Although our high-risk designation covers only DOD’s program, our  reports have documented clearance-related problems affecting other  agencies such as the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Recent events affecting clearance programs across the federal government  include the passage of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention  Act (IRTPA) of 2004 and the issuance of the June 2005 Executive Order  13381, “Strengthening Processes Relating to Determining Eligibility for  Access to Classified National Security Information.” IRTPA included  milestones for reducing the time to complete clearances, general  specifications for a database on security clearances, and requirements for  reciprocity of clearances. Four Key Factors Should Be Considered in Efforts to Reform the Security Clearance Process

In our prior work, we identified four key factors that should be considered  to reform the security clearance process. These include (1) ensuring a  strong requirements-determination process, (2) building quality in all  clearance processes, (3) developing additional metrics to provide a fuller  picture of clearance processes, and (4) including long-term funding  requirements of security clearance reform. A change  in the level of clearances being requested also increases the investigative  and adjudicative workloads. Cost. The cost of obtaining and maintaining a top secret clearance for  10 years is approximately 30 times greater than the cost of obtaining and  maintaining a secret clearance for the same period. In our November  2005 testimony on the previous governmentwide strategic plan to improve  the clearance process, we noted that the plan devoted little attention to  monitoring and improving the quality of the personnel security clearance  process, and that limited attention and reporting about quality continues. In addition, when OMB issued its February 2007 annual report on security  clearances, it documented quality with a single metric in one of the six  phases of the security clearance process (i.e., requirements setting,  application submission, investigation, adjudication, appeal, and clearance  updating). When OMB issued its February 2008 annual report on  security clearances, it did not discuss the percentage of completed  investigations that are returned to OPM or the development or existence  of any other metric measuring the level of quality in security clearance  processes or products. We found that OPM provided some incomplete investigative reports to  DOD adjudicators, which the adjudicators then used to determine top  secret clearance eligibility. In our September 2006 report, we recommended  that regardless of whether the metric on investigations returned for  rework continues to be used, OMB’s Deputy Director for Management  should require OPM and DOD to develop and report metrics on  investigative and adjudicative completeness and other measures of quality. In  their absence, reciprocity concerns will continue to exist and Congress  will not have sufficient information to perform its oversight function. Government Clearance Metrics Emphasize Timeliness Measurement, but Additional Metrics Could Provide a Fuller Picture of Clearance Processes

As we testified in February 2008, reform efforts should also consider  metrics beyond timeliness to evaluate the clearance processes and  procedures and to provide a more complete picture of the performance of  a reformed clearance process. In February 2008, we noted that including these  additional metrics could add value in monitoring clearance processes and  provide a more complete picture of the performance of a reformed  clearance process. Long-Term Funding Requirements Information Could Enable More- Informed Congressional Oversight of Security Clearance Reform

In February 2008, we recommended that the Joint Reform Team also  provide Congress with long-term funding requirements as it develops plans  to reform the security clearance process. In addition, the long-term funding requirements to  implement changes to security clearance processes are also needed to  enable the executive branch to compare and prioritize alternative  proposals for reforming the clearance processes especially as the nation’s  fiscal imbalances constrain federal funding. Related GAO Products

Personnel Clearances: Key Factors to Consider in Efforts to Reform  Security Clearance Processes. DOD Personnel Clearances: Government Plan Addresses Some Long- standing Problems with DOD’s Program, But Concerns Remain. It may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without further  permission from GAO.
Why GAO Did This Study

Since 1974, GAO has examined personnel security clearance processes and acquired a historical view of key factors to consider in reform efforts. GAO placed the Department of Defense's (DOD) personnel security clearance program, which represents 80 percent of federal government clearances, on its high-risk list in 2005 due to long-standing problems. These problems include incomplete investigative reports from the Office of Personnel Management (OPM), the agency primarily responsible for providing clearance investigation services; the granting of some clearances by DOD adjudicators even when required data were missing from the investigative reports used to make such determinations; and delays in completing clearance processing. Delays can lead to a heightened risk of disclosure of classified information, additional costs and delays in completing related contracts, and problems retaining qualified personnel. DOD has reported on these continuing delays. However, there has been recent high-level governmentwide attention to improving the process, including establishing a team to develop a reformed federal government security clearance process. This statement addresses four key factors that should be considered in personnel security clearance reforms. This statement draws on GAO's past work, which included reviews of clearance-related documents and interviews of senior officials at DOD and OPM.

What GAO Found

Efforts to reform personnel security clearance processes should consider, among other things, the following four key factors: (1) a strong requirements determination process, (2) quality in all clearance processes, (3) metrics to provide a fuller picture of clearance processes, and (4) long-term funding requirements of security clearance reform. In February 2008, GAO noted that a sound requirements process is important because requesting a clearance for a position in which it will not be needed, or in which a lower-level clearance would be sufficient, will increase both costs and investigative workload unnecessarily. For example, the cost of obtaining and maintaining a top secret clearance for 10 years is approximately 30 times greater than the cost of obtaining and maintaining a secret clearance for the same period. Also, changing a position's clearance level from secret to top secret increases the investigative workload for that position about 20-fold. Building quality throughout the clearance process could promote positive outcomes, including more reciprocity governmentwide. However, agencies have paid little attention to this factor despite GAO's 2006 recommendation to place more emphasis on quality. For example, the Office of Management and Budget's (OMB) February 2007 report on security clearances documented quality with a single metric in only one of the six phases of the process. Further, OMB did not discuss the development or existence of any metric measuring the level of quality in security clearance processes or products in its February 2008 report. Concerns about the quality of investigative and adjudicative work underlie the continued reluctance of agencies to accept clearances issued by other agencies; thus, government resources may be used to conduct duplicative investigations and adjudications. Federal agencies' efforts to monitor clearance processes emphasize timeliness, but additional metrics should be developed to provide a fuller picture of the performance of the clearance process. GAO has highlighted a variety of metrics in its reports (e.g., completeness of investigative reports, staff's and customers' perceptions of the process, and the adequacy of internal controls), all of which could add value in monitoring clearance processes. The emphasis on timeliness is due in part to the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 which provides guidelines for the speed of completing clearances and requires annual reporting of that information to Congress. Providing Congress with the long-term funding requirements to implement changes to security clearance processes could enable more-informed congressional oversight. Reform efforts should identify long-term funding requirements to implement proposed changes, so that decision makers can compare and prioritize alternate reform proposals in times of fiscal constraints. The absence of long-term funding requirements to implement reforms would limit decision makers'--in the executive and legislative branches--ability to carry out their budgetary development and oversight functions.