Included among these aircraft are  airplanes, balloons, unmanned aircraft systems, gliders, and helicopters. As we reported about accidents occurring in 1998,  personal operations accounted for more than 75 percent of fatal general  aviation accidents. Some Industry Segments Experienced Fatal Accidents Disproportionately to Their Estimated Annual Flight Hours

To better understand the above observations about the airplanes involved  in and the types of operations flown during general aviation accidents, we  compared the proportions of fatal accidents by airplane category and  operation type to their shares of FAA estimated flight hours for 1999  through 2010. Though the single-engine  piston airplane is most often involved in fatal general aviation accidents,  its share of fatal accidents (60 percent) was slightly less than its share of  general aviation flight hours (65 percent). By comparison, E-ABs  comprised 21 percent of fatal accidents, but only 4 percent of estimated  flight hours. FAA and the industry recently completed a review of a  subgroup of fatal loss of control accidents and will be developing detailed  implementation plans for the intervention strategies. We discuss the implications of the lack of this and other data  later in this section. Flight Activity Data Limitations Impede FAA’s Ability to Assess General Aviation Safety and Target Risk Mitigation Efforts

FAA estimates of general aviation annual flight hours—a measure key to  NTSB’s calculation of general aviation accident and fatality rates and  NTSB’s and FAA’s assessments of the safety of general aviation—may  not be reliable because of methodological and conceptual limitations with  the survey used to gather flight activity data. FAA’s Singular Goal to Reduce the Fatal Accident Rate May Mask Problems in Certain Segments of General Aviation

In 2008, FAA set a goal to reduce the fatal general aviation accident rate  by 10 percent—from a baseline of 1.12 fatal accidents per 100,000 flight  hours to 1 fatal accident per 100,000 flight hours—over 10 years, from  2009 to 2018. Although both initiatives work toward the overall goal of reducing general  aviation fatalities, the GAJSC is using a data-driven approach to identify  risks in general aviation operations and propose mitigations, while the 5- year strategy is composed of a wide variety of activities under four focus  areas. The GAJSC consists of a steering committee that  provides, among other things, strategic guidance and membership  outreach. The 5-Year Strategy Has Significant Shortcomings

FAA’s 5-year strategy to improve general aviation safety suffers from  several shortcomings that hinder its potential for success. Without performance goals or measures for the  individual initiatives implemented under the 5-year strategy, FAA will not  be able to evaluate the success or failure of those activities, regardless of  whether the fatal accident rate is reduced. According to officials  from the GAJSC and the general aviation industry groups we contacted,  although they were briefed on the strategy, they were not consulted in its  development and were surprised by the announcement of the strategy. Given the diversity of the general aviation community—illustrated, for  example by the wide variety of aircraft in the fleet and the varying nonfatal  and fatal accident rates among the general aviation segments, the  adoption of a singular agency goal–-a 10 percent reduction in the general  aviation fatal accident rate per 100,000 flight hours by 2018 is not the  most effective risk-based tool for achieving general aviation safety gains. If the goal is  reached, the overall success might mask ongoing safety issues in one or  more segments of the community. For this  reason, we think it is important for FAA to develop performance measures  for the significant initiatives underlying the 5-year strategy. Improve measures of general aviation activity by requiring the  collection of the number of hours that general aviation aircraft fly over  a period of time (flight hours). DOT officials agreed to consider our  recommendations and provided technical comments, which we  incorporated as appropriate. To do so, we addressed the following questions: (1) what are the  characteristics and trends in general aviation accidents from 1999 to 2011  and (2) what actions have been taken by the Federal Aviation  Administration (FAA) to improve general aviation safety? To identify the characteristics of and trends in general aviation accidents,  we conducted a data analysis using the National Transportation Safety  Board’s (NTSB) Aviation Accident Database.
Why GAO Did This Study

Although the U.S. aviation system is one of the safest in the world, hundreds of fatalities occur each year in general aviationwhich includes all forms of aviation except commercial and military. The general aviation industry is composed of a diverse fleet of over 220,000 aircraft that conduct a wide variety of operationsfrom personal pleasure flights in small, piston aircraft to worldwide professionally piloted corporate flights in turbine-powered aircraft. According to 2011 National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) data, 92 percent of that years fatal accidents occurred in general aviation. The majority of general aviation accidents are attributed to pilot error. GAO was asked to examine the (1) characteristics of and trends in general 2011 and (2) recent actions taken by FAA to improve general aviation safety. GAO analyzed NTSB accident data, reviewed government and industry studies and other documents, and interviewed FAA and NTSB officials and industry stakeholders.

What GAO Found

The number of nonfatal and fatal general aviation accidents decreased from 1999 through 2011; more than 200 fatal accidents occurred in each of those years. Airplanesparticularly single-engine piston airplanesflying personal operations were most often involved in accidents. Most general aviation accidents are attributed to pilot error and involved a loss of aircraft control. Some segments of the industry experienced accidents disproportionately to their total estimated annual flight hours. For example, among the airplane categories we reviewed, experimental amateur-built airplanes were involved in 21 percent of the fatal accidents but accounted for only 4 percent of the estimated annual flight hours. In another example, corporate operations were involved in about 1 percent of fatal accidents while accounting for 14 percent of estimated annual flight hours. We can draw some conclusions about general aviation accident characteristics, but limitations in flight activity and other data preclude a confident assessment of general aviation safety. The Federal Aviation Administrations (FAA) survey of general aviation operators, on which the agency bases its annual flight-hour estimates, continues to suffer from methodological and conceptual limitations, even with FAAs efforts to improve it over the years. To obtain more reliable data, FAA has discussed requiring that flight-hour data be reported, such as during annual aircraft maintenance inspections. FAA has set a goal to reduce the fatal general aviation accident rate per 100,000 flight hours by 10 percent from 2009 to 2018. However, given the diversity of the industry and shortcomings in the flight activity data, this goal is not sufficient for achieving reductions in fatality rates among the riskier segments of general aviation. Further, achieving the goal could mask continuing safety issues in segments of the community.
FAA has embarked on several initiatives to meet its goal of reducing the fatal general aviation accident rate by 2018. These include the renewal of the General Aviation Joint Steering Committee (GAJSC) with a data-driven approach and the implementation of the Flight Standards Services 5-year strategy. The GAJSC, a government-industry partnership, focuses on analyzing general aviation accident data to develop effective intervention strategies. The 5-year strategy involves numerous initiatives under four focus areas: (1) risk management, (2) outreach which is composed of FAA staff and industry volunteers, will be responsible for carrying out significant portions of the strategy. While the GAJSCs efforts are modeled on an approach deemed successful in contributing to a reduction in fatal jeopardize its potential for success. For example, the strategy lacks performance measures for the significant activities that comprise it. Without a strong performance management structure, FAA will not be able to determine the success or failure of the significant activities that underlie the 5-year strategy.

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends, among other things, that FAA require the collection of general aviation aircraft flight-hour data in ways that minimize the impact on the general aviation community, set safety improvement goals for individual general aviation industry segments, and develop performance measures for the significant activities underlying the 5-year strategy. Department of Transportation officials agreed to consider GAOs recommendations and provided technical comments, which GAO incorporated as appropriate.