1). The protracted conflict led to the flight of a large number of refugees into  Pakistan and Iran. Despite the fact that only 11.5  percent (7.5 million hectares) of Afghanistan’s total area is cultivable, 85  percent of the population depends on agriculture for its livelihood, and 80  percent of export earnings and more than 50 percent of the gross domestic  product have historically come from agriculture. 2). Since 1965, the WFP has been the major provider of food assistance to  Afghanistan. U.S. and International Food Assistance Had Significant Impact and Was Well Managed, but Donor Support Was Problematic

The emergency food assistance provided to Afghanistan by the United  States and the international community from January 1999 through  December 2002 benefited millions and was well managed, but donor  support was inadequate. Further, WFP could have provided assistance to an additional  685,000 people and reduced its delivery times if the United States had  donated cash or regionally purchased commodities instead of shipping  U.S.-produced commodities. Over the 4-year  period, WFP delivered approximately 1.6 million metric tons of food that  helped avert famine and stabilize the Afghan people, both in Afghanistan  and in refugee camps in neighboring countries. The United States  provided most of this funding. U.S. Food Assistance Contributions Were Costly and Inefficient

The U.S.-produced commodities and humanitarian daily rations provided  by the United States to Afghanistan resulted in lower volumes of food than  if the United States had provided regionally purchased commodities or  cash donations. Finally, the inadequacy of  proposed agricultural assistance, and the increase in domestic terrorism,  warlords’ control of much of the country, and opium production all present  obstacles to the international community’s goal of achieving food security  and political stability in Afghanistan. The assistance was provided in an  effort to increase short-term food security and decrease Afghanistan’s  dependence on emergency food assistance. Because of the lack of  coordination, the Afghan government and the international community  have not developed a single operational strategy to direct the agricultural  rehabilitation effort; instead, all of the major assistance organizations have  independent strategies. Lack of Coordination Prevented Development of Operational Strategy

Because of the inadequate coordination of agricultural assistance, the  Afghan government and the international community have not developed  an operational agricultural sector strategy. Environmental and political problems have limited the impact of the  international community’s agricultural assistance efforts. A new coordination mechanism established in  December 2002 is largely similar to earlier mechanisms, and it is too recent  for us to determine its effectiveness. These obstacles threaten the recovery  of the agricultural sector and the U.S. goals of achieving food security and  political stability in Afghanistan.
Why GAO Did This Study

After the events of September 11, 2001 led to the defeat of the Taliban, the United States and the international community developed an assistance program to support Afghanistan's new government and its people. Key components of this effort include food and agricultural assistance. GAO was asked to assess (1) the impact, management, and support of food assistance to Afghanistan and (2) the impact and management of agricultural assistance to Afghanistan, as well as obstacles to achieving food security and political stability.

What GAO Found

The emergency food assistance that the United States and the international community provided from January 1999 through December 2002 helped avert famine by supplying millions of beneficiaries with about 1.6 million tons of food. However, the inadequacy of the international community's financial and in-kind support of the World Food Program's (WFP) appeal for assistance disrupted the provision of food assistance throughout 2002. Because of a lack of resources, WFP reduced the amount of food rations provided to returning refugees from 150 kilograms to 50 kilograms. Meanwhile, as a result of the statutory requirement that U.S. agencies providing food assistance purchase U.S.-origin commodities and ship them on U.S.-flag vessels, assistance costs and delivery times were higher by $35 million and 120 days, respectively, than if the United States had provided WFP with cash or regionally produced commodities. Had the U.S. assistance been purchased regionally, an additional 685,000 people could have been fed for 1 year. The livelihood of 85 percent of Afghanistan's approximately 26 million people depends on agriculture. Over 50 percent of the gross domestic product and 80 percent of export earnings have historically come from agriculture. Over the 4-year period, because of continued conflict and drought, the international community provided primarily short-term agricultural assistance such as tools and seed. As a result, the assistance did not significantly contribute to the reconstruction of the agricultural sector. In 2002, agricultural assistance was not adequately coordinated with the Afghan government; a new coordination mechanism was established in December 2002, but it is too early to determine its effectiveness. As a result of the weak coordination, the Afghan government and the international community have not developed a joint strategy to direct the overall agricultural rehabilitation effort. Meanwhile, inadequate assistance funding, continuing terrorist attacks, warlords' control of much of the country, and the growth of opium production threaten the recovery of the agricultural sector and the U.S. goals of food security and political stability in Afghanistan.