The department further directed that the office be responsible forimplementing CI programs at non-NNSA facilities. Supporters of the dual office structureargue, however, that a separate, dedicated CI office within NNSA is necessary if counterintelligenceprotection of DOE's national security laboratories is to receive the focus it warrants. And second, is the current dual office organizational structure within DOE and NNSAflawed? The range of alternatives currently being discussed include the following: (1) consolidatethe two counterintelligence programs under the control of a new DOE intelligence agency; (2)consolidate the two counterintelligence programs under the control of NNSA; (3) establish a newDOE intelligence agency but maintain a separate NNSA counterintelligence program; (4) completelysever DOE's and NNSA's counterintelligence programs; and (5) maintain the status quo. Alternative One: Consolidate DOE and NNSA CI Programs Under New DOE Intelligence Agency

One approach, which the DOE Secretary has initiated, integrates DOE's Office ofIntelligence, whose principal task is to assess other countries' nuclear weapons programs, (35) and DOE's CI office undera newly created DOE Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence. In a secondphase, NNSA's CI office would be consolidated under the new intelligence agency'scounterintelligence directorate. Such a change would require congressional approval. Proponents assert that such a consolidation would produce a more efficient bureaucraticstructure, one that would better serve DOE's broader intelligence needs and responsibilities. Proponents also contend that bymerging DOE's and NNSA's CI programs under a new DOE intelligence agency, the department willbe able to clarify roles and missions and to improve coordination and communication. Alternative Three: Establish New DOE Intelligence Agency but Maintain Separate NNSA CI Program

This approach would integrate the DOE's Office of Intelligence and counterintelligence officeunder a new DOE intelligence agency that would develop CI policy for DOE and NNSA, but wouldimplement it only at non-NNSA facilities. Proponents concede that thisapproach would fall short of a preferred goal, which would be to consolidate DOE and NNSAcounterintelligence programming, but argue that it nevertheless would enhance counterintelligenceefforts by improving communication and coordination between the two existing programs. Some opponents counter the department can eliminate problems of program fragmentation,coordination, and communication only by eliminating the current bifurcated structure. Opponents counter that such an arrangement would produce chaos in the field; could lead to futureproblems of redundancy, coordination, and communications; and could undermine relations with lawenforcement. The semi-autonomous NNSAand its counterintelligence office, they argue, were established for the express purpose of having oneentity outside of DOE focus on, and be held accountable for, implementing CI policy at DOE'ssensitive nuclear and national security programs, including its weapons labs.
Concerned by reported security and counterintelligence (CI) lapses at the Department ofEnergy (DOE), Congress in 1999 established a semi-autonomous agency -- the National NuclearSecurity Administration (NNSA) -- to oversee DOE's national security-related programs. WithinNNSA, Congress established the Office of Defense Nuclear Counterintelligence to implement NNSA's counterintelligence program. Although DOE's existing Office of Counterintelligencedevelops CI policy for both agencies, it implements policy only at non-NNSA facilities. Somestudies have questioned the effectiveness of a dual office structure in combating foreign espionageand have urged the adoption of an alternative structure. Several alternative organizationalapproaches have been discussed, including the following.
One approach, which DOE has initiated, merges under the control of a new DOE Office ofIntelligence and Counterintelligence DOE's Office of Intelligence, which assesses foreign nuclearweapons programs, and DOE's CI office. Under an anticipated second phase, which would requirecongressional approval, the new office would absorb NNSA's CI program. Proponents assert thatconsolidation would improve command, control, and communication. Opponents argue thatconsolidation would dilute the focus on counterintelligence at DOE's weapons labs.
Under a second approach, the DOE and NNSA CI programs could be consolidated under thecontrol of the NNSA administrator. Proponents argue that a semi-autonomous agency such asNNSA, by virtue of its independence, is better able to implement CI measures than is DOE.Opponents contend that such a consolidation would undermine the effectiveness of acounterintelligence program, which they argue requires a consolidated DOE-wide program thatincludes NNSA and is under the direct control and supervision of the Energy Secretary.
Under a third approach, DOE could integrate its Office of Intelligence and CI office undera new DOE intelligence agency, but allow NNSA's CI office to remain as a separate entity.Proponents argue that such an approach would not eliminate the current bifurcated structure -- apreferred outcome -- but would enhance overall communication and coordination between the twoexisting programs. Opponents counter that only way to resolve coordination and communicationproblems is to consolidate the two CI programs within DOE.
A fourth approach would be to completely separate the DOE and NNSA counterintelligenceprograms. Proponents suggest that such an approach would clarify the chain of command.Opponents assert that separation could further undermine coordination and communication.
A final approach would be to maintain the status quo. Proponents suggest that the currentstructure is required for counterintelligence to receive focused attention at the weapons labs. Opponents counter that dual offices are inefficient and ultimately ineffective. This report will beupdated as warranted.