	The Help America Vote Act (HAVA)

The deadlocked November 2000 presidential election focused national attention on previously obscure details of election administration. 107-252 ), was enacted in October. It established requirements in the states to 
provide a provisional ballot to a voter who is not on the registration list or whose registration is in question; post a sample ballot and voter information at polling places on election day; restate the requirement for first time voters who registered by mail, to vote in person (first required by the National Voter Registration Act, NVRA) and impose a new voter identification standard; provide for voter error correction on voting systems used in federal elections; provide accessibility for persons with disabilities via at least one properly equipped voting machine per polling place; provide for manual auditing of the voting system and alternative-language accessibility; and create and maintain a computerized, verified statewide voter registration list. In addition, HAVA
required the EAC to develop voting system guidelines for computer hardware and software for voluntary use by the states, and voluntary guidance to assist states in meeting HAVA requirements; left methods of implementation to the states and prohibited rulemaking by the EAC, leaving enforcement to the U.S. Attorney General while requiring states to establish grievance procedures; and amended the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act (UOCAVA) to make improvements to voting procedures for members of the military and overseas citizens. Although many bills have been introduced to amend HAVA since it became law, only a minor change has been enacted. The outcome of the debate was that HAVA authorized appropriations for the EAC only for FY2003 through FY2005, but it did not contain a sunset provision for the agency. 1994 in the 113 th Congress, which was reported by the Committee on House Administration. None of those bills received further action. 195 would eliminate the EAC and transfer its functions to the FEC. BMDs were relatively uncommon when HAVA was enacted, but today, optical scan systems with BMDs can meet the HAVA accessibility requirements. Ballots are counted either at the polling place or the central election office. Direct recording electronic (DRE) systems . Voters mark choices via a computer interface and the voting machine records them directly to an electronic memory (either with or without a paper copy that the voter can check)—used in at least some jurisdictions in about 60% of states to meet HAVA accessibility requirements, with at least some jurisdictions in almost half of all states using it as the primary polling-place voting system. Hand-counted paper ballots . Most states require that their systems be tested for conformance with EAC guidelines. Election Administration Improvements. Administered by Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). As with all information systems, those computers are potentially vulnerable to unauthorized access aimed at stealing, deleting, modifying, or otherwise affecting the confidentially, integrity, or availability of the information they store or process. Such vulnerabilities apply not only to systems with Internet connectivity but also those that can be accessed through other means such as memory cards or other peripheral devices. In response to such concerns, many states enacted requirements for paper ballot records that can be verified by the voter and used in recounts. More than 90% of HAVA payments to states were appropriated in FY2003 and FY2004. In 2016, documented intrusions into systems of state and local election offices and political organizations have amplified concerns about foreign influence. For those and other reasons, many observers expect that the risk of impacts of attempted intrusions is minimal at present. That could create problems in elections in several ways. Both DRE and optical scan voting systems are potentially vulnerable to such attacks. In light of the documented breaches and concerns about security, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has offered assistance to states in addressing the security of their election systems, in addition to the efforts of the EAC. 5819 , S. 3214 ); amend HAVA to require that voting systems use voter-verifiable paper ballots and meet other requirements, provide additional requirements payments to states, require manual audits of election results, provide the EAC with rulemaking authority, and establish other election administration requirements ( H.R. The EAC has been criticized by some for exceeding its authority, or for being slow, ineffectual, or even unnecessary. Others believe that the agency is a necessary federal resource for improving election administration and has been hampered by budgetary constraints and difficulties in the nomination process for commissioners. The final appropriation ( P.L. FY2010
For FY2010, the President's budget request included $16.5 million for the Election Assistance Commission (EAC) and $106 million for election reform payments to states, with $5.26 million for protection and advocacy programs and $12.15 million for accessibility payments administered by HHS, as in FY2009.
The deadlocked November 2000 presidential election focused national attention on previously obscure details of election administration. Congress responded with the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA; P.L. 107-252). HAVA created the Election Assistance Commission (EAC), established a set of election administration requirements, and provided federal funding, but it did not supplant state and local control over election administration. Several issues have arisen or persisted in the years since HAVA was enacted.
Some observers have criticized the EAC for being obtrusive, slow, ineffectual, or even unnecessary. Others believe that the agency is an important resource for improving the election administration. The EAC lacked a quorum of commissioners between 2011 and 2015.
HAVA requires computerized state voter registration systems, and its voting-system requirements promote the use of electronic voting systems. However, those systems, especially the kinds that record votes directly into a computer's memory (DREs), raise concerns about security and reliability. In response, many states have enacted requirements for paper ballot records that can be verified by the voter and used in recounts.
All states now use paper-based optical scan systems for at least some voters, and most use them in at least some polling places. DRE systems are also used in most states, in many cases to meet HAVA accessibility requirements, but in several states to serve as the primary voting system in at least some jurisdictions. Several states also have jurisdictions that still use hand-counted paper ballots.
Both DRE and optical scan voting systems are computerized, with votes counted electronically. All computerized systems, whether used in the polling place or the election office, are potentially vulnerable to unauthorized access aimed at stealing, deleting, or modifying the information that the systems store or process. Such vulnerabilities apply not only to systems with Internet connectivity but also those that can be accessed electronically through other means, such as memory cards.
Documented intrusions into systems of state and local election offices and political organizations in 2016 have amplified concerns about attempts by nation-states such as Russia, or by nonstate actors, to use tampering or disinformation campaigns to influence the election. The Department of Homeland Security and the EAC are providing assistance to states to help them secure their systems. Whether such actions will be sufficient is a subject of ongoing debate, although many observers expect that the risk of tampering is minimal.
HAVA's limited voter-identification provisions did not resolve the longstanding controversy over whether broad identification requirements are needed to prevent voter fraud, or whether such requirements would create an unacceptable risk of disenfranchising legitimate voters. Many states have enacted requirements that voters present identification documents at polling places. Also, while HAVA's voter-registration requirements may have improved that process, some observers have argued that more automated registration systems are needed to make further improvements.
HAVA authorized $3.65 billion in payments to states to replace voting systems and meet the requirements of the act. Congress appropriated $3.28 billion of that amount between FY2003 and FY2010. Altogether, more than $3.5 billion of HAVA funds were appropriated through FY2016: the $3.28 billion in election reform payments to states, $196 million for the EAC and its programs, and more than $129 million in accessibility payments to states, administered by the Department of Health and Human Services. Numerous bills to amend HAVA have been considered in Congress, but none have been enacted except the 2009 MOVE Act, which made some amendments relating to uniformed services and overseas voters.
In the 114th Congress, H.R. 195, reported by the Committee on House Administration, would eliminate the EAC and transfer its functions to the Federal Election Commission. House-passed appropriations bills for FY2014 and FY2015 would have defunded the EAC, but the agency has received about $10 million in final appropriations for each fiscal year since FY2012. Other bills in the 114th Congress would address a variety of issues, and some committees have held hearings on election issues, including security.