the  funding levels for New Triad activities and capabilities in the  department’s summary FYDP report to Congress. GAO’s Notional Analysis of the Programs and Projected Spending on the New Triad in the Future Years Defense Program

To determine how much the Department of Defense (DOD) plans to spend  on the New Triad, we performed a notional analysis of the Future Years  Defense Program (FYDP) to identify programs and projected spending  associated with New Triad capabilities.
Why GAO Did This Study

In its December 2001 Nuclear Posture Review, the Department of Defense (DOD) created a New Triad by significantly changing its definition and conceptual framework for its strategic capabilities to include not only the nuclear capabilities of the old Triad that consisted of intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and strategic bombers, but also the capabilities of offensive conventional strike forces, active and passive defenses, and a revitalized defense infrastructure. GAO was asked to determine the extent to which DOD has (1) identified the projected spending for the New Triad in its Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) and (2) developed a long-term investment approach to identify and manage future spending for the New Triad.

What GAO Found

Although DOD broadened its definition of strategic capabilities during the 2001 Nuclear Posture Review and established a New Triad, it has not developed a way to use the FYDP to identify the total amount it plans to spend to sustain and enhance New Triad capabilities during the next few years. The FYDP is one of the principal tools available to help inform DOD and Congress about spending plans for the next 5 years and to make informed decisions in light of competing priorities. While DOD has identified some New Triad spending included in the FYDP, it has not identified all associated spending. GAO's notional analysis of New Triad-related programs in the FYDP through 2009 shows that overall spending could be significantly greater than DOD's limited analyses have identified to date. According to DOD officials, DOD has not fully identified spending in the FYDP because of the diversity and broad scope of the concept. A mechanism for aggregating FYDP data, known as a "virtual major force program," could help DOD address these obstacles and provide the Secretary of Defense and Congress with better visibility into overall DOD spending plans for the New Triad. DOD also faces long-term affordability challenges in funding the New Triad. However, it has not developed an overarching and integrated long-term investment approach to identify the projected resource requirements and funding timelines to acquire and sustain New Triad capabilities beyond the period of time covered by FYDP. Long-term capital investment planning is an important tool to help organizations establish priorities and develop future budgets. DOD is likely to face significant affordability challenges in the long term in deciding the mix of nuclear and conventional capabilities needed to implement the vision of the New Triad, as existing nuclear weapons platforms begin to reach the end of their lives within the next 15 years and missile defense capabilities are expanding. While DOD has identified some near-term investments, its investment plans are incomplete and it lacks a comprehensive strategy for developing a long-term plan.