	FAA Uses Reactive and Proactive Data Analysis to Prevent Accidents and Manage Risk

For decades, FAA, other federal regulators, and the aviation industry  have used data in a reactive fashion—that is, to identify the causes of  aviation accidents and incidents and take actions to prevent their  recurrence. Aviation accident data are collected by NTSB, but FAA also  collects some accident data and uses various databases and voluntary  reporting programs to collect incident data, such as for runway  incursions—the unauthorized presence of an aircraft, vehicle, or person  on a runway. Since 1998, FAA has partnered with the airline industry through the  Commercial Aviation Safety Team (CAST) to identify precursors and  contributing factors and ensure that efforts to improve safety focus on the  most prevalent categories of accidents. CAST analyzes accident  and incident data to identify precipitating conditions and causes, and then  formulates an intervention strategy designed to reduce the likelihood of a  recurrence. Although FAA will continue using data in a reactive manner to understand  the causes of accidents and incidents, it is shifting emphasis to a  proactive approach in which it analyzes data to identify and mitigate risks  to prevent future accidents as part of its adoption of SMS. FAA uses the Air Transportation Oversight System (ATOS), a  risk-based data-driven system, to oversee maintenance and operations at  all air carriers. FAA Has Various Processes in Place to Help Ensure Data Quality

Implementing systems and processes that capture accurate and complete  data is critical for FAA to determine the magnitude of safety issues,  assess their potential impacts, identify their root causes, and effectively  address and mitigate them. FAA has furthermore put in place data quality controls that we consider  good practices for handling data, although weaknesses remain in some  areas. This quality control is  important because it could affect accuracy and completeness.controls in place and is taking steps to address its data weaknesses;   FAA has  however, vulnerabilities remain that potentially limit the usefulness of  FAA’s data for some of the safety analyses planned to support SMS. Although FAA concurred with our recommendations, it has not fully  implemented them. Data Limitations and Lack of Data Challenge FAA’s Ability to Manage Safety Risks

FAA has put in place various quality controls for its data, but it continues  to experience data challenges—including limitations with the analysis it  conducts and data it collects, as well as the absence of data in some  areas. 3.) Lack of ramp incident data means FAA is unable to assess the risk of  catastrophic accidents in this area. In 2007, we reported that efforts to  address the occurrence of safety incidents in ramp areas were  hindered by the lack of data on the nature, extent, and cost of ramp  incidents and accidents. FAA still collects no comprehensive data on  incidents in the ramp area and NTSB does not routinely collect data  on ramp accidents unless they result in serious injury or substantial  aircraft damage. We recommended in   FAA agreed with  2011 that FAA extend oversight to the ramp areas.our recommendation but noted that it already oversees ramps through  its oversight of airlines. FAA expects to further enhance that oversight  through its proposed ruling to require airports with air carrier  operations to establish a safety management system. Lack of a process to track and assess runway excursions denies FAA  the ability to assess the risks of these incidents. Runway excursions  can be as dangerous as incursions; according to the Flight Safety  Foundation, excursions have resulted in more fatalities than  incursions globally. FAA does not have a process to track  excursions, unlike for runway incursions. We recommended in 2011  that FAA develop and implement plans to track and assess runway  excursions. FAA agreed and will be developing a program to collect  and analyze runway excursion data and is drafting an order to set out  the definitions and risk assessment processes for categorizing and  analyzing the data. However, according to our review of FAA’s plans,  it will be several years before FAA has obtained enough detailed  information about these incidents in order to assess risks.
Why GAO Did This Study

The U.S. aviation system is one of the safest in the world, but fatal accidents, though rare, continue to occur. As a result of recent accidents and related NTSB findings, FAA announced a Call to Action Plan in June 2009 to, among other things, increase air carrier participation in voluntary safety programs. In 2010, Congress passed the Airline Safety and Federal Aviation Administration Extension Act, which, in part, called for FAA to better manage safety risks. As a result, FAA developed a concerted strategy to implement new safety programs, including increasing air carrier use of voluntary safety programs and advancing the use of SMS.
FAA is implementing SMSa data-driven, risk-based safety approach that involves establishing the necessary organizational structures, accountabilities, policies, and procedures. The implementation of SMS heightens the importance of obtaining and using high-quality aviation safety data.
This statement is based on GAOs previous work and focuses on (1) how FAA uses data to manage safety risks, (2) how FAA ensures it has quality data to manage risk, and (3) the challenges FAA faces in using data to better manage safety risks.

What GAO Found

The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) uses data reactively and proactively to prevent accidents and manage safety risks. For instance, since 1998, FAA has partnered with the airline industry to identify precursors and contributing factors, and ensure that efforts to improve safety focus on the most prevalent categories of accidents and formulate an intervention strategy designed to reduce recurrences. Although FAA plans to continue using data reactively to understand the causes of accidents and incidents, as part of its adoption of Safety Management Systems (SMS), it is shifting to a proactive approach in which it analyzes data to identify and mitigate risks before they result in accidents.
Implementing systems and processes that capture accurate and complete data are critical for FAA to determine the magnitude of safety issues, assess their potential impacts, identify their root causes, and effectively address and mitigate them. Though FAA has put in place data quality controls, weaknesses remain in some areas. In particular, several FAA databases GAO reviewed in 2010 did not have a managerial review process prior to data entryan important control that helps ensure data accuracy and completeness. In response to GAOs recommendations, FAA is taking steps to address its data weaknesses, but vulnerabilities that remain potentially limit the datas usefulness for safety analysis.
FAA also continues to experience data-related challenges, including limitations with the analysis it conducts and the data it collects and the absence of data in some areas. For example, FAA does not have a process to track or assess runway excursions, which occur when an aircraft veers off or overruns a runway. Runway excursions can be as dangerous as runway incursions, which occur when an unauthorized aircraft, vehicle, or person is on a runway, and FAA has tracked runway incursions for years. GAO previously recommended that FAA develop and implement plans to track and assess runway excursions. FAA agreed and is currently developing a program to collect and analyze runway excursion data and is drafting an order to set out the definitions and risk assessment processes for categorizing and analyzing the data. However, according to GAOs review of FAAs plans, it will be several years before FAA has obtained enough detailed information about these incidents to assess risks. Similarly, GAO has found that efforts to address the occurrence of safety incidents in ramp areas were hindered by the lack of data on the nature, extent, and cost of such incidents and accidents. FAA collects no comprehensive data on incidents in ramp areas, and the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) does not routinely collect data on ramp accidents unless they result in serious injury or substantial aircraft damage. FAAs lack of ramp incident data means that FAA is unable to assess the risk of catastrophic accidents in this area. FAA agreed with GAOs recommendation to extend oversight to ramp areas but noted that it already provides oversight through its oversight of airlines. FAA expects to further enhance that oversight through its proposed ruling to require airports with air carrier operations to establish a safety management system.

What GAO Recommends

GAO has made a number of recommendations to address data quality weaknesses. FAA concurred with most of these recommendations and in some cases has taken steps toward addressing them.