In the United States, PSI is not a program housed in a  single agency, but instead is a set of activities with participation by seven  agencies and the intelligence community. Agencies Have Adopted Policies and Procedures, but Annual Reports Lack Some Required Information

U.S. agencies have adopted interagency guidance documents that  establish policies and procedures for all agencies participating in PSI  activities. As we noted in our 2008 report, while DOD  and Customs and Border Protection (CBP) had established some policies  and procedures for their PSI activities, State and some law enforcement  agencies had not. State and DOD have  submitted annual PSI reports in 2009, 2010, and 2011 including  descriptions of PSI activities, but these reports do not include all required  estimated expenditures for PSI activities over the next 3 fiscal years and  the amount expended in the prior year. For example, the  2011 report states that DOD’s total PSI expenditures for that year were  approximately $519,000. The annual reports do not uniformly include expenditure data for any  other agencies participating in PSI. Extent to Which Activities Meet PSI Objective Is Unclear because Agencies Lack Measures of Results

DOD, State, CBP, and FBI officials participated in a range of PSI activities  since 2008 to meet their objective of expanding and enhancing  counterproliferation efforts, but it is unclear to what extent these activities  have achieved the objective because agencies lack measures of results. The agencies either led or participated in 22 PSI activities from fiscal year  2009 through fiscal year 2011, including multilateral meetings and  exercises. In addition, they have extended access to PSI activities to  more countries that are not part of the 21-country OEG. Despite  recommendations in the 9/11 Act and by GAO that agencies develop PSI  performance indicators, DOD, State, CBP, and FBI have not developed  indicators that can be used to systematically measure progress toward   Further, the agencies have not systematically  the stated PSI objective.evaluated PSI activity results. Although some officials indicated plans to  develop PSI performance indicators, officials from DOD and State also  cited several challenges to developing indicators to measure PSI  activities’ results, including difficulty quantifying how PSI activities  improved capacity. However, GAO has previously reported that, despite  challenges, evaluating results and developing measures are possible. One approach PSI agency officials could consider is developing a  framework to link performance measures, such as number of participants  trained, to outcomes, such as changes in national policies that strengthen  their authority to perform interdictions. For example, the  U.S. Agencies Have Not Established a Framework to Measure PSI’s Results

While U.S. agencies have undertaken a range of PSI efforts since 2008,  they have not established a framework to measure PSI activities’ results  and, therefore, it is unclear to what extent these activities have enhanced  and expanded capacity to prevent the flow of WMD, their delivery  systems, and related materials on the ground, in the air, and at sea, to  and from states and nonstate actors of proliferation concern. DOD also partially  concurred with our recommendation to develop a results framework. State partially concurred with the recommendation to provide expenditure  information for all U.S. agencies participating in PSI activities. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

To assess the progress agencies have made since 2008 in establishing  recommended Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) policies and  procedures, and issuing required annual reports, we reviewed the  findings and recommendations in GAO’s 2006 and 2008 reports on PSI  and the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of  2007 (the 9/11 Act). We also reviewed PSI annual reports submitted  to Congress by the Departments of State (State) and Defense (DOD) and  analyzed them for compliance with the requirements in the 9/11 Act. To assess the extent to which PSI activities have enhanced and  expanded U.S. efforts to prevent the flow of weapons of mass destruction  (WMD) materials, we reviewed and analyzed documents from DOD,  State, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and the Department  of Justice (DOJ).
Why GAO Did This Study

In 2003, the Bush Administration announced the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) to enhance U.S. efforts to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). PSI is not a program housed in only one agency, but instead is a set of activities with participation by multiple U.S. agencies and other countries. Congress recommended that the Department of Defense (DOD) and Department of State (State) establish policies, procedures, and indicators to measure results and required that they submit annual reports. It also mandated that GAO report on PSI effectiveness. In 2008, GAO likewise recommended that law enforcement agencies also establish policies, procedures, and performance indicators.
This report assesses (1) the progress relevant agencies have made since 2008 in establishing recommended PSI policies and procedures and issuing required annual reports; and (2) the extent to which PSI activities have enhanced and expanded U.S. counterproliferation efforts.
GAO reviewed and analyzed agency documents and interviewed officials from State, DOD, and other agencies with PSI responsibilities.

What GAO Found

U.S. agencies have adopted interagency guidance documents that establish PSI policies and procedures and have submitted annual reports; however, these reports do not contain expenditure data for all agencies as required by law. The agencies produced documents that contain general PSI policies and procedures. In addition, DOD and the Department of Homeland Securitys Customs and Border Protection (CBP) developed policies and procedures specifically to guide their agencies PSI activities. The annual reports submitted in 2009, 2010, and 2011 met requirements to describe PSI-related activities planned for future years and those that took place in the preceding year. Although the reports included an account of DODs PSI expenditures, they did not contain all expenditures for other agencies for PSI activities as required by law.
U.S. officials participated in a range of PSI activities since 2008 to meet their objective of expanding and enhancing counterproliferation efforts, but it is unclear to what extent these activities have achieved the objective because agencies lack measures of results. The agencies either led or participated in 22 PSI activities from fiscal year 2009 through fiscal year 2011 including multilateral meetings and exercises. Officials stated that their outreach efforts contributed to increased support for PSI since GAOs 2008 report, such as the increase from 93 to 98 countries endorsing PSI. In addition, they have extended access to PSI activities to more countries that are not part of the group of 21 PSI Operational Experts Group countries, for example by holding regional planning meetings. Despite recommendations of Congress and GAO that agencies develop PSI performance indicators, DOD, State, CBP, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation have not developed indicators that can be used to systematically measure progress toward the stated PSI objective. Further, the agencies have not systematically evaluated PSI activity results. Although some officials indicated plans to develop PSI performance indicators, officials from DOD and State also cited several challenges to developing indicators to measure PSI activities results including difficulty quantifying how PSI activities improved capacity. However, GAO has previously reported that, despite such challenges, developing measures that help link activities to results is possible. PSI agencies could develop a framework that links performance measures to outcomes. For example, such a framework could link the number of participants trained to changes in national policies that strengthen participant countries authority to interdict the shipment of WMD, their delivery systems, and related materials.

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that State and DOD provide all required expenditure information in PSI annual reports and develop a framework for measuring PSIs results. DOD partially concurred with both recommendations and State partially concurred with the reporting recommendation. State disagreed with the framework recommendation, but noted its support for analysis consistent with it.