Specifically, we used NNSA’s data to identify  contaminated nonoperational facilities, operational facilities that will be  considered nonoperational over the next 25 years, and the annual cost to  maintain these facilities. In addition, we visited two of the six NNSA sites with contaminated  facilities—Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) in California  and the Y-12 National Security Complex (Y-12) in Tennessee—to view  contaminated facilities and interview officials that are familiar with facility  surveillance and maintenance. To determine the extent to which EM considers the risks of NNSA’s  contaminated nonoperational facilities and the costs to maintain them, we  reviewed DOE and EM policies and guidance documents related to the  facility transfer process and prioritization of EM’s cleanup work. 1). Until EM has funds available to immediately begin  disposition, program offices, such as NNSA, are responsible for  maintaining their nonoperational facilities through activities known as  surveillance and maintenance. NNSA Has Identified 83 Facilities to Be Transferred to EM for Disposition, and the Condition of Nonoperational Facilities Continues to Degrade

NNSA has identified 83 contaminated facilities for potential transfer to EM  for disposition over a 25-year period, 56 of which are currently  nonoperational. NNSA is maintaining these facilities for future transfer to  EM, but the condition of nonoperational facilities continues to degrade,  resulting in increasing costs to NNSA to maintain them to prevent the  spread of contamination. NNSA Has Identified 83 Contaminated Facilities for Transfer to EM

According to NNSA facility data, NNSA has identified 83 contaminated  facilities at six of its eight sites for potential transfer to EM for disposition  over 25 years, 27 of which are operational, and 56 are nonoperational  (see fig. 2). EM officials stated that, while EM confirmed in 2009 that 14 NNSA  facilities were eligible for transfer to EM, none of those facilities have  been transferred and remain part of the 56 nonoperational facilities  managed by NNSA. As a result, EM officials told us  they estimate that EM may not be able to accept any facilities for transfer  until at least 2030 due to budget uncertainties. Specifically,  site officials now detect radiological and toxicological contaminants— beryllium, mercury, and black mold—in areas where they were not  detected 2 years earlier (see fig. Additional repair  activities were planned in fiscal year 2014, but even with these additional  repairs, according to NNSA documents, the overall risk of the facility to  workers and the environment will not be significantly reduced. EM Does Not Consider Risks or Costs of NNSA’s Contaminated Nonoperational Facilities When Prioritizing Cleanup Activities

When developing its annual plans and schedules for decontaminating and  decommissioning facilities, EM does not consider the human health and  environmental risks of NNSA’s contaminated nonoperational facilities that  are eligible for transfer, but have not yet been transferred to EM. According to the 2006 DOE Deputy Secretary Program Decision  Memorandum, EM is to incorporate DOE’s contaminated nonoperational  facilities into its planning for decontamination and decommissioning,  commensurate with the risk such activities pose. EM officials told us that EM does not include contaminated  nonoperational facilities maintained by NNSA and other program offices  in its planning until EM officials believe they will have available funding to  begin decontamination and decommissioning. Conditions at many of NNSA’s contaminated facilities, some of which  have been nonoperational for many years, continue to worsen, resulting  in increased costs and risks, which are not considered by EM when  prioritizing its cleanup work. Recommendations for Executive Action

We recommend the Secretary of Energy direct the Office of  Environmental Management (EM) to take the following two actions to aid  EM in its decision making on which facilities to accept and decontaminate  and decommission:
To ensure that EM’s annual process to prioritize facilities for  decontamination and decommissioning considers all relevant risks  from NNSA, EM should integrate its lists of facilities prioritized for  disposition with all NNSA facilities that meet EM’s transfer  requirements, and EM should include this integrated list as part of the  Congressional Budget Justification for DOE. DOE, however, did not state whether it concurred with  the report’s recommendations.
Why GAO Did This Study

Seventy years of nuclear weapons production and energy research by DOE and its predecessor agencies generated radioactive waste, resulting in thousands of contaminated facilities. Some facilities pose risks to workers near the facilities and to the environment. NNSA, a separately organized agency within DOE, now manages many of these contaminated facilities, and though many are no longer in use, others are still operational. Once NNSA considers these facilities to be nonoperational, they may be eligible for transfer to EM, whose mission includes disposing of contaminated facilities through decontamination and decommissioning. In 2007, EM updated its facility transfer process, but until EM accepts these facilities, NNSA is responsible for their maintenance.
The Senate Armed Services Committee Report accompanying the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014 mandated GAO to assess the inventory of facilities that NNSA plans to transfer to EM for disposition. This report examines (1) how many facilities NNSA has identified for transfer to EM for disposition and their condition and (2) the extent to which EM considers risks of NNSA's contaminated nonoperational facilities and the costs to maintain them when prioritizing its cleanup activities. GAO reviewed documents and interviewed officials from NNSA and EM and visited two NNSA sites that have some of the most contaminated facilities.

What GAO Found

The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) has identified 83 facilities at six of its eight sites for transfer to the Department of Energy's (DOE) Office of Environmental Management (EM) for disposition, and the condition of NNSA's facilities awaiting transfer continues to degrade. NNSA plans to transfer all 83 facilities to EM over the next 25 years. Twenty-seven of them are still operational but are expected to become nonoperational in the next 25 years, and 56 are nonoperational now. In 2009, EM agreed to accept 14 NNSA facilities when it had funds available to begin decontamination and decommissioning. Six years later, none of these facilities have been transferred, and EM officials said they may not be able to accept these or other NNSA facilities until at least 2030 due to budget uncertainties and other priorities. Meanwhile, as NNSA maintains contaminated nonoperational facilities, the facilities' condition continues to worsen, resulting in increased costs to maintain them, and NNSA documents show that some facilities will require significant additional maintenance to prevent the spread of contamination. For example, the Alpha-5 facility at NNSA's Y-12 National Security Complex in Tennessee has degraded to the extent that site officials now detect contaminants, such as mercury, in areas where they were not detected 2 years earlier, and additional funds are needed to repair its failing roof.
EM does not consider the risks of NNSA's nonoperational facilities when prioritizing its cleanup activities. Specifically, when developing its annual facility disposition plans, EM does not consider the human health or environmental risks of NNSA's contaminated nonoperational facilities that meet its transfer requirements but have not yet been transferred. A 2006 DOE Deputy Secretary Program Decision Memorandum stated that EM is to incorporate DOE's contaminated nonoperational facilities into its planning for decontamination and decommissioning, commensurate with the risk such activities pose. EM officials told GAO that they do not include facilities maintained by NNSA in their planning until they have available funding to begin cleanup work. However, without integrating NNSA's inventory of nonoperational facilities into its process for prioritizing facilities for disposition, EM may be prioritizing cleanup for lower-risk facilities under its management ahead of facilities at NNSA that may present a higher risk of spreading contamination.
Alpha-5, a Nonoperational Facility, Shows Degradation Over 2 Years

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends, among other things, that EM integrate into one prioritized list all NNSA facilities that meet EM's transfer requirements. EM neither agreed nor disagreed with the recommendation, stating it has formed a working group that may address GAO's findings.