In other cases, DOD has publicly sold its  unneeded property. Infrastructure Needs of Many Enclaves Not Identified Until after BRAC Decision Making

Many of DOD’s specific enclave infrastructure needs were not identified  until after the commission for a BRAC round held its deliberations and  had rendered its recommendations. In addition, DOD’s enclave-planning processes  generally did not include a cross-service analysis of the needs of military  activities or activities in the vicinity of a realigning or closing base with  a proposed enclave. Army officials told us  that it was recognized early in the process that the Army wanted to retain  the majority of existing training land at some of its bases slated for closure  or realignment that also served as reserve component maneuver training  locations, but time constraints precluded the Army from fully identifying  specific enclave needs before the commission completed decision-making. The Air Force’s enclave infrastructure needs were reportedly more defined  than those of the Army at the time of commission deliberation and  decision making. Air Force officials told us that the base evaluation  process for the 1991 and 1993 rounds—the rounds when the Air Force’s  major reserve enclaves were created—included a detailed analysis of  the infrastructure needed for the enclaves, including enclave size,  identification of required facilities, and expected costs to operate and  maintain its proposed enclaves prior to commission consideration of its  proposals. The Army subsequently updated its savings estimates in  its succeeding annual budget submissions to reflect estimated costs to  operate and maintain many of its enclaves. As a result, the previous estimated cost omissions have not materially  affected the department’s estimate of $6.6 billion in annual recurring  savings across all previous round BRAC actions due to the fact that the  savings estimates for these locations have been updated to reflect many  enclave costs in subsequent annual budget submissions. Recommendations for Executive Action

As part of the new base realignment and closure round scheduled for 2005,  we recommend that you establish provisions to ensure that data provided  to the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission clearly specify  the (1) infrastructure (e.g., acreage and total square footage of facilities)  needed for any proposed reserve enclaves and (2) estimated costs to  operate and maintain such enclaves. We also contacted select officials who had participated in the  1995 BRAC round decision-making process to discuss their views on  establishing enclaves on closed or realigned bases. To determine whether projected costs to operate and maintain reserve  enclaves were considered in deriving estimated savings during the  BRAC decision-making process, we reviewed available cost and savings  estimation documentation derived from DOD’s COBRA model to ascertain  if estimated savings were offset by projected enclave costs.
Why GAO Did This Study

While four previous base closure rounds have afforded the Department of Defense (DOD) the opportunity to divest itself of unneeded property, it has, at the same time, retained more than 350,000 acres and nearly 20 million square feet of facilities on enclaves at closed or realigned bases for use by the reserve components. In view of the upcoming 2005 base closure round, GAO undertook this review to ascertain if opportunities exist to improve the decision-making processes used to establish reserve enclaves. Specifically, GAO determined to what extent (1)specific infrastructure needs for reserve enclaves were identified as part of base realignment and closure decision making and (2) estimated costs to operate and maintain enclaves were considered in deriving net estimated savings for realigning or closing bases.

What GAO Found

The specific infrastructure needed for many DOD reserve enclaves created under the previous base realignment and closure process was generally not identified until after a defense base closure commission had rendered its recommendations. While the Army generally decided it wanted much of the available training land for its enclaves before the time of the commission's decision making during the 1995 closure round, time constraints precluded the Army from fully identifying specific training acreages and facilities until later. Subsequently, in some instances the Army created enclaves that were nearly as large as the bases that were being closed. In contrast, the infrastructure needed for Air Force reserve enclaves was more defined during the decision-making process. Moreover, DOD's enclave-planning processes generally did not include a cross-service analysis of military activities that may have benefited by their inclusion in a nearby enclave. The Army did not include estimated costs to operate and maintain its reserve enclaves in deriving net estimated base realignment or closure savings during the decision-making process, but the Air Force apparently did so in forming its enclaves. GAO's analysis showed that the Army overestimated savings and underestimated the time required to recoup initial investment costs to either realign or close those bases with proposed enclaves. However, these original cost omissions have not materially affected DOD's recent estimate of $6.6 billion in annual recurring savings from the previous closure rounds because the Army subsequently updated its estimates in its budget submissions to reflect expected enclave costs.