Attorneys, Assistant U.S. The Interagency Security  Committee (ISC) ranks U.S. circuit, district, and bankruptcy courthouses  as “very high”—the highest security level—because they are prominent  symbols of U.S. power or authority. Stakeholders Have Taken Steps to Improve Courthouse Security, but Face Challenges Implementing Their Roles and Responsibilities

			Interagency Agreements and Mechanisms for Identifying and Coordinating Roles and Responsibilities

Various interagency agreements designate courthouse security roles and  responsibilities for federal stakeholders, including FPS, the Marshals  Service, GSA, and the judiciary. In recent years, federal stakeholders have taken various actions to  strengthen their collaborative efforts to secure courthouses. First, according to AOUSC and other  stakeholders, the federal government’s approach to courthouse security  in which the Marshals Service and FPS both provide security services  has resulted in a bifurcated security environment with two lines of  authority for implementation and oversight of security services. In 2008 Congress authorized the Marshals Service, in consultation with  the AOUSC, to implement a Perimeter Pilot Security Program for the  Marshals Service to assume FPS’s responsibilities to provide perimeter  security at selected courthouses participating in the program. Although AOUSC has recommended expansion of the pilot program on  the basis of its evaluation, additional analysis of the benefits and costs of  this approach could better position the federal stakeholders and Congress  to consider and determine whether to expand the pilot. We have previously reported that allocating  resources using risk management is a facility protection key practice. The Marshals Service and FPS have not always conducted risk  assessments of courthouses, as required by their respective guidance  and directives. With regard to the Marshals Service, in 9 of the 11  courthouses we visited, the Marshals Service had not conducted risk  assessments—what the Marshals refer to as court security facility  surveys—for their judicial facilities. Marshals Service officials at 6  courthouses told us they assess security needs as part of the budget  process. FPS has also faced difficulties in preparing FSAs. Marshals Service, GSA, and court officials told us that  they did not consistently receive full FSAs from FPS at the courthouses  we visited. Among other things, we recommended that  FPS develop interim solutions for completing FSAs. However, updating the MOA that identifies  these roles and responsibilities to better incorporate accountability for  federal agencies’ collaborative efforts could strengthen the multiagency  courthouse security framework. As such, updating the MOA to help ensure that these assessments,  referred to by the Marshals Service as court security facility surveys and  by FPS as FSAs, are completed in a timely manner and the results  shared with the other federal agencies responsible for courthouse  security, could better equip federal stakeholders to assess courthouses’  security needs and gaps and make informed decisions. Specifically, in this update to the MOA  stakeholders should:  (1)  clarify federal stakeholders’ roles and responsibilities including,  but not limited to, the conditions under which stakeholders may  assume each other’s responsibilities and whether such  agreements should be documented; and define GSA’s  responsibilities and determine whether GSA should be included  as a signatory to the updated MOA;  (2)  outline how they will ensure greater participation of relevant  stakeholders in court or facility security committees; and  (3)  specify how they will complete required risk assessments for  courthouses, referred to by the Marshals Service as court  security facility surveys and by FPS as FSAs, and ensure that  the results of those assessments are shared with relevant  stakeholders, as appropriate. Second, to the extent that steps are taken to expand the perimeter pilot  program, we recommend that the Secretary and Attorney General instruct  the Director of FPS, and the Director of the Marshals Service,  respectively, to work collaboratively, in consultation and agreement with  the judiciary and GSA, to further assess costs and benefits, in terms of  enhanced security, of expanding the pilot program to other primary  courthouses, and assess all stakeholders’ views about the pilot program. DHS concurred with our recommendations. To assess the extent to which federal stakeholders have collaborated and  used risk management practices to protect federal courthouses, we  examined relevant statutes; and documentation from the Marshals  Service, FPS, GSA, and the judiciary, including plans, reports, guidance,  security assessments, and surveys. The information we obtained from our site visits cannot be  generalized across all U.S. federal courthouses, but because we selected  the courthouses based on a mix of criteria, they provided us with  examples of federal stakeholders’ implementation of courthouse security  activities.
Why GAO Did This Study

Safe and accessible federal courthouses are critical to the U.S. judicial process. The Federal Protective Service (FPS), within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the U.S. Marshals Service (Marshals Service), within the Department of Justice (DOJ), the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts (AOUSC), and the General Services Administration (GSA) are the federal stakeholders with roles related to courthouse security. As requested, this report addresses (1) attributes that influence courthouse security considerations and (2) the extent to which stakeholders have collaborated in implementing their responsibilities and using risk management. GAO analyzed laws and documents, such as security assessments; reviewed GAO's work on key practices for collaboration and facility protection; visited 11 courthouse facilities, selected based on geographic dispersion, age, size, and other criteria; and interviewed agency and judiciary officials. While the results from site visits cannot be generalized, they provided examples of courthouse security activities.

What GAO Found

Various attributes influence security considerations for the nation's 424 federal courthouses, which range from small court spaces to large buildings in major urban areas. According to DOJ data, threats against the courts have increased between fiscal years 2004 and 2010--from approximately 600 to more than 1,400. The Interagency Security Committee--an interagency group that develops standards for federal facility security--has assigned courthouses the highest security level because they are prominent symbols of U.S. power. Federal stakeholders have taken steps to strengthen their collaboration, such as establishing agency liaisons, but have faced challenges in implementing assigned responsibilities and using risk assessment tools. (1) A 1997 memorandum of agreement (MOA) outlines each stakeholder's roles and responsibilities and identifies areas requiring stakeholder coordination. However, at 5 of the 11 courthouses GAO visited, FPS and the Marshals Service were either performing duplicative efforts (e.g., both monitoring the courthouse lobby) or performing security roles that were inconsistent with their responsibilities. The judiciary and other stakeholders stated that having the Marshals Service and FPS both provide security services has resulted in two lines of authority for implementing and overseeing security services. Updating the MOA that identifies roles and responsibilities could strengthen the multiagency courthouse security framework by better incorporating accountability for federal agencies' collaborative efforts. (2) In 2008, Congress authorized a pilot program, whereby the Marshals Service would assume FPS's responsibilities to provide perimeter security at 7 courthouses. In October 2010, the judiciary recommended that the pilot be expanded. AOUSC noted general consensus among various stakeholders in support of the pilot and estimated the costs of expanding it, but AOUSC did not obtain FPS's views on assessing the pilot results or on how the expansion may affect FPS's mission. Additional analysis on the costs and benefits of this approach and the inclusion of all stakeholder perspectives could better position Congress and federal stakeholders to evaluate expansion options. (3) The Marshals Service has not always completed court security facility surveys (a type of risk assessment), as required by Marshals Service guidance. At 9 of the courthouses GAO visited, the Marshals Service had not conducted these surveys, but Marshals Service officials at some courthouses told us that they assessed security needs as part of their budget development process. However, these assessments are less comprehensive than the court security facility surveys required by Marshals Service guidance. FPS has faced difficulties completing its risk assessments, known as facility security assessments, and recently halted an effort to implement a new system for completing them. Furthermore, GAO found that the Marshals Service and FPS did not consistently share the full results of their risk assessments with each other and key stakeholders. Sharing risk assessment information could better equip federal stakeholders to assess courthouses' security needs and make informed decisions.

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends DHS and DOJ update the MOA to, among other things, clarify stakeholders' roles and responsibilities and ensure the completion and sharing of risk assessments; and further assess costs and benefits of the perimeter pilot program, in terms of enhanced security, and include all stakeholders' views, should steps be taken to expand the program. DHS and DOJ concurred with GAO's recommendations.