For more than a decade, Washington and New Delhi have pursued a "strategic partnership." U.S. Withdrawal from the Paris Agreement on Climate Change

President Trump's June announcement of U.S. withdrawal from the Paris Agreement on climate change generally was received poorly in India, where both government and private sector are focused in earnest on developing renewable energy sources (see the "Energy and Climate Issues" section below). In recent years, Indian nationals have accounted for the great majority of such U.S. visa issuances—70% in FY2016—as well as work visas for their spouses. Meanwhile, the results brought into high relief the weakened position of India's opposition parties. This relates to some of the human rights concerns expressed by some in the U.S. Congress, among others. India's Foreign Relations and U.S. Interests

India's long-held focus on maintaining "non-alignment" in the international system—more recently conceived by Indian officials as "strategic autonomy"—is, in the current century, shifting toward increased bilateral engagements, perhaps especially with the United States and with greater energy under the Modi government. India shares lengthy disputed borders with both countries and sits astride vital sea lanes. What follows is a brief review of five key Indian bilateral relations having direct bearing on perceived U.S. national interests, those with Pakistan, Afghanistan, China, Japan, and Iran. Relations only began to blossom in the current century after being significantly undermined by India's 1998 nuclear weapons tests. Today, leaders from both countries acknowledge numerous common values and interests as they engage in a "strategic and global partnership" formally launched in 2006. In 2005, the United States and India signed a ten-year defense pact outlining planned collaboration in multilateral operations, expanded two-way defense trade, increased opportunities for technology transfers and co-production, and expanded collaboration related to missile defense. Despite general optimism among U.S. officials and independent boosters about India's potential in this realm, some analysts contend that India's ability to influence regional security dynamics significantly will continue to remain limited in coming years and decades. Navy-to-navy collaboration—with annual, large-scale, and now multilateral "Malabar" joint exercises—appears to be the most robust in terms of exercises and personnel exchanges. India's military is the world's third-largest, and New Delhi seeks to transform it into one with advanced technology and global reach, reportedly planning up to $100 billion on new procurements over the next decade to update its mostly Soviet-era arsenal. Despite some reports of progress in the areas of intelligence and counterterrorism cooperation—in 2016, Secretary Kerry told an Indian audience that American and Indian intelligence agencies "now exchange information constantly" —there has been asymmetry in the willingness of the two governments to move forward: Washington has tended to want more cooperation from India and is willing to give more in return, while it appears that officials in New Delhi remain hesitant and their aspirations are more modest. India became a member of the MTCR in June 2016. The Trump Administration is reviewing this policy. U.S.-India Bilateral Trade and Investment Relations

The United States has viewed India—one of the world's fastest-growing economies and its third-largest on a purchasing power parity (PPP) basis—as an important strategic partner in advancing common interests regionally and globally. These and other developments continue to raise concerns for the U.S. regarding localization barriers to trade in India. India may be in the midst of one of history's largest energy transformation project, with a rapidly growing renewables sector. As described in this report, key legislative and oversight considerations for Congress in U.S.-India relations include the following:
what levels of U.S. foreign assistance to provide India; whether to continue bilateral clean and renewable energy cooperation programs even in the absence of the Administration's support for the Paris Agreement; whether to enact legislation tightening U.S. immigration policy, especially with respect to H-1B visas; how vigorously to support bilateral defense trade with India, including whether to allow or otherwise seek to influence potential future major arms sales and/or co-production agreements, such as the one recently proposed for F-16 combat aircraft; what avenues of engagement on U.S.-India trade and investment issues to support, including whether to advocate for continuing U.S.-India BIT negotiations; whether to renew U.S. support for APEC membership for India; whether to support U.S. trade promotion and financing programs, such as Ex-Im Bank, OPIC, and TDA, that have been active in India; whether to reconsider India's GSP status in light of concerns with the country's IPR protection and enforcement; whether to continue efforts supporting India's membership in the Nuclear Suppliers Group and other expert control regimes; and how to respond to human rights abuses in India, among others.
India will soon be the world's most populous country, home to about one of every six people. Many factors combine to infuse India's government and people with "great power" aspirations: the Asian giant's rich civilization and history, expanding strategic horizons, energetic global and international engagement, critical geography (with more than 9,000 total miles of land borders, many of them disputed) astride vital sea and energy lanes, major economy (at times the world's fastest growing) with a rising middle class and an attendant boost in defense and power projection capabilities (replete with a nuclear weapons arsenal and triad of delivery systems), and vigorous science and technology sectors, among others.
In recognition of India's increasingly central role and ability to influence world affairs—and with a widely-held assumption that a stronger and more prosperous democratic India is good for the United States in and of itself—the U.S. Congress and two successive U.S. Administrations have acted both to broaden and deepen America's engagement with New Delhi. Such engagement is unprecedented after decades of Cold War-era estrangement and today takes place "across the spectrum of human endeavor for a better world," as described in a 2015 U.S.-India Declaration of Friendship. Washington and New Delhi launched a "strategic partnership" in 2005, along with a framework for long-term defense cooperation that now includes large-scale joint military exercises and significant defense trade. Bilateral trade and investment have increased while a relatively wealthy Indian-American community is exercising newfound domestic political influence, and Indian nationals account for a large proportion of foreign students on American college campuses and foreign workers in the information technology sector.
Yet more engagement has meant more areas of friction in the partnership, many of which attract congressional attention. India's economy, while slowly reforming, continues to be a relatively closed one, with barriers to trade and investment deterring foreign business interests. Differences over U.S. immigration law, especially in the area of nonimmigrant work visas, remain unresolved; New Delhi views these as trade disputes. India's intellectual property protection regime comes under regular criticism from U.S. officials and firms. The June 2017 announcement of U.S. withdrawal from the Paris Agreement on climate change dismayed many in India and brought into question significant ongoing bilateral collaboration in the energy field. Other stumbling blocks—on localization barriers and civil nuclear commerce, among others—add to sometimes argumentative associations. Meanwhile, cooperation in the fields of defense trade, intelligence, and counterterrorism, although vastly superior to that of only a decade ago, runs up against the obstacles variously posed by India's bureaucracy, limited governmental capacity, difficult procurement process, seemingly incompatible federal institutions, and a lingering shortage of trust, not least due to America's ongoing security relationship with and aid to India's key rival, Pakistan. Finally, Members of Congress take notice of human rights abuses in India, perhaps especially those related to religious freedom.
Despite these many areas of sometimes serious discord, the U.S. Congress has remained broadly positive in its posture toward the U.S.-India strategic and commercial partnership. Meanwhile, the Trump Administration has thus far issued amicable rhetoric overall (with some lapses) that suggests an intention to maintain the general outlines of recent U.S.-India ties.
This report reviews the major facets of current U.S.-India relations, particularly in the context of congressional interest. It discusses areas in which perceived U.S. and Indian national interests converge and areas in which they diverge; other leading Indian foreign relations that relate to U.S. interests; the outlines of bilateral engagement in defense, trade, and investment relations, as well as important issues involving energy, climate change; and human rights concerns. This report will be updated.