Inappropriate deletions of TECS lookout records could negatively affect Customs’ ability to detect drug smuggling. 3. 4. 5. All records must be viewed by the supervisor. Separation of Duties

The Comptroller General’s internal control standards require that key duties and responsibilities in authorizing, processing, recording, and reviewing transactions should be separated among individuals. Documentation of Transactions

The Comptroller General’s standards require that internal control systems and all transactions and other significant events are to be clearly documented, and that the documentation is to be readily available for examination. This standard requires supervisors to continuously review and approve the assigned work of their staffs, including approving work at critical points to ensure that work flows as intended. Although our review was limited to Customs headquarters, three CMCs, and three ports of entry, because of the lack of systemwide (1) internal control standards concerning deletion authority and (2) specific guidance concerning the deletion of TECS records that comply with the Comptroller General’s standards for internal controls, it is possible that TECS lookout records are not adequately safeguarded in other CMCs and other ports of entry as well.
Why GAO Did This Study

Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the internal control techniques the Customs Service has in place to safeguard certain law enforcement records in the Treasury Enforcement Communications System (TECS) from being inappropriately deleted.

What GAO Found

GAO noted that: (1) Customs did not have adequate internal controls over the deletion of TECS lookout records; (2) standards issued by the Comptroller General require that: (a) key duties and responsibilities in authorizing, processing, recording, and reviewing transactions should be separated among individuals; (b) internal control systems and all transactions and other significant events should be clearly documented; and (c) supervisors should continuously review and approve the assigned work of their staffs; (3) however, guidance on TECS does not require these safeguards and Customs officials at the three ports GAO visited had not implemented these controls; (4) as a result, Customs employees could inappropriately remove lookout records from TECS; and (5) although GAO's review was limited to Customs headquarters, three Customs Management Centers, and three ports of entry, because of the lack of adequate systemwide internal control standards over deletion authority, it is possible that TECS lookout records may not be adequately safeguarded in other ports of entry as well.