	Highlights of GAO’s Work on EELV

Because of the importance of the national security space launch  enterprise, we have been asked to look at many aspects of the EELV  program over the last 10 years. We reported that when DOD moved the EELV program from the research  and development phase to the sustainment phase in the previous year,  DOD eliminated various reporting requirements that would have provided  useful oversight to program officials and Congress. We reported that the block buy acquisition approach may be based on  incomplete information and although DOD was still gathering data as it  finalized the new acquisition strategy, some critical knowledge gaps  remained. We reported that DOD had numerous efforts underway to address the  knowledge gaps and data deficiencies identified in our 2011 report. Of  the seven recommendations we made to the Secretary of Defense, two  had been completely addressed, four were partially addressed and one  had no action taken. We reported on the status of DOD’s efforts to certify new entrants for  EELV acquisitions.generally satisfied with the Air Force’s efforts to implement the process,  they identified several challenges to certification, as well as perceived  advantages afforded to the incumbent launch provider, ULA. We reported and testified that DOD’s new contract with ULA (sometimes  referred to as the “block buy”) represented a significant effort on the part  of DOD to negotiate better launch prices through its improved knowledge  of contractor costs, and that DOD officials expected the new contract to  realize significant savings, primarily through stable unit pricing for all  launch vehicles. DOD and Congress are currently  weighing the need to reduce U.S. reliance on rocket engines produced in  Russia and the costs and benefits to produce a similar engine  domestically. In other words,  replacing the RD-180 could require the development of a new launch  vehicle and potentially new launch infrastructure. Space launch vehicle development efforts are high risk from technical,  programmatic, and oversight perspectives. For these reasons, it is imperative that any  future development effort adopt disciplined practices and lessons learned  from past programs. I would like to highlight a few practices that would  especially benefit a launch vehicle development effort. First, decisions on what type of new program to pursue should be made  with a government-wide and long-term perspective. Second, requirements and resources (for example, time, money, and  people) need to be matched at program start. Third, the program itself should adopt knowledge-based practices during  execution. Space: Launch Services New Entrant Certification Guide. Space Acquisitions: Uncertainties in the Evolved Expendable Launch  Vehicle Program Pose Management and Oversight Challenges. This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the  United States.
Why GAO Did This Study

The EELV program is the primary provider of launch vehicles for U.S. military and intelligence satellites. The DOD expects to spend about $9.5 billion over the next five years acquiring launch hardware and services through the program, during which time it will also be working to certify new launch providers. This investment represents a significant amount of what the entire U.S. government expects to spend on launch activities—including new development, acquisition of launch hardware and services, and operations and maintenance of launch ranges—for the same period. The United Launch Alliance (ULA) is currently the sole provider of launch services through the EELV program. However, DOD, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), and the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) are working to certify new launch providers who can compete with ULA for launch contracts.
GAO was asked to discuss past work related to the EELV program, as well as best practices for acquiring new launch capabilities, as the Congress is currently weighing the need to reduce our reliance on rocket engines produced in Russia.

What GAO Found

GAO has reported extensively on the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) program in the past.
In 2008, GAO reported that when the Department of Defense (DOD) moved the EELV program from the research and development phase to the sustainment phase in the previous year, DOD eliminated various reporting requirements that would have provided useful oversight to program officials and the Congress.
In 2011, GAO reported that the block buy acquisition approach may be based on incomplete information and although DOD was still gathering data as it finalized the new acquisition strategy, some critical knowledge gaps remained.
In 2012, GAO reported that DOD had numerous efforts under way to address the knowledge gaps and data deficiencies identified in the 2011 GAO report, and found that two of GAO’s seven recommendations had been completely addressed, four partially addressed, and one had no action taken.
In 2013, GAO reported on the status of DOD's efforts to certify new entrants for EELV acquisitions. While potential new entrants stated that they were generally satisfied with the Air Force’s efforts to implement the process, they identified several challenges to certification, as well as perceived advantages afforded to the incumbent launch provider.
In 2014, GAO reported and testified that DOD's new contract with ULA (sometimes referred to as the “block buy”) represented a significant effort on the part of DOD tonegotiate better launch prices through improved knowledge of contractor costs. DOD officials expect the new contract to realize significant savings, primarily through stable unit pricing for all launch vehicles.
Space launch vehicle development efforts are high risk from technical, programmatic, and oversight perspectives. It is imperative that any future development effort adopts disciplined practices and lessons learned from past programs. Practices that would especially benefit a launch vehicle development effort include the following:
Decisions on what type of new program to pursue should be made with a government-wide and long-term perspective.
Requirements and resources (for example, time, money, and people) need to be matched.
The EELV program itself should adopt knowledge-based practices.