Enhance the ability of the U.S. defense industrial base to meet U.S.  defense requirements and maintain long-term military technological  superiority at lower costs. These decisions are made before weapons or  technologies are approved for transfer. It also aims to  assess how U.S. technological advantage can be maintained. Process to Determine the Releasability of Advanced Weapons and Technologies Is Inherently Complex

The process governing the release of advanced weapons and technologies  is inherently complex because it involves multiple, multilevel reviews by  various U.S. government entities and individuals with varying  perspectives. Multiple Reviews Are Conducted

A foreign government’s request for the transfer of an advanced weapon or  technology is directed to the military department that is responsible for  the particular weapon or technology. In addition to the military departments’ reviews and the NDPC exception  process, special committee processes are set up to review requests for  sensitive technologies that may be included in a proposed transfer. Varying Perspectives and Broad Guidance Governing Potential Transfers Add to the Complexity of the Review Process

The multilayered reviews involved in the process for determining the  releasability of an advanced weapon or technology can be particularly  complex because individual entities and decision makers have varying  perspectives. According to NDPC members, the  broad criteria allow for a certain level of flexibility that is needed in  determining whether an advanced weapon should be released to a foreign  country. Technological Advantage and Various Safeguards Are Considered When Determining Releasability

One criterion NDPC must consider when determining the releasability of  advanced weapons and technologies is that the transfer must be consistent  with U.S. military and security objectives. In addition, factors outside of U.S. control can  diminish the effectiveness of certain individual safeguards. For example,  the United States may stop providing spare parts to former allies, but these  countries may obtain needed parts through other means, such as  “cannibalizing” parts from other weapons or obtaining parts from other  countries at a higher cost through the “grey market.” Some DOD officials  told us that while certain individual safeguards may not be as effective as  desired, they consider various safeguards for each proposed transfer to  ensure technological advantage is maintained. DOD’s centralized database contains some of this information, as well as  historical case data; however, it is not always complete, up-to-date, or easy  to access. However, the National Disclosure Policy  System that was used to make decisions during the last 4 years contained   data only for decisions made during that time period. However, according to some NDPC members, this information is used by  the State Department primarily for nonproliferation purposes and is not  provided to NDPC. For example, NDPC officials said that in a  recent instance an intelligence agency discovered that a country  requesting the release of an advanced weapon system did not have the  security capabilities to protect U.S. classified military information, but did  not provide this information to NDPC during the review process. Recommendations for Executive Actions

To ensure that NDPC members have complete and accurate information in  a centralized database that facilitates coordination and decision making on  the potential release of advanced weapons and technologies, we are  recommending that the Secretary of Defense direct the NDPC Executive  Secretariat to    evaluate the accuracy and effectiveness of the upgraded National    determine with NDPC members the additional capabilities, such as  inclusion of CIA risk assessments, needed for the upgraded National  Disclosure Policy System, and    work with the DOD Policy Automation Directorate to address user  comments and technical problems related to the upgraded system as they  arise. To ensure that useful and timely information is available for making  informed release decisions, we are recommending that the Secretary of  Defense direct the NDPC Executive Secretariat to    work with CIA to prioritize risk assessments that need to be updated,  establish a schedule for performing these assessments, and systematically  distribute the assessments to NDPC members through the automated  system or other means;    develop a plan to be used as a business case for determining the  appropriate level of resources required to conduct needed security surveys  or if a survey cannot be conducted, ensure that an alternative analysis of  or information on the foreign government’s security capability is made  available to NDPC members; and  identify what additional information, such as end-use monitoring reports,  would be useful to NDPC members, and establish a mechanism for  requesting this information from appropriate sources, and systematically  distribute it to NDPC members. To determine if U.S. technological advantage is considered and protected  in the review process, we reviewed selected weapons transfers records,  including pertinent initial country requests; military department, Joint  Staff, and other National Disclosure Policy Committee (NDPC) members’  input and positions on the requests; and limitations and conditions  included in the final committee positions.
Why GAO Did This Study

The heightened visibility of advanced U.S. weapons in military conflicts has prompted foreign countries to seek to purchase such weaponry. In 2001, transfers of U.S. weapons and technologies to foreign governments totaled over $12 billion. The potential loss of U.S. technological advantage has been raised as an issue in recently approved transfers of advanced military weapons and technologies--such as military aircraft that were reported in the media to contain superior radar and avionics than those in the Department of Defense's (DOD) inventory. GAO looked at how releasability of advanced weapons is determined, how U.S. technological advantage is considered and protected, and what information is needed to make informed decisions on the potential release of advanced weapons.

What GAO Found

Before transfers are approved, the U.S. government must first determine if classified weapons or technologies are releasable to the requesting country according to the National Disclosure Policy (NDP). The process for determining releasability is complex. A foreign government's request is first reviewed by the military department that owns the requested weapon or technology. In cases where the request exceeds NDP's approved classification level, the military department forwards the request to the National Disclosure Policy Committee for its review. For some sensitive technologies, such as stealth, the case is also forwarded to a special committee for review. The process requires coordination among different U.S. government entities--including DOD, the military departments, the State Department, and the intelligence community--which have varying perspectives. Adding to this complexity, determinations of releasability are governed by broad guidance, which allows latitude in interpreting the unique circumstances of each proposed transfer. In determining the releasability of advanced weapons and technologies, a number of factors are considered, including how U.S. technological advantage would be affected. To protect U.S. technological advantage, safeguards--such as lowering the capability of a transferred weapon and withholding sensitive information on how the system operates--are considered for proposed transfers. However, the effectiveness of some individual safeguards may be limited. For example, one safeguard--the ability of the United States to deny spare parts to former allies--may not be effective if these countries are able to obtain spare parts through other means. While certain individual safeguards may not be as effective as desired, DOD officials said they consider various safeguards to ensure technological advantage is maintained. Information needed to assess releasability is not always complete, up-to-date, or available. For example, DOD's centralized National Disclosure Policy System database that was used to make decisions during the last 4 years only contained information for that time period. DOD has recently deployed an upgrade to the system, but has not yet determined its effectiveness. Other information, such as Central Intelligence Agency risk assessments--which provide counterintelligence information and risks involved in releasing advanced weapons to a foreign country--are often outdated or nonexistent. Finally, some intelligence information that could have a direct bearing on whether an advanced weapon or technology should be released is prepared for other purposes and is not provided to decision makers involved in releasability determinations.