NRC and the licensees of nuclear power plants share the responsibility for  ensuring that commercial nuclear power reactors are operated safely. NRC Uses Various Tools and Takes a Graded and Risk- Informed Approach to Ensuring the Safety of Nuclear Power Plants

NRC uses various tools to oversee the safe operation of nuclear power  plants, generally consisting of physical plant inspections of equipment and  records and objective indicators of plant performance. These tools are  risk-informed in that they are focused on the issues considered most  important to plant safety. Based on the results of the information it  collects through these efforts, NRC takes a graded approach to its  oversight, increasing the level of regulatory attention to plants based on  the severity of identified performance issues. The majority of these inspection efforts were spent on baseline  inspections, which all plants receive on an almost continuous basis. The inspection  procedures are risk-informed to focus inspectors’ efforts on the most  important areas of plant safety in four ways: 1) areas of inspection are  included in the set of baseline procedures based on, in part, their risk  importance, 2) risk information is used to help determine the frequency  and scope of inspections, 3) the selection of activities to inspect within  each procedure is informed with plant-specific risk information, and 4) the  inspectors are trained in the use of risk information in planning their  inspections. When NRC becomes aware of one or more performance problems at a  plant that are assigned a risk color greater-than-green (white, yellow, or  red), it conducts supplemental inspections. NRC conducts special inspections when specific events occur at plants  that are of particular interest to NRC because of their potential safety  significance. These objective  numeric measures of plant operations are designed to measure plant  performance related to safety in various aspects of plant operations. NRC Has Continually Identified Problems at Nuclear Power Plants but Few Have Been Considered Significant to Safe Operation of the Plants

The ROP has identified numerous performance deficiencies as inspection  findings at nuclear power plants since it was first implemented, but most  of these were considered to be of very low risk to safe plant operations. Of more than 4,000 inspection findings identified between 2001 and 2005,  97 percent were green. In contrast  to the many green findings, NRC has identified 12 findings of the highest  risk significance (7 yellow and 5 red), accounting for less than 1 percent of  the findings since 2001. On the basis of its inspection findings and performance indicators, NRC  has subjected more than three quarters of the 103 operating plants to at  least some level of increased oversight (beyond the baseline inspections)  for varying amounts of time. In assessing the results of the ROP data, we found that  all plants subjected to NRC’s highest level of oversight also had a  substantive cross-cutting issue open either prior to or during the time that  it was subjected to increased oversight inspections. While NRC communicates the results of its oversight process on  a plant-specific basis to plant managers, members of the public, and other  government agencies through annual public meetings held at or near each  site and an internet Web site, it does not publicly summarize the overall  results of its oversight process, such as the total number and types of  inspection findings and performance indicators falling outside of  acceptable performance categories, on a regular basis. It has several mechanisms in place to incorporate feedback from  both external and internal stakeholders and is currently working on  improvements in key areas of the process, including better focusing  inspections on areas most important to safety, improving its timeliness in  determining the risk significance of its inspection findings, and modifying  the way that it measures some performance indicators. NRC is also  working to address what we believe is a significant shortcoming in its  oversight process by improving its ability to address plants’ safety culture,  allowing it to better identify and address early indications of deteriorating  safety at plants before performance problems develop. An audit by the NRC Inspector General, a  review by a special task group formed by NRC, and feedback from other  stakeholders have pointed to several significant weaknesses with the SDP. Largely as a result  of this event, in August 2004, the NRC Commission directed the NRC staff  to enhance the ROP by more fully addressing safety culture. For example, the nuclear power industry has expressed concern  that the changes could introduce undue subjectivity to NRC’s oversight,  given the difficulty in measuring these often intangible and complex  concepts. NRC officials view this effort as the beginning step in an  incremental approach and acknowledge that continual monitoring,  improvements, and oversight will be needed in order to better allow  inspectors to detect deteriorating safety conditions at plants before events  occur.
Why GAO Did This Study

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has the responsibility to provide oversight to ensure that the nation's 103 commercial nuclear power plants are operated safely. While the safety of these plants has always been important, since radioactive release could harm the public and the environment, NRC's oversight has become even more critical as the Congress and the nation consider the potential resurgence of nuclear power in helping to meet the nation's growing energy needs. Prior to 2000, NRC was criticized for having a safety oversight process that was not always focused on the most important safety issues and in some cases, was overly subjective. To address these and other concerns, NRC implemented a new oversight process--the Reactor Oversight Process (ROP). NRC continues to modify the ROP to incorporate feedback from stakeholders and in response to other external events. This testimony summarizes information on (1) how NRC oversees nuclear power plants, (2) the results of the ROP over the past several years, and (3) the aspects of the ROP that need improvement and the status of NRC's efforts to improve them. This testimony discusses preliminary results of GAO's work. GAO will report in full at a later date. GAO analyzed program-wide information, inspection results covering 5 years of ROP operations, and detailed findings from a sample of 11 plants.

What GAO Found

NRC uses various tools to oversee the safe operation of nuclear power plants, including physical plant inspections and quantitative measures or indicators of plant performance. To apply these tools, NRC uses a riskinformed and graded approach--that is, one considering safety significance in deciding on the equipment and operating procedures to be inspected and employing increasing levels of regulatory attention to plants based on the severity of identified performance problems. The tools include three types of inspections--baseline, supplemental, and special. All plants receive baseline inspections of plant operations almost continuously by NRC inspectors. When NRC becomes aware of a performance problem at a plant, it conducts supplemental inspections, which expand the scope of baseline inspections. NRC conducts special inspections to investigate specific safety incidents or events that are of particular interest to NRC because of their potential significance to safety. The plants also self-report on their safety performance using performance indicators for plant operations related to safety, such as the number of unplanned reactor shutdowns. Since 2001, NRC's ROP has resulted in more than 4,000 inspection findings concerning nuclear power plant licensees' failure to comply with regulations or other safe operating procedures. About 97 percent of these findings were for actions or failures NRC considered important to correct but of low significance to overall safe operation of the plants. In contrast, 12 of the inspection findings, or less than 1 percent, were of the highest levels of significance to safety. On the basis of its findings and the performance indicators, NRC has subjected more than three-quarters of the 103 operating plants to oversight beyond the baseline inspections for varying amounts of time. NRC has improved several key areas of the ROP, largely in response to independent reviews and feedback from stakeholders. These improvements include better focusing its inspections on those areas most important to safety, reducing the time needed to determine the risk significance of inspection findings, and modifying the way that some performance indicators are measured. NRC also recently undertook a major initiative to improve its ability to address plants' safety culture--that is, the organizational characteristics that ensure that issues affecting nuclear plant safety receive the attention their significance warrants. GAO and others have found this to be a significant shortcoming in the ROP. Although some industry officials have expressed concern that its changes could introduce undue subjectivity to NRC's oversight, given the difficulty in measuring these often intangible and complex concepts, other stakeholders believe its approach will provide NRC better tools to address safety culture issues at plants. NRC officials acknowledge that its effort is only a step in an incremental approach and that continual monitoring, improvements, and oversight will be needed to fully detect deteriorating safety conditions before an event occurs.