Yet the task of providing security to the nation’s aviation system is unquestionably daunting, and we must reluctantly acknowledge that any form of travel can never be made totally secure. Safeguarding airplanes and passengers requires, at the least, ensuring that perpetrators are kept from breaching security checkpoints and gaining access to aircraft. Still, in recent years, we and others have often demonstrated that significant weaknesses continue to plague the nation’s aviation security. With the events of the last week, concerns have been raised again as to who should be responsible for security and screening passengers at our nation’s airports. Weaknesses in Airport Access Controls

Control of access to aircraft, airfields, and certain airport facilities is a critical component of aviation security. In May 2000, we reported that our special agents, in an undercover capacity, obtained access to secure areas of two airports by using counterfeit law enforcement credentials and badges. Concerns have long existed about screeners’ ability to detect and prevent dangerous objects from entering secure areas. Furthermore, the recent tests show that as tests become more realistic and more closely approximate how a terrorist might attempt to penetrate a checkpoint, screeners’ ability to detect dangerous objects declines even further. These criteria are to   establish accountability for screening performance;   ensure cooperation among stakeholders, such as airlines, airports, FAA,   efficiently move passengers to flights; and   minimize legal and liability issues. Because each country follows its own unique set of screening practices, and because data on screeners’ performance in each country were not available to us, it is difficult to measure the impact of these different practices on improving screeners’ performance.
What GAO Found

A safe and secure civil aviation system is a critical component of the nation's overall security, physical infrastructure, and economic foundation. Billions of dollars and a myriad of programs and policies have been devoted to achieving such a system. Although it is not fully known at this time what actually occurred or what all the weaknesses in the nation's aviation security apparatus are that contributed to the horrendous terrorist acts of Semptember 11, 2001, it is clear that serious weaknesses exist in the nation's aviation security system and that their impact can be far more devastating than previously imagined. There are security concerns with (1) airport access controls, (2) passenger and carry-on baggage screening, and (3) alternatives to current screening practices, including practices in selected other countries. Controls for limiting access to secure areas, including aircraft, have not always worked as intended. In May of 2000, special agents used counterfeit law enforcement badges and credentials to gain access to secure areas at two airports, bypassing security checkpoints and walking unescorted to aircraft departure gates. In June 2000, testing of screeners showed that significant, long-standing weaknesses--measured by the screeners' abilities to detect threat objects located on passengers or contained in their carry-on luggage--continue to exist. More recent results show that as tests more closely approximate how a terrorist might attempt to penetrate a checkpoint--screeners' performance declines significantly. Weaknesses in screening and controlling access to secure are as have left questions concerning alternative approaches. In assessing alternatives, respondents identified five important criteria: improving screening performance, establishing accountability, ensuring cooperation among stakeholders, moving people efficiently, and minimizing legal and liability issues.