	Agencies’ Roles and Responsibilities in the Personnel Security Clearance Process

Several agencies in the executive branch have key roles and  responsibilities in the federal government’s personnel security clearance  process. As  such, the DNI is responsible for developing policies and procedures to  help ensure the effective, efficient, and timely completion of background  investigations and adjudications relating to determinations of eligibility for  access to classified information and eligibility to hold a sensitive position. The order also appointed the Deputy Director  for Management at the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) as the  chair of the council.heads shall assist the Performance Accountability Council and executive  agents in carrying out any function under the order, as well as  implementing any policies or procedures developed pursuant to the order. In addition, the executive order states that agency  Executive branch agencies that request background investigations use  the information from investigative reports to determine whether an  applicant is eligible for a personnel security clearance. Two of the  agencies that grant the most security clearances are DOD and the  Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Investigators—often contractors—from Federal Investigative Services  within the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) conduct the  investigations for most of the federal government. DHS spent more than $57 million on suitability and security clearance  background investigations in fiscal year 2011. Phases of the Personnel Security Process

To help ensure the trustworthiness and reliability of personnel in positions  with access to classified information, executive branch agencies rely on a  personnel security clearance process that includes multiple phases:  requirements determination, application, investigation, adjudication,  appeals (if applicable, where a clearance has been denied), and  reinvestigation (where applicable, for renewal or upgrade of an existing  clearance). In December 2012, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence  (ODNI) and OPM jointly issued a revised version of the federal  investigative standards for the conduct of background investigations for  individuals that work for or on behalf of the federal government. Adjudication and Appeals Phases

During the adjudication phase, adjudicators from the hiring agency use  the information from the investigative report along with federal  adjudicative guidelines to determine whether an applicant is eligible for a  security clearance.adjudicative guidelines specify that adjudicators consider 13 specific  areas that elicit information about (1) conduct that could raise security  concerns and (2) factors that could allay those security concerns and   To make clearance eligibility decisions, the  permit granting a clearance.weighing of a number of variables, to include disqualifying and mitigating  factors, known as the “whole-person” concept. The adjudication process is a careful  If a clearance is denied or revoked, appeals of the adjudication decision  are generally possible. Reinvestigation Phase

Once an individual has obtained a personnel security clearance and as  long as they remain in a position that requires access to classified  national security information, that individual is reinvestigated periodically  at intervals that are dependent on the level of security clearance. Agencies Do Not Consistently Assess Quality Throughout the Personnel Security Clearance Process

Executive branch agencies do not consistently assess quality throughout  the personnel security clearance process, in part because they have not  fully developed and implemented metrics to measure quality in key  aspects of the personnel security clearance process. For example, in May 2009 we  reported that, with respect to DOD initial top secret clearances  adjudicated in July 2008, documentation was incomplete for most OPM  investigative reports. We also estimated that 12 percent of the 3,500 investigative  reports did not contain a required personal subject interview. As a result of  the incompleteness of OPM’s investigative reports on DOD personnel, we  recommended in May 2009 that OPM measure the frequency with which  its investigative reports meet federal investigative standards, so that the  executive branch can identify the factors leading to incomplete reports  and take corrective actions.recommendation. Extent of Clearance Reciprocity Not Measured

Executive branch agencies have not yet developed and implemented  metrics to track the reciprocity of personnel security clearances, which is  an agency’s acceptance of a background investigation or clearance  determination completed by any authorized investigative or adjudicative  agency, although some efforts have been made to develop quality  metrics. For example, OPM created a metric in early 2009 to  track reciprocity, but this metric only measures the number of  investigations requested from OPM that are rejected based on the  existence of a previous investigation and does not track the number of  cases in which an existing security clearance was or was not successfully  honored by the agency. In conclusion, to avoid the risk of damaging, unauthorized disclosures of  classified information, oversight of the reform efforts to measure and  improve the quality of the security clearance process are imperative next  steps.
Why GAO Did This Study

In 2012, the DNI reported that more than 4.9 million federal government and contractor employees held or were eligible to hold a personnel security clearance. Furthermore, GAO has reported that the federal government spent over $1 billion to conduct more than 2 million background investigations in fiscal year 2011. A high quality process is essential to minimize the risks of unauthorized disclosures of classified information and to help ensure that information about individuals with criminal activity or other questionable behavior is identified and assessed as part of the process for granting or retaining clearances. Security clearances may allow personnel to gain access to classified information that, through unauthorized disclosure, can in some cases cause exceptionally grave damage to U.S. national security. Recent events, such as unauthorized disclosures of classified information, have illustrated the need for additional work to help ensure the process functions effectively and efficiently.
This testimony addresses the (1) roles and responsibilities of different executive branch agencies involved in the personnel security process; (2) different phases of the process; and (3) extent that agencies assess the quality of the process. This testimony is based on GAO work issued between 2008 and 2013 on DOD's personnel security clearance program and government-wide suitability and security clearance reform efforts. As part of that work, GAO (1) reviewed statutes, executive orders, guidance, and processes; (2) examined agency data on timeliness and quality; (3) assessed reform efforts; and (4) reviewed samples of case files for DOD personnel.

What GAO Found

Several agencies in the executive branch have key roles and responsibilities in the personnel security clearance process. Executive Order 13467 designates the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) as the Security Executive Agent, who is responsible for developing policies and procedures for background investigations and adjudications. The Office of Personnel Management (OPM) conducts investigations for most of the federal government. Adjudicators from agencies, such as the Departments of Defense (DOD) and Homeland Security, that request background investigations use the investigative report and consider federal adjudicative guidelines when making clearance determinations. Reform efforts to enhance the personnel security process throughout the executive branch are principally driven and overseen by the Performance Accountability Council, which is chaired by the Deputy Director for Management at the Office of Management and Budget (OMB).
Executive branch agencies rely on a multi-phased personnel security clearance process that includes requirements determination, application, investigation, adjudication, appeals (if applicable, where a clearance has been denied), and reinvestigation (for renewal or upgrade of an existing clearance). In the requirements determination phase, agency officials must determine whether positions require access to classified information. After an individual has been selected for a position that requires a personnel security clearance and the individual submits an application for a clearance, investigators--often contractors--from OPM conduct background investigations for most executive branch agencies. Adjudicators from requesting agencies use the information from these investigations and consider federal adjudicative guidelines to determine whether an applicant is eligible for a clearance. If a clearance is denied or revoked by an agency, appeals of the adjudication decision are possible. Individuals granted clearances are subject to reinvestigations at intervals that are dependent on the level of security clearance.
Executive branch agencies do not consistently assess quality throughout the security clearance process, in part because they have not fully developed and implemented metrics to measure quality in key aspects of the process. For example, GAO reported in May 2009 that, with respect to initial top secret clearances adjudicated in July 2008 for DOD, documentation was incomplete for most of OPM's investigative reports. GAO also estimated that 12 percent of the 3,500 reports did not contain the required personal subject interview. To improve the quality of investigative documentation, GAO recommended that OPM measure the frequency with which its reports met federal investigative standards. OPM did not agree or disagree with this recommendation, and as of August 2013 had not implemented it. Further, GAO reported in 2010 that agencies do not consistently and comprehensively track the reciprocity of personnel security clearances, which is an agency's acceptance of a background investigation or clearance determination completed by any authorized investigative or adjudicative agency. OPM created a metric in early 2009 to track reciprocity, but this metric does not track how often an existing security clearance was successfully honored. GAO recommended that OMB develop comprehensive metrics to track reciprocity. OMB agreed with the recommendation, but has not yet fully implemented actions to implement this recommendation.