1). To conduct such  assessments, DOE uses, among other things, subject matter experts, such  as U.S. Special Forces; computer modeling to simulate attacks; and  force-on-force exercises, in which the site's protective forces undergo  simulated attacks by a group of mock terrorists. Protective Forces at ESE Sites Generally Meet Established DOE Readiness Requirements, but Some Weaknesses in Protective Force Practices Exist

We found that the majority of the 105 protective force members we  interviewed at ESE sites generally believe that they currently are ready to  perform their mission of protecting the site’s special nuclear material. However, we did find some weaknesses at ESE sites that could adversely  affect the ability of ESE protective forces to defend their sites. ESE Protective Forces Generally Meet the DOE Training and Equipment Requirements We Reviewed

As called for in DOE’s Protective Force Program Manual, readiness is  achieved through appropriate training and equipment. Protective force officers at all five of the sites we visited reported problems  with their radio communications systems. Site security officials at two sites  acknowledged that efforts were under way to improve radio  communications equipment. DOE and ESE Officials Need to Take Several Prompt and Coordinated Actions to Address the New DBT Requirements by 2008

To successfully defend against the much larger terrorist threat contained in  the 2004 DBT by October 2008, DOE and ESE officials recognize that they  need to take several prompt and coordinated actions. These include the  transformation of current protective forces into an “elite force,” the  development and deployment of new security technologies, the  consolidation and elimination of special nuclear material, and  organizational improvements within ESE’s security program. However,  because these initiatives, particularly an elite force, are in early stages of  development and will require significant commitment of resources and  coordination across DOE and ESE, their completion by the October 2008  DBT implementation deadline is uncertain. The department believes technologies can reduce the risk to  protective forces in case of an attack and provide additional response time  to meet and defeat an attack. Such an approach will need to include a comprehensive  plan for all of the initiatives DOE and ESE are considering and will need to  be supported by a sound ESE management structure that has sufficient  authority to ensure coordination across all ESE program offices that have  Category I special nuclear material. To determine the extent to which protective forces at Office of the Under  Secretary for Energy, Science and Environment sites are meeting DOE’s  existing readiness requirements, we reviewed DOE policies to determine  current requirements. We conducted  structured interviews with 105 ESE protective force officers at the five ESE  sites. To determine what actions DOE and ESE will need to take to successfully  defend against the new threat identified in the 2004 DBT by DOE’s  implementation deadline of October 2008, we reviewed the 2004 DBT and  associated guidance documents.
Why GAO Did This Study

A successful terrorist attack on a Department of Energy (DOE) site containing nuclear weapons material could have devastating effects for the site and nearby communities. DOE's Office of the Under Secretary for Energy, Science and Environment (ESE), which is responsible for DOE operations in areas such as energy research, manages five sites that contain weapons-grade nuclear material. A heavily armed paramilitary force equipped with such items as automatic weapons protects ESE sites. GAO was asked to examine (1) the extent to which ESE protective forces are meeting DOE's existing readiness requirements and (2) the actions DOE and ESE will need to take to successfully defend against the terrorist threat identified in the October 2004 design basis threat (DBT) by DOE's implementation deadline of October 2008.

What GAO Found

Protective forces at the five ESE sites containing weapons-grade nuclear material generally meet existing key DOE readiness requirements. Specifically, GAO determined that ESE protective forces generally comply with DOE standards for firearms proficiency, physical fitness levels, and equipment standardization and that the five ESE sites had the required training programs, facilities, and equipment. However, GAO did find some weaknesses at ESE sites that could adversely affect the ability of ESE protective forces to defend their sites. For example, despite the importance of training exercises in which protective forces undergo simulated attacks by a group of mock terrorists (force-on-force exercises), DOE neither sets standards for individual protective force officers to participate in these exercises, nor does it require sites to track individual participation. In another example, GAO found that protective force officers at all five of the ESE sites reported problems with their radio communications systems. Specifically, according to 66 of the 105 protective force officers GAO interviewed, they did not always have dependable radio communications as required by the DOE Manual 473.2-2, Protective Force Program Manual. Security officials stated that improvements were under way. To successfully defend against the larger terrorist threat contained in the 2004 DBT by October 2008, DOE and ESE officials recognize that they will need to take several prompt and coordinated actions. These include transforming its current protective force into an "elite force"--modeled on U.S. Special Forces, developing and deploying new security technologies to reduce the risk to protective forces in case of an attack, consolidating and eliminating nuclear weapons material between and among ESE sites to reduce security costs, and creating a sound ESE management structure that has sufficient authority to ensure coordination across all ESE offices that have weapons-grade nuclear material. However, because these initiatives, particularly an elite force, are in early stages of development and will require significant commitment of resources and coordination across DOE and ESE, their completion by the 2008 October DBT implementation deadline is uncertain.