Yet he has also indicated readiness, in principle, to maintain a small U.S. force presence after 2014, to focus on conducting counter-terrorism and supporting the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). While troop levels and drawdown curves tend to steal the headlines, more fundamental is the question of how coherently all the facets of U.S. engagement in Afghanistan fit together as part of a single political strategy aimed at bringing the war to an acceptable conclusion that protects U.S. interests over the longer term. For Congress, next steps in the war in Afghanistan, including near-term policy decisions by the U.S. and Afghan governments, raise several basic oversight issues:
The costs associated with a continued U.S. force presence in Afghanistan. The challenges of "re-setting" the force and restoring its readiness as it comes home from Afghanistan. Accountability for sound strategy that protects U.S. interests. Integration of effort across U.S. government agencies in support of broad U.S. political strategy for Afghanistan. Appropriate prioritization of this effort compared to competing national security exigencies. Strategy

For the U.S. government, fundamental components of strategy for the war in Afghanistan include:
U.S. national security interests in Afghanistan and the region; the minimum essential conditions—political, economic, security—that would need to pertain in Afghanistan and the region in order to protect U.S. interests over the long run; current and projected U.S. approaches, until and after 2014, for helping Afghans establish and sustain those conditions; the timeline by which, and extent to which, Afghans are likely to be able to sustain those conditions with relatively limited support from the international community; risks to U.S. national security interests if Afghans are unable to do so; and the importance of this overall effort—given its likely timeline, risks, and costs—compared to other U.S. priorities. That discussion most sensibly begins with the interests that the United States has at stake in Afghanistan and the region. Where if at all on that list should the following concerns figure: countering al Qaeda and other violent extremist organizations; preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; preventing nuclear confrontation between nuclear-armed states; standing up for core U.S. values including human rights and the protection of women; preserving and strengthening U.S. ability to exercise leadership on the world stage? By most Afghan and coalition accounts, the basic logic of the campaign has proven to be sound—based on the overall improvement of Afghan forces, degradation of the insurgency, and adaptation by coalition forces. Coalition Forces

As the U.S. government, NATO, and the Afghan government consider the possibility of a post-2014 coalition force presence in Afghanistan, most observers agree that a prerequisite for any such presence is the ability of coalition forces to adapt to the advisory and enabling roles they would be required to play. What are the most helpful ways to evaluate the strength of the insurgency? In practice on the ground—and increasingly in coalition theory as well—advising can refer to a number of different, complementary activities. At issue is what it would take in each of these areas, at a minimum, to protect security gains and make them sustainable. Many observers suggest that the Afghan presidential elections scheduled to be held in April 2014 offer an opportunity to catalyze constructive changes in Afghan governance. How might these elements best inform each other over?
This is a critical time for U.S. efforts in the war in Afghanistan. U.S. military engagement beyond December 2014, when the current NATO mission ends, depends on the achievement of a U.S.-Afghan Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA), specifying the status of U.S. forces. Afghan President Hamid Karzai threw the BSA process into confusion by introducing new terms and conditions after a deal had been reached by negotiators. Even if a BSA is reached, U.S. decisions are still pending regarding the scope, scale, and timeline for any post-2014 U.S. force presence in Afghanistan. President Obama has indicated U.S. readiness, in principle, to maintain a small force focused on counter-terrorism and supporting the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF).
While troop levels tend to steal the headlines, more fundamentally at stake is what it would take to ensure the long-term protection of U.S. interests in Afghanistan and the region. Arguably, the United States may have a number of different interests at stake in the region: countering al Qaeda and other violent extremists; preventing nuclear proliferation; preventing nuclear confrontation between nuclear-armed states; standing up for American values, including basic human rights and the protection of women; and preserving the United States' ability to exercise leadership on the world stage. At issue is the relative priority of these interests, what it would take in practice to ensure that they are protected, and their relative importance compared to other compelling security concerns around the globe.
U.S. efforts in Afghanistan include an array of activities: prosecuting the fight on the ground, in support of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), to counter the insurgency; supporting Afghanistan's political process, including the presidential elections scheduled to be held in April 2014; providing assistance to help Afghans craft and grow a viable economy; and facilitating Afghan-led efforts to achieve a high-level political settlement with the Taliban. At issue is whether these are the activities best suited to achieve a lasting outcome that protects U.S. interests, as well as how these activities might most constructively inform each other.
In 2013, most Afghan and ISAF commanders suggested that the campaign on the ground was gaining traction, reflected in the successful security transition to Afghan lead responsibility for security and in improvements in the ANSF; in the diminished strength of the insurgency; and in the successful adaptation by coalition forces to new roles and missions. Yet most observers agree that the long-term sustainability of campaign gains—and the protection of U.S. interests—would require major changes in the broader strategic landscape. Critical requirements would include sufficiently responsive Afghan governance; a viable economy that offers Afghans sufficient opportunities; a regional context that supports rather than undermines Afghan stability; and a conclusion to the war broadly acceptable to the Afghan people.
For Congress, next steps in the war in Afghanistan, including near-term policy decisions by the U.S. and Afghan governments, raise several basic oversight issues: the costs associated with a continued U.S. force presence in Afghanistan; the challenges of "re-setting" the force and restoring its readiness as it comes home from Afghanistan; accountability for sound strategy that protects U.S. interests; integration of effort across U.S. government agencies in support of broad U.S. political strategy for Afghanistan; and appropriate prioritization of this effort compared to competing national security exigencies.