The Army National Guard and the Army Reserve Face Several Challenges with Implementation of Their Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Programs

The Army National Guard and the Army Reserve have implemented  sexual assault prevention and response programs, but face challenges in  areas such as staffing, budget management, and investigation timeliness  that may hinder program implementation. The Reserve Components Face Staffing Challenges Due to Workload Imbalances Associated with the Number and Location of Full-Time SARCs and VAs and Unfilled Collateral Duty Positions

The National Guard and the Army Reserve have staffed their sexual  assault prevention and response programs with a mix of full-time and  collateral-duty personnel, but their staffing approach has produced  sizeable workload disparities among full-time program personnel, and the  collateral-duty positions have not been fully filled. Specifically, Rhode Island  has just over 1,000 square miles of land area and an Army National  Guard population of about 2,000 soldiers and is assigned the same  number of staff—one full-time SARC and one full-time VA—as Texas,  which has more than 260,000 square miles of land area and a Guard  population of about 18,600 soldiers. For example, the 807th Medical  Command has one full-time SARC who is responsible for more than  9,000 soldiers assigned to units located in 16 states, whereas the 81st  Regional Support Command has one full-time SARC who is responsible  for fewer than 300 soldiers located in 4 states. In addition to issues with budget guidance, we found that the Department  of the Army’s SHARP office has limited visibility over the use of SHARP  program funds by the states and territories in the National Guard and by  the Army Reserve commands. While OCI helps to fill a gap in investigating sexual assault cases  involving National Guard members, timely investigations are a challenge  that may affect the extent to which OCI is used to conduct investigations. According to National Guard guidance, OCI investigations should typically  be completed in 3 weeks. However, OCI investigation data show that of  the 79 investigations it conducted in fiscal year 2015, 57 percent or 45  cases took 6 to 9 months from the time a case was referred until when  the investigation was completed, and 39 percent or 31 cases took 3 to 6  months to complete. However, the Army and National Guard Bureau have not  reassessed OCI’s resources and timeliness since 2014 to take into  account OCI’s growing caseload and to determine how to improve the  timeliness of sexual assault investigations in light of the increased  number of requests for investigations conducted by OCI. In addition, sexual assault victims serving in  the Army National Guard or in the Army Reserve must go through a  process to determine whether they are eligible for any follow-up or long- term medical and mental health care related to the assault that is  provided by or paid for by DOD; the Army National Guard established an  expedited process to make this determination, but the Army Reserve has  not, which can delay a soldier’s access to services. However, their eligibility  for follow-up or long-term  medical and mental health-care services that are paid for or provided by  DOD varies based on the victim’s duty status at the time of the assault. As of September 2016, Army Reserve officials said that they plan to  include an expedited process for line-of-duty determinations for Army  Reserve sexual assault victims in the Army Reserve chapter of the new  Army SHARP regulation that is currently being drafted. However, Army  Reserve officials did not elaborate on the details about the planned  process or provide any documentation about how this process would be  implemented for the Army Reserve. Without an expedited  line-of-duty determination process in the Army Reserve that provides for  more timely decisions, along with a method for tracking the length of time  to make the determinations so that officials have visibility over the extent  that they are meeting the required time frames, sexual assault victims in  the Army Reserve may continue to have to pay for their care up front,  even if an assault occurred during an eligible duty status, or else face  delayed access to care provided or paid for by DOD. Specifically,  the Army has not evaluated the use of program staff by its active and  reserve components, thus limiting its ability to discern, for example, how  workload disparities affect responsiveness to victims and its capacity to  address such issues within current resource levels. To help ensure that Army National Guard and Army Reserve program  staff have the necessary information to develop their budgets and to help  ensure the efficient and effective use of program funds, direct the  Secretary of the Army to  (1) direct the Army National Guard SHARP Program Office to  communicate and disseminate its guidance on budget development  and execution for the SHARP program to all full-time SHARP program  personnel  (2) direct the Army Reserve SHARP Program Office to develop clear  guidance on budget development and execution for the SHARP  program and disseminate this guidance to its full-time SHARP  program personnel and  (3) direct the Director of the Army SHARP Program Office to expand the  scope of the midyear review to include monitoring and providing  oversight of SHARP program expenditures at the Army National  Guard state and Army Reserve command level. In  written comments, DOD concurred with three recommendations, partially  concurred with two recommendations, and did not concur with one  recommendation. 9. Military Personnel: Prior GAO Work on DOD’s Actions to Prevent and  Respond to Sexual Assault in the Military.
Why GAO Did This Study

Sexual assault in the Army is often discussed in terms of its incidence among active-duty forces. Sexual assault is a crime that similarly confronts the more than 550,000 members who collectively serve in the Guard and Reserve, who together reported 604 sexual assault incidents in fiscal year 2015; however, sexual assault is generally an underreported crime. Congress included a provision in statute for GAO to review sexual assault prevention and response in the Army's reserve components.
This report addresses the extent to which (1) the Guard and Reserve face any challenges implementing programs to prevent and respond to sexual assault; and (2) medical and mental health-care services are available to victims in the Guard and Reserve. GAO reviewed DOD and Army policies; administered two web-based surveys; conducted site visits to four installations; and interviewed officials.

What GAO Found

The Army National Guard (Guard) and Army Reserve (Reserve) have implemented sexual assault prevention and response programs, but face challenges in areas such as staffing, budget management, and investigation timeliness that may hinder program implementation.
Staffing: The Guard and the Reserve have staffed their sexual assault prevention and response programs, but their use of full-time and collateral-duty personnel has produced sizeable workload disparities. For example, the Guard allots two full-time staff to each state and territory, which provides Rhode Island—a state with about 2,000 soldiers—the same number of staff as Texas, which has about 18,600 soldiers. Similar imbalances exist in the Reserve, with one full-time staff at one command responsible for about 9,000 soldiers located in 16 different states, while the one full-time staff member at another command is responsible for 300 soldiers in 4 states. Officials said that collateral-duty personnel are used to mitigate workload disparities, but these positions are not always filled in the Guard, and the Reserve does not know the number filled. Without evaluating their staffing structures, the Army does not know the extent of such issues and their effect.
Budget Management: The Guard has developed budget guidance on the use of funds but has not effectively communicated it to program staff, and the Reserve has not developed or distributed this guidance to its staff. Thus, Guard and Reserve program staff do not have information needed to develop their budget allocations and help ensure the efficient use of program funds.
Investigation Timeliness: Data on Guard cases investigated by its Office of Complex Administrative Investigations (OCI) in fiscal year 2015 show that 57 percent, or 45 of 79 cases, took 6 to 9 months to complete; 39 percent, or 31 of 79 cases, took 3 to 6 months; and the remaining 4 percent (3 of 79 cases) took longer than 9 months. According to OCI officials, investigations take longer to complete because OCI does not have enough personnel to handle its growing caseload, which more than doubled from 2014 to 2015. The Army and the Guard have not reassessed OCI's resources since the increase in investigation requests to help ensure it has the staff needed to complete investigations within 3 weeks, as required by OCI guidance.
Eligibility for follow-up or long-term health-care services paid for or provided by the Department of Defense (DOD) varies based on a Guard or Reserve victim's duty status at the time of an assault. Victims in the Guard and Reserve must go through a process, known as a line of duty determination, to determine their eligibility for care. The Guard has established an expedited process for making a determination within 72 hours of the process being initiated. However, the Reserve's process is lengthy, and in prior work GAO found that 80 percent of these determinations were overdue. Reserve officials said they plan to include an expedited process in the new Army regulation that is being drafted; however, Reserve officials did not provide details about the planned process or documentation about how it would be implemented. Without an expedited process to provide more timely decisions, sexual assault victims in the Reserve may continue to pay for their care up front, or else face delayed access to care.

What GAO Recommends

GAO is making six recommendations, including that DOD evaluate program staffing structure, communicate and develop budget guidance, assess the Guard's investigation timeliness and resources, and develop an expedited process for determining Reserve eligibility for healthcare services. DOD concurred with three recommendations partially concurred with two, and did not concur with assessing Guard investigation timeliness, stating that the Army has limited authority over OCI. GAO continues to believe that actions are needed to fully address the two recommendations, and redirected the OCI recommendation to the Guard, as recommended by DOD.