Scorekeeping in the Federal Budget  What is scorekeeping? The FBF is  the primary source of funds for operating and capital costs associated  with federal space. GSA concurred with this recommendation. Case Study Agency Officials Experienced Challenges Receiving Full Upfront Funding for Federal Real Property Projects

Officials at four selected agencies—GSA, USDA, VA, and Interior— experienced challenges receiving full upfront funding for federal real  property projects through the annual appropriations process. For example, GSA’s sole acquisition between 2008 and 2012  resulted from exercising a purchase option on a preexisting lease. Interior officials said that GSA has been unable to obtain  FBF funding through the annual appropriations process to complete  renovations in Interior’s federally-owned and GSA-managed headquarters  building. Officials at GSA and USDA noted that the authority to retain proceeds  provides a key incentive to initiate disposal transactions. For example,  officials at GSA, which provides disposal services across the federal  government, stated that the vast majority of current disposal transactions  are by agencies or components that have the authority to retain the  proceeds from sales or disposals. Alternative Funding Mechanisms Helped Agencies Meet Their Real Property Needs, but Also Posed Challenges

		Agencies Use a Variety of Funding Mechanisms to Meet Their Real Property Needs

Selected agencies have been authorized to use a variety of funding  mechanisms as an alternative to full upfront funding to meet their real  property needs. Funding mechanisms leverage both monetary resources,  such as retained fees, and non-monetary resources, such as property  exchanged in a land swap or space offered in an enhanced use lease  (EUL). Alternative funding mechanisms are not universally available to all  agencies. Moreover, even within an agency, legal authorities may differ  across agency components. In addition to an agency’s ability to share risk and manage stakeholder  relationships, the availability of an appropriate partner and the geographic  location of the property may affect the use and success of an alternative  funding mechanism. For example, ARS needed to acquire land or  build an incinerator to dispose of excess manure. Because of these legal, cost,  and anticipated stakeholder challenges, ARS officials said that ARS held  onto the land for about 10 years while seeking an appropriate partner with  whom to exchange land. Alternative Budgetary Structures Have Potential to Help Congress and Agencies Recognize the Costs and Returns of Real Property Projects Upfront and Over Time

While different funding mechanisms have been used as an alternative to  obtaining upfront funding for federal real property projects, changes to the  budgetary structure itself—within the bounds of the unified budget that  encompasses the full scope of federal programs and transactions—may  also help agencies meet their real property needs. Alternative budgetary  structures may be established to change budgetary incentives for  agencies and therefore help Congress and agencies make more prudent  long-term fiscal decisions. These alternatives could promote more complete consideration  of the full costs of projects and associated returns over time as well as  provide agencies with greater flexibility to manage their real property  needs. Budgeting and Capital Planning Principles Offer a Framework for Considering Alternative Budgetary Structures

To assist congressional and agency-level decision makers in considering  alternative budgetary structures, we identified two key budgeting and  capital planning principles. An alternative budgetary structure should do  two things: promote transparency and fiscal control with regard to the  funding of federal real property projects; and provide agencies the  flexibility to facilitate the acquisition, repair and alteration, and disposal of  federal real property in support of federal missions. Discretionary Budget Authority Options Could Provide a Straightforward Means of Dedicating Funding to Real Property Projects

Changes to the current discretionary structure for funding federal real  property projects may provide a relatively straightforward means of  dedicating funding to federal real property while creating room for  additional agency flexibility. As previously described, resources  deposited into the FBF have exceeded the amount that Congress has  appropriated to GSA in recent years, resulting in a $4.7 billion difference  between the full balance of the FBF and amounts made available for  spending in fiscal year 2013. 2. For each useful asset, agencies might provide  updated business case analyses, which could include reestimates of both  costs and returns. 3. 2. 4. We provided a draft of this report for review and comment to the  Secretaries of the Departments of Agriculture (USDA), Interior, and  Veterans Affairs (VA), and to the Administrator of the General Services  Administration (GSA). All agencies generally concurred with our findings. We further clarified this point in  our report. USDA, Interior, and VA provided technical comments, which  we incorporated as appropriate.
Why GAO Did This Study

Federal real property projects are fully funded when Congress provides budget authority and appropriations for the estimated full cost of the projects up front—at the time they are undertaken. However, as agencies work to balance limited resources with mission demands, many have turned to approaches other than full upfront funding to acquire, renovate, or dispose of federal real property, such as buildings, structures, and land. GAO was asked to review alternative models for managing federal real property. This report examines (1) agency experiences funding federal real property projects, (2) some of the alternative funding mechanisms selected agencies use, as well as agency experiences using selected mechanisms, and (3) alternative budgetary structures within the current unified budget that may potentially help Congress and agencies better recognize the cost of real property projects and associated returns, promoting both transparency and fiscal control. GAO reviewed case study projects from 4 agencies among the top 10 in federal real property holdings and chosen based on their use of alternative funding mechanisms, as identified in our past and ongoing work. Finally, GAO identified alternative budgetary structures that may support real property projects and principles for considering them by reviewing published reports and interviewing federal budget staff and experts.
GAO is not making any recommendations in this report. GSA, USDA, VA, and Interior generally agreed with our findings. USDA, Interior and VA provided technical comments that were incorporated as appropriate.

What GAO Found

Officials at four selected agencies—the General Services Administration (GSA), U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), and the Department of the Interior (Interior)—experienced challenges receiving full upfront funding for federal real property projects through the annual appropriations process. For example, due to budget constraints, GSA acquired one property between 2008 and 2012. In addition, GSA has been unable to access funding to complete renovations in Interior's headquarters building due to obligation limitations in the GSA-administered Federal Buildings Fund (FBF). The FBF, which is the primary funding source for operating and capital costs associated with federal space, held an unobligated carryover balance of $4.7 billion at the end of fiscal year 2013 as a result of congressional limits on obligations. Officials noted that authority to retain proceeds provides a key incentive to initiate disposals, as agencies without this authority must request upfront funding for disposal costs while resulting proceeds are paid to the Department of the Treasury. Nonetheless, officials at selected agencies with the authority to retain disposal proceeds cited barriers to disposals, such as poor market demand, historical status or necessary remediation.
Instead of full upfront funding, selected agencies sometimes used a variety of alternative funding mechanisms to meet their real property needs by leveraging authorized monetary resources, such as retained fees, and non-monetary resources, such as property exchanged in a swap or space offered in an enhanced use lease. Alternative funding mechanisms are not universally available to all agencies; even within an agency, legal authorities may differ across agency components. For alternative funding mechanisms that involve working with a partner, such as in a land swap, the agency's ability to find an appropriate partner, manage that partnering relationship, and share risk—both explicit and implicit—with the partner affected project outcomes. For example, because of legal, cost, and other challenges, officials from USDA's Agricultural Research Service (ARS) said that ARS held onto land for about 10 years while seeking an appropriate partner to successfully complete the land swap.
Changes to the budgetary structure itself—within the bounds of the unified budget—might provide a more consistent way to meet real property needs while helping Congress and agencies make more prudent long-term fiscal decisions. Alternative budgetary structures should balance tradeoffs across two key GAO-identified budgeting and capital planning principles: (1) promoting transparency and fiscal control with regard to the funding of federal real property; and (2) providing agencies the flexibility to facilitate the acquisition, repair and alteration, and disposal of federal real property in support of federal missions. GAO provides alternative budgetary structure options for Congress to consider. For example, in one option Congress would make the full balance of the FBF available for funding real property projects, which could create room for additional agency flexibility but may reduce fiscal control. Another option would establish a government-wide capital acquisition fund with authority to borrow from the Federal Financing Bank for approved projects, which could improve transparency of both costs and benefits upfront and over time while business case analyses could provide a means of assuring fiscal control.