Most observers agree that after 30 years, a comprehensive review of the Goldwater-Nichols legislation is warranted. Further, there appears to be a broad consensus among observers that DOD must retain its strength while becoming considerably more agile in order to enable the United States to meet a variety of critical emerging national security challenges. Yet agreement seemingly ends there. There appears to be little consensus regarding what changes are needed within DOD and what specific direction reform ought to take. Discussions have begun to coalesce around a number of proposals, including reforming defense acquisition processes, further strengthening the Joint Staff, reducing Pentagon staffs, and better empowering the services in the "joint" arena. However, ideas vary on how, specifically, to accomplish those goals. Disagreement also exists as to whether or not reorganizing DOD alone will be sufficient. Some observers maintain that a reform of the broader interagency system on national security matters is needed. Yet there are several fundamental, first order questions that seem to be driving the current examination of DOD's structure. These include, but are not limited to the following:
Why, after the expenditure of nearly $1.6 trillion and over 15 years at war in Iraq and Afghanistan, has the United States had such perceived difficulty translating tactical and operational victories into sustainable political outcomes? Why, despite the expenditure of now over $600 billion per year on defense, is the readiness of the force approaching critically low levels, according to senior military officials, while the number of platforms and capabilities being produced are generally short of perceived requirements? Why, despite tactical and operational level adaptations around the world, is DOD often seen as having difficulty formulating strategies and policies in sufficient time to adapt to and meet the increasingly dynamic threat environment of the 21 st century? No single answer exists for these questions. No one decision, no one individual, no one process led to these arguably less than desirable outcomes. Taken together, however, the issues raised by these questions suggest the systemic nature of the challenges with which the Department of Defense appears to be grappling. In other words, they suggest that DOD's organizational architecture and culture may merit serious review and analysis. Key findings included the following:
The United States should undertake a broad transformation of its military and national security structures, operational concepts, and equipment, and DOD's key business processes; Transformation should go beyond operational concepts, force structures, and equipment, and should include procurement reform and changes to the support structure, including base closures; The concept of "jointness" should be extended beyond the military to the broader national security establishment (a "Goldwater-Nichols for the interagency"); The Unified Command Plan should be augmented through: The establishment of an "Americas Command," to address the challenges of homeland defense as well as those of the Western Hemisphere; The establishment of a Joint Forces Command to be the force provider to the geographic CINCs (later to be called Combatant Commands), address standardization among the various unified commands, oversee joint training and experimentation, and coordinate and integrate activities among the networked service battle labs; Elimination of U.S. Atlantic Command, subordination of Southern Command; Establishment of a Logistics Command that merges necessary support functions divided among various agencies; Assignment of the information domain to Space Command; Initiation of planning and preparedness for urban operations as a matter of priority; Enhanced defense intelligence capabilities, and in particular prioritization of Human Intelligence (HUMINT) collection capabilities; Reconsideration and/or redesign of the PPBS.
Thirty years after its enactment, Congress has undertaken a review of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act (GNA) as well as the broader organization and structure of the contemporary Department of Defense (DOD) more broadly. Most observers agree that in principle a comprehensive review of the Goldwater-Nichols legislation is warranted at this juncture. Further, a broad consensus appears to exist among observers that DOD must become considerably more agile while retaining its strength in order to enable the United States to meet a variety of critical emerging national security challenges.
Agreement seemingly ends there. There appears to be little consensus on what should be changed within DOD and what specific direction reform ought to take. Discussions have begun to coalesce around a number of proposals, including reforming defense acquisition processes, further strengthening the Joint Staff, reducing Pentagon staffs, and better empowering the services in the joint arena. Ideas vary, however, on how, specifically, to achieve those outcomes. Disagreement also exists as to whether or not reorganizing DOD alone will be sufficient. Some observers maintain that a reform of the broader interagency system on national security matters is needed.
Despite these disagreements, several fundamental, "first order" questions appear to be driving the current examination of DOD's structure. These include, but are not limited to the following:
Why, after the expenditure of nearly $1.6 trillion and over 15 years at war in Iraq and Afghanistan, has the United States had such difficulty translating tactical and operational victories into sustainable political outcomes? Why, despite the expenditure of over $600 billion per year on defense, is the readiness of the force approaching critically low levels, according to military officials, while the number of platforms and capabilities being produced are generally short of perceived requirements? Why, despite tactical and operational adaptations around the world, is DOD often seen as having difficulty formulating strategies and policies in sufficient time to adapt to and meet the increasingly dynamic threat environment?
No single answer exists for these questions. No one decision, no one individual, no one process led to these arguably less than desirable outcomes. Taken together, however, the issues raised by these questions suggest the systemic nature of the challenges with which the Department of Defense appears to be grappling. In other words, they suggest that DOD's organizational architecture and culture may merit serious review and analysis.
This report is intended to assist Congress as it evaluates the variety of reform proposals currently under discussion around Washington.