	Introduction

In 1933, during the first 100 days of President Franklin D. Roosevelt's New Deal, the Securities Act of 1933 and the Glass-Steagall Act (GSA) were enacted, setting up a pervasive regulatory scheme for the public offering of securities and generally prohibiting commercial banks from underwriting and dealing in those securities. One of the benefits of being a bank, and thus being subjected to heavy, expensive regulation, is access to what is referred to as the "federal safety net," which includes the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation's (FDIC's) deposit insurance, the Federal Reserve's discount window lending facility, and the Federal Reserve's payment system. Rather than regulating for safety and soundness, the SEC's regulatory regime is predominately built around registration, disclosure of risk, and the prevention and prosecution of insider trading and other forms of fraud. While there are two distinct regulatory systems, the distinguishing lines between the traditional activities engaged in by commercial and investment banks became increasingly difficult to discern as a result of competition, financial innovation, and technological advances in combination with permissive agency and judicial interpretation. In the wake of the Great Recession of 2008, there have been calls to reexamine the activities that should be permissible for commercial banks in light of the fact that they receive governmental benefits through access to the federal safety net. Some have called for the reenactment of the repealed provisions of the GSA, which is discussed in greater detail in another CRS report. While neither the House- nor the Senate-passed version of H.R. 4173 , the comprehensive financial regulatory reform proposals of the 111 th Congress, includes provisions that would reenact the GSA, both bills do propose curbs on "proprietary trading" by banking institutions. The bills would limit the ability of commercial banking institutions and their affiliated companies and subsidiaries to engage in trading unrelated to customer needs and investing in and sponsoring hedge funds or private equity funds. Such an approach has been referred to as the "Volcker Rule," having been urged upon Congress by Paul Volcker, former Chairman of the FRB and current Chairman of the President's Economic Recovery Advisory Board. This report briefly discusses the permissible proprietary trading activities of commercial banks and their subsidiaries under current law. It then analyzes the Volcker Rule proposals under both the House- and Senate-passed financial reform bills. Appendix A , Appendix B , and Appendix C of the report provide the full legislative language from both bills. (g) Council Study and Rulemaking- 
(1) STUDY AND RECOMMENDATIONS- Not later than 6 months after the date of enactment of this Act, the Council —
(A) shall complete a study of the definitions under subsection (a) and the other provisions under subsections (b) through (f), to assess the extent to which the definitions under subsection (a) and the implementation of subsections (a) through (f) would —
(i) promote and enhance the safety and soundness of depository institutions and the affiliates of depository institutions;
(ii) protect taxpayers and enhance financial stability by minimizing the risk that depository institutions and the affiliates of depository institutions will engage in unsafe and unsound activities;
(iii) limit the inappropriate transfer of Federal subsidies from institutions that benefit from deposit insurance and liquidity facilities of the Federal Government to unregulated entities;
(iv) reduce inappropriate conflicts of interest between the self-interest of depository institutions, affiliates of depository institutions, and financial companies supervised by the Board, and the interests of the customers of such institutions and companies;
(v) raise the cost of credit or other financial services, reduce the availability of credit or other financial services, or impose other costs on households and businesses in the United States ;
(vi) limit activities that have caused undue risk or loss in depository institutions, affiliates of depository institutions, and financial companies supervised by the Board of Governors, or that might reasonably be expected to create undue risk or loss in such institutions, affiliates, and companies; and
(vii) appropriately accommodates the business of insurance within an insurance company subject to regulation in accordance with State insurance company investment laws;
(B) shall make recommendations regarding the definitions under subsection (a) and the implementation of other provisions under subsections (b) through (f), including any modifications to the definitions, prohibitions, requirements, and limitations contained therein that the Council determines would more effectively implement the purposes of this section; and
(C) may make recommendations for prohibiting the conduct of the activities described in subsections (b) and (c) above a specific threshold amount and imposing additional capital requirements on activities conducted below such threshold amount.
In 1933, during the first 100 days of President Franklin D. Roosevelt's New Deal, the Securities Act of 1933 and the Glass-Steagall Act (GSA) were enacted, setting up a pervasive regulatory scheme for the public offering of securities and generally prohibiting commercial banks from underwriting and dealing in those securities. Banks are subject to heavy, expensive prudential regulation, while the regulation of securities firms is predominately built around registration, disclosure of risk, and the prevention and prosecution of insider trading and other forms of fraud.
While there are two distinct regulatory systems, the distinguishing lines between the traditional activities engaged in by commercial and investment banks became increasingly difficult to discern as a result of competition, financial innovation, and technological advances in combination with permissive agency and judicial interpretation.
One of the benefits of being a bank, and thus being subject to more extensive regulation, is access to what is referred to as the "federal safety net," which includes the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation's (FDIC's) deposit insurance, the Federal Reserve's discount window lending facility, and the Federal Reserve's payment system.
In the wake of the Great Recession of 2008, there have been calls to reexamine the activities that should be permissible for commercial banks in light of the fact that they receive governmental benefits through access to the federal safety net. Some have called for the reenactment of the provisions of the GSA that imposed affiliation restrictions between banks and securities firms, which were repealed by the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA) in 1999.
While neither the House- nor the Senate-passed version of H.R. 4173, the comprehensive financial regulatory reform proposals of the 111th Congress, includes provisions that would reenact the GSA, both bills do propose curbs on "proprietary trading" by banking institutions. H.R. 4173, newly titled the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, which is modeled on the Senate version, would limit the ability of commercial banking institutions and their affiliated companies and subsidiaries to engage in trading unrelated to customer needs and investing in and sponsoring hedge funds or private equity funds. Such an approach has been referred to as the "Volcker Rule," having been urged upon Congress by Paul Volcker, former Chairman of the Board of Governors for the Federal Reserve System and current Chairman of the President's Economic Recovery Advisory Board.
This report briefly discusses the permissible proprietary trading activities of commercial banks and their subsidiaries under current law. It then analyzes the Volcker Rule proposals under the House- and Senate-passed financial reform bills and under the Conference Report. Appendix A, Appendix B, and Appendix C of the report provide the full legislative language in each.