Specifically, S&T is responsible for the basic and applied  research and advanced development of new technologies, while TSA,  through its Passenger Screening Program (PSP), identifies the need for  new checkpoint screening technologies and provides input to S&T during  the research and development of new technologies, which TSA then  procures and deploys. Increased Deployment of AIT Highlights the Importance of Operational Testing and Cost-Benefit Analysis Prior to Deployment

		TSA Plans to Procure and Deploy 1,800 AITs by 2014 and Use Them as a Primary Screening Measure

In response to the December 2009 attempted terrorist attack, TSA has  revised its procurement and deployment strategy for the AIT, increasing  the number of AITs it plans to procure and deploy. As we previously reported, TSA’s experience with the explosives trace  portal (ETP), or “puffers,” demonstrates the importance of testing and  evaluation in an operational environment. While TSA officials stated that the laboratory  and operational testing of the AIT included placing explosive material in  different locations on the body, it remains unclear whether the AIT  would have been able to detect the weapon Mr. Abdulmutallab used in his  attempted attack based on the preliminary TSA information we have  received. We are in the process of reviewing these operational tests to  assess the AIT’s detection capabilities and to verify that TSA successfully  completed operational testing of the AIT. In addition, while TSA officials stated that the AITs performed as well as  physical pat downs in operational testing, TSA officials also reported they  have not conducted a cost-benefit analysis of the original or revised AIT  deployment strategy. However, these officials reported that they had  completed, earlier in the program, a life-cycle cost estimate and an  analysis of alternatives for the AIT as required by DHS, which, according  to agency officials, provides equivalent information to a cost-benefit  analysis. We estimate that, based on  TSA’s fiscal year 2011 budget request and current AIT deployment  strategy, increases in staffing costs due to doubling the number of AITs  that TSA plans to deploy could add up to $2.4 billion over the expected  service life of this investment. While we recognize that TSA is taking action to address a vulnerability of  the passenger checkpoint exposed by the December 25, 2009, attempted  attack, we continue to believe that, given TSA’s expanded deployment  strategy, conducting a cost-benefit analysis of TSA’s AIT deployment is  important. An updated cost-benefit analysis would help inform TSA’s  judgment about the optimal deployment strategy for the AITs, as well as  provide information to inform the best path forward, considering all  elements of the screening system, for addressing the vulnerability  identified by this attempted terrorist attack. TSA Has Made Progress in Securing Air Cargo and Airport Access, but Challenges Remain

		TSA Has Made Progress in Meeting the Air Cargo Screening Mandate, but Faces Participation, Technology, Oversight, and Inbound-Cargo Challenges

As we previously reported in March 2009, based on preliminary  observations from ongoing work, TSA has taken several key steps to meet  the statutory mandate to screen 100 percent of air cargo transported on  passenger aircraft by August 2010. We will continue to explore these issues  as part of our ongoing review of TSA’s air cargo security efforts, to be  issued later this year. TSA Has Taken Actions to Strengthen Airport Security, but Faces Challenges That Include Assessing Risk and Evaluating Worker Screening Methods

In our September 2009 report on airport security, we reported that TSA  has implemented a variety of programs and protective actions to  strengthen the security of commercial airports. As we reported in September 2009, while TSA has taken numerous steps to  enhance airport security, it continues to face challenges in several areas,  such as assessing risk, evaluating worker screening methods, addressing  airport technology needs, and developing a unified national strategy for  airport security. DHS concurred with this  recommendation.
Why GAO Did This Study

The attempted bombing of Northwest flight 253 highlighted the importance of detecting improvised explosive devices on passengers. This testimony focuses on (1) the Transportation Security Administration's (TSA) efforts to procure and deploy advanced imaging technology (AIT), and related challenges; and (2) TSA's efforts to strengthen screening procedures and technology in other areas of aviation security, and related challenges. This testimony is based on related products GAO issued from March 2009 through January 2010, selected updates conducted from December 2009 through March 2010 on the AIT procurement, and ongoing work on air cargo security. For the ongoing work and updates, GAO obtained information from the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and TSA and interviewed senior TSA officials regarding air cargo security and the procurement, deployment, operational testing, and assessment of costs and benefits of the AIT.

What GAO Found

In response to the December 25, 2009, attempted attack on Northwest flight 253, TSA revised the AIT procurement and deployment strategy, increasing the planned deployment of AITs from 878 to 1,800 units and using AITs as a primary--instead of a secondary--screening measure where feasible; however, challenges remain. In October 2009, GAO reported on the challenges TSA faced deploying new technologies such as the explosives trace portal (ETP) without fully testing them in an operational environment, and recommended such testing prior to future deployments. TSA officials concurred and stated that, unlike the ETP, operational testing for the AIT was successfully completed late in 2009 before its deployment was fully initiated. While officials said AITs performed as well as physical pat downs in operational tests, it remains unclear whether the AIT would have detected the weapon used in the December 2009 incident based on the preliminary information GAO has received. GAO is verifying that TSA successfully completed operational testing of the AIT. In October 2009, GAO also recommended that TSA complete cost-benefit analyses for new passenger screening technologies. While TSA conducted a life-cycle cost estimate and an alternatives analysis for the AIT, it reported that it has not conducted a cost-benefit analysis of the original deployment strategy or the revised AIT deployment strategy, which proposes a more than twofold increase in the number of machines to be procured. GAO estimates increases in staffing costs alone due to doubling the number of AITs that TSA plans to deploy could add up to $2.4 billion over its expected service life. While GAO recognizes that TSA is attempting to address a vulnerability exposed by the December 2009 attempted attack, a cost-benefit analysis is important as it would help inform TSA's judgment about the optimal deployment strategy for the AITs, and how best to address this vulnerability considering all elements of the screening system. TSA has also taken actions towards strengthening other areas of aviation security but continues to face challenges. For example, TSA has taken steps to meet the statutory mandate to screen 100 percent of air cargo transported on passenger aircraft by August 2010, including developing a program to share screening responsibilities across the air cargo supply chain. However, as GAO reported in March 2009, a number of challenges to this effort exist, including attracting participants to the TSA screening program, completing technology assessments, and overseeing additional entities that it expects to participate in the program. GAO is exploring these issues as part of an ongoing review of TSA's air cargo security program which GAO plans to issue later this year. Further, while TSA has taken a variety of actions to strengthen the security of commercial airports, GAO reported in September 2009 that TSA continues to face challenges in several areas, such as assessing risk and evaluating worker screening methods. In September 2009, GAO also recommended that TSA develop a national strategy to guide stakeholder efforts to strengthen airport perimeter and access control security, to which DHS concurred.