Flight Safety Aircraft Parts Program

DOD also has a program to identify and prevent parts with potential flight safety risks from being sold through the disposal process. This situation occurred because (1) the military services assigned the wrong demilitarization codes to parts with military technology that needed to be protected, (2) an initiative intended to correct inaccurately assigned demilitarization codes did not ensure that data systems were updated with the corrected codes, and (3) the methods DOD used to demilitarize some parts did not adequately destroy the military technology contained in the parts. 2). Conclusions

While DOD recognizes the dangers associated with selling surplus parts with military technology to the public and has taken certain actions to address the problem, DOD’s disposal offices have inadvertently sold surplus parts with military technology intact. These sales occurred for three reasons. Because guidance was inadequate, codes assigned to parts with military technology incorrectly indicated that the parts did not contain the technology. DOD has been considering ways to address this situation but has not yet reached a final decision. As a result, disposal offices continued to sell parts with military technology intact after the codes for the parts were determined to be inaccurately assigned. Personnel responsible for correcting the inaccurately assigned codes did not always update their data systems with the corrected codes. Guidance to disposal offices on how to destroy the military technology inherent in some items was not adequate. DOD and its components have not aggressively pursued implementation of initiatives to prevent the sale of potentially dangerous flight safety critical aircraft parts through the disposal system. DOD and the components have not set timelines for implementing the flight safety program. Also, none of the components have fully implemented all of the program initiatives, but some have made greater progress than others. For example, at the time our fieldwork was completed, the Army had identified over 4,500 aircraft parts with flight safety implications, whereas the Navy had not identified any aircraft parts with these implications. DOD plans to increase its interaction and involvement in the program, but the military services and the Defense Logistics Agency continue to have problems accomplishing flight safety program initiatives. Recommendations

We recommend that the Secretary of Defense take the following actions to prevent the sale of parts with military technology and flight safety implications.
Why GAO Did This Study

Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Department of Defense's (DOD) disposal process for surplus parts with both military technology and flight safety risks, focusing on DOD's efforts to: (1) identify and destroy parts with military technology; and (2) implement a flight safety program to prevent aircraft parts with potential flight safety risks from being sold through the disposal process.

What GAO Found

GAO noted that: (1) while DOD recognizes the dangers associated with selling surplus parts with military technology to the public and has taken certain actions to address the problem, DOD's disposal offices have inadvertently sold surplus parts with military technology intact; (2) these sales occurred for three reasons; (3) the military services assigned the wrong demilitarization codes to the parts; (4) because guidance was inadequate, codes assigned to parts with military technology incorrectly indicated that the parts did not contain the technology; (5) DOD has been considering ways to address this situation but has not yet reached a final decision; (6) an initiative intended to correct inaccurately assigned demilitarization codes did not ensure that data systems were updated with the corrected codes; (7) as a result, disposal offices continued to sell parts with military technology intact after the codes for the parts were determined to be inaccurately assigned; (8) personnel responsible for correcting the inaccurately assigned codes did not always update their data systems with the corrected codes; (9) the methods that the disposal offices used to demilitarize some parts did not adequately destroy the military technology contained in the parts; (10) guidance to disposal offices on how to destroy the military technology inherent in some items was not adequate; (11) DOD and its components have not aggressively pursued implementation of initiatives to prevent the sale of potentially dangerous flight safety critical aircraft parts through the disposal system; (12) DOD and the components have not set timelines for implementing the flight safety program; (13) also, none of the components have fully implemented all of the program initiatives, but some have made greater progress than others; (14) for example, at the time GAO's fieldwork was completed, the Army had identified over 4,500 aircraft parts with flight safety implications, whereas the Navy had not identified any aircraft parts with these implications; and (15) DOD plans to increase its interaction and involvement in the program, but the military services and the Defense Logistics Agency continue to have problems accomplishing flight safety program initiatives.