DOD Has Not Comprehensively and Accurately Assessed Whether It Has the Required Core Capability to Support Fielded Systems

DOD, through its core process, has not comprehensively and accurately  assessed whether it has the required core capability to support fielded  systems in military depots. Although DOD generally followed its own  guidance for conducting the 2007 biennial core assessment, we found that  (1) DOD’s method of compiling and internally reporting core requirements  and associated workloads for the 2007 core process did not reveal  shortfalls that the services had identified for specific  equipment/technology categories, (2) the services had errors and  inconsistencies in their identification of core requirements and associated  workloads, and (3) there was no mechanism for ensuring that the services  take corrective actions to resolve capability shortfalls. Finally, DOD is not required to provide  Congress information on its core process, and therefore the results of the  core process are not readily and routinely visible for purposes of  congressional oversight. As  a result, DOD did not present a comprehensive and accurate assessment of  the services’ 2007 core capability. Their projected organic  workloads in military depots are adequate to support core capability  requirements.” More specifically, the memorandum stated that the  department’s planned maintenance workload of 92.7 million hours was  “well over” the minimum of 70.5 million hours needed to fulfill core  requirements at military depots. The Marine Corps had shortfalls in 7 categories and the Navy in 6. However, this still  leaves a net shortfall of more than 1.3 million hours. Moreover, DOD did not have effective internal controls to prevent these  errors and deficiencies in the core process. Because  the Army could not show whether all systems were included in the  biennial core process, the Army lacks the assurance that core capabilities  were identified for all required weapon systems. DOD Has Neither Identified nor Established Core Capabilities in a Timely Manner to Prepare Military Depots to Support Future Core Requirements for Some New and Modified Systems

DOD has neither identified nor established core capabilities in a timely  manner to prepare military depots to support future core requirements for  some new and modified systems included in our review. Although DOD acquisition  guidance requires that core logistics capabilities be identified no later than  Milestone B, or by Milestone C if there is no Milestone B, the identification  of core requirements did not normally occur until later for most of the  systems we reviewed. According to DOD officials and based on the results of our analyses, if  core capability requirements for new and modified systems have not been  identified early in the acquisition process, and if there is no existing DOD  capability for a particular system, it is unlikely that core capability can be  established at military depots within 4 years of initial operational  capability, as required by DOD guidance. DOD Is Not Establishing Required Core Capabilities for Some New and Modified Systems in a Timely Manner

In addition to not identifying core capability requirements in a timely  manner for new and modified systems in the acquisition process, program  offices are also not taking the actions that are needed to establish required  core capabilities in a timely manner. More specifically, (1) acquisition  guidance provides little to no information on how to identify and plan for  the establishment of core capability, (2) acquisition strategies do not fully  address core requirements, and (3) some program offices are not  procuring technical data required to establish core capabilities. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

To evaluate the extent to which the DOD has accurately assessed whether  it has the required core capabilities in military depots to support fielded  systems, we reviewed DOD’s core determination process for 2007. We  reviewed the military services’ implementation of the core determination  methodology.
Why GAO Did This Study

The Department of Defense (DOD) is required, by law, to maintain a core logistics capability that is government owned and government operated to meet contingency and other emergency requirements. Military depots play a key role in maintaining this "core capability," although in recent years DOD has significantly increased its use of contractors. At the subcommittee's request, GAO examined the extent to which (1) DOD has accurately assessed whether it has the required core capabilities in military depots and (2) DOD is preparing to support future core requirements for new and modified systems. GAO reviewed DOD's biennial process for determining core capability requirements and the associated workloads for fielded systems. GAO also reviewed whether DOD had identified and established core capability in a timely manner for new and modified systems.

What GAO Found

DOD, through its biennial core process, has not comprehensively and accurately assessed whether it has the required core capability to support fielded systems in military depots. Although DOD internally reported that its maintenance workload of 92.7 million hours in 2007 was "well over" the minimum of 70.5 million hours needed to fulfill core requirements at military depots and that the services were complying with their core capability requirements, this assessment did not show capability shortfalls identified by the services in their core computations. GAO's analysis of the services' 2007 core capabilities data determined that the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps had shortfalls for some equipment categories or technologies. For example, the Army identified core shortfalls of 1.4 million hours for 10 equipment categories. Several factors contributed to the deficiencies in the core process. Current guidance does not address how DOD is to consolidate the services' results into a meaningful department wide assessment. Also, there were errors and inconsistencies in the services' core calculations, making the full extent of the shortfalls unclear, and DOD also did not have effective internal controls in place to identify and resolve these errors and deficiencies. Further, DOD's core process does not have an effective mechanism for ensuring that corrective actions are taken to resolve shortfalls for fielded systems. As a result of shortcomings in the core process, DOD does not know the extent to which the military depots will have the capability to repair weapon systems to support future military operations. Finally, since DOD is not required to provide Congress information on its core process, the results of the process are not readily and routinely visible for purposes of congressional oversight. DOD is not adequately preparing military depots to support future core requirements through its acquisition process. Specifically, for the new and modified systems included in our review, the department had neither identified nor established core capabilities for certain systems in a timely manner. DOD acquisition guidance requires that an analysis of core requirements for new and modified systems be conducted early in the acquisition phase (no later than Milestone B or no later than Milestone C if there is no Milestone B). However, GAO found that program offices managing 20 of 52 systems we reviewed did not identify core requirements by Milestone C. DOD is also not establishing core capabilities for new and modified systems in a timely manner--that is, within 4 years of the system's achieving its initial operational capability, as required under DOD guidance. Shortcomings in the acquisition process include (1) acquisition guidance provides little or no information on how to identify and plan for the establishment of core capability, (2) program acquisition strategies do not fully address core requirements, and (3) some program offices are not procuring technical data necessary to establish a core capability. As a result, DOD has little assurance that the department is preparing military depots to meet future national defense contingencies.