The cumulative development cost for the 10  programs we reviewed increased by over $3 billion, or 37 percent, from  initial estimates. While 3 of the 10 programs had little or no development  cost growth and 1 had a cost reduction, 6 experienced substantial growth  ranging from 60 percent to 264 percent. In large part, this cost growth was  the result of changes in program requirements and system designs after  initiating development. The procurement unit cost for Global Hawk increased the most, in  large part because the Air Force not only increased the program’s  requirements but also reduced the number of aircraft it intended to  purchase. Four programs have also experienced delays in achieving initial  operational capability by 1 to almost 4 years (see table 3). Efforts to Achieve Commonality and Efficiencies among Unmanned Aircraft Programs Have Had Mixed Success

Consistent with DOD’s framework for acquiring unmanned systems,  several of the tactical and theater-level unmanned aircraft acquisition  programs we reviewed have identified areas of commonality to leverage  resources and gain efficiencies. For example, the Navy plans to equip BAMS with  the same electro-optical and infrared sensor used on the Air Force’s  Reaper unmanned aircraft. The Army and Air Force Have Missed Opportunities to Achieve Commonality and Efficiencies between Sky Warrior and Predator

OSD’s efforts to consolidate and achieve greater commonality between the  Army Sky Warrior and the Air Force Predator have generally not been  successful. As a variant of Predator, Sky Warrior is now being  assembled in the same facility. However, the  services have maintained separate program offices and funding for their  respective programs and the two aircraft still have little in common. Service-Driven Acquisition Processes and Ineffective Collaboration Have Reduced Opportunities for Commonality

While several of the unmanned aircraft programs we examined have  achieved commonality at the airframe level, factors such as service-driven  acquisition processes and ineffective collaboration have resulted in  service-unique subsystems, payloads, and ground control stations. DOD officials have not quantified the potential costs or benefits of  pursuing various alternatives, including systems with commonalities. However, to maximize  acquisition resources and meet increased demand, Congress and DOD  have increasingly pushed for more commonality among unmanned aircraft  systems. The services also agreed to use one  contract to procure the airframe. DOD recognizes that to more effectively leverage its acquisition  resources it must achieve greater commonality among the military  services’ various unmanned system programs. Recommendations for Executive Action

To more effectively leverage resources and increase the efficiency in  unmanned aircraft system acquisition programs, we recommend that the  Secretary of Defense take the following two actions:    Direct a rigorous and comprehensive analysis of the requirements for  current unmanned aircraft programs, develop a strategy for making  systems and subsystems among those programs more common, and  report the findings of this analysis to Congress. Specifically, our objectives were to  (1) assess the cost, schedule, and performance progress of selected  tactical and theater-level unmanned aircraft acquisition programs;   (2) examine the extent to which the military services are collaborating and  identifying commonality among those programs; and (3) identify the key  factors influencing the effectiveness of their collaboration. The eight unmanned  aircraft programs included in our review—Global Hawk, Reaper, Shadow,  Predator, Sky Warrior, Fire Scout, Broad Area Maritime Surveillance  (BAMS), and Unmanned Combat Aircraft System (UCAS)—make up more  than 80 percent of DOD’s planned investment in unmanned aircraft  systems from 2008 through 2013. Program Status

Global Hawk is being developed and procured in four configurations. TCDL  development is ongoing; retrofitting is scheduled to begin in 2009. The Marine Corps has benefited from the Army’s development of the  Shadow system by avoiding the costs of initial development and  purchasing a mature system.
Why GAO Did This Study

From 2008 through 2013, the Department of Defense (DOD) plans to invest over $16 billion to develop and procure additional unmanned aircraft systems. To more effectively leverage its acquisition resources, DOD recognizes that it must achieve greater commonality among the military services' unmanned aircraft programs. Doing so, however, requires certain trade-offs and complex budget, cost, and schedule interactions. GAO was asked to assess the progress of selected unmanned aircraft acquisition programs, examine the extent to which the services are collaborating and identifying commonality among those programs, and identify key factors impacting the effectiveness their collaboration. GAO analyzed cost, schedule, and performance data for eight unmanned aircraft systems--accounting for over 80 percent of DOD's total planned investment in unmanned aircraft systems from 2008 through 2013--and two payload programs.

What GAO Found

While proving successful on the battlefield, DOD's unmanned aircraft acquisitions continue to incur cost and schedule growth. The cumulative development costs for the 10 programs GAO reviewed increased by over $3.3 billion (37 percent in 2009 dollars) from initial estimates--with nearly $2.7 billion attributed to the Air Force's Global Hawk program. While 3 of the 10 programs had little or no development cost growth and 1 had a cost reduction, 6 programs experienced significant growth ranging from 60 percent to 264 percent. These outcomes are largely the result of changes in program requirements and system designs. Procurement funding requirements have also increased for most programs, primarily because of increases in the number of aircraft being procured, changes in system requirements, and upgrades and retrofits to equip fielded systems with capabilities that had been deferred. Overall, procurement unit costs increased by 12 percent, with unit cost increases of 25 percent or more for 3 aircraft programs. Finally, several programs have experienced significant delays in achieving initial operating capability, ranging from 1 to nearly 4 years. Several of the tactical and theater-level unmanned aircraft acquisition programs GAO reviewed have identified areas of commonality to leverage resources and gain efficiencies. For example, the Marine Corps chose to procure the Army's Shadow system after it determined Shadow could meet its requirements, and was able to avoid the cost of initial system development and quickly deliver capability to the warfighter. Also, the Navy's Broad Area Maritime Surveillance system will use a modified Global Hawk airframe. However, other programs have missed opportunities to achieve commonality and efficiencies. The Army's Sky Warrior--which is a variant of the Air Force's Predator, is being developed by the same contractor, and will provide similar capabilities--was initiated as a separate development program in 2005. Sky Warrior development is now estimated to cost nearly $570 million. DOD officials continue to press for more commonality in the two programs, but the aircraft still have little in common. Although several unmanned aircraft programs have achieved airframe commonality, service-driven acquisition processes and ineffective collaboration are key factors that have inhibited commonality among subsystems, payloads, and ground control stations. For example, the Army chose to develop a new sensor payload for its Sky Warrior, despite the fact that the sensor currently used on the Air Force's Predator is comparable and manufactured by the same contractor. To support their respective requirements, the services also make resource allocation decisions independently. DOD officials have not quantified the potential costs or benefits of pursuing various alternatives, including common systems. To maximize acquisition resources and meet increased demand, Congress and DOD have increasingly pushed for more commonality among unmanned aircraft systems.