Another layer of security is checked-baggage  screening, which uses technology referred to as explosive detection  systems (EDS) and explosives trace detection (ETD). DHS and TSA Have Experienced Challenges in Developing and Meeting Key Performance Requirements for Various Screening Technologies

Our past work has found that technology program performance cannot be  accurately assessed without valid baseline requirements established at  the program start. For example, in June 2010, we reported  that more than half of 15 DHS programs we reviewed awarded contracts  to initiate acquisition activities without component or department approval  of documents essential to planning acquisitions, setting operational  requirements, or establishing acquisition program baselines.currently have ongoing work related to this area and we plan to report the  results later this year. For example:
We reported in January 2012 that TSA did not fully follow DHS  acquisition policies when acquiring AIT, which resulted in DHS  approving full AIT deployment without full knowledge of TSA’s revised  specifications. In July 2011, we reported that TSA revised its EDS requirements to  better address current threats, and plans to implement these  requirements in a phased approach. However, we reported that  some number of EDS machines in TSA’s checked baggage screening  fleet are configured to detect explosives at the levels established in  the 2005 requirements. The remaining EDS machines are configured  to detect explosives at 1998 levels. When TSA established the 2005  requirements, it did not have a plan with the appropriate time frames  needed to deploy EDSs to meet the requirements. DHS and TSA Have Encountered Challenges in Overseeing and Testing New Screening Technologies

Our prior work has also shown that not resolving problems discovered  during testing can sometimes lead to costly redesign and rework at a later  date. Specifically:  In January 2012, we reported that TSA began deploying AIT before it  received approval for how it would test AIT. As a  result, we reported that TSA procured AIT without DHS’s full oversight  and approval or knowledge of how TSA would test and evaluate AIT. We also reported that TSA made additional  revisions to the EDS requirements in January 2010 but experienced  challenges in collecting explosives data on the physical and chemical  properties of certain explosives needed by vendors to develop EDS  detection software to meet the 2010 requirements.also needed by TSA for testing the machines to determine whether  they meet established requirements prior to their procurement and  deployment to airports. TSA and S&T have experienced these  challenges because of problems associated with safely handling and  consistently formulating some explosives, which have also resulted in  problems carrying out the EDS procurement as planned. DHS  concurred and reported actions underway to address them. DHS and TSA Have Experienced Challenges Identifying Acquisition Program Baselines, Program Schedules, and Costs

We have found that realistic acquisition program baselines with stable  requirements for cost, schedule, and performance are among the factors  that are important to successful acquisitions delivering capabilities within  cost and schedule. Our prior work has found that program performance  metrics for cost and schedule can provide useful indicators of the health  of acquisition programs and, when assessed regularly for changes and  the reasons that cause changes, such indicators can be valuable tools for  improving insight and oversight of individual programs as well as the total  portfolio of major acquisitions.be accurately assessed without valid baseline requirements established   Importantly, program performance cannot  at the program start, particularly those that establish the minimum  acceptable threshold required to satisfy user needs. In April 2012, we reported that TSA’s methods for developing life  cycle cost estimates for the EBSP did not fully adhere to best  practices for developing these estimates. DHS Has Efforts Underway to Strengthen Oversight of Technology Acquisitions

In part due to the problems we have highlighted in DHS’s acquisition  process, the implementation and transformation of DHS remains on our  high-risk list. Specifically, DHS has faced challenges overseeing the  management, testing, acquisition, and deployment of various technology  programs including AIT and EDS. Transportation Security Administration: Progress and Challenges Faced  in Strengthening Three Key Security Programs. Homeland Security: DHS Could Strengthen Acquisitions and  Development of New Technologies. Department of Homeland Security: Assessments of Selected Complex  Acquisitions. Aviation Security: TSA Is Increasing Procurement and Deployment of  Advanced Imaging Technology, but Challenges to This Effort and Other  Areas of Aviation Security Remain. Aviation Security: DHS and TSA Have Researched, Developed, and  Begun Deploying Passenger Checkpoint Screening Technologies, but  Continue to Face Challenges.
Why GAO Did This Study

Within DHS, TSA is responsible for developing and acquiring new technologies to address transportation-related homeland security needs. TSAs acquisition programs represent billions of dollars in life-cycle costs and support a wide range of aviation security missions and investments, including technologies used to screen passengers and checked baggage such as AIT and EDS, among others. GAOs testimony addresses three key DHS and TSA challenges identified in past work: (1) developing and meeting technology program requirements, (2) overseeing and conducting testing of new screening technologies, and (3) identifying acquisition program baselines (or starting points), program schedules, and costs. This statement will also discuss recent DHS and TSA efforts to strengthen TSAs investment and acquisition processes. This statement is based on reports and testimonies GAO issued from October 2009 through April 2012 related to TSAs efforts to manage, test, and deploy various technology programs.

What GAO Found

GAOs past work has found that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) have faced challenges in developing and meeting program requirements when acquiring screening technologies. GAOs past work has demonstrated that program performance cannot be accurately assessed without valid baseline requirements established at the program start. In June 2010, GAO reported that more than half of the 15 DHS programs GAO reviewed awarded contracts to initiate acquisition activities without component or department approval of documents essential to planning acquisitions, setting operational requirements, or establishing acquisition program baselines. At the program level, in January 2012, GAO reported that TSA did not fully follow DHS acquisition policies when acquiring advanced imaging technology (AIT)commonly referred to as a full body scanner that identifies objects or anomalies on the outside of the bodywhich resulted in DHS approving full AIT deployment without full knowledge of TSAs revised specifications. In July 2011, GAO reported that in 2010 TSA revised its explosive detection systems (EDS) requirements to better address current threats and planned to implement these requirements in a phased approach; however, GAO reported that some number of the EDSs in TSAs fleet were configured to detect explosives at the levels established in 2005 while the remaining ones were configured to detect explosives at 1998 levels and TSA did not have a plan with time frames needed to deploy EDSs to meet the current requirements.
GAO also reported DHS and TSA challenges in overseeing and testing new technologies. For example, in January 2012, GAO reported that TSA began deploying AIT before it received approval for how it would test AIT. Contrary to DHSs acquisition guidance, TSA approved AIT for deployment prior to DHSs approval of the AIT testing and evaluation plan. In July 2011, GAO also reported that TSA experienced challenges collecting data on the properties of certain explosives needed by vendors to develop EDS detection software and needed by TSA before testing EDS prior to procurement and deployment to airports. TSA and the DHS Science and Technology Directorate experienced these challenges because of problems safely handling and consistently formulating some explosives. The challenges related to data collection for certain explosives resulted in problems carrying out the EDS procurement as planned.
DHS and TSA have experienced challenges identifying acquisition program baselines, program schedules, and costs. GAOs prior work has found that realistic acquisition program baselines with stable requirements for cost, schedule, and performance are among the factors that are important to successful acquisitions delivering capabilities within cost and schedule. GAO also found that program performance metrics for cost and schedule can provide useful indicators of the health of acquisition programs. In April 2012 GAO reported that TSAs methods for developing life-cycle cost estimates for the Electronic Baggage Screening Program did not fully adhere to best practices for developing these estimates.
DHS has efforts underway to strengthen oversight of technology acquisitions. In part due to the problems GAO highlighted in DHSs acquisition process, the implementation and transformation of DHS remains on GAOs high-risk list.

What GAO Recommends

GAO is not making any new recommendations. In prior work, GAO made recommendations to address challenges related to deploying AIT, EDS, and other screening technology to meet requirements; overseeing and conducting testing of AIT and EDS technologies; and incorporating information on costs and schedules, among other things, in making technology acquisition decisions. DHS and TSA concurred and have actions underway to address these recommendations.