DOD, DOE, and State are responsible specifically for the  overseas programs. 1.) To that  end, in 2005, DNDO identified critical gaps in domestic efforts to prevent  and detect radiological and nuclear smuggling, including, but not limited  to: (1) land border areas between ports of entry into the United States,   (2) aviation, and (3) small maritime craft. However, DNDO is still in the  early stages of developing initiatives to address these vulnerabilities, and it  has not clearly articulated a long-term plan for how to achieve its goal of  closing these gaps by expanding radiological and nuclear detection  capabilities in the time frames identified. Assuming no further schedule and  technological delays, the radiation detection equipment to help secure the  U.S. land border areas between ports of entry may not be fully in place  until fiscal year 2012. According to DNDO officials, such  efforts are being included in the strategy for the first time. CBP uses this sample to routinely test equipment. Small maritime vessels. To  address one of the vulnerabilities, DNDO has been working since 2005  with multiple federal agencies, including the Coast Guard and CBP, as well  as state and local agencies, to develop and expand capabilities to detect  radiological and nuclear materials that could be smuggled on small  maritime craft. For example, in Puget Sound, the majority of  the law enforcement personnel and equipment available for radiological  and nuclear detection belong to the 15 state, tribal, and local agencies  participating in the pilot. However, DNDO has not  established criteria for assessing the success of this pilot effort to help  determine whether it should be expanded to other locations. DNDO Has Limited Role in Influencing U.S. Efforts to Combat Radiologi and Nuclear Smuggling Ov

lthough DNDO has no authority over other federal agencies’ programs to  A combat radiological and nuclear smuggling overseas, it has exchanged  lessons learned with DOD, DOE, and State and provided technical  expertise on radiological and nuclear detection equipment. Howeve r, most  of DNDO’s efforts are modest in scope and reflect the fact that DOD, DOE,  and State have well-established programs to combat nuclear smuggling  overseas. DOE officials  OE. DNDO is working with State on the Global Initiative to Combat  S Nuclear Terrorism—which provides 75 countries with an opportunity t integrate resources and share information and expertise on nuclear o  smuggling prevention, detection, and response—to develop model  guidelines that other countries can use to establish their own nucle detection strategies. Amounts Budgeted for Programs to Combat Nuclear Smuggling Overseas and to Detect Nuclear Materials Primarily at U.S. Bo and Ports of Entry Were Nearly the Same

According to our analysis of DNDO’s data, of the approximately   $2.8 billion agencies budgeted in fiscal year 2007, about 39 percen t went to  combat nuclear smuggling overseas, while 41 percent went to programs to  detect and secure radiological and nuclear materials at and within U.S.  borders; another 20 percent went to programs that cut across foreign an domestic activities. borders. DNDO’s Joint Annual Interagency Report Is Not Used for Analysis or to Focus Nuclear Detection Priorities

In July 2007, Congress passed the “Implementing Recommendations of the  9/11 Commission Act of 2007,” which required DHS, DOD, DOE, the  Department of Justice, and the Director of National Intelligence to  coordinate the preparation of a Joint Annual Interagency Review of the  Global Nuclear Detection Architecture. It also has made some  progress in developing and supporting initiatives to close these gaps. In  addition, the report identified some of DNDO’s accomplishments in  specific areas, such as working with the other agencies to develop new  radiation detection technologies. Finally, where appropriate, we have incorporated a variety of technical  comments provided by DHS to better characterize DNDO’s role and  accomplishments, and the challenges it faces in developing a global  nuclear detection strategy to combat nuclear smuggling. GAO Comments

1. 2. 3. However, DNDO is responsible for enhancing and  coordinating federal, state, and local efforts to combat nuclear  smuggling domestically and overseas. Radiation Detection Programs Overseas

Combating Nuclear Smuggling: Challenges Facing U.S. Efforts to Deploy  Radiation Detection Equipment in Other Countries and in the United  States. Homeland Security: Limited Progress in Deploying Radiation Detection  Equipment at U.S.
Why GAO Did This Study

In April 2005, the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) was established within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to enhance and coordinate federal, state, and local efforts to combat nuclear smuggling domestically and overseas. DNDO was directed to develop, in coordination with the departments of Defense (DOD), Energy (DOE), and State (State), a global strategy for nuclear detection--a system of radiation detection equipment and interdiction activities domestically and abroad. GAO was asked to examine (1) DNDO's progress in developing programs to address critical gaps in preventing nuclear smuggling domestically, (2) DNDO's role in supporting other agencies' efforts to combat nuclear smuggling overseas, and (3) the amount budgeted by DHS, DOD, DOE, and State for programs that constitute the global nuclear detection strategy. To do so, GAO analyzed agency documents; interviewed agency, state, and local officials; and visited select pilot program locations.

What GAO Found

DNDO has made some progress in strengthening radiation detection capabilities to address critical gaps and vulnerabilities in combating nuclear smuggling, which include the land border area between ports of entry into the United States, aviation, and small maritime vessels. However, DNDO is still in the early stages of program development, and has not clearly developed long term plans, with costs and time frames, for achieving its goal of closing these gaps by expanding radiological and nuclear detection capabilities. For example, DNDO and Customs and Border Protection have been collaborating on radiological and nuclear detection options to better secure the land borders between ports of entry. However, DNDO-sponsored field evaluations to test radiation detection equipment are still not complete and DNDO and CBP may not have all radiation detection equipment in place until 2012. In addition, DNDO is in the first year of a 3-year maritime pilot program, working with the Coast Guard and local law enforcement agencies in the Puget Sound, Washington, area to field test equipment and to develop radiological and nuclear screening procedures. However, DNDO has made little progress in (1) developing criteria for assessing the success of the pilot to help determine whether it should be expanded to other locations, and (2) resolving some of the challenges it faces in the pilot program, such as technological limitations of the detection equipment and sustaining current detection efforts. Although DNDO has no authority over other federal agencies' programs to combat radiological and nuclear smuggling overseas, it has worked with DOD, DOE, and State to provide subject matter expertise and exchange lessons learned on radiological and nuclear detection. However, most of DNDO's efforts are modest in scope, reflecting the fact that these agencies have well-established programs to combat nuclear smuggling. For example, DNDO has been working with State's Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism to develop model guidelines that other nations can use to establish their own nuclear detection programs. According to DNDO, approximately $2.8 billion was budgeted by DHS, DOD, DOE, and State in fiscal year 2007 for programs included in the global strategy for nuclear detection. Of this amount, approximately $1.1 billion was budgeted for programs to combat nuclear smuggling overseas, $1.1 billion was budgeted for nuclear detection programs at the U.S. border and within the United States, and approximately $577 million was budgeted to fund cross-cutting activities, such as providing technical support to users of the radiation detection equipment. DNDO collected budget data and published them in the Joint Annual Interagency Review, an annual report required by Congress. DOD, DOE, and State officials told GAO that this information is used primarily as a status report of individual programs to combat nuclear smuggling. It is not used as a tool to help plan for or inform the future direction of the strategy or to help establish current or future priorities.