TSA also maintains a current list of  prohibited items on its public website. TSA has developed checkpoint screening standard operating procedures  that establish the process and standards by which TSOs are to screen  passengers and their carry-on items at the screening checkpoint. For  example, in 2005, TSA modified the PIL in response to a statutory  requirement to prohibit passengers from carrying any type of lighter on  their person or in their accessible property on board aircraft. TSA Considers Several Factors when Modifying the PIL, but Did Not Fully Assess Risk or Stakeholder Perspectives when Evaluating Its Small Knives Proposal

		TSA Considers Several Factors when Evaluating Potential PIL Modifications

TSA officials told us that when evaluating whether or not to change the  PIL, they generally consider the following four factors: (1) the security  risks posed by each item on the current PIL or potential item to be added,  (2) opportunities a potential change may have to improving checkpoint  screening and passenger experience, (3) harmonization with international  aviation security standards and recommended practices published by  ICAO, and (4) stakeholder perspectives on the change. TSA Did Not Fully Assess Risk Prior to Its Decision to Remove Small Knives from the PIL

As previously discussed, TSA used its risk assessment to conclude that  overall risk to aviation security would be lowered by allowing small knives  onto aircraft because security screeners would be able to better focus on  identifying higher-risk items, such as IEDs. However, TSA did not conduct  sufficient analysis to show that removing small knives would ultimately  reduce risk and improve checkpoint screening. Such an analysis would have allowed TSA to actually  measure whether airport screeners would be better able to identify  explosives if they no longer had to screen for small knives, and better  determine whether the added risk of allowing small knives onto aircraft  would be offset by potential efficiencies in screening for explosives. We previously recommended in 2007 that TSA strengthen its evaluation  of proposed modifications to the PIL and other checkpoint screening  procedures to better justify its decisions. As a result, we recommended that TSA, when operationally  testing proposed modifications to its checkpoint screening procedures,  such as the PIL, develop sound evaluation methods to assist it in  determining whether proposed procedures would achieve their intended  result, such as enhancing the agency’s ability to better detect prohibited  items, and free up existing TSO resources. Some of these groups later raised strong objections after TSA publicly  announced the change. For  example, TSA did not coordinate with or obtain input from the Aviation  Security Advisory Committee (ASAC), which is its primary external  advisory group for aviation security matters and whose membership  includes various airline industry associations.stakeholders—from whom TSA did not adequately solicit feedback— subsequently expressed strong opposition to the proposal, which  contributed to TSA reversing its decision to implement the proposal. TSA officials also stated that they would have  benefited from broader engagement earlier in the process with external  groups, such as the ASAC and flight attendants. This could help avoid rescission of those  changes after investing resources in training TSOs and informing the  general public of the change, as was the case with the proposed change  to remove small knives from the PIL. These types of analyses would be consistent with the previous  recommendation we made that TSA should strengthen its evaluation of  proposed modifications to checkpoint screening procedures. However, by not taking the necessary steps to sufficiently  consult with relevant external stakeholders who may be directly affected  by the proposal to allow small knives onto aircraft, TSA ultimately  reversed its decision to implement the small knives change to the PIL  after having already publicly announced its decision and invested  resources in training and implementation. Recommendation for Executive Action

To help ensure its proposed PIL modifications fully account for the views  of key external stakeholders in the aviation industry, we recommend that  the Transportation Security Administration’s Administrator establish a  formal process to ensure the solicitation of input from relevant external  stakeholders on proposed changes to the PIL, including when in the PIL  modification process TSA officials are to coordinate with such  stakeholders, before deciding to make a PIL change.
Why GAO Did This Study

As part of its responsibilities for securing civil aviation, TSA ensures that all passengers and their accessible property are screened and prohibits individuals from carrying onto aircraft items that it determines to be a threat.TSA maintains a public list of such items, known as the Prohibited Items List, and updates it as necessary. In March 2013, TSA announced it would modify the PIL to allow small knives and certain sporting equipment onto aircraft, stating the change would result in more efficient security screening. However, several aviation industry groups opposed the decision, leading TSA to reverse its decision to implement the change. GAO was asked to review TSA's procedures for modifying the PIL.
This report examines, among other issues, (1) on what basis TSA modifies the PIL and the extent to which TSA assessed risk when considering recent modifications to the PIL, and (2) the extent to which TSA involved stakeholders when considering these modifications. GAO reviewed TSA's standard operating procedures, risk assessment, documentation of its decisions and stakeholder outreach, and interviewed TSA officials at six airports. This is a public version of a report with Sensitive Security Information that GAO issued in December 2014. Information TSA deemed sensitive has been redacted.

What GAO Found

Transportation Security Administration (TSA) officials stated that TSA considers four factors when determining whether to make modifications to the Prohibited Items List (PIL), but the agency did not fully assess risk when considering its recent proposed PIL modifications, as GAO has previously recommended. TSA generally considers the following four factors when determining whether to modify the PIL: (1) the security risks posed by each carry-on item, (2) opportunities to improve screening operations and passenger experience, (3) harmonization with international security standards and practices, and (4) stakeholder perspectives. While TSA considered these four factors when making its March 5, 2013, decision to allow small knives and certain sporting equipment on aircraft, TSA officials also reasoned that the proposed change could help screening personnel focus less on lower-threat items, such as small knives, and more on higher-threat items, such as explosives, thereby potentially increasing security for passengers. However, TSA did not conduct sufficient analysis to show that the increased risk of allowing small knives on aircraft—as determined in its risk assessment—would be offset by a resulting reduction in risk from improved screening for explosives. GAO has previously recommended that TSA strengthen its evaluation methods for operationally testing proposed modifications to checkpoint screening procedures, including changes to the PIL. However, TSA has not consistently implemented this recommendation. Conducting additional risk analysis would have allowed TSA to actually measure whether airport screeners would be better able to identify explosives if they no longer had to screen for small knives. GAO continues to believe that TSA should develop and apply sound evaluation methods when considering modifications to the PIL, as GAO recommended in April 2007.
TSA did not effectively solicit feedback on its 2013 PIL decision from relevant external stakeholders, some of whom subsequently expressed strong opposition to the decision to remove small knives from the PIL. For example, prior to announcing its decision, TSA did not coordinate with or obtain input from the Aviation Security Advisory Committee, which is TSA's primary external advisory group for aviation security matters and whose membership includes various airline industry associations. Some relevant stakeholders, such as flight attendant groups—from whom TSA did not adequately solicit feedback—subsequently expressed strong opposition to the proposal, which contributed to TSA reversing its decision to implement the change after having already trained screening personnel for its implementation. Having a defined process and associated procedures in place to communicate with relevant stakeholders earlier in the decision-making process could allow TSA to ensure appropriate consideration of their perspectives in the decision-making process. Use of a defined process and associated procedures could also allow TSA to better avoid rescission of any future changes after investing resources in training screening personnel and informing the general public of the change—as happened in the case of TSA's 2013 PIL decision.

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that TSA establish a formal process for soliciting input from relevant external stakeholders on proposed modifications to the PIL before making changes to it. DHS agreed with the recommendation.