	Overview: Historic Patterns of Afghan Authority and Politics

Afghanistan's governing structure has historically consisted of a weak central government unwilling or unable to enforce significant financial or administrative mandates on all of Afghanistan's diverse ethnic communities or on the 80% of Afghans who live in rural areas. The major groups are discussed below. His successor, Ashraf Ghani, is from a prominent Ghilzai clan. Another is Karim Khalili, who served as second vice president during Karzai's presidency. There are also tensions between the Hazaras and the Tajiks, even though both oppose Pashtun dominance. Post-Taliban Transition and Political Landscape

U.S. policy has been to help expand the capacity of formal Afghan governing institutions. The ouster of that government in late 2001 paved the way for the success of a long-stalled U.N. effort to form a broad-based Afghan government. To implement the September 21, 2014, power-sharing agreement that resolved the presidential election dispute, Ghani agreed to delegate some of his presidential powers to "Chief Executive Officer" (CEO) of the government, Abdullah. The Informal Power Structure: Faction Leaders and Traditional Decisionmaking Mechanisms

An informal power structure exists outside the formal governing institutions—consisting of locally popular faction leaders with armed militia forces and traditional decisionmaking mechanisms. 2014 Presidential and Provincial Elections25

U.S. officials and many Afghans were concerned that the 2009 presidential election fraud would recur in the 2014 presidential elections, which occurred as international forces have been drawing down. The April 5, 2014, first round appeared largely free of widespread fraud, but the June 14, 2014, runoff was clouded by allegations, leveled particularly by Dr. Abdullah, of systematic fraud. Acting under the newly signed election laws, a committee of lawyers, human rights activists, the speakers of the two chambers of the National Assembly, and judicial officials nominated IEC and ECC candidates. Candidate Requirements . Efforts to Promote Women . President Obama spoke by phone with Dr. Abdullah on July 8 and sent Secretary of State John Kerry to Kabul to broker a resolution. On July 12, Secretary Kerry, Abdullah, and Ghani announced an agreement at a joint press conference providing for:
a recount of all 23,000 ballot boxes by Afghan election officials, with monitoring from diplomats posted to various embassies in Afghanistan and other officials. It was completed by the end of August but results were withheld to allow time for the Abdullah and Ghani camps to bridge differences over a post-election power-sharing arrangement. Ghani was inaugurated President on September 29 and immediately issued a decree appointing Abdullah as "CEO." The CEO is to have powers approximating those of a Prime Minister. The CEO will lead weekly meetings of a "Council of Ministers" (the ministers plus the CEO and deputy CEOs) that will implement the strategic direction given it by the "cabinet" that is led by the President. Ghani has sought to assert the full extent of his constitutional role, and has announced initiatives to curb corruption and hold corrupt individuals accountable, to install officials based on merit, to promote women, and, through several trips to regional countries with a stake in Afghanistan's future, to explore new ways to settle the conflict with the Taliban insurgency. Doing so complicated the need to balance competence and factional interests, and delayed the nomination process until January 12, 2015, well beyond the constitutionally required 30 day period for such nominations (October 28, 2014). Many of the shortcomings in governance are attributed to all of the political disputes, governmental corruption, nepotism and favoritism, and the lack of trained or skilled workers. Many Afghans have come to view the central government as "predatory." However, the results of these initiatives remain unclear. Auditing Capabilities . Promoting Human Rights and Civil Society61

Since 2001, U.S. policy has been to build capacity in human rights institutions in Afghanistan and to promote civil society and political participation. Advancement of Women

Women and women's groups are a large component of the burgeoning of civil society in post-Taliban Afghanistan. For tables on U.S. aid to Afghanistan, see CRS Report RL30588, Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy , by [author name scrubbed].
The capacity, transparency, legitimacy, and cohesiveness of Afghan governance are crucial to Afghan stability as nearly all international forces exit Afghanistan by the end of 2016. The size and capability of the Afghan governing structure has increased significantly since the Taliban regime fell in late 2001, but the government remains rife with corruption and ethnic and political tensions among its major factions are ever present. Its recent elections have been marred by allegations of vast fraud and resulting post-election political crises.
Hamid Karzai, who served as president since late 2001, was constitutionally term-limited and left office when his successor, Ashraf Ghani, was inaugurated on September 29. The inauguration represented a resolution of a presidential election dispute that consumed Afghan and U.S. official attention from April to September. The results of the April 5, 2014, first round of the election required a June 14 runoff between Ghani and Dr. Abdullah Abdullah—increasing tensions between Ghani's Pashtun community, Afghanistan's largest group, and the Tajik community with which Abdullah is identified. Amid accusations by Abdullah of widespread fraud in the runoff, Secretary of State John Kerry brokered an agreement for a recount of all 23,000 ballot boxes and formation of a post-election unity government under which Abdullah, the losing candidate, became "Chief Executive Officer" (CEO) of the government. The CEO is to function as a prime minister, pending a subsequent national deliberation over changing the constitution to create a formal prime ministerial post. The resolution of the election dispute paved the way for the long-delayed signing of formal agreements to permit U.S. and NATO deployments in post-2014 international missions to train Afghan forces (Resolute Support Mission) and conduct counterterrorism operations (Operation Freedom Sentinel).
To date, the power-sharing arrangement has nearly paralyzed the Afghan central government. Abdullah's role in governance has been limited and, until early January 2015, the two were unable to agree to new cabinet appointments despite a constitutional requirement to form a cabinet within 30 days of taking office. The government has been run in the interim by caretaker officials and bureaucrats lacking high-level policy direction. The cabinet choices reportedly represent efforts to balance the need for competent officials with the demands to satisfy both leaders' key constituencies. Government authority remains constrained not only by the power-sharing arrangement but also by the exertion of influence by the long-standing informal power structure consisting of regional and ethnic leaders. Faction leaders often maintain groups of armed fighters who often exercise arbitrary administration of justice and commit human rights abuses. These constraints could slow Ghani's efforts to prioritize curbing governmental corruption and promoting women's rights.
International officials and groups are attempting to help ensure that the significant gains in civil society, women's rights, and media freedoms achieved since 2001 are preserved. Those gains have come despite the persistence of traditional attitudes and Islamic conservatism in many parts of Afghanistan—attitudes that cause the judicial and political system to tolerate child marriages and imprisonment of women who flee domestic violence. Islamist influence and tradition has also frequently led to persecution of converts from Islam to Christianity, and to curbs on the sale of alcohol and on Western-oriented media programs. Afghan civil society activists, particularly women's groups, assert that many of these gains are at risk as international forces depart, especially should there be a reconciliation agreement between the government and insurgent leaders. See also CRS Report RL30588, Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy, by [author name scrubbed].