	The Absence of a Risk Management Program Hampers FPS’s Ability to Protect Federal Facilities

For many years we have advocated the use of a risk management  approach that entails managing risk through actions, including setting  strategic goals and objectives, assessing risk, allocating resources based  on risk, evaluating alternatives, selecting initiatives to undertake, and  implementing and monitoring those initiatives. Despite the importance of this  mission, FPS has not implemented an effective risk management  program. In August 2010, we reported that FPS does not use a  comprehensive risk management approach that links threats and  vulnerabilities to resource requirements. Instead, FPS uses a facility-by- facility approach to risk management: we reported in 2010 that FPS  assumes that all facilities with the same security level have the same risk  regardless of their location. In response to our recommendations in this area, FPS began developing  a new system, the Risk Assessment and Management Program (RAMP). FPS Has Not Fully Addressed Several Key Human Capital Issues

Over the last 3 years we have reported on the challenges FPS has faced  in the human capital area since moving to DHS from GSA in 2003. As  mandated by Congress, in 2009 FPS increased the size of its workforce  to 1,200 full time employees. However, FPS continues to operate without  a strategic human capital plan. We recommended in 2009 that FPS  develop a human capital plan to guide its current and future workforce  planning efforts. In  addition, we found that FPS’s workforce planning is limited because FPS  headquarters does not collect data on its workforce’s knowledge, skills,  and abilities. Without such information, FPS is not able to determine what  its optimal staffing levels should be or identify gaps in its workforce needs  and determine how to modify its workforce planning strategies to fill these  gaps. FPS also has yet to fully ensure that its recent move to an inspector- based workforce does not hinder its ability to protect federal facilities. FPS Faces Longstanding Challenges in Managing Its Contract Guard Workforce

FPS’s contract guard program is the most visible component of the  agency’s operations and the agency relies on its guards to be its “eyes  and ears” while performing their duties. Since 2009,  we have identified weaknesses in FPS’s contract guard program which  hamper its ability to protect federal facilities. For example, we reported in  2009 and in 2010 that FPS does not have a reliable system to ensure that  its 13,000 guards have the training and certifications required to stand  post at federal facilities or comply with post orders once they are  deployed. In response to our recommendations, FPS has taken several steps to  improve the oversight of its contract guard program. Additionally, FPS began the process of providing additional x-ray  and magnetometer training for its workforce. FPS Has Not Reviewed Its Fee Design or Determined an Appropriate Funding Mechanism

We reported in May 2011 that FPS increased its basic security fee 4  times in 6 years to try to cover costs (an increase of over 100 percent). However, FPS has not reviewed its fees to develop an informed,  deliberate fee design. FPS has broad authority to design its  security fees, but the current fee structure has consistently resulted in  total collection amounts less than agency costs, is not well understood or  accepted by tenant agencies, and continues to be a topic of  congressional interest and inquiry. In 2008, we recommended that FPS evaluate whether its use of a fee- based system or an alternative funding mechanism is the most  appropriate manner to fund the agency. Since  2008, we have made 28 recommendations to help FPS to address its  challenges with risk management, strategic human capital planning,  oversight of its contract guard workforce, and its fee-based funding  structure. DHS and FPS have generally agreed with these  recommendations. As of July 2011, as shown in Table 1, FPS was in the  process of addressing 21 of them, although none were fully implemented. According to FPS officials, the agency has faced difficulty in implementing  many of our recommendations because of changes in its leadership,  organization, funding, and staffing levels. In addition, FPS officials stated  that its progress in implementing our recommendations has been affected  by delays in developing several new management systems, such as  RAMP. Homeland Security: Ongoing Challenges Impact the Federal Protective  Service’s Ability to Protect Federal Facilities. Homeland Security: Preliminary Results Show Federal Protective  Service’s Ability to Protect Federal Facilities Is Hampered By  Weaknesses in Its Contract Security Guard Program.
Why GAO Did This Study

As part of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Federal Protective Service (FPS) is responsible for protecting federal employees and visitors in approximately 9,000 federal facilities owned or leased by the General Services Administration (GSA). FPS has a budget of approximately $1 billion and maintains approximately 1,200 full-time employees and about 13,000 contract security guards that help accomplish the agency's facility protection mission. This testimony is based on past reports and testimonies and discusses challenges FPS faces in carrying out its mission with regard to (1) risk management, (2) strategic human capital planning, (3) oversight of its contract guard program, and (4) ensuring that its fee-based funding structure is the appropriate mechanism for funding the agency. GAO also addresses the extent to which FPS has made progress in responding to these challenges. To perform this work, GAO used its key facility protection practices as criteria, visited FPS regions and selected GSA buildings, reviewed training and certification data for FPS's contract guards, and interviewed officials from DHS, GSA, guard contractors, and guards.

What GAO Found

FPS continues to face challenges in carrying out its mission. Specifically: (1) The absence of a risk management program hampers FPS's ability to protect federal facilities. For many years, GAO has advocated the importance of a risk management approach. GAO reported in August 2010 that FPS does not use a comprehensive risk management approach that links threats and vulnerabilities to resource requirements. Instead, FPS uses a facility-by-facility approach which assumes that facilities with the same security level have the same risk regardless of their location. Without a risk management approach that identifies threats and vulnerabilities and the resources required to achieve FPS's security goals, as GAO has recommended, there is limited assurance that programs will be prioritized and resources will be allocated to address existing and potential security threats in an efficient and effective manner. (2) FPS has not fully addressed several key human capital issues. FPS continues to operate without a strategic human capital plan to guide its current and future workforce planning efforts, as GAO recommended in 2009. Further, FPS is not able to determine what its optimal staffing levels should be because FPS headquarters does not collect data on its workforce's knowledge, skills, and abilities. FPS has yet to fully ensure that its recent move to an inspector-based workforce does not hinder its ability to protect federal facilities. (3) FPS faces longstanding challenges in managing its contract guard workforce. Weaknesses in FPS's contract guard program hamper its ability to protect federal facilities. GAO reported in 2009 and 2010 that FPS cannot ensure that its contract guards have required training and certifications. FPS is in the process of addressing GAO recommendations. For example, FPS revised its x-ray and magnetometer training for its inspectors and guards. (4) FPS has not reviewed its fee design or determined an appropriate funding mechanism. FPS increased its basic security fee four times in 6 years to try to cover costs, but has not reviewed its fees to develop an informed, deliberate design. FPS's current fee structure has consistently resulted in total collection amounts less than agency costs and continues to be a topic of congressional interest and inquiry. FPS has yet to evaluate whether its fee-based structure or an alternative funding mechanism is most appropriate for funding the agency, as GAO recommended in 2008 and 2011. FPS has made some progress in improving its ability to protect federal facilities. For example, in response to GAO recommendations, FPS is developing the Risk Assessment and Management Program (RAMP), which could enhance its ability to comprehensively assess risk at federal facilities and improve oversight of its contract guard program. DHS and FPS have initiatives in process to address 21 of the 28 recommendations GAO has made related to the challenges above, although none are yet fully implemented. According to FPS officials, this is in part because of changes in the agency's leadership, organization, funding, staffing levels, and delays in developing several new management systems, such as RAMP. DHS and FPS have generally concurred with GAO's past recommendations. DHS and FPS have initiatives in process, for example, to address risk management, strategic human capital planning, and oversight of its contract guard program.