	Background

The Air Force is developing the F/A-22 aircraft to replace its fleet of F-15  air superiority aircraft. The F/A-22 is designed to be superior to the F-15 by  being capable of flying at higher speeds for longer distances, less  detectable, and able to provide the pilot with substantially improved  awareness of the surrounding situation. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998 requires us  to annually assess the F/A-22 development program and determine  whether the program is meeting key performance, schedule, and cost  goals. We have issued six of these annual reports to Congress. We have  also reported on F/A-22 production program costs over the last 3 years. Most recently, we reported on F/A-22 production and development in  February and March 2003, respectively. Performance Issues

In the past several years, we have reported on a range of performance  issues that have arisen during the development of the F/A-22. F/A-22  estimated performance in the areas of supercruise, acceleration,  maneuverability, radar observability, combat radius, and radar range in  searching targets have so far been met or exceeded. However, problems  have surfaced related to some overheating concerns during high-speed  flight-testing, reliability, avionics that perform radar, communication,  navigation, identification and electronic warfare functions as well as  excess movement of the vertical tails. Modifications are being made to  some test aircraft to address some of these problems. For now, however,  testing in some areas is restricted. Yet, we have been  reporting on delays of flight tests for the F/A-22 and that these delays have  contributed to scheduling and cost problems affecting the program. Each year since 1998, we have  reported that assembly of the test aircraft was requiring more time than  planned and that this was causing the test aircraft to be delivered late to  the test center for flight-testing. We have also reported annually since 2000  that the flight-test program efficiency—the amount of flight-testing  accomplished—has been less than planned. In addition, late delivery of development  aircraft to the flight-test center continued to be a contributing problem. Cost Increases

Cost increases have plagued the F/A-22 program since it began in 1991. Development Costs

Since 1997, the Air Force’s estimated cost to develop the F/A-22 has  increased by $3.2 billion. Production Cost Growth

Over the last 6 years, DOD has identified about $18 billion in estimated  production cost growth during the course of two DOD program reviews. As a result, the estimated cost of the production program currently  exceeds the congressional cost limit. However, this amount exceeds  the production cost limit of $36.8 billion. Modernization Cost Increases

Modernization costs have increased dramatically in recent years. Such a decrease, in turn, has jeopardized the Air  Force’s ability to modernize its fleet of tactical aircraft. Aging equipment contributes significantly to  increased operating and support costs. Risks in the F/A-22 Acquisition Plan

Despite continuing development problems and challenges, the Air Force  plans to continue acquiring production aircraft at increasing annual rates.
Why GAO Did This Study

The Air Force is developing the F/A-22 aircraft to replace its fleet of F-15 air superiority aircraft. The F/A-22 is designed to be superior to the F-15 by being capable of flying at higher speeds for longer distances, less detectable, and able to provide the pilot with substantially improved awareness of the surrounding situation. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998 requires us to annually assess the F/A-22 development program and determine whether the program is meeting key performance, schedule, and cost goals. We have issued six of these annual reports to Congress. We have also reported on F/A-22 production program costs over the last 3 years. Most recently, we reported on F/A-22 production and development in February and March 2003 respectively. This testimony summarizes our work on the F/A-22 program, covering performance, cost, and scheduling issues.

What GAO Found

In the past several years, we have reported on a range of problems affecting the development of F/A-22. Specifically, F/A-22 estimated performance in the areas of supercruise, acceleration, maneuverability, radar observability, combat radius, and range in searching targets have so far been met or exceeded. However, problems have surfaced related to overheating during high-speed flight-testing, reliability, avionics that perform radar, communication, navigation, identification and electronic warfare functions as well as excess movement of the vertical tails. Modifications are being made to some test aircraft to address some of these problems. For now, however, testing in some areas is restricted. Each year since 1998, we have reported that assembly of the test aircraft was requiring more time than planned and that this was causing the test aircraft to be delivered late to the test center for flight-testing. We have also reported annually since 2000 that flight-test program efficiency--the amount of flight-testing accomplished--has been less than planned. Cost increases have plagued the F/A-22 program since development began in 1991. Since 1997, the Air Force's estimated cost to develop the F/A-22 has increased by $3.2 billion bringing the total estimate to $21.9 billion. In addition, over the last 6 years, DOD has identified about $18 billion in estimated production cost growth bringing the total estimate to $42.2 billion--which exceeds the congressionally mandated production cost limit of $36.8 billion. Further, modernization costs have increased dramatically in recent years. Actions to offset estimated cost growth have had mixed success. These problems have dramatically affected the F/A-22 program. Cost increases, in part, have forced the Air Force to substantially decrease the number of aircraft to be purchased--from 648 to 276. Delays in testing also have significant consequences. Continuing to acquire aircraft before adequate testing is a high-risk strategy that could serve to further increase production costs. Moreover, F/A-22 problems have limited DOD's ability to upgrade its aging tactical aircraft fleet. If the F/A-22 program had met its original goals, the Air Force could have been replacing older aircraft with F/A-22 aircraft over 7 years ago. Now, however, it will not begin replacing aircraft until late 2005 at the earliest. The rate of replenishment will be substantially lower, due to the decrease in the number of new aircraft to be purchased. As a result, DOD will have to continue to use tactical aircraft that contribute to increased operating and support costs and it will have to wait longer than anticipated to have access to the advanced capabilities to be offered by the F/A-22.