U.S. Government Has Spent about $86 Million to Help Countries Combat Nuclear Smuggling

From fiscal year 1992 through 2001, six federal agencies received $140 million and spent $86.1 million to combat the threat of nuclear smuggling in about 30 countries, including all of the countries of the former Soviet Union and numerous countries in Central and Eastern Europe. U.S. Assistance Is Divided Among Six Federal Agencies

The Departments of Energy, State, and Defense; the U.S. Customs Service; the Federal Bureau of Investigation; and the U.S. Coast Guard have provided assistance to about 30 countries’ customs, border, and law enforcement agencies to detect, interdict, and investigate nuclear smuggling. Departments of Energy, State, and Defense Have the Primary Role in Delivering U.S. Assistance

DOE has two programs that have provided assistance to combat nuclear material smuggling—the Second Line of Defense program and the International Export Control Program (IECP). U.S. Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling Lacks a Coordinated Approach

Because U.S. efforts are not effectively coordinated, the Departments of Energy, State, and Defense are pursuing separate approaches to enhancing other countries’ border crossings, with the result that some countries’ border crossings are more vulnerable to nuclear smuggling than others. Efforts to Coordinate Assistance Have Been Inadequate

The six agencies that are providing training and equipment to combat nuclear smuggling coordinate their assistance through an interagency group chaired by the State Department. However, serious problems with installing, using, accounting for, and maintaining radiation detection equipment have undermined U.S. efforts. Russian customs officials told us that radiation detection equipment funded by DOE’s Second Line of Defense program has helped accelerate Russia’s plans to improve border security. These cases include contaminated scrap metal, irradiated cargo, and other radioactive materials that could pose a proliferation concern. He stated that the most effective approach to combating nuclear smuggling is to secure the nuclear material at its source at civilian and military facilities. Since the early 1990s, there have been numerous reports of illicit trafficking in many types of nuclear materials worldwide. Regardless of the number of actual cases of nuclear smuggling, officials stated that the threat posed by illicit trafficking is real and should not be underestimated. Many of the incidents involved material that came from countries of the former Soviet Union, primarily Russia.
Why GAO Did This Study

The worldwide trafficking and smuggling of nuclear material has reportedly increased in recent years. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reports 181 confirmed cases of illicit trafficking of nuclear material since 1993. Many of the cases reported by IAEA involved material that could be used to produce a "dirty bomb" that could spread radioactive contamination over a wide area. Nuclear material can be smuggled across a country's border through various means. Many nuclear smuggling cases have been traced to nuclear material that originated in the former Soviet Union. The United States, through the Department of Energy's Material Protection, Control, and Accounting program, has helped them secure nuclear material at civilian and defense facilities--the first line of defense against potential theft and diversion of nuclear materials. To address the threat posed by nuclear smuggling, the United States is helping these countries improve their border security--a second line of defense--but these assistance efforts face daunting challenges. U.S. efforts to combat nuclear smuggling are divided among six federal agencies--the Departments of Energy, State, and Defense; the U.S. Customs Service; the Federal Bureau of Investigation; and the U.S. Coast Guard. From fiscal year 1992 through fiscal year 2001, the six agencies spent $86 million to help 30 countries, mostly in the former Soviet Union and Central and Eastern Europe, combat the threat of smuggling of nuclear materials.

What GAO Found

GAO found that U.S. assistance is not effectively coordinated and lacks an overall governmentwide plan to guide it. Although an interagency group, chaired by the State Department, exists to coordinate U.S. assistance efforts, the six agencies that are providing assistance do not always coordinate their efforts through this group. The Departments of Energy, State, and Defense have pursued separate approaches to installing radiation detection equipment at other countries' border crossings; consequently, some countries' border crossings are more vulnerable to nuclear smuggling than others. U.S. assistance is generally helping countries combat the smuggling of nuclear and other radioactive materials, but serious problems with installing, using, and maintaining radiation detection equipment have undermined U.S. efforts. These and other problems have largely resulted from a lack of agency oversight and follow-up.