	Limitations in the Inventory Undermine Ability to Determine Extent of Civilian IC Elements’ Reliance on Contractors

Limitations in the core contract personnel inventory hinder the ability to  determine the extent to which the eight civilian IC elements used these  personnel in 2010 and 2011 and to identify how this usage has changed  over time. IC CHCO uses the inventory information in its statutorily- mandated annual personnel assessment to compare the current and  projected number and costs of core contract personnel to the number and  costs during the prior 5 years. Additionally, IC CHCO did not clearly explain  the effect of the limitations when reporting the information to Congress. We identified several issues that limit the comparability, accuracy, and  consistency of the information reported by the civilian IC elements as a  whole including:
Changes to the definition of core contract personnel. IC CHCO explained in both documents that this  civilian IC element’s rebaselining had an effect on the element’s  reported number of contractor personnel for fiscal year 2010 but did  not explain how this would limit the comparability of the number and  costs of core contract personnel for both this civilian IC element and  the IC as a whole. Most of the civilian IC  elements did not maintain readily available documentation of the  information used to calculate the number of FTEs reported for a  significant number of the records we reviewed. For 37  percent of the 287 records we reviewed, however, we could not  determine the reliability of the information reported. For example, we found that the civilian IC  elements either under- or over-reported the amount of contract  obligations by more than 10 percent for approximately one-fifth of the  287 records we reviewed. Inventory Provides Limited Insight into Functions Performed by Contractors and Reasons for Their Use

The civilian IC elements have used core contract personnel to perform a  range of functions, including human capital, information technology,  program management, administration, collection and operations, and  security services, among others. However, the aforementioned limitations  we identified in the obligation and FTE data precluded us from using the  information on contractor functions to determine the number of personnel  and their costs associated with each function category. Further, the  civilian IC elements could not provide documentation for 40 percent of the  contracts we reviewed to support the reasons they cited for using core  contract personnel. Limited Progress Has Been Made in Developing Policies and Strategies on Contractor Use to Mitigate Risks

CIA, ODNI, and the executive departments that are responsible for  developing policies to address risks related to contractors for the six  civilian IC elements within those departments have generally made  limited progress in developing such policies. Further, the eight civilian IC  elements have generally not developed strategic workforce plans that  address contractor use and may be missing opportunities to leverage the  inventory as a tool for conducting strategic workforce planning and for  prioritizing contracts that may require increased management attention  and oversight. Within the IC, core contract personnel perform the types of functions that  may affect an IC element’s decision-making authority or control of its  mission and operations. DHS and State had issued policies  and guidance that addressed generally all of OFPP Policy Letter 11-01’s  requirements related to contracting for services that closely support  inherently governmental functions. We also found that decisions to use contractors were not guided by  strategies on the appropriate mix of government and contract personnel. ICD 612 directs IC elements to determine, review, and evaluate the  number and uses of core contract personnel when conducting strategic  workforce planning but does not reference the requirements related to  determining the appropriate workforce mix specified in OMB’s July 2009  memorandum or require elements to document the extent to which  contractors should be used. For example, based on the  contract documents we reviewed, we identified at least 128 instances in  the 287 records we reviewed in which the functions reported in the  inventory data did not reflect the full range of services listed in the  contracts. In our January 2014 report, we concluded that without  complete and accurate information in the core contract personnel  inventory on the extent to which contractors are performing specific  functions, the civilian IC elements may be missing an opportunity to  leverage the inventory as a tool for conducting strategic workforce  planning and for prioritizing contracts that may require increased  management attention and oversight. To  improve the ability of the civilian IC elements to strategically plan for their  contractors and mitigate associated risks, we also recommended that IC  CHCO revise ICD 612 to require IC elements to identify their assessment  of the appropriate workforce mix on a function-by-function basis, assess  how the core contract personnel inventory could be modified to provide  better insights into the functions performed by contractors, and require  the IC elements to identify contracts within the inventory that include  services that are critical or closely support inherently governmental  functions. IC CHCO generally agreed with these recommendations and  indicated it would explore ways to address the recommendations.
Why GAO Did This Study

The IC uses core contract personnel to augment its workforce. These contractors typically work alongside government personnel and perform staff-like work. Some core contract personnel require enhanced oversight because they perform services that could significantly influence the government's decision making.
In September 2013, GAO issued a classified report that addressed (1) the extent to which the eight civilian IC elements use core contract personnel, (2) the functions performed by these personnel and the reasons for their use, and (3) whether the elements developed policies and strategically planned for their use. GAO reviewed and assessed the reliability of the elements' core contract personnel inventory data for fiscal years 2010 and 2011, including reviewing a nongeneralizable sample of 287 contract records. GAO also reviewed agency acquisition policies and workforce plans and interviewed agency officials. In January 2014, GAO issued an unclassified version of the September 2013 report, GAO-14-204 . This statement is based on the information in the unclassified GAO report.

What GAO Found

Limitations in the intelligence community's (IC) inventory of contract personnel hinder the ability to determine the extent to which the eight civilian IC elements—the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), and six components within the Departments of Energy, Homeland Security, Justice, State, and the Treasury—use these personnel. The IC Chief Human Capital Officer (CHCO) conducts an annual inventory of core contract personnel that includes information on the number and costs of these personnel. However, GAO identified a number of limitations in the inventory that collectively limit the comparability, accuracy, and consistency of the information reported by the civilian IC elements as a whole. For example, changes to the definition of core contract personnel limit the comparability of the information over time. In addition, the civilian IC elements used various methods to calculate the number of contract personnel and did not maintain documentation to validate the number of personnel reported for 37 percent of the records GAO reviewed. GAO also found that the civilian IC elements either under- or over-reported the amount of contract obligations by more than 10 percent for approximately one-fifth of the records GAO reviewed. Further, IC CHCO did not fully disclose the effects of such limitations when reporting contract personnel and cost information to Congress, which limits its transparency and usefulness.
The civilian IC elements used core contract personnel to perform a range of functions, such as information technology and program management, and reported in the core contract personnel inventory on the reasons for using these personnel. However, limitations in the information on the number and cost of core contract personnel preclude the information on contractor functions from being used to determine the number of personnel and their costs associated with each function. Further, civilian IC elements reported in the inventory a number of reasons for using core contract personnel, such as the need for unique expertise, but GAO found that 40 percent of the contract records reviewed did not contain evidence to support the reasons reported.
Collectively, CIA, ODNI, and the departments responsible for developing policies to address risks related to contractors for the other six civilian IC elements have made limited progress in developing those policies, and the civilian IC elements have generally not developed strategic workforce plans that address contractor use. Only the Departments of Homeland Security and State have issued policies that generally address all of the Office of Federal Procurement Policy's requirements related to contracting for services that could affect the government's decision-making authority. In addition, IC CHCO requires the elements to conduct strategic workforce planning but does not require the elements to determine the appropriate mix of government and contract personnel. Further, the inventory does not provide insight into the functions performed by contractors, in particular those that could inappropriately influence the government's control over its decisions. Without complete and accurate information in the inventory on the extent to which contractors are performing specific functions, the elements may be missing an opportunity to leverage the inventory as a tool for conducting strategic workforce planning and for prioritizing contracts that may require increased management attention and oversight.

What GAO Recommends

In the January 2014 report, GAO recommended that IC CHCO take several actions to improve the inventory data's reliability, revise strategic workforce planning guidance, and develop ways to identify contracts for services that could affect the government's decision-making authority. IC CHCO generally agreed with GAO's recommendations.