On the other hand, according to the Court in its landmark 1976 decision, Buckley v. Valeo , an absolutely free "political marketplace" is neither mandated by the First Amendment, nor is it desirable, because when left uninhibited by reasonable regulation, corruptive pressures undermine the integrity of political institutions and undercut public confidence in republican governance. In other words, although the Court reveres the freedoms of speech and association, it has upheld infringements on these freedoms in order to further the governmental interests of protecting the electoral process from corruption or the appearance of corruption. In Buckley , the Court reviewed the constitutionality of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA), requiring political committees to disclose political contributions and expenditures, and limited to various degrees, the ability of natural persons and organizations to make political contributions and expenditures. While First Amendment freedoms and campaign finance regulation present conflicting means of preserving the integrity of the democratic political process, the Court resolved this conflict in favor of First Amendment interests and subjected any regulation burdening free speech and free association activities to "exacting scrutiny." Under this standard of review, the Court evaluates whether the state's interests in regulation are compelling, examines whether the regulation burdens and outweighs First Amendment liberties, and inquires whether the regulation is narrowly tailored to further its interest. If a regulation meets all three criteria, the Court will uphold it. This report discusses the critical holdings and rationales enunciated by the Buckley Court and then examines the Court's extension of Buckley in subsequent cases. Buckley 's extensions are evaluated in various regulatory contexts: contribution limits, expenditure limits, disclosure requirements, and political party spending and electioneering communication restrictions. In general, the Court struck down expenditure limitations, but upheld reasonable contribution limitations, disclosure requirements, and voluntary spending limits linked with public financing provisions. Most notably, the Buckley Court held that the spending of money, whether in the form of contributions or expenditures, is a form of "speech" protected by the First Amendment. Prohibiting or Limiting Corporate Expenditures (First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti; FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc.; Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce)

Representing an important new emphasis on First Amendment protection of corporate free speech, in First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti , the Supreme Court held that the fact that the corporation is the speaker does not limit the scope of its interests in free expression, as the scope of First Amendment protection turns on the nature of the speech, not the identity of the speaker. Limiting Political Party Expenditures (Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee v. FEC (Colorado I); FEC v. Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee (Colorado II); FEC v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee)

In Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee v. Federal Election Commission (Colorado I), the Supreme Court examined whether the FECA "Party Expenditure Provision," which imposed dollar limits on political party expenditures "in connection with the general election campaign of a [congressional] candidate," was unconstitutionally enforced against a party's funding of radio "attack ads" directed against its likely opponent in a federal senatorial election. Citizens United v. FEC

A potentially pivotal case in the Supreme Court's campaign finance jurisprudence, Citizens United v. F ederal Election Commission (FEC) , is currently before the Supreme Court.
Political expression is at the heart of First Amendment activity and the Supreme Court has granted it great deference and protection. However, according to the Court in its landmark 1976 decision, Buckley v. Valeo, an absolutely free political marketplace is not required by the First Amendment—nor is it desirable—because without reasonable regulation, corruption will result. Most notably, the Buckley Court ruled that the spending of money in campaigns, whether as a contribution or an expenditure, is a form of "speech" protected by the First Amendment. The Court upheld some infringements on free speech, however, in order to further the governmental interests of protecting the electoral process from corruption or the appearance of corruption.
In Buckley, the Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA), requiring political committees to disclose campaign contributions and expenditures and limiting, to various degrees, the ability of persons and organizations to make contributions and expenditures. While First Amendment freedoms and campaign finance regulation present conflicting means of attempting to preserve the integrity of the political process, the Court resolved this conflict in favor of the First Amendment interests and subjected any regulation burdening free speech and free association to "exacting scrutiny." Under this standard of review, a court will evaluate whether the government's interests in regulating are compelling, examine whether the regulation burdens and outweighs First Amendment liberties, and inquire as to whether the regulation is narrowly tailored to serve the government's interests. If a regulation meets all three criteria, a court will uphold it.
This report first discusses the key holdings enunciated by the Supreme Court in Buckley, including those upholding reasonable contribution limits, striking down expenditure limits, upholding disclosure reporting requirements, and upholding the system of voluntary presidential election expenditure limitations linked with public financing. It then examines the Court's extension of Buckley in several subsequent cases, evaluating them in various regulatory contexts: contribution limits (California Medical Association v. FEC; Citizens Against Rent Control v. Berkeley; Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC; FEC v. Beaumont); expenditure limits (First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti; FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life; Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce; FEC v. National Right to Work; Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee (Colorado I) v. FEC; FEC v. Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee (Colorado II); FEC v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee; FEC v. National Conservative Political Action Committee; Randall v. Sorrell); disclosure requirements (Buckley v. American Constitutional Law Foundation; Brown v. Socialist Workers '74 Campaign Committee; FEC v. Akins; McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission); and political party soft money and electioneering communication restrictions (McConnell v. FEC; Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc. v. FEC (WRTL II)). This report also discusses a case that is currently pending before the Court, Citizens United v. FEC, that may result in a decision that is pivotal to the Supreme Court's campaign finance jurisprudence.