Appendix II describes the Army’s nonstockpile chemical warfare materiel. Although the method for destroying binary chemical weapons has not been determined, the Army estimates that, subject to the availability of funds, it can destroy the binary weapons within 10 years for $190 million. With appropriate funding, the Army estimates that the destruction of recovered chemical items can be completed within 10 years, at a cost of $110 million. The Army estimates that it will take 10 years and $420 million to dispose of former chemical weapon production facilities. 1.) Lessons From the Stockpile Disposal Program Should Be Applied to the Nonstockpile Planning Process and Cost and Schedule Estimates

Because both chemical disposal programs involve similar environmental requirements and potentially similar disposal methods, many of the lessons learned from the stockpile disposal program may apply to the nonstockpile program. In the 1990s, we reported that the Army did not adequately anticipate and plan for (1) the time needed to obtain the necessary environmental approvals and permits for the stockpile disposal program and (2) the strong public opposition to the chemical weapons incineration process. However, lessons learned were not discussed in the Army’s 1993 survey and analysis report on the nonstockpile program. In its 1993 report, the Army reported that changes to environmental regulations could significantly affect its estimated disposal cost and schedule for the nonstockpile disposal program. As a result of these problems, the Army has not achieved its expected disposal rates for the stockpile program. To identify lessons learned from the Army’s stockpile disposal program, we reviewed our previous reports and testimonies and their supporting documentation. The activity’s office of Program Manager for Nonstockpile Chemical Materiel is responsible for collecting and analyzing data on nonstockpile chemical materiel; identifying and assessing sites with possible buried chemical warfare materiel; coordinating the transportation of recovered chemical weapons to locations for interim storage; destroying recovered chemical warfare materiel on-site as needed to protect the general public and environment; researching, developing, evaluating, and selecting disposal methods for all destroying binary chemical weapons, miscellaneous chemical warfare materiel, recovered chemical weapons, and former production facilities in accordance with the Chemical Weapons Convention, in compliance with public safety and environmental requirements and regulations, and in coordination with the potentially affected public; and reclaiming and destroying buried chemical warfare materiel in the interest of safeguarding the general public and environment. State governments and communities affected by the nonstockpile disposal program provide information for and have input into the Army’s decision-making process.
Why GAO Did This Study

Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Army's nonstockpile disposal program, focusing on: (1) the Army's planning process for the nonstockpile disposal program; (2) the Army's estimated disposal cost and schedule; and (3) applicable lessons learned from the Army's stockpile disposal program.

What GAO Found

GAO found that: (1) the Army has not finalized plans for its nonstockpile disposal program because it has not fully identified the amount of materiel to be destroyed or appropriate disposal methods; (2) the Army believes it can dispose of binary chemical weapons within 10 years for $190 million, miscellaneous chemical warfare materiel within 5 years for $210 million, and recovered chemical weapons within 10 years for $110 million; (3) the Army has limited information on buried chemical warfare materiel, which it estimates will take 40 years to find and destroy at a cost of $16.6 billion; (4) the Army's nonstockpile disposal program will likely be affected by the same issues as the stockpile program, including compliance with federal, state, and local laws and regulations, obtaining environmental approvals and permits, and strong public opposition to chemical weapons incineration and transportation; (5) although the Army said it applied lessons learned from the stockpile disposal program to the nonstockpile disposal program, its 1993 survey and analysis report on the nonstockpile program did not discuss those lessons; and (6) the Army's estimated cost and schedule for the nonstockpile disposal program are likely to increase, since the Army has limited experience in destroying nonstockpile materiel and will likely encounter difficulties similar to those experienced in the stockpile disposal program.