To address this limitation, FAA is acquiring the Safety Performance Analysis System (SPAS), an automated decision support system to aid FAA in targeting its inspection and certification resources on those areas that pose the greatest aviation safety risks. To date, FAA has spent $6.3 million on the initial and enhanced prototypes. Our objectives were to determine (1) whether FAA is effectively managing the SPAS acquisition, including its communication network, and (2) the extent to which SPAS will rely on Aviation Safety Analysis System (ASAS) databases and whether FAA is effectively addressing known data quality problems with these databases. Also, FAA’s decision to employ an independent verification and validation agent should further mitigate system development and acquisition risks. FAA’s current cost estimate for developing and installing SPAS is $32 million. FAA Lacks a Strategy for Ensuring the Quality of SPAS Source Data

Despite FAA’s recognition of both SPAS’ need for quality source data and its lack of such data, FAA has not developed a coordinated strategy for rectifying the situation. In other words, FAA has not agreed on a definition of its long-term data quality goals.
Why GAO Did This Study

Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) Safety Performance Analysis System (SPAS), focusing on: (1) whether FAA is effectively managing the SPAS acquisition; (2) the extent to which SPAS will rely on Aviation Safety Analysis System (ASAS) databases; and (3) whether FAA is effectively addressing known data quality problems with the ASAS databases.

What GAO Found

GAO found that: (1) FAA has generally implemented good development and acquisition procedures for SPAS; (2) FAA has maximized user involvement and system prototyping in developing and evaluating SPAS; (3) FAA has reduced SPAS development risks by using an independent verification and validation agent; (4) FAA is exploring the potential of its proposed corporate-wide area network to accommodate SPAS in order to avoid the acquisition of duplicate communication networks; (5) FAA cost estimates for SPAS software may not be reliable, since they are subjective; (6) FAA lacks a strategy for improving SPAS data sources, particularly ASAS, which jeopardizes the system's utility; (7) ASAS databases contain incomplete, inaccurate, and inconsistent data on airline inspections; (8) FAA has not yet defined its long-term data quality goals; and (9) if FAA fails to improve ASAS data, it could improperly target its limited inspection and certification resources on less important problems.