	Background

Under the DERP, DOD is authorized to identify, investigate and clean up  environmental contamination and other hazards at FUDS as well as active  installations. DOD delegated its  authority for administering the cleanup of FUDS to the Army, which in  turn delegated its execution to the Army Corps of Engineers (the Corps). Shortcomings in the Use of Available Information and Guidance Can Lead to Poor Decision-making

When we reviewed the Spring Valley cleanup in 2002, we found that the  Army determined that there was no evidence of large–scale burials of  hazards remaining at Spring Valley before it received all technical input. Our  review of other FUDS nationwide found significant shortcomings in the  Corps’ use of available information and guidance for making decisions  relating to cleanup of contamination at these sites. For example, in 2002,  we reported that the Corps did not have a sound basis for determining that  about 1,468 of 3,840 FUDS properties––38 percent––did not need further  study or cleanup action. We found that these problems occurred in part because the Corps’  guidance did not specify (1) what documents or level of detail the agency  should obtain when looking for information on the prior uses of and the  facilities located at FUDS properties to identify potential hazards or (2)  how to assess the presence of potential hazards. Incomplete Data on Site Conditions and Emerging Contaminants Can Interfere With the Development of Accurate Cost Estimates and Schedules

At Spring Valley, the Corps’ estimate of the cost to complete cleanup of the  site increased by about six fold––from about $21 million to about $124  million––from fiscal year 1997 through 2001. As these assumptions have  changed, the cost to cleanup Spring Valley has continued to rise where the  most recent estimate for fiscal year 2007 is $173.7 million. The challenges of estimating the costs of the Spring Valley cleanup are  common to many FUDS, and our past work has shown that incomplete  data on site conditions and emerging contaminants can interfere with the  development of accurate cost and schedule estimates. For example, in  2004, we evaluated DOD’s MMRP program and found several weaknesses  in preliminary cost estimates for numerous sites. Funding Available for a Particular Site May Be Influenced by Overall Program Goals and Other Priorities

Spring Valley has received priority funding due to its proximity to the  nation’s capitol and high visibility; however, our past work shows that this  is not the case with most FUDS. Over the past 10 years DOD has invested  nearly $42 billion in its environmental programs, which include  compliance, restoration, natural resources conservation, and pollution  prevention activities. DOD requests separate funding amounts for active sites and FUDS cleanup  programs based on specific DERP restoration goals and the total number  of sites in each program’s inventory. Better Coordination and Communication with Regulators and Property Owners Can Increase Public Confidence and Facilitate Effective Decision-making

In our 2002 report on Spring Valley, we reported that the Corps, EPA and  the District of Columbia had made progress on site cleanup by adopting a  partnership approach for making cleanup decisions. However, we have found that this kind of cooperation and  coordination does not always occur at other sites nationwide. We reported that federal and state regulators believed  that better coordination with the Corps regarding cleanup at FUDS would  increase public confidence in the cleanups and improve their  effectiveness. In addition to better coordination with regulators, our past work has  shown that the Corps frequently did not notify property owners of its  determinations that the properties did not need further action, as called  for in its guidance, or instruct the owners to contact the Corps if evidence  of DOD-caused hazards was found later.
Why GAO Did This Study

Under the Defense Environmental Restoration Program (DERP), the Department of Defense (DOD) has charged the Army Corps of Engineers (the Corps) with cleaning up 4,700 formerly used defense sites (FUDS) and active sites that were under its jurisdiction when they were initially contaminated. The 661-acre Spring Valley site in Washington, D.C is one such site. Like many other FUDS, the U.S. Army used the Spring Valley site during World War I for research and testing of chemical agents, equipment, and munitions. Most of the site is now privately owned and includes private residences, a hospital, and several commercial properties. The primary threats at the site are buried munitions, elevated arsenic in site soils, and laboratory waste; perchlorate was also found onsite. This testimony discusses GAO's past work relating to remediation efforts at FUDS and military munitions sites to provide context for issues at Spring Valley. Specifically, it addresses: (1) the impact that shortcomings in information and guidance can have on decision-making; (2) the impact that incomplete data can have on cost estimates and schedules; (3) how funding for a particular site may be influenced by overall program goals; and (4) how better coordination can increase public confidence in cleanups and facilitate effective decision-making. GAO has made several prior recommendations that address these issues, with which, in most cases, the agency concurred.

What GAO Found

GAO's past work has found significant shortcomings in the Corps' use of available information and guidance for making decisions relating to cleanup of FUDS. For example, in 2002, GAO found that the Army determined that there was no evidence of large-scale burials of hazards remaining at Spring Valley before it had received all technical input. This experience is not unique. In a 2002 national study, GAO reported that the Corps did not have a sound basis for determining that about 1,468 of 3,840 FUDS properties--38 percent--did not need further study or cleanup action. GAO attributed these shortcomings to limitations in the Corps guidance that did not specify what documents or level of detail the agency should obtain to identify potential hazards at FUDS or how to assess the presence of potential hazards. GAO's past work has also shown that incomplete data on site conditions and emerging contaminants can interfere with the development of accurate cost and schedule estimates. At Spring Valley, the Corps' estimates of cleanup costs increased by about six fold, from about $21 million to about $124 million from fiscal year 1997 through fiscal year 2001. As assumptions about site conditions changed and new hazards were discovered, the estimates continued to rise and currently stand at about $174 million. Again, these problems are not unique. In 2004, GAO evaluated DOD's cleanup of sites with military munitions and found several similar weaknesses in preliminary cost estimates for numerous sites across the country. GAO's past work has shown that funding available for specific sites may be influenced by overall program goals and other priorities. Spring Valley has received priority funding due to its proximity to a major metropolitan area and high visibility; however, GAO's past work shows that this is usually not the case with most FUDS sites. Over the past 10 years DOD has invested nearly $42 billion in its environmental programs, but it typically requests and receives a relatively smaller amount of funding for environmental restoration activities at FUDS sites compared to funding available for active sites. GAO's past work has found that better coordination and communication with regulators and property owners can increase public confidence and facilitate effective decision-making for contaminated sites. With regard to Spring Valley, GAO reported in 2002 that the Corps, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the District of Columbia had made progress because they had adopted a partnership approach to cleanup decisions. However, this kind of cooperation and coordination does not always occur nationwide. For example, in 2003, GAO reported that the Corps only informed states of upcoming work and requested input from them about half of the time. Similarly, GAO found that the Corps did not always communicate with property owners about the decisions it makes regarding contamination at FUDS sites and more often than not did not inform property owners about how to contact the Corps in the event that further hazardous substances were identified at the site.