	Background

Since it started development in 2003, FCS was at the center of the Army’s  efforts to modernize into a lighter, more agile, and more capable combat  force. DOD directed the  Army to transition to an Army-wide modernization plan consisting of a  number of integrated acquisition programs, including one to develop  ground combat vehicles (GCV). In Implementing DOD Direction, the Army Is Moving Away from Many of Its FCS Approaches

The Army is implementing DOD direction and redefining its overall  modernization strategy as a result of the Secretary of Defense’s decision to  significantly restructure the FCS program. It established a key task force  to refine its future force concepts and modernization plans and has moved  away from FCS as the centerpiece of ground force modernization. 2). The third acquisition program would develop a new GCV. Networking capabilities will be expected to  meet specific standards and interface requirements. Acquisition Direction and FCS Lessons Learned Offer Opportunities to Increase the Likelihood of Successful Outcomes

The challenge facing both DOD and the Army is to set these ground force  modernization efforts on the best footing possible by buying the right  capabilities at the best value. However, in the first major acquisition decision for the Army’s  post-FCS initiatives, DOD and the Army—because they want to support  the warfighter quickly—are proceeding with low-rate initial production of  one brigade set of Increment 1 systems despite having acknowledged that  the systems are immature, are unreliable, and cannot perform as required. The Under Secretary also said that he was aware of  the importance of fielding systems to the current warfighter and that the  flexibility to deploy components as available would allow DOD to “best  support” the Secretary of Defense’s direction to “win the wars we are in.”  Because of that, the Under Secretary specified that a number of actions be  taken over the next year or more and directed the Army to work toward  having all components for the program fielded as soon as possible and to  deploy components of the program as they are ready. As we have noted, at this time, detailed plans for these  efforts are still being developed and may not be available until at least  later in fiscal year 2010 as those plans are solidified and approved. Until late in the FCS  program, DOD passed on opportunities to hold the FCS program  accountable to more knowledge-based acquisition principles. For instance,  at an October 2009 DOD review, the Army offered preliminary plans for  post-FCS efforts. The Army’s fiscal year 2011 budget request does not  provide sufficient details to allay all concerns. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

To outline the Army’s preliminary post–Future Combat System (FCS)  plans, we obtained and reviewed proposed plans for the Army’s new  modernization approach. To identify the challenges and opportunities the Department of Defense  (DOD) and the Army will need to address as they proceed with Army  ground force modernization efforts, we reviewed relevant Army and DOD  documents, including the Secretary of Defense’s April 6, 2009,  announcement on restructuring FCS and the June 23, 2009, acquisition  decision memorandum that implemented the Secretary’s proposed  restructure; the Army Capstone Concept; the Director, Operational Test  and Evaluation’s Fiscal Year 2009 Annual Report; the Comprehensive  Lessons Learned White Paper; and the Army Modernization White Paper.
Why GAO Did This Study

Since 2003, the Future Combat System (FCS) program has been the centerpiece of the Army's efforts to transition to a lighter, more agile, and more capable combat force. In 2009, however, concerns over the program's performance led to the Secretary of Defense's decision to significantly restructure and ultimately cancel the program. As a result, the Army has outlined a new approach to ground force modernization. This report (1) outlines the Army's preliminary post-FCS plans and (2) identifies the challenges and opportunities the Department of Defense (DOD) and the Army must address as they proceed with Army ground force modernization efforts. To meet these objectives, GAO reviewed key documents, performed analyses, visited test facilities where the Army evaluated FCS equipment, and interviewed DOD and Army officials.

What GAO Found

With DOD having canceled the FCS acquisition program, the Army has moved away from FCS as the centerpiece of ground force modernization. Although the Army is still refining its post-FCS plans, it has already taken a number of actions to comply with DOD directions and define new modernization initiatives. For instance, the Army has terminated FCS vehicle development and is preparing for a new ground combat vehicle program. Also, Army officials convened a special task force to refine future force concepts and formulate an expedited fielding strategy. The Army also announced preliminary plans for new acquisition programs. With ground force modernization efforts at an early stage, DOD and the Army face the challenge of setting the emerging modernization efforts on the best possible footing by buying the right capabilities at the best value. They have an opportunity to position these efforts for success by effectively implementing the enhanced body of acquisition legislation and DOD policy reforms as well as lessons learned from the FCS program, including lessons that underscore the use of knowledge-based acquisition and disciplined contracting strategies. Preliminary plans suggest that the Army is moving in that direction, including expectations to begin future developments with mature technologies and utilizing competitive prototyping. However, DOD recently approved, with a number of restrictions, low-rate initial production of the first increment of FCS spinout equipment, such as new radios and sensors, despite having acknowledged that the systems were immature, unreliable, and not performing as required. The restrictions include required DOD reviews of Army progress toward improving the systems' maturity and reliability. The spin out equipment was being developed within the FCS program, and the decision to approve production reflects DOD and Army emphasis on providing new capabilities quickly to combat units. However, this decision runs the risk of delivering unacceptable equipment to the warfighter and trading off acquisition principles whose validity has been so recently underscored. Detailed plans for most of the Army's new modernization efforts are still being developed and may not be available until at least later in fiscal year 2010. That will be a limiting factor as the Congress considers the Army's fiscal year 2011 budget request for these modernization efforts.