Ambassador) or under  DOD’s combatant commander authority. In addition, representatives  from State, other U.S. agencies under Chief of Mission authority, and  U.S. Embassy Kabul participate in periodic interagency staffing reviews. that are organized, ready, trained, cleared, and equipped in a manner that  enhances their availability to mobilize and respond urgently to  expeditionary requirements now and in the future. Department of Defense Directive 1404.10, DOD Civilian Expeditionary Workforce (Jan.  23, 2009). civilians must complete. U.S. Agencies Reported Expanding Their Civilian Presence in Afghanistan and Took Steps to Improve Their Ability to Track That Presence

Since January 2009, U.S. agencies under Chief of Mission authority more  than tripled their civilian presence and expanded outside Kabul in  response to the President’s 2009 announcement. DOD both created new  programs to build the security capacity of the Afghan government and  reported expanding its overall civilian presence. Furthermore, according to federal  internal control standards, program managers need operational data to  determine whether they are meeting the goals of their agencies’ strategic  and annual performance plans and accounting for the effective and  efficient use of resources.Orientation and In-Processing (responsible for ensuring that interagency  personnel meet all administrative, medical, and training requirements  before deploying to Afghanistan) began using a data system called the  Afghanistan Civilian Personnel Tracking System (ACPTS) in February  2011 to track Chief of Mission personnel’s locations and movements  (e.g., movement from Kabul to a district support team) and to identify  position-specific information (e.g., location, position title, appointment type  or grade, vacancy status, and the strategic line of effort to which a  position belongs). As shown in  figure 3, DOD reported its civilian presence in Afghanistan grew from 394  civilians in January 2009 to 2,929 in December 2011. In addition, DOD established two programs to respond to the  department’s mission to build the capacity of the Afghan government. DOD Took Preliminary Steps to Implement CEW Policy but Did Not Identify the Number and Types of Positions That Should Constitute the CEW

The Office of the Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness is  responsible for overseeing implementation of the 2009 CEW directive,  including developing policy and implementing procedural guidance for the  CEW. However, the CEW program has not been fully developed and  implemented. In particular, DOD components have not identified and  designated the number and types of positions that should constitute the  emergency-essential, non-combat essential, and capability-based  volunteer segments of the CEW because guidance for making such  determinations has not been provided by the Office of the Secretary of  Defense. Office of the Secretary of Defense officials stated that once key  assumptions regarding the size and composition of the CEW have been  finalized, implementing guidance will be issued that will contain  information on how the components are to identify and designate  positions as emergency-essential, non-combat essential and capability- based volunteers. By not developing guidance that instructs the components on how to  identify and designate the number and types of positions that will  constitute the CEW, DOD may not be able to (1) make the CEW a  significant portion of the civilian workforce as called for in DOD’s Fiscal   (2) meet readiness  Year 2009 Civilian Human Capital Strategic Plan,goals for the CEW as required in DOD’s Strategic Management Plan for  Fiscal Years 2012-2013,missions. U.S. Agencies Established Afghanistan-Specific Predeployment Training Requirements, but DOD Faced Implementation Challenges

		State Provided Required Training for Personnel Deploying to Afghanistan

State has established predeployment training requirements for all Chief of  Mission personnel deploying to Afghanistan, including courses offered by  State’s Foreign Service Institute, as well as key security training provided  by State’s Diplomatic Security Bureau—the FACT course. Conclusions

The U.S. civilian presence in Afghanistan and the deployment of civilians  to Afghan provinces and districts remain crucial to U.S. efforts to build the  capacity of the Afghan government to provide essential services to its  people with limited international support. While agencies present  under Chief of Mission authority benefit from a centralized set of training  requirements and internal controls, DOD’s civilian training process does  not have the same level of oversight or centralized control. DOD concurred with our recommendation to establish a process to  identify and approve pre-deployment training requirements for all DOD  civilians. DOD concurred with our recommendation to establish a process to  coordinate with key stakeholders such as the military services and  subordinate commands to ensure that training requirements are  synchronized among and within DOD components and with department- wide guidance. To examine the expansion of the U.S. civilian presence in Afghanistan,  we obtained and analyzed staffing data from State and DOD regarding  staffing requirements and fill rates for all civilian positions under Chief of  Mission authority and key positions under combatant commander  authority deployed in-country following the President’s March 2009 call to  enhance support of Afghan national and subnational government  institutions. However, the extent to which DOD staffing data in the Joint  Personnel Status Report are reliable is unknown because previous  reports have omitted or double counted personnel. To determine the extent to which U.S. agencies had provided required  Afghanistan-specific training to their personnel before deployment, we  reviewed predeployment training requirements established by the  Department of State for all Chief of Mission personnel and the  requirements set by various programs and components within the DOD.
Why GAO Did This Study

In March 2009, the President called for an expanded U.S. civilian presence under Chief of Mission authority to build the capacity of the Afghan government to provide security, essential services, and economic development. In addition, the Department of Defense (DOD) deploys civilians under combatant commander authority to Afghanistan to support both combat and capacity-building missions. DOD established the Civilian Expeditionary Workforce (CEW) in 2009 to create a cadre of civilians trained, cleared, and equipped to respond urgently to expeditionary requirements. As the military draws down, U.S. civilians will remain crucial to achieving the goal of transferring lead security responsibility to the Afghan government in 2014.
For this report, GAO (1) examined the expansion of the U.S. civilian presence in Afghanistan, (2) evaluated DODs implementation of its CEW policy, and (3) determined the extent to which U.S. agencies had provided required Afghanistan-specific training to their personnel before deployment. GAO analyzed staffing data and training requirements, and interviewed cognizant officials from the Department of State (State), other U.S. agencies with personnel under Chief of Mission authority in Afghanistan, and DOD.

What GAO Found

U.S. agencies under Chief of Mission authority and the Department of Defense (DOD) have reported expanding their civilian presence in Afghanistan and took steps to improve their ability to track that presence. Since January 2009, U.S. agencies under Chief of Mission authority more than tripled their civilian presence from 320 to 1,142. However, although State could report total Chief of Mission numbers by agency, in mid-2011 GAO identified discrepancies in States data system used to capture more-detailed staffing information such as location and position type. State began taking steps in the fall of 2011 to improve the reliability of its data system. Also, DOD reported expanding its overall civilian presence from 394 civilians in January 2009 to 2,929 in December 2011 to help assist U.S. efforts in Afghanistan. The extent to which DODs data is reliable is unknown due to omissions and double counting, among other things. In a 2009 report, GAO noted similar data issues and recommended DOD improve data concerning deployed civilians. DOD concurred with the recommendation and expects the issues will be addressed by a new tracking system to be completed in fiscal year 2012.
DOD has taken preliminary steps to implement its Civilian Expeditionary Workforce (CEW) policy, including establishing a program office; however, nearly 3 years after DODs directive established the CEW, the program has not been fully developed and implemented. Specifically, DOD components have not identified and designated the number and types of positions that should constitute the CEW because guidance for making such determinations has not been provided by the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Officials stated that once key assumptions regarding the size and composition of the CEW have been finalized, implementing guidance will be issued. Until guidance that instructs the components on how to identify and designate the number and types of positions that will constitute the CEW is developed, DOD may not be able to (1) make the CEW a significant portion of the civilian workforce as called for in DODs fiscal year 2009 Civilian Human Capital Strategic Plan, (2) meet readiness goals for the CEW as required in DODs Strategic Management Plan for fiscal years 2012-2013, and (3) position itself to respond to future missions.
U.S. agencies under Chief of Mission authority and DOD provided Afghanistan-specific, predeployment training to their civilians, but DOD faced challenges. State offered predeployment training courses to address its requirements for Chief of Mission personnel and designated a centralized point of contact to help ensure that no personnel were deployed without taking required training, including the Foreign Affairs Counter Threat course. While predeployment training requirements were established for Afghanistan by the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Combatant Commander, DOD relied on its various components to provide the training to its civilians. In some cases, DOD components offered duplicate training courses and did not address all theater requirements in their training because DOD did not have a process for identifying and synchronizing requirements and coordinating efforts to implement them, as called for in the Strategic Plan for the Next Generation of Training for the Department of Defense. Absent this process, DOD could not ensure that its civilians were fully prepared for deployment to Afghanistan and that training resources were used efficiently.

What GAO Recommends

GAOs recommendations to DOD include developing key assumptions and identifying the number and types of positions that should constitute the CEW, and establishing a process to identify and synchronize training requirements. DOD concurred with GAOs recommendations.