Ensuring that only workers that do not  pose a terrorist threat are allowed unescorted access to secure areas is  important in helping to prevent an attack. 1). DHS and Industry Stakeholders Face Challenges in Addressing Testing Problems and Ensuring Key Components of the TWIC Program Work Effectively

DHS and industry stakeholders face three major challenges in addressing  problems identified during TWIC program testing and ensuring that key  components of the TWIC program can work effectively. The first challenge  is enrolling and issuing TWIC cards to a significantly larger population of  workers in a timely manner than was done during testing of the TWIC  program. DHS Recognizes Stakeholder Concerns Regarding TWIC Implementation, but Plans No Further Program Testing

DHS officials acknowledged that there are challenges in ensuring that the  TWIC technology works effectively in a maritime environment. Problems in Planning for and Overseeing the Contract to Test the TWIC Program

TSA experienced problems in planning for and overseeing the contract to  test the TWIC program. However, it is not clear to what extent  these actions will ensure that the contract to implement the TWIC  program will include comprehensive and clearly defined contract  requirements. However, TSA did not effectively oversee the  contractor’s performance to ensure that key components of the program  were tested. The independent  contractor’s assessment confirmed this component was not tested. Evaluating contractor performance. However, until TSA develops its plans for  monitoring contractor performance, it is not clear to what extent these  actions will ensure that contractor performance and costs will be closely  monitored. Postponing the issuance of  requirements for TWIC access control technologies will afford the  maritime industry additional time to comment on these requirements. TSA’s decision to rapidly move forward with  implementation of the TWIC program without developing and testing  solutions to identified problems could lead to additional problems,  increased costs, and further program delays without achieving the  program’s intended goals. In developing and testing these solutions, TSA should:    ensure that the TWIC program will be able to efficiently enroll and  issue TWIC cards to large numbers of workers;    ensure that the technology necessary to operate the TWIC program  will be readily available to industry stakeholders and will function  effectively in the maritime sector, including biometric card readers  and the capability to link facility access control systems with the  national TWIC database;    ensure that the TWIC program balances the added security it  provides with the potential effect that the program could have on  the flow of maritime commerce; and    closely coordinate with maritime industry stakeholders— particularly those that are currently implementing or using  biometric access control systems—to learn from their experiences. 2. To address our first objective, to identify the problems, if any, during  testing of the TWIC program and the challenges, if any, DHS and industry  stakeholders face in implementing the program, we interviewed TSA and  Coast Guard officials regarding the development of the TWIC program,  results of TWIC program testing, and challenges identified with  implementing the program. To address our second objective, to determine to what extent, if at all, the  contract to test the TWIC program identified contract planning and  oversight problems that should be addressed before implementing the  program, we interviewed TSA officials regarding the planning for and  oversight of the contract to test the TWIC program.
Why GAO Did This Study

The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is developing the Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC) to ensure that only workers that do not pose a terrorist threat are allowed to enter secure areas of transportation facilities. TSA completed TWIC program testing in June 2005 and is moving forward with implementing the program in the maritime sector by the end of this year. To evaluate the status of the TWIC program, GAO examined (1) what problems, if any, were identified during TWIC program testing and what key challenges, if any, do the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and industry stakeholders face in implementing the program; and (2) to what extent, if at all, did TSA experience problems in planning for and overseeing the contract to test the TWIC program. To address these issues, GAO interviewed DHS officials and industry stakeholders, reviewed documentation regarding TWIC testing, and conducted site visits to testing locations.

What GAO Found

DHS and industry stakeholders face three major challenges in addressing problems identified during TWIC program testing and ensuring that key components of the TWIC program can work effectively in the maritime sector. First, enrolling workers and issuing TWIC cards in a timely manner to a significantly larger population of workers than was done during testing of the TWIC program. Second, ensuring that the TWIC technology, such as biometric card readers, works effectively in the maritime sector. TSA has obtained limited information on the use of biometric readers in the maritime sector because most facilities that tested the TWIC program did not use these types of readers. Thirs, balancing the added security components of the TWIC program with the potential impact that the program could have on the flow of maritime commerce. An independent contractor's assessment found deficiencies with TWIC program testing and recommended that additional testing be conducted to determine its effectiveness. TSA has acknowledged that there are challenges to implementing the TWIC program and has taken some actions to address these issues, including allowing more time to consider requirements for installing TWIC access control technologies. However, TSA plans no additional testing of the TWIC program. Rapidly moving forward with implementation of the TWIC program without developing and testing solutions to identified problems to ensure that they work effectively could lead to further problems, increased costs, and program delays without achieving the program's intended goals. TSA experienced problems in planning for and overseeing the contract to test the TWIC program. Specifically, TSA made a number of changes to contract requirements after the contract was awarded, contributing to a doubling of contract costs, and TSA did not ensure that all key components of the program were tested. TSA has acknowledged that problems with contractor oversight occurred because the agency did not have sufficient personnel to monitor contractor performance. TSA has taken some actions to address this problem. However, until TSA issues the contract for TWIC implementation and develops its plans for monitoring contractor performance, it is not clear to what extent these actions will ensure that the contract to implement the TWIC program will include comprehensive and clearly defined requirements and that contractor performance will be closely monitored to ensure that the program is implemented successfully and costs are controlled.