The resulting AIM-9X system requirement has five key performance parameters: the ability to operate during the day or at night; the ability to operate over land and at sea in the presence of infrared countermeasures; weight, size, and electrical compatibility with all current U.S. fighters and the F-22; the ability to acquire, track, and fire on targets over a wider area than the AIM-9M; and a high probability that a missile launched will reach and kill its target. Both companies demonstrated, among other things, how they would reduce the technical risk of developing the AIM-9X missile. Our objectives were to determine (1) the services’ efforts to reduce missile development risk, (2) the missile program’s plan to transition from development to production, and (3) the importance of separately managed but essential supporting systems. Among these are: using existing subsystems, components, and items not requiring conducting a competitive demonstration and validation of new technology; combining government and contractor technical expertise through integrated product teams. Whether program efforts to reduce technical, cost, and schedule risk will succeed will not be known for at least another year. This production decision is to be made before completing development flight tests, before adequately testing production representative missiles, and before full operational testing begins. As figure 3.1 shows, the low-rate initial production decision for the AIM-9X missile is to be made about 1 year before completion of the planned developmental flight test program. AIM-9X System of Systems Needs to Be Tested, Produced, and Deployed Together

All three elements of the AIM-9X weapon system—the missile, the helmet-mounted cueing system, and the associated aircraft modifications—must be present and properly working together to ensure that U.S. fighters can prevail against modern threat missiles. By not requiring that the missile, helmet, and aircraft modifications be tested, produced, and deployed together, as a “system of systems,” DOD risks fielding a missile unable to prevail in aerial combat. Development Programs Are Separate but Closely Coordinated

The AIM-9X missile, helmet, and associated aircraft modifications are being developed under separate but closely coordinated programs. We are concerned about this because of the criticality that all three elements work together to ensure that the AIM-9X system will prevail against modern threat missiles. Until the weapon system is tested and evaluated using production representative missiles and helmets, DOD decisionmakers will not have information on whether the AIM-9X weapon system’s key performance parameters are achievable.
Why GAO Did This Study

Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the development status of the AIM-9X missile program and its concerns about the testing and production of all elements of the AIM-9X weapon system, focusing on the: (1) services' efforts to reduce missile development risk; (2) missile program's plan to transition from development to production; and (3) importance of separately managed but essential supporting systems.

What GAO Found

GAO noted that: (1) the AIM-9X missile program includes many initiatives to reduce the risk of technical, cost, and schedule problems; (2) it uses many existing subsystems, components, and items not requiring development, and government and contractor technical experts have joined together in integrated product teams; (3) in addition, the services conducted a competitive demonstration and validation of new technologies to reduce technical risk; (4) GAO is concerned, however, about two situations; (5) the plan to start missile low-rate initial production about 1 year before completing development flight testing and before operational testing of production-representative missiles will risk later discovery of technical or operational suitability problems; (6) accordingly, at this critical juncture, Department of Defense (DOD) decisionmakers will not have enough verifiable information on the system's key performance parameters in an operational environment to make an informed production decision; (7) GAO is concerned that the helmet-mounted cueing system is being developed under a separate program from the missile even though U.S. fighter pilots need both the AIM-9X missile and the helmet-mounted cueing system to ensure that they can prevail in air-to-air combat against modern threat missiles; (8) while the separate development programs are being coordinated, there is no requirement that the missile, helmet, and aircraft modifications be thoroughly and realistically tested and evaluated together as a system of systems prior to initiating AIM-9X missile production; (9) until the weapon system is tested and evaluated using production-representative missiles and helmets, DOD decisionmakers will not have information on whether the AIM-9X weapon system's key performance parameters--such as the ability to acquire, track, and fire on targets over a wider area than the AIM-9M--are achievable; and (10) further, if all elements of the system are not produced and deployed together, the AIM-9X may not be able to prevail in aerial combat against modern threat missiles.