CERP Program Management and Project Oversight Is Hindered by Insufficient and Inadequately Trained Personnel

U. S. efforts to enhance Afghanistan’s development is costly and requires  some complex projects, underscoring the need to effectively manage and  oversee the CERP program, including effectively managing and overseeing  contracting as well as contractor efforts. Availability of Personnel

Although DOD has used CERP funds to construct roads, schools, and  other projects that commanders believe have provided benefits to the  Afghan people, DOD faces significant challenges in providing adequate  management and oversight of CERP because of an insufficient number of  trained personnel to execute and manage the program. We have frequently  reported on several long-standing problems facing DOD as it uses  contractors in contingency operations including inadequate numbers of  trained management and oversight personnel. Our previous work has  shown that high-performing organizations routinely use current, valid, and  reliable data to make informed decisions about current and future  workforce needs, including data on the appropriate number of employees,  key competencies, and skill mix needed for mission accomplishment, and  appropriate deployment of staff across the organization. DOD has not  conducted a workforce assessment of CERP to identify how many military  personnel are needed to effectively and efficiently execute and oversee the  program. Rather, commanders determine how many personnel will  manage and execute CERP. Personnel at all levels, including headquarters  and unit personnel that we interviewed after they returned from  Afghanistan or were in Afghanistan in November 2008, expressed a need  for more personnel to perform CERP program management and oversight  functions. Due to a lack of personnel, key duties such as performing  headquarters staff assistance visits to help units to improve contracting  procedures and site visits to monitor project status and contractor  performance were either not performed or not consistently performed. Sufficiency of Training

According to DOD policy, members of the Department of Defense shall  receive, to the maximum extent possible, timely and effective, individual,  collective, and staff training, conducted in a safe manner, to enable  performance to standard during operations. The training consisted of a 1-hour briefing, which included a  detailed discussion of CERP guidance but did not provide detailed  information on the duties of the PPO. As  we have reported in the past, poorly written contracts and statements of  work can increase the department’s cost risk and could result in the  department paying for projects that do not meet project goals or  objectives. He went on to state “it would appear  that even a small amount of contract training provided through command  channels and some basic ground-level oversight that does not impinge on  the CERP’s objective would lower the risk in this susceptible area.”

	DOD Lacks Visibility of Development Projects Being Undertaken By USAID

DOD and USAID participate in various mechanisms to facilitate  coordination, but lack information that would provide greater visibility on  all U.S. government development projects in Afghanistan. Further, a  USAID representative is located at the CJTF-101 headquarters and acts as  a liaison to help coordinate projects costing $200,000 or more. Also, in  November 2008, the Integrated Civilian-Military Action Group which  consists of representatives from the Department of State, USAID, and U.S.  Forces-Afghanistan was established at the U.S. Embassy in Kabul, to help  unify U.S. efforts in Afghanistan through coordinated planning and  execution, according to a document provided by USAID. While USAID officials have  conducted some assessments for the development of the centralized  database, as of yet no specific milestones have been established for when  that database will be complete. Without clear goals and a method to judge  the progress of this initiative it is unclear how long this project might take  or if it will ever be completed. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

To determine the extent to which the Department of Defense (DOD) has  the capacity to provide adequate management and oversight of the CERP  in Afghanistan, we reviewed guidance from DOD, Combined Joint Task  Force-101 (CJTF-101), and Combined Joint Task Force-82 (CJTF-82) to  identify roles and responsibilities of CERP personnel, how personnel are  assigned to the CERP, the nature and extent of the workload related to  managing and executing the CERP, and the training curriculum provided  to familiarize personnel with the CERP. Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan and Iraq. Goals.
Why GAO Did This Study

U.S. government agencies, including the Department of Defense (DOD) and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) have spent billions of dollars to develop Afghanistan. From fiscal years 2004 to 2008, DOD has reported obligations of about $1 billion for its Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP), which enables commanders to respond to urgent humanitarian and reconstruction needs. As troop levels increase, DOD officials expect the program to expand. Under the authority of the Comptroller General, GAO assessed DOD's (1) capacity to manage and oversee the CERP in Afghanistan and (2) coordination of projects with USAID. Accordingly, GAO interviewed DOD and USAID officials, and examined program documents to identify workload, staffing, training, and coordination requirements. In Afghanistan, GAO interviewed key military personnel on the sufficiency of training, and their ability to execute assigned duties.

What GAO Found

Although DOD has used CERP to fund projects that it believes significantly benefit the Afghan people, it faces significant challenges in providing adequate management and oversight because of an insufficient number of trained personnel. GAO has frequently reported that inadequate numbers of management and oversight personnel hinders DOD's use of contractors in contingency operations. GAO's work also shows that high-performing organizations use data to make informed decisions about current and future workforce needs. DOD has not conducted an overall workforce assessment to identify how many personnel are needed to effectively execute CERP. Rather, individual commanders determine how many personnel will manage and execute CERP. Personnel at all levels, including headquarters and unit personnel that GAO interviewed after they returned from Afghanistan or who were in Afghanistan in November 2008, expressed a need for more personnel to perform CERP program management and oversight functions. Due to a lack of personnel, key duties such as performing headquarters staff assistance visits to help units improve contracting procedures and visiting sites to monitor project status and contractor performance were either not performed or inconsistently performed. Per DOD policy, DOD personnel should receive timely and effective training to enable performance to standard during operations. However, key CERP personnel at headquarters, units, and provincial reconstruction teams received little or no training prior to deployment which commanders believed made it more difficult to properly execute and oversee the program. Also, most personnel responsible for awarding and overseeing CERP contracts valued at $500,000 or less received little or no training prior to deployment and, once deployed, received a 1-hour briefing, which did not provide detailed information on the individual's duties. As a result, frequent mistakes occurred, such as the omission of key clauses from contracts, which slowed the project approval process. As GAO has reported in the past, poorly written contracts and statements of work can increase DOD's cost risk and could result in payment for projects that do not meet project goals or objectives. While mechanisms exist to facilitate coordination, DOD and USAID lack information that would provide greater visibility on all U.S. government development projects. DOD and USAID generally coordinate projects at the headquarters and unit level as well as through military-led provincial reconstruction teams which include USAID representatives. In addition, in November 2008, USAID, DOD and the Department of State began participating in an interagency group composed of senior U.S. government civilians and DOD personnel in Afghanistan to enhance planning and coordination of development plans and related projects. However, complete project information is lacking, because DOD and USAID use different databases. USAID has been tasked to develop a common database and is coordinating with DOD to do so, but development is in the early stages and goals and milestones have not been established. Without clear goals and milestones, it is unclear how progress will be measured or when it will be completed