Corrective actions to improve the safety of Ranger training were also prescribed by the Fiscal Year 1996 National Defense Authorization Act. In response to the mandated 90-percent level, the Army excepted the Brigade from normal Army staffing priorities and raised the Brigade’s officer distribution and enlisted personnel authorizations to 90 percent of the required numbers. The Brigade staffing level has improved since the accident, even though the Army has not maintained staffing at the mandated level. Mandated Officer and Enlisted Personnel Levels Have Not Been Sustained

Although in the aggregate, the Brigade was assigned 96 percent of its required personnel in February 1997, it had only 88 percent of the required number of officers. Although the number of assigned officers was below the act’s requirement, it was significantly higher than it was at the time of the accident, when only 38 officers were assigned. If the services had met their instructor requirements, the Army would have achieved the mandated enlisted personnel level in most months since February 1997. Army Plans to Staff Safety Cells With Civilians

The act specified that safety cell personnel at each location must have sufficient continuity and experience to be knowledgeable of local terrain, weather, and other conditions. Currently, members of the Brigade and the battalions’ chains of command, including the Brigade and battalion commanders, serve in the safety cells and supervise daily training safety decisions. Army officers usually rotate to new units every 2 years, enlisted personnel about every 3 years. However, in September 1998, TRADOC reconsidered this approach and began work on a plan to authorize hiring four civilians for the safety cells at the Brigade and at each of the three training battalions. Specifically, the Brigade continued to apply safety improvements at the Florida Ranger camp, such as command and control systems to better monitor and predict river and swamp conditions, and to conduct waterborne training exercises in designated training lanes outside of high-risk areas. At all three training locations, medical evacuation procedures had been revised, rehearsed, and inspected; and physician assistants had been assigned to the Brigade and training battalions. In addition, the Brigade has improved safety and the supervision of training by requiring that its training companies be commanded by experienced and branch-qualified captains. A complete description and status of all corrective actions are included in appendixes II through V.

	Safety Inspections Do Not Evaluate or Document Compliance With Training Safety Controls

Our preliminary report assessing Ranger training safety recommended that TRADOC, the Army Infantry Center, Fort Benning, the Ranger Training Brigade, and organizations outside the chain of command, such as the Army Inspector General, conduct periodic inspections to determine compliance with the safety controls implemented after the 1995 accident. We, therefore, recommend that the Secretary of the Army continue the current 90-percent officer distribution planning level for the direct that future inspections of the Brigade include evaluations of training safety controls and that the inspections’ results are documented. The Brigade Commander has increased meals provided Ranger students from 1-1/2 to 2 per day based on Army nutritional studies. A recorded menu will provide information on how to obtain these lists.
Why GAO Did This Study

Pursuant to a legislative requirement, GAO provided information on the corrective actions taken by the Army following the deaths of four Ranger students in a 1995 training accident, focusing on the status of: (1) Army Ranger training manning levels required by the fiscal year 1996 National Defense Authorization Act; (2) establishing safety cell organizations required by the act; (3) corrective safety actions instituted after the accident; and (4) inspections of identified safety controls.

What GAO Found

GAO noted that: (1) even though the Army placed the Ranger Training Brigade on the list of units excepted from normal Army personnel priorities and raised the Brigade's personnel distribution to 90 percent of required numbers, it was not able to meet the act's required personnel levels; (2) in February 1997, when the Army planned to first meet the act's requirement, the Brigade had 97 percent of required enlisted personnel but only 88 percent of the required number of officers; (3) the Brigade's personnel strength was below the mandated 90-percent level for both officers and enlisted personnel from October 1997 through September 1998; (4) while Brigade officer staffing levels were below the mandate, they were significantly higher than they were at the time of the accident; (5) if the Army continues the current 90-percent officer distribution planning level for the brigade, it is not necessary to continue the mandated personnel levels in law; (6) the Army has established safety cells with personnel knowledgeable about local terrain and weather conditions, but the frequency of personnel rotations may make it difficult to provide sufficient continuity that the act requires; (7) specifically, the Brigade and battalion chains of command who serve as the safety cell members and supervise daily training safety decisions generally rotate to new units every 2-3 years; (8) because of the act's requirement that safety cell personnel have sufficient continuity and experience, the Army has recently authorized the addition of four civilian personnel to the safety cells at the Brigade and the three training battalions; (9) the Army plans to fill these positions by September 1999; (10) the Army has completed and institutionalized most of the recommended corrective actions, and they appear to be functioning effectively; (11) the Brigade has improved safety controls at the Florida Ranger camp by developing systems to better monitor and predict river and swamp conditions; (12) it has moved waterborne training exercises outside high-risk areas and eliminated discretion to deviate from established training lanes; (13) at all three training phases, medical evacuation procedures have been revised, rehearsed, and inspected, physician assistants have been assigned to the Brigade and training battalions, and a Brigade communications officer has been assigned; (14) in addition, the Brigade now requires that its training companies be commanded by branch-qualified captains; and (15) although frequent inspections have been conducted since the accident, they did not evaluate continued compliance with the training safety controls, nor were the results of the inspections adequately documented.