These requirements included an assessment of  the critical skills that will be needed in the future DOD civilian employee  workforce to support national security requirements and effectively  manage the department over the next decade,  the critical competencies that will be needed in the future DOD civilian  employee workforce to support national security requirements and  effectively manage the department over the next decade,  the skills of the existing DOD civilian employee workforce,  the competencies of the existing DOD civilian employee workforce,  the projected trends in that workforce based on expected losses due to  retirement and other attrition, and    gaps in the existing or projected DOD civilian employee workforce that  should be addressed to ensure that the department has continued access  to the critical skills and competencies needed to support national security  requirements and effectively manage the department over the next decade. While DOD’s 2008 Update Shows Progress, It Only Partially Addresses Each of the Fiscal Year 2006 Legislative Requirements

DOD has made progress in implementing the eight requirements in the FY  2006 NDAA as compared to its first plan; however, as seen in table 1, the  2008 update only partially addresses each of the eight requirements. Furthermore, DOD’s 2008  update only included gap analyses for about half of the 25 identified  enterprisewide mission-critical occupations. For example, DOD identified—through the  department’s functional and human resource leadership—25  enterprisewide mission-critical occupations but did not provide an  assessment of future enterprisewide mission-critical occupations that  covered a 10-year period. DOD’s Recently Established Program Management Office Does Not Have a Performance Plan to Articulate How the Legislative Requirements Will Be Addressed

OSD officials stated that they are working to more fully address all of the  legislative requirements, and in November 2008 OUSD (P&R) officially  established a program management office—whose responsibility is to,  among other things, specifically monitor and review DOD’s enterprisewide  mission-critical occupation assessments, workforce trends, and gap  analyses. DOD’s 2008 Update of Its Civilian Human Capital Strategic Plan Generally Addresses 2007 Legislative Requirements for DOD’s Senior Leader Workforce

Of the nine requirements stipulated in the FY 2007 NDAA, DOD’s update  and related documentation addresses four and partially addresses the  remaining five. Assessment of DOD’s Needs for Senior Leaders

DOD’s 2008 update notes that the department has not completely  addressed this requirement and has ongoing work to do so through a  baseline review of senior leadership positions. The update does not, however, address specific  strategies for deploying senior leaders. As noted before, without such a plan, DOD and its  components may not be able to design and fund the best strategies to  address the legislative requirements and meet their workforce needs. Although DOD Identified Some Factors That Could Affect Its Plan, the Update Does Not Include Strategies to Address These Factors

While DOD’s update identified a number of factors that could affect  civilian workforce plans, such as the effect of decisions made during  BRAC and the conversion of military positions to civilian positions, it  did not specifically incorporate strategies to address these factors. For  example, we previously identified the need to develop a civilian workforce  strategy to address the extent of contractor use and the appropriate mix of  contractors. The update mentioned that the department may  consider using government employees to perform, among other things, a  new mission requirement or an activity performed by a contractor when  an economic analysis shows DOD civilian employees are the low-cost  providers. GAO’s body of work has shown that DOD faces long-standing challenges  with increased reliance on contractors to perform core missions. We  continue to believe that, without strategies that address DOD’s reliance on  contractors—a key part of DOD’s workforce—the department may not  have the right people, in the right place, at the right time, and at a  reasonable cost to achieve its mission in the future. Recommendations for Executive Action

To continue the progress DOD has made with its human capital strategic  planning efforts, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the  Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness to  take the following three actions:  task the newly established program management office, which is  responsible for addressing the requirements of the FY 2006 NDAA, to  develop a performance plan that includes establishing implementation  goals and time frames, measuring performance, and aligning activities with  resources;  task the newly established executive management office, which is  responsible for addressing the requirements of the FY 2007 NDAA, to  develop a performance plan that includes establishing implementation  goals and time frames, measuring performance, and aligning activities with  resources; and  incorporate, in future updates to its strategic human capital plan,  strategies for addressing factors that could significantly affect DOD’s  civilian workforce plans—including contractor roles and the effect  contractors have on requirements for DOD’s civilian workforce. Our  review was structured to assess the extent to which DOD’s update  addressed the FY 2006 and FY 2007 NDAA requirements and key factors  that may affect civilian workforce planning. The  department noted that our report said DOD does not have and does not  plan to have a performance plan or road map for its newly formed civilian  workforce readiness program office and that this statement was not  correct. 2. The Department of Defense’s Civilian Human Capital Strategic Plan  Does Not Meet Most Statutory Requirements.
Why GAO Did This Study

Having the right number of civilian personnel with the right skills is critical to achieving the Department of Defense's (DOD) mission. With more than 50 percent of its civilian workforce (about 700,000 civilians) eligible to retire in the next few years, DOD may be faced with deciding how to fill numerous mission-critical positions--some involving senior leadership. The National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year (FY) 2006 requires DOD to develop a strategic human capital plan, update it annually through 2010, and address eight requirements. GAO previously found that DOD's 2007 plan did not meet most requirements. The 2007 NDAA added nine requirements to the annual update to shape DOD's senior leader workforce. GAO was asked to assess the extent to which DOD's 2008 update addressed (1) the 2006 human capital planning requirements, (2) the 2007 senior leader requirements, and (3) key factors that may affect civilian workforce planning. GAO analyzed the update, compared it with the requirements, and reviewed factors identified in the update and prior GAO work.

What GAO Found

While DOD's 2008 update to its strategic human capital plan, when compared with the first plan, shows progress in addressing the FY 2006 NDAA requirements, the update only partially addresses each of the act's requirements. For example, DOD identified 25 critical skills and competencies--referred to as enterprisewide mission-critical occupations, which included logistics management and medical occupations. The update, however, does not contain assessments for over half of the 25 occupations, and the completed assessments of future enterprisewide mission-critical occupations do not cover the required 10-year period. Also, DOD's update included analyses of "gaps," or differences between the existing and future workforce for about half of the 25 occupations. Finally, DOD's update partially addressed the act's requirements for a plan of action for closing the gaps in DOD's civilian workforce. Although DOD recently established a program management office whose responsibility is to monitor DOD's updates to the strategic human capital plan, the office does not have and does not plan to have a performance plan--a road map--that articulates how the NDAA requirements will be met. Until such a plan is developed, DOD may not be able to design the best strategies to address the legislative requirements and meet its civilian workforce needs. DOD's 2008 update and related documentation address four of the nine requirements in the FY 2007 NDAA for DOD's senior leader workforce and partially address the remaining five. For example, the update identifies a plan of action to address, among other things, changes in the number of authorized senior leaders. However, the update noted that DOD had conducted only initial leadership assessments as a first step in identifying some of its needs, capabilities, and gaps in the existing or projected senior leader workforce and stated that the final assessments would not be completed until the summer of 2009. Although DOD recently established an executive management office to manage the career life cycle of DOD senior leaders, as well as the FY 2007 NDAA requirements, this office has not and does not plan to develop a performance plan to address the NDAA-related requirements. While DOD's 2008 update identified some key factors that could affect civilian workforce plans, such as base closures and legislation requiring the use of government employees for certain functions, it does not include strategies for addressing these factors. For example, the update noted that DOD may consider using government employees to perform, among other things, an activity performed by a contractor when an economic analysis shows DOD civilian employees are the low-cost providers, but DOD does not provide a strategy for doing so. Further, GAO's body of work has noted a similar factor not discussed in DOD's update--DOD's extensive reliance on contractors and its long-standing challenges in developing a civilian workforce strategy to address the use of contractors and the appropriate mix of contractors and civilians. Without strategies that address key factors like the use of contractors, DOD may not have the right number of people, in the right place, at the right time, and at a reasonable cost to achieve its mission in the future.