DOD Has Developed an Approach to Improve Stability Operations Capabilities, but Faces Challenges in Identifying Capability Gaps and Measures of Effectiveness

DOD has developed and continues to evolve an approach to enhance its  stability operations capabilities, but it has encountered challenges in  identifying capability gaps and developing measures of effectiveness,  which are critical to successfully executing this approach. Specifically, the department has:   (1) formalized a new stability operations policy that elevated stability  operations to a core mission and gave them priority comparable to combat  operations, and assigned numerous responsibilities to DOD organizations,  (2) expanded DOD’s planning construct to more fully address stability  operations, and (3) defined a new joint operating concept that will serve as  a basis for how the military will support stabilization, security, transition,  and reconstruction operations in the next 15 to 20 years. However, DOD  has made limited progress in identifying and prioritizing needed  capabilities, and in developing measures of effectiveness, which are  critical steps required by DOD’s new directive and important tenets of  performance-based management. This directive reflects a fundamental shift in DOD’s policy  because it designates stability operations as a core mission that shall be  given priority comparable to combat operations and emphasizes that  integrated military and civilian efforts are key to successful stability  operations efforts. DOD Lacks Adequate Mechanisms to Facilitate Interagency Planning for Stability Operations

DOD is taking steps to develop more comprehensive plans related to  stability operations, but it has not established adequate mechanisms to  facilitate and encourage interagency participation in the development of  military plans developed by the combatant commanders. Limited Guidance, Information Sharing and Training Hinder Interagency Participation in the Development of Military Plans

Combatant Commanders have achieved limited interagency participation  in the development of military plans because: (1) DOD has not provided  specific guidance to commanders on how to integrate planning with non- DOD organizations, (2) DOD practices inhibit the appropriate sharing of  planning information with non-DOD organizations, and (3) DOD and non- DOD organizations lack an understanding of each other’s planning  processes and capabilities, and non-DOD organizations have limited  capacity to fully engage in DOD’s planning efforts. Without clear guidance to the combatant commanders on how to establish  adequate mechanisms to facilitate and encourage interagency  participation in planning at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of  planning, a process to share planning information as plans are being  developed, and methods to orient and include professional planners from  key organizations in DOD’s planning process, the contributions and  capabilities of these organizations may not be fully integrated into DOD’s  plans, and a unified government approach may not be achieved. Inadequate Guidance, Information Systems, and Processes Contribute to Inconsistent Use of Lessons Learned in Stability Operations Planning

DOD planners are not consistently using lessons learned from past  operations as they develop future contingency plans. Lessons learned from current and past operations  are being captured and incorporated into various databases, but our  analysis indicates that DOD planners are not using this information on a  consistent basis as plans are revised or developed. Three factors  contribute to this inconsistent use of lessons learned in planning:   (1) DOD’s guidance for incorporating lessons learned into plans is  outdated and does not specifically require planners to include lessons  learned in the planning process, (2) accessing and searching lessons- learned databases is cumbersome, and (3) the planning review process  does not evaluate the extent to which lessons learned are incorporated  into specific plans. We interviewed  officials at the Department of State’s Office of the Coordinator for  Reconstruction and Stabilization, the Bureau of Political Military Affairs,  and the United States Agency for International Development to obtain  other agencies’ perspectives regarding DOD’s planning process and the  inclusion of non-DOD perspectives in contingency plans.
Why GAO Did This Study

Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has frequently been involved in stability and/or reconstruction operations that typically last 5 to 8 years and surpass combat operations in the cost of human lives and dollars. A 2005 presidential directive requires DOD and State to integrate stability activities with military contingency plans. GAO was asked to address (1) DOD's approach to enhance stability operations capabilities, and challenges that have emerged in implementing its approach; (2) DOD planning for stability operations and the extent of interagency involvement; and (3) the extent to which DOD is applying lessons learned in future plans. To address these issues, GAO assessed DOD policy and planning documents, reviewed planning efforts at three combatant commands, and evaluated DOD's use of lessons learned. GAO is also conducting a related study of the Department of State's efforts to lead and coordinate stability operations.

What GAO Found

DOD has taken several steps to improve planning for stability operations, but faces challenges in developing capabilities and measures of effectiveness, integrating the contributions of non-DOD agencies into military contingency plans, and incorporating lessons learned into future plans. These challenges may hinder DOD's ability to develop sound plans. Since November 2005, the department issued a new policy, expanded its military planning guidance, and defined a joint operating concept to help guide DOD planning for the next 15-20 years. These steps reflect a fundamental shift in DOD's policy because they elevate stability operations as a core mission comparable to combat operations and emphasize that military and civilian efforts must be integrated. However, DOD has yet to identify and prioritize the full range of capabilities needed for stability operations because DOD has not provided clear guidance on how and when to accomplish this task. As a result, the services are pursuing initiatives to address capability shortfalls that may not reflect the comprehensive set of capabilities that will be needed by combatant commanders to effectively accomplish stability operations in the future. Similarly, DOD has made limited progress in developing measures of effectiveness because of weaknesses in DOD's guidance. DOD is taking steps to develop more comprehensive military plans related to stability operations, but it has not established adequate mechanisms to facilitate and encourage interagency participation in its planning efforts. At the combatant commands, DOD has established working groups with representatives from several key organizations, but these groups and other outreach efforts by the commanders have had limited effect. Three factors cause this limited and inconsistent interagency participation in DOD's planning process: (1) DOD has not provided specific guidance to commanders on how to integrate planning with non-DOD organizations, (2) DOD practices inhibit sharing of planning information, and (3) DOD and non-DOD organizations lack a full understanding of each other's planning processes, and non-DOD organizations have had a limited capacity to participate in DOD's full range of planning activities. Although DOD collects lessons learned from past operations, planners are not consistently using this information as they develop future contingency plans. At all levels within the department, GAO found that information from current and past operations are being captured and incorporated into various databases. However, planners are not consistently using this information because (1) DOD's guidance for incorporating lessons into its plans is outdated and does not specifically require planners to take this step, (2) accessing lessons-learned databases is cumbersome, and (3) the review process does not evaluate the extent to which lessons learned are incorporated into specific plans.