	DOD and OPM Have Made Significant Progress in Reducing Delays in the Clearance Process for DOD Personnel

Since 2005, DOD and OPM have made significant progress in reducing  delays in making personnel security clearance decisions and met statutory  timeliness requirements for DOD’s initial clearances completed in fiscal  year 2008. IRTPA currently requires that decisions on at least 80 percent of  initial clearances be made within an average of 120 days. We found that these clearance decisions  were completed within 87 days, on average, and well within IRTPA’s  requirements. We also analyzed the executive branch’s  2009 annual report to Congress, which presented an average of the fastest  90 percent of initial clearance decisions in anticipation of IRTPA’s  December 2009 requirements. Opportunities Exist to Improve Executive Branch Reporting to Congress

		Annual Reports Could Benefit from Greater Transparency in Clearance Timeliness Reporting

IRTPA requires that the executive branch report annually on the progress  made during the preceding year toward meeting statutory requirements for  security clearances, including timeliness, and also provides broad  discretion to the executive branch to report any additional information  considered appropriate. Under the timeliness requirements in IRTPA, the  executive branch can exclude the slowest clearances and then calculate  the average of the remaining clearances. By limiting its reporting on timeliness to the average of the fastest 90  percent of the initial clearance decisions made in fiscal year 2008 and  excluding mention of the slowest clearances, the executive branch did not  provide congressional decision makers with visibility over the full range of  time it takes to make all initial clearance decisions and the reasons why  delays continue to exist. The 2009 report does not contain any data on quality  but proposes two measures of investigative report quality and identifies  plans to measure adjudicative quality. For example, we recently estimated that with respect  to initial top secret clearances adjudicated in July 2008, documentation  was incomplete for most OPM investigative reports and some DOD  adjudicative files. Initial Reform Efforts Partially Reflect Key Practices for Organizational Transformation and Essential Factors for Clearance Reform, but Lack a Fully Developed Strategic Framework

Initial joint reform efforts partially reflect key practices for organizational  transformation that we have identified, such as having committed  leadership and a dedicated implementation team, but reports issued by the  Joint Reform Team do not provide a strategic framework that contains  important elements of successful transformation, including long-term  goals with related outcome-focused performance measures to show  progress, nor do they identify potential obstacles to progress and possible  remedies. While the personnel security clearance joint reform reports, which we  reviewed collectively, begin to address essential factors for reforming the  security clearance process, which represents positive steps, the Joint  Reform Team’s information technology strategy does not yet define roles  and responsibilities for implementing a new automated capability that is  intended to be a cross-agency collaborative initiative. In  addition, the Joint Reform Team’s reports do not contain any information  on initiatives that will require funding, determine how much they will cost,  or identify potential funding sources. The reform effort’s  success will be dependent upon the extent to which the Joint Reform  Team is able to fully address these key factors moving forward. In our May 2009 report, we recommended that OMB’s Deputy Director of  Management, in the capacity as Chair of the Performance Accountability  Council, ensure that the appropriate entities—such as the Performance  Accountability Council, its subcommittees, or the Joint Reform Team— establish a strategic framework for the joint reform effort to include (1) a  mission statement and strategic goals; (2) outcome-focused performance  measures to continually evaluate the progress of the reform effort toward  meeting its goals and addressing long-standing problems with the security  clearance process; (3) a formal, comprehensive communication strategy  that includes consistency of message and encourages two-way  communication between the Performance Accountability Council and key  stakeholders; (4) a clear delineation of roles and responsibilities for the  implementation of the information technology strategy among all agencies  responsible for developing and implementing components of the  information technology strategy; and (5) long-term funding requirements  for security clearance reform, including estimates of potential cost savings  from the reformed process and provide them to decision makers in  Congress and the executive branch. In oral comments on our report, OMB stated that it partially concurred  with our recommendation to establish a strategic framework for the joint  reform effort. High-Risk Series: An Update.
Why GAO Did This Study

Due to concerns about long standing delays in the security clearance process, Congress mandated reforms in the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA), which requires, among other things, that the executive branch report annually to Congress. Since 2005, the Department of Defense's (DOD) clearance program has been on GAO's high-risk list due to delays and incomplete documentation. The Office of Personnel Management (OPM) conducts much of the government's clearance investigations. In 2007, the Director of National Intelligence and DOD established a Joint Reform Team to coordinate governmentwide improvement efforts for the process. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) oversees these efforts. Based on two recent GAO reports, this statement addresses (1) progress in reducing delays at DOD, (2) opportunities for improving executive branch reports to Congress and (3) the extent to which joint reform efforts reflect key factors for reform. GAO independently analyzed DOD clearances granted in fiscal year 2008, assessed the executive branch's 2006-2009 reports to Congress, and compared three joint reform reports to key transformation practices. GAO previously recommended that OMB improve the transparency in executive branch reporting and establish a strategic framework. OMB concurred or partially concurred with these recommendations.

What GAO Found

DOD and OPM have made significant progress in reducing delays in making security clearance decisions and met statutory timeliness requirements for DOD's initial clearances completed in fiscal year 2008. IRTPA currently requires that decisions on at least 80 percent of initial clearances be made within an average of 120 days. In 2008, GAO found that OPM and DOD made initial decisions on these clearances within 87 days, on average. Opportunities exist for the executive branch to improve its annual reports to Congress. For example, the executive branch's 2009 report to Congress did not reflect the full range of time it took to make all initial clearance decisions and has provided little information on quality. Under the current IRTPA requirements, the executive branch can exclude the slowest 20 percent of clearances and then calculate timeliness based on an average of the remaining clearances. GAO analyzed 100 percent of initial clearances granted in 2008 without taking averages or excluding the slowest clearances and found that 39 percent took more than 120 days. The absence of comprehensive reporting limits full visibility over the timeliness of initial clearance decisions. With respect to quality, although IRTPA grants the executive branch latitude in reporting, the 2006-2009 reports provided little information on quality. However, the 2009 report identified quality measures that the executive branch proposes to collect. GAO has stated that timeliness alone does not provide a complete picture of the clearance process. For example, GAO recently estimated that with respect to initial top secret clearances adjudicated in July 2008, documentation was incomplete for most OPM investigative reports. Greater attention to quality could increase instances of reciprocity--an entity's acceptance of another entity's clearances. Initial joint reform efforts reflect key practices for organizational transformation that GAO has identified, such as having committed leadership and a dedicated implementation team, but the Joint Reform Team's reports do not provide a strategic framework that contains important elements of successful transformation, including long-term goals with outcome-focused performance measures, nor do they identify potential obstacles to progress and possible remedies. Further, GAO's prior work and IRTPA identified several factors key to reforming the clearance process. These include (1) engaging in governmentwide reciprocity, (2) consolidating information technology, and (3) identifying and reporting long-term funding requirements. However, the Joint Reform Team's information technology strategy does not yet define roles and responsibilities for implementing a new automated capability which is intended to be a cross-agency collaborative initiative. Also, the joint reform reports do not contain information on funding requirements or identify funding sources. The reform effort's success will depend upon the extent to which the Joint Reform Team is able to fully address these key factors moving forward. Further, it is imperative that OMB's Deputy Director for Management continue in the crucial role as chair of the Performance Accountability Council, which oversees joint reform team efforts.