	Scope and Methodology

To determine the extent to which the federal government’s response to the  helium-3 shortage was affected by DOE’s management of helium-3, we  reviewed the DOE Isotope Program’s strategic planning documents,  helium-3 sales data, and information on NNSA’s inventory of helium-3. Also, we used the federal standards for internal control to assess  DOE’s management of helium-3. To  describe the steps that the federal government is taking, if any, to increase  the helium-3 supply and develop alternatives to helium-3, we reviewed  feasibility studies that presented options for alternative sources and  recycling unused equipment and interviewed representatives from Ontario  Power Generation, a Canadian power company. In radiation detection equipment, helium-3 is used to  detect neutrons that are emitted by nuclear material. Like the  United States, Russia extracts helium-3 from its tritium stockpile. Federal Response to the Helium-3 Shortage Was Delayed by Weaknesses in DOE’s Management of Helium-3

The federal government’s awareness of and response to the helium-3  shortage was delayed because no DOE entity had stewardship  responsibility for the overall management of helium-3. Without  stewardship responsibility, key risks to managing helium-3, such as the  lack of understanding of the helium-3 inventory and the demand for  helium-3, were not identified or mitigated by either entity. Officials from DOE’s Isotope Program and NNSA Did Not Communicate about the Helium-3 Inventory or Its Extraction Rate

While the Isotope Program’s mission includes selling isotopes and  providing related isotope services, senior program officials said that they  interpret this mission to exclude helium-3 and other isotopes that the  program sells but whose supply it does not control. Helium-3 inventory and production information was not shared between  officials at the Isotope Program and NNSA because, according to NNSA  officials, this information was generally treated as classified by NNSA out  of concern that the inventory and annual extraction rate could be used to  calculate the size of the U.S. tritium stockpile, which is classified. One of the standards for internal control in the  federal government—information and communications—states that  information should be recorded and communicated to management and  others within an entity in a form and within a time frame that enables them  to carry out their responsibilities. Isotope Program and NNSA officials told us that this lack of  communication contributed to the government’s delayed response to the  helium-3 shortage. In doing so, the  policy committee established the following three priorities for allocating  the limited supply of helium-3:    Priority 1: Applications for which there are no alternatives to helium-3,  which includes, for example, research that requires ultra-low temperatures  that can be achieved only with helium-3. Priority 2: Programs for detecting nuclear material at foreign ports and  borders, which includes, for example, NNSA’s Second Line of Defense  program that deploys radiation detection portal monitors at key overseas  ports and border crossings. Priority 3: Programs for which substantial costs have already been  incurred, such as DOE’s Spallation Neutron Source research facility that  conducts physics research. Key Federal Agencies Are Collaborating to Increase the Helium-3 Supply and Develop Alternatives

DOE and NNSA are taking actions to increase the supply of helium-3 by,  among other things, pursuing other sources and recycling helium-3 from  retired equipment. Specifically, NNSA officials said that NNSA is in  discussions with Ontario Power Generation (OPG) to determine the  feasibility of obtaining helium-3 from OPG’s stores of tritium. OPG has  accumulated this tritium as a by-product of producing electricity using  heavy-water nuclear reactors. In addition to increasing the supply of helium-3, federal agencies and  private companies are researching alternatives to helium-3 for several  applications in order to decrease demand. Conclusions

Facing a critical shortage of helium-3 since 2008, DOE and other federal  agencies are collaborating to bring supply and demand into balance, while  supporting essential applications for which there are no alternatives. Once the  stewardship for these isotopes has been assigned, we further recommend  that the Secretary of Energy direct the head of the responsible office(s) to  take the following three actions:    develop and implement a communication process that provides complete  information to the assigned entity on the production and inventory of  isotopes that are produced outside the Isotope Program;   develop strategic plans that, among other things, systematically assess and  document risks to managing the isotopes and supporting activities, such as  not having control over the supply of these isotopes, and implement  actions needed to mitigate them; and   develop and implement a method for forecasting the demand of isotopes  that is more accurate than the one that is currently used.
Why GAO Did This Study

Helium-3 gas is a key component of equipment used at ports and border crossings to detect radiation and prevent the smuggling of nuclear material into the United States, among other uses. The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), a separate agency within the Department of Energy (DOE), extracts helium-3 and controls the inventory. Since 2003, NNSA has made helium-3 available for sale to DOE's Isotope Development and Production for Research and Applications Program (Isotope Program). After September 11, 2001, demand increased for radiation detection equipment, and in 2008, the federal government learned that it faced a severe domestic shortage of the gas. GAO was asked to review DOE's management of helium-3 to (1) determine the extent to which the federal government's response to the helium-3 shortage was affected by DOE's management of helium-3; (2) determine the federal government's priorities for allocating the limited supply of helium-3; and (3) describe the steps that the federal government is taking to increase the helium-3 supply and develop alternatives to helium-3. GAO reviewed DOE and NNSA documents and interviewed cognizant agency officials.

What GAO Found

The federal government's awareness of and response to the helium-3 shortage was delayed because no DOE entity had stewardship responsibility for the overall management of helium-3--a by-product of the radioactive decay of tritium, a key component of the U.S. nuclear weapons program. Although the Isotope Program's mission includes selling isotopes and providing related isotope services, senior program officials said that they interpret this mission to exclude helium-3 and 16 other isotopes that the program sells but whose supply it does not control. As a result of this weakness in DOE's management of helium-3, officials at the Isotope Program and NNSA did not communicate about the helium-3 inventory or its extraction rate. According to NNSA and Isotope Program officials, they communicated with each other about how much helium-3 to sell each year and at what price but not about the size of the helium-3 inventory or extraction rate because NNSA generally treated this information as classified, due to concerns that the helium-3 inventory could be used to calculate the size of the U.S. tritium stockpile. NNSA and Isotope Program officials told GAO that this lack of communication contributed to the federal government's delayed response to the helium-3 shortage. The standards for internal control in the federal government state that information should be communicated to management and others within a time frame that enables them to carry out their responsibilities. Further, without stewardship by a DOE entity, key risks to managing helium-3, such as the lack of complete information on the production and inventory of helium-3, were not identified or mitigated. The federal standards for internal control state that management should assess the risks faced from external and internal sources and decide what actions to take to mitigate them. Facing this critical shortage of helium-3, DOE and other federal agencies are collaborating to bring supply and demand into balance. Specifically, in July 2009, an interagency policy committee was formed, which halted allocations of helium-3 for domestic radiation detection equipment and established three priorities for allocating helium-3: (1) applications for which there are no alternatives to helium-3 have first priority (e.g., research that can be achieved only with helium-3); (2) programs for detecting nuclear material at foreign ports and borders have second priority; and (3) programs for which substantial costs have already been incurred have third priority (e.g., a DOE research facility that conducts physics research). To increase the supply of helium-3, the federal government is, among other things, pursuing other sources and developing alternatives. Specifically, NNSA is in discussions with Ontario Power Generation (OPG), a power company in Ontario, Canada, to obtain helium-3 from its stores of tritium. OPG has accumulated tritium as a by-product of producing electricity using a type of nuclear reactor not found in the United States. Also, federal agencies and private companies are researching alternative technologies to replace helium-3 in several applications to decrease demand.

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends, among other things, that DOE clarify whether the stewardship for those isotopes produced outside the Isotope Program, such as helium-3, rests with the program or another DOE entity. DOE stated that it understands and can implement these recommendations.