	Introduction: The 9/11 Commission Report and Long-Standing Contradictions in U.S. Policy Towards Pakistan and South Asia(1)

In calling for a clear, strong, and long-term commitment to the military-dominatedgovernment of Pakistan despite serious concerns about that country's nuclear proliferation activities, The Final Report of the 9/11 Commission cast into sharp relief two long-standing dilemmasconcerning U.S. policy towards Pakistan and South Asia. First, in an often strained securityrelationship spanning more than five decades, U.S. and Pakistani national security objectives haveseldom been congruent. Pakistan has viewed the alliance primarily in the context of its rivalry withIndia, whereas U.S. policymakers have tended to view it from the perspective of regional stabilityand U.S. global security interests. (2) Second, U.S.nuclear nonproliferation objectives towards Pakistan (and India) repeatedly have been subordinatedto other important U.S. goals. During the 1980s, Pakistan exploited its key role as a conduit for aidto the anti-Soviet Afghan mujahidin to avoid U.S. nuclear nonproliferation sanctions and receiveannually some $600 million annually in U.S. military and economic aid. Underscoring Pakistan'sdifferent agenda, some of the radical Islamists favored by its military intelligence service laterformed the core of Al Qaeda and the Taliban. During the 108th Congress, these concerns wereraised by some Members of Congress in committee hearings and in proposed legislation that did notreceive action. This report briefly recounts previous failed efforts to reconcile conflicting American regionalsecurity and nuclear nonproliferation policy objectives regarding Pakistan; (2) documents A.Q.Khan's role, whether with or without official involvement, in supplying nuclear technology to"rogue" states and how these activities escaped detection by U.S. intelligence agencies; (3) considersissues regarding the nature, objectives, and viability of the military-dominated government headedby President Pervez Musharraf; and, (4) outlines a series of unilateral and multilateral U.S. options,with a discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of each, for gaining further nuclearnonproliferation cooperation from Pakistan and forestalling future exports from Pakistan of nuclearand dual-use components, materials, and technology. This report will not be further updated. intelligence officials have not been able to gain access to Khan. Transfers to North Korea. Pakistani Government Response to U.S. Beg denies all claims that he sought to provide nuclear assistance to Iran. (118) 

	Issues Concerning the Viability of the Musharraf Government As a Long-Term U.S. Security Partner(119)

The critical importance of gaining cooperation against terrorism has been the BushAdministration's main justification for largely setting aside U.S. nonproliferation concerns in the caseof Pakistan. At the same time, questions remain about Pakistan's nuclear policies. Khan's activities and networks. Khan case and other activitieslinking Pakistan to nuclear proliferation.
In calling for a clear, strong, and long-term commitment to the military-dominatedgovernment of Pakistan despite serious concerns about that country's nuclear proliferation activities,The 9/11 Commission cast into sharp relief two long-standing dilemmas concerning U.S. policytowards Pakistan and South Asia. First, in an often strained security relationship spanning more thanfive decades, U.S. and Pakistani national security objectives have seldom been congruent. Pakistanhas viewed the alliance primarily in the context of its rivalry with India, whereas Americanpolicymakers have viewed it from the perspective of U.S. global security interests. Second, U.S.nuclear nonproliferation objectives towards Pakistan (and India) repeatedly have been subordinatedto other important U.S. goals. During the 1980s, Pakistan exploited its key role as a conduit for aidto the anti-Soviet Afghan mujahidin to avoid U.S. nuclear nonproliferation sanctions and receivesome $600 million annually in U.S. military and economic aid. Underscoring Pakistan's differentagenda, some of the radical Islamists favored by its military intelligence service later formed thecore of Al Qaeda and the Taliban.
A crucial U.S. policy challenge is to gain Pakistani cooperation in shutting down theextensive illicit nuclear supplier network established in the 1990s by the self-designated "father" ofPakistan's nuclear bomb, Abdul Qadir Khan, which provided nuclear enrichment technology to Iran,Libya, and North Korea, while at the same time supporting stability in Pakistan and gaining itsmaximum cooperation against terrorism. To date, the Administration appears largely to haveacquiesced in Pakistan's refusal to allow access to Khan by U.S. intelligence officials. TheAdministration has been equally reluctant to publicly criticize the Musharraf government's apparentuse of international arms dealers to obtain controlled U.S. dual-use technology for its own nuclearweapons program, in violation of U.S. law.
The 109th Congress has been asked by the Administration to provide some $698 million inmilitary and economic assistance to Pakistan for FY2006, part of a five-year, $3 billion aid package. Some Members of Congress have expressed concern that, as during the 1980s, the urgent need forPakistan's cooperation will prevent the Administration from dealing forcefully with its nuclearproliferation activities, and have introduced legislation that seeks to make U.S. assistance contingenton Pakistan's cooperation on nuclear proliferation.
This report: (1) briefly recounts previous failed efforts to reconcile American nuclearnonproliferation and other security objectives regarding Pakistan; (2) documents A.Q. Khan's role,whether with or without official involvement, in supplying nuclear technology to "rogue" states andhow these activities escaped detection by U.S. intelligence agencies; (3) considers issues regardingthe objectives, and viability of the military-dominated government of President Pervez Musharraf;and, (4) outlines and evaluates several U.S. options for seeking to gain more credible cooperationfrom Pakistan's regarding its nuclear activities while still maintaining effective counterterroristcooperation. This report will not be further updated.