	Background

Russia's then-Premier (and current President) Vladimir Putin ordered military, police, andother security forces to enter the breakaway Chechnya region (with a population variously estimatedat less than one-half to one million) in September 1999, and these forces occupied most of the regionby early 2000. (1) Theconflict has ebbed and flowed since then and has resulted in thousands of military and civiliancasualties and the massive destruction of housing and infrastructure. (7) 
Since the 2002 Moscow theater siege, the Putin administration has appeared unequivocallyopposed to talks with the rebels and more dedicated to establishing a pro-Moscow government inChechnya. This has permitted the disengagement and withdrawal of thousands of Russian troopsfrom the region. This "Chechenization" of the conflict, along with related pacification efforts,constitutes the main elements of the Russian government's campaign to wind down the Chechnyaconflict. Pacification efforts aim to gain the support or acquiescence of the population to federalcontrol and include rebuilding assistance and elections. The assassination of the Chechen presidentin May 2004, and the attack on the school in Beslan in September 2004 have raised questions aboutwhether Chechenization and pacification are succeeding. He also presumably enjoyed automatic support from the 23,000-30,000 permanentlydeployed Russian troops in the region. (28) 

		Implications for Chechnya and Russia

The Russian and pro-Moscow Chechen governments have hailed elections in Chechnya asmarking an emergent peace and rule of law in the republic. Interests

A consistent theme of U.S. and other international criticism of Russia has been that Russiantroops are using excessive and indiscriminate force in quelling separatism in Chechnya andotherwise are committing serious human rights abuses. (44) 
On other issues, several analysts have discerned shifts in Administration policy in recentyears, perhaps spurred to some degree by the Moscow theater siege in late 2002 and stepped-upterrorist bombings throughout Russia in 2003 and 2004. Thereappeared to be fewer Administration suggestions to Russia that it should open peace talks withseparatists, more tolerance for Russia's argument that it was battling terrorism in Chechnya, andsome hope that elections and rebuilding efforts in Chechnya could contribute to a "politicalsettlement." (52) 
Some Administration officials have raised concerns that problematic elections in Chechnyaare emblematic of a Russia less interested in adopting Western democratic and human rights"values," and that such slippage could ultimately harm bilateral relations. Even after September 11, 2001 --when the Administration's focus was on forging an international anti-terrorist coalition that includedRussia -- Congress retained a provision first included in FY2001 appropriations that cut some aidto Russia unless the President determined that non-governmental organizations (NGOs) were givenfull access to Chechnya. Foreign Operations Appropriations for FY2006 ( H.R. 3057 ; P.L. 109-102 ) retains this provision. (63) 
Issues for the second Session of the 109th Congress include weighing the benefits of Russiansupport for U.S.-backed anti-terrorism efforts against continuing a ban on some aid to Russia.
Russia's then-Premier (and current President) Vladimir Putin ordered military, police, andsecurity forces to enter the breakaway Chechnya region in September 1999, and these forcesoccupied most of the region by early 2000. The conflict has resulted in thousands of military andcivilian casualties and the massive destruction of housing and infrastructure. Putin's rise to powerand continuing popularity have been tied at least partly to his perceived ability to prosecute thisconflict successfully. In the run-up to Russian legislative elections in December 2003 and apresidential election in March 2004, Putin endeavored to demonstrate that peace had returned to theregion.
After Chechen terrorists held hundreds of Moscow theater-goers hostage in late 2002, thePutin administration appeared unequivocally opposed to talks with the rebels and more dedicatedto establishing a pro-Moscow government in Chechnya. This pro-Moscow government has used itsown forces to battle the remaining rebels, ostensibly permitting the disengagement and withdrawalof most Russian troops from the region. This "Chechenization" of the conflict, along with relatedpacification efforts, has constituted the main elements of the Russian government's campaign to winddown the fighting. Pacification efforts have aimed to gain the support or acquiescence of thepopulation to federal control and have included rebuilding assistance and elections. Theassassination of a pro-Moscow Chechen leader in May 2004, the attack on a school in the town ofBeslan, Russia, in September 2004, by Chechen terrorists, and widening of conflict to other areasof Russia's North Caucasus have raised questions about whether Chechenization and pacification aresucceeding.
A consistent theme of U.S. and other international criticism of Russia is that Russian troopsuse excessive and indiscriminate force to quell separatism in Chechnya and commit serious humanrights abuses. Several analysts have discerned a decrease in Bush Administration criticism ofRussian policy in Chechnya, perhaps spurred to some degree by the Moscow theater hostage crisisand stepped-up terrorist bombings and armed attacks throughout Russia in recent years. U.S.concerns before the Iraq conflict with gaining Russia's support also may have contributed to theshifts. There appeared to be fewer Administration suggestions to Russia that it should open peacetalks with "moderate" separatists, more tolerance for Russia's argument that it primarily was battlingterrorism in Chechnya, and some hope that elections and rebuilding in Chechnya could contributeto a "political settlement." But some in the Administration also argue that Russia is showingdeclining interest in the adoption of Western democratic and human rights "values," and that suchslippage could ultimately harm bilateral relations.
Foreign Operations Appropriations for FY2006 ( H.R. 3057 ; P.L. 109-102 )retains a provision first included in FY2001 appropriations that cuts some aid to Russia unless thePresident determines that Russia is not hampering access to Chechnya by non-governmentalorganizations (NGOs). One issue for the second Session of the 109th Congress is whether tocontinue this ban in FY2007 legislation.