	Background

Agricultural inspections at U.S. ports of entry had been the responsibility of  USDA since 1913. After the transfer, CBP formalized this  process to ensure all agriculture specialists were receiving the necessary  on-the-job training. CBP and APHIS Have Taken Steps to Improve Targeting of Agricultural Inspections

CBP and APHIS have also taken steps to better identify and target  shipments and passengers that present potentially high risk to U.S.  agriculture. CBP has not developed  sufficient performance measures to manage and evaluate the AQI program. Since then, CBP  has hired more than 630 specialists, but the agency has not yet developed  or used a risk-based staffing model for determining where to assign its  agriculture specialists. However, CBP has not used this data to evaluate the effectiveness of the  AQI program. Agriculture Canine Program Has Deteriorated

Agriculture canines are a key tool for targeting passengers and cargo for  inspection, but we found that the program has deteriorated since the  transfer. Furthermore, APHIS did not always make regular transfers of funds to CBP  as it had agreed to, causing CBP to use other funding sources or to reduce  spending. Despite the drop in  revenue, APHIS had to increase AQI inspection activities because of post- September 11 concerns about the threat of bioterrorism. Consequently, in fiscal years 2004 and 2005, APHIS used AQI user-fee  collections from previous years, and CBP used another available appropriation to cover AQI costs. APHIS uses this information to set user-fee rates and to audit user-fee  collections. Although CBP provided detailed cost information by activity  and user-fee type to APHIS for fiscal year 2004, CBP provided only  estimated cost information for fiscal year 2005 because of a weakness in  the design of the agency’s new financial management system. Specifically, in light of the AQI program’s expanded mission,  DHS needs to develop and adopt meaningful performance measures to  assess the AQI program’s effectiveness at intercepting prohibited  agricultural materials; implement a national risk-based staffing model to  ensure that adequate numbers of agriculture specialists are staffed to areas  of greatest vulnerability; and review its financial management systems to  ensure financial accountability for funds allocated to the AQI program. Recommendations for Executive Action

To ensure the effectiveness of CBP and APHIS agricultural quarantine  inspection programs designed to protect U.S. agriculture from accidental  or deliberate introduction of foreign pests and disease, we are making the  following seven recommendations: We recommend that the Secretaries of Homeland Security and Agriculture  work together to  adopt meaningful performance measures for assessing the AQI  program’s effectiveness at intercepting foreign pests and disease on  agricultural materials entering the country by all pathways—including  commercial aircraft, vessels, and truck cargo—and posing a risk to U.S.  agriculture;  establish a process to identify and assess the major risks posed by  foreign pests and disease and develop and implement a national staffing  model to ensure that agriculture staffing levels at each port are  sufficient to meet those risks;   ensure that urgent agriculture alerts and other information essential to  safeguarding U.S. agriculture are more effectively shared between the  departments and transmitted to DHS agriculture specialists in the ports;  improve the effectiveness of the agriculture canine program by  reviewing policies and procedures regarding training and staffing of  agriculture canines and ensure that these policies and procedures are  followed in the ports; and  revise the user fees to ensure that they cover the AQI program’s costs. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are  listed in appendix V.

Scope and Methodology

To assess the extent to which the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA)  and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) have changed the  Agricultural Quarantine Inspection (AQI) program since the transfer of  responsibilities from USDA to DHS, we reviewed the 2003 Memorandum of  Agreement between the United States Department of Homeland Security  and the United States Department of Agriculture, dated February 28, 2003,  and the associated appendixes governing how USDA and DHS are to  coordinate inspection responsibilities. We also reviewed agency  documentation, including training materials for newly hired Customs and  Border Protection (CBP) officers, information on databases used by CBP  agricultural specialists to target agriculture inspections, joint-agency  reports on port compliance with agricultural inspection policy, and  information related to CBP’s establishment and utilization of new  agriculture liaison positions. To assess how the departments have managed and coordinated their  agriculture inspection responsibilities, we reviewed the interagency  memorandum of agreement between DHS and USDA and its associated  appendixes. 3.
Why GAO Did This Study

U.S. agriculture generates over $1 trillion in annual economic activity, but concerns exist about the sector's vulnerability to a natural or deliberate introduction of foreign livestock, poultry, and crop pests and disease. Under the Agricultural Quarantine Inspection (AQI) program, international passengers and cargo are inspected at U.S. ports of entry to seize prohibited material and intercept foreign agricultural pests. The Homeland Security Act of 2002 transferred AQI inspections from the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and left certain other AQI responsibilities at USDA. GAO examined (1) the extent to which USDA and DHS have changed the inspection program since the transfer, (2) how the agencies have managed and coordinated their responsibilities, and (3) how funding for agricultural inspections has been managed since the transfer.

What GAO Found

After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, federal agencies' roles and responsibilities were modified to help protect agriculture. In March 2003, more than 1,800 agriculture specialists within USDA's Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) became DHS Customs and Border Protection (CBP) employees, while USDA retained responsibility for AQI activities such as setting inspection policy, providing training, and collecting user fees. Since the transfer, the agencies have expanded training on agriculture issues for CBP officers and agriculture specialists. CBP and APHIS also have taken steps to enable agriculture specialists to better target shipments and passengers for inspections and established a process to assess how CBP agriculture specialists are implementing AQI policy. Finally, CBP created a new agriculture liaison position in each of its district field offices to advise regional directors on agricultural issues. While these are positive steps, the agencies face management and coordination problems that increase the vulnerability of U.S. agriculture to foreign pests and disease. CBP has not developed sufficient performance measures that take into account the agency's expanded mission or consider all pathways by which prohibited agricultural items or foreign pests may enter the country. Specifically, although CBP's measures focus on two pathways that pose a risk to U.S. agriculture, they do not consider other key pathways such as commercial aircraft, vessels, and truck cargo. Also, although CBP has hired more than 630 specialists since the transfer, it has not yet developed or used a risk-based staffing model to ensure that adequate numbers of agriculture specialists are staffed to areas of greatest vulnerability. CBP also has not used available inspection and interception data to evaluate the performance of the AQI program. CBP and APHIS also continue to experience difficulty in sharing information such as key policy changes and urgent inspection alerts, and CBP has allowed the number and proficiency of agriculture canine units to decline. Although APHIS is legally authorized (though not required) to charge AQI user fees to cover program costs, we found that the agencies have not taken the necessary steps to ensure that user fees cover AQI costs. Consequently, the agencies had to use other authorized funding sources to pay for the program. Also, because of weaknesses in the design of CBP's new financial management system, CBP was unable to provide APHIS with information on the actual costs of the AQI program by user-fee type--for example, fees paid by international air passengers. APHIS uses this information to set future user-fee rates. Finally, in fiscal years 2004 and 2005, APHIS did not transfer AQI funds to CBP as agreed to by both agencies, causing some ports of entry to reduce spending on inspection activities in fiscal year 2005.