During the late 1980s, several bills were introduced in Congress to relax the statutory restrictions.The first proposal that actually broke the deadlock was the elaborate scheme prescribed by theDefense Authorization Amendments and Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1988 ( P.L. Among other things, the 1990 version of the law provided for three successive, eight-membercommissions that would operate in 1991, 1993, and 1995, with all eight members of eachcommission appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. The statutes and the Base Closure and Realignment (BRAC) (6) commissions succeeded ineffecting the selective closure of many military bases and the reduction of military infrastructure. Furthermore, the BRAC statute provided for expedited congressional procedures todisapprove commission recommendations regarding base realignments and closures, with a straightup or down vote and no possibility for amending the list. The Secretary of Defense madethe initial recommendations for closure or realignment. The commission could, and did, add to anddelete from these recommendations. (7) Heads of federal departments and agencies were allowed to detailpersonnel to the commission, upon the commission director's request, and the Comptroller Generalwas required to provide assistance to the commission (including the detailing of GAO employees)in accordance with an agreement with the commission. 101-510 , dated November 5, 1990. 100-526 ). First, it was declared to be the "sense of Congress" that militaryoperations at overseas bases be terminated at the discretion of the Secretary of Defense "at theearliest opportunity." The 1990 statute required the Defense Department to publish its proposed criteriafor selecting bases to be closed. Cost and manpower implications. A number of Senators and Congressmen objectedto proposed closures in their various jurisdictions, but in general Congress appeared to find the listmore acceptable than the one announced by Secretary Cheney in January 1990. Many Membersof Congress, as well as other witnesses, testified regarding the process, merits, and impacts of thepossible closings. However, this emphasis shifted to assistingthe economic recovery of communities affected by a closure. He also commented, in connection with the base closureprogram, that "we have closed all of the bases that were relatively easy to close," but that DOD still"need(s) to close more bases from the point of view of saving infrastructure..." 

	Creation of 1995 Base Closure Commission

Former Senator Alan Dixon of Illinois was nominated and confirmed as chairman of the 1995commission in October 1994, before the 103rd Congress adjourned. DOD estimated aggregated savings of about $57 billion over 20 years, from this and the previousthree rounds. Creation of a new BRAC commission wouldrequire new authorizing legislation by Congress. Additional changes werecontained in the FY1997 National Defense Authorization Act ( P.L. Thus, RAND noted, "(C)losuresof major facilities such as Mare Island or Long Beach may have serious effects on the displacedworkers, but the effects on the local community are muted by the fact that the community isembedded in a much larger economy..." (p.12) 
It was clear to many observers that individual workers and firms would be adversely affectedas the base closures and realignments laid out by the four commissions were completed.
The United States has experienced difficulty in closing military bases to match therequirements of downsized forces with changed composition. During the decade of the 1980s, majormilitary base closures were seriously hampered by procedural requirements established by Congress,to the point that none occurred. The mismatch between real estate assets and defense requirementsgrew with the military downsizing that began late in the Reagan Administration and continued underPresidents George H. W. Bush and Clinton.
After several legislative efforts to break the deadlock had failed, Congress established a newbase closure procedure in P.L. 100-526 , enacted October 24, 1988. The statute provided for abipartisan commission, appointed by the Secretary of Defense, to make recommendations toCongress on closures and realignments to be voted down or accepted as a whole. The process wassuccessfully implemented, but produced complaints of partisanship in selecting bases for closure. P.L. 101-510 , enacted November 5, 1990, provided new authority for additional base closurerecommendations by a series of presidentially appointed commissions (with the advice and consentof the Senate), commonly called Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) commissions. Thesecommissions were to operate in 1991, 1993, and 1995, after which the authority of the final baseclosure commission would end.
The four commissions recommended closure of 98 major bases and hundreds of smallerinstallations, and the realignment of many other bases and facilities. These recommendations wereestimated to be implemented and completed by the year 2001. The Department of Defense at onetime estimated savings of about $57 billion over 20 years.
At the community level, in turn, implementation of the base closure process commenced. Congress has amended the base closure legislation several times to protect and assist communitiesas they adjust to the social and economic stress caused by the loss of military installations. Many,but by no means all, communities appeared to be succeeding in local efforts to replace defense jobsand find new uses for former military lands and buildings.
After expiration of the authorizing legislation, a number of influential leaders recommendedestablishment of a new commission and the closure of additional bases and facilities. Theseadvocates included the chairman of the 1995 commission, Alan Dixon, former Defense SecretaryWilliam Perry, and Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman John Shalikashvili. In Congress, many felt thatinfrastructure costs diverted money from modernization and sapped the readiness of America's armedforces. Against these pressures to cut military real estate further was caution concerning furthermilitary cuts, as well as the traditional reluctance of Senators and Representatives to lose federal jobsand disrupt communities in their state or district.
Subsequently, new authorizing legislation by the Congress was required to reconstitute baseclosure and realignment through the commission approach.