The directive states that JIEDDO shall “focus”  (i.e., lead, advocate, and coordinate) all DOD actions in support of the  Combatant Commanders’ and their respective Joint Task Forces’ efforts  to defeat IEDs as “weapons of strategic influence.”
GAO, Defense Management: More Transparency Needed over the Financial and  Human Capital Operations of the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization,  GAO-08-342 (Washington D.C.: Mar. DOD Has Not Provided a Results- Oriented Strategic Plan to Manage Its Counter-IED Efforts

Beginning in February 2006, JIEDDO has been responsible for  developing DOD’s IED defeat strategic plan for countering the IED  threat, but its strategic-planning actions have not followed leading  strategic management practices, or have since been discontinued. However, JIEDDO’s 2007 strategic plan  did not contain a means of measuring its performance outcomes, which is  a leading strategic management practice. For example, JIEDDO’s 2009–2010  strategic plan contained performance measures, but JIEDDO  discontinued using these measures because they determined that the  data from these measures were not relevant to the organization’s goals. However, those plans  did not have outcome-related goals specific enough for JIEDDO and  these organizations to be able to develop enduring measures of  effectiveness that inform DOD whether its counter-IED mission is being  met. Further,  according to JIEDDO officials, the strategic plan applies only to counter- IED efforts managed by JIEDDO and does not apply to all other counter- IED efforts departmentwide. Consequently, successful implementation of  JIEDDO’s strategic plan alone will not provide the means necessary for  determining the effectiveness of all counter-IED efforts across DOD. As JIEDDO moves forward to implement its counter-IED strategic plan,  and DOD develops a departmentwide counter-IED strategic plan, DOD  will continue to face difficulty in developing measures of effectiveness, if it  does not have results-oriented strategic goals to accompany DOD’s  general counter-IED mission statement. Without actionable goals and  objectives established by DOD, JIEDDO, and other DOD components  cannot tie individual performance measures to DOD’s desired outcomes. As a result, DOD and external stakeholders are left without a  comprehensive, data-driven assessment as to whether DOD’s counter- IED efforts are achieving DOD’s mission. While JIEDDO has  established procedures to assess counter-IED gaps and prioritize and  manage its requirements and individual investments—including  coordinating and collaborating with various DOD entities—to rapidly  pursue these critical lines of effort, JIEDDO and DOD are not informed  about the overall effectiveness of their counter-IED efforts and use of  resources as they relate to DOD’s mission. However,  given the lack of a DOD-wide counter-IED database, there could be  more directed energy efforts that we have not identified. Conclusions

Six years after DOD established JIEDDO as its coordinating agency to  lead, advocate, and coordinate responses to the IED threat across the  department, DOD continues to lack comprehensive visibility of its counter- IED expenditures and investments, including those from JIEDDO, the  military services, and relevant DOD agencies. Specifically, DOD has  not implemented adequate actions to (1) provide a comprehensive plan to  ensure that all DOD counter-IED efforts are strategically managed in  order to achieve its goal to defeat IEDs as a weapon of strategic  influence, and (2) comprehensively list all DOD-wide counter-IED  initiatives in a database that provides internal and external parties with  visibility into the department’s counter-IED efforts. Therefore, it is critical that DOD complete this  task as soon as possible to enable JIEDDO to develop its planned  counter-IED database as described in DOD’s comments. To analyze the extent to which DOD has provided a  comprehensive counter-IED strategic plan including strategic results- oriented goals and metrics that determine the effectiveness of efforts  across DOD to combat IEDs, we collected and reviewed DOD’s counter- IED strategic-planning documents from JIEDDO. We considered counter-IED efforts from fiscal years 2006 through 2011  managed by DOD components with involvement in counter-IED efforts:  JIEDDO, military services, combatant commands, and defense agencies. To determine the extent to which DOD has identified counter-IED  initiatives and activities, and coordinated these efforts, we reviewed  JIEDDO databases on counter-IED efforts and interviewed OSD, military  service and JIEDDO officials to discuss the availability of data about  additional counter-IED efforts/initiatives. Warfighter Support: Actions Needed to Improve the Joint Improvised  Explosive Device Defeat Organization’s System of Internal Control.
Why GAO Did This Study

Over $18 billion has been appropriated to the Joint Improvised Explosive Device (IED) Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) to address the improvised explosive device (IED) threat, and there is widespread consensus that this threat will continue to be influential in future conflicts. DOD established the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) in 2006 to lead, advocate, and coordinate all DOD actions in support of the combatant commanders and their respective joint task forces efforts to defeat IEDs. This report, one in a series on JIEDDOs management and operations, addresses the extent to which DOD (1) has provided a comprehensive counter-IED strategic plan including measurable objectives that determine the effectiveness of efforts across DOD to combat IEDs, and (2) has identified counter-IED initiatives and activities, and coordinated these efforts. To address these objectives GAO reviewed counter-IED efforts from fiscal years 2006 through 2011, reviewed and analyzed relevant strategic-planning documents, collected and reviewed data identifying DOD counter-IED efforts, and met with DOD and service officials.

What GAO Found

As the responsible DOD agency for leading, advocating, and coordinating all DOD efforts to defeat improvised explosive devices (IED) the Joint IED Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) was directed to develop DODs counter-IED strategic plan in February 2006 under DOD Directive 2000.19E. As previously recommended by GAO, JIEDDO has made several attempts to develop such a plan, but its strategic-planning actions have not followed leading strategic-management practices or have since been discontinued. For example, JIEDDOs 2007 strategic plan did not contain a means of measuring its performance outcomesa leading strategic-management practice. In addition, JIEDDOs 20092010 strategic plan contained performance measures, but JIEDDO discontinued using these measures because it later determined that the measures were not relevant to the organizations goals. Although DOD tasked JIEDDO to develop its counter-IED strategic plan, DOD has not translated DODs counter-IED general mission objective of eliminating IEDs as a weapon of strategic influence into actionable goals and objectives. JIEDDO issued a new counter-IED strategic plan in January 2012; however, the new plan does not apply to all other counter-IED efforts departmentwide, only to those managed by JIEDDO. Consequently, JIEDDOs new strategic plan alone will not provide the means necessary for determining the effectiveness of all counter-IED efforts across DOD. Further, as JIEDDO implements its plan, it will continue to face difficulty measuring effectiveness until DOD establishes and provides results-oriented goals to accompany its general mission objective. Without actionable goals and objectives established by DOD, JIEDDO and other DOD components cannot tie individual performance measures to DODs desired outcomes. As a result, DOD and external stakeholders will be left without a comprehensive, data-driven assessment as to whether their counter-IED efforts are achieving DODs mission and will not be informed about the overall effectiveness of its counter-IED efforts or use of resources as they relate to DODs mission.
DOD has not fully identified its counter-IED initiatives and activities, and as a result is not able to effectively coordinate these efforts across DOD. In attempting to develop a comprehensive database, as previously recommended by GAO, JIEDDO has used at least three systems to collect and record complete information on DODs counter-IED efforts but discontinued each of them for reasons including lack of timeliness, comprehensiveness, or cost. For example, beginning in 2009, JIEDDO pursued Technology Matrix as a possible counter-IED database for all efforts within the DOD. However, JIEDDO discontinued support for Technology Matrix as a database since DOD did not require all relevant organizations to provide information to JIEDDO, and therefore it was not comprehensive. Without an automated means for comprehensively capturing data on all counter-IED efforts, the military services may be unaware of potential overlap, duplication, or fragmentation. For example, GAO identified six systems that DOD components developed to emit energy to neutralize IEDs, and DOD spent about $104 million collectively on these efforts, which could be duplicative because the military services did not collaborate on these efforts. Given the lack of a DOD-wide counter-IED database, other efforts may be overlapping.

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends four actions for DOD to develop a comprehensive strategic plan with strategic outcome-related goals and a complete listing of counter-IED efforts to maximize its resources. DOD concurred with one of the recommendations but did not concur with three. GAO continues to believe that its recommendations are warranted as discussed in the report.