The Army’s agile  process involves seven phases and three decision points intended to  identify proposed solutions that can be evaluated for feasibility to address  an identified need and can be deployed to the field. Through these initiatives, the Army  has developed preliminary plans to address the areas of cost, technology  maturity, security, and readiness. The Army has identified near-term funding  needs for network investments and established a process for screening  proposed networking capabilities before they are tested. The Army is also attempting to  align network capability fielding with its relatively fixed schedule for  deploying forces to ensure soldiers are trained with new equipment prior  to deployment. Army Executing Network Strategy and Implementing Agile Process

The Army is beginning to execute its network strategy and implement its  agile process. However, the network strategy is still evolving,  implementation has only recently started, and the Army has not yet  executed one full cycle of the agile process. The Army is using the agile  process to quickly evaluate emerging networking capabilities. However, those costs will be substantial— at an estimated $3 billion annually, this level of effort could total in excess  of $60 billion over a 20-year period. Vendors understand that they need to secure certification from the  National Security Agency, and the Army has a customer service advocate  to help in this regard. In the future, the challenge for the  Army will be to ensure that the network equipment to be sent to operating  units has been thoroughly demonstrated and integrated in advance, that  fielding decisions are not made solely to accommodate the deployment  schedule, and that the process is delivering mature and militarily useful  capabilities. Army’s Network Modernization Strategy and Agile Process Face Other Risks and Challenges

The Army’s network strategy and agile process face several other risks  and challenges as implementation continues. The  network strategy also presents oversight challenges in that the Army has  not yet (1) fully defined performance metrics that would allow decision  makers to gauge progress in the portfolio and make informed investment  decisions and (2) created a consolidated reporting and budgeting  framework for the network portfolio. However, the Army noted that acquiring such a capability  without adequate evaluation and testing adds risk that it will not work  properly in a combat environment. The COE, which includes the current network architecture, is intended to  reduce duplication and redundancy. In that review and subsequent collaboration with the Army, the  USD(AT&L) officials and staff have (1) provided extensive technical input  on the soundness of individual network components and whether they are  in synch with the rest of the capability set and the existing network as a  whole, and (2) reviewed the acquisition schedules of all the network  programs of record within the capability set to ensure that they are  properly aligned. DOD’s  directive, issued in 2005, calls for responsible authorities to “measure  actual contributions of the portfolio against established outcome-based  performance measures to determine improved capability as well as to  support adjustments to the mix of portfolio investments, as necessary.”
The Army and DOD consider the fielding of capability set 13 as the initial  output from the Army’s network modernization portfolio but have yet to  fully define outcome-based performance measures to evaluate the actual  contributions of the capability set. For the fiscal year 2013 request, the  network portfolio was made up of over 50 research and development and  procurement budget elements. A consolidated  reporting and budgeting framework for all of the programs that are part of  the tactical network portfolio could yield more consistency and clarity in  the justifications for Army network initiatives as well as facilitate oversight  of the strategy’s affordability. The size and scope of the Army’s  modernization investment deserves high-level oversight attention by both  the Army and DOD. However, if the Army can find a way to procure  and field new technologies within 2 to 3 years, that is still considerably  better than a typical development effort that in the past has taken a  decade or longer. Recommendations

In order to enhance oversight of Army network initiatives by the Army,  DOD, and Congress, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct  the Secretary of the Army to define an appropriate set of quantifiable outcome-based performance  measures to evaluate the actual contributions of capability set 13 and  future components under the network portfolio, and develop and implement a plan for future NIEs to provide the  necessary information and insights to determine if those performance  measures have been met. As additional information is provided, we recommend that the Secretary  of Defense identify an oversight body to determine how capability set 13—as fielded in operational units—has  actually impacted overall network performance, capability gaps, and  essential network capabilities and make recommendations for  adjustments, as may be necessary, and determine how well the Army is rapidly fielding mature and militarily  useful network capabilities to its operating forces and maintaining  robust industry participation in the process. To facilitate congressional oversight of the overall affordability of this  important Army initiative, we also recommend that the Secretary of  Defense direct the Secretary of the Army to consolidate tactical network  budget elements and justifications into a single area of the Army budget  submittal. To examine the extent to which the Army’s agile process addresses cost,  technology maturity, security, and readiness, we interviewed officials from  the Army’s System of Systems Integration Directorate; the Army Training  and Doctrine Command; the Army’s Program Executive Office for  Command, Control, Communications—Tactical; the Army’s Program  Executive Office for Intelligence, Electronic Warfare and Sensors;  Communications—Electronics Research, Development, and Engineering  Center; Army G-8; and the Army Test and Evaluation Command.
Why GAO Did This Study

For nearly 20 years, the Army has had limited success in developing an information network--sensors, software, and radios--to give soldiers the exact information they need, when they need it, in any environment. Such a network is expected to improve situational awareness and decision making in combat. Under its network modernization strategy, the Army is implementing a new agile process intended to leverage industry technology solutions. The Army estimates that it will require about $3.8 billion in fiscal 2013. As requested, this report addresses the extent to which (1) the Army's network strategy and agile process addresses cost, technology maturity, security, and readiness; and (2) the Army's strategy faces other risks and challenges. To conduct this work, GAO analyzed key documents, observed testing activities, and interviewed acquisition officials.

What GAO Found

The Army has taken a number of steps to begin executing its network strategy and agile process, including establishing a baseline network architecture for Army communications. The Army's agile process involves seven phases and three decision points to allow officials to quickly evaluate emerging networking technologies to determine if they address capability gaps and can be deployed to the field. However, the network strategy is still evolving and the Army has not yet executed one full cycle of the agile process. The Army's strategy addresses some aspects of cost, technology maturity, security, and readiness, but as implementation is still under way, data for assessing progress are not available at this time. Nevertheless, the Army is beginning to spend billions of dollars netting together dozens of disparate systems to form a network that is intended to enhance warfighter effectiveness and survivability. Specifically, the Army has identified that over $3 billion will be needed each year on an indefinite basis for investments in networking capabilities, potentially making it one of the Army's most costly investments. To help determine that technologies meet prescribed levels of technical maturity, the Army has established a laboratory-based screening process for evaluating technologies, and those that show promise move to evaluations in a realistic environment with soldiers and testers. To help provide security and information assurance, the Army is working with contractors and the National Security Agency to obtain appropriate certifications prior to fielding new networking technologies. Furthermore, the Army is attempting to align the procurement and fielding of networking systems with the relatively fixed schedules for equipping and training units before they are deployed. The challenge will be to ensure that the equipment being sent to the field has been thoroughly demonstrated and that fielding decisions are not made solely to accommodate deployment cycles.
The overall scope and cost of the Armys new network strategy, as well as other factors unique to the strategy, present significant risks and challenges and deserve high-level oversight attention by both the Army and the Department of Defense (DOD). For example, the Army wants to field smaller quantities with greater frequency to be able to take advantage of new and improved capabilities as they become available, thus avoiding long-term procurements of outdated technology and potentially helping to realize savings in development, testing, and maintenance costs. However, the Army is still weighing funding and contracting options that would allow it to accomplish this goal while adhering to established acquisition and budget processes that may require long lead time to acquire these technologies. DOD guidance calls for measuring actual contributions of information technology portfolios, which includes the Army network, against established outcome-based performance measures to determine improved capability and allow for adjustments in the mix of portfolio investments. Senior DOD officials provided extensive input on the soundness of individual network components and the schedule for fielding equipment and have offered that future evaluations in an operational environment present a good opportunity to evaluate the overall performance of the network. However, the Army and DOD have not yet fully defined quantifiable network performance measures or plans to periodically review and evaluate the actual effectiveness of new Army network capabilities. Inadequate oversight of the portfolio could put the investment at risk. Finally, budget justification and other planning materials for network equipmentover 50 research and development and procurement budget elementsare not organized to provide insight into the budget for and affordability of the entire network. Given the magnitude and financial commitment envisioned, a consolidated reporting and budgeting framework could yield more consistency and clarity in the justifications for Army network initiatives and facilitate congressional oversight.

What GAO Recommends

To help ensure adequate oversight, GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense (1) define quantifiable outcome-based performance metrics for network equipment; (2) develop a plan for future network evaluations to determine if those measures have been met; and (3) evaluate fielded network performance and make recommendations for adjustments, as necessary. GAO also recommends that the Secretary of Defense consolidate Army tactical network budget elements and justifications into a single area of the Army budget submittal. DOD generally concurred with these recommendations and stated that it has initiated actions to address several of the challenges identified in the report.