	DHS Has Made Progress Deploying Radiation Detection Equipment at Land Borders and Major Seaports, but Challenges Remain

Over the past decade, DHS has made significant progress in deploying  radiation detection equipment and developing procedures to scan cargo  and conveyances entering the United States through land and sea ports  of entry for nuclear and radiological materials, but it has made less  progress with other pathways. In 2010, we reported that DHS initially  planned to deploy more than 2,100 portal monitors to U.S. ports of entry. However, as we reported in 2010 and 2011, DHS has made less progress  scanning: (1) railcars entering the United States from Canada and Mexico  and (2) international air cargo and commercial aviation aircraft,  passengers, and baggage. According to DHS officials, the department scans nearly all containerized  cargo entering U.S. seaports for nuclear and radiological materials. As we reported over the last 2 years, DHS has made limited progress  with regard to radiation scanning of the roughly 4,800 loaded railcars in  approximately 120 trains entering the United States each day from   Although, most  Canada and Mexico through 31 rail ports of entry.international rail crossings have radiography systems to scan the majority  of cargo, much of the scanning for nuclear and radiological materials that  takes place at these ports of entry is conducted with portable, handheld  radioactive isotope identification devices. Observations from Our Past Work for DHS to Consider When Replacing Portal Monitors

As deployed portal monitors reach the end of their expected service lives,  observations from our past work may help DHS as it considers options for  deploying new technologies as to whether to refurbish or replace them. Ports and border crossings have received most of  the investment of radiation detection technologies because these are  the areas through which a significant amount of cargo must pass, and  federal law requires certain scanning at seaports. As we reported in  2011, any additional investment in radiation detection equipment  needs to be consistent with the highest priority needs of the domestic  side of the GNDA, including examining and balancing the needs and  risks of all smuggling pathways into the United States. Testing new equipment rigorously prior to acquisition and deployment. Obtaining full concurrence of the end user––CBP––to ensure that any  new equipment meets CBP’s operational needs. Our past work on the  advanced spectroscopic portal and DNDO efforts to develop a system  to use radiography to scan cargo for nuclear materials found that  DNDO did not fully understand (1) how CBP used existing radiation  detection equipment in a port environment or (2) the extent of the  space limitations in port environments. Conducting a cost-benefit analysis to inform acquisition decisions. A  key part of deciding whether to refurbish or replace currently deployed  portal monitors is conducting a comprehensive cost-benefit analysis  that can be used to compare the relative costs and expected benefits  of existing versus new equipment. DHS’s GNDA Strategic and Implementation Plans Address Our Past Recommendations but Do Not Yet Clearly Define Priorities

In our past work on the GNDA, we made recommendations about the  need for a strategic plan to guide the development of the GDNA. Among  other things, in July 2008, we recommended that DHS develop an  overarching strategic plan for the GNDA that (1) clearly defines the  objectives to be accomplished, (2) identifies the roles and responsibilities  for meeting each objective, (3) identifies the funding necessary to achieve  those objectives, and (4) employs monitoring mechanisms to determine  programmatic progress and identify needed improvements. DHS agreed  with our recommendation. In January 2009, we recommended that DHS  develop a strategic plan for the domestic part of the global nuclear  detection strategy and that this plan focus on establishing time frames  and costs for addressing previously identified pathways within the  architecture—land border areas between ports of entry, aviation, and  small maritime vessels. DHS did not comment on this recommendation  but noted that it aligned with DNDO’s past, present, and future actions. DHS has taken action on these recommendations. In December 2010,  DHS issued the interagency GNDA strategic plan and in April 2012, it  issued its GNDA implementation plan for domestic aspects of the GNDA. As we reported in July 2011, the 2010 GNDA strategic plan addresses  several aspects of our prior recommendations—including defining  program objectives and assigning roles and responsibilities. Our review of the April 2012 GNDA implementation plan found that DHS  had made progress in both identifying funding dedicated to plan  objectives and in employing monitoring mechanisms to assess progress  in meeting plan objectives. While  these pathways remain an area of concern, the strategies discussed in  the plan address our 2009 recommendations and lay out an approach to  making nuclear smuggling through these pathways more difficult and thus  less likely to succeed. However, in both the GNDA strategic plan and the implementation plan, it  remains difficult to identify priorities from among various components of  the domestic part of the GNDA. Identifying priorities would help inform DHS’s decisions to  refurbish or replace portal monitors or invest in radiation detection  equipment for other potential pathways. DHS has done a comprehensive  analysis of GNDA capabilities and compared its capabilities with the  expected capabilities of adversaries who may wish to smuggle nuclear  material into the United States. This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the  United States.
Why GAO Did This Study

This testimony discusses the efforts of the Department of Homeland Securitys (DHS) Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) to develop and deploy a global nuclear detection architecture (GNDA)an integrated system of radiation detection equipment and interdiction activities to combat nuclear smuggling in foreign countries, at the U.S. border, and inside the United Statesand to provide an update on the deployment of radiation detection equipment at U.S. borders. Preventing terrorists from using nuclear or radiological material to carry out an attack in the United States is a top national priority. DNDO is charged with, among other things, enhancing and coordinating the nuclear detection efforts of federal, state, local, and tribal governments and the private sector to ensure a managed, coordinated response. Among other things, DNDO is required to coordinate with other federal agencies to develop an enhanced GNDA. It is also responsible for developing, acquiring, and deploying radiation detection equipment to support the efforts of DHS and other federal agencies. While federal efforts to combat nuclear smuggling have largely focused on established ports of entry, such as seaports and land border crossings, DNDO has also been examining nuclear detection strategies along other potential pathways in the architecture, including (1) land border areas between ports of entry into the United States, (2) international general aviation, and (3) small maritime craft, such as recreational boats and commercial fishing vessels.
Even before DNDOs inception in 2005, we were highlighting the need for a more comprehensive strategy for nuclear detection. In 2002, we reported on the need for a comprehensive plan for installing radiation detection equipment, such as radiation portal monitors, at all U.S. border crossings and ports of entry. In July 2008, we testified that DNDO had not developed an overarching strategic plan to guide the development of a more comprehensive GNDA, and we recommended that DHS coordinate with the Departments of Defense, Energy, and State to develop one. DHS agreed with our recommendation. In January 2009, we recommended that the Secretary of Homeland Security develop a strategic plan for the domestic part of the global nuclear detection strategy to help ensure the success of initiatives aimed at closing vulnerabilities in the United States. We stated that this plan should focus on, among other things, establishing time frames and costs for the areas DNDO had identifiedland border areas between ports of entry, aviation, and small maritime craft. DHS did not comment on this recommendation but noted that it aligned with DNDOs past, present, and future actions. The status of these recommendations is discussed later in this testimony.
DHS has made meaningful progress in deploying radiation detection equipment at U.S. border crossings and seaports; however, as deployed portal monitors begin to reach the end of their expected service lives, DHS will soon need to make decisions about whether to refurbish or replace them. DHS has also made progress in developing key planning documents to guide the GNDA. This testimony discusses: (1) DHSs efforts to complete the deployment of radiation detection equipment to scan all cargo and conveyances entering the United States at ports of entry, (2) observations from our past work that may help DHS as it considers options for deploying new technologies to refurbish or replace existing portal monitors when they reach the end of their expected service lives, and (3) our assessment of the extent to which DHS has addressed our prior recommendations.
This testimony is primarily based on our prior work on federal efforts to detect and prevent the smuggling of nuclear and radiological materials, issued from October 2002 through July 2011. We have updated our prior work in this testimony to reflect DHSs continuing efforts to deploy radiation detection equipment.

What GAO Found

Over the past 10 years, DHS has made significant progress in deploying radiation detection equipment to scan for nuclear or radiological materials in nearly all trucks and containerized cargo coming into the United Stated through seaports and border crossings. However, challenges remain for the agency in developing a similar scanning capability for railcars entering this country from Canada and Mexico, as well as for international air cargo and international commercial aviation. As portal monitors approach the end of their expected service lives, observations from our past work may help DHS as it considers options to refurbish or replace such monitors. Among other things, we have previously reported that DHS should (1) test new equipment rigorously prior to acquisition and deployment, (2) obtain the full concurrence of the end user to ensure that new equipment meets operational needs, and (3) conduct a cost-benefit analysis to inform any acquisition decisions. In our past work on the GNDA, we recommended that DHS develop an overarching strategic plan to guide the development of the GDNA, as well as a strategic plan for the domestic part of the global nuclear detection strategy. DHS took action on these recommendations and, in December 2010, it issued the interagency GNDA strategic plan. We reported, in July 2011, that the GNDA strategic plan addressed several of the aspects of our prior recommendations but did not (1) identify funding necessary to achieve plan objectives or (2) employ monitoring mechanisms to determine progress and identify needed improvements. In April 2012, DHS issued its GNDA implementation plan, which addresses the remaining aspects of our recommendations by identifying funding dedicated to plan objectives and employing monitoring mechanisms to assess progress in meeting those objectives. However, in both the GNDA strategic plan and the implementation plan, it remains difficult to identify priorities from among various components of the domestic part of the GNDA.