An attack could contaminate some square miles, disrupt the economy, cost tens of billions of dollars to remediate, increase the long-term cancer rate, and cause panic in the target area and beyond. This report examines radiation and its effects, steps to prevent, respond to, and recover from an attack, and issues for Congress. As a guide to quantities of material that should be protected, in 2003 the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) revised its Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources. Threats and Impediments

An RDD could cause prompt casualties, which would most likely come only from the explosion of a dirty bomb; panic; economic disruption, which might result if a port or city center were contaminated with radioactive material; asset denial, in which public concern over the presence of radioactive material might lead people to abandon a subway system or an area of a city for months to years; a requirement for decontamination, which would be costly; and long-term casualties resulting from exposure to or inhalation of radioactive material. Terrorists would need to learn about radiation for self-protection. Many government agencies and other entities have taken steps to secure these sources. Since 9/11, the NRC has issued orders and regulations requiring its licensees to take various measures to enhance radiation source security. The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) is a semiautonomous agency within the Department of Energy. CRS Report R40154, Detection of Nuclear Weapons and Materials: Science, Technologies, Observations , by Jonathan Medalia, discusses detection. Preventing an Attack: Global Efforts

		Securing Radioactive Sources

Because an RDD attack might occur outside the United States, or material obtained abroad might be used for an RDD attack on this nation, the United States and others—including international organizations and foreign governments—are working to secure sources worldwide. The partnership has many programs to reduce CBRN threats. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

The NRC helps regulators in other nations implement the IAEA Code of Conduct, such as by helping them develop national registries of radioactive sources, helping them with safety and security regulatory oversight, and holding workshops that describe the NRC's requirements for physical protection of materials and the U.S. regulatory framework. How Secure Are Radioactive Sources in Other Nations? According to the U.S. Department of State, "Of the 222 events reported to the IAEA from 1 July 2009 to 30 June 2010 involving radiological and nuclear materials outside legitimate control, most involved incidents overseas and roughly 10 percent occurred in the U.S. All of the incidents the U.S. reported to the IAEA during this time involved detections of radioactively contaminated materials coming into the U.S."
In 2009, the IAEA reported "a persistent problem with illicit trafficking in nuclear and other radioactive materials, with thefts, losses and other unauthorized activities and events." Accordingly, the federal government has planned for a response. Key authorities for response include the Stafford Act, P.L. In 2008, FEMA issued its "Planning Guidance for Protection and Recovery Following Radiological Dispersal Device (RDD) and Improvised Nuclear Device (IND) Incidents," which provides detailed guidance on response. Some states and localities have developed response plans and held exercises. Issues for Congress

		Priority for Countering Radiological Terrorism

What priority should be given to countering radiological vs. other forms of terrorism? (1) Despite concerns about terrorist interest in RDDs, no successful RDD attack has occurred. (3) Most planning, training, equipment, and supplies that would help respond to an RDD attack would be of use in other disasters as well, so it is difficult to determine the balance between funds to counter all hazards and those to counter RDDs only. (4) Since costs resulting from an RDD attack could be tens of billions of dollars, some measures directly relevant to an RDD attack, such as decontamination R&D and securing radioactive sources, may be cost-effective. Domestic vs. Overseas Expenditures to Secure Radioactive Sources

Where are U.S. funds to secure radioactive sources most effectively spent? One argument is that it is better to spend money to secure domestic radiological sources because if they are illicitly obtained they could be used promptly in an RDD, avoiding the risk of detection in other countries and at U.S. ports of entry. Radiation Detection Networks

While attention has focused on explosive-driven "dirty bombs," an unobtrusive RDD attack could go undetected for hours, giving material time to spread and to irradiate people. Techniques to decontaminate areas struck by an RDD would help decontaminate the much larger area struck by radioactive fallout from an IND. Waste Disposition and RDDs

Many studies have considered how to dispose of nuclear waste.
Congress has long sought, through legislation and oversight, to protect the United States against terrorist threats, especially from chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) weapons. Radiological dispersal devices (RDDs) are one type of CBRN weapon. Explosive-driven "dirty bombs" are an often-discussed type of RDD, though radioactive material can also be dispersed in other ways. This report provides background for understanding the RDD threat and responses, and presents issues for Congress.
Radioactive material is the necessary ingredient for an RDD. This material is composed of atoms that decay, emitting radiation. Some types and amounts of radiation are harmful to human health.
Terrorists have shown some interest in RDDs. They could use these weapons in an attempt to cause panic, area denial, and economic dislocation. While RDDs would be far less harmful than nuclear weapons, they are much simpler to build and the needed materials are used worldwide. Accordingly, some believe terrorists would be more likely to use RDDs than nuclear weapons. Key points include:
RDDs could contaminate areas with radioactive material, increasing long-term cancer risks, but would probably kill few people promptly. Nuclear weapons could destroy much of a city, kill tens of thousands of people, and contaminate much larger areas with fallout. Cleanup cost after an RDD attack could range from less than a billion dollars to tens of billions of dollars, depending on area contaminated, decontamination technologies used, and level of cleanup required. Terrorists would face obstacles to using RDDs, such as obtaining materials, designing an effective weapon, and avoiding detection.
Governments and organizations have taken steps to prevent an RDD attack. Domestically, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission has issued regulations to secure radioactive sources. The Department of Homeland Security develops and operates equipment to detect radioactive material. The National Nuclear Security Administration has recovered thousands of disused or abandoned sources. Some state and local governments have taken steps to prepare for an RDD attack. Internationally, the International Atomic Energy Agency has led efforts to secure radioactive sources. Its Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources offers guidance for protecting sources. The G8 Global Partnership has secured sources in Russia and elsewhere. Other nations have taken steps to secure sources as well. Key points include:
Nuclear Regulatory Commission actions have done much to instill a security culture for U.S. licensees of radioactive sources post-9/11. Many programs have sought to improve the security of radioactive sources overseas, but some incidents raise questions about security.
Should prevention fail, federal, state, and local governments have taken many measures to respond to and recover from an RDD attack. The National Response Framework "establishes a comprehensive, national, all-hazards approach to domestic incident response." The federal government has expertise and equipment to use for recovery. Key points include:
Government agencies have done much to prepare for and recover from an RDD attack. This work would help cope with other disasters. Conversely, planning for other disasters would help in the event of an RDD attack. Response planning fell short in the wake of Katrina and the Gulf oil spill, raising questions about the effectiveness of planning to respond to an RDD attack.
Issues for Congress include:
The priority for countering RDDs vs. other types of CBRN weapons. The proper balance of effort for securing domestic vs. overseas radioactive sources. Whether to establish a radiation detection system in cities; how to dispose of potentially large volumes of radioactive waste that could result from an RDD attack. Whether to modify the pace of a program for implementing certain security enhancements for U.S. radioactive sources. How to improve radiological forensics capability.
This report is an abridged version of CRS Report R41890, "Dirty Bombs": Technical Background, Attack Prevention and Response, Issues for Congress, by Jonathan Medalia.