	Background and History of the Issue

Many innovations that have become familiar features of modern elections originated at leastin part as a way to reduce election fraud such as tampering with ballots to change the vote count fora candidate or party. Australian Secret Ballot. Computer-assisted counting of document ballots can be done very rapidly, thus speedingthe reporting of election results. It makes some kinds of tampering more difficult than with manual counting, butit does not eliminate them, and it creates possibilities for tampering with the counting software andhardware. DREs (direct recording electronic systems) are the first completely computerized voting systems. They wereintroduced in the 1970s. Touchscreen and other DREs using computer-style displays are arguably the most versatile anduser-friendly of any current voting system. DREs and HAVA. The popularity of DREs, particularly the touchscreen variety, has grown in recent years, (8) and their use is expected to increasesubstantially under provisions of HAVA. (9) Third, the Act requires, also beginning in 2006,that each polling place used in a federal election have at least one voting machine that is fullyaccessible for persons with disabilities. Security Concerns about DREs. Threats

Kinds of Attacks and Attackers. Computer Code. In the recent public debate about the security of DREs, much of the attention has focused on the computer code. (63) Some experts have proposed that such an approachbe used in the development of voting systems. Confidence in DREs

There appears to be an emerging consensus among computer scientists that current DREs, and to a lesser extent other computer-assisted voting systems, do not adhere sufficiently to currentlyaccepted security principles for computer systems, especially given the central importance of votingsystems to the functioning of democratic government. 231(a)(1)). Use Open Source Software

Some experts have proposed the use of open source software code for at least some voting system software. (2) The use of printerswould substantially increase both the cost of administering an election and the risk of mechanicalfailure of a voting machine. Inaddition, there are no proven cases of tampering with DREs or other computer-assisted votingsystems in public elections. States. However, this approach might also leadto a patchwork of responses, which could be challenging for vendors to meet and could lead to somestates being more vulnerable to tampering than others. The Election Assistance Commission created by HAVA will have some responsibilities to provide guidance and to perform studies andresearch specifically relating to the security of voting systems. They include using current procedures and security mechanisms, with improvements as necessary;improving standards for the development and certification of voting systems; using open-sourcesoftware for voting systems; and several methods to improve the transparency and verifiability ofelections, including voter-verified paper ballots and an electronic version of that approach, use ofmodular electronic voting architecture that physically separates the voter interface from the castingand counting functions; and a system that uses cryptographic protocols to permit voters to verify thattheir ballots were cast as intended and that no votes were improperly changed, omitted, or added.
In July 2003, computer scientists from Johns Hopkins and Rice Universities released a security analysis of software purportedly from a direct recording electronic (DRE) touchscreen votingmachine of a major voting-system vendor. The study drew public attention to a long-simmeringcontroversy about whether current DREs are vulnerable to tampering that could influence theoutcome of an election.
Many innovations that have become familiar features of modern elections, such as the secret ballot and mechanical lever voting machines, originated at least in part as a way to reduce electionfraud and abuse. Computer-assisted counting of ballots, first used in the 1960s, can be done veryrapidly and makes some kinds of tampering more difficult. However, it does not eliminate thepotential for fraud, and it has created new possibilities for tampering through manipulation of thecounting software and hardware. DREs, introduced in the 1970s, are the first voting systems to becompletely computerized. Touchscreen DREs are arguably the most versatile and user-friendly ofany current voting system. Their use is expected to increase substantially under provisions of TheHelp America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA, P.L. 107-252 ), especially the requirement that, beginningin 2006, each polling place used in a federal election have at least one voting machine that is fullyaccessible for persons with disabilities.
With DREs, unlike document-ballot systems, the voter sees only a representation of the ballot; votes are registered electronically. Some computer security experts believe that this and otherfeatures of DREs make them more vulnerable to tampering than other kinds of voting systems,especially through the use of malicious computer code. While there are some differences of opinionamong experts about the extent and seriousness of those security concerns, there appears to be anemerging consensus that in general, current DREs do not adhere sufficiently to currently acceptedsecurity principles for computer systems, especially given the central importance of voting systemsto the functioning of democratic government. Others caution, however, that there are nodemonstrated cases of computer tampering in public elections, and any major changes that might bemade to improve security could have unanticipated negative effects of their own. Several proposalshave been made to improve the security of DREs and other computer-assisted voting systems. Theyinclude (1) ensuring that accepted security protocols are followed appropriately, (2) improvingsecurity standards and certification of voting systems, (3) use of open-source computer code, and (4)improvements in verifiability and transparency.
Much of the current debate has focused on which such proposals should be implemented and through what means -- in particular, whether federal involvement is necessary. Some states arealready addressing these issues. The Election Assistance Commission established by HAVA willhave some responsibilities relating to voting system security and could address this controversydirectly. Some observers have also proposed federal funding for research and development in thisarea, while others have proposed legislative solutions including enhancement of the auditrequirements under HAVA.