	Background

		DOD’s Family of Readiness Reporting Systems

DOD established the Defense Readiness Reporting System in response to  the Strom Thurmond National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year  1999. Two Types of Mission Assessments

DOD units assess their readiness for their core and assigned missions  using two different types of mission assessments. The  systems are also designed to meet the services’ reporting requirements, as  well as to collect other services-specific information from reporting units. Army and Marine Corps Requirements for Readiness Reporting Have Generally Increased the Quantity and Objectivity of Information Available to Decision Makers

		Revised Army and Marine Corps Guidance Requires New Objective Measure of Readiness

The current Army and Marine Corps readiness reporting requirements  generally have increased the quantity and objectivity of readiness  information provided to decision makers. While the Army and Marine Corps updated their readiness reporting  guidance in 2010 to include more objective assigned mission ratings, the  services’ guidance retained many of the previous reporting requirements  for core missions, such as the requirements to report personnel and  equipment information, training assessments, commander comments that  provide additional information about their unit’s reported resources, and  installation readiness reports. Army and Marine Corps Units Have Implemented Revised Guidance for Readiness Reporting, but Some Reporting Is Inconsistent

While the Army and Marine Corps have taken steps to implement the  revised readiness reporting guidance, we identified several areas where  units were inconsistently reporting readiness. Reporting Time Frames Are Inconsistent

We found that Army and Marine Corps units are using different time  frames when reporting their readiness data. Internal Controls Are Not Preventing Readiness Reporting Inconsistencies

According to federal standards for internal control, management must  continually assess and evaluate its internal controls to assure that the  control activities being used are effective and updated when necessary. OSD and the Services Continue to Develop Their Respective Systems in the Enterprise

The DRRS Concept of Operations calls for a family of systems to be  developed and operated under a single framework to share information  requirements and data elements seamlessly across the enterprise. Because  the developers have focused on the needs of different system users, and  have yet to reach agreement on key elements, progress in achieving  interoperability among the three individual systems and across the  enterprise has been incremental. In  our report, we also recommended that DOD conduct an independent  program risk assessment of DRRS, and use the findings in our report and  the risk assessment to decide how to redirect the program structure,  approach, funding, management, and oversight. However, as we were finishing this review  the risk assessment was postponed and is currently scheduled to begin in  the fall of 2011. Until this assessment is completed and presented to the  DRRS Executive Committee for any actions, OSD will not have the  information needed to reach consensus with the services and make any  adjustments needed to achieve interoperability. However, some readiness  data are currently being reported in an inconsistent manner that  diminishes its value to decision makers. To increase the timeliness and consistency of readiness information and  thus enhance the usefulness of this information to decision makers, we  recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Army  and Commandant of the Marine Corps to:    Provide additional internal controls, which could include clarifying  policy guidance, increasing quality assurance reviews, or putting  system technical checks in place to prevent submission of data that  does not comply with service readiness reporting requirements. Specifically, DOD did not concur with our  recommendation that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the  Army to develop an alternative means of indicating which units are in  RESET without using C-5 as a means to flag units in RESET. DOD stated  that internal controls are adequate. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

To assess the extent to which current readiness reporting requirements  have affected the content of readiness information provided to various  decision makers within and outside of the Department of Defense (DOD),  we interviewed officials from the Department of Army–Readiness Division  and Headquarters Marine Corps Readiness Branch. To assess the extent to which the Army and Marine Corps units have  consistently implemented their current readiness reporting guidance, we  first reviewed the data within each service’s respective readiness reporting  systems and compared the data with system criteria—Army Regulation  220-1 and Marine Corps Order 3000.13.
Why GAO Did This Study

To obtain visibility of the capabilities of its military forces, the Department of Defense (DOD) has developed an enterprise of interconnected readiness reporting systems. In 2010, to better meet the information needs of their leaders, the Army and Marine Corps implemented new reporting requirements. House and Senate Reports, which accompanied proposed bills for the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011, directed GAO to review recent readiness reporting changes. GAO assessed the extent that 1) current readiness reporting policies have affected the content of readiness information provided to decision makers, 2) the services have consistently implemented their new policies, and 3) changes to the Army, Marine Corps, and Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) systems have affected the Defense Readiness Reporting System (DRRS) enterprise. GAO analyzed DOD, Army, and Marine Corps policies, readiness data, service readiness reporting systems, and spoke to headquarters officials and reporting units.

What GAO Found

Current Army and Marine Corps guidance has generally improved the quantity and objectivity of readiness information available to decision makers. As in the past, Army Regulation 220-1 and Marine Corps Order 3000.13 direct units to report on two types of missions--the core missions for which units were designed as well as any other missions they may be assigned, but recent changes to the guidance also added new requirements. Units must now provide objective, personnel and equipment data to supplement commanders' assessments of their units' assigned mission capabilities. The updated service guidance also provides additional criteria, which are intended to help unit commanders consistently assess their units' mission capabilities. The new data and additional mission assessment criteria improve the objectivity and consistency of readiness information provided to decision makers. However, to clearly identify units that recently returned from deployment, the Army regulation now requires units to uniformly report a specific service directed readiness level rather than assess and report the unit's actual readiness level. As a result, decision makers lack a complete picture of the readiness of some units that could be called upon to respond to contingencies. While the Army and Marine Corps have taken steps to implement the revised readiness reporting guidance, units are inconsistently reporting readiness in some areas. GAO site visits to 33 Army and 20 Marine Corps units revealed that units were using inconsistent reporting time frames, and GAO data analysis showed that 49 percent of Marine Corps reports submitted between May 2010 and January 2011 were late. Furthermore, units are reporting equipment and personnel numbers differently, and some units are not linking their two types of mission assessments, in accordance with current guidance. The federal standards for internal control state management must continually assess and evaluate its internal controls to assure that the control activities being used are effective and updated when necessary. However, Marine Corps and Army quality assurance reviews have not identified all the inconsistencies and system mechanisms are not preventing the submission of inconsistent data. Until internal controls improve, decision makers will continue to rely on readiness information that is based on inconsistent reporting. While the DRRS Concept of Operations calls for a family of systems to exchange information seamlessly under an enterprise framework, DOD and the services have focused their efforts on the needs of different users and have not reached agreement on key steps to achieve interoperability. Consequently progress has been incremental. In 2009, GAO issued a report highlighting the challenges facing DRRS and recommended that DOD use GAO's report and an independent program risk assessment to redirect the program's approach, structure, and oversight. As of April 2011, the risk assessment had not been done and it is now scheduled to begin in the fall of this year. Until this assessment is complete, OSD will continue to lack the information it needs to reach consensus with the services and make any adjustments needed to achieve interoperability.

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that the Army develop an alternative means to show which units recently returned from deployment and that both services improve internal controls to enhance readiness reporting. DOD did not concur, citing the availability of other readiness data and actions taken on internal controls. GAO disagrees that the data DOD cites provides sufficient visibility; therefore, additional actions are needed.