	Background

In the years preceding the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States lacked a comprehensive national policy and strategy for aviation security. The United States approach to aviation security had largely been shaped by past events such as the bombing of Pan Am flight 103 in December, 1988 and, at that time, was undergoing a reactive shift in strategy, placing emphasis on addressing the threat of aircraft bombings aboard commercial airliners, albeit with limited resources and a much slower time frame compared to actions taken following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. While the FAA strategic plan for aviation security failed to adequately consider all security risks, the 9/11 Commission concluded that the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, revealed failures in imagination, policy, capabilities, and management both on the part of the FAA and the U.S. intelligence community. Immediately following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, aviation security policy and strategy debate were closely linked to the legislative process leading to the swift passage of the Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA; P.L. 107-71 ). On July 22, 2004, the 9/11 Commission released its final report, concluding that the TSA had failed to develop an integrated strategic plan for the overall transportation sector and specific plans for each of the transportation modes. These strategy documents have been designated as security sensitive information as provided for in the act. However, in June 2006, President Bush issued policy guidance directing the DHS to establish and implement a national strategy for aviation security and a series of supporting plans for implementing this strategy. The policy established a requirement for the Secretary of Homeland Security to develop an overarching national strategy for aviation security and supporting plans to carry out this strategy. The risk-based methodology seeks to achieve these three overarching goals by prioritizing resources based on risk. These include
deterring and preventing terrorist attacks and criminal or hostile acts in the air domain; protecting the homeland and United States interests in the air domain; mitigating damage and expediting recovery if an attack against aviation occurs; minimizing the impact of an attack on the aviation system and the broader U.S. economy; and actively engaging domestic and international partners. Some possible issues that may arise as the result of oversight or legislative debate may include
the validity of underlying risk assumptions made in developing the aviation security policy, national strategy, and mode-specific plans; the adequacy of considerations regarding the sustainability of the aviation security system and its various components; whether the policy and strategy are forward-looking, or rather, do they perpetuate a reactive approach to security planning in the aviation domain; the extent to which the policy and strategy provide a comprehensive framework for developing and maintaining a robust aviation security system; and the extent to which objectives and approaches outlined in the national strategy align with budgetary processes and resource availability to ensure that strategic objectives can be adequately met. The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 ( P.L.
In the years leading up to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States lacked a comprehensive national policy and strategy for aviation security. The approach to aviation security was largely shaped by past events, such as the bombing of Pan Am flight 103 in December 1988, rather than a comprehensive evaluation of the full range of security risks. The 9/11 Commission concluded that the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, revealed failures of imagination, policy, capabilities, and management by both the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and the U.S. intelligence community.
Following the September 11, 2001, attacks, U.S. aviation security policy and strategy was closely linked to the changes called for in the Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA; P.L. 107-71), which emphasized sweeping changes to the security of passenger airline operations. While the importance of strategic planning was recognized, it was not a priority. The 9/11 Commission Report concluded that the TSA had failed to develop an integrated strategy for the transportation sector and mode specific plans, prompting Congress to mandate the development of these strategies and plans in the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (P.L. 108-458). While the TSA has developed these strategies and plans, the documents have been considered security sensitive thus limiting public discourse on the DHS strategy for aviation security. However, in June 2006 President Bush directed the DHS to establish and implement a national strategy for aviation security and an accompanying set of supporting plans.
Under the framework for national aviation security policy established by the President, the DHS has developed a publicly available national strategy for aviation security that addresses threats to aviation using a risk-based methodology to complement the overarching National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) and seeks to deter and prevent terrorist attacks against aviation, mitigate damage and expedite recovery and minimize the impact of an attack to the aviation system. The strategy seeks to achieve these objectives by engaging domestic and international partners and carrying out specific actions set forth in a series of supporting plans for operational security, surveillance and intelligence, threat response, system recovery, and coordination.
Congress may have a specific interest in assessing whether these plans are comprehensive, adaptable, sustainable, and adequately coordinated with budgetary decisions and resource allocation. Specific issues for Congress may include the validity of the strategy's underlying risk assumptions; the extent to which 9/11 Commission recommendations and statutory requirements are reflected in the strategy; consideration of sustainability of and advancement of security technologies to meet future needs and system demands; whether the strategy is sufficiently forward-looking and not reactive in its approach; the extent to which the strategy provides a comprehensive framework for a robust aviation security system; and the degree to which strategic objectives and approaches align with budget priorities and resource availability. This report will not be updated.