According to DOE, more than  50,000 tons of the spent fuel have accumulated at 72 sites in 33 states,  many located near urban areas in the Midwest and the East. Likelihood of Widespread Harm from Terrorist Attacks or Severe Accidents Involving Spent Fuel Is Low

Studies conducted by NRC and DOE have consistently found that the  likelihood of widespread harm to human health from a terrorist attack or  a severe accident involving spent fuel is very low. Some studies  involving spent fuel stored in pools of water found that widespread harm  is possible under severe but unlikely accident conditions. To respond to increased security concerns stemming from the  September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, NRC is further studying the safety  and security of spent fuel in transit and in wet or dry storage, including  the potential effects of more extreme attack scenarios such as deliberate  aircraft crashes. As part of an ongoing process to assess its safety measures, NRC has a  number of ongoing and planned studies. Shipping Fuel from Shutdown Reactor Sites First

DOE could potentially enhance the overall security of spent fuel by  first shipping fuel currently stored at shutdown nuclear reactor sites. Regardless of the potential transportation-related security benefits, DOE’s  contracts with spent fuel owners limit its ability to ship the oldest fuel  first. It is not clear  whether this will be a common preference. Currently, no rail line extends to Yucca Mountain. Recommendations for Executive Action

To ensure that all reasonable options to further enhance the security and  safety of spent fuel in storage at nuclear power plants and in transit are  explored, we recommend that the Secretary of Energy assess the potential  benefits and costs of (1) minimizing the total number of shipments of  spent fuel by consolidating shipments where possible, (2) shipping spent  fuel in an order that further minimizes risk, and (3) emphasizing the use of  trains dedicated to hauling spent fuel. To determine the potential health effects of a terrorist attack or a severe  accident involving commercial spent nuclear fuel, we examined a variety  of federally sponsored studies, primarily conducted or sponsored by DOE  and NRC. To identify options for DOE to enhance the security of spent fuel as it  develops its plans to ship the fuel to Yucca Mountain, we reviewed  documents analyzing DOE’s plans and preferred alternatives, including the  environmental impact statement and many of its supporting documents.
Why GAO Did This Study

Spent nuclear fuel, the used fuel periodically removed from nuclear power reactors, is one of the most hazardous materials made by man. Nuclear power companies currently store 50,000 tons of spent fuel at 72 sites in 33 states. That amount will increase through 2010, when the Department of Energy (DOE) expects to open a permanent repository for this fuel at Yucca Mountain, Nevada. Concerns have been raised since September 11, 2001, that terrorists might target spent fuel. GAO was asked to (1) review federally sponsored studies that assessed the potential health effects of a terrorist attack or a severe accident on spent fuel, either in transit or in storage, and (2) identify options for DOE to further enhance the security of spent fuel during shipping to Yucca Mountain.

What GAO Found

The likelihood of widespread harm from a terrorist attack or a severe accident involving commercial spent nuclear fuel is low, according to studies conducted by DOE and NRC. Largely because spent fuel is hard to disperse and is stored in protective containers, these studies found that most terrorist or accident scenarios would cause little or no release of spent fuel, with little harm to human health. Some assessments found widespread harm is possible under certain severe but extremely unlikely conditions involving spent fuel stored in storage pools. As part of its ongoing research program and to respond to increased security concerns, NRC has ongoing and planned studies of the safety and security of spent fuel, including the potential effects of more extreme attack scenarios, including deliberate aircraft crashes. While NRC and DOE have found that spent fuel may be relatively safe and secure, DOE could potentially enhance the security of this fuel through options such as minimizing the number of shipments and picking up fuel in an order that would reduce risk, such as moving older less dangerous fuel first. These options could reduce the risk during transport and at some locations where the fuel is currently stored. However, contractual agreements between DOE and owners of spent fuel may limit DOE's ability to choose among these options. In addition, it is not clear that the benefits of these measures would justify the potential costs, including a possible renegotiation of the contracts between DOE and the spent fuel owners.