On October 15, a staff member in Senator Daschle’s  office opened the contaminated envelope. The  Postal Service closed the facility on October 21, 2001, after CDC confirmed  that the employee had the disease. It is in the  process of being decontaminated. Brentwood Employees Questioned Whether the Decision to Wait for Confirmation of Inhalation Anthrax Adequately Protected Their Health

The Postal Service’s decision to wait for CDC’s confirmation of a case of  inhalation anthrax before closing Brentwood and referring the facilities’  employees for medical treatment was consistent with the public health  advice the Postal Service received and the health risk information  available at the time. Three days later, on October 21, 2001, CDC confirmed that a  Brentwood employee had inhalation anthrax, and the Postal Service  closed the facility and referred its employees for medical treatment. The Decisions Made at Brentwood and Capitol Hill Differed Because the Circumstances and Decisionmakers Differed

The Postal Service’s decision to wait for a confirmed case of inhalation  anthrax before closing the facility and referring employees for medical  treatment differed from the decision to implement precautionary measures  immediately after anthrax contamination was identified at the Hart  Building. The decisions differed, in part, because there was an observable  incident at the Hart Building, but not at Brentwood. Communication Problems Exacerbated Postal Service Employees’ Concerns

The Postal Service communicated health risk and other information to its  Brentwood employees during the anthrax crisis, but some of the  information it initially provided changed as public health knowledge  evolved, intensifying employees’ concerns about whether adequate  measures were being taken to protect them. Other factors, including difficulties in  communicating the uncertainty associated with health recommendations  and employees’ long-standing distrust of postal managers, also challenged  efforts to communicate effectively. The Postal Service has made additional  efforts to communicate with Brentwood employees since the facility’s  closure, but challenges remain, particularly the need to effectively  communicate information on any possible residual risks. Among the lessons learned are that the risk to employees of  contracting anthrax through contaminated mail is greater than was  previously believed and more caution is needed to respond to that greater  risk. Another important lesson learned during the 2001 anthrax incidents is that  clear and accurate communication is critical to managing the response to  an incident. The Postal Service agrees that although the Brentwood facility has been  tested and certified as safe for occupancy, the Postal Service cannot assert  that the building is 100 percent free of anthrax contamination. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) issues an alert about bioterrorism,  providing information about preventive measures for anthrax. (On or about) Daschle letter passes through Brentwood. Part of the Hart Senate Office Building is closed in the morning, and the remainder of the building is  closed in the evening.
Why GAO Did This Study

On October 21, 2001, the U.S. Postal Service closed its Brentwood mail processing facility after the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) confirmed that an employee there had contracted inhalation anthrax, an often-fatal form of the disease. On October 21 and 22, two other Brentwood employees died of inhalation anthrax. The contamination was linked to a letter that passed through the facility on or about October 12, before being opened in the office of Senator Daschle in the Hart Senate Office Building on October 15. The Hart Building was closed the next day. The Brentwood facility has since been decontaminated and will soon reopen. This testimony, which is based on ongoing work, provides GAO's preliminary observations on the decisions made in closing the facility and problems experienced in communicating with employees, as well as lessons learned from the experience.

What GAO Found

The Postal Service's decision to wait to close the Brentwood facility and refer employees for medical treatment until CDC confirmed that a postal employee had contracted inhalation anthrax was consistent with the advice the Postal Service received from public health advisers and the information about health risk available at the time. However, because circumstances differed at Brentwood and the Hart Building--an observed spill at the Hart Building and no observable incident at Brentwood--the Postal Service's response differed from the response at Capitol Hill, leading some Brentwood employees to question whether the Postal Service was taking adequate steps to protect their health. The Postal Service communicated information to its Brentwood employees during the anthrax incident, but some of the health risk information changed over time, exacerbating employees' concerns about the measures being taken to protect them. Notably, employees later learned that their risk of contracting the disease was greater than originally stated. Other factors, including difficulties in communicating the uncertainty associated with health recommendations and employees' distrust of postal managers, also challenged efforts to communicate effectively. Recently, the Postal Service informed employees that Brentwood, which has been tested and certified as safe for occupancy, is "100 percent free of anthrax contamination." However, in discussions with GAO, the Service agreed to revise future communications to acknowledge that although any remaining risk at the facility is likely to be low, complete freedom from risk cannot be guaranteed. The Postal Service and others have learned since the 2001 anthrax incidents that (1) the risk of contracting anthrax through the mail is greater than was previously believed and more caution is needed to respond to that greater risk and (2) clear, accurate communication is critical to managing the response to an incident and its aftermath. The Postal Service is revising its guidance to respond more quickly and to communicate more effectively to employees and the public in the event of a future incident.