The VVSG are a set of technical standards for voting systems that use computers to assist in recording or counting votes. It went into effect in December 2007. The Relationship Between the VVSG and the Federal Voting Systems Standards (VSS)

The VVSG replaced the federal voluntary VSS originally developed under the auspices of the Federal Election Commission (FEC). The act is largely silent on the relationship between the VVSG and those requirements, which stipulate that voting systems must provide for auditability, accessibility, and ballot verification and error correction by voters, that states must set standards for what constitutes a vote on a given system, and that machine error rates of voting systems must conform to the standards set in the guidelines. They include the following:
The functional capabilities a voting system is expected to have. Requirements for voter-verified paper trails (VVPAT) used in conjunction with DREs (this is new in the VVSG ). Major Policy Issues about the VVSG

Several issues have been raised about the VVSG that may require congressional attention. Among them are the following:
The degree to which the guidelines are voluntary. The 2005 version did not address the second criticism, but the 2007 draft would require more realistic testing. The 2005 version of the guidelines partially revised the VSS, and some observers believe that the revisions should have been more comprehensive to address perceived shortcomings of the VSS.
The federal Voluntary Voting System Guidelines (VVSG) are a set of technical standards for voting systems that use computers to assist in recording or counting votes. The first version went into effect in December 2007, and a draft second version has been developed. The VVSG replaced the federal voluntary Voting Systems Standards (VSS). The 2005 VVSG are a partial revision of the VSS, with revision focused mainly on accessibility, usability, and security. The 2007 draft is a complete rewrite. Several issues have been raised about the VVSG that may require congressional attention. Among them is the question of timing. Some vendors claim that there needs to be more time for technology development before the new guidelines become effective; some activists argue that problems with voting systems, and federal requirements, demand more rapid implementation of the VVSG. The new guidelines did not have much direct impact on voting systems used in 2006. One exception was provisions relating to paper-ballot audit trails, which several states now require to be used in conjunction with electronic voting machines such as touchscreen systems. Like the VSS, the VVSG are voluntary, but some observers believe that a regulatory approach would be more appropriate given the importance of elections to the democratic process. However, since many states require that voting systems be certified, vendors are expected to treat the VVSG in the same way they have treated the VSS—as effectively mandatory.