Sarasota County Used ES&S Voting Systems in 2006 General Elections

In the 2006 general election, Sarasota County used voting systems  manufactured by ES&S. Sarasota County used iVotronic DREs for early and election day voting. 2). 3). 4). Analysis of Election Data Shows that Undervote Was Distributed across All Machines and Precincts

Our analysis of the 2006 general election data from Sarasota County does  not identify any particular voting machines or machine characteristics that  could have caused the large undervote in Florida’s 13th Congressional  District race. The undervotes in Sarasota County for the congressional  race were generally distributed across all machines and precincts. Prior Tests and Reviews Provide Some Assurance, but Do Not Provide Reasonable Assurance That the iVotronic DREs Did Not Contribute to the Undervote

Prior to the elections, Sarasota County’s voting systems were subjected to  several different tests that included testing by the manufacturer,  certification testing by the Florida Division of Elections, testing by  independent testing authorities, and logic and accuracy testing by Sarasota  County’s Supervisor of Elections. Reasonable Assurance of Some Voting System Objectives Has Been Achieved

The Unity election management system and the iVotronic DREs are the  major voting system components that may require testing to determine  whether they contributed to the large undervote in Sarasota County. Further Tests Could Provide Increased but Not Absolute Assurance That the iVotronic DREs Used in the Election Did Not Cause the Undervote

On the basis of our analysis of all prior test and audit activities, we  propose that a firmware verification test, a ballot test, and a calibration  test be conducted to try to obtain increased assurance that the iVotronic  DREs used in Sarasota County during the 2006 general election did not  cause the undervote. We propose that the firmware verification testing be started first, once the  necessary arrangements have been made, such as access to the needed  machines and the development of test protocols and detailed test  procedures. We  propose drawing a representative sample from all the iVotronic DREs that  recorded votes in the general election. We would test 112 ways to select a candidate on the early voting machine. Assuming that  (1) reasonable assurance is obtained that all iVotronic DREs used during  the election were using the same certified firmware, and (2) we found no  failures during the ballot testing, this testing would provide increased  assurance that the iVotronic DREs used during the election, both in early  voting and in election day voting, were able to accurately record and count  ballots when using any of the 112 ways to select a candidate in the  Florida-13 race. Deliberately Miscalibrate an iVotronic DRE to Understand the Effect on the Undervote

Because little is known about the effect of a miscalibrated machine on the  behavior of an iVotronic DRE, we propose to deliberately miscalibrate an  iVotronic DREs and verify the functioning of the machine. Several Matters Remain to Be Addressed to Conduct Further Testing

Should the task force ask us to conduct the proposed testing, we want to  make the task force aware of several other matters that would need to be  addressed before we could begin testing. First, we would need to gain access to iVotronic DREs that have been  subject to a sequestration order in the state court system of Florida. Sarasota County  Supervisor of Elections has indicated that we can use its warehouse space,  but because of upcoming elections in November and January, the only  time the election officials would be able to provide us this space and the  necessary support is between November 26 and December 7, 2007. We found that the prior reviews  of Sarasota County’s 2006 general election have provided valuable  information about the voting systems. By successfully conducting the proposed tests, we  could reduce the possibility that the iVotronic DREs were the cause of the  undervote and shift attention to the possibilities that the undervote was  the result of intentional actions by the voter or voters that did not properly  cast their votes on the voting system. We disagree that the collective results of testing already conducted on the  Sarasota County voting systems adequately demonstrate that the voting  systems could not have contributed to the undervote in the Florida-13  race. However, the focus of our review, as agreed with the task force, was to  review whether the voting systems could have contributed to the large  undervote.
Why GAO Did This Study

In November 2006, about 18,000 undervotes were reported in Sarasota County in the race for Florida's 13th Congressional District (FL-13). After the contesting of the election results in the House of Representatives, the task force unanimously voted to seek GAO's assistance in determining whether the voting systems contributed to the large undervote in Sarasota County. GAO agreed with the task force on an engagement plan, including the following review objectives: (1) What voting systems were used in Sarasota County and what processes governed their use? (2) What was the scope of the undervote in Sarasota County in the general election? (3) What tests were conducted on the voting systems in Sarasota County prior to the general election and what were the results of those tests? (4) Considering the voting systems tests conducted after the general election, are additional tests needed to determine whether the voting systems contributed to the undervote? To conduct its work, GAO met with officials from the State of Florida, Sarasota County, and Election Systems and Software (ES&S)--the voting systems manufacturer--and reviewed voting systems test documentation. GAO analyzed election data to characterize the undervote. On the basis of its assessments of prior testing and other activities, GAO identified potential additional tests for the Sarasota County voting systems.

What GAO Found

In the 2006 general election, Sarasota County used voting systems manufactured by ES&S, specifically iVotronic direct recording electronic (DRE) voting systems during early and election day voting and the Unity election management system, which handles the election administration functions, such as ballot design and election reporting. GAO's analysis of the 2006 general election data from Sarasota County did not identify any particular voting machines or machine characteristics that could have caused the large undervote in the FL-13 race. The undervotes in Sarasota County were generally distributed across all machines and precincts. GAO's analysis found that some of the prior tests and reviews conducted by the State of Florida and Sarasota County provide assurance that certain components of the voting systems in Sarasota County functioned correctly, but they are not enough to provide reasonable assurance that the iVotronic DREs did not contribute to the undervote. Specifically, GAO found that assurance is lacking in three areas, and proposes that tests be conducted to address those areas. First, because there is insufficient assurance that the firmware in all the iVotronic DREs used in the election matched the certified version held by the Florida Division of Elections, GAO proposes that a firmware verification test be conducted on a representative sample of 115 (of the 1,499) machines that were used in the general election. Second, because an insufficient number of ways to select a candidate in the FL-13 race were tested, GAO proposes that a test be conducted to verify all 112 ways that GAO identified to select a candidate. Third, because no prior tests were identified that address the effect of a miscalibrated iVotronic DRE on the undervote, GAO proposes that an iVotronic DRE be deliberately miscalibrated to verify the accurate recording of ballots under these conditions. GAO expects these three tests would take 2 weeks, once the necessary arrangements are made. Should the task force ask GAO to conduct the proposed tests, several matters would need to be addressed before testing could begin, including obtaining access to the iVotronic DREs that have been subject to a sequestration order, arranging for a test site, obtaining some commercially available test tools, developing test protocols and detailed test procedures, and arranging for the video recording of the tests. Sarasota County election officials have indicated that they can help GAO access the machines and provide a test site between November 26 and December 7, 2007. Although the proposed tests could help provide increased assurance, they would not provide absolute assurance that the iVotronic DREs did not cause the large undervote in Sarasota County. The successful conduct of the proposed tests could reduce the possibility that the voting systems caused the undervote and shift attention to the possibilities that the undervote was the result of intentional actions by voters or voters that did not properly cast their votes on the voting system.