Further, the continuing U.S. military presence at Soto Cano appears inconsistent with the current goal of the U.S. Embassy in Honduras—which is to reduce the overall size and scope of U.S. activities in Honduras in recognition of declining U.S. funding and increased political stability in the region. While the U.S. military presence at Soto Cano is useful and convenient, it is not essential to support military training activities in the region. U.S. military personnel are routinely deployed throughout Latin America for training missions without a dedicated, semipermanent U.S. logistics and support base like Soto Cano. Officials from the U.S. Army Reserve and National Guard said that the support they receive from U.S. military forces at Soto Cano makes training more convenient but that the training can be accomplished without a U.S. military presence. Two Navy P-3 counterdrug planes based in Panama sometimes use Soto Cano for refueling or as a temporary base for their operations. Therefore, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense reduce U.S. military personnel at Soto Cano to the level necessary to support counterdrug activities, pending the development of other arrangements to support those counterdrug activities; the Commissioner of the U.S. Customs Service, the Administrator of DEA, the Secretaries of State and Defense, in conjunction with the Director of the Office of National Drug Control Policy, develop a plan to conduct their operations without U.S. military units at Soto Cano; and the Secretary of Defense withdraw the remaining U.S. military personnel at Soto Cano once the interagency plan is developed and implemented. We obtained additional information related to the costs of maintaining the presence at the base from Air Force Air Combat Command Headquarters in Langley, Virginia, and the Army Forces Command Headquarters in Atlanta, Georgia.
Why GAO Did This Study

GAO reviewed whether the U.S. military presence at Soto Cano Air Base in Honduras is critical to current U.S. activities and objectives in the region, focusing on: (1) the cost of maintaining U.S. forces at the base; (2) U.S. objectives for regional economic growth and democratic reform; (3) drug interdiction activities; and (4) the withdrawal of U.S. forces from an air base in Panama.

What GAO Found

GAO found that: (1) the U.S. military presence at Soto Cano provides useful but minimal support to some U.S. government activities in the region, but there is not sufficient justification for maintaining the presence; (2) U.S. forces are to support military training exercises, humanitarian and civic assistance exercises, and U.S. counterdrug activities in Honduras; (3) the Army acknowledges that training can be conducted in the region without a semipermanent logistics support base; (4) federal agency officials believe that they can continue their regional operations without support from the U.S. military at Soto Cano; (5) Soto Cano provides minimal support to U.S. counterdrug activities; (6) Soto Cano's potential as a support facility for military operations in Latin America is limited by the lack of a base rights agreement with Honduras, its limited capacity, and political issues; and (7) eliminating the U.S. military presence at Soto Cano would have a minimal impact on current U.S. missions and would potentially result in budgetary savings.