It was not until December 2005 that, as a result  of the joint requirements process, an agreement was reached. One issue the agreement has not resolved is the lack of a  clear definition for volume of fire. According to the Marine Corps,  volume of fire, defined as large quantities of munitions delivered over time  or simultaneously to suppress or destroy a target, is also necessary to  immobilize or destroy the enemy and enable maneuver. The inability to quantify requirements for volume of fire also affects the  ability of the Navy to develop systems to meet the Marine Corps’s needs. Development of the Extended Range Munition  has been delayed by nearly 11 years due to technical and programmatic  challenges, resulting in cost growth of over 550 percent from initial  estimates. The  primary reason for this reduced capability is that the Navy’s concept for  the Zumwalt class destroyer promised revolutionary performance at an  unrealistically low cost. Currently, the Navy plans to field the Extended Range Munition on 32  Arleigh Burke class destroyers, which will be supplemented with 7  Zumwalt class ships carrying long-range land-attack munitions. Further analysis by the Navy  and the Department of Defense will determine whether these technologies  are feasible and if these systems are needed. Extended Range Munition and Zumwalt Class Destroyer Offer Significant Naval Surface Fire Support Capability, but Cannot Meet All the Needs of Future Warfighters

In December 2005, the Joint Requirements Oversight Council reviewed and  validated the Joint Fires in Support of Expeditionary Operations in the  Littorals Initial Capabilities Document, which describes some of the fire  support needs of the warfighter for the next decade as well as the gaps  that exist in meeting these needs. The document lists the gaps in order of priority as 1) the  ability to transmit and receive targeting information to enable command  and control of fire support, 2) engaging moving targets in poor weather, 3)  providing fire support when collateral damage or casualties in friendly  forces is a concern, and 4) providing volume fires to achieve suppression  of enemy targets. However, they do not provide enough additional capability to  close any of the four gaps. The Navy, through its Surface  Warfare Division, has already begun the analysis for the three engagement  gaps presented in the initial capabilities document. Any attempt to  close this gap could have consequences for systems developed to engage  targets, as they rely on the command and control architecture for target  assignment and information. Third, because of challenges posed by the development of the Extended  Range Munition and the Zumwalt class destroyer, the Navy is now in a  position in which it will rely more heavily on Extended Range Munition to  provide fire support than originally planned. In order to ensure that the systems providing naval surface fire support  are aligned with the requirements and operating concepts of the forces  they assist, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the  Navy to provide the Chief of Naval Operations’s Expeditionary Warfare  Division, as the division charged with establishing capabilities and  requirements for naval surface fire support and liaison to the Marine  Corps, a formal role in developing requirements, determining  capabilities, and managing resources for Navy systems responsible for  providing naval surface fire support. To assess the Navy’s progress in developing and fielding the Extended  Range Munition, the Zumwalt class destroyer, and future systems for  naval surface fire support, we analyzed key program documentation  including performance requirements, cost estimates, budget submissions,  acquisition strategies, development and demonstration contracts, and  testing plans and results. To address our objectives, we visited and interviewed officials from the  Navy’s Surface Warfare and Expeditionary Warfare Divisions; the Marine  Corps’s Combat Development Command and Plans, Policies, and  Operations offices; the Program Executive Office for Integrated Warfare  Systems; and the Extended Range Munition and Zumwalt class destroyer  program offices.
Why GAO Did This Study

Since the mid-1990s, the Navy and Marine Corps have studied ways to better protect landing forces. As new operational concepts evolved, the Marine Corps identified requirements for naval surface fire support and the Navy began developing two systems to meet these needs--the Extended Range Munition for existing classes of ships and the future Zumwalt class destroyer. GAO was asked to address (1) whether requirements for fire support have been established and (2) the Navy's progress on the Extended Range Munition, Zumwalt class destroyer, and follow-on systems. GAO also analyzed whether these Navy systems fulfill the requirements and whether gaps remain. To address these objectives GAO analyzed key documents on requirements and programs and held discussions with officials from the Navy and Marine Corps as well as other interested organizations.

What GAO Found

In December 2005, more than a decade after the Navy and Marine Corps began to formulate requirements, agreement was reached on the capabilities needed for naval surface fire support. However, quantifiable measures are still lacking for volume of fire--the delivery of a large quantity of munitions simultaneously or over a period of time to suppress or destroy a target. Until further quantifiable requirements are set for volume of fire, it is difficult to assess whether additional investment is necessary or the form it should take. The Navy's Extended Range Munition and Zumwalt class destroyer have cost more, taken longer to develop and field than anticipated, and will deliver fewer capabilities than originally promised. Largely due to technical challenges, the Extended Range Munition is expected to exceed the original cost estimate for development by 550 percent, and the Navy has delayed delivery of initial capability by 11 years. The munition's path for development and fielding remains uncertain as key technologies and munition design have not been adequately demonstrated. The Office of the Secretary of Defense recently assumed oversight of the program, and while a comprehensive review has not yet been held, there are ongoing studies that could assist such a review. The Navy has reduced Zumwalt class land attack munitions by 50 percent and cut ship quantities from 32 to 7. The primary reason for reduced capabilities are cost pressures created by the Navy's original concept of revolutionary performance at an unrealistically low cost. The Navy plans to begin construction of the first two ships in the Zumwalt class in fiscal year 2008. The recent study of future fire support needs approved by the Joint Requirements Oversight Council identifies four capability gaps: command and control of fire support; engaging moving targets in poor weather; engaging targets when collateral damage is a concern; and engaging targets that require a large volume of fire. The analysis that forms the basis of the joint study contends that while the Extended Range Munition and Zumwalt class destroyer offer significant capabilities in some scenarios, they do not provide enough capability to meet all fire support needs. The Navy, through its surface warfare directorate, has begun analyzing the three engagement gaps, but the Navy has not chosen an organization to analyze the gap in command and control, which is essential for target assignment and information. Any attempts to accept the risks or invest in programs to fill remaining gaps should also involve the expeditionary warfare directorate as the Marine Corps representative. The expeditionary warfare directorate does not have a formal role in developing requirements, determining capabilities, and managing resources for systems that provide naval surface fire support.