Deployed Ships’ Supply Goals Go Unmet As Only About Half of Needed Spare Parts Are Onboard

Only about 54 percent of spare parts requisitions for ships in 6 battle  groups in the Atlantic and Pacific fleets deployed in fiscal years 1999 and  2000 could be filled from onboard sources—a supply effectiveness rate  that fell below the Navy’s goal of 65 percent. When priority parts were not  on board, ships had to wait an average of 18.1 days, more than 3 times the  Navy’s wait-time goal of 5.6 days for ships outside the continental United  States. The Navy has fallen short of meeting its ship supply performance  goals for more than 20 years. Inaccurate Configuration and Demand Data Contribute to Unmet Supply Goals

Our analysis identified two key problems that contribute to the Navy’s  inability to achieve its supply goals for deployed ships: inaccurate ship  configuration records and incomplete, outdated, or erroneous historical  parts demand data. However, because of data  inaccuracies, the ships may stock all of the parts they are allowed to  carry but still find they cannot fill a large number of parts requisitions  from onboard inventories, thus failing to meet the Navy’s supply  performance goals. This information is used in allowance  models to prepare a Coordinated Shipboard Allowance List (COSAL). Spare Parts Supply Problems Can Affect Ship Operations and Mission Readiness and Increase Costs

The Navy’s spare parts supply problems can delay the completion  of needed maintenance and repair jobs on deployed ships and can  affect their operations and mission readiness, although their precise  impacts are not always well defined. The Navy also expends  substantial funds—totaling nearly $25 million for the six ships we  reviewed—to maintain large inventories that are not requisitioned during  deployments because it has given low priority to identifying and purging  unneeded spare parts from ship inventories. Our analysis of more than  50,000 maintenance work orders opened during 6 recent battle  group deployments indicates that about 29,000 (almost 58 percent of  the total) could not be completed because one or more needed repair  parts were not on board ship. Data Unclear on Impact of Spare Parts Shortages on Ship Operations and Mission Readiness

A complete picture of the impact of the Navy’s spare part shortages,  however, is unclear because the Navy’s two forms of reporting on the  extent to which significant equipment malfunctions affect a ship’s  operations and mission readiness are inconsistent. Recommendations for Executive Action

In order to improve supply availability, enhance operations and mission  readiness, and reduce operating costs for deployed ships, we recommend  the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Navy to    develop plans to conduct periodic ship configuration audits and to ensure  that configuration records are updated and maintained in order that  accurate inventory data can be developed for deployed ships;    ensure that demand data for parts entered into ship supply systems are  recorded promptly and accurately as required to ensure that onboard ship  inventories reflect current usage or demands;    periodically identify and purge spare parts from ship inventories to reduce  costs when parts have not been requisitioned for long periods of time and  are not needed according to current and accurate configuration and parts  demand information; and    ensure that casualty reports are issued consistent with high priority  maintenance work orders, as required by Navy instruction, to provide a  more complete assessment of ship’s readiness. Also, we reviewed the Navy’s criteria for assessing the effects of failed  equipment on a ship’s ability to accomplish its mission, particularly  the standards for determining what maintenance work orders result in  casualty reports. 2).
Why GAO Did This Study

GAO is conducting a series of reviews in response to a congressional request to identify ways to improve the Department of Defense's (DOD's) availability of high-quality spare parts for ships, aircraft, vehicles, and weapons systems. This report focuses on the effectiveness of the U.S. Navy's spare parts support to deployed ships. It examines (1) the extent to which the Navy is meeting its spare parts supply goals, (2) the reasons for any unmet supply goals, and (3) the effects of spare parts supply problems on ship operations, mission readiness, and costs. To conduct the review, GAO looked at data on parts requisitions, maintenance work orders, and casualty reports for various Navy ship deployments between fiscal years 1999 and 2003.

What GAO Found

In typical 6-month deployments at sea, Navy ships are generally unable to meet the Navy's supply performance goals for spare parts. GAO's analysis of data for 132,000 parts requisitions from ships in 6 Atlantic and Pacific battle groups deployed in fiscal years 1999 and 2000 showed that 54 percent could be filled from inventories onboard ship. This supply rate falls short of Navy's long-standing 65 percent goal. When parts were requisitioned, maintenance crews waited an average of 18.1 days to get the parts--more than 3 times the Navy's wait-time goal of 5.6 days for ships outside the continental United States. The Navy recognizes it has not met its supply goals for over 20 years. Two key problems contribute to the Navy's inability to achieve its supply goals. Its ship configuration records, which identify the types of equipment and weapons systems that are installed on a ship, are often inaccurate because they are not updated in a timely manner and because audits to ensure their accuracy are not conducted periodically. In addition, the Navy's historical demand data are often out-of-date, incomplete, or erroneous because supply crews do not always enter the right information into the ships' supply system databases or do not enter it on a timely basis. Because configuration-record and demand data are used in models to estimate what a ship needs to carry in inventory, inaccuracies in this information can result in a ship's not stocking the right parts for the equipment on board or not carrying the right number of parts that may be needed during deployment. While precise impacts are not always well defined, the Navy's spare parts supply problems can affect a deployed ship's operations, mission readiness, and costs. GAO's analysis of data on 50,000 work orders from 6 deployed battle groups showed that 58 percent could not be completed because the right parts were not available onboard. More complete reporting of work orders identified as critical or important would have resulted in a more complete assessment of ship mission readiness. In addition, the Navy expends substantial funds--nearly $25 million for six ships GAO reviewed--to maintain large inventories that are not requisitioned during deployments.