NASA’s safety organization provides an independent channel for assessing shuttle flight safety. Interviews with key shuttle program officials, survey data, and our observations indicate that NASA has been successful in creating communication channels and an organizational culture that encourages people to discuss safety concerns and to bring those concerns to higher management if necessary. Not Complete Agreement on Type and Amount of Information Needed

While there was a high level of agreement that the current culture encourages and enables contractors and employees to discuss safety issues and concerns, there was not universal agreement about the kinds of risk information needed for final launch decisions. Some participants in our discussion groups expressed concern about the effect of continued cost reductions and the transition to contractor management of the program. However, NASA still relies primarily on qualitative methods to assess and prioritize significant shuttle risk. NASA uses a variety of methods to assess shuttle risk issues, and efforts are underway to increase the use of quantitative methods. Cost, lack of specific expertise, and lack of data are the reasons cited for limited use. NASA’s Databases Do Not Provide Sufficient Information for Quantitative Analysis

Another factor that has hindered development of quantitative methods of risk assessment is that NASA’s databases do not always provide timely, accessible, accurate, and complete information.
Why GAO Did This Study

Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA) management of risk associated with space shuttle flights, focusing on NASA attempts to: (1) increase the flow and communication of risk information; and (2) use quantitative methods for assessing risk.

What GAO Found

GAO found that: (1) NASA has successfully created numerous formal and informal communication channels and an open organizational culture that encourages people to discuss safety concerns and to elevate unaddressed concerns to higher management levels; (2) while most personnel agreed that the current culture encourages discussions of safety concerns, there was not universal agreement about the kinds of risk information needed for final launch decisions; (3) some personnel expressed concerns about the effects of pending cost reductions and program changes on shuttle safety; (4) NASA primarily relies on qualitative methods to assess and prioritize significant shuttle risk; (5) costs, lack of expertise, and lack of data have hindered NASA progress in increasing its use of quantitative methods to assess shuttle safety risks; and (6) NASA databases do not always provide timely, accessible, accurate, and complete information to facilitate quantitative assessment or decisionmaking.