As a result, the net savings decreased from $385 million to $258 million. Even though the 1993 analysis continued to show a net savings by implementing the program, it did not include all program costs. Repair Turn Around Times for Engine and Avionics Items

The decision as to whether a TLM-designated item is repaired on base or sent to a depot depends on the extent of maintenance required. The Air Force has established repair turn around time standards for TLM items. In turn, this level of increase could overwhelm the depots’ repair capabilities and result in increased repair turn around times for avionics items. If this occurs, the number of engines to be repaired will be reduced and the maintenance focus will shift to meeting the repair turn around time or the Air Force will have to buy additional stocks for the base level. Use of TLM to Support Deployed Forces

When Air Force units deploy overseas, they will not take intermediate maintenance capability with them for the TLM avionics items and engines. Airlift priorities and assignments are controlled by the theater commander. U.S. Central Command officials told us that airlift has not been specifically dedicated for returning unserviceable items from the theater of operation to the United States and for resupplying units in the theater with needed spare parts. Recommendations

In view of the unresolved TLM issues and the fact that the program has not fully achieved its intended objectives and has not been fully implemented, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Air Force to continue to periodically reassess the cost efficiency and effectiveness of items already in the program as well as those planned for the program to determine whether the avionics items and engines are the most appropriate TLM candidates. To facilitate the reassessment, the Secretary of the Air Force should develop a revised cost and savings analysis that reflects (1) the facilities and minor construction costs incurred to ready depots for TLM and (2) the fact that the anticipated workload at the depots has not materialized; an assessment of the depots’ ability to meet the repair turn around times prescribed by the Air Force standard when the current inventory of engines is reduced and TLM is fully implemented; and an action plan, in concert with wartime theater commanders, that assesses the availability of airlift in the early stages of a conflict to fully support the added airlift requirements of TLM.
Why GAO Did This Study

GAO reviewed the Air Force's implementation of the Two Level Maintenance (TLM) program, which is its plan to facilitate downsizing by transferring some repairs from many individual bases to centralized depots, focusing on whether the program: (1) has achieved the expected results; (2) has reduced repair turnaround time; and (3) will be an effective maintenance program for supporting deployed forces.

What GAO Found

GAO found that; (1) the TLM program is not achieving the full extent of the intended benefits; (2) between the time of the Air Force's first cost and savings analysis in 1992 and the second analysis in 1993, the estimated costs to implement TLM had increased and the expected net savings had decreased--from $385 million to $258 million; (3) in addition, all program costs have not been included in the cost/savings analyses; (4) for avionics items, the repair turn around time under TLM generally met the Air Force's established repair turn around standard; (5) for engines, however, the repair turn around times are exceeding the standard by as many as 87 days; (6) for example, the repair turn around time standard for the TF30-111 engine, used on the F-111 aircraft, is 41 days, but as of August 1995, its average repair turn around time was 128 days; (7) the use of TLM to support deployed forces in times of conflict will add to the airlift burden; (8) because the deployed forces will not have in-country intermediate maintenance capability, the forces will be dependent on airlift for their spare and repair parts; (9) however, airlift priorities are controlled by the theater commander not the Air Force; (10) as a result, a theater commander could decide that the need for combat power in the early stages of the conflict has a higher priority than return of unserviceable items to depot repair facilities and movement of items from the depots to the theater of operation; and (11) the need for early sustainment airlift to support TLM is an issue that has not been fully resolved and is one that could affect sustainment of the deployed forces.