The first part of this CRS Report discusses policy issues regarding such military-to-military (mil-to-mil) contacts. However, results were limited and the military relationship did not regain the closeness reached in the 1980s, when the United States and China cooperated strategically against the Soviet Union and such cooperation included arms sales to the PLA. Improvements and deteriorations in overall bilateral relations affected mil-to-mil contacts, which had close ties in 1997-1998 and 2000, but were marred by the 1995-1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis, mistaken NATO bombing of the PRC embassy in Yugoslavia in 1999, and the EP-3 aircraft collision crisis in 2001. The PLA has repeatedly suspended mil-to-mil contacts while blaming U.S. "obstacles" (including U.S. reconnaissance, arms sales to Taiwan, legislated restrictions on contacts with the PLA, and the Pentagon's annual report to Congress on PRC Military Power). Other issues concern whether there is adherence to U.S. laws, including the FY2000 NDAA, and consistency with U.S. concerns about allies showing U.S.-origin equipment. The Commander of Pacific Air Forces (PACAF) also said he hoped to bring a C-17 to China's air show in November 2014 (in General Hawk Carlisle's interview with Defense News , February 10, 2014). As the Defense Department gradually resumed the mil-to-mil relationship in that context, policy issues for Congress included whether the Administration complied with legislation and used leverage effectively in its contacts with the PLA to advance a prioritized list of U.S. security interests, while balancing security concerns about the PLA's warfighting capabilities. Moreover, the Obama Administration expanded engagement with the PLA, including increasing combined exercises. On December 10, 2014, Representative Randy Forbes wrote to the Defense Secretary with concerns about the trajectory of mil-to-mil contacts with China and to request a review of this policy. Issues for Congress include whether the Administration has complied with legislation overseeing dealings with the PLA and has determined a program of contacts with the PLA that advances, and does not harm, U.S. security interests. The Defense Department has asserted that it conducts all military-to-military contacts with China in a manner consistent with the provisions of the FY2000 NDAA. Congress could, as it has in the past, consider the following options:
Host PLA delegations on Capitol Hill or meet them at other venues Engage with the PLA as an aspect of visits by Codels to China Receive briefings by the Administration before and/or after military visits Investigate or oversee investigations of prisoner-of-war/missing-in-action (POW/MIA) cases Require reports or briefings from the Pentagon, particularly in unclassified form Review exchanges at PACOM's Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies (APCSS) in Hawaii Fund or prohibit funding for certain commissions or activities Pass legislation on sanctions and exchanges with the PLA Assess the Administration's adherence to laws on sanctions, contacts, and reports Obtain and review the Department of Defense (DOD)'s plan for upcoming mil-to-mil contacts, particularly proposed programs already discussed with the PLA Require binding reviews of mil-to-mil contacts by the Defense Technology Security Administration (DTSA) and counter-intelligence authorities Examine whether to negotiate any agreements with the PLA, such as an Acquisition and Cross-Service Agreement (ACSA) for logistics support Require periodic (e.g., monthly, quarterly) reports to appropriations and defense committees on the costs of travel and other elements of mil-to-mil exchanges. 101-246 ). An issue is whether President Obama is required to issue waivers and consult with Congress concerning the increased exposures of the PLA to U.S. equipment in military exchanges. Then, in the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for FY1997 ( P.L. 3979 ; P.L. 111-84 on October 28, 2009, Congress changed the title of the report to "Annual Report on Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China." Based on S. 1197 , Section 1242 of the FY2014 NDAA ( P.L . 4495 , Asia-Pacific Region Priority Act, to support the strategic "rebalance" to the region. The House passed H.R. On June 2, the Senate Armed Services Committee reported S. 2410 (Levin), FY2015 NDAA. H.R. 113-291 on December 19, 2014. In March 2008, Deputy Secretary of Defense Gordon England defined these principal U.S. objectives in the annual report to Congress on contacts with the PLA:
support the President's overall policy goals regarding China; prevent conflict by clearly communicating U.S. resolve to maintain peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region; lower the risk of miscalculation between the two militaries; increase U.S. understanding of China's military capabilities and intentions; encourage China to adopt greater openness and transparency in its military capabilities and intentions; promote stable U.S.-China relations; increase mutual understanding between U.S. and PLA officers; and encourage China to play a constructive and peaceful role in the Asia-Pacific region; to act as a partner in addressing common security challenges; and to emerge as a responsible stakeholder in the world. military.) Given confrontations in the maritime areas (particularly in 2001 and 2009), some stress that the foremost U.S. interest would be to safeguard the safety of U.S. military personnel. Defense officials have used the DTL at other times. Kelly also noted that the PRC leadership accelerated the PLA buildup after 1999. The SSD discussed cyber and maritime disputes. With concerns about internal repression by the PRC regime in the Tiananmen Crackdown of June 1989 and after, U.S. sanctions (in §902 of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act for FY1990-FY1991, P.L.
This CRS Report, updated through the 113th Congress, discusses policy issues regarding military-to-military (mil-to-mil) contacts with the People's Republic of China (PRC) and records major contacts and crises since 1993. The United States suspended military contacts with China and imposed sanctions on arms sales in response to the Tiananmen Crackdown in 1989. In 1993, President Clinton reengaged with the top PRC leadership, including China's military, the People's Liberation Army (PLA). Renewed military exchanges with the PLA have not regained the closeness reached in the 1980s, when U.S.-PRC strategic alignment against the Soviet Union included U.S. arms sales to China. Improvements and deteriorations in overall bilateral engagement have affected military contacts, which were close in 1997-1998 and 2000, but marred by the 1995-1996 Taiwan Strait crisis, mistaken NATO bombing of a PRC embassy in 1999, the EP-3 aircraft collision crisis in 2001, and the PLA's aggressive maritime and air confrontations.
Issues for Congress include whether the Administration complies with legislation overseeing dealings with the PLA and pursues contacts with the PLA that advance a prioritized set of U.S. security interests, especially the operational safety of U.S. military personnel. Oversight legislation includes the Foreign Relations Authorization Act for FY1990-FY1991 (P.L. 101-246) and National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for FY2000 (P.L. 106-65). A particular issue is whether the President is required to issue waivers of sanctions. Skeptics and proponents of military exchanges with the PRC have debated whether the contacts achieve results in U.S. objectives and whether the contacts contribute to the PLA's warfighting capability that might harm U.S. and allied security interests. Some have argued about whether the value that U.S. officials place on the contacts overly extends leverage to the PLA. Some believe talks can serve U.S. interests that include risk-reduction or conflict-avoidance; military-civilian coordination; transparency and reciprocity; tension reduction over Taiwan; weapons nonproliferation; talks on nuclear, missile, space, and/or cyber domains; counterterrorism; and POW/MIA accounting.
Policy makers could review the approach to mil-to-mil contacts, given concerns about potential crises and conflicts. U.S. officials have faced challenges in gaining cooperation from the PLA. The PLA has tried to use its suspensions of exchanges while blaming U.S.-only "obstacles" (including arms sales to Taiwan, FY2000 NDAA, and air and naval reconnaissance operations).
The PRC's harassment of U.S. ships and increasing assertiveness in maritime disputes showed some limits to mil-to-mil engagement, similar views, and PLA restraint. The U.S. articulations in 2011-2012 of a strategic "rebalancing" to the Asia-Pacific raised an issue of how to deal with China's challenges. The Administration's "rebalance" entails not only expanded engagement with the PLA, but also increasing exercises. The PLA Navy's invited participation for the first time in the U.S. Navy-led multinational exercise, RIMPAC, based at Hawaii in summer 2014 raised concerns in Congress and elsewhere. The U.S. Navy has increased some "interoperability" with the PLA Navy. The Defense Secretary issued the latest required annual report on June 5, 2014, concerning military and security developments involving the PRC, cooperation, and military-to-military contacts. The report noted that the PLA uses combined exercises to improve capabilities by learning from more advanced militaries and asserted that the Defense Department complies with the FY2000 NDAA in all military contacts with China. The U.S. Pacific Air Forces Commander sent a C-17 transport aircraft to China's Zhuhai Air Show in November 2014.
Legislation in the 113th Congress includes the FY2014 NDAA (P.L. 113-66); FY2014 Defense Appropriations Act (H.R. 2397); Asia-Pacific Region Priority Act, H.R. 4495 (Forbes); FY2015 NDAA, H.R. 4435 (McKeon), S. 2410 (Levin), and H.R. 3979 (P.L. 113-291); and H.Res. 643 (Chabot). On December 10, 2014, Representative Randy Forbes wrote to the Defense Secretary with concerns about mil-to-mil contacts with China and to request a review of this policy.