Also of critical importance is the Army's ability to fund both the Future Combat System (FCS) program and its modularity program concurrently. Are some Brigade Combat Teams vulnerable to enemy armor? Accordingly, the Army hopes that modularization will result in:
At least a 30% increase in the combat power of the Active Component of the force; An increase in the rotational pool of ready units by at least 50%; Army operating forces that require less augmentation when deployed—reducing the requirement for ad hoc organizations; Creation of a deployable joint-capable headquarters and improvement of joint interoperability across all Army units; Force design upon which the future network centric developments [Future Combat System] can be readily applied; Reduced stress on the force through a more predictable deployment cycle: One year deployed and two years at home station for the Active Component; One year deployed and four years at home station for the Reserve Force; One year deployed and five years at home station for the National Guard Force; and Reduced mobilization times for the Reserve Component as a whole. These shortages will likely be even more pronounced in the Army National Guard that could start their modular conversions with less and much older equipment than most active Army units. Rebalancing and Stabilizing the Force and Cyclical Readiness

		Other Critical Army Initiatives

The Army has three other concurrent initiatives underway which have been described as "critical enablers" in the Army's brigade-centric reconfiguration: rebalancing and stabilizing the force and cyclic unit readiness. These initiatives involve substantial policy, organizational, and personnel changes and some observers contend that these initiatives may be more be difficult to achieve than the creation of modular BCTs and support brigades as they require significant cultural changes for the entire Army. The objective is to keep soldiers in units longer in order to reduce historically high turnover rates of soldiers and their leaders and to foster unit cohesion and operational effectiveness. In addition, this initiative is intended to provide stability to Army families, and could ultimately save the Army money as it could result in fewer moves for soldiers and their families. Congress might decide to examine this issue of Infantry and Stryker BCT firepower vulnerabilities with the Army in greater detail.
In what the Army describes as the "most significant Army restructuring in the past 50 years," it is redesigning its current active duty division force to a 48 brigade combat team (BCT) force. The Army National Guard and Army Reserves will also redesign their forces in a similar fashion. The planned addition of active duty brigades and the conversion of Army National Guard brigades could provide a larger force pool of deployable combat units to ease the burden on units presently deployed, and possibly to shorten the length of time that units are deployed on operations. The Army has three other concurrent initiatives underway that it considers inextricably linked to its brigade-centric redesign: rebalancing to create new "high demand" units; stabilizing the force to foster unit cohesion and enhance predictability for soldiers and their families; and cyclical readiness to better manage resources and to ensure a ready force for operations. These initiatives involve substantial cultural, policy, organizational, and personnel changes.
Some experts believe that modular redesign, selective rebalancing, stabilizing, and cyclical readiness are prudent actions that should provide the Army with additional deployable units and also eventually bring stability to soldiers and their families. As long as no additional significant long term troop commitments arise, many feel that these initiatives could help ease the stress on both the active and reserve forces. As the Army continues its modular conversion, it may have to contend with budget, personnel, and equipment shortages which could impede plans to build this new force as intended. Some also question if the Army can afford both its Future Combat System (FCS) program and its modularity program. The 110th Congress might decide to examine these and other concerns in greater detail. This report will be updated.