The primary  agencies providing assistance to Yemen in support of the U.S. strategy  are State, DOD, and USAID. The three U.S. assistance programs in Yemen receiving the largest  amount of allocated funds over the last 6 fiscal years are USAID’s FFP  program, which provides emergency food aid, and DOD’s Section 1206  and 1207(n) programs, which provide Yemeni security forces with training  and equipment for counterterrorism operations. Progress toward U.S. Strategic Goals for Yemen Has Been Mixed

Progress toward U.S. strategic goals for Yemen has been mixed,  according to agency officials, agency documents, and international  organizations. However, the national dialogue conference—a key step in the transition  process—has been delayed from November 2012 to March 2013. The security situation in Yemen has improved in some respects, but  remains unstable. While USAID data indicate that, between fiscal  years 2008 and 2011, FFP exceeded annual performance targets three  times for the number of individuals in Yemen benefiting from food  donations, reports to Congress about the program have lacked  timeliness, accuracy, clarity, and consistency.1206 and 1207(n) programs, DOD has cited security concerns in Yemen  as preventing it from evaluating the programs’ progress in building   With regard to Section  Yemeni counterterrorism capacity. Consequently, limited information  exists for decision makers to use in conducting oversight of these  assistance programs and making future funding decisions. In April 2010, we  found that DOD had not evaluated the effectiveness of its global Section  1206 program and recommended that DOD develop a plan to monitor  and evaluate Section 1206 project outcomes. Security Conditions and Political Divisions in Yemen Challenge U.S. Assistance Efforts

U.S. assistance efforts in Yemen face two significant types of  challenges.complicated U.S. efforts to train and assess the capability of Yemeni  security forces, restricted oversight of civilian assistance projects, and  endangered Yemeni staff who play a key role in providing assistance. Second, because of political divisions within the Yemeni government, key  recipients of U.S. security assistance made limited use of this assistance  until recently to combat AQAP in support of the U.S. strategic goal of  improving Yemen’s security. However, these officials  stated that no DOD personnel have been embedded with Yemeni  security forces since 2011. According to DOD officials, recent actions by the Yemeni government  have addressed some of these challenges. Conclusions

AQAP terrorists based in Yemen are a continuing national security threat  to the United States—a threat exacerbated by Yemen’s fragile economic,  social, and political situation. DOD concurred with our recommendations to collect and analyze  available data on the extent to which Section 1206 and 1207(n)  assistance has built the capacity of Yemeni security forces. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

To determine the extent of progress made toward U.S. strategic goals for  Yemen, we reviewed relevant documents from the Departments of State  (State) and Defense (DOD) and the U.S. Agency for International  Development (USAID), including strategy and planning documents, fact  sheets, and progress reporting. To assess the extent of progress made by USAID’s Food for Peace (FFP)  program and DOD’s Section 1206 and 1207(n) programs in Yemen, we  analyzed funding data on all U.S. assistance activities in Yemen to  determine allocations for these civilian and security assistance programs  in Yemen since fiscal year 2007. To obtain a more in-depth understanding of U.S.  assistance efforts in Yemen, we also conducted fieldwork in Sana’a,  Yemen, in October 2012, during which we met with State, DOD, and  USAID officials; U.S. implementing partners; and representatives of the  Yemeni Ministries of Interior, Defense, and Planning and International  Cooperation. 2.
Why GAO Did This Study

The terrorist group AQAP, one of the top threats to U.S. national security, is based in Yemena country facing serious economic and social challenges and undergoing a difficult political transition following civil unrest in 2011. Since 2007, State, DOD, and USAID have allocated over $1 billion in assistance to help Yemen counter AQAP and address other challenges. The three largest U.S. assistance programs in Yemen are USAIDs Food for Peace program, which has provided emergency food aid, and DODs Section 1206 and 1207(n) programs, which have provided training and equipment to Yemeni security forces.
In response to a Senate report that directed GAO to review U.S. assistance to Yemen, and following up on GAOs February 2012 report on the types and amounts of such assistance, GAO examined (1) the extent of progress made toward U.S. strategic goals for Yemen, (2) the extent of progress made by the Food for Peace and Section 1206 and 1207(n) programs, and (3) key challenges to U.S. assistance efforts. GAO reviewed agency documents and met with U.S. and Yemeni officials and implementing partners in Washington, D.C., and Sanaa, Yemen.

What GAO Found

Progress toward U.S. strategic goals for Yemen has been mixed. The Departments of State (State) and Defense (DOD) and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) have conducted numerous civilian and security assistance activities in support of these strategic goals. Although some progress has been made since the civil unrest in 2011, obstacles remain to achieving each goal. For example, while there has been an orderly political transition to a new president, key milestonessuch as convening a national dialogue to promote reconciliationhave been delayed. In addition, while Yemeni security forces have retaken territory seized by al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in 2011, the security situation remains unstable.
USAID data indicate that the Food for Peace program exceeded most of its annual targets between fiscal years 2008 and 2011 for the number of individuals in Yemen benefiting from food donations. However, reports to Congress about the program have lacked timeliness, accuracy, clarity, and consistency. With regard to the Section 1206 and 1207(n) programs, DOD has developed an evaluation process to assess the programs effectiveness but has not conducted an evaluation in Yemen, citing security concerns. Consequently, limited information exists for decision makers to use in conducting oversight of these assistance programs and making future funding decisions.
Security conditions and political divisions in Yemen pose key challenges to U.S. assistance efforts. First, Yemens unstable security situation constrains U.S. training of Yemeni security forces, restricts oversight of civilian assistance projects, and endangers Yemeni nationals who work for the United States. For example, a Yemeni employee of the U.S. embassy was murdered in October 2012, and other Yemeni staff at the embassy, as well as their families, face threats. Second, because of leadership and coordination challenges within the Yemeni government, key recipients of U.S. security assistance made limited use of this assistance until recently to combat AQAP in support of the U.S. strategic goal of improving Yemens security. However, according to DOD officials, recent actions by the Yemeni government to replace key leaders of security force units and reorganize security ministries have addressed some of these challenges.

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that USAID improve performance reporting on Food for Peace efforts in Yemen and that DOD collect and analyze data on the effectiveness of the Section 1206 and 1207(n) programs in Yemen until security conditions permit an evaluation of these programs. USAID and DOD concurred with GAOs recommendations.