We reported in June 2009 that the HSC requested that federal agencies  certify to the council that they were addressing applicable elements of the   Because  Key Elements checklist in December 2006 and October 2008.the certification process, as implemented, did not provide for monitoring  and reporting as envisioned in the Implementation Plan, we  recommended in our June 2009 report that the HSC request that the  Secretary of Homeland Security monitor and report to the Executive  Office of the President on the readiness of agencies to continue their  operations while protecting their employees in the event of an influenza  pandemic. Agencies Reported Progress in Planning to Protect Employees during an Influenza Pandemic

		Additional Agencies Reported Completing Influenza Pandemic Plans to Protect Their Federal Workers

As shown in figure 1, almost all of the agencies we surveyed—or an  increase of three agencies since 2009—reported in 2012 that they have  completed influenza pandemic plans that address the operational  approach for how they would protect their federal employees in the event  of an influenza pandemic. Specifically, all of the agencies reported that they developed  policies or procedures consistent with this strategy such as telework and  avoiding all unnecessary travel. They have also planned for the  distribution of hygiene supplies to protect employees whose duties  require their presence at an assigned workplace during an influenza  pandemic. Employees who must work onsite during an influenza pandemic will face  varying levels of exposure risk. However, according to two agencies’ officials, the HSC has not asked  agencies to certify their plans since then. The four agencies we selected are responsible for  providing guidance, policy, or influenza pandemic-related expertise to  other agencies. Each of these agencies is responsible for providing  influenza pandemic continuity of operations (COOP) guidance, which  includes elements such as COOP planning, personnel protection, or  workplace options for federal departments and agencies. The DHS Secretary provides  biennial assessments of department and agency continuity capabilities  and reports the results to the President, through the NCC, and to agency  heads as required by Federal Continuity Directive 1. Consequently, the  evaluation tool, for example, does not include pandemic preparedness- related questions such as whether federal workers’ influenza pandemic  risk assessments are regularly updated and whether agencies have  planned to provide protective measures to mitigate exposure risks. However, the  agencies also reported uneven status in some key areas suggesting  some oversight targeted to bring attention to these areas is needed. For  example, only nine agencies reported that they have classified all or most  jobs for onsite mission essential functions by exposure risk level. Adequate oversight could help in ensuring  that, by classifying jobs by exposure risk level, agencies have appropriate  measures in place to protect those employees who must carry out  mission essential functions that cannot be performed remotely during an  influenza pandemic. While agencies have reported in  2012 they have made significant progress in planning for protecting  workers during an influenza pandemic, additional oversight targeted to  those areas in which reported progress is uneven could help focus  attention on those areas. Recommendation For Executive Action

To provide additional oversight of agencies’ progress in their  preparedness to protect workers, help focus attention on areas of uneven  progress reported in our survey, and build upon the efforts FEMA has  underway, we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct  the Administrator of FEMA to include in its biennial assessments of  agencies’ continuity capabilities consideration of agencies’ progress in  assessing exposure risk levels, identifying appropriate protective  measures, and establishing operational plans to provide such protections. GAO staff who made major contributions to  this report are listed in appendix V.

Appendix I: Chief Financial Officers Act Agencies

Appendix II: List of Agencies and Selected Components

Appendix III: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

The objectives of this report were to (1) determine what progress federal  agencies report they have made since our 2009 report and identify  challenges federal agencies report they face in protecting their workforce  during an influenza pandemic, and (2) determine the extent to which  oversight of agencies’ progress was being conducted and how the  oversight information is being used. We reviewed  agency and component pandemic plans and conducted interviews with  agency officials.
Why GAO Did This Study

Federal agencies must plan to protect federal workers essential to ensuring the continuity of the countrys critical operations in the event of a pandemic. GAO reported in 2009 that agencies had made uneven progress in developing operational influenza pandemic plans and some agencies were not close to having plans. In addition, there was no real mechanism to monitor agencies progress.
GAO was asked to (1) determine what progress federal agencies report they have made since GAOs 2009 report and identify challenges federal agencies report they face in protecting their workforce during an influenza pandemic, and (2) determine the extent to which oversight of agencies progress is being conducted and how the oversight information is being used.
GAO surveyed the 24 agencies covered by the Chief Financial Officers Act of 1990, conducted a follow-up case study review, and interviewed agency officials responsible for providing guidance to other federal agencies in planning for an influenza pandemic.

What GAO Found

In 2012, federal agencies reported they had made progress in planning to protect their federal employees during an influenza pandemic. For example:
Twenty-three of 24 federal agencies reported they had completed influenza pandemic plans that address the operational approach they would use to protect their employees in the event of an influenza pandemic. In 2009, 20 agencies reported completing such plans.
All 24 agencies reported that, to reduce employees risk of exposure to influenza, they developed policies or procedures such as telework and avoiding all unnecessary travel. In the 2009 survey, 22 agencies reported developing the former policy and 18 the latter.
All of the agencies reported that they planned for the distribution of hygiene supplies to protect employees whose duties require them to work onsite during an influenza pandemic. In 2009, 18 agencies reported taking this planning step.
However, the agencies reported uneven status in some key areas suggesting some additional oversight is needed. For example, only nine agencies reported they have classified all or most jobs for onsite mission essential functions by exposure risk level. Additional oversight could help in ensuring that, by classifying jobs by exposure risk level, agencies have appropriate measures in place to protect those employees who must carry out mission essential functions that cannot be performed remotely during an influenza pandemic.
There is limited oversight of agencies progress to protect their employees during a pandemic. In 2008, the Homeland Security Council required agencies to certify their pandemic planning status, but according to agencies officials, has not done so since then. As in 2009, GAO interviewed four agenciesDepartment of Health and Human Services, Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Department of Labor, and Office of Personnel Management. Each of these agencies is responsible for providing influenza pandemic continuity of operations guidance, which includes elements such as planning, personnel protection, or workplace options to federal departments and agencies. DHS and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) reported they conduct biennial assessments of department and agency continuity capabilities and report the results to the President through the National Continuity Coordinator. However, this assessment does not include planning elements specific to influenza pandemic planning, such as whether federal workers influenza pandemic risk assessments are regularly updated and whether agencies have planned to provide protective measures to mitigate exposure risks. Including such information in the biennial assessment process could provide monitoring, evaluation, and reporting of progress and help focus attention on those areas in which reported progress is uneven.

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that DHS provide additional oversight of agencies pandemic preparedness and help focus attention on areas of uneven progress reported in GAOs survey by directing FEMA to include in its biennial assessments of agencies continuity capabilities consideration of agencies progress in assessing exposure risk levels of occupational exposure, identifying appropriate protective measures, and establishing operational plans to provide such protections for federal workers during an influenza pandemic. DHS concurred with the recommendation.