DOD Implemented BRAC 2005 Recommendations to Relocate Selected Training Functions but Missed Some Opportunities to Consolidate Training to Increase Jointness

DOD implemented the BRAC 2005 recommendations we reviewed by  requiring military services to relocate selected training functions; however  we found that, although DOD’s justifications for collocating each of the six  training functions that we reviewed mentioned jointness or inter-service  training as a potential benefit, two of the six training functions took  advantage of the opportunity provided by BRAC to consolidate training to  increase jointness. The implementation of the remaining four BRAC recommendations that  we reviewed relocated—moved separate functions to one location—but  did not consolidate training functions. This guidance focused on movement of personnel or construction. DOD Cannot Determine Operating Cost Savings Resulting from BRAC 2005 Joint Training Recommendations

Although we reported in 2012 that DOD had projected that four of the  recommendations in our review would result in annual savings in  operating costs, we found that DOD could not determine whether  implementing the 2005 BRAC joint training recommendations that we  reviewed resulted in savings in operating costs. By developing baseline operating costs,  agencies can better evaluate whether they are achieving their cost  savings targets. Although it can sometimes be difficult to attribute costs and savings to a  specific event, such as a BRAC change, DOD will not be able to estimate  whether it has achieved annual savings in operating costs if it does not  collect complete baseline cost data with which to measure progress. Final Implementation Costs Reported to DOD for Some Joint Training Recommendations Likely Did Not Include All Implementation Costs

In 2012, we reported on DOD’s estimates of its final implementation costs  for the BRAC 2005 recommendations; however, for two of the six  recommendations in this review—the Joint Strike Fighter Initial Training  Site and the 7th Special Forces Group move to Eglin Air Force Base—we  found that at least $110 million in implementation costs funded from  outside of the BRAC account that likely should have been included were  not reported to DOD by the business plan managers. Thus DOD’s  previously reported total cost of $35.1 billion to implement BRAC 2005 is  likely somewhat understated. DOD concurred with the recommendation, and in August 2010  the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Installations and Environment)  issued a memo requiring BRAC business plan managers to submit all  BRAC-related expenditures, including those funded from both inside and  outside of the BRAC account. Housing. However, the Basing Directorate official further  stated that it was up to the military departments to ensure that all BRAC  implementation costs were accounted for, and that the military  departments had the flexibility to determine which costs would be  associated with the BRAC recommendation and which would be  attributed to other actions. We found that this flexibility  in determining  which costs were to be reported as BRAC costs led to inconsistencies in  what kinds of projects were counted as BRAC implementation costs. By  clarifying in guidance what is to be included as a BRAC implementation  cost, DOD can help ensure that it has an accurate accounting of the final  costs for any future BRAC implementation and that DOD and Congress  are able to determine how much money is actually spent on any future  BRAC rounds. Unless DOD develops baseline cost  data for the recommendations in any future BRAC rounds, it will be  unable to determine the budgetary effect of its actions. Recommendations for Executive Action

To make further progress toward taking full advantage of the opportunity  of consolidating training in order to increase jointness following the  implementation of the BRAC 2005 recommendations, for the training  functions that did not consolidate training beyond colocation, we  recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Under Secretary of  Defense for Personnel and Readiness and the Secretaries of the military  departments to provide guidance to the program managers on  consolidating training, if DOD decides that taking advantage of an  opportunity to increase jointness is still appropriate. Both DOD and the  Commission develop such estimates for each recommendation and did  so for these six recommendations. DOD did not concur with our second recommendation to develop and  provide specific guidance for the military departments to use in  implementing recommendations designed to consolidate training to  increase jointness in the event of future BRAC rounds. GAO  recommendation  GAO-15-274—Military Base Realignments and Closures: Process for Reusing Property for Homeless Assistance Needs  Improvements (Mar. Partial concur. Modify  the recently issued guidance on the  status of BRAC implementation to require the  services and defense agencies to provide  information on possible mitigation measures  to reduce the effects of those challenges. Military Base Closures: Observations on Prior and Current BRAC  Rounds.
Why GAO Did This Study

The 2005 BRAC round was the fifth round of base closures and realignments undertaken by DOD since 1988, and it was the largest, most complex, and costliest. DOD has relied on the BRAC process to reduce excess infrastructure and realign bases to meet changing force structure needs. According to the Secretary of Defense, BRAC 2005 provided opportunities to foster jointness among the military services. House Report 113-446 included a provision for GAO to review the status of BRAC 2005 recommendations to reduce infrastructure and promote opportunities for jointness. This report evaluates the extent to which DOD has (1) implemented the recommendations requiring the services to relocate select training functions to increase opportunities for jointness and (2) determined if implementing these recommendations has achieved cost savings. GAO reviewed guidance, course listings, and cost data; interviewed DOD and service officials.

What GAO Found

For each of the six recommendations GAO reviewed from the 2005 Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) round, the Department of Defense (DOD) implemented the recommendations by requiring military services to relocate select training functions; however, GAO found that two of the six training functions reviewed were able to take advantage of the opportunity provided by BRAC to consolidate training so that services could train jointly. In implementing the remaining four BRAC recommendations, DOD relocated similar training functions run by separate military services into one location, but the services did not consolidate training functions. For example, they do not regularly coordinate or share information on their training goals and curriculums. DOD's justification for numerous 2005 BRAC recommendations included the assumption that realigning military department activities to one location would enhance jointness—defined by DOD as activities, operations, or organizations in which elements of two or more military departments participate. For these four training functions, DOD missed the opportunity to consolidate training to increase jointness, because it provided guidance to move personnel or construct buildings but not to measure progress toward consolidated training. Without additional guidance for consolidating training, the services will not be positioned to take advantage of such an opportunity in these types of recommendations as proposed by DOD and will face challenges encouraging joint training activities and collaboration across services.
DOD cannot determine if implementing the 2005 BRAC joint training recommendations that GAO reviewed has resulted in savings in operating costs. For three of the recommendations in this review, the services did not develop baseline operating costs before implementing the BRAC recommendations, which would have enabled it to determine whether savings were achieved. Without developing baseline cost data, DOD will be unable to estimate any cost savings resulting from similar recommendations in any future BRAC rounds. Further, costs reported to DOD by the training functions business plan managers for implementation of two of the six recommendations in this review likely did not include all BRAC-related costs funded from outside the BRAC account. A DOD memo requires BRAC business plan managers to submit all BRAC-related expenditures, including those funded from both inside and outside of the BRAC account. GAO identified at least $110 million in implementation costs that likely should have been reported to DOD in accordance with the memo but were not; therefore the $35.1 billion total cost reported for BRAC 2005 is likely somewhat understated. A DOD official stated that it was up to the military departments to ensure that all BRAC implementation costs were accounted for and that the military departments had the flexibility to determine which costs were associated with the BRAC recommendation and which were attributed to other actions. GAO found that this flexibility in determining which costs were to be reported as BRAC costs led to inconsistencies in what kinds of projects had their costs counted as BRAC implementation costs. By clarifying in guidance what is to be included as a BRAC implementation cost, DOD can help ensure that it has an accurate accounting of the final costs for any future BRAC implementation and that DOD and Congress are able to determine how much money is spent on any future BRAC rounds.

What GAO Recommends

To help improve the implementation of jointness-focused recommendations in any future BRAC rounds, GAO recommends that DOD provide additional guidance for consolidating training and reporting BRAC costs and require the development of baseline cost data. DOD partially concurred with the recommendation to clarify guidance for reporting BRAC costs but did not concur with the other recommendations, stating that GAO misunderstood its approach to joint training. GAO believes its findings and recommendations are valid and addresses these points in the report.