It is a large and complex  development effort to provide a networked family of weapons and other  systems for the future force. Establishing reliable, robust communications  and networking capabilities is essential to FCS. The WIN-T program is developing communications equipment that  supports an expanded area of battlefield operations and interfaces with  JTRS radios to connect warfighters and command centers, including joint,  allied, and coalition forces, providing commanders with access to on-the- move communications—that is, continuously updated, real-time  multimedia information from dispersed locations throughout the theater. However, the Army restructured the FCS program in July 2004 to  address development risks. JTRS Cluster 1 Began System Development without Requisite Knowledge, Resulting in Cost and Schedule Problems

The JTRS Cluster 1 program began system development and  demonstration in 2002 with an aggressive schedule, immature  technologies, and a lack of clearly defined and stable requirements. In addition, because of  increased concern about the contractor’s ability to develop the radios, the  Army notified the contractor that it was considering contract termination. The National Security Agency has recently determined that the current  design is not sufficient to meet security requirements to operate in an  open networked environment. Size, Weight, and Power Requirements for Key Platform Users Have Presented a Significant Challenge for Cluster 1

A key technical challenge in developing the Cluster 1 radio is meeting the  size, weight, and power requirements for ground vehicles and helicopters. Thus far, the program has not been able to develop radios that meet size,  weight, and power requirements, and the current projected transmission  range is only 3 kilometers—well short of the 10-kilometer range required  for the Wideband Networking Waveform. Adding to the program’s uncertainty is the impact of pending requirements  on program cost and schedule. Several programmatic  changes and a contract award bid protest have contributed to disruptions  in the progress of the Cluster 5 program. The Army has concluded that the schedule for the small form  radios is not synchronized with the FCS schedule and has asked the  contractor for a plan to accelerate deliveries. None  of the critical technologies will be fully mature at the time production  begins in March 2006. Because there are significant interdependencies  among critical technologies, any delay in maturing an individual  technology further increases overall program risk. The tightly  compressed schedule also assumes nearly flawless execution and may not  allow sufficient time for correcting problems. WIN-T’s  ability to significantly improve upon current communications capabilities  relies on demonstrating integrated network operations and the ability to  work on the move. According to  program officials, SOSCOE development does not require “cutting edge”  software technology. The high risk  is derived from the fact that SOSCOE may not reach the necessary  technical maturity level required to meet program milestones. FCS Program Requirements Are Still Evolving

Higher-level FCS specifications are still evolving nearly 2 years after the  program started development. As currently structured, the JTRS, WIN-T, and SOSCOE programs are at  risk of not delivering intended capabilities when needed, particularly for  the first spiral of FCS. They continue to struggle to meet an ambitious set  of user requirements, steep technical challenges, and stringent timeframes. Recommendations for Executive Action

Since (1) an enhanced Army communications network is critical for a  successful transformation to FCS and (2) JTRS, including the advanced  wideband waveforms, WIN-T, and SOSCOE are the key pillars of the  communications network, the timing of the first FCS spiral should be  based on when the pacing capabilities to be provided by JTRS and WIN-T  will be demonstrated. To determine the development risks associated with the System of  Systems Common Operating Environment (SOSCOE), we obtained  briefings on fielding plans, analyzed documents describing SOSCOE  software availability and maturity, and interviewed project officials from  the Project Manager for FCS Network Systems Integration, Fort  Monmouth, New Jersey.
Why GAO Did This Study

The Army has embarked on a major transformation of its force. Central to this transformation is the Future Combat Systems (FCS), a $108 billion effort to provide warfighters with the vehicles, weapons, and communications needed to identify and respond to threats with speed, precision, and lethality. Establishing reliable, robust communications and networking capabilities is key to FCS's success. Each of the systems integral to the FCS communications network--the Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS), the Warfighter Information Network-Tactical (WIN-T), and the System of Systems Common Operating Environment (SOSCOE)--rely on significant advances in current technologies and must be fully integrated to realize FCS. Given the complexity and costs of this undertaking, GAO was asked to review each of these key development efforts to identify any risks that may jeopardize the successful fielding of FCS.

What GAO Found

Each of the programs for developing FCS's communications network is struggling to meet ambitious sets of user requirements and steep technical challenges within highly compressed schedules. As currently structured, the programs are at risk of not delivering intended capabilities for the first spiral of FCS, slated to start in fiscal year 2008. The JTRS Cluster 1 program--a program to develop radios for ground vehicles and helicopters--began development with an aggressive schedule, immature technologies, and a lack of clearly defined and stable requirements. As currently designed, the radio will only have a transmission range of only 3 kilometers--well short of the required 10 kilometers--and will not meet security requirements for operating in an open networked environment. The program's struggle to mature and integrate key technologies has contributed to significant cost and schedule growth. A recent review of the program concluded that the current program structure is not executable, and in April 2005, DOD directed the Army to stop work and notify the contractor that it was considering terminating the contract. Meeting requirements for JTRS Cluster 5 radios--miniaturized radios, including those that soldiers carry--is even more technically challenging given their smaller size, weight, and power needs. The smallest of these radios weighs only about 1 pound, compared with 84 pounds for Cluster 1 radios. Several programmatic changes and a contract award bid protest have further slowed program progress. The Army is considering options for restructuring the program to meet the needs of FCS and address the technical issues encountered in the Cluster 1 program. The Army does not expect to fully mature the technologies for WIN-T--communications equipment that supports an expanded area of battlefield operations and interfaces with JTRS radios--when production begins in March 2006. Moreover, the compressed schedule assumes nearly flawless execution and does not allow sufficient time for correcting problems. Significant interdependencies among the critical technologies further increase overall program risk. The program was directed to deliver networking and communications capabilities sooner to meet near-term warfighting needs and synchronize with the restructured FCS program. A plan for how to develop and field WIN-T capabilities sooner to address FCS needs remains undetermined. According to Army network system integration officials, SOSCOE--the operating software to integrate the communications network--may not reach the necessary technical maturity level required to meet program milestones. In addition, top-level FCS requirements are still evolving and have not been translated into more detailed specifications necessary for writing SOSCOE software.