	FY2016 Syria Train and Equip Proposals

Proposed FY2016 defense authorization and appropriations legislation under consideration in Congress as of June 2015 ( H.R. 2685 , H.R. For example:
Proposed reporting and certification requirements in the House and Senate versions of the FY2016 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA, H.R. In the Administration's June 2014 amended request for war funding, President Obama requested authority and funding from Congress to begin an overt "train and equip" program for vetted Syrians for the following purposes: 
defending the Syrian people from attacks by the Syrian regime, facilitating the provision of essential services, and stabilizing territory controlled by the opposition; 
defending the United States, its friends and allies, and the Syrian people from the threats posed by terrorists in Syria; and, 
promoting the conditions for a negotiated settlement to end the conflict in Syria. 113-291 ) and the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015 ('Counterterrorism Partnership Fund' and Section 9016 of P.L. 113-235 ) provided further authority and funding guidance for the program. As of June 2015, several hundred U.S. military training personnel and a similar number of support personnel have deployed in support of the Syria Train and Equip Program. According to Administration officials, the program intends to field a force of approximately 3,000 vetted Syrians in 2015 and 5,400 others per year in 2016 and, if authorized, in 2017. Congressional Action

The Administration's FY2016 defense appropriations request seeks $600 million in additional U.S. funding for the program. 1735 and S. 1376 ) would authorize that level of funding on different terms (see "Funding Source" in Table 1 ), and would create new reporting and certification requirements relative to the provision of U.S. support to U.S.-trained fighters in the event of their attack by pro-Asad or Islamic State forces (see " What degree of post-training support or protection should the U.S. government provide to Syrian trainees and on what terms? " Should the authorized purposes of U.S. assistance be modified? 1735 ) would amend the underlying program authority in Section 1209 of the FY2015 NDAA to make approval of future program funding contingent on a new certification that: 
a required amount of support, including support provided by United States Armed Forces and enablers, has been or will be provided by the United States to the elements of the Syrian opposition that are to be trained and equipped under this section to ensure that such elements are able to defend themselves from attacks by ISIL and Government of Syria forces consistent with the purposes [of the program]

			Defense Department Position

Defense Department officials have stated that the main focus of U.S. efforts to combat the Islamic State remains on operations in Iraq, and they have acknowledged ongoing consideration of what types of post-training support to provide Syrian participants in the train and equip program. What congressional notification and reporting of oversight information is required? The FY2015 NDAA ( P.L. With what implications for U.S. policy goals in Syria or more broadly? What support or protection, if any, should the United States provide to trainees upon their return to Syria? With what implications for its potential success and for U.S. policy toward Syria? For further analysis of proposals related to the Authorization for the Use of Military Force relative to the Islamic State, see CRS Report R43760, A New Authorization for Use of Military Force Against the Islamic State: Issues and Current Proposals in Brief , by [author name scrubbed].
In 2014, Congress for the first time provided the President with authority and funds to overtly train and lethally equip vetted members of the Syrian opposition for select purposes. These purposes include supporting U.S. efforts to combat the Islamic State and other terrorist organizations in Syria and setting the conditions for a negotiated settlement to Syria's civil war. The FY2015 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA, P.L. 113-291) and the FY2015 Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015 (P.L. 113-235) provided that up to $500 million could be transferred from the newly-established Counterterrorism Partnerships Fund (CTPF) to train and equip such Syrian forces. Additional funding could be provided from other sources for the Syrian Train and Equip Program, including from foreign contributions, subject to the approval of the congressional defense committees.
As of June 2015, the defense committees have approved the transfer of $500 million in FY2015 CTPF funds for the program and an additional $80 million in Defense Working Capital Funds for related U.S. government operations. Several hundred U.S. military training personnel and a similar number of support personnel have deployed in support of the program. According to Administration officials, the intention is for the program to field a force of approximately 3,000 vetted Syrians in 2015 and 5,400 others per year in 2016 and, if authorized, in 2017. The authority provided in the FY2015 NDAA expires after December 31, 2016.
In FY2016, the Administration is requesting $600 million in a new, separate Syria Train and Equip account that, if authorized and appropriated as requested, would not require advance notification and approval by the four defense committees.
Current debate over the program—as expressed in congressional consideration of proposed FY2016 defense authorization and appropriations legislation (H.R. 2685, H.R. 1735, S. 1376) centers on:
The amounts, alignment, and terms associated with FY2016 funding for the program. The extent and type of U.S. support or protection, if any, that may be provided to Syrian trainees upon their return to Syria, especially in the event of attack by pro-Asad or other forces in Syria. The size, scope, and effectiveness of the Syria Train and Equip Program as currently implemented; its purposes relative to overarching U.S. strategy toward Syria; and its integration with U.S.-led coalition efforts to combat the Islamic State organization. The content and scope of requested strategy and reporting requirements.
For more information on the Islamic State crisis and U.S. policy, see CRS Report R43612, The "Islamic State" Crisis and U.S. Policy, by [author name scrubbed] et al., and CRS Report RL33487, Armed Conflict in Syria: Overview and U.S. Response, coordinated by [author name scrubbed]. For analysis of proposals related to the Authorization for the Use of Military Force relative to the Islamic State, see CRS Report R43760, A New Authorization for Use of Military Force Against the Islamic State: Issues and Current Proposals in Brief, by [author name scrubbed].