The Navy Has Not Fully Established a Comprehensive Management Approach to Coordinate and Integrate Rotational Crewing Efforts

Although the Navy has taken action to provide leadership in specific  rotational crewing programs and transform its ship-crewing culture, the  Navy has not fully established a comprehensive management approach to  coordinate and integrate rotational crewing efforts throughout the  department. Rotational Crewing Is a Transformational Cultural Change

Rotational crewing represents a transformational cultural change for the  Navy. As a result, the Navy may fail to lead a successful transformation of  its ship-crewing culture. The Navy has not developed an overarching directive that  provides high-level vision and guidance for rotational crewing initiatives  and has been inconsistent in addressing rotational crewing in individual  ship-class concepts of operations. However, the Navy has developed and  promulgated crew-exchange instructions that have provided some specific  guidance for crew turnovers and increased accountability. While the guided missile submarine,  LCS, and DDG communities relied on a concept of operations, other  commands supporting operations conducted by rotationally crewed  surface ships have not developed or used a concept of operations. The Navy Has Not Implemented a Systematic Approach for Analyzing Rotational Crewing on Current and Future Ships

The Navy has completed some analyses of rotational crewing for its  surface ships; however, unlike the Atlantic Fleet DDG Sea Swap initiative,  the Navy has not developed a systematic method for data collection and  analysis, assessment, and reporting of rotational crewing on current  surface ships, including the cost-effectiveness of rotational crewing  options. Without comprehensive analysis of  alternatives, cost-effective force structure assessments are incomplete and  the Navy does not have a complete picture of the number of ships it needs  to acquire. Additionally, by not systematically  collecting and using lessons learned from rotational crewing experiences,  the Navy risks repeating mistakes and could miss opportunities to more  effectively plan and conduct crew rotations. To ensure that the Navy assesses the potential of different rotational  crewing alternatives for improving performance and reducing costs for  ship classes, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the  Secretary of the Navy, under the purview of the implementation team, to  take the following two actions:    develop a standardized, systematic method for data collection and  analysis, assessment, and reporting on the results of rotational crewing  efforts, including a comprehensive cost-effectiveness analysis that  includes life-cycle costs, for all rotational crewing efforts; and  require, as part of the mandatory analysis of alternatives in the concept  refinement phase of the defense acquisition process, assessments of  potential rotational crewing options for each class of surface ship in  development, including full life-cycle costs of each crewing option. Matter for Congressional Consideration

Because DOD disagreed with our recommendations dealing with assigning  clear leadership, establishing an implementation team, developing and  promulgating overarching guidance, and improving the use of lessons  learned, we are suggesting that Congress consider requiring the Secretary  of Defense to direct the Secretary of the Navy to    assign clear leadership and accountability for managing rotational crewing    establish an overarching implementation team to provide day-to-day  management oversight of rotational crewing efforts, coordinate and  integrate efforts, and apply their results to the fleet;     develop and promulgate overarching guidance to provide the high-level  vision and guidance needed to consistently and effectively manage,  implement, and evaluate all rotational crewing efforts;     develop overarching guidance to ensure the systematic collection and  dissemination of lessons learned pertaining specifically to rotational  crewing; and   incorporate components of the lessons-learned approach outlined in the  Atlantic Fleet DDG Sea Swap Concept of Operations, including, among  other things, establishing a lessons-learned team, developing a data- collection plan, and increasing use of the Navy Lessons Learned System. We have identified several  key management practices at the center of implementing transformational  programs, which include ensuring that top leadership drives the  transformation. However, despite some progress in collecting  and sharing lessons learned within individual ship communities, the  Navy’s efforts in many cases were not systematic and did not use the Navy  Lessons Learned System. Crew size has not  been determined.
Why GAO Did This Study

The Navy faces affordability challenges as it supports a high pace of operations and increasing ship procurement costs. The Navy has used multiple crews on some submarines and surface ships and has shown it to increase a ship's operational availability. GAO was asked to evaluate the extent to which the Navy, for ship rotational crewing, has (1) employed a comprehensive management approach, (2) developed and implemented guidance, (3) systematically collected, analyzed data, and reported findings, and (4) systematically collected and used lessons learned. To conduct this work, GAO analyzed Department of Defense (DOD) and Navy documentation and best practices for transformation, conducted focus groups, and interviewed DOD and Navy officials.

What GAO Found

Rotational crewing represents a transformational cultural change for the Navy. While the Navy has provided leadership in some rotational crewing programs, the Navy has not fully established a comprehensive management approach to coordinate and integrate rotational crewing efforts across the department and among various types of ships. GAO's prior work showed that sound management practices for implementing transformational programs include ensuring top leadership drives the change and dedicating an implementation team. The Navy has not assigned clear leadership and accountability for rotational crewing or designated an implementation team to ensure that rotational crewing receives the attention necessary to be effective. Without a comprehensive management approach, the Navy may not be able to lead a successful transformation of its crewing culture. The Navy has promulgated crew exchange instructions for some types of ships that have provided some specific guidance and increased accountability. However, the Navy has not developed an overarching instruction that provides high-level guidance for rotational crewing initiatives and it has not consistently addressed rotational crewing in individual ship-class concepts of operations. Defense best practices hold that key aspects of a concept of operations include how a set of capabilities may be employed to achieve objectives and identifies by whom, where, and how it is to be accomplished. The Navy has conducted some analyses of rotational crewing; however, it has not developed a systematic method for analyzing, assessing and reporting findings on the potential for rotational crewing on current and future ships. Despite using a comprehensive data-collection and analysis plan in the Atlantic Fleet Guided Missile Destroyer Sea Swap, the Navy has not developed a standardized data-collection plan that would be used to analyze all types of rotational crewing, and life-cycle costs of rotational crewing alternatives have not been evaluated. The Navy has also not adequately assessed rotational crewing options for future ships. As new ships are in development, DOD guidance requires that an analysis of alternatives be completed. These analyses generally include an evaluation of the operational effectiveness and estimated costs of alternatives. In recent surface ship acquisitions, the Navy has not consistently assessed rotational crewing options. In the absence of this, cost-effective force structure assessments are incomplete and the Navy does not have a complete picture of the number of ships it needs to acquire. The Navy has collected and disseminated lessons learned from some rotational crewing experiences; however, some ship communities have relied on informal processes. The Atlantic Sea Swap initiative used a systematic process to capture lessons learned. However, in other ship communities the actions were not systematic and did not use the Navy Lessons Learned System. By not systematically recording and sharing lessons learned from rotational crewing efforts, the Navy risks repeating mistakes and could miss opportunities to more effectively implement crew rotations.