Congressional Funding for UAVs Has Met or Exceeded DOD’s Requests

Overall, Congress has provided funding for UAV development and  procurement that exceeds the amounts requested by DOD during the past  5 fiscal years, and the services to date have obligated about 99 percent of  these funds. From fiscal year 1999 through fiscal year 2003, DOD  requested approximately $2.3 billion, and Congress, in its efforts to  encourage rapid employment of UAVs by the military services, has  appropriated nearly $2.7 billion to develop and acquire UAVs. Generally, the additional funding provided by Congress was targeted for  specific programs and purposes, enabling the services to acquire systems  at a greater rate than originally planned. For example, in fiscal year 2003  the Air Force requested $23 million to acquire 7 Predators, but Congress  provided over $131 million—an increase of approximately 470 percent— enough to acquire 29 Predators to meet operational demands in the war  against terrorism. DOD Lacks Assurance That Its Planning Will Efficiently Integrate UAVs into the Force Structure

DOD’s planning for developing and fielding UAVs does not provide  reasonable assurance that UAVs will be integrated into the force structure  efficiently, although the department has taken certain positive steps to  improve its management of the UAV program. The Roadmap is designed to guide U.S. military planning  for UAV development from 2002 to 2027 and describes current programs,  identifies potential missions for UAVs, and provides guidance on  developing emerging technologies. The Task Force  Director testified in March 2003 that the Task Force does not have  program directive authority, but provides the Under Secretary of Defense  for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics with advice and recommended  actions. Officials from each of the services indicated  that their UAV roadmap was developed to primarily address their  individual service’s requirements and operational concepts. Conclusions

Without a strategic plan and an oversight body with sufficient program  directive authority to implement the plan, DOD has little assurance that its  investment will result in UAV programs being effectively integrated into  the force structure. Consequently, DOD risks poorly integrating UAVs into  the force structure, which could increase development, procurement, and  logistics costs; increase the risk of future interoperability problems; and  unnecessarily duplicate efforts from one service to the next. Recommendations for Executive Action

To enhance management control over the UAV program, we recommend  that the Secretary of Defense take the following two actions:    establish a strategic plan or set of plans that are based on mission  requirements to guide UAV development and fielding by modifying the  Roadmap or developing another document or documents and, at a  minimum, ensure that the plan links operational requirements with  development plans to ensure that the services develop systems that  complement each other, will perform the range of missions needed,  and avoid duplication and    designate the UAV Task Force or another appropriate organization to  oversee the implementation of a UAV strategic plan; provide this  organization with sufficient authority to enforce the plan’s direction,  and promote joint operations and the efficient expenditure of funds. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

To determine the extent to which the Department of Defense (DOD)  requested, received, and used funds for major unmanned aerial vehicle  (UAV) development efforts during fiscal years 1999-2003, we reviewed  department and service documentation for major operational UAV  programs, programs that are in procurement, and programs that are under  development and to be procured by 2010.
Why GAO Did This Study

The current generation of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) has been under development for defense applications since the 1980s. UAVs were used in Afghanistan and Iraq in 2002 and 2003 to observe, track, target, and strike enemy forces. These successes have heightened interest in UAVs within the Department of Defense (DOD) and the services. GAO was asked to (1) determine how much funding DOD requested, was appropriated, and was obligated for major UAV development efforts during fiscal years 1999-2003 and (2) assess whether DOD's approach to planning for UAVs provides reasonable assurance that its investment in UAVs will facilitate their integration into the force structure.

What GAO Found

During the past 5 fiscal years, Congress provided more funding for UAV development and procurement than requested by DOD, and to date the services have obligated most of these funds. To promote rapid employment of UAVs, Congress has provided nearly $2.7 billion for UAV development and procurement compared with the $2.3 billion requested by DOD. Because Congress has appropriated more funds than requested, the services are able to acquire systems at a greater rate than planned. For example, in fiscal year 2003, the Air Force requested $23 million to buy 7 Predator UAVs, but Congress provided over $131 million--enough to buy 29 Predators. DOD's approach to planning for developing and fielding UAVs does not provide reasonable assurance that its investment in UAVs will facilitate their integration into the force structure efficiently, although DOD has taken positive steps to improve the UAV program's management. In 2001 DOD established a joint Planning Task Force in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. To communicate its vision and promote commonality of UAV systems, in 2002, the Task Force published the UAV Roadmap, which describes current programs, identifies potential missions, and provides guidance on emerging technologies. While the Roadmap identifies guidance and priority goals for UAV development, neither it nor other key documents represent a comprehensive strategic plan to ensure that the services and DOD agencies develop systems that complement each other, perform all required missions, and avoid duplication. Moreover, the Task Force serves in an advisory capacity to the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, but has little authority to enforce program direction. Service officials indicated that their service-specific planning documents were developed to meet their own needs and operational concepts without considering those of other services. Without a strategic plan and an oversight body with sufficient authority to enforce program direction, DOD risks fielding a poorly integrated UAV force structure, which could increase costs and the risk of future interoperability problems.