Performance in meeting schedule  estimates varied, and more than half of the initiatives experienced  schedule delays. Most Initiatives Fielded or Are Expected to Field Capabilities within 2 Years

A number of initiatives have been fielded in a year or less, and most  initiatives (26 of 30) met, or expected to meet, the expectation for fielding  capabilities within 2 years, as shown in figure 3. Initiatives that addressed joint urgent operational needs leveraged three  types of solutions: (1) off-the-shelf products, (2) modifications of off-the- shelf items to add capabilities, and (3) products that required  development of a technology. Off-the-shelf solutions should be fielded the  quickest because they are focused on buying already-existing products. Once a contract was awarded, off-the-shelf  solutions were fielded quickly. Off-the-shelf solutions took longer during the early phases, in part,  because they were less likely than other solution types to leverage  ongoing efforts and thus required additional time to identify, fund, and  contract for the solution. Engineering centers such as the Naval Surface Warfare Center and the  Army Research, Development and Engineering Center typically provide  support to the program offices that manage acquisition programs. The  ability of program offices to field capabilities more quickly is partly  explained by the expertise that these organizations have with the full  range of acquisition activities, including developing test plans, accessing  contract support, and planning for training and transportation. As  illustrated in figure 12, the median time to contract award was 6 months  shorter for initiatives that used existing contracts. While the Joint Staff worked to  define and clarify urgent needs requirements during validation, officials for  16 of the 45 initiatives in our sample stated that they had to work with  U.S. Central Command officials in theater and at headquarters to further  develop the requirements after they were tasked with the urgent need. Schedule estimates were not consistently available in databases used by  U.S. Central Command, JRAC, and JIEDDO. Several  practices have potential for facilitating a quick response to warfighter  needs. But, there is no  requirement that an initiative decision memorandum be prepared for all  initiatives. Recommendations for Executive Action

To improve the process for responding to joint urgent operational needs,  we recommend that the Secretary of Defense take the following four  actions:
Expedite fielding of off-the-shelf solutions by reducing the time it takes  to identify the solution and award a contract. Devise methods for providing early funding to reimbursable  organizations tasked to execute joint urgent needs. Require acquisition organizations to communicate with the combatant  commands, such as Central Command, regularly about progress in  executing initiatives and plans for fielding capabilities. Require that an initiative decision memorandum be developed for all  initiatives that identifies the acquisition organization responsible for  the initiative, schedule estimates, and expectations for acquisition  strategies. To identify key practices that enabled executing organizations to  overcome challenges in the development and fielding of joint urgent  needs solutions, we interviewed officials from each initiative and collected  data on the challenges that each executing organization encountered. We also reviewed practices that executing organizations  employed to overcome these and other programmatic challenges. Appendix II: Sample Joint Urgent Operational Needs and Executing Organizations

Appendix II: Sample Joint Urgent Operational  Needs and Executing Organizations Army, Counter-Rocket Artillery Mortar Program Directorate  Army, Product Manager Improvised Explosive Device Defeat / Protect Force  Joint Project Office, Mine Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicle  Intelligence Surveillance Reconnaissance Task Force / Unmanned Aerial Systems Task  Force  Army Research Laboratory
Defense Information Systems Agency, Enhanced Mobile Satellite Services Division  Air Force, Director of Weather  Army, Program Manager, Biometrics Identity Management Agency
Naval Sea Systems Command, Asymmetric Systems Department  Joint Project Office, Mine Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicle  Joint Project Office, Mine Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicle  Army, Office of the Provost Marshal
Navy, Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command
Naval Air Systems Command, Special Surveillance Programs  Army, Project Manager Robotics and Unmanned Systems  Army, Armament Research Development and Engineering Center, Combating  Terrorism Technology Team  Army Space & Missile Defense Command / Army Forces Strategic Command
Naval Surface Warfare Center, Directed Energy Warfare Office  Army, Product Manager Improvised Explosive Device Defeat / Protect Force  Army, Project Manager, Distributed Common Ground System
Naval Surface Warfare Center, Explosive Ordnance Disposal Technology Division  Air Force, Aeronautical Systems Center, Intelligence Surveillance and Surveillance,  Sensors  Army Corps of Engineers  Army, Night Vision and Electronic Sensors Directorate  Army, Combating Terrorism Technical Support Office
Naval Explosive Ordnance Disposal Technology Division
Naval Air Systems Command, PMA-266  Executing organization
Department of Energy, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory  Army, Prototype Integration Facility  Air Force, Big Safari  Air Force Research Laboratory  Army, Communication-Electronics Research, Development and Engineering Center  Army, Project Manager Robotics and Unmanned Sensors  Army, Project Manager, Airborne Reconnaissance and Exploitation Systems  Army, Project Manager, Unmanned Aerial Systems  Army, Aviation Applied Technology Directorate
Naval Air Systems Command, Special Surveillance Programs
Navy, Wide Focal Plane Array Camera, Integrated Product Team  The names of some organizations are not listed because of sensitivity issues.
Why GAO Did This Study

With the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, DOD has had to accelerate efforts to field capabilities addressing urgent warfighter needs, including joint needs affecting more than one service. GAO was asked to assess (1) how quickly capabilities responding to joint urgent operational needs have been developed and fielded and (2) what key practices enabled executing organizations to overcome challenges. To do this, GAO studied a sample of joint urgent operational needs including all urgent needs over $100 million approved from April 2008 through December 2010 and a random selection of smaller urgent needs. GAO analyzed data on key events and issues in the development and fielding of solutions and met with service and DOD officials responsible for validating, assigning, and executing joint urgent needs.

What GAO Found

A majority of the initiatives GAO reviewed (26 of 30) met, or expected to meet, the Department of Defenses (DOD) expectation for fielding a capability in response to joint urgent operational needs within 2 years. However, performance in meeting schedule estimates varied, and more than half of the initiatives experienced schedule delays.
Initiatives leveraged three types of solutions: (1) off-the-shelf products, (2) modifications of off-the-shelf items to add capabilities, and (3) products requiring technology development. Off-the-shelf solutions should be fielded the quickest because existing products are being bought. However, while off-the-shelf solutions were fielded quickly once a contract was awarded, it took longer than the two other types to identify, fund, and contract for off-the-shelf solutions. In addition to the program offices that manage traditional acquisition programs, initiatives were also managed by research laboratories and engineering centers, such as the Army Research Laboratory or the Naval Surface Warfare Center. Program offices fielded solutions faster, in part, because program offices are experienced in the full range of acquisition activities. Also, laboratories and engineering centers depended on funding provided by other organizations and delays in receiving this funding affected the start of some initiatives.
Acquisition organizations employed various practices to overcome challenges affecting fielding of capabilities within short time frames. For example, although these practices could affect the prices paid, shorter times were associated with using existing contracts, awarding contracts without agreeing on contract terms (prices), or awarding contracts without competition. U.S. Central Command officials stated that they were not aware of all initiatives underway or the expected schedule for fielding capabilities and this could affect planning activities. In some cases, initiative decision memorandums were prepared that documented schedule estimates but such memorandums are not required for all initiatives. Also, some organizations were proactive in communicating with U.S. Central Command and this facilitated a clearer understanding of requirements and plans for fielding initiatives, but regular communication is not required.

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that DOD reduce the time spent on identifying and contracting for off-the-shelf solutions, devise methods for providing early funding to research laboratories and engineering centers, require that initiative decision memorandums be prepared for all initiatives, and require acquisition organizations to communicate with the Central Command and other combatant commands about plans for fielding capabilities. DOD concurred with these recommendations.