As of the end  of fiscal year 2007, State had obligated more than $5.9 billion for this  program, awarded contracts for the construction of 78 new embassy and  consulate compounds, and completed more than 50 new facilities. State has identified the following four goals for CSUP:  to provide physical security protection to the extent practical for existing  facilities; to provide physical security upgrades to meet current security standards  for those facilities that will not be replaced by a NEC in the near-term; to initiate physical security upgrades at facilities that are not part of the  chancery compound, including annexes, public diplomacy facilities, and  warehouses; and to provide security upgrades to nongovernmental facilities (“soft targets”)  frequented by U.S. citizens. 1). The DS analysis currently focuses  on embassy and consulate compounds, though DS is developing a risk- based prioritization process that considers the number of personnel,  threats, and vulnerabilities at each facility, including off-compound  facilities. OBO has improved its process for developing projects by  conducting more comprehensive needs assessments of posts, including  off-compound facilities, early in the design phase. DS Priority Assessments Focus on Main Compounds, but Efforts Are Being Made to Address All Post Facilities

According to OBO and DS officials, the DS physical security assessment is  currently based on the physical security needs of each post’s main  compound but does not factor in the security of facilities located outside  the main embassy or consulate compound, even though hundreds of such  facilities exist. CSUP Projects Generally Completed within Contractual Time Frames and Costs, and OBO Has Project Management Procedures to Help Ensure Completion

While most CSUP projects we reviewed have been completed within their  contractual time frames and costs, OBO found it necessary to modify all  but one of the contracts to extend project time frames, adjust costs, or  both. In reviewing schedule performance data, we found  that 96 percent of projects were completed within 30 days of their  contractual completion date (see fig. However, we found that OBO  modified the contracts to extend their completion dates for 81 percent of  the projects. Many of these extensions did not result in  increased costs to the government. For each of the 47 projects, OBO paid the contractor the amount specified  in the fixed-price contracts—an average project cost of $2.6 million. OBO cited factors outside the contractor’s control as the cause of most of  the delays and cost increases, such as unusually lengthy local permitting  processes, previously unidentified underground utilities that needed to be  moved, design changes that OBO made during construction work, and  project changes requested by the post. For each CSUP project, OBO  assigns a project manager who is responsible for the effective completion  of the project. At the 11 posts we visited with ongoing or completed CSUP projects, we  found that the projects had enhanced posts’ compliance with State’s  physical security standards as detailed in the “Foreign Affairs Handbook”  and “Foreign Affairs Manual.” The projects we viewed added or enhanced  pedestrian and vehicle access points, replaced perimeter fencing to meet  anti-climb requirements, installed bollards and barriers at key points to  meet anti-ram requirements, built safe areas for post officials in case of  attack, enhanced the hard line separating post employees from visitors,  and installed forced entry/ballistic-resistant windows and doors. For example, most of the posts we visited were  located in dense urban areas that prevented them from achieving a 100- foot setback from the street, one of the key security standards (see fig. As a result, many buildings and their  occupants may remain vulnerable to attack. Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

The Department of State provided written comments on a draft of this  report, which are reproduced in appendix II. State agreed with our  findings, noting that the report accurately describes State’s CSUP efforts. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

To discuss the factors that the Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations  (OBO) considers as it plans and prioritizes Compound Security Upgrades  Program (CSUP) projects, we reviewed Department of State (State)  prioritization and planning documents concerning the assignment of post  threat levels, assessments of the security vulnerabilities of posts, and  CSUP. To review the extent to which State’s CSUP efforts have enhanced posts’  ability to comply with State’s physical security standards, we reviewed the  project authorization memoranda, contract modifications, and OBO  summary document on each of the 47 CSUP projects. To confirm our initial findings, we  traveled to 11 posts in Latin America, Europe, and the Middle East that  had recently completed or ongoing CSUP projects. Washington, D.C.:  September 28, 2004.
Why GAO Did This Study

Following the 1998 embassy bombings, the Department of State (State) determined that more than 85 percent of diplomatic facilities did not meet security standards and were vulnerable to terrorist attacks. State's Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations (OBO) has undertaken a program to replace or upgrade the security of these facilities. As of 2007, OBO had constructed more than 50 new embassies and moved nearly 15,000 staff to safer facilities. However, most remaining facilities will not be replaced in the near term. To address these facilities, OBO has obligated about $140 million per year for its Compound Security Upgrade Program (CSUP). GAO was asked to (1) describe the process that OBO follows to prioritize and plan CSUP projects, including stakeholder involvement; (2) determine the extent to which CSUP projects met contracted cost and time frames and whether OBO has procedures to ensure security upgrades are installed; and (3) assess whether State's CSUP efforts have enhanced posts' abilities to comply with State's physical security standards. To address these objectives, GAO reviewed pertinent State documents, met with State officials in Washington, D.C., and overseas, and traveled to 11 posts in Latin America, Europe, and the Middle East. State provided written comments on a draft of this report and agreed with our findings.

What GAO Found

OBO has a threat- and vulnerability-based process for prioritizing which posts receive CSUP projects and a planning process that utilizes input from State's Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS) and post officials. DS assessments are currently based on physical security of each post's main compound, although many posts have facilities located outside the compound. DS is developing a prioritization process that will factor in the number of personnel, threat levels, and vulnerabilities at each facility, including those off compound. OBO has improved its planning processes by conducting a comprehensive survey of posts' physical security needs, including off-compound facilities. GAO found that 96 percent of 47 projects undertaken since fiscal year 2004 were completed within 30 days of their contractual completion date. However, OBO modified 81 percent of the contracts to extend their completion dates. GAO also found that while OBO paid the contractors the amount specified in the contracts, contract modifications resulted in cost adjustments to all but two contracts, which GAO found in prior work is not uncommon in government renovation projects. OBO cited factors outside the contractors' control as the cause of most delays and cost increases, such as lengthy local permitting issues. To help ensure security upgrades contracted for are completed, OBO assigns a project manager who is responsible for the project's completion and relies on regional and post officials to provide additional monitoring. CSUP projects have enhanced posts' compliance with physical security standards by constructing compound access control facilities, safe areas for post personnel, and compound walls and barriers. However, at the 11 posts GAO visited, site conditions prevented them from adhering fully with standards. For example, more than one post's urban location prevented it from achieving a 100-foot setback from the street, a key security standard. As a result, many buildings and their occupants may remain vulnerable to attack.