RS21816 -- Japan's Self-Defense Forces in Iraq: Motivations, Constraints, and Implications for U.S.-Japan AllianceCooperation 
Updated April 30, 2004

	Crisis Provoked by the Hostage Situation

The April 8, 2004 seizure of three Japanese civilian volunteers near the chaotic city of Fallujah, created the first major test of Prime Minister JunichiroKoizumi's commitment to non-combat military participation in the U.S.-led coalition in Iraq. Koizumi and other senior officials immediately vowed not to give in to the terrorists demands. The Vice President reportedly reassured Japanese leaders that U.S. forces would make every effort torescue the hostages. (6)

	Background to Japan's Role in Iraq: The North Korea Factor

Concern about the near term threat posed by North Korea's nuclear weapons program and ballistic missiles, as well as longer term concern about a rising China,has had a major influence on how Japan views its broader alliance relations with the United States and its owninternational role, including its role in Iraq. (9)
While explaining his decision to send troops to Iraq in terms of Japan's international obligations, Prime Minister Koizumi has made clear that the NorthKorean threat and the
longer term viability of the U.S.-Japan alliance have been uppermost in his thinking. (16)
For the Bush Administration, faced with the worst fighting since the fall of Bagdad in April 2003, and the withdrawal of forces by Spain, Honduras, and theDominican Republic, Japan's strong stance has been important to stiffening the resolve of wavering coalitionpartners. (18)
Questions remain about the Japanese government's staying power. The Japanese Defense Agency already has announced that a replacement contingent of 460 troops was beingreadied for Iraq.
The capture and subsequent release of five Japanese civilians in two differenthostage-taking situations by Islamicterrorist groups in Iraq in April 2004 underscored the high stakes for both the Japanese government of PrimeMinister Junichiro Koizumi and for the U.S.-ledcoalition. Except for the small Communist and Socialist parties, Japanese political leaders across the boardsupported Koizumi's adamant stance againstresponding to the hostage-takers' demands that Japan withdraw its contingent of some 550 troops that were deployedto Samawah, in southern Iraq, in early2004. While this show of resolve by Japan has been welcomed by the Bush Administration, the longer-term effectof the hostage-taking and the upsurge inanti-coalition violence may reinforce the views of many in Japan, including the main opposition party, that agreeingto send Japanese troops to Iraq was amistake. A number of Japanese commentators and political leaders have suggested that the government's mainmotive for sending troops was to strengthenU.S.-Japan alliance cooperation in the face of perceived security threats from North Korea and a rising China, notbecause of strong agreement with U.S. policyin Iraq. From this perspective, Tokyo's steadfastness could have a positive influence on other coalition governments who may now be reconsidering theircommitments, while the withdrawal of Japanese forces, as many in Japan are demanding, could cause significantcomplications for the U.S. effort in Iraq andadversely affect broader U.S.-Japan alliance relations. This report will be updated as news events warrant.