DEA’s background investigations were part of its personnel security program. Scope and Methodology

To identify and describe the circumstances that led DEA to consider relinquishing its delegated authority to conduct personnel background investigations, we interviewed cognizant officials of DEA, DOJ, and OPM. To assess whether OPM acted in an independent and objective manner in choosing to review DEA’s background investigations and security program, we applied three criteria posed in the following questions:
What was OPM’s responsibility for reviewing background investigations performed by DEA and/or its contractors? DEA Was Considering Relinquishing Its Background Investigation Authority

As of July 1999, DEA was considering whether to relinquish its personnel- security background investigation authority to OPM. Partially in response to this initiative, DEA conducted an assessment and concluded that it lacked the expertise and resources to capably perform or oversee all of its background investigations. Between 1996 and 1998, OPM reviewed a total of 265 background investigations conducted by DEA and its contractors. OPM also found that even though the background investigations were deficient, DEA still granted security clearances. In addition to its periodic review of investigations, OPM also reviewed DEA’s overall personnel security program in 1992 and again 6 years later in 1998. The memorandum was based on the DOJ audit and on the recurring findings of OPM. The assessment covered areas such as the (1) results of reviews performed by OPM and DOJ, (2) requirements of the Memorandum of Understanding and Agreement with OPM, (3) efforts to correct deficiencies with the security program and background investigations, (4) contract with the company that currently did background investigations for DEA, and (5) other management issues related to background investigations. DEA did not comply with this requirement for its current contractor because DEA did not have funds to finance such investigations. DEA had been heavily criticized for its performance in this regard. As of July 1999, DEA had not made a final decision on relinquishing its background investigation authority. In his October 1998 memorandum, the Assistant Attorney General for Administration said that he believed that DEA should relinquish all authority, including the authority to investigate the backgrounds of Special Agent applicants. DEA said it believed that it would be unwise to segregate the background investigation from the overall Special Agent applicant selection process by having them conducted by an independent entity not familiar with DEA’s unique requirements for Special Agents. Because of the relationship between OPM and USIS, we reviewed whether OPM acted in an objective and independent manner in choosing to review DEA’s background investigation reports and personnel security program. OPM reviewed a sample of the background investigation reports of the U.S. Given DEA’s difficulties in ensuring the quality of its personnel background investigations and its conclusion that it is not able to capably perform or oversee background investigations, its consideration of relinquishing its delegated authority is not unreasonable. In October 1998, DOJ advised DEA to relinquish its authority.
Why GAO Did This Study

Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on background investigations conducted by the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), focusing on: (1) the circumstances that led DEA to consider relinquishing its authority to conduct personnel background investigations; and (2) whether the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) acted in an independent and objective manner in choosing to review DEA and its background investigations.

What GAO Found

GAO noted that: (1) a series of evaluations in the 1990s critical of DEA's background investigations and personnel security program caused DEA to consider relinquishing its background investigation authority; (2) the findings of OPM's assessments over much of the 1990s, an assessment by the Department of Justice (DOJ) in 1998, and its own assessment in 1999 triggered DEA's consideration of this issue; (3) DEA's relinquishment of investigation authority would be consequential because DEA and its contractor performed an estimated 5,600 background investigations in 1998; (4) during the late 1990s, OPM reviewed a sample of 265 background investigation reports prepared by DEA and its contractors and determined that all but 1 investigation was deficient in meeting the investigative requirements that DEA had agreed to follow; (5) DOJ audited DEA's personnel security program in 1997 and found deficiencies similar to what OPM had found in 1992 and again in 1998; (6) based on the DOJ audit and the recurring finds of OPM, DOJ's Assistant Attorney General for Administration told the DEA Administrator in October 1998 that he believed that DEA should relinquish all of its background investigation authority to OPM; (7) in early 1999, DEA conducted its own examination of the personnel security program, focusing on background investigations, and concluded that DEA was not able to capably perform or oversee background investigations; (8) this lack of capability allowed security clearances to be granted, regardless of whether the related background investigations were adequate; (9) DEA had allowed contract investigators to perform background investigations, even though the investigators had not gone through required background investigations because DEA did not have funds to finance such investigations; (10) as of July 1999, subsequent to its examination of the personnel security program, DEA was considering relinquishing its authority for background investigations to OPM, except for the authority to investigate backgrounds of applicants for DEA Special Agent positions; (11) DEA believed that it would be unwise to separate the background investigation from the overall applicant selection process by having them conducted by an independent entity not familiar with DEA's unique requirements for Special Agents; and (12) OPM appeared to have been objective and independent in choosing to review DEA's personnel security program and background investigations.