To address these concerns, the Navy initiated the NTCSS program in 1995  to enhance the combat readiness of ships, submarines, and aircraft. The Navy  has not managed NTCSS in accordance with many key aspects of these  policies and guidance. For example, the Navy has not economically  justified its investment in NTCSS on the basis of cost and benefits. It has  not invested in NTCSS within the context of a well-defined enterprise  architecture. Further, the Navy has not effectively performed key  measurement, reporting, and oversight activities, and has not adequately  conducted requirements management and testing activities. Reasons the  Navy cited for not following policies and guidance included questioning  their applicability to the NTCSS program, having insufficient time in which  to apply them, and believing that plans to adopt them were not meant to be  applied retroactively. As a result, the Navy does not currently have a sufficient  basis for determining whether NTCSS is the right system solution for its  tactical command support needs, and it has not pursued the proposed  solution in a way that increases the likelihood of delivering defined  capabilities on time and within budget. The Navy has also not had an enterprise architecture to guide and constrain  its IT system investments. In particular, it is a means to measure performance  and serves as an early warning system for deviations from plans. The OOMA application has failed  operational testing twice over the last 4 years reportedly because of  deficiencies in developmental testing. It is important that the NTCSS program improve its developmental testing. To  accomplish this, the Secretary of the Navy should direct the program office  to take the following three actions:  collaborate with the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for  Networks and Information Integration/Chief Information Officer, the  Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation, and the Naval Cost Analysis  Division to prepare a reliable economic analysis that encompasses all  viable alternatives, including the Navy’s recent enterprise resource  planning program;  ensure that development of this economic analysis (1) complies with  cost estimating best practices, including recognition of costs to resolve  open trouble reports and change proposals, and relevant OMB cost  benefit guidance and (2) incorporates available data on whether  deployed NTCSS capabilities are actually producing benefits; and  collaborate with the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition,  Technology, and Logistics and the Under Secretary of Defense  (Comptroller) to ensure that NTCSS is adequately aligned with evolving  DOD and Navy enterprise architectures. If—based on reliable data—a decision is made to continue the NTCSS  program, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary  of the Navy to ensure that the following two actions are taken:  the NTCSS program implements effective program management  activities, including earned value management, requirements  development and management, and test management; and  key stakeholders, such as the central design agency and the  developmental testing organization, have the people, processes, and  tools to effectively execute their respective roles and responsibilities. Nevertheless, the department agreed  to address this recommendation. GAO staff who made major contributions to this  report are listed in appendix V.

Objective, Scope, and Methodology

Our objective was to determine whether the Naval Tactical Command  Support System (NTCSS) is being managed according to important aspects  of the Department of Defense’s (DOD) acquisition policies and guidance, as  well as other relevant acquisition management best practices. GAO Comments

1. However, the point in our report is that NTCSS has  not been defined and developed in the context of a DOD or Navy  enterprise architecture because a well-defined version of either has not  existed to guide and constrain the program.
Why GAO Did This Study

Because it is important that the Department of Defense (DOD) adheres to disciplined information technology (IT) acquisition processes to successfully modernize its business systems, GAO was asked to determine whether the Naval Tactical Command Support System (NTCSS) is being managed according to important aspects of DOD's acquisition policies and guidance, as well as other relevant acquisition management best practices. NTCSS was started in 1995 to help Navy personnel effectively manage ship, submarine, and aircraft support activities. To date, about $1 billion has been spent to partially deploy NTCSS to about one-half its intended ashore and afloat sites.

What GAO Found

The Department of the Navy has not managed its NTCSS program in accordance with key aspects of the department's policies and related guidance, including federal and recognized best practice guidance. Collectively, these policies and guidance are intended to reasonably ensure that investment in a given IT system represents the right solution to fill a mission need and, if it is, that acquisition and deployment of the system are handled in a manner that maximizes the chances of delivering defined system capabilities on time and within budget. In the case of NTCSS, neither of these outcomes is being realized. The Navy has not economically justified its ongoing and planned investment in NTCSS. Specifically, it (1) has not reliably estimated future costs and benefits and (2) has not ensured that independent reviews of its economic justification were performed to determine its reliability. The Navy has not invested in NTCSS within the context of a well-defined DOD or Navy enterprise architecture, which is necessary to guide and constrain NTCSS in a way that promotes interoperability and reduces redundancy with related and dependent systems. The Navy has not effectively performed key measurement, reporting, budgeting, and oversight activities. In particular, earned value management, which is a means for determining and disclosing actual performance against budget and schedule estimates, has not been implemented effectively, and oversight entities have not had the visibility into the program needed to affect its direction. The Navy has not adequately conducted requirements management and testing activities. For example, requirements were neither prioritized nor traced to related documentation to ensure that the system delivers capabilities that meet user needs. This contributed to failures in developmental testing that have prevented the latest component of NTCSS from passing operational testing twice over the last 4 years. Reasons the Navy cited for not following policies and guidance ranged from their not being applicable to the NTCSS program, to lack of time available to apply them, to plans for strengthening system practices not being applied retroactively. Nevertheless, the Navy has begun taking steps and is considering other steps intended to address some of the above problems. Until program management improves, NTCSS will remain a risky program.