The training primarily benefits U.S.  forces. U.S.-Provided Security Assistance Is Intended to Support Counterterrorism and Other Security Cooperation Goals and Is Assessed Collectively with Other Activities

The United States uses security assistance to Algeria, Morocco, and  Tunisia to support the broad goals of security cooperation and  counterterrorism. The security  assistance programs in each of these countries may support one or more  of these goals. State and DOD Provided Security Assistance to Train and Equip Security Forces in Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia

State and DOD collectively allocated approximately $146.6 million through  their security assistance programs to Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia from  fiscal years 2002 to 2005. State  assesses these goals in its annual mission planning process. Lapses in Human Rights Vetting of Foreign Trainees Resulted from Unclear Procedures and the Lack of Monitoring to Ensure Posts’ Compliance with State Policy

In Morocco and Tunisia, lapses in vetting trainees for human rights abuses  occurred in fiscal years 2004 and 2005. These lapses resulted from unclear vetting procedures, undefined roles for  vetting, and the lack of a monitoring mechanism to ensure posts’  compliance with vetting procedures. However,  we found that responsible officials at the posts in Morocco and Tunisia did  not monitor whether offices within each post were following vetting  procedures, and State headquarters did not monitor the efforts of the posts  to vet trainees. To Comply with U.S. Laws, State Policy Calls for Human Rights Vetting of Foreign Security Forces Receiving U.S. Assistance

Each of the annual Foreign Operations Appropriations Acts since 1998 has  included a provision, commonly referred to as the Leahy Amendment, that  restricts the provision of assistance appropriated in these acts to any  foreign security unit when the Secretary of State has credible evidence  that the unit has committed gross violations of human rights. Based on our review of 273 out of 468 files,  we estimate that 27 percent (127 trainees) lacked evidence of vetting. The two posts did maintain vetting files for 468 trainees. Morocco and Tunisia do not  have any sensitive U.S.-origin equipment subject to this systematic  monitoring, and Algeria does not participate in any programs involving  government transfers of U.S.-origin equipment, such as foreign military  sales or EDA. Additionally, according to State and  based on our work, there have been no allegations of unauthorized use of  U.S.-origin equipment in Tunisia, Morocco, and the Western Sahara that  would trigger greater scrutiny of end use. To assess U.S. agencies’ implementation in Morocco and Tunisia of State’s  policy to screen foreign security forces to ensure compliance with  congressional human rights funding restrictions, we reviewed relevant  statutes and implementing guidelines. We interviewed DOD  officials responsible for end-use monitoring at the Defense Security  Cooperation Agency (DSCA), EUCOM, and the posts in Rabat and Tunis to  determine what monitoring activities took place in these countries,  whether these countries have any sensitive defense articles requiring  systematic monitoring under DOD guidelines, and whether there have  been any allegations of misuse of U.S.-origin equipment. Algeria does not  receive U.S.-origin defense articles from the U.S. government.
Why GAO Did This Study

Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia are important U.S. allies in the war on terrorism. The United States provides these countries with security assistance, however, Congress restricts funding when credible evidence exists that foreign security units have committed gross human rights violations. GAO (1) describes the goals of U.S. security assistance to these countries and examines U.S. agencies' assessment of this assistance, (2) assesses U.S. agencies' implementation in Morocco and Tunisia of State's policy to screen foreign security forces to ensure compliance with congressional human rights funding restrictions, and (3) examines agencies' efforts to monitor the use of U.S.-origin defense articles provided through U.S. security assistance programs in the three countries, including Western Sahara, to ensure that they are not misused or diverted. GAO visited U.S. posts in Morocco and Tunisia and analyzed trainee files to determine compliance with human rights vetting policy.

What GAO Found

The goals of the U.S. security assistance programs in Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia are to support counterterrorism and broader security cooperation goals, such as maintaining regional stability and security, building the military capacity of foreign partners, and promoting interoperability with U.S. forces. To support these goals, the Departments of State (State) and Defense (DOD) have allocated approximately $146.6 million, from fiscal years 2002 to 2005, to train and equip security forces in these countries. DOD and State assess these programs together with other related activities through evaluations of security cooperation, counterterrorism, and other country goals. State policy requires human rights vetting of individuals and units of foreign security forces receiving U.S.-provided training. In Morocco and Tunisia, GAO found lapses in the vetting of trainees during fiscal years 2004 and 2005. These lapses include more than 400 trainees for whom no vetting files existed at the posts. In addition, even though posts maintained vetting files on 468 trainees, GAO estimates that 27 percent of these files did not have evidence of vetting. The lapses in vetting trainees resulted from unclear guidance on vetting procedures, undefined roles and responsibilities for vetting, and the lack of a systematic monitoring mechanism to ensure that procedures were followed. Although State has issued a guide to clarify procedures and has required posts to assign an official responsible for vetting, it does not monitor whether posts are following vetting procedures. Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia do not have any sensitive U.S.-origin defense articles subject to DOD's systematic monitoring requirements, such as physical inventory and inspection requirements. According to DOD officials and human rights organizations, no allegations of unauthorized use of U.S.-origin equipment have been made that would call for greater scrutiny of end use by these countries.