DHS’s strategy includes: (1) countering proliferation at the source by  assisting foreign governments in their efforts to detect and interdict  nuclear and radiological smuggling; (2) controlling the illegal export of  technology and equipment from the United States that terrorists could use  to develop a nuclear or radiological weapon; (3) detecting and interdicting  potential smuggling attempts before they reach the United States; and (4)  securing U.S. ports-of-entry through multiple technologies that include  radiation detection and nonintrusive inspections to view images of cargo in  sea containers. DHS Has Made Progress in Deploying Radiation Detection Equipment, but the Agency’s Program Goals Are Unrealistic and the Cost Estimate Is Uncertain

As of December 2005, DHS had completed deployment of portal monitors  at two categories of entry—a total of 61 ports-of-entry—and has begun  work on two other categories; overall, however, progress has been slower  than planned. The Program to Install Portal Monitors Has Fallen Behind Schedule

Between October 2000 and October 2005, DHS, mainly through its prime  contractor PNNL, has spent about $286 million to deploy radiation  detection equipment at U.S. ports-of-entry. As of December 2005, DHS had  deployed 670 of 3,034 radiation portal monitors—about 22 percent of the  portal monitors DHS plans to deploy. Delays in Gaining Agreements Have Slowed Seaport Deployments

Negotiations with seaport operators have been slow and have also delayed  the portal monitor deployment program. In addition, deploying  portal monitors in major seaports presents several unique challenges. Second, our analysis of CBP’s earned  value data also suggests that the program will likely cost much more than  planned. Recent tests of the new portal monitors indicate that  DNDO’s criteria have not yet been met. However, we do not agree. CBP Officers Have Made Progress in Using Radiation Detection Equipment Correctly and Adhering to Inspection Guidelines, but There Are Potential Issues with Agency Procedures

CBP officers we observed conducting primary and secondary inspections  appeared to use radiation detection equipment correctly and to follow the  agency’s inspection procedures. However, the agency’s  inspection procedures could be strengthened. However, NRC regulations  do not require that the license accompany the shipment, although in some  cases importers choose to voluntarily include the license. DHS Is Working to Improve the Capabilities of Currently-fielded and New Radiation Detection Equipment, but Much Work Remains to Achieve Better Equipment Performance

DHS has managed research, development, and testing activities that  attempt to address the inherent limitations of currently-fielded radiation  detection equipment and to produce new, advanced technologies with even  greater detection capabilities. However, because  DNDO was created so recently, these efforts are in their early stages of  development and implementation. A subset of this issue concerns screening rail traffic leaving  seaports, which is a particularly difficult problem. On the other hand, because CBP officers do not have access to NRC  licensing data, it is difficult for them to verify that shippers have obtained  necessary NRC licenses and to verify the authenticity of any NRC licenses  that may accompany shipments of radioactive materials. Recommendations for Executive Action

Since DHS provides the Congress with information concerning the  acquisition and deployment of portal monitors, and since DHS’s procedures  to obtain internal agreement on this information are lengthy and  cumbersome—often resulting in delays—we recommend that the Secretary  of Homeland Security, working with the Director of DNDO and the  Commissioner of CBP, review these approval procedures and take actions  necessary to ensure that DHS submits information to the Congress early in  the fiscal year. GAO staff  who made major contributions to this report are listed in appendix IV. Homeland Security: Key Cargo Security Programs Can Be Improved.
Why GAO Did This Study

Preventing radioactive material from being smuggled into the United States is a key national security objective. To help address this threat, in October 2002, DHS began deploying radiation detection equipment at U.S. ports-of-entry. This report reviews recent progress DHS has made (1) deploying radiation detection equipment, (2) using radiation detection equipment, (3) improving the capabilities and testing of this equipment, and (4) increasing cooperation between DHS and other federal agencies in conducting radiation detection programs.

What GAO Found

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has made progress in deploying radiation detection equipment at U.S. ports-of-entry, but the agency's program goals are unrealistic and the program cost estimate is uncertain. As of December 2005, DHS had deployed 670 portal monitors and over 19,000 pieces of handheld radiation detection equipment. However, the deployment of portal monitors has fallen behind schedule, making DHS's goal of deploying 3,034 by September 2009 unlikely. In particular, two factors have contributed to the schedule delay. First, DHS provides the Congress with information on portal monitor acquisitions and deployments before releasing any funds. However, DHS's lengthy review process has caused delays in providing such information to the Congress. Second, difficult negotiations with seaport operators about placement of portal monitors and how to most efficiently screen rail cars have delayed deployments at seaports. Regarding the uncertainty of the program's cost estimate, DHS would like to deploy advanced technology portals that will likely cost significantly more than the currently deployed portals, but tests have not yet shown that these portals are demonstrably more effective than the current portals. Consequently, it is not clear that the benefits of the new portals would be worth any increased cost to the program. Also, our analysis of the program's costs indicates that DHS may incur a $342 million cost overrun. DHS has improved in using detection equipment and in following the agency's inspection procedures since 2003, but we identified two potential issues in Customs and Border Protection (CBP) inspection procedures. First, although radiological materials being transported into the United States are generally required to have a Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) license, regulations do not require that the license accompany the shipment. Further, CBP officers do not have access to data that could be used to verify that shippers have acquired the necessary documentation. Second, CBP inspection procedures do not require officers to open containers and inspect them, although under some circumstances, doing so could improve security. In addition, DHS has sponsored research, development, and testing activities to address the inherent limitations of currently fielded equipment. However, much work remains to achieve consistently better detection capabilities. DHS seems to have made progress in coordinating with other agencies to conduct radiation detection programs; however, because the DHS office created to achieve the coordination is less than 1 year old, its working relationships with other agencies are in their early stages of development and implementation. In the future, this office plans to develop a "global architecture" to integrate several agencies' radiation detection efforts, including several international programs.