First, on March 26, 2010, a South Korean naval vessel, the Cheonan , sank in waters disputed by the two Koreas. Nearly 50 South Korean sailors died in the incident. A multinational investigation team led by South Korea determined that the ship was sunk by a North Korean submarine. In the spring and early summer of 2010, the State Department appeared to deem these reports insufficient to place North Korea back on the terrorism list. Possible Implications of Re-Listing North Korea

The Bush Administration's removal of North Korea from the terrorism list in 2008 does not appear to have provided Pyongyang with direct, tangible benefits. Thus, the major impact of a decision to re-list North Korea would likely be symbolic. The 2008 Removal of North Korea from the Terrorism List

On October 11, 2008, the Bush Administration formally removed North Korea from the U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism. North Korea is to allow a process of disablement of its plutonium nuclear facilities at Yongbyon. North Korea's second obligation is to provide the United States and other members of the six party talks on North Korea's nuclear program with a "complete and correct" declaration of nuclear programs. The removal of North Korea from the terrorism list, however, did not result in an early conclusion of the February 2007 six party nuclear agreement, contrary to the expectations of the Bush Administration. The North Korean government and the Bush Administration soon conflicted over the content of the October 2008 agreement on verification, particularly over whether it allowed inspectors to take samples of nuclear materials from the Yongbyon installations. The non-North Korea five parties to the talks (the United States, South Korea, China, Japan, and Russia) also had not completed the delivery of 1 million tons of heavy oil that they had promised in the February 2007 agreement. Background

		U.S.-North Korean Negotiations

			Three Diplomatic Stages over the Terrorism List

The issue of North Korea's inclusion on the U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism has been in U.S.-North Korean diplomacy since 2000, but three stages are of particular importance: the first in 2000 in Clinton Administration-North Korean negotiations; the second during the 2003-2004 Six Party negotiations over the North Korean nuclear issue; and the third in the diplomacy around the Six Party nuclear agreement of February 2007. Referencing the U.S. commitments in the February 2007 nuclear agreement to begin the process of removing North Korea from the list of state sponsors of terrorism and the Trading with the Enemy Act, the statement read that "the United States will fulfill its commitments to the DPRK in parallel with the DPRK's actions based on consensus reached at the meetings on the working group on normalization of DPRK-U.S. The second type of reports, coming from several diverse sources, asserts that North Korea has provided arms and possibly training to Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka and that it maintains an intimate relationship with the Iranian Revolutionary Guard. Three vessels were intercepted, which contained North Korean weapons that Western intelligence and Israeli intelligence officials and non-government experts believe were bound for Hezbollah and Hamas, terrorist groups on the official U.S. list of international terrorist organizations. Moreover, the reported arms supply link between North Korea and the Tamil Tigers appears to be one of long duration. North Korea first tested the missile in 1993. The North Korea Sanctions and Diplomatic Nonrecognition Act of 2010. Condemns and demands an apology from North Korea for the sinking of the Cheonan.
Whether North Korea should be included on the U.S. list of terrorism-supporting countries has been a major issue in U.S.-North Korean diplomacy since 2000, particularly in connection with negotiations over North Korea's nuclear program. North Korea demanded that the Clinton and Bush Administrations remove it from the terrorism support list. On October 11, 2008, the Bush Administration removed North Korea from the terrorism list.
This move was one of the measures the Bush Administration took to implement a nuclear agreement that it negotiated with North Korea in September 2007 and finalized details of in April 2008. The agreement was reached under the format of the six party talks, which involve the United States, North Korea, South Korea, China, Japan, and Russia. The President also announced that he was immediately lifting sanctions on North Korea under the U.S. Trading with the Enemy Act. North Korea's obligations under this nuclear agreement were to allow the disabling of its plutonium facility at Yongbyon and present to the United States and other government in the six party talks a declaration of its nuclear programs. North Korea submitted its declaration in June 2008.
The removal of North Korea from the terrorism list, however, did not result in an early conclusion of the February 2007 six party nuclear agreement. The North Korean government and the Bush Administration disagreed over the content of an October 2008 agreement on verification, particularly over whether it allowed inspectors to take samples of nuclear materials from the Yongbyon installations. The other parties to the talks also had not completed the delivery of 1 million tons of heavy oil that they had promised in the February 2007 agreement. Against this backdrop, along with an apparent stroke suffered by North Korean leader Kim Jong-il, the six party process broke down.
In the months after the breakdown of the talks, North Korea took a series of actions that have led to calls for its reinstatement on the terrorism list. In April 2009, North Korea launched devices suspected of being long-range missiles. In May 2009, North Korea tested a nuclear device. In March 2010, a South Korean naval vessel, the Cheonan, sank in waters disputed by the two Koreas. Nearly 50 South Korean sailors died in the incident. A multinational investigation team led by South Korea determined that the ship was sunk by a North Korean submarine. In June 2010, the State Department determined that the Cheonan sinking was not an act of terrorism and thus by itself was an insufficient reason for placing North Korea back on the terrorism list.
Meanwhile, reports in 2009 and 2010 from French, Japanese, South Korean, and Israeli sources described North Korean programs to provide arms and training to Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka, two groups on the U.S. list of international terrorist organizations. Large quantities of North Korean arms bound for Iran, intercepted in 2009, contained weapons that Iran supplies heavily to Hezbollah and Hamas. Moreover, a large body of reports describe a long-standing, collaborative relationship between North Korea and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps.
This report describes the rationales for including North Korea on the terrorism list from 1987-2008, for North Korea's delisting in 2008, and the debate in 2010 over whether to re-list North Korea. The major impact of a decision to return North Korea to the list would likely be symbolic, because removing North Korea from the list does not appear to have provided Pyongyang with direct, tangible benefits.