The Effectiveness of MSHA’s Approval Process Was Hampered by Several Factors that Delayed Approval and Resulted in Variations in the Plans

The effectiveness of MSHA’s approval process for underground coal  mines’ emergency response plans was hampered by several factors that  delayed approval of the plans. Specifically, MSHA issued its guidance  multiple times and did not issue guidance on one key requirement until 6  months after the initial plans were due. It is understandable that the  content of the plans may differ because there are differences in the  specific characteristics of mines. However, in our review of the plans we  sampled, we found that some plans did not specify the protections to be  provided and the amount of information about these protections varied  from plan to plan. As a result, in some mines,  miners working in these locations may not have access to postaccident  breathable air if they become trapped in the mine after an accident. While Most Plan Components Have Been Implemented, Two Key Components Have Not

Most of the components of mines’ emergency response plans have been  implemented, but two key components remain. In addition, mines had not begun to  implement another component—wireless communications systems or a  comparable alternative—because fully wireless technology is not available  and MSHA had not determined what alternative technologies mine  operators will be allowed to use to meet this requirement of the MINER  Act, which mines must implement by June 2009. One Key Component Had Not Been Fully Implemented Because Equipment Was Not Available

As of January 2008, because needed equipment was not available, more  than three-quarters of the mines had not been able to fully implement the  requirement to provide long-term postaccident breathable air for trapped  miners, and one-fifth of the mines had not been able to provide all of the  required self-contained self-rescuers to aid in miners’ escape. At the time of our review, MSHA officials  told us they had no immediate plans to issue guidance detailing what  technology will be acceptable in meeting the June 2009 requirement for  wireless communications because they wanted to wait and see what  technology is available closer to the deadline. As a result, it is uncertain  whether mine operators will be able to plan for and order enhanced  communications systems to meet the deadline. MSHA’s districts have inspected  many mines for compliance and issued citations to enforce  implementation of their emergency response plans, but MSHA  headquarters officials have not systematically evaluated the data on  citations related to emergency response plans to identify potential  problems with implementation or enforcement. In addition, MSHA  headquarters has provided insufficient oversight to ensure the quality of  underground coal mines’ emergency response plans or to identify whether  corrective actions might be needed. However,  if MSHA does not act soon to determine what will be acceptable, it is not clear  that manufacturers and mine operators will be able to plan and prepare for the  implementation of new technologies before the deadline, thereby missing  opportunities to improve trapped miners’ chances of survival after an accident. To improve oversight of the enforcement and approval of emergency  response plans, we recommend that the Secretary of Labor direct the  Assistant Secretary for Mine Safety and Health to take steps to ensure that  district offices are consistently applying MSHA’s guidance on approving  and enforcing emergency response plans, such as:    analyzing its citation data by district offices and using the information  to clarify policies across districts if these analyses reveal discrepancies  in policies;   analyzing violations of the MINER Act and related regulations to  identify trends and ensure that the appropriate penalties are being  assessed, particularly for repeat violations; and  reviewing a sample of plans across districts to ensure that the content  of the plans meets a consistent agencywide standard and, if not, take  corrective action by clarifying the guidance. Finally, we consulted with outside individuals knowledgeable about the  field of mine safety; mine company officials; and other representatives of  the mining community, including the United Mine Workers of America, the  National Mining Association, and the Bituminous Coal Operators’  Association to obtain their views on mine safety efforts and the new  requirements of the Mine Improvement and New Emergency Response Act  of 2006 (MINER Act) for emergency response plans.
Why GAO Did This Study

In 2006, several mining tragedies led the Congress to pass the Mine Improvement and New Emergency Response Act of 2006 (MINER Act). The law required underground coal mine operators to develop emergency response plans that contain several components designed to improve accident preparedness and response, including providing a refuge of air to miners trapped underground after an accident and wireless communications systems. The Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA) is responsible for approving the plans and ensuring their implementation. GAO examined (1) the effectiveness of the approval process, (2) the status of implementation of the plans, and (3) MSHA's efforts to enforce and oversee implementation. To address these questions, GAO reviewed a nonprobability sample of emergency response plans, analyzed MSHA data, and interviewed MSHA officials and members of the mining community.

What GAO Found

The effectiveness of MSHA's process for approving underground coal mines' emergency response plans was hampered by several factors, including revisions and delays by MSHA in developing guidance for mine operators on the required components of the plans and the lack of specificity of its guidance, which delayed approval of the plans. MSHA revised its guidance several times and did not issue guidance on one key requirement--providing a refuge of air to miners trapped underground--until 6 months after the initial plans were due. In addition, while the content of the plans may differ because of the unique characteristics of the mines, GAO found that some plans did not specify the protections to be provided and information about these protections varied. For example, some of the plans did not specify whether refuges of air would be provided to miners working in certain areas of the mine to help them survive if they are trapped in the mine after an accident. As a result, it is uncertain whether all of the plans will help ensure that miners will be adequately protected in the event of an accident. Most of the components of the mines' emergency response plans have been implemented but, as of January 2008, two key components remain. First, many mines have not implemented methods of providing air to trapped miners because needed equipment is not available. Second, mines have not begun to implement wireless communications systems or comparable alternatives to meet the June 2009 requirement in the MINER Act because fully wireless technology is not available and MSHA has not determined what technology it will allow mines to use to meet the requirement. The act provides that, where wireless systems are not available, alternatives to wireless communications systems are acceptable. While alternatives are currently available, MSHA headquarters officials told us they had no immediate plans to issue guidance detailing what technology would be acceptable in meeting the June 2009 requirement because they wanted to wait and see how new technologies developed by then. Given the delay, it is uncertain whether mine operators will be able to plan for and order the appropriate technology to meet the deadline, thereby missing opportunities to improve the chances of miners trapped in an underground coal mine after an accident to survive until they are able to be rescued. MSHA's district offices have inspected many of the mines for compliance with their emergency response plans and have issued citations to enforce immediate implementation of the plans, but MSHA headquarters officials have not systematically evaluated the data on citations to identify potential problems with implementation or enforcement. For example, MSHA headquarters has not analyzed or compared citations issued under the statute or related regulations, which may lead to inconsistent enforcement and assessment of penalties. In addition, MSHA has provided insufficient oversight to ensure the quality of emergency response plans or to identify whether corrective actions are needed.