2). In September 2004, the UN Security Council adopted a  resolution stating that the UN Secretary-General should “rapidly establish  an international commission of inquiry in order immediately to investigate  reports of violations of international humanitarian law and human rights  law in Darfur by all parties, to determine also whether or not acts of  genocide have occurred, and to identify the perpetrators of such violations  with a view to ensuring that those responsible are held accountable.” In  January 2005, the UN issued a report stating that “the Government of Sudan  and the Janjaweed are responsible for serious violations of international  human rights and humanitarian law amounting to crimes under  international law.” The report concluded that a policy of genocide had not  been pursued but noted that “the crimes against humanity and war crimes  that have been committed in Darfur may be no less serious and heinous  than genocide.”
The UN Security Council has also adopted resolutions establishing a travel  ban and asset freeze for those determined to impede the peace process or  violate human rights and referring the situation in Darfur to the  prosecutor of the International Criminal Court and calling on the  government of Sudan and all other parties to the conflict to cooperate with  the court. In addition, IDP malnutrition and mortality rates decreased over time, a  trend that U.S., UN, and other officials attribute in part to humanitarian  assistance. 9). U.S. Assistance Addressed Range of Other Needs

In addition to providing food aid, as of September 30, 2006, the United  States had obligated approximately $315 million for other humanitarian  assistance in a range of sectors, including shelter, water and sanitation,  health care, and nutrition. Continued insecurity restricts humanitarian  organizations’ access to IDPs and affected residents of Darfur. Numerous Challenges Have Hampered U.S. Assistance Efforts and Oversight

Since the beginning of the humanitarian crisis in Darfur, entities delivering  U.S. humanitarian assistance to affected residents and IDPs have faced  numerous challenges. Impact on food assistance. African Union Has Taken Actions to Meet Mandate, but Some Actions Have Been Incomplete or Inconsistent

Although the African Union’s peace support operation has reportedly  contributed to a reduction of large-scale violence in Darfur, AMIS’s actions  to fulfill its mandate in Darfur have been taken in an incomplete or  inconsistent manner. To monitor compliance with the cease-fire agreement,  the first component of its mandate, AMIS military observers in Darfur have  actively investigated alleged cease-fire agreement violations. However, the Joint Commission has not consistently  reviewed the resulting Ceasefire Commission investigation reports. Sudanese government. U.S. Government Has Funded AMIS Camps

To support AMIS’s efforts to carry out its mandate, the U.S. government  expended about $240 million from June 2004 to August 2006 and obligated  another $40 million in September of 2006, primarily to build and maintain  the 32 camps that house AMIS forces throughout Darfur, according to a  State official who tracks this funding. NATO has also provided training for AMIS  personnel and has assisted with troop rotation efforts. These factors include inadequacies in management, organization,  and capacity; a relatively small force; resources that have been constrained  or inefficiently allocated; and a lack of information regarding, and  cooperation from, parties to the conflict. As AMIS has faced operational  and other challenges, the UN has approved a UN peacekeeping operation in  Darfur when AMIS’s mandate expires; however, as of October 2006, the  Sudanese government had rejected the proposal. As insecurity continues in Darfur,  such support may be required well into the future. We received written comments from the Department of  State and USAID. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

This report examines (1) U.S. humanitarian assistance provided to help  relieve the crisis in Darfur, (2) challenges that the U.S. Agency for  International Development (USAID) and its implementing partners have  encountered, (3) the African Union’s efforts to fulfill its peace support  mandate in Darfur, and (4) factors affecting the implementation of this  mandate. GAO Comments

1. GAO Comments

1.
Why GAO Did This Study

In 2003, violent conflict in Darfur, Sudan broke out between rebel groups, government troops, and government-supported Arab militias, known as the Janjaweed. The conflict has displaced about 2 million Darfurians and has so affected over 1.9 million others that they require assistance. Since October 2003, the U.S. government has provided humanitarian assistance in Darfur and supported African Union Mission in Sudan's (AMIS) efforts to fulfill a peace support mandate. This report reviews (1) U.S. humanitarian assistance provided to Darfur and the challenges that have been encountered and (2) African Union efforts to fulfill its mandate and challenges that have affected these efforts.

What GAO Found

The United States has been the largest donor of humanitarian aid to Darfur, obligating nearly $1 billion from October 2003 through September 2006. Although more than 68 percent of this assistance consisted of food aid, U.S. assistance has also supported other needs, such as water and sanitation, shelter, and health care. Since 2003, humanitarian organizations have made significant progress in increasing the number of people in Darfur receiving aid. In addition, malnutrition and mortality rates in Darfur dropped, a trend that U.S. and other officials attribute in part to humanitarian assistance efforts. However, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and the entities providing U.S. humanitarian assistance have encountered several challenges that have hampered delivery of, or accountability for, humanitarian services in Darfur. These challenges include continued insecurity in Darfur; Sudanese government restrictions on access to communities in need; the timing of funding; and an incapacity to ensure monitoring of, and reporting on, U.S.-funded programs. AMIS has taken several positive actions in Darfur to pursue its mandate, although some actions have been incomplete or inconsistent. For example, to monitor compliance with a 2004 cease-fire agreement--one mandate component--AMIS investigated alleged cease-fire violations and identified numerous violations; however, the resulting reports were not consistently reviewed at higher levels or made fully publicly available to identify those violating the agreement. The U.S. government, via private contractors, provided about $280 million from June 2004 through September 2006 tobuild and maintain 32 camps for AMIS forces in Darfur, according to the Department of State. Numerous challenges have been identified by African Union or U.S. officials, among others, as negatively affecting AMIS's efforts in Darfur. These challenges include inadequacies in AMIS's organization, management, and capacity, such as inconsistent interpretation of the AMIS mandate; its relatively small forces; limited or poorly allocated resources; and a lack of intelligence regarding, and cooperation from, the parties to the conflict. A transition from AMIS to a UN peacekeeping operation is being considered, although the Sudanese government has rejected such a transition. A possible NATO-assisted review of AMIS operations has not been conducted. Meanwhile, insecurity and violence continue in Darfur.