Because DOD  could not rely on existing operation plans to guide its mobilizations, it  used a modified mobilization process that was slower than the traditional  mobilization process. About 300,000 Reservists Called to Active Duty

DOD has called about 300,000 of the 1.2 million National Guard and  Reserve personnel to active duty since September 2001. According to senior Air Force officials, none of the operation plans  that existed on September 11, 2001, contained requirements for the  extended use of Guard and Reserve members to fly combat air patrols  over the nation’s capital and major cities. The Modified Mobilization Process Was Slower and Less Efficient Than the Traditional Process

After September 11, 2001, DOD used a modified mobilization process  because existing operation plans had not adequately addressed  mobilization requirements and changing priorities. For example, under the modified  process, the Secretary of Defense signed 246 deployment orders to  mobilize over 280,000 reservists between September 11, 2001, and May 21,  2003, compared to the less than 10 deployment orders needed to mobilize  over 220,000 reservists during the 1991 Gulf War. DOD Officials Had Limited Visibility Over the Mobilization Process

DOD officials did not have visibility over the entire mobilization process  primarily because DOD lacked adequate systems for tracking personnel  and other resources. First, DOD’s primary automated readiness reporting  system could not adequately track the personnel and other resources  within the small units that were frequently needed by combatant  commanders. Second, some systems used by the active and reserve  components to track personnel were incompatible. The Services Have Two Approaches to Provide Preparation Time for Mobilizations and Deployments

The services have used two primary approaches—predictable operating  cycles and formal advanced notification—to provide time for units and  servicemembers to prepare for upcoming mobilizations and deployments. All the services provide predictability to portions of their active forces  through some type of standard operating cycle, but only the Air Force has  a standard operating cycle that brings predictability to both its active and  reserve forces. The Army assigns priority categories to its units, and lower- priority units generally need extra training and preparation time prior to  deploying. Because existing operation plans had not accurately identified  all mobilization requirements, a number of lower-priority units were  mobilized with relatively little advance notice. Despite the large number of lower-priority units within the Army National  Guard and the Army Reserve, the Army does not have a standard operating  cycle concept to provide predictability to its reserve forces. Without such  a concept, the Army’s opportunities to provide extra training and  preparation time to its reserve forces, particularly those with low  priorities, are limited. DOD Has Limited Access to Portions of the Ready Reserve

After September 11, 2001, mobilizations were hampered because about  one-quarter of the Ready Reserve was not readily accessible. Some  Selected Reserve members could not be mobilized due to the lack of  training. Conclusions

About 300,000 of the 1.2 million National Guard and Reserve personnel  have been called to active duty since September 11, 2001. They fought on  the front lines in Iraq; tracked down terrorists throughout Asia and Africa;  maintained the peace in the Balkans, Afghanistan, and now Iraq; and  participated in a wide range of domestic missions. However, the process  to mobilize reservists had to be modified and contained numerous  inefficiencies. Existing operation plans did not adequately address the  mobilization requirements needed to deal with terrorist attacks and  overseas requirements. Specifically, we recommend that the  Secretary of Defense direct  the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to identify all of the mobilization  requirements that have evolved since September 11, 2001, and create or  update operation plans as necessary, to account for these requirements;  the Secretaries of the Army and the Navy to capture readiness information  on the resources within all the units that are available to meet the tailored  requirements of combatant commanders so that these resources will be  visible to key mobilization officials within DOD, the Joint Staff, and the  service headquarters;  the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, in  conjunction with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, to  develop a single automated system or fully integrated automated systems  that will provide for the seamless transfer of reservists information,  regardless of whether the reservists are in an active or reserve status;  the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, the  Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Assistant Secretary of the Air  Force for Manpower and Reserve Affairs to update their applicable  mobilization instructions, notices, and publications;  the Secretary of the Army to develop a standard operating cycle concept  to help increase predictability for Army reserve units;  the service secretaries to develop and use results-oriented performance  metrics to guide service efforts to gain and maintain improved information  on IRR members; and  the service secretaries to review and update their IRR policies to take into  account the nature of the mobilization requirements as well as the types of  reservists who are available to fill the requirements.
Why GAO Did This Study

On September 14, 2001, President Bush proclaimed that a national emergency existed by reason of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. Under section 12302 of title 10, United States Code, the President is allowed to call up to 1 million National Guard and Reserve members to active duty for up to 2 years. GAO was asked to review issues related to the call-up of reservists following September 11, 2001. GAO examined (1) whether the Department of Defense (DOD) followed existing operation plans when mobilizing forces, (2) the extent to which responsible officials had visibility over the mobilization process, and (3) approaches the services have taken to provide predictability to reservists. GAO also determined the extent to which the Ready Reserve forces, which make up over 98 percent of nonretired reservists, were available.

What GAO Found

About 300,000 of the 1.2 million National Guard and Reserve personnel have been called to active duty since September 11, 2001. They fought on the front lines in Iraq; tracked terrorists throughout Asia and Africa; maintained the peace in the Balkans, Afghanistan, and now Iraq; and participated in a wide range of domestic missions. However, DOD's process to mobilize reservists after September 11 had to be modified and contained numerous inefficiencies. Existing operation plans did not fully address the mobilization requirements needed to deal with the terrorist attacks or uncertain overseas requirements. For example, no previous requirements called for the extended use of National Guard and Reserve members to fly combat air patrols over the nation's capital and major cities. Because DOD could not rely on existing operation plans to guide its mobilizations, it used a modified process that relied on additional management oversight and multiple layers of coordination, which resulted in a process that was slower and less efficient than the traditional process. Under the modified process, the Secretary of Defense signed 246 deployment orders to mobilize over 280,000 reservists compared to the less than 10 deployment orders needed to mobilize over 220,000 reservists during the 1991 Persian Gulf War. DOD did not have visibility over the entire mobilization process primarily because it lacked adequate systems for tracking personnel and other resources. DOD's primary automated readiness reporting system could not adequately track the personnel and other resources within the small units that were frequently needed. Also, visibility was lost because some services' active and reserve systems for tracking personnel were incompatible, resulting in ad hoc coordination between active and reserve officials. Both groups often resorted to tracking mobilizations with computer spreadsheets. In addition, some reservists were deployed beyond dates specified in their orders or stayed on alert for more than a year and never mobilized because officials lost visibility. The services have used two primary approaches--predictable operating cycles and advance notification--to provide time for units and personnel to prepare for mobilizations. All the services provide predictability to portions of their forces through some type of standard operating cycle, but only the Air Force has a standard operating cycle that brings predictability to both its active and reserve forces. The Army prioritizes its units, and lower-priority units generally need extra training and preparation time before deploying. Yet, since September 11, a number of lower-priority units have been mobilized with relatively little advance notice. Despite the large number of lower-priority units within the Army Guard and Reserve, the Army does not have a standard operating cycle to provide predictability to its reserves. Without such a concept, the Army's opportunities to provide extra training and preparation time to its reserve forces are limited. Mobilizations were hampered because one-quarter of the Ready Reserve was not readily available for mobilization. Over 70,000 reservists could not be mobilized because they had not completed their training requirements, and the services lacked information needed to fully use the 300,000 pretrained IRR members.