	Background

Seaports are critical gateways for the movement of international commerce. Against this backdrop, it is not surprising that various assessments of national security have concluded that the nation’s ports are far more vulnerable to terrorist attacks than the nation’s aviation system, where most of the nation’s efforts and resources have been placed since September 11th. Many of these participants carry out their roles in the exporting country (see fig. Efforts Aimed Specifically at Detecting Nuclear Cargo Entering U.S. These efforts are based largely on an approach of targeting a small percentage of containers for in-depth screening. The main thrust of several new initiatives has been to create multiple lines of defense by pushing security beyond U.S. docks to include points of departure and, ultimately, places of manufacture. Although various efforts to do so are under way, these efforts are in their preliminary stages. OSC relies on using new technology such as electronic container seals to strengthen the security of cargo as it moves along the international supply chain. Efforts center on the following:   ensuring that containers are loaded in a secure environment at the point of product origin, with 100 percent verification of their contents;   using such technology as pressure, light, or temperature sensors to continually monitor containers throughout their overseas voyage to the point of distribution in the United States; and   using cargo-tracking technology to keep accurate track of containers at all points in the supply chain, including distribution to their ultimate destinations. For example, the Port and Maritime Security Act of 2001, which is being finalized in conference committee action, calls for the Secretary of Transportation to assess the acceptability of foreign port security “based on the standards for port security and recommended practices of the IMO and other appropriate international organizations.”

			Establishing Stronger Customs Procedures through the World Customs Organization

The World Customs Organization (WCO) is an independent intergovernmental body whose mission is to enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of customs administrations. Key Challenges Include Creating and Implementing Standards, Ensuring Cooperation of Diverse Groups, and Securing Resources

In our August 2002 testimony on security actions being taken to improve security within domestic ports, we found indications that there could be considerable challenges. The attempts to improve existing nuclear-detection programs and to implement the new initiatives now under way could face challenges domestically and internationally in these three areas as well. Efforts to develop international standards are under way on several fronts, but much still remains to do. Mr. Chairman, this completes my prepared statement. Scope and Methodology

To determine the programs in place to prevent illegal fissile material or a tactical nuclear weapon from being smuggled into the United States through our ports, we relied on issues raised in a number of GAO-issued products, as indicated in footnote 1.
Why GAO Did This Study

After the attacks of September 11th, 2001, concerns intensified over the vulnerability of U.S. ports to acts of terrorism. One particular concern involves the possibility that terrorists would attempt to smuggle illegal fissile material or a tactical nuclear weapon into the country through a cargo container shipped from overseas. This testimony discusses the programs already in place to counter such attempts, new initiatives now under way to enhance the nation's security against such attempts, and the key challenges faced in implementing these various efforts.

What GAO Found

U.S. ports have programs in place to detect illegal fissile material or nuclear weapons, but these programs are limited in several respects. They focus on screening a small portion of total cargo as it enters the country, and they are carried out without the use of adequate detection aids, such as equipment that can scan entire containers for radiation. Efforts to target cargo for screening are hampered by the quality of information regarding which cargo poses the greatest risk. New initiatives are under way to supplement these programs. The predominant focus of these initiatives has been to establish additional lines of security in the supply chain of international commerce. In essence, this means moving part of the security effort overseas, where goods are prepared for shipment into this country. These initiatives include such efforts as establishing international standards for ports, carriers, and maritime workers; stationing Customs personnel overseas; reducing security vulnerabilities all the way back to points of manufacture; and using new technology to monitor the contents and movement of containers from their point of origin. The nation faces three key challenges to implementing efforts to improve the security of ports and containers: creating and enforcing a set of security standards, ensuring the cooperation of diverse groups with competing interests when it comes to the specifics of how things are to be done, and paying the increased security bill. Such challenges exist both for strengthening domestic efforts and for developing new initiatives that expand security on an international basis. GAO is currently reviewing several aspects of port and container security, and will report as those efforts are completed.