JIEDDO emerged  through a series of attempts to focus counter-IED efforts, but its  development did not follow a formal process. Many Different DOD Entities Began Focusing on Counter-IED Issues in an Effort to Address Capability Gaps

As IED attacks in Iraq reached nearly 300 per month by October 2003 and  over 400 per month by May 2004, many different DOD entities at the  service and joint levels began focusing on addressing capability gaps in the  areas of counter-IED technologies, qualified personnel with expertise in  counter-IED tactics, training, dedicated funding, and expedited acquisition  processes. These various actions that led to the development of JIEDDO were done in  the absence of DOD having formal guidance for establishing joint  organizations. Furthermore, DOD did not systematically evaluate  all preexisting counter-IED resources in order to determine whether other  entities were engaged in similar efforts within DOD, according to DOD  officials. JIEDDO and the Services Lack Full Visibility over Counter-IED Initiatives throughout DOD

JIEDDO has taken steps to improve visibility over its counter-IED efforts  by, for example, involving the services in the joint counter-IED acquisition  process and hosting DOD counter-IED conferences. No Comprehensive IED Defeat Initiative Database Exists throughout DOD

JIEDDO and the services have limited visibility over all counter-IED  initiatives throughout DOD in that there is no comprehensive database of  all existing counter-IED initiatives. JIEDDO is currently  developing a management system that will track its initiatives as they  move through JIEDDO’s acquisition process. However, this system will  only track JIEDDO-funded initiatives—not those being independently  developed and procured by the services and other DOD components. The Services Lack Visibility over Some JIEDDO-Funded Initiatives

The services lack full visibility over those JIEDDO-funded initiatives that  bypass JIEDDO’s acquisition process. JIEDDO Faces Difficulties with Transitioning Joint IED Defeat Initiatives to the Military Services

Since its creation, JIEDDO has taken steps to support the services’ and  defense agencies’ ability to program and fund counter-IED initiatives  approved for transition following JIEDDO’s 2- year transition timeline. However, JIEDDO’s initiative  transitions to the services are hindered by funding gaps between JIEDDO’s  transition timeline and DOD’s base budget cycle as well as by instances  when service requirements are not fully considered during the  development and integration of jointly-funded counter-IED initiatives. In a  transfer, one of the services may sustain the initiative through funding for  current contingency operations. Continuing to fund transferred  initiatives with overseas contingency operations appropriations does not  ensure funding availability for those initiatives in future years, since these  appropriations are not necessarily renewed from one year to the next. In 2006,  DOD established the Navy as single manager and executive agent for  ground-based jamming systems for DOD. Although JIEDDO has  supported service counter-IED training, its lack of clear criteria for the  counter-IED training initiatives it will fund has affected its counter-IED  training investment decisions. As a result, JIEDDO has funded training initiatives that may  have primary uses other than defeating IEDs. As with JIEDDO’s urgent needs criteria for  training, these guidelines could also be broadly interpreted, as  demonstrated by the above examples. Without criteria specifying which  counter-IED training initiatives it will fund, JIEDDO may diminish its  ability to fund future initiatives that are more directly related to the  counter-IED mission. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

To assess the extent to which capability gaps were initially identified in  DOD’s effort to defeat IEDs and how these gaps and other factors led to  the development of JIEDDO, we spoke with current and former senior  officials involved in the evolution of JIEDDO and examined existing  documentation.
Why GAO Did This Study

Prior to the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization's (JIEDDO) establishment in 2006, no single entity was responsible for coordinating the Department of Defense's (DOD) counter improvised explosive device (IED) efforts. JIEDDO was established to coordinate and focus all counter-IED efforts, including ongoing research and development, throughout DOD. This report, which is one in a series of congressionally mandated GAO reports related to JIEDDO's management and operations, assesses the extent to which 1) capability gaps were initially identified in DOD's effort to defeat IEDs and how these gaps and other factors led to the development of JIEDDO, 2) JIEDDO has maintained visibility over all counter-IED efforts, 3) JIEDDO has coordinated the transition of JIEDDO-funded initiatives to the military services, and 4) JIEDDO has developed criteria for the counter-IED training initiatives it will fund. To address these objectives, GAO reviewed and analyzed relevant documents and met with DOD and service officials.

What GAO Found

With the escalation of the IED threat in Iraq, DOD identified several counter-IED capability gaps that included shortcomings in the areas of counter-IED technologies, qualified personnel with expertise in counter-IED tactics, training, dedicated funding, and expedited acquisition processes. For example, prior to JIEDDO's establishment, many different DOD entities focused on counter-IED issues, but coordination among these various efforts was informal and ad hoc. DOD's efforts to focus on addressing these gaps culminated in the creation of JIEDDO, but its creation was done in the absence of DOD having formal guidance for establishing joint organizations. Further, DOD did not systematically evaluate all preexisting counter-IED resources to determine whether other entities were engaged in similar efforts. JIEDDO and the services lack full visibility over counter-IED initiatives throughout DOD. First, JIEDDO and the services lack a comprehensive database of all existing counter-IED initiatives, limiting their visibility over counter-IED efforts across DOD. Although JIEDDO is currently developing a management system that will track initiatives as they move through JIEDDO's acquisition process, the system will only track JIEDDO-funded initiatives--not those being independently developed and procured by the services and other DOD components. Second, the services lack full visibility over those JIEDDO-funded initiatives that bypass JIEDDO's acquisition process. With limited visibility, both JIEDDO and the services are at risk of duplicating efforts. JIEDDO faces difficulties with transitioning Joint IED defeat initiatives to the military services, in part because JIEDDO and the services have difficulty resolving the gap between JIEDDO's transition timeline and DOD's base budget cycle. As a result, the services are mainly funding initiatives with funding for overseas contingency operations rather than their base budgets. Continuing to fund transferred initiatives with overseas contingency operations appropriations does not ensure funding availability for those initiatives in future years since these appropriations are not necessarily renewed from one year to the next. This transition is also hindered when service requirements are not fully considered during the development of joint-funded counter-IED initiatives, as evidenced by two counter-IED jamming systems. As a result, JIEDDO may be investing in counter-IED solutions that do not fully meet existing service requirements. JIEDDO's lack of clear criteria for the counter-IED training initiatives it will fund has affected its counter-IED training investment decisions. As a result, JIEDDO has funded training initiatives that may have primary uses other than defeating IEDs. In March 2009, JIEDDO attempted to update its criteria for joint training initiatives by listing new requirements; however, these guidelines also could be broadly interpreted. Without specific criteria for counter-IED training initiatives, DOD may find that it lacks funding for future initiatives more directly related to the counter-IED mission.