	Background

DOD and the military services invest in ground radars and air-to-ground  precision guided munitions. Air-to-ground precision guided munitions are weapons launched from  Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps aircraft that are intended to  accurately engage and destroy enemy targets on the ground. DOD’s Office of Cost Assessment and  Program Evaluation (CAPE) approves study guidance, which provides  direction on what the AOA must include, for acquisition category I  programs. Overlapping Performance Requirements and Potential Duplication Exist across Ground Radar Programs, but DOD Has Determined Any Redundancy Is Necessary

Our analysis of DOD’s active ground radar programs found evidence of  overlapping performance requirements and potential duplication in certain  mission areas. The  military services pursued separate ground radar acquisition programs for  several reasons: other programs did not fully meet their performance  requirements; the timelines for other programs did not align with their  needs; and they made different decisions on whether to pursue multi-role  or single role radars. However, while many of the requirements overlap,  the AN/TPQ-53 does not meet the G/ATOR Block II detection range  requirements for multiple target types. In addition to some unique requirements, urgent operational needs and  different acquisition approaches led the Army and Marine Corps to  establish separate acquisition programs for counterfire target acquisition  radars. The JROC  did not validate the Army’s AN/TPQ-53 performance requirements  because it was initially an urgent wartime need and did not meet  acquisition category I dollar thresholds. However, at the point the JROC  could have reviewed the AN/TPQ-53 requirements, the program had  transitioned to the more traditional acquisition process. Air-To-Ground Precision Guided Munitions Programs Are Not Duplicative, but Potential for Duplication in the Future Exists

Our analysis of DOD’s active air-to-ground precision guided munitions  found some munitions shared some capabilities, but after taking into  consideration characteristics such as the aircraft that can launch them,  we found the systems were not duplicative. To the extent overlapping  capabilities exist, DOD officials said these capabilities provided needed  flexibility for different military operations. Both the Army and the Navy plan to buy APKWS through fiscal year 2015  to meet their guided rocket needs, but starting in fiscal year 2016, they  may pursue separate, potentially duplicative, efforts to meet their  requirements. There are costs and  benefits associated with both the Army and Navy’s acquisition  approaches; however, if the Army and Navy fulfill their guided rocket  needs separately instead of through a single solution with a cooperative  contracting strategy, it could result in the inefficient use of weapon system  investment dollars and a loss of buying power. We found these programs to  be potentially duplicative. For example, DOD may have missed an opportunity to review  whether the capabilities of the Army’s AN/TPQ-53 Counterfire Radar and  the Marine Corps’ G/ATOR Block II were unnecessarily redundant or  duplicative because the requirements document for the AN/TPQ-53 was  validated by the Army, rather than the JROC, which has a broader  perspective on DOD’s capability needs. This cooperation has helped DOD leverage its buying  power. Recommendations for Executive Action

We recommend that DOD take the following two actions:
To provide the JROC the opportunity to review all ground radar  programs for potential duplication and CAPE with the opportunity to  develop broad analysis of alternative guidance, the Vice Chairman of  the Joint Chiefs of Staff should direct the Joint Staff to assign all new  ground radar capability requirement documents with a Joint Staff  designation of “JROC Interest.”
To address potential overlap or duplication in the acquisition of Hydra- 70 rocket guidance kits, the Under Secretary of Defense for  Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics should require the Army and  Navy to assess whether a single solution and cooperative, preferably  competitive, contracting strategy offers the most cost effective way to  meet both services’ needs. GAO staff who made major contributions to  this report are listed in appendix V.

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

To determine the extent of potential overlap or duplication across (1)  ground radar and (2) air-to-ground precision guided munitions programs,  we reviewed acquisition programs currently in development or production,  which does not include systems only being developed or produced for  foreign military sales. Our  scope included two air surveillance and air defense ground radar  systems—the Air Force’s Three-Dimensional Expeditionary Long-Range  Radar (3DELRR) and the Marine Corps’ AN/TPS-80 Ground/Air Task  Oriented Radar (G/ATOR) Block I Radar—and two counterfire target  acquisition ground radar programs—the Army’s AN/TPQ-53 Counterfire  Radar and the Marine Corps’ AN/TPS-80 G/ATOR Block II.
Why GAO Did This Study

Over the past five years, GAO has found potential overlap or duplication in DOD weapon system investments. Overlap occurs when multiple agencies or programs are engaged in similar activities. Duplication occurs when two or more agencies or programs are engaged in the same activities. Senate Report 113-44 accompanying the fiscal year 2014 National Defense Authorization Act mandated that GAO examine the military services' ground radar and air-to-ground precision guided munitions programs for potential duplication. Ground radars are sensors used to detect and track targets, and precision guided munitions are weapons intended to accurately engage and destroy enemy targets.
This report examines the extent to which potential overlap or duplication exists across the military services' (1) ground radar and (2) air-to-ground precision guided munitions programs. GAO analyzed program documentation on system performance requirements and capabilities and interviewed DOD officials about potential duplication.

What GAO Found

Several of the Department of Defense's (DOD) active ground radar programs have overlapping performance requirements and two are potentially duplicative. In these instances, the military service pursued separate acquisition programs because other programs did not fully meet their performance requirements, among other reasons. Specifically, GAO found:
The Marine Corps' Ground/Air Task Oriented Radar (G/ATOR) Block I and the Air Force's Three-Dimensional Expeditionary Long-Range Radar (3DELRR) have some overlapping key requirements, such as range, and are potentially duplicative. The Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC), which validates requirements for DOD's largest acquisition programs, did not find unnecessary redundancy, and Air Force officials stated that G/ATOR could not meet all of the 3DELRR's requirements.
The Army's AN/TPQ-53 Counterfire Radar and the Marine Corps' G/ATOR Block II have some overlapping requirements, but the AN/TPQ-53 does not meet certain key G/ATOR Block II requirements, therefore reducing the risk that the programs are duplicative. In this case, urgent operational needs and different acquisition approaches also led the Army and Marine Corps to establish separate acquisition programs.
As a result of reviews conducted by the JROC and DOD's Office of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE), which develops guidance for analyzing alternative ways to fulfill capability needs, the Air Force made positive changes to the 3DELRR program, such as reducing some requirements to improve program affordability. CAPE also expanded the alternatives considered on acquisition programs to minimize potential duplication. DOD missed an opportunity to assess whether the capabilities of the AN/TPQ-53 and G/ATOR Block II were unnecessarily redundant. The JROC did not review the AN/TPQ-53 requirements because it was initially fielded to meet an urgent need and did not meet the dollar threshold to automatically trigger a review. However, the AN/TPQ-53 transitioned to the traditional, non-urgent needs acquisition process at which point the JROC could have reviewed it. Ensuring that the JROC and CAPE review new ground radar acquisitions could help DOD avoid duplication.
DOD's active air-to-ground precision guided munitions programs are not duplicative, but potential for duplication exists in the future. The active programs share some capabilities, but characteristics such as the aircraft that can launch them distinguish them from one another. To the extent that overlapping capabilities exist, DOD officials said these capabilities provided needed flexibility for military operations. Cooperation among the military services contributed to the current lack of duplication. GAO found one example of potential future duplication. Both the Army and the Navy plan to buy the Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System through fiscal year 2015 to meet their guided rocket needs, but starting in fiscal year 2016, they may pursue separate, potentially duplicative, efforts. There are costs and benefits associated with both the Army and Navy's acquisition approaches; however, if the Army and Navy fulfill their guided rocket needs separately instead of cooperatively, it could result in the inefficient use of weapon system investment dollars and a loss of buying power.

What GAO Recommends

To address potential duplication, GAO recommends that DOD ensure that new ground radar acquisitions are reviewed by the JROC and CAPE and require the Army and Navy to jointly assess the possibility of using a single solution and a cooperative, preferably competitive, contracting strategy to meet their guided rocket needs. DOD partially agreed with GAO's first recommendation, but stated it should not be mandatory. GAO believes the recommendation remains valid as discussed in its report. DOD agreed with the second recommendation.