1). 2. 3. U.S. troops experienced shortages of  seven of the nine items GAO selected for review. According to the 2004  National Military Strategy, U.S. forces expect to have sufficient quantities  of the right items at the right time. However, demand for the seven items  exceeded availability sometime between October 2002 and September  2004. For example, while units in the 3rd Infantry Division reported that tire  shortages affected their mission by forcing them to abandon equipment,  the 4th Infantry Division reported that their tire shortages had no affect on  their mission. The shortages  reduced the operational capabilities of these vehicles and negatively  impacted operations in Iraq. Inaccurate and Inadequately Funded Army War Reserve Requirements for Spare Parts Led to Early Shortages during OIF

The inaccurate requirements for and poor funding of war reserves affected  the availability of three of the supply items (armored vehicle track shoes,  lithium batteries, and tires). Annual updates of the Army’s war reserve  requirements for supply items have not been conducted and, as a result, the  Army did not have an accurate estimate of the spare parts and other items  needed for a contingency such as OIF. In prior reports, we have identified problems with the Army’s process for  computing the war reserve spare parts requirements. While we did not evaluate  the changes’ potential for success, we observed that the majority of them  focus on the distribution aspects of logistics problems, not the full range of  supply deficiencies we identified. Ineffective distribution. We also recommend the Secretary of Defense take the following three  actions and specify when they will be completed:  revise current joint logistics doctrine to clearly state, consistent with  policy, who has responsibility and authority for synchronizing the  distribution of supplies from the U.S. to deployed units during  operations,  develop and exercise, through a mix of computer simulations and field  training, deployable supply receiving and distribution capabilities  including trained personnel and related equipment for implementing  improved supply management practices, such as radio frequency  identification tags that provide in-transit visibility of supplies, to ensure  they are sufficient and capable of meeting the requirements in  operational plans, and  establish common supply information systems that ensure the DOD and  the services can requisition supplies promptly and match incoming  supplies with unit requisitions to facilitate expeditious and accurate  distribution. We judgmentally selected the nine items because we believed they  presented possible shortages with operational impacts based on our prior  work on OIF logistics and other sources such as military “after-action”  reports on OIF operations, military and contractor “lessons learned”  studies, briefings, congressional testimonies, and interviews with  Department of Defense (DOD) and military service officials covering the  time period between October 2002 and September 2004. To determine what actions DOD has taken to improve the availability of  supplies for current and future operations, we collected data from military  service and joint command headquarters personnel to identify short- and  long-term efforts to address supply shortages. Marine Corps Helicopter Rotor Blades

	Background

During Operation Iraqi Freedom, the Marine Corps relied on a variety of  helicopters to support its forces during combat operations.
Why GAO Did This Study

GAO has identified spare parts supply as a long-standing Department of Defense (DOD) management problem. In December 2003, GAO reported on problems with Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) logistics support including shortages of spare parts and supplies in Iraq. This report expands on that effort by assessing (1) what supply shortages were experienced by U.S. forces in Iraq between October 2002 and September 2004 and what impact the shortages had on their operations, (2) what primary deficiencies in the supply system contributed to any identified supply shortages, and (3) what actions DOD has taken to improve the timely availability of supplies for current and future operations. To address these objectives, GAO judgmentally selected nine items based on lessons learned and after-action reports that represented possible shortages with operational impacts.

What GAO Found

U.S. troops experienced shortages of seven of the nine items GAO reviewed. According to the 2004 National Military Strategy, U.S. forces expect to have sufficient quantities of the right items at the right time. However, demand for the seven items exceeded availability sometime between October 2002 and September 2004. The documented impact of these shortages varied between combat units. For example, while units in the 3rd Infantry Division reported that tire shortages reduced their operational capability, forcing them to abandon equipment, the 4th Infantry Division reported no similar effect. GAO identified five systemic deficiencies that contributed to shortages of the reviewed items, including inaccurate Army war reserve spare parts requirements and ineffective distribution. Annual updates of Army war reserve parts requirements have not been conducted since 1999. As a result, the war reserves did not contain enough track shoes, batteries, and tires to support U.S. forces during initial operations. Effective distribution relies on a seamless process to promptly move supplies from the United States to a customer. GAO found that conflicting doctrinal responsibilities for distribution management, improperly packed shipments, insufficient transportation personnel and equipment, and inadequate information systems prevented the timely availability of four of the items. While U.S. troops developed short-term solutions to manage item shortages during OIF, DOD and the services have begun to undertake systemic, long-term changes to fix some supply problems identified. While GAO did not evaluate their potential for success, the majority of the changes are focused on distribution, and not on the full gamut of systemic deficiencies GAO identified.