We identified state roads close to the border that appeared  to be unmanned and unmonitored, allowing us to simulate the cross- border movement of radioactive materials or other contraband from  Canada into the United States. We also located several ports of entry that  had posted daytime hours and which, although monitored, were  unmanned overnight. State Roads Close to the Northern Border

We found state roads close to the U.S.–Canada border in several states. Many of the roads we found appeared to be unmanned and unmonitored,  allowing us to simulate the cross-border movement of radioactive  materials or other contraband from Canada into the United States. However, the U.S.  Border Patrol was not able to locate the investigators with the duffel bag,  even though they had parked nearby to observe traffic passing through the  port of entry. During the night, CBP told us that it relies on surveillance  systems to monitor, respond to, and attempt to interdict illegal border  crossing activity. When the U.S. Border Patrol did not  arrive at the port of entry, our investigators returned south, only to have a  U.S. Border Patrol agent pull them over 3 miles south of the port of entry. Southern Border

Safety considerations prevented our investigators from performing the  same assessment work on the U.S.–Mexico border as performed on the  northern border. In contrast to our observations on the northern border,  our investigators observed a large law enforcement and Army National  Guard presence near a state road on the southern border, including  unmanned aerial vehicles. These areas did not appear to be  monitored or have a noticeable law enforcement presence during the time  our investigators visited the sites. Federal Lands Adjacent to the Southern Border

Investigators identified potential security vulnerabilities on federally  managed land adjacent to the U.S.–Mexico border. Although CBP is ultimately responsible for  protecting these areas, officials told us that certain legal, environmental,  and cultural considerations limit options for enforcement—for example,  environmental restrictions and tribal sovereignty rights. CBP officials clarified their approach to law  enforcement in unmanned and unmonitored areas at the northern and  southern U.S. borders, including an explanation of jurisdictional issues on  federally managed lands. Our work shows that a determined cross- border violator would likely be able to bring radioactive materials or other  contraband undetected into the United States by crossing the U.S.–Canada  border at any of the locations we investigated. Borders

This appendix details four cases where Customs and Border Protection  (CBP) apprehended individuals who were engaged in suspicious activities  on the northern and southern borders.
Why GAO Did This Study

The possibility that terrorists and criminals might exploit border vulnerabilities and enter the United States poses a serious security risk, especially if they were to bring radioactive material or other contraband with them. Although Customs and Border Protection (CBP) has taken steps to secure the 170 ports of entry on the northern and southern U.S. borders, Congress is concerned that unmanned and unmonitored areas between these ports of entry may be vulnerable. In unmanned locations, CBP relies on surveillance cameras, unmanned aerial drones, and other technology to monitor for illegal border activity. In unmonitored locations, CBP does not have this equipment in place and must rely on alert citizens or other information sources to meet its obligation to protect the border. Today's testimony will address what GAO investigators found during a limited security assessment of seven border areas that were unmanned, unmonitored, or both--four at the U.S.-Canada border and three at the U.S.-Mexico border. In three of the four locations on the U.S.-Canada border, investigators carried a duffel bag across the border to simulate the cross-border movement of radioactive materials or other contraband. Safety considerations prevented GAO investigators from attempting to cross north into the United States from a starting point in Mexico.

What GAO Found

On the U.S.-Canada border, GAO found state roads close to the border that CBP did not appear to man or monitor. In some of these locations, the proximity of the road to the border allowed investigators to cross without being challenged by law enforcement, successfully simulating the cross-border movement of radioactive materials or other contraband into the United States from Canada. In one location on the northern border, the U.S. Border Patrol was alerted to GAO activities through the tip of an alert citizen. However, the responding U.S. Border Patrol agents were not able to locate GAO investigators. Also on the northern border, GAO investigators located several ports of entry that had posted daytime hours and were unmanned overnight. On the southern border, investigators observed a large law enforcement and Army National Guard presence on a state road, including unmanned aerial vehicles. Also, GAO identified federally managed lands that were adjacent to the U.S.-Mexico border. These areas did not appear to be monitored or did not have an observable law enforcement presence, which contrasted sharply with GAO observations on the state road. Although CBP is ultimately responsible for protecting federal lands adjacent to the border, CBP officials told GAO that certain legal, environmental, and cultural considerations limit options for enforcement--for example, environmental restrictions and tribal sovereignty rights.