DOD and the Military Services Do Not Consistently Address Weapon System Chemical and Biological Survivability

DOD and the military services do not consistently address weapon system  chemical and biological survivability during the acquisition process. DOD and Service Policies Do Not Establish a Clear Process for Considering and Testing Weapon System Chemical and Biological Survivability

Although emphasis is placed on chemical and biological threats in DOD's  strategic guidance, DOD and military service policies do not establish a  clear process for considering and testing weapon system chemical and  biological survivability. The extent to which services consider weapon system survivability during  the acquisition process is further influenced by differences in how each  service perceives the chemical and biological threat and plans to conduct  operations in a contaminated environment. Comprehensiveness of Chemical and Biological Survivability Information in DOD's Centralized Database Is Unknown

DOD, through DTIC, maintains a centralized database for science and  technology information that could facilitate program offices' consideration  of weapon system chemical and biological survivability, but the  comprehensiveness of the survivability information in this database is  unknown. It is unclear whether chemical and biological survivability information is  covered by the broad DOD policy directing that scientific and technical  information be submitted to DTIC. Further, there is no established process for submitting  chemical and biological information to DTIC. As a result, individual  personnel and organizations submit information to DTIC through ad hoc  actions, and some DOD officials expressed concern that not all information  is submitted to DTIC as required. The absence of an internal  control for ensuring that research and test results are submitted to DTIC  and entered in DTIC's database could result in unnecessary expenditures  on duplicative work. Without  DOD establishing consistent policy requiring that chemical and biological  survivability be considered during weapon system acquisition and  establishing a clear process for doing so, the incorporation of chemical and  biological survivability into major weapons system acquisition is likely to  remain varied and inconsistent. Consequently, military planners and  commanders are likely to face varying weapon system performance,  availability, and interoperability issues. Finally, the  absence of a clearly defined DOD-level process for overseeing military  service and program office actions limits DOD's ability to ensure that  appropriate weapon system survivability decisions are being made. This policy or guidance should  establish a clear process for program offices to follow regarding the  extent to which chemical and biological system survivability should  be considered and tested;  require consistent, DOD-wide documentation of decisions regarding  how weapon system chemical and biological survivability is  considered and tested; and   establish an oversight process within DOD and the services for  monitoring weapon system program office decisions;   modify current DOD policy to ensure that DOD's database of chemical  and biological scientific and technical information is comprehensive. This modified policy should   state which chemical and biological survivability information belongs  in the body of scientific and technical information that is required to  be submitted to DTIC;  clarify responsibilities and establish a specific process for the  submission of chemical and biological scientific and technical  information to DTIC; and   designate which DOD office or organization is responsible for  exercising oversight to ensure that this information is submitted to  DTIC. We also conducted a non probability sample of  nine major weapon systems. We selected programs for this non probability  sample based on several factors, including (1) high dollar value,  (2) whether the weapon system was a joint program, and (3) risk of  exposure to chemical and biological weapons.
Why GAO Did This Study

The possibility that an adversary may use chemical or biological weapons against U.S. forces makes it important for a weapon system to be able to survive such attacks. In the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005, Congress mandated that the Department of Defense submit a plan to address weapon system chemical and biological survivability by February 28, 2005. This plan was to include developing a centralized database with information about the effects of chemical and biological agents on materials used in weapon systems. DOD did not submit its plan as mandated. GAO was asked to evaluate (1) the extent to which DOD addresses weapon system chemical and biological survivability during the acquisition process, and (2) DOD's internal controls for maintaining a comprehensive database that includes chemical and biological survivability research and test data for weapon system design and development.

What GAO Found

The extent to which chemical and biological survivability is considered in the weapon system acquisition process is mixed and varied. Although DOD strategic guidance and policy has emphasized the growing threat of an adversary's use of chemical and biological weapons for over a decade, DOD, joint, and military service weapon system acquisition policies are inconsistent and do not establish a clear process for considering and testing system chemical and biological survivability. To assess the extent DOD addresses chemical and biological survivability during the acquisition process, GAO conducted a non probability sample of nine major weapon systems based on high dollar value, whether the system was a joint program, and risk of exposure to chemical and biological weapons. Because DOD and joint acquisition policies do not require that survivability be specifically addressed, the military services have developed their own varying and unique policies. Thus, for the nine weapon systems GAO reviewed, the program offices involved made individual survivability decisions, resulting in inconsistent survivability consideration and testing. In the absence of DOD requirements, program offices also inconsistently document their decisions regarding how they consider and test chemical and biological survivability. Furthermore, DOD policies do not establish a clear process for responsibility, authority, and oversight for monitoring program office decisions regarding chemical and biological survivability. Without establishing consistent policies requiring that chemical and biological survivability be considered during weapon system acquisition, and a clear process for doing so, military planners and commanders are likely to face varying weapon system performance, availability, and interoperability issues. These could negatively affect system availability in a contaminated environment and limit DOD's ability to identify risk and ensure that appropriate decisions are made. DOD, through its Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC), maintains a centralized database for science and technology information that could facilitate program offices' consideration of weapon system chemical and biological survivability, but the comprehensiveness of this database is unknown due to inadequate internal controls. It is unlikely that the DTIC database contains fully comprehensive information about this for three reasons. First, it is unclear whether this information is covered by the broad DOD policy directing that scientific and technical information be submitted to DTIC. Second, there is no established process for submitting scientific and technical information to DTIC. As a result, it is submitted to DTIC through the ad hoc actions of individual personnel and organizations, and some DOD officials expressed concern that not all information is being submitted to DTIC. Third, no office or organization in DOD has been given clear oversight responsibility to ensure that information is submitted to DTIC. The lack of a database with comprehensive information about weapon system chemical and biological survivability creates the risk of unnecessary expenditures on duplicative testing.