Army and Air National Guard Have Participated in Multiple Missions and Experienced High Activations for Overseas and Homeland Security Operations

Since the September 11 terrorist attacks, nearly half of the National  Guard’s members have been alerted or activated to meet the multiple  federal requirements at home and abroad arising out of the Global War on  Terrorism. Moreover, Army Guard  units with high-demand specialties have faced extended and repeated  deployments. High Use and Expanded Missions of Army Guard Signify Change from Strategic Reserve Force to Operational Force

The high level of Army Guard forces needed for federal missions for the  foreseeable future represents a fundamental change from the Guard’s  planned role as a strategic reserve force that would have additional time to  train following the onset of war to an operational force that has had to  respond quickly. Army Guard forces  that are frequently called on by state governors to respond to state needs  such as natural disasters have also been affected by current operational  demands—about 70 percent of the enhanced brigades and separate  battalions and 75 percent of the Guard’s divisional combat battalions have  been deployed at some point since September 11 and, when deployed,  were not available for state needs. For example,  to avoid critical shortages of military police units, 27 Army National Guard  units, containing over 7,000 personnel, were converted from other  specialties such as field artillery to military police units, some of which  have already deployed to Iraq to perform missions such as convoy  security. In total, more than 34,000 soldiers deployed with new units that  were tailored to provide specific capabilities needed as a result of the new  security environment. Significant Use of Air Guard Occurred for Iraq Combat Operations and Homeland Defense Missions, but Number of Activated Personnel Has Decreased

The Air National Guard has also faced expanded roles and high utilization  since September 11, 2001. Since the terrorist attacks on the homeland, the Air National Guard has  been called on to perform new missions such as flying combat air patrols  and providing radar coverage for the continental United States. Readiness of Non- deployed National Guard Units Has Declined, but Decline Is Most Significant for the Army Guard

Since September 11, 2001, the extensive use of both the Army and Air  National Guard in recent operations has resulted in a steady decline in the  warfighting readiness of non-deployed units. The effect of this  readiness decline on the Guard’s ability to perform homeland security  missions is unknown because DOD has not completed its efforts to define  requirements and readiness standards and measures for the homeland  defense missions it would lead or the civil missions is would support. Since September 11,  2001, the Army National Guard has initiated over 71,000 transfers of  personnel from one unit to another to enhance the readiness of deploying  units. Many Air Guard units use aging aircraft, and the high pace of operations  has been a training and maintenance challenge. DOD Has Not Fully Defined Mission Requirements or Readiness Standards and Measures for All Its Homeland Security Missions, and Some States Have Concerns about Preparedness and Availability of Guard Units

It is difficult to assess the Guard’s preparedness for the full range of  homeland security missions because requirements for these missions are  not yet well defined. Readying and Resourcing National Guard Units for Overseas and Domestic Missions Presents Significant Near- and Long- Term Challenges

Our work has shown that DOD, the states, and Congress face significant  near- and long-term challenges to readying and resourcing National Guard  units for overseas and domestic missions in the Global War on Terrorism. These improvements may be difficult to realize  because the Army National Guard is still operating at peacetime funding  levels despite declining readiness. Second, in the longer term, the Guard’s  ability to successfully organize for its missions in the new strategic  environment will depend on whether adequate resources are identified for  these efforts and whether DOD’s readiness and funding policies are  consistent with the Army Guard’s expected high utilization for the  foreseeable future. Finally, in addition to restructuring and funding to  be ready for the Guard’s federal mission, DOD must consider how to  balance homeland and overseas requirements. Conclusion

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, while the high pace of operations has caused  some difficulties for the Air Guard and the Army Guard, the Army Guard’s  efforts to ready units to deploy by taking trained personnel and critical  equipment from other units has created urgent personnel and equipment  shortages in units that have not yet been deployed.
Why GAO Did This Study

As a result of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks and launch of the Global War on Terrorism, the National Guard has experienced the largest activation of its forces since World War II. The Guard consists of 350,000 Army Guard soldiers and 107,000 Air Guard members. With its unique dual status, it performs state missions under the governor and federal missions at home and overseas under the President. Since September 11, the Guard's missions have expanded, raising concerns about its ability to simultaneously perform all of these functions. The Department of Defense (DOD) funds the Army Guard for partial readiness to accomplish mission requirements assuming that there will be time to supply additional personnel and equipment in an extended conflict. In contrast, the Air Guard is funded to be an operational reserve ready on short notice. Today's testimony addresses GAO's observations on (1) the extent and purpose of the National Guard's use since September 11, (2) the effects of that use on Guard forces' readiness for future missions, and (3) the challenges that DOD, the states, and Congress face in organizing and equipping the Guard to support both overseas and homeland missions.

What GAO Found

With the high pace of operations since September 11, more than 51 percent of Army Guard members and 31 percent of Air Guard members have been activated to meet new homeland and overseas demands. The Army Guard has experienced significant difficulties in responding to these extensive and ongoing requirements because much of it was funded and equipped as a later-deploying reserve force rather than an operational force designed for continued overseas deployments. Moreover, units with certain specialties--military police, transportation, and combat arms--have been in high demand, resulting in lengthy and repeated deployments. To ease critical shortages, 27 Army Guard units were retrained as military police from other specialties such as field artillery. The Air Guard, although less affected by the high pace because it is funded to deploy quickly, has also seen significant use for Iraq combat operations and homeland security missions. While the number of activated Air Guard personnel has decreased over the past year, some personnel were activated outside their normal rotational schedules and tour lengths have been extended. In addition, some units have been assigned new homeland missions such as flying combat air patrols and providing radar coverage over the United States. While the high use of the National Guard since September 11 has led to declining war-fighting readiness of non-deployed Army and Air Guard units, the decline is most significant for the Army Guard. To meet wartime needs, the Army Guard has had to take personnel and equipment from units that had not been activated to ready others for deployment. For example, the Army Guard has initiated over 71,000 transfers to fill personnel shortages in deploying units and transferred about 22,000 pieces of equipment from nondeploying units to ready units deploying to Iraq. The Air Guard's readiness has also declined because the high pace of operations created maintenance challenges for its aging aircraft and limited training opportunities. Because DOD has not fully defined requirements, readiness standards, and readiness measures for the homeland security missions it will lead or support, the Guard's preparedness specifically for homeland security missions is unknown. However, states are concerned that continuing deployments reduce the Guard's preparedness and availability for all its homeland security and natural disaster missions. DOD, the states, and Congress face near- and long-term challenges readying and funding National Guard units for overseas and domestic missions in the Global War on Terrorism. Enhancing the near-term readiness of Army Guard units will be difficult because the Army Guard is still operating with peacetime funding. In the long term, the Army Guard's ability to restructure its forces to meet the requirements of the new security environment will depend on whether it is given adequate resources and funding priority. Finally, DOD will need to consider how to balance Army and Air Guard forces needed for both homeland and overseas security requirements.