DOD approved the program to begin low-rate initial production (LRIP) in April 1997 and will purchase 25 V-22 aircraft in  4 LRIP lots of 5, 5, 7, and 8 through fiscal year 2000. This is particularly true because, as discussed later, the aircraft design is not yet stable and further changes are expected as the test program continues. Resolution of performance and operational issues will likely increase V-22 program costs. The following are some issues that must be resolved before a determination can be made as to whether the V-22 will satisfy the services’ stated requirements. However, our review showed that in order for the aircraft to meet key performance parameters, such as range, trade-offs are being considered. Due to the significant limitations of these early operational assessments, their reliability as the basis for deciding to proceed into LRIP is questionable and future production decisions should be based on more realistic tests. In that report, the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, concluded that V-22 testing had concentrated on system integration and flight envelop expansion, but had “not extensively investigated mission applications of tiltrotor technology and potential operational effectiveness and suitability of the EMD V-22.” The report also highlighted the following operational test and evaluation limitations relative to the operational assessments of the V-22. The key to efficient production and the efficient use of the funds Congress has provided for the V-22 is program stability. However, after 15 years of development effort, the V-22 design has not been stabilized. Accordingly, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense provide in the Department’s next request for V-22 funds an explanation of how it plans to (1) introduce more realistic testing earlier into the V-22 program schedule and (2) achieve the production efficiencies desired by Congress. Given the artificial nature of the prior operational testing that was used to justify LRIP lot 1 production and the fact that earlier tests were conducted using nonproduction representative aircraft developed under the earlier V-22 full-scale development program, we believe that DOD should expand the LRIP lot 2 criteria to introduce more realistic testing into the program, using aircraft produced under the EMD phase of the program. 3. The first copy of each GAO report and testimony is free.
Why GAO Did This Study

GAO reported on the V-22 Osprey Program, which is intended to provide the armed services with 523 new tilt-rotor aircraft, focusing on: (1) the status of the program and areas of potential cost increases or performance challenges; and (2) whether the aircraft being developed will meet the stated requirements of each of the services.

What GAO Found

GAO noted that: (1) the V-22 has been in development for almost 15 years; (2) although Congress has provided significant funding and support to the Department of Defense (DOD), the system has not yet achieved program stability in terms of cost or aircraft design; (3) there are large disparities among the cost estimates from the program office, the contractors, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense; (4) these estimates range from about $40 million to $58 million for each aircraft; (5) the design of the aircraft will not be stabilized until further testing is completed and several important performance and operational issues, such as payload capability, aerial refueling, and downwash are resolved; (6) resolution of these issues, which could also require mission trade-offs or changes to planned operational concepts, will likely escalate program costs and extend the program schedule; (7) the April 1997 low-rate initial production (LRIP) decision was based, in large part, on the results of early operational testing using aircraft produced under an earlier full-scale development program; (8) however, those aircraft are not representative of the aircraft currently being developed during the engineering and manufacturing development phase of the V-22 program; (9) furthermore, the DOD Director, Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E), has characterized the tests on which the LRIP decision was based as extremely artificial because of significant test limitations; and (10) future production decisions for the V-22 should be based on more realistic testing.