	Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

Our objectives were to determine (1) the overall status of Defense’s effort to identify and correct its date sensitive systems and (2) the appropriateness of Defense’s strategy and actions to correct these systems. Identify and secure the necessary resources. In conducting the individual component reviews and assessing oversight efforts from Defense headquarters, we reviewed and analyzed official memoranda and other documents discussing Defense and component Year 2000 policy and procedures; the June 1996 and February 1997 Defense and component responses to Year 2000 questions from the House Government Operations Committee, Subcommittee on Oversight; the January 1997 Action Plan for Year 2000 Information Technology Compliance; Defense’s May 1997, August 1997, November 1997, and February 1998 component quarterly reports on Year 2000 program status to ASD C3I, and Defense’s subsequent department-level reports to the Office of Management and Budget; Year 2000 status briefings to the Deputy Secretary of Defense by the Military Services, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, DISA, DFAS, and DLA; early drafts and the final April 1997 versions of the Defense Year 2000 Management Plan; and Year 2000 inventory data compiled by ASD C3I, Defense components, and their subcomponents. Should Defense fail to successfully address the Year 2000 problem in time, its mission-critical operations could be severely degraded or disrupted. Defense has taken a long time in the early phases of its Year 2000 program and its progress in fixing systems has been slow. Our reviews have shown that individual components have also taken positive actions to increase awareness. Furthermore, Defense has not promulgated and enforced good management practices for Year 2000 corrective efforts. Defense, however, does not yet have a complete and accurate inventory of its systems and other equipment needing repair. Once Defense decides the relative priority of its mission-critical systems, it will still need to ensure that its mission-critical rather than nonmission-critical systems receive focused management attention and resources. As a result, Defense runs the risk that all systems and interfaces will not be thoroughly and carefully tested. Contingency plans are important because they identify the manual or other fallback procedures to be employed should systems miss their Year 2000 deadline or fail unexpectedly in operation. Conclusions

Defense operations hinge on the department’s ability to successfully fix its mission-critical computer systems before the Year 2000 deadline. As a result, Defense lacks complete and reliable information on systems, interfaces, and costs. It is allowing nonmission-critical systems to be corrected even though only a small percentage of mission-critical systems have been completed. GAO Comment

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Why GAO Did This Study

Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Department of Defense's (DOD) program for solving the year 2000 computer systems problem, focusing on the: (1) overall status of DOD's effort to identify and correct its date-sensitive systems; and (2) appropriateness of DOD's strategy and actions to correct its year 2000 problems.

What GAO Found

GAO noted that: (1) DOD relies on computer systems for some aspect of all of its operations, including strategic and tactical operations, sophisticated weaponry, intelligence, surveillance and security efforts, and routine business functions, such as financial management, personnel, logistics, and contract management; (2) failure to successfully address the year 2000 problem in time could severely degrade or disrupt any of DOD's mission-critical operations; (3) DOD has taken many positive actions to increase awareness, promote sharing of information, and encourage components to make year 2000 remediation efforts a high priority; (4) however, its progress in fixing systems has been slow; (5) in addition, DOD lacks key management and oversight controls to enforce good management practices, direct resources, and establish a complete picture of its progress in fixing systems; (6) as a result, DOD lacks complete and reliable information on systems, interfaces, other equipment needing repair, and the cost of its correction efforts; (7) it is spending limited resources fixing nonmission-critical systems even though most mission-critical systems have not been corrected; (8) it has also increased the risk that: (a) year 2000 errors will be propagated from one organization's systems to another's; (b) all systems and interfaces will not be thoroughly and carefully tested; and (c) components will not be prepared should their systems miss the year 2000 deadline or fail unexpectedly in operation; (9) each one of these problems seriously endangers DOD chances of successfully meeting the year 2000 deadline for mission-critical systems; and (10) together, they make failure of at least some mission-critical systems and the operations they support almost certain unless corrective actions are taken.