CBP Has A Layered Approach to Select and Inspect Cargo Containers

CBP is responsible for preventing terrorists and weapons of mass  destruction from entering the United States. As part of its responsibility, it  has the mission to address the potential threat posed by the movement of  oceangoing containers. It includes external peer review, testing, and validation. In addition, CBP developed a training course for staff  responsible for targeting cargo containers. Further, CBP also promulgated  regulations aimed at improving the quality and timeliness of transmitted  cargo manifest data for use in the targeting system. However, while its  strategy incorporates some elements of risk management, CBP has not  performed a comprehensive set of threat, criticality, vulnerability and risk  assessments that experts said are vital for determining levels of risk for  each container and the types of responses necessary to mitigate that risk. CBP officials told us that, given the urgency to take steps to  protect against terrorism after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks,  that they had to take an “implement and amend” approach. The National  Targeting Center also assists targeters in conducting research on  incoming cargo, attempts to improve the targeting of cargo, and  manages a national targeting training program for CBP targeters. Targeting Strategy Does Not Incorporate Key Elements of Risk Management

While CBP’s targeting strategy incorporates some elements of risk  management, our discussions with terrorism experts and our comparison  of CBP’s targeting system to recognized risk management practices  showed that the strategy does not fully incorporate all key elements of a  risk management framework. Further, we found that space limitations and safety concerns  constrain the ports in their utilization of screening equipment, which can  affect the efficiency of examinations. CBP Lacks National System To Track Cargo Container Inspections By Risk Category

A CBP official told us that CBP does not have a national system for  reporting and analyzing inspection statistics by risk category. While  officials at all the ports provided us with inspection data, the data from  some ports were generally not available by risk level, were not uniformly  reported, were difficult to interpret, and were not complete. While the ATS findings module shows potential as a  useful tool for capturing inspection results, it is too soon to tell whether it  will provide CBP management with consistent, complete inspection data  for analyzing and improving the targeting strategy. In closing, as part of a program to prevent terrorists from smuggling  weapons of mass destruction into the United States, CBP has taken a  number of positive steps to target cargo containers for inspection. CBP  faces a number of other challenges in implementing its strategy to identify  and inspect suspicious cargo containers. To assess how well the targeting strategy has been implemented at  selected seaports in the country, we visited various CBP facilities and the  Miami, Los Angeles-Long Beach, Philadelphia, New York-New Jersey, New  Orleans, and Seattle seaports.
Why GAO Did This Study

After the attacks of September 11, 2001, concerns intensified that terrorists would attempt to smuggle a weapon of mass destruction into the United States. One possible method for terrorists to smuggle such a weapon is to use one of the 7 million cargo containers that arrive at our nation's seaports each year. The Department of Homeland Security's U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) is responsible for addressing the potential threat posed by the movement of oceangoing cargo containers. Since CBP cannot inspect all arriving cargo containers, it uses a targeting strategy, which includes an automated targeting system. This system targets some containers for inspection based on a perceived level of risk. In this testimony, GAO provides preliminary findings on its assessment of (1) whether CBP's development of its targeting strategy is consistent with recognized key risk management and computer modeling practices and (2) how well the targeting strategy has been implemented at selected seaports around the country.

What GAO Found

CBP has taken steps to address the terrorism risks posed by oceangoing cargo containers. These include establishing a National Targeting Center, refining its automated targeting system, instituting a national training program for its personnel that perform targeting, and promulgating regulations to improve the quality and timeliness of data on cargo containers. However, while CBP's strategy incorporates some elements of risk management, it does not include other key elements, such as a comprehensive set of criticality, vulnerability and risk assessments that experts told GAO are necessary to determine risk and the types of responses necessary to mitigate that risk. Also, CBP's targeting system does not include a number of recognized modeling practices, such as subjecting the system to peer review, testing and validation. By incorporating the missing elements of a risk management framework and following certain recognized modeling practices, CBP will be in a better position to protect against terrorist attempts to smuggle weapons of mass destruction into the United States. CBP faces a number of challenges at the six ports we visited. CBP does not have a national system for reporting and analyzing inspection statistics and the data provided to us by ports were generally not available by risk level, were not uniformly reported, were difficult to interpret, and were incomplete. CBP officials told us they have just implemented a new module for their targeting system, but it is too soon to tell whether it will provide consistent, complete inspection data for analyzing and improving the targeting strategy. In addition, CBP staff that received the national targeting training were not tested or certified to ensure that they had learned the basic skills needed to provide effective targeting. Further, space limitations and safety concerns about inspection equipment constrained the ports in their utilization of screening equipment, which has affected the efficiency of examinations.