DOD Unable to Estimate the Size of Its Clearance Backlog

DOD did not know the size of its personnel security clearance backlog and  has not estimated the size of the backlog since January 2000. DOD was  unable to estimate the size of its backlog for overdue reinvestigations that  have not yet been submitted, but our estimates for overdue submitted  investigation requests and overdue adjudications were roughly 270,000 and  90,000 cases, respectively, at the end of September 2003. These estimates  are not based on a consistent set of DOD-wide definitions  and measures; instead, the time limits for defining and measuring the  backlog varied from agency to agency. 2). The existence of varying sets of time limits for completing investigations  makes it difficult to develop accurate estimates of the size of DOD’s  investigative backlog. Multiple Impediments Slow DOD’s Progress in Eliminating Its Backlog and Generating Accurate Backlog Estimates

We have identified four major impediments that have slowed DOD’s  progress in eliminating its clearance backlog and two impediments that  have hindered its ability to produce accurate backlog estimates. Large Number of Clearance Requests, Limited Staffing, Existing Backlog, and No Strategic Plan for Information- Access Problems Slow DOD’s Efforts to Eliminate the Backlog

In our review of documents and discussions with officials from DOD,  OPM, industry associations, and investigator contractors, we identified  four major impediments that have hampered DOD’s ability to eliminate its  current security clearance backlog. Also, backlog-related  delays in issuing initial security clearances may raise the cost of doing  classified work for the U.S. government. In addition, DOD’s inability to  accurately determine the actual size of its clearance backlog and project  the number of clearances needed results in inaccurate budget requests and  staffing plans. Status Update on the Authorized Transfer of DSS Investigative Functions and Personnel to OPM

In December 2003, advisors to the Director of OPM recommended that the  congressionally authorized transfer of DSS investigative functions and  personnel to OPM not occur—at least for the rest of fiscal year 2004—due  primarily to concerns about the financial risks associated with the  transfer. The advisors recommended an alternative plan that is currently  being discussed by DOD and OPM officials. As of December 16, 2003, the Secretary of  Defense had not provided Congress with the certifications required before  the transfer can take place. This situation may increase risks to national security and monetary  costs associated with delays in granting clearances. Key to generating those reports is the implementation  of the overdue JPAS with its ability to track when reinvestigations are due. Recommendations for Executive Action

Because of continuing concerns about the size of the backlog and its  accurate measurement and the personnel security clearance program’s  importance to national security, we recommend that the Secretary of  Defense direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence take the  following four actions:  Identify and implement steps to match the sizes of the investigative and  adjudicative workforces to the clearance request workload;    Develop a strategic plan for overcoming problems accessing data  locally, at the state level, and overseas;    Develop DOD-wide backlog definitions and measures, and monitor the  backlog at each of the three clearance-process stages using the  DOD-wide measures; and    Complete the implementation of the Joint Personnel Adjudication  System. In addition, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense instruct the  Defense Security Service Director, with oversight by the Assistant  Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications, and  Intelligence) to    develop a corrective action plan as required under the Federal  Managers’ Financial Integrity Act that incorporates corrective actions  and milestones for addressing material weaknesses in the Defense  Security Service personnel security investigative program and  performance measures for monitoring the progress of corrective  actions;    establish a strategic plan that includes agency goals, performance  measures, and procedures for tracking progress in meeting goals in  accordance with sound management practices and the Government  Performance and Results Act;    conduct analyses needed to (1) determine an appropriate workload  that investigators and case analysts can manage while meeting federal  standards and (2) develop an overall strategy and resource plan to  improve the quality and timeliness of investigations and reduce the  number of overdue reinvestigations;  review and clarify all investigative policy guidance to ensure that  investigations comply with federal standards;    establish a process for identifying and forwarding to the Security Policy  Board suggested changes to policy guidance concerning the  implementation of the federal standards and other investigative policy  issues;    establish formal quality control mechanisms to ensure that Defense  Security Service or contracted investigators perform high-quality  investigations, including periodic reviews of samples of completed  investigations and feedback on problems to senior managers,  investigators, and trainers;    establish a training infrastructure for basic and continuing investigator  and case analyst training that includes formal feedback mechanisms to  assess training needs and measure effectiveness, and as a high priority,  provide training on complying with federal investigative standards for  investigators and case analysts; and  take steps to correct the case management automation problems to  gain short-term capability and develop long-term, cost-effective  automation alternatives. Appendix II: Scope and Methodology

To estimate the size and accuracy of the Department of Defense-wide  (DOD) personnel security clearance backlog, we obtained separate  estimates of the investigative and adjudicative backlogs from the Defense  Security Service (DSS), the Office of Personnel Management (OPM), and  DOD’s central adjudication facilities. To identify the potential adverse effects of the impediments to eliminating  the backlog and accurately estimating its size, we reviewed prior GAO and  Joint Security Commission reports.
Why GAO Did This Study

Terrorist attacks and espionage cases have heightened national security concerns and highlighted the need for a timely, high-quality personnel security clearance process. However, GAO's past work found that the Department of Defense (DOD) had a clearance backlog and other problems with its process. GAO was asked to address: (1) What is the size of DOD's security clearance backlog, and how accurately is DOD able to estimate its size? (2) What factors impede DOD's ability to eliminate the backlog and accurately determine its size? (3) What are the potential adverse effects of those impediments to eliminating DOD's backlog and accurately estimating the backlog's size? GAO was also asked to determine the status of the congressionally authorized transfer of Defense Security Service (DSS) investigative functions and personnel to the Office of Personnel Management (OPM).

What GAO Found

DOD did not know the size of its security clearance backlog at the end of September 2003 and has not estimated the size of the backlog since January 2000. DOD cannot estimate the size of its backlog of overdue reinvestigations that have not been submitted for renewal, but prior estimates of this portion of the backlog suggest it was sizeable. Using September 2003 data from DSS, OPM, and nine adjudication facilities, GAO calculated the size of investigative and adjudicative portions of the backlog at roughly 270,000 and 90,000 cases, respectively. Because these estimates were made using time-based goals that varied from agency to agency, the actual backlog size is uncertain. Several impediments hinder DOD's ability to eliminate--and accurately estimate the size of--its clearance backlog. Four major impediments slowing the elimination of the backlog are (1) the large numbers of new clearance requests; (2) the insufficient investigator and adjudicator workforces; (3) the size of the existing backlog; and (4) the lack of a strategic plan for overcoming problems in gaining access to state, local, and overseas information needed to complete investigations. Two other factors have hampered DOD's ability to develop accurate estimates of the backlog size. DOD has failed to provide adequate oversight of its clearance program, including developing DOD-wide backlog definitions and measures and using the measures to assess the backlog regularly. In addition, delays in implementing its Joint Personnel Adjudication System have limited DOD's ability to monitor backlog size and track when periodic reinvestigations are due. DOD's failure to eliminate and accurately assess the size of the backlog may have adverse effects. Delays in updating overdue clearances for command, agency, and industry personnel who are doing classified work may increase risks to national security. Slowness in issuing new clearances can increase the costs of doing classified government work. Finally, DOD's inability to accurately define and measure the backlog and project future clearance requests that it expects to receive can adversely affect its ability to develop accurate budgetary and staffing plans. In December 2003, advisors to OPM's Director recommended that the authorized transfer of DOD's investigative functions and personnel to OPM should not occur for at least the rest of fiscal year 2004. That recommendation was based on uncertainties over financial risks that OPM might incur. An alternative plan being discussed by DOD and OPM calls for leaving investigative staff in DSS and giving them training for, and access to, OPM's case management system. A DOD official estimated that using the OPM system, instead of DOD's current system, would avoid about $100 million in update and maintenance costs during the next 5 years. Also, as of December 16, 2003, the Secretary of Defense had not provided Congress with certifications required prior to any transfer.