NATO’s Enlargement Study

In September 1995, NATO released an internal study of the rationale behind the enlargement and the way it should occur. In fact, NATO members have not yet established a timetable for enlargement or who will be invited to join. U.S. Bilateral Assistance to PFP Member States

In addition to its contribution through NATO common budgets, the United States provided about $53 million in fiscal year 1995 to PFP member countries through five bilateral programs that help to enhance their military equipment and operations. As table 2 shows, the fiscal year 1996 amount for these programs increased to about $125 million. This increase will largely support cooperative activities with PFP member countries. All of these programs, except PFP assistance, predate discussion of NATO enlargement. Partnership for Peace Program

The United States has provided $130 million in bilateral support to the PFP program over 2 years. Seventeen other nations may also receive some U.S. bilateral PFP assistance. The Joint Contact Team Program is executed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in coordination with the Defense Security Assistance Agency. The International Military Education and Training program is funded through the Foreign Operations appropriation. Potential Costs to NATO and New Members

		NATO’s Potential Costs

If NATO increases its membership, it will likely have to provide an undetermined amount of common funding to help the new member nations. The United States provides 23.3 percent of NATO infrastructure project funding, the highest of any member state. However, neither NATO nor the United States know what the total costs of enlargement will be to NATO or individual members, both current and new. New Members’ Potential Costs

Many of the costs resulting from NATO enlargement would be expected to be borne by the new members themselves. The total potential costs that could be incurred by each new NATO member to upgrade its military capabilities cannot be fully determined at this time because NATO has yet to define country-specific military requirements. For example, the Czechs have a 10-year modernization plan to upgrade their equipment and become interoperable with NATO forces. Article 6

For the purposes of Article 5, an armed attack on one or more of the Parties is deemed to include an armed attack: on the territory of any of the Parties in Europe or North America, on the Algerian Departments of France, on the territory of Turkey or on the islands under the jurisdiction of any of the Parties in the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer; on the forces, vessels, or aircraft of any of the Parties, when in or over these territories or any other area in Europe in which occupation forces of any of the Parties were stationed on the date when the Treaty entered into force or the Mediterranean Sea or the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer.
Why GAO Did This Study

Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO) future enlargement and plans to include the newly democratic states of the former communist bloc, focusing on: (1) actions NATO plans to take to enlarge itself; (2) U.S. bilateral assistance programs that enhance the military operations and capabilities of aspiring NATO members; and (3) the potential costs of enlargement to NATO and the new members.

What GAO Found

GAO found that: (1) in accordance with its 1991 strategic concept, NATO has initiated two programs designed to reach out to its former adversaries to the east, the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) and the Partnership for Peace (PFP) program; (2) in September 1995, NATO released an internal study examining the rationale for enlarging NATO and how it might occur; (3) NATO members have not yet established a timetable for enlargement or decided who will be invited to join; (4) the United States has five bilateral assistance programs that help to improve the operational capabilities of potential NATO members and other countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the Newly Independent States, these programs are bilateral PFP assistance (the Warsaw Initiative), Foreign Military Financing, the International Military Education and Training program, the Joint Contact Team Program, and Excess Defense Articles transfers; (5) all but the bilateral PFP assistance predate discussion of NATO's future enlargement; (6) in fiscal year (FY) 1995, the United States provided about $54 million in bilateral assistance to PFP member states through the five bilateral assistance programs and, in FY 1996, the United States will provide about $125 million; (7) this increase in assistance largely supports PFP bilateral assistance for cooperative activities with these nations and, of the total $179 million, about $130 million (or 73 percent) represents support for the PFP program; (8) neither NATO nor the United States knows what the total costs of enlargement will be to NATO or individual members, both current and new; increased membership will place new financial burdens on NATO's commonly funded infrastructure programs and on the new members themselves; (9) many of the costs of enlargement would be expected to be borne by the new members, some of whom may lack the ability to fund the changes necessary for their militaries to become interoperable with NATO forces; (10) the cost that each new member may incur cannot be fully determined because NATO has not yet defined country-specific military requirements; and (11) U.S. officials anticipate that these nations may require bilateral or multilateral financial assistance from the United States and other NATO members.