If USCIS  grants asylum to the applicant, the asylee is eligible to apply for  adjustment to lawful permanent resident (LPR) status after 1 year. The Number of Asylum Applications Filed per Fiscal Year Has Increased Every Year from 2010 to 2014

		The Number of Asylum Applications Filed in Fiscal Year 2014 Is More than Double the Total Filed in Fiscal Year 2010

The total number of asylum applications (principal applicants and their  eligible dependents), including affirmative and defensive applications,  increased from 47,118 in fiscal year 2010 to 108,152 in fiscal year 2014,  an increase of 130 percent. USCIS’s backlog of principal affirmative asylum  applications as of September 2015 was 106,121. DHS and DOJ Have Limited Capabilities to Detect and Prevent Asylum Fraud

		DHS and DOJ Have Established Dedicated Antifraud Entities

Both DHS and DOJ have established dedicated antifraud entities, a  leading practice for managing fraud risks. For example,
As of March 2014, a joint fraud investigation led by the U.S. Attorney’s  Office for the Southern District of New York, the Federal Bureau of  Investigation (FBI), the New York City Police Department, and USCIS,  known as Operation Fiction Writer, resulted in charges against 30  defendants, including 8 attorneys, for their alleged participation in  immigration fraud schemes in New York City. Without regularly identifying and assessing  fraud risks and determining the fraud risk tolerance in immigration courts,  EOIR does not have complete information on the inherent fraud risks that  may affect the integrity of the defensive asylum process and therefore  does not have reasonable assurance that it has implemented controls to  mitigate those risks. USCIS Has Limited Capability to Detect Fraud in Affirmative Asylum Applications

			USCIS’s Capability to Identify Patterns of Fraud across Asylum Applications is Limited

USCIS  uses various tools to attempt to identify fraud in specific  affirmative asylum applications. Further, USCIS’s tools for detecting patterns of fraud across affirmative  asylum applications are limited because USCIS relies on a paper-based  system for asylum applications. Asylum officers and FDNS immigration officers told  us that they can identify potential fraud by manually analyzing trends  across asylum applications they review. FDNS Has Not Established Clear Responsibilities for Fraud Detection in Asylum Offices

FDNS has not established clear responsibilities related to fraud detection  for its immigration officers in asylum offices, and FDNS fraud detection  activities vary widely by asylum office. FDNS immigration  officers we spoke with in all eight asylum offices stated that they have  limited guidance about their roles and responsibilities with respect to  fraud detection, and officers at seven of the eight offices stated that the  limited guidance creates challenges for them in addressing asylum  fraud. USCIS data indicate that USCIS terminated the asylum  status of 374 individuals for fraud from fiscal years 2010 through 2014. In August 2015, the Asylum Division adopted a new target of  180 days for conducting initial termination reviews that applies solely for  cases with pending applications for adjustment to LPR. USCIS’s new  180-day target for conducting initial termination review for cases with  pending applications to adjust to LPR is a positive step; however,  developing and implementing timeliness goals for all pending termination  reviews of asylees granted affirmative asylum would help USCIS to better  identify the staffing resources needed to address the terminations  workload and better utilize existing resources to address potential fraud  before asylees adjust to LPR or receive other immigration or federal  benefits. DHS and DOJ could  be better positioned to assess and address fraud risks across their  asylum processes. To provide reasonable assurance that USCIS’s fraud prevention  controls are adequate and effectively implemented, and ensure that  asylum officers and FDNS immigration officers have the capacity to  detect and prevent fraud, we recommend that the Secretary of  Homeland Security direct USCIS to take the following ten actions:  conduct regular fraud risk assessments across the affirmative asylum  application process; develop and implement a mechanism to collect reliable data, such as the number of referrals to FDNS from asylum officers, about FDNS’s efforts to combat asylum fraud; identify and implement tools that asylum officers and FDNS immigration officers can use to detect potential fraud patterns across affirmative asylum applications; require FDNS immigration officers to prescreen all asylum  applications for indicators of fraud to the extent that it is cost-effective and feasible; develop asylum-specific guidance on the fraud detection roles and responsibilities of FDNS immigration officers working in asylum  offices; develop and deliver additional training for asylum officers on asylum  fraud; develop and implement a mechanism to regularly collect and incorporate feedback on training needs from asylum officers and  supervisory asylum officers; develop and implement a method to collect reliable data on asylum  officer attrition; include a review of potential fraud indicators in future random quality assurance reviews of asylum applications; and develop and implement timeliness goals for all pending termination  reviews of affirmative asylum cases. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

Our objectives were to (1) describe what Department of Homeland  Security (DHS) and Department of Justice (DOJ) data indicate about  trends in the characteristics of asylum claims, (2) evaluate the extent to  which DHS and DOJ have designed mechanisms to prevent and detect  fraud in the asylum system, and (3) evaluate the extent to which DHS and  DOJ have designed and implemented processes to address any fraud  that has been identified in the asylum system.
Why GAO Did This Study

Each year, tens of thousands of aliens in the United States apply for asylum, which provides refuge to those who have been persecuted or fear persecution on protected grounds. Asylum officers in DHS's USCIS and immigration judges in DOJ's EOIR adjudicate asylum applications.
GAO was asked to review the status of the asylum system. This report addresses (1) what DHS and DOJ data indicate about trends in asylum claims, (2) the extent to which DHS and DOJ have designed mechanisms to prevent and detect asylum fraud, and (3) the extent to which DHS and DOJ designed and implemented processes to address any asylum fraud that has been identified. GAO analyzed DHS and DOJ data on asylum applications for fiscal years 2010 through 2014, reviewed DHS and DOJ policies and procedures related to asylum fraud, and interviewed DHS and DOJ officials in Washington, D.C., Falls Church, VA, and in asylum offices and immigration courts across the country selected on the basis of application data and other factors.

What GAO Found

The total number of asylum applications, including both principal applicants and their eligible dependents, filed in fiscal year 2014 (108,152) is more than double the number filed in fiscal year 2010 (47,118). As of September 2015, the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) has a backlog of 106,121 principal applicants, of which 64,254 have exceeded required time frames for adjudication. USCIS plans to hire additional staff to address the backlog.
USCIS and the Department of Justice's (DOJ) Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) have limited capabilities to detect asylum fraud. First, while both USCIS and EOIR have mechanisms to investigate fraud in individual applications, neither agency has assessed fraud risks across the asylum process, in accordance with leading practices for managing fraud risks. Various cases of fraud illustrate risks that may affect the integrity of the asylum system. For example, an investigation in New York resulted in charges against 30 defendants as of March 2014 for their alleged participation in immigration fraud schemes; 829 applicants associated with the attorneys and preparers charged in the case received asylum from USCIS, and 3,709 received asylum from EOIR. Without regular assessments of fraud risks, USCIS and EOIR lack reasonable assurance that they have implemented controls to mitigate those risks. Second, USCIS's capability to identify patterns of fraud across asylum applications is hindered because USCIS relies on a paper-based system for asylum applications and does not electronically capture some key information that could be used to detect fraud, such as the applicant's written statement. Asylum officers and USCIS Fraud Detection and National Security (FDNS) Directorate immigration officers told GAO that they can identify potential fraud by analyzing trends across asylum applications; however, they must rely on labor-intensive methods to do so. Identifying and implementing additional fraud detection tools could enable USCIS to detect fraud more effectively while using resources more efficiently. Third, FDNS has not established clear fraud detection responsibilities for its immigration officers in asylum offices; FDNS officers we spoke with at all eight asylum offices told GAO they have limited guidance with respect to fraud. FDNS standard operating procedures for fraud detection are intended to apply across USCIS, and therefore do not reflect the unique features of the asylum system. Developing asylum-specific guidance for fraud detection, in accordance with federal internal control standards, would better position FDNS officers to understand their roles and responsibilities in the asylum process.
To address identified instances of asylum fraud, USCIS can, in some cases, terminate an individual's asylum status. USCIS terminated the asylum status of 374 people from fiscal years 2010 through 2014 for fraud. In August 2015, USCIS adopted a target of 180 days for conducting initial reviews, in which the asylum office reviews evidence and decides whether to begin termination proceedings, when the asylee has applied for adjustment to lawful permanent resident status; however, this goal applies only to a subset of asylees and pertains to initial reviews. Further, asylees with pending termination reviews may be eligible to receive certain federal benefits. Developing timeliness goals for all pending termination reviews would help USCIS better identify the staffing resources needed to address the terminations workload.

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that DHS and DOJ conduct regular fraud risk assessments and that DHS, among other things, implement tools for detecting fraud patterns, develop asylum-specific guidance for fraud detection roles and responsibilities, and implement timeliness goals for pending termination reviews. DHS and DOJ concurred with GAO's recommendations.