	Introduction

In 1984, Congress passed the Comprehensive Crime Control Act (CCCA ) . . . to make major comprehensive improvements to the federal criminal laws." In an effort to achieve that goal, the CCCA established new bail procedures, imposed mandatory minimum sentences for many criminal offenses, increased the penalties for drug offenses and violent crimes, and created additional federal criminal offenses. Various provisions of the CCCA employ the term "crime of violence" in reference to the elements of certain offenses, the conditions for the issuance of bail, and the circumstances where enhanced prison sentences are required. In addition, courts have sometimes looked to the COV definition (and jurisprudence interpreting that provision) for guidance in interpreting similarly worded provisions found elsewhere in the federal criminal code, such as those statutory provisions referencing a "misdemeanor crime of domestic violence" or "violent felony." The COV definition contains two prongs. In its 2018 ruling in Sessions v. Dimaya , the Supreme Court struck down on vagueness grounds the second prong of the COV definition, as incorporated into the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), which covers any felony offense that, "by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force . The Statutory Definition of a "Crime of Violence"

Prior to the CCCA, some federal statutes employed the term "crime of violence" in setting forth the elements of a criminal offense or the conditions of confinement. § 16, covers each of the following:
(a) [A]n offense that has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another, or
(b) any other offense that is a felony and that, by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of another may be used in the course of committing any offense. For example, under the INA, a non-U.S. national who commits a crime of violence for which the term of imprisonment is at least one year may face significant immigration consequences, including being subject to removal from the United States, subject to mandatory detention pending removal proceedings, ineligible for certain forms of relief from removal, barred from naturalization, and generally barred for readmission into the United States. Judicial Interpretation of the Crime of Violence Definition

Despite Congress's attempt to provide a uniform definition of a crime of violence, courts have struggled to assess the scope of that definition. The following section briefly discusses three major issues the courts have considered in assessing the scope of activities covered by the COV definition: (1) whether to examine either the underlying conduct of a criminal offense, the statutory elements of the offense, or some combination in order to determine whether a person has been convicted of a crime of violence; (2) the degree of force necessary for an act to satisfy the "physical force" element of the COV definition; and (3) whether a crime of violence requires a specific mental state. With respect to 18 U.S.C. Other courts, meanwhile, concluded that crimes of violence encompassed only offenses that involved deliberate, intentional acts. The Court held that the use of force requirement in the first prong of the COV definition, 18 U.S.C. Constitutional Challenges to the Second Prong of the Crime of Violence Definition

In addition to considering the degree of physical force that must be employed and the mental state required for an offense to constitute a crime of violence, courts have also considered a more fundamental question—is the COV definition unconstitutionally vague? § 16(b) is unconstitutionally vague because it has no standard to determine whether a criminal offense carries a "substantial risk" of physical force.
In an effort to deter violent crime, and to limit the broad discretion accorded to federal judges with respect to prison sentencing, Congress in 1984 passed legislation that revised the federal criminal code. The Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984 (CCCA) aimed to substantially reform and improve federal criminal laws, and "to restore a proper balance between the forces of law and the forces of lawlessness." To that end, the CCCA adopted new bail procedures, imposed mandatory minimum sentences for certain criminal offenses, increased the penalties for drug offenses and violent crimes, and created new federal criminal offenses. The term "crime of violence" was used in various provisions of the CCCA that defined the elements of certain newly established criminal offenses, set forth conditions for bail, and provided for enhanced prison sentences when certain aggravating factors were met. Since the CCCA's enactment, several federal laws have incorporated the act's "crime of violence" definition. For example, under the Immigration and Nationality Act, a non-U.S. national who commits a "crime of violence" for which the term of imprisonment is at least one year may face significant immigration consequences, including being subject to removal from the country and thereafter rendered generally ineligible for readmission.
As codified in 18 U.S.C. § 16, the CCCA contains a two-pronged definition of a crime of violence. Specifically, the term includes both (1) "an offense that has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another"; and (2) "any other offense that is a felony and that, by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of another may be used in the course of committing any offense."
Since the CCCA's enactment, reviewing courts have had to interpret and apply the statutory definition of a crime of violence, sometimes reaching disparate conclusions over the scope of that term. For example, courts have differed regarding the degree of "physical force" required for an offense to constitute a crime of violence. Courts have also reached conflicting rulings on whether a crime of violence encompasses only intentional or deliberate acts, or whether the term also covers offenses involving gross negligence or pure recklessness. Moreover, courts have sometimes looked to the crime of violence definition (and jurisprudence interpreting that provision) for guidance in interpreting similarly worded provisions found elsewhere in the federal criminal code, such as those provisions referencing a "misdemeanor crime of domestic violence" or "violent felony." More recently, courts have addressed an entirely different question—whether the crime of violence definition is unconstitutionally vague. In particular, litigants have challenged the second prong of 18 U.S.C. § 16's crime of violence definition, arguing that there is no reliable standard to assess whether a criminal offense constitutes a crime of violence because it carries a "substantial risk" of physical force. In its 2018 decision in Sessions v. Dimaya, the Supreme Court held that the second prong of the crime of violence definition, as incorporated into the INA, was unconstitutionally vague under the Due Process Clause. While the first prong of the crime of violence definition was not affected by the Dimaya ruling, the Court's invalidation of the second prong narrows the potential application of the crime of violence definition, possibly having far-reaching consequences for the application of numerous statutes that incorporate that definition.