Since 2006, the Navy has nearly doubled the percentage of the  fleet assigned to overseas homeports. Overseas-Homeported Ships Incur Additional Costs and Adverse Effects on Readiness and Ship Condition Higher Operations and Support Costs

The operational benefits the Navy describes that result from homeporting  ships overseas also result in costs to the Navy and DOD more broadly. For example, casualty report data  provide information on individual pieces of equipment or systems that are  degraded or out of service, the lack of which will affect a ship’s ability to  support required mission areas. The Navy Has Not Identified Costs and Risks Associated with the Increased Operational Tempo for Ships Homeported Overseas

The Navy has not identified or mitigated the risks its increasing reliance  on overseas homeporting poses to its force over the long term. We found  that, due to the high pace of operations the Navy uses for overseas- homeported ships, some of these ships have had consistently deferred  maintenance that has resulted in long-term degraded material condition  and increased maintenance costs, and could shorten the ships’ service  lives. The Navy is implementing a revised operational schedule for U.S.- based ships that is intended to lengthen time between deployments, citing  the need for a sustainable schedule. However, the Navy has not  determined how—or whether—it will apply a more sustainable schedule  to all ships homeported overseas. Additionally, although the Navy’s  decision processes for moving individual ships overseas identifies actions  and resources needed, the Navy does not assess risks such moves pose  to costs, readiness, or expected service life of ships that it can expect  based on its historical experience of increased operational tempo for  ships homeported overseas. As discussed earlier, we  found that the high pace of operations the Navy uses for overseas- homeported ships limits their dedicated training and maintenance periods,  which has resulted in difficulty keeping crews fully trained and ships  maintained. In addition, we found that casualty reports for both U.S.- and  overseas-homeported ships have doubled over the past 5 years, with the  material condition of overseas-homeported ships having decreased  slightly faster than U.S.-homeported ships. Recommendations for Executive Action

To balance combatant commanders’ demands for forward presence with  the Navy’s needs to sustain a ready force over the long term and identify  and mitigate risks consistent with Federal Standards for Internal Control,  we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the  Navy to take the following two actions:  to fully implement its optimized fleet response plan, develop and  implement a sustainable operational schedule for all ships  homeported overseas; and develop a comprehensive assessment of the long-term costs and  risks to the Navy’s surface and amphibious fleet associated with its  increasing reliance on overseas homeporting to meet presence  requirements, make any necessary adjustments to its overseas  presence based on this assessment, and reassess these risks when  making future overseas homeporting decisions and developing future  strategic laydown plans. To assess the extent to which the Navy has identified and taken steps to  mitigate any risks from homeporting ships overseas, we analyzed (1) key  Navy and Department of Defense (DOD) guidance and policies for  assigning ships to homeports in the United States and overseas and (2)  the Navy’s required actions for evaluating, planning, and implementing  changes to overseas force structure.
Why GAO Did This Study

Forward presence supports the Navy's goals of ensuring sea control, projecting U.S. power, and providing maritime security. To meet these goals and combatant commanders' growing demand for forward presence, the Navy has doubled the number of ships assigned to overseas homeports since 2006, to a total of 40 by the end of 2015, and plans to increase this number further in the future.
House Report 113-446 included a provision that GAO analyze the Navy's decision-making process for determining when to homeport ships overseas and identify the relative costs and benefits of various approaches. This report addresses (1) the operational benefits, costs, and readiness effects associated with assigning ships to U.S. or overseas homeports and (2) the extent to which the Navy has identified and mitigated risks from homeporting ships overseas. GAO analyzed Navy policies and 5 to 10 years of historical cost, operational tempo, and readiness data and interviewed fleet officials.

What GAO Found

Homeporting ships overseas considerably increases the forward presence— U.S. naval forces in overseas operating areas—that the Navy's existing fleet provides and has other near-term benefits such as rapid crisis response, but incurs higher operations and support costs when compared to U.S.-homeported ships. GAO found that casualty reports—incidents of degraded or out-of-service equipment—have doubled over the past 5 years and that the material condition of overseas-homeported ships has decreased slightly faster than that of U.S.-homeported ships (see figure below). In addition, the Navy has spent hundreds of millions of dollars on overseas infrastructure and base operating costs since 2009, while moving large numbers of sailors, dependents, and ship repair work overseas. GAO also found that the high pace of operations the Navy uses for overseas-homeported ships limits dedicated training and maintenance periods, which has resulted in difficulty keeping crews fully trained and ships maintained.
The Navy has not identified or mitigated the risks its increasing reliance on overseas homeporting poses to its force over the long term. GAO found that some ships homeported overseas have had consistently deferred maintenance that has resulted in long-term degraded material condition and increased maintenance costs, and could shorten a ship's service life. The Navy began implementing a revised operational schedule in 2014 for U.S.-based ships that lengthens time between deployments, citing the need for a sustainable schedule. However, the Navy has not determined how—or whether—it will apply a more sustainable schedule to all ships homeported overseas. Although the Navy's decision process for moving individual ships overseas identifies actions and resources needed, it does not assess risks that such moves pose to costs, readiness, or expected service lives of ships that the Navy can expect based on its historical experience operating ships from overseas homeports. Without a sustainable operational schedule and a comprehensive risk assessment on overseas homeporting, the Navy lacks information needed to make informed homeporting decisions and it will be difficult for the Navy to identify and mitigate the risks its homeporting decisions pose to its budget, readiness, and ship service lives over the long term.

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that the Navy develop and implement a sustainable operational schedule for all ships homeported overseas and conduct a comprehensive assessment of the risks associated with overseas homeporting. The Department of Defense concurred with GAO's recommendations.