During the first few years of implementation, FTA worked with states to  develop compliant programs that addressed FTA’s requirements. Many Agencies Are Involved in the State Safety Oversight Program

FTA designed the State Safety Oversight program as one in which FTA,  other federal agencies, states, and rail transit agencies collaborate to  ensure the safety and security of rail transit systems. As the program administrator, FTA is  responsible for developing the rules and guidance that state oversight  agencies are to use to perform their oversight of rail transit agencies. State Oversight Agencies Conduct Direct Oversight of Rail Transit Agencies

In the State Safety Oversight program, state oversight agencies are  responsible for directly overseeing rail transit agencies. Finally, one state, New York, has given its  oversight authority to its Public Transportation Safety Board (PTSB). In the program, oversight  agencies are responsible for the following:    Developing a program standard that outlines oversight and rail transit  agency responsibilities, providing “guidance to the regulated rail transit  properties concerning processes and procedures they must have in place  to be in compliance with the State Safety Oversight program.”
Reviewing transit agencies’ safety and security plans and annual reports. The Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA), passed by  Congress in response to the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, gave  TSA authority for security over all transportation modes, including  authority to issue security regulations. Also, TSA has hired 100 rail security inspectors, as authorized by  Congress. Transit and Oversight Agencies Perceive the Program as Worthwhile; However, FTA Does Not Have Goals or Performance Measures to Document the Impact of the State Safety Oversight Program on Safety and Security

The majority of officials from transit and oversight agencies with whom  we spoke agreed that the State Safety Oversight program improves safety  and security in their organizations. In addition to transit agency officials, officials from 23 of the 24 state  safety oversight agencies with whom we spoke believed that the State  Safety Oversight program is valuable or very valuable for improving transit  systems’ safety and security. FTA Gathers Various Types of Safety Information, but Does Not Have the Data to Document the Impact of the Oversight Program on Safety and Security

One potential source of information about the State Safety Oversight  program’s impact on safety and security are data that FTA collects through  the annual reports it requires state oversight agencies to submit. Although the audits provide detailed information on  specific oversight agencies, FTA has not brought together information  from these audits to provide information on the safety and security of  transit systems across the country. A  second challenge FTA faces in implementing the program is that many  transit and oversight agency personnel are confused about how security  issues in the program will be handled, and what agencies will be  responsible for what actions, as TSA takes on a greater role in rail transit  security. Specifically, officials from 18 of 24  oversight agencies with which we spoke stated they believed additional  training would help them provide more efficient and effective safety and  security oversight. Officials from 10  of the 24 oversight agencies with whom we spoke cited a lack of funds as  one reason why they could not attend training they had hoped to attend. Transit and Oversight Agency Staff Are Uncertain How TSA’s Emerging Role in Transit Security Will Affect the Program

Another challenge facing the program is how TSA and its rail inspectors  might affect oversight of transit security. This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the  United States.
Why GAO Did This Study

The U.S. rail transit system is a vital component of the nation's transportation infrastructure, carrying millions of people daily. Unlike most transportation modes, safety and security oversight of rail transit is the responsibility of state-designated oversight agencies following Federal Transit Administration (FTA) requirements. In addition, in 2001, Congress passed the Aviation and Transportation Security Act, giving the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) authority for security over all transportation modes, including rail transit. This testimony is based on ongoing work for this subcommittee's committee--the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure. I describe (1) how the State Safety Oversight program is designed; (2) what is known about the impact of the program on rail safety and security; and (3) challenges facing the program. I also provide information about oversight of transit systems that cross state boundaries. To address these issues, we reviewed program documents and interviewed stakeholders including officials from FTA, TSA, the National Transportation Safety Board, and the American Public Transportation Association. We also surveyed state oversight and transit agencies covered by FTA's program, interviewing 24 of the 25 oversight agencies and 37 of 42 transit agencies across the country.

What GAO Found

FTA designed the State Safety Oversight program as one in which FTA, other federal agencies, states, and rail transit agencies collaborate to ensure the safety and security of rail transit systems. FTA requires states to designate an agency to oversee the safety and security of rail transit agencies that receive federal funding. Oversight agencies are responsible for overseeing transit agencies, including reviewing transit agencies' safety and security plans. While oversight agencies are to include security reviews as part of their responsibilities, the TSA also has security oversight authority over transit agencies. Officials from 23 of the 24 oversight agencies and 35 of the 37 transit agencies with whom we spoke found the program worthwhile. Several transit agencies cited improvements through the oversight program, such as reductions in derailments, fires, and collisions. While there is ample anecdotal evidence suggesting the benefits of the program, FTA has not definitively shown the program's benefits and has not developed performance goals for the program, to be able to track performance as required by Congress. Also, because FTA was reevaluating the program after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, FTA did not keep to its stated 3-year schedule for auditing state oversight agencies, resulting in a lack of information to track the program's trends. FTA officials recognize it will be difficult to develop performance measures and goals to help determine the program's impact, especially since fatalities and incidents involving rail transit are already low. However, FTA has assigned this task to a contractor and has stated that the program's new leadership will make auditing oversight agencies a top priority. FTA faces some challenges in managing and implementing the program. First, expertise varies across oversight agencies. Specifically, officials from 16 of 24 oversight agencies raised concerns about not having enough qualified staff. Officials from transit and oversight agencies with whom we spoke stated that oversight and technical training would help address this variation. Second, transit and oversight agencies are confused about what role oversight agencies are to play in overseeing rail security, since TSA has hired rail inspectors to perform a potentially similar function, which could result in duplication of effort.