N ational delegations from more than 190 countries and the European Union will gather in Paris, France, on November 29, 2015, to try to negotiate an agreement to address climate change. A climate change deal in Paris is not assured. The Congressional Research Service (CRS) has drawn on the draft texts of an agreement and a decision under negotiation, and publicly available reports and views to provide a current sense of what may be likely outcomes. These are not predictions. While many stakeholders are optimistic that an agreement will be reached, the nature of the expected agreement and the provisions within it are far from certain. Existing Obligations under the UNFCCC

All Parties to the 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), including the United States, have a host of common obligations under the treaty. In addition, more than 174 Parties to the UNFCCC—almost 90%—voluntarily submitted Intended Nationally Determine d Contributions (INDCs) prior to the Paris conference, with almost all containing pledges to limit or reduce their GHG emissions. What Is Likely in an Expected Agreement and Decision

If the Paris negotiations succeed in resolving the major disputes, they are likely to yield at least two agreements: an Agreement (hereinafter capitalized)—which many expect to be legally binding; and a Decision (hereinafter capitalized) by the COP that would adopt the Agreement under the UNFCCC and include provisions intended to "give effect to the Agreement." The Decision would lay out follow-up processes for the Parties, tasks for the Secretariat, and possibly include related provisions that could be legally binding under the Convention. For example, the UNFCCC already contains many legally binding obligations for all Parties; however, the United States delegation may oppose an Agreement that would establish new substantive obligations on the United States, such as making the GHG emission reduction in the U.S. INDC legally binding. Very broad participation has already been achieved by the negotiating process. For example, while only a few Annex I Parties of the 1992 UNFCCC took on specific obligations to produce national plans to mitigate their GHG emissions (e.g., under the Kyoto Protocol), already a large majority of Parties to the UNFCCC have submitted INDCs in preparation for the COP21. Calls for guidelines for (transparent) reporting and review of financing and other means to assist Parties to meet their obligations could make it into a final Agreement. Placeholders to define "developed country Parties" and "developing country Parties" appear in the Definitions article of the draft as well; whether quantified pledges for GHG emission mitigation and/or financing are legally binding for all Parties, only developed country Parties, or no Parties; whether to further characterize, in the Agreement, the UNFCCC's objective as avoidance of a temperature goal (2 o C, 1.5 o C, or well below either), or to "decarbonize" economies, and whether the responsibilities to achieve any long-term goal might be allocated to Parties individually; whether financing heretofore pledged collectively by most of the highest-income Parties, to aim to mobilize $100 billion annually by 2020, should be included in the Agreement, quantified, required to continually increase over time, be prescribed by formula, or be limited to "developed country Parties" rather than all Parties "in a position to do so." Parties that perceive themselves as vulnerable to climate change seek provisions to provide them with funds for "loss and damage" that they may suffer even with adaptation efforts. There remains a placeholder in the draft regarding whether a Party may place reservations on its accession to the Agreement. The Role of Congress in Approving a New Climate Agreement23

The UNFCCC is legally binding on the United States—the United States ratified the agreement and it entered into force in 1994.
The Conference of the Parties (COP) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) convenes for the 21st time (COP21) in Paris, France, from November 29 to December 11, 2015. The United States ratified the UNFCCC in 1992. Accordingly, the United States and the other 195 UNFCCC Parties already have legally binding but qualitative obligations under the treaty. COP21 intends to finalize an agreement under the UNFCCC to address climate change from 2020 on. A major focus is to lay out a path toward stabilizing greenhouse gas (GHG) concentrations in the atmosphere to avoid a 2o Celsius (3.6oF) increase in global temperature. The expected agreement would replace the Kyoto Protocol, to which the United States is not a Party. The Kyoto Protocol contains obligations for a limited set of the highest income countries to the year 2020.
This report identifies critical issues regarding (1) the expected Paris Agreement and (2) a Decision that would give effect to the Agreement. The Congressional Research Service (CRS) draws on the draft negotiating texts, publicly available reports, and commentaries to suggest likely outcomes. These are not predictions. While many stakeholders are optimistic that agreement will be reached, the conclusions are far from certain.
There are many issues under negotiation. The main issues include (with key terms italicized) the following:
Which provisions will be legally binding, and on which Parties? Will responsibilities be differentiated among Parties with different circumstances and capacities? Will all Parties agree to modify the existing bifurcation into Annex I and developing country Parties? Is resolution possible if the Agreement does not ensure differentiated but efficacious participation of all Parties? Will a durable Agreement, intended to provide a multi-decade framework, include binding processes for all Parties to ensure progression toward the long-term UNFCCC objective? Might greater priority be given to adaptation to climate change, particularly with regard to financing and capacity-building? Will Parties find common ground on Means of Implementation (MOI), including assistance in financing, capacity building, and access to technologies? Will all Parties accept a common transparency framework with international reviews of national performance and consultations to address noncompliance? Would Parties with historically high contributions to current GHG concentrations agree to address loss and damage from climate change, or would Parties that feel most vulnerable to climate change accept an agreement without it? Will an agreement set long-term goals to avoid future temperature increases of 2o Celsius (3.6oF) or lower, or to impose deadlines to achieve decarbonization of economies?
Legal form and force: A new agreement could be internationally legally binding but not add legally binding obligations for the United States. If it does not, a new agreement may constitute an executive agreement that may not require the advice and consent of the Senate under the Constitution. Some in Congress, however, suggest that an executive agreement could be an "end run" or violate the treaty clause of the Constitution.
Financing: Financing beyond 2020 remains a crucial issue for the Paris deal. Some Parties seek to make financing pledges legally binding; scale up amounts on a timetable; restrict contributors to public funds from developed country Parties, and pay for loss and damage in developing countries. The United States and many current donor countries oppose proposals to pay for loss and damage.
Worldwide Participation: Very broad participation has already been achieved by the negotiating process. While only a few Annex I Parties of the 1992 UNFCCC took on specific obligations to produce national plans to mitigate their GHG emissions, 174 Parties to the UNFCCC—almost 90%—voluntarily submitted Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs) prior to the Paris conference, almost all containing pledges to limit or reduce their GHG emissions.