	U.S. Policy

This CRS Report discusses U.S. security assistance for Taiwan, formally called the Republic of China (ROC), particularly policy issues for Congress. Role of Congress

Congress passed and exercises oversight of the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), P.L. 96-8 , the law that has governed U.S. arms sales to Taiwan since 1979, when the United States recognized the People's Republic of China (PRC) instead of the ROC. Section 3(a) states that "the United States will make available to Taiwan such defense articles and defense services in such quantity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability." The Pentagon reported that, despite closer cross-strait ties, the PLA has continued to develop and deploy capabilities for action against Taiwan. President Bush approved four decommissioned Kidd-class destroyers for sale as Excess Defense Articles (EDA). Taiwan's Decisions

After the U.S. response to Taiwan's requests in 2001, attention turned to Taiwan, where the military, civilian officials, and competing political parties in a newly assertive legislature (Legislative Yuan, or LY) have debated contentious issues. The department also noted that Taiwan has not requested technical assistance for its own submarine program. P-3C ASW Aircraft

After the United States approved Taiwan's request for 12 P-3C planes, the two sides negotiated the proposed sale. In the end, Taiwan's LY deleted the defense ministry's request of about $347 million (out of a total program cost of $3.6 billion) to procure PAC-3 missiles in the 2007 defense budget passed on June 15, 2007, and opted to fund about $110 million for PAC-2 upgrades (out of a total program cost of $603 million). In September 1992, President George H. W. Bush notified Congress of the sale of 150 F-16A/B fighters with a value of $5.8 billion. Other Possible Future Arms Sales to Taiwan's Military

In addition to the major systems discussed above, possible future arms sales to Taiwan include:
signals intelligence (SIGINT) aircraft (perhaps from Gulfstream, Raytheon, or Cessna) for which Taiwan requested price and availability data in 2002; C-27J Spartan medium transport aircraft (sold by L3 Communications); F-35 Joint Strike Fighters (JSF), particularly the short take-off/vertical landing (STOVL) version, produced by Lockheed Martin and foreign partners; Stryker armored wheeled vehicles (sold by General Dynamics); upgraded engines for F-16s (Pratt & Whitney or General Electric); CH-53X minesweeping helicopters (developed by Sikorsky); T-6C trainer aircraft to replace T-34C trainers (sold by Beechcraft); Phalanx Close-In Weapons System (CIWS) (sold by Raytheon); Sensor Fuse Weapon for the Air Force (sold by Textron Systems); Armor Security Vehicle for the Military Police (sold by Textron Systems); Upgrades of Lafayette-class frigates, other ships, and Sea Dragon submarines; Air traffic control system for Taiwan's Air Force (sold by ITT); Perry-class frigates (as Excess Defense Articles from the U.S. Navy); Newport-class landing ship tank (as Excess Defense Articles); Athena C4ISR situational awareness system (sold by Raytheon); Aegis Ashore, land-based missile defense system (sold by Lockheed Martin); Sky Warrior tactical unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) (sold by General Atomics); MH-60R Seahawk ASW helicopters (sold by Sikorsky and Lockheed Martin); Combat management system for mine-hunters (sold by Lockheed Martin). Policy considerations include the TRA, the 1982 Joint Communique (which discussed reductions in U.S. arms sales to Taiwan premised on the PRC's "peaceful unification" policy), and the 1982 "Six Assurances" to Taiwan (including one of not holding prior consultations with the PRC on U.S. arms sales to Taiwan). Gregson also urged Taiwan to stress "asymmetrical advantages" in its defense. In October 2009, Shuai Hua-ming, a key KMT Member of the Legislative Yuan in Taipei who is a retired Lieutenant General of the Army, questioned the U.S. commitment to help Taiwan's self-defense under the TRA (with delays and cost increases in arms programs), the push by some in Taiwan to build trust through triangular talks among Taiwan, China, and the United States (rather than traditional trust between Taiwan and the United States), and the will of Taiwan's military leadership to reform with new concepts of training, jointness, warfighting, and strategy (not simply using defensive weapons with no combat experience for decades). On May 24, 2005, the LY's Procedure Committee failed to place the Special Budget on the legislative calendar, blocking consideration before the session's end on May 31. After the KMT's Ma Ying-jeou became president in May 2008, he retained the goal of defense budgets at 3% of GDP, a commitment reaffirmed in Taiwan's Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) of March 2009 and the National Defense Report of October 2009. The budget included amounts to support requests for F-16C/D fighters and a submarine design. However, MND also is cutting personnel. However, President Bush submitted only six of the eight pending sales for a total value of $6.5 billion, or about half of the pending total. Despite concerns raised by President Bush's decision-making, President Obama repeated that process since 2008 to decide on submissions to Congress all at one time (no notifications for FMS programs after October 3, 2008, until his first notifications on January 29, 2010 ). On one day, he notified Congress of five programs (not a "package") with a total value of $6.4 billion that involved PAC-3 missile defense systems (a sale that was broken up into two parts with notification of one part in 2008), Black Hawk utility helicopters, Harpoon anti-ship training missiles, follow-on technical support for the Po Sheng joint command and control project, and Osprey-class minehunters (that Congress authorized for sale in P.L. Like Bush, President Obama did not advance the submarine design program (the only one pending for notification to Congress stemming from decisions in 2001) and has not accepted Taiwan's formal request for F-16C/D fighters (pending for submission since 2006). 419 (Ros-Lehtinen), the Taiwan Policy Act of 2013. On April 7, 2014, the House agreed by voice vote to pass H.R. 4435 ( H.Rept. Thus, H.R. H.R. 113-291 on December 19. S. 1683 became P.L. 113-276 on December 18.
This report, updated through the 113th Congress, discusses U.S. security assistance to Taiwan (calling itself Republic of China (ROC)), including policy issues for Congress and legislation. Congress has oversight of the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), P.L. 96-8, which has governed arms sales to Taiwan since 1979, when the United States recognized the People's Republic of China (PRC) instead of the ROC. The U.S.-ROC Mutual Defense Treaty terminated in 1979. Two other relevant parts of the "one China" policy are the August 17, 1982, U.S.-PRC Joint Communique and the "Six Assurances" to Taiwan. U.S. arms sales to Taiwan have been significant. The United States also expanded military ties with Taiwan after the PRC's missile firings in 1995-1996.
At the last U.S.-Taiwan annual arms sales talks on April 24, 2001, President George W. Bush approved for possible sale diesel-electric submarines, P-3 anti-submarine warfare (ASW) aircraft (linked to the submarine sale), four decommissioned U.S. Kidd-class destroyers, and other items. Bush also deferred decisions on Aegis-equipped destroyers and other items, while denying other requests. Afterward, attention turned to Taiwan, where the military, civilian officials, and legislators from competing political parties debated contentious issues about how much to spend on defense and which U.S. weapons to acquire, despite the increasing threat (including a missile buildup) from the PRC's military, the People's Liberation Army (PLA). The Pentagon also has broadened its concern from Taiwan's arms purchases to its defense spending, seriousness in self-defense and protection of secrets, joint capabilities, deterrence, operational readiness, critical infrastructure protection, and innovative, asymmetrical advantages. Blocked by the Kuomintang (KMT) party in the Legislative Yuan (LY) that opposed the Democratic Progressive Party's (DPP's) president (2000-2008), the Special Budget (not passed) for submarines, P-3C ASW aircraft, and PAC-3 missile defense systems was cut from $18 billion in 2004 to $9 billion (for submarines only) in 2005. In March 2006, Taiwan's defense minister requested a Supplemental Defense Budget (not passed) in part for submarine procurement, P-3Cs, and PAC-2 upgrades (not new PAC-3 missiles). In June 2007, the LY passed Taiwan's 2007 defense budget with funds for P-3C planes, PAC-2 upgrades, and F-16C/D fighters. In December 2007, the LY approved $62 million to start the submarine design phase. After the KMT's Ma Ying-jeou became President in May 2008, he resumed cross-strait talks, reduced tension, and retained the arms requests. However, Ma has failed to invest in defense at the bipartisan goal of budgeting at 3% of GDP. On June 5, 2014, the Pentagon reported to Congress that the PLA remains focused on Taiwan.
In 2008, congressional concerns mounted about a suspected "freeze" in President Bush's notifications on arms sales. On October 3, 2008, Bush finally notified Congress. However, he submitted six of the eight pending programs (not a "package") for a combined value of $6.5 billion. Despite those concerns, President Obama repeated that cycle to wait to submit formal notifications for congressional review all on one day (on January 29, 2010) of five major programs with a total value of $6.4 billion and again (on September 21, 2011) of three major programs with a total value of $5.9 billion, including upgrades for Taiwan's existing F-16A/B fighters. Like Bush, President Obama has not notified a diesel-electric submarine design program (the only one pending from decisions in 2001) and has not accepted Taiwan's formal request for new F-16C/D fighters (pending since 2006). An issue for oversight is whether the President is adhering to the TRA in making available defense articles and defense services in such quantity as necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a "sufficient" self-defense capability. By 2014, an issue arose about whether to approve technical assistance to Taiwan's indigenous submarine program. Also, Congress authorized the transfer of U.S. Navy excess Perry-class frigates to Taiwan. Legislation in the 113th Congress includes H.R. 419 (Ros-Lehtinen), S. 12 (Coats), H.R. 1960 (McKeon), H.R. 3470 (Royce), S. 1197 (Levin), S. 1683 (Menendez)/P.L. 113-276, H.R. 4435 (McKeon), H.R. 4495 (Forbes), S. 2410 (Levin), and H.R. 3979 (Barletta)/P.L. 113-291.