Homeland security presidential directives (HSPD) have called for HHS,  USDA, DHS, and other federal agencies to take action to strengthen  biosurveillance, including food and agriculture disease surveillance. The  Homeland Security Council was maintained as the principal venue for  interagency deliberations on issues that affect the security of the  homeland, such a biosurveillance. In May 2009, the staff serving the Homeland Security Council  We have previously reported that in an era of rapid transit and global  trade, the public health and agricultural industries, as well as natural  ecosystems including native plants and wildlife, face increased threats of  naturally occurring outbreaks of infectious disease and accidental  exposure to biological threats. The White House Has Developed a National Biosurveillance Strategy, but More Action Is Needed to Enhance Federal and Nonfederal Capabilities

		The National Biosurveillance Strategy Does Not Yet Identify Resource and Investment Needs

Although the White House developed the National Strategy for  Biosurveillance in July 2012, this strategy does not include information  that identifies resource and investment needs as we previously  recommended. In June 2010, we found that there was no integrated  approach to help ensure an effective national biosurveillance capability  and to provide a framework to help identify and prioritize investments. Specifically, we found there was neither a  comprehensive national strategy nor a designated focal point with the  authority and resources to guide the effort to develop a national  biosurveillance capability. The National Biosurveillance Strategy Does Not Address Key Challenges for Nonfederal Efforts or the Need to Leverage Nonfederal Resources

The National Strategy for Biosurveillance also does not address issues  we raised related to state and local biosurveillance efforts, and that we  previously recommended. In addition, we noted that the federal  government had not conducted a comprehensive assessment of state  and local jurisdictions’ ability to contribute to a national biosurveillance  capability. We further reported in October 2011 that state and local officials identified  common challenges to developing and maintaining their biosurveillance  capabilities such as (1) state policies in response to state budget  constraints that restricted hiring, travel, and training; (2) obtaining and  maintaining resources, such as adequate workforce, equipment, and  systems; and (3) the lack of strategic planning and leadership to support  long-term investment in crosscutting core capabilities, integrated  biosurveillance, and effective partnerships. More Oversight and Coordination Are Needed to Ensure That Federal Food and Agriculture Surveillance Efforts Align with National Policy

		Federal Oversight and Coordination of the Nation’s Food and Agriculture Defense Policy Could Be Enhanced

As part of the national biosurveillance capability, the maintenance of  effective animal and plant surveillance systems is critical to detecting and  enhancing the situational awareness of biological events that might  disrupt agriculture and food production systems, such as highly  pathogenic avian influenza. In August 2011, we found that there  was no centralized coordination to oversee the federal government’s  overall progress implementing HSPD-9 on the nation’s food and  agriculture defense policy, responsibilities for which are distributed across  several agencies. Prior to 2011, the White House’s  Homeland Security Council had conducted some coordinated activities to  oversee federal agencies’ HSPD-9 implementation by gathering  information from agencies about their progress. We also reported in August 2011 that USDA’s component agencies had  taken steps to implement the department’s HSPD-9 responsibilities, but  USDA did not have a department-wide strategy for implementing its  numerous HSPD-9 responsibilities. APHIS Developed a New Approach for Livestock and Poultry Surveillance, but Has Not Integrated These Efforts into an Overall Strategy with Performance Measures

We reported in May 2013 that APHIS had developed a new approach for  its livestock and poultry surveillance activities, but had not yet integrated  these efforts into an overall strategy with goals and performance  measures aligned with the nation’s larger biosurveillance policy. We reported in 2013 that under its new approach  APHIS had begun to broaden its approach by monitoring the overall  health of livestock and poultry and using additional sources and types of  data to better detect and control new or reemerging diseases. We concluded that without integrating its new approach to  livestock and poultry surveillance activities into an overall strategy with  goals and measures aligned with broader national homeland security  efforts to detect biological threats, APHIS may not be ideally positioned to  support national efforts to address the next threat to animal and human  health. Key contributors for the previous work that this testimony is  based on are listed in each product. This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the  United States.
Why GAO Did This Study

Naturally-occurring infectious disease or the intentional use of a biological agent to inflict harm could have catastrophic consequences. For example, the recent outbreak of naturally-occurring highly pathogenic avian influenza affecting wild birds and poultry in the Midwest and on the Pacific coast presents a serious threat to the economy and trade, and underscores the importance of maintaining effective food and agriculture disease surveillance systems. Biosurveillance aims to detect such events as early as possible and to enhance situational awareness related to human, animal, and plant health.
Since 2010, GAO has issued a number of reports that discuss the importance of effectively conducting biosurveillance across the human, animal, and plant domains. This statement discusses prior GAO reports and the status of recommendations related to (1) federal, state, and local biosurveillance efforts, and (2) efforts related to food and agriculture disease surveillance.
This testimony is based on previous GAO products issued from 2010 through 2013 related to biosurveillance, along with selected updates conducted from November 2014 through June 2015. For these updates, GAO reviewed agency responses and documents provided in response to its recommendation follow-up efforts, such as the July 2012 National Strategy for Biosurveillance .

What GAO Found

In June 2010, GAO reported that there was neither a comprehensive national strategy nor a designated focal point with the authority and resources to guide development of a national biosurveillance capability. Further, in October 2011, GAO reported that states and local agencies faced challenges in developing and maintaining their biosurveillance capabilities, such as obtaining resources for an adequate workforce, and that the federal government had not conducted an assessment of state and local jurisdictions' ability to contribute to a national biosurveillance capability. To help ensure the successful implementation of a complex, intergovernmental undertaking, GAO recommended in 2010 that the White House's Homeland Security Council direct the National Security Council Staff to develop a national biosurveillance strategy, and further recommended in 2011 that the strategy consider nonfederal capabilities. The White House issued the National Strategy for Biosurveillance in July 2012, which describes the U.S. government's approach to strengthening biosurveillance. However, the strategy did not fully respond to the challenges GAO identified. For example, it did not establish a framework to prioritize resource investments or address the need to leverage nonfederal resources. The White House was to issue an implementation plan within 120 days of publishing the strategy. GAO has reported that it is possible that the implementation plan could address issues previously identified, such as resource investment prioritization; however, the plan has not been released as of June 2015.
In August 2011, GAO reported that there was no centralized coordination to oversee federal agencies' efforts to implement Homeland Security Presidential Directive 9 (HSPD-9) on the nation's food and agriculture defense policy, which includes food and agriculture disease surveillance. GAO also found that the Department of Agriculture (USDA) had no department-wide strategy for implementing its HSPD-9 responsibilities. Therefore, GAO recommended that the National Security Council Staff and the Department of Homeland Security resume their efforts to coordinate and oversee implementation, and that USDA develop a department-wide strategy. In response, the National Security Council Staff began hosting interagency working group meetings, and DHS has worked to develop a report on agencies' HSPD-9 implementation efforts, which officials stated will be finalized by late summer 2015. As of February 2015, USDA had conducted a gap analysis of its HSPD-9 implementation efforts but had not yet developed a department-wide strategy. Further, GAO reported in May 2013 that USDA's Animal and Plant Inspection Service (APHIS) had broadened its previous disease-by-disease surveillance approach to an approach in which the agency monitors the overall health of livestock and poultry, but had not yet integrated this approach into an overall strategy aligned with the nation's larger biosurveillance efforts, such as efforts called for in HSPD-9. GAO recommended that APHIS integrate its new approach into an overall strategy aligned with national homeland security efforts, and develop goals and measures for the new approach. In June 2015, officials stated that APHIS has begun to develop some measures, but noted that resource constraints limit their ability to assess their new approach to disease surveillance. Fully integrating its new approach into an overall strategy aligned with broader homeland security efforts, as GAO recommended, will better position APHIS to support national efforts to address threats to animal and human health.