CORs serve as the eyes and ears for the contracting officer and  act as the liaisons between the contractor, the contracting officer, and the  unit receiving support or services. DOD Took Steps to Enhance Existing Training Program, but Existing Training Does Not Fully Prepare CORs for Contract Management and Oversight Duties

Although DOD requires CORs to receive training and took some actions  to enhance training programs, CORs we met with in Afghanistan do not  always receive adequate training to prepare them for their contract  management and oversight duties. DOD requires that CORs be qualified  by training and experience commensurate with the responsibilities to be  delegated to them. Additionally, not all of the required training for CORs was  conducted, and some other oversight personnel were not being trained. Other CORs,  contracting officials, and commanders described similar situations in  which services were either not provided as anticipated or were not  provided at all. For example, DOD contracting personnel told us  about a dining facility in Afghanistan that was built without a kitchen  because it was not included in the original statement of work, resulting in  DOD having to generate a separate statement of work for the kitchen. CORs Do Not Always Have the Subject Area-Related Technical Expertise Needed to Oversee Some Contracts

CORs did not always have the subject area-related technical expertise or  access to subject matter experts with those skills to manage and oversee  contracts in Afghanistan, especially those contracts of a highly technical  and complex nature. However, according to CORs and contracting personnel we interviewed in  Afghanistan, CORs did not have the subject area-related technical  expertise necessary to monitor contract performance for the contracts  they were assigned to oversee. Contracting officials told us that guard towers at a forward operating  base were poorly constructed and unsafe to occupy. The COR’s  inadequate subject area-related technical expertise or access to  subject matter experts prevented the early identification of defective  welding on the staircase that rendered it unsuitable to use to climb up  the guard tower. Number of CORs Is Not Sufficient to Adequately Oversee the Contracts in Afghanistan

DOD does not have a sufficient number of CORs to oversee the  numerous contracts in Afghanistan and, according to some government  officials, there are not enough CORs in theatre to conduct adequate  oversight. The CENTCOM Joint Theater Support Contracting Command  requires the nomination of CORs for all service contracts worth over  $2,500 with significant technical requirements that require on-going  advice and surveillance from technical or requirements personnel, unless  exempted by the contracting officer. Further, we found that CORs do not always have  the time needed to complete their oversight responsibilities. While  available data do not enable us to determine the precise number of  contracts that require CORs, in fiscal year 2011, DOD completed over  35,000 contracting actions on over 24,600 contracts and orders that were  executed primarily in Afghanistan.CORs we interviewed in Afghanistan, some CORs are responsible for  providing oversight to multiple contracts in addition to performing their  primary military duty. For example, one COR we interviewed was  assigned to more than a dozen construction projects. According to the  COR, it was impossible to be at each construction site during key phases  of the project, such as for the concrete pouring of building footings, wiring  installation, or plumbing. Consequently, according to contracting officials,  construction on these multiple projects was completed without sufficient  government oversight and problems were not always identified until the  building was completed. In addition, in some cases units did not assign enough CORs to provide  oversight. Conclusions

DOD and the services have taken some steps, such as developing a new  CORs training course with a focus on contingency operations to improve  oversight of contracts in contingency operations, such as in Afghanistan;  other more general efforts, such as the COR certification program for  services’ acquisitions, may also lead to improvement. The current mechanism for training CORs that  also perform duties related to the requirements determination process  and to the development of requirements documentation continues to have  weaknesses because DOD has not yet developed training standards to  ensure that these personnel fully understand Joint Operational Area  specific issues such as the Afghan First program, the Counterinsurgency  Contracting Guidance, and the details on the preparation of statements of  work and documents required by the contract review boards. Direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology,  and Logistics to develop standards regarding the number of contracts  that a COR can manage and oversee based on the technical nature  and complexity of the contract. DOD concurred with our recommendation that the Secretary of Defense  direct the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretaries of the  military departments to fully institutionalize OCS in professional military  education by increasing the number of training offerings with a particular  emphasis on contingency operations to ensure that CORs, commanders,  senior leaders, and other personnel expected to perform OCS duties are  prepared to do so.
Why GAO Did This Study

In fiscal year 2011, DOD reported obligating over $16 billion for contracts that were executed primarily in Afghanistan. GAO has previously identified the need for DOD to improve its oversight of contractors by non-acquisition personnel, such as CORs, and Congress has addressed this issue in legislation. CORs act as the liaisons between the contractor, the contracting officer, and the unit receiving support.
Following up on previous GAO work on this topic, GAO determined the extent to which (1) DODs required training prepares CORs to perform their contract management and oversight duties, (2) CORs have the subject area-related technical expertise needed to oversee contracts, and (3) the number of CORs is sufficient to oversee the contracts in Afghanistan. GAO conducted field work in Afghanistan and the United States and focused on the preparedness of CORs to manage and oversee contracts in the CENTCOM area of responsibility.

What GAO Found

The Department of Defense (DOD) has taken steps to enhance its existing training program for contracting officers representatives (CORs), but the required training does not fully prepare them to perform their contract oversight duties in contingency areas such as Afghanistan. DOD requires that CORs be qualified by training and experience commensurate with the responsibilities to be delegated to them. DOD took several actions to enhance its training program, such as developing a CORs training course with a focus on contingency operations. However, GAO found that CORs are not prepared to oversee contracts because the required training does not include specifics on how to complete written statements of work and how to operate in Afghanistans unique contracting environment. For example, DOD contracting personnel told GAO about opening delays and additional expenses related to the construction of a dining facility, which was originally constructed without a kitchen because it was not included in the original statement of work. In some cases, contract-specific training was not provided at all. In addition, not all oversight personnel such as commanders and senior leaders receive training to perform contract oversight and management duties in Afghanistan because such training is not required of them. Because DODs required training does not prepare CORs and other oversight personnel to oversee contracts, units cannot be assured that they receive what they paid for.
CORs do not always have the necessary subject area-related technical expertise to oversee U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) contracts they were assigned to. Contracting officials noted, for example, that the staircases on guard towers at a forward operating base were poorly constructed and unsafe to climb. The COR assigned to that contract had inadequate subject area-related technical expertise, preventing the early identification of the defective welding on the staircases. According to contracting officials, situations like this often occurred due to the shortage of CORs with expertise in construction. Also, at the time of GAOs field work, CORs for contracts written by CENTCOM contracting officers did not have access to subject matter experts, particularly those with construction experience. According to contracting personnel, because CORs do not have the subject area-related technical expertise needed to oversee contracts or access to subject matter experts, facilities were sometimes deficient and had to be reconstructed at great additional expense to the taxpayer.
DOD does not have a sufficient number of CORs to oversee the numerous contracts in Afghanistan. CENTCOM requires CORs to be nominated for all service contracts over $2,500 that, unless exempted, require significant ongoing technical advice and surveillance from requirements personnel. However, there is no guidance on the number of contracts a single COR should oversee. According to contracting officials and CORs GAO interviewed in Afghanistan, some CORs were responsible for providing oversight to multiple contracts in addition to carrying out their primary military duty. For example, one COR GAO interviewed was assigned to more than a dozen construction projects. According to that COR, it was impossible to be at each construction site during key phases of the project because the projects were occurring almost simultaneously at different locations. Consequently, according to officials, in situations like these, construction was completed without sufficient government oversight and problems were sometimes identified after facilities had been completed.

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that DOD enhance the current strategy for managing and overseeing contracts in contingency areas such as Afghanistan by, for example, developing training standards for providing operational contract support (OCS), fully institutionalizing OCS in professional military education, and developing standards regarding the number of contracts that CORs can oversee based on the technical nature and complexity of the contract. DOD concurred with all of GAOs recommendations.