	Introduction

Congress and the Department of Defense (DOD) are engaged in an extended discourse overthe future direction of U.S. defense strategy and military force structure. (1) In the past, these discussionshave focused almost exclusively on questions related to U.S. conventional military forces, withdiscussions about nuclear weapons held in separate fora. However, the 2005 Quadrennial DefenseReview (QDR) examined both nuclear and conventional forces, a first in the QDR's history. (2) As a result, this indicates thatanalysts both inside and outside government are beginning to review and assess the relationshipbetween conventional and nuclear weapons. A key question for contemporary defense planners is what proportion of U.S. militarycapabilities should be focused on traditional military challenges and what proportion should befocused on non-traditional challenges, such as "irregular, disruptive and catastrophic" threats? Owing to growing concerns about controlling the overall size of the federal budget, itappears that pressure is building on DOD leaders to make strategy and force structure decisions withcost-effectiveness in mind. Deterrence. To effectively analyze the desired size and characteristics of tomorrow's military, some arguethat we must take "a hard look at feasible, real-world contingencies." Analysis

The analysis that follows seeks to study the role that U.S. nuclear and conventional forcesmight play in four stages of each potential conflict: deterrence prior to the start of the conflict; crisisstability in the early stages of the conflict; warfighting during the height of the conflict; and wartermination. (60) 

	Potential Implications

A possible conflict with China attracts considerable attention from defense planners becauseit is a regional competitor today and could over time grow to be a "near-peer" competitor. Analystscan also easily identify flashpoints where the two nations might meet and feel compelled to defendnational interests. Conclusion

This report highlights a number of policy issues that may bear consideration in the ongoingdebate regarding investments in conventional and nuclear forces:
It appears that China and the United States currently have a stable deterrentrelationship. Nuclear and conventional military capabilities can simultaneously havepositive effects on deterrence or warfighting, and negative effects on crisis stability or wartermination objectives. Therefore, it may be overly simplistic to make changes in military forcestructure or capabilities to improve deterrence, for example, without considering potential effectson crisis stability, for example. Investments in military capabilities that may positively contribute to allpotential stages of military conflict (e.g. deterrence, crisis stability, warfighting, and wartermination), might be preferred to investments that have a mixed effect on the potential range ofconflict.
Congress and the Department of Defense (DOD) are engaged in an extended discourse overthe future direction of U.S. defense strategy and military force structure. In the past, thesediscussions have focused almost exclusively on questions related to U.S. conventional militaryforces, with discussions about nuclear weapons held in separate fora. However, the 2005Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) examined both nuclear and conventional forces, a first in theQDR's history. This indicates that analysts both inside and outside government are beginning toreview and assess the potential deterrent and operational relationship between conventional andnuclear weapons.
It appears that considerable pressure is building on DOD leaders to make strategy and forcestructure decisions with cost-effectiveness in mind. A key question for contemporary defenseplanners is what proportion of U.S. military capabilities should be focused on traditional militarychallenges and what proportion should be focused on non-traditional challenges, such as "irregular,disruptive and catastrophic" threats?
To effectively analyze the desired size and characteristics of tomorrow's military, some arguethat we must take a hard look at feasible, real-world contingencies. A possible conflict with Chinaattracts considerable attention from defense planners because it is a regional competitor today andcould over time grow to be a "near-peer" competitor. Analysts can also easily identify flashpointswhere the two nations might meet and feel compelled to defend national interests.
The analysis that follows seeks to explore the possible role that U.S. nuclear andconventional forces might play in four stages of potential conflicts: deterrence, prior to the start ofthe conflict; crisis stability in the early stages of the conflict; warfighting during the height of theconflict; and war termination, through either a negotiated settlement or a battlefield victory.
This report highlights a number of policy issues that may bear consideration in the ongoingdebate regarding military investments. For example, this report suggests that nuclear andconventional military capabilities can simultaneously have positive effects on deterrence orwarfighting and negative effects on crisis stability or war termination objectives. Therefore, changesin military force structure or capabilities to improve deterrence, for example, should considerpotential effects on crisis stability, for example. Further, investments in military capabilities thatmay positively contribute to all potential stages of military conflict (e.g. deterrence, crisis stability,warfighting, and war termination), might be preferred to investments that have a mixed effect on thepotential range of conflict. This report will not be updated.