The Air Force and the Army Have Not Fully Applied Most of the Key Principles for Effective Strategic Human Capital Planning for UAS Pilots to Resolve Key Challenges in Managing UAS Pilots

The Air Force and the Army have not fully applied four of the five key  principles for effective strategic human capital planning in the actions  taken to resolve the challenges that each faces in managing its UAS pilot  workforce (see table 1 for a summary of our assessment). We determined that the Air Force applied this  principle in the actions taken to address UAS pilot shortages because the  Air Force has involved top senior Air Force leaders, stakeholder offices,  and UAS pilots in UAS units to develop a strategy (i.e., the Get Well Plan)  to address UAS pilot shortages. In documentation of the Get Well Plan  the Air Force describes its UAS pilot shortage, the plan’s goals, and  initiatives to address the shortages, such as by reassigning some of the  UAS workload to Air National Guard units and by supporting training and  operations through the use of contractors. According to  Army officials, by addressing UAS unit training shortfalls, the Army could  address those UAS mishaps that are due to human error. The Air Force has developed a strategy  designed to address UAS pilot shortfalls and the Air Force has increased  the staffing levels of UAS pilots; however, we determined that the Air  Force partially applied this principle because its strategy is not fully  tailored to address persistent gaps such as continuing to rely on manned- aircraft pilots, limitations in cadet interest in the UAS pilot career field, and  the high workload of UAS pilots. As of March 2016, 37 percent of the personnel  filling UAS pilot positions were temporarily assigned manned-aircraft  pilots. Without  developing strategies and tools that are more fully tailored to address this  gap, the Air Force’s UAS pilot workforce will continue to lose the  experience that temporarily assigned manned aircraft pilots have  acquired. 2). A senior Army official  acknowledged that continued UAS unit training shortfalls is a concern for  the Army. Without revising its strategy to address root causes of training shortfalls to  address these contributing factors, the Army risks that its Shadow units  may continue to train at levels that are well below Army requirements. Army—partially applied. The Air Force and the Army Have Not Evaluated the Workforce Mix of Personnel to Fly UAS and Have Not Conducted Workforce Cost Analyses

The Air Force and the Army have not evaluated their workforce mix—that  is the mix of military, federal civilian, and private sector contractor  personnel—to determine the extent to which these personnel sources  could be used to fly UAS. Furthermore, although neither the Air Force nor  the Army has evaluated how and to what extent federal civilians could be  used as UAS pilots, both services are using private sector contractors to  fly some UAS. In  addition, if the Air Force and the Army do not revise their strategies to  fully tailor them to address remaining issues with gaps, the Air Force risks  continuing to not meet its requirements and the Army risks continuing to  train at levels that are below Army requirements. In  addition, the Air Force and Army did not inform their workforce decisions  with cost analyses that would provide information on the most cost- effective workforce for meeting mission needs. For the nine recommendations  with which DOD partially concurred, DOD noted actions that it had been  taken that DOD believed addressed the intent of our recommendations. Given this, we believe that the Army needs to revise its  strategy to more fully tailor it to address the barriers to help it address  these training shortfalls. To assess the extent to which the Air Force and the Army have evaluated  the workforce mix to meet UAS pilot requirements, we compared Air  Force and Army efforts to determine the type of personnel to use for UAS  pilots positions with criteria in Department of Defense (DOD) Directive  1100.4 Guidance for Manpower Management which articulates DOD  policy that assigned missions shall be accomplished using the least costly  mix of military, civilian, and contract personnel consistent with military  requirements and other needs of the department and DOD Instruction  1100.22 Policies and Procedures for Determining Workforce Mix, which  establishes the workforce mix decision process, including the  consideration of cost as a deciding factor in workforce mix decisions, and  states that manpower authorities consider all available personnel when  determining the workforce mix, including active military, federal civilians,  and contractors.
Why GAO Did This Study

The demand for UAS combat operation support has grown dramatically in the last decade. Since 2008, the Air Force has more than quadrupled its requirements for UAS pilots but faced challenges meeting the requirements due to UAS pilot shortages. Meanwhile, a 2015 Army review found that Army UAS units' mishap rate was higher than for other aircraft and Army officials stated that training shortfalls had contributed to the mishaps.
Senate Report 114-49 included a provision that GAO review Air Force and Army UAS personnel strategies. GAO assesses the extent to which the Air Force and the Army have (1) applied key principles of effective strategic human capital planning for managing UAS pilots and (2) evaluated the workforce mix to meet UAS pilot requirements. GAO compared its previously developed key principles of effective strategic human capital planning with Air Force and Army actions. GAO analyzed data on required and actual Air Force UAS pilots and data on Army UAS training.

What GAO Found

The Air Force and the Army have not fully applied four of the five key principles for effective strategic human capital planning for managing pilots of unmanned aerial systems (UAS) that are important for resolving the Air Force's pilot shortages and the Army's training shortfalls (see table below). Consistent with the first principle, the Air Force involved top senior leaders, UAS pilots, and stakeholders to develop a plan to resolve its UAS pilot shortages—including reassigning UAS workload to Air National Guard units and supporting training and operations with contractors. The Air Force partially applied the second principle to tailor its strategy to address gaps, or shortages, in UAS pilots, such as by using temporary personnel. As of March 2016, 37 percent of the personnel filling UAS pilot positions are temporarily assigned manned-aircraft pilots. Air Force headquarters personnel stated that no other career field in the Air Force relies on temporarily assigned personnel to this extent. Without tailoring its strategy to provide more permanently assigned pilots, the Air Force risks losing the experience that temporarily assigned manned-aircraft pilots have acquired. The Army partially applied the second principle because its strategy is not fully tailored to address its shortages in unit training. The Army experienced training shortfalls—61 of 73 UAS units flew fewer than half of the 340-flight-hour per unit annual minimum training goal in fiscal year 2015. A Senior Army official acknowledged the continued training shortfalls was a concern for the Army. Without revising its strategy to address the remaining training shortfalls, the Army risks that its UAS units may continue to train at levels below Army goals.
The Air Force and the Army have not evaluated their workforce mix—that is the mix of military, federal civilian, and private sector contractor personnel—to determine the extent to which these personnel sources could be used to fly UAS. Furthermore, although neither the Air Force nor the Army have evaluated how and to what extent federal civilians could be used as UAS pilots, both services are using private sector contractors to fly some UAS. Without evaluating their workforce mix, the Air Force and the Army do not have information on alternatives for meeting UAS pilot personnel requirements to meet mission needs. In addition, although the Air Force and the Army deci use private sector contractors to meet mission needs, they did not conduct cost analyses to inform this decision. Without such an analysis, the Air Force and the Army may not be using the most cost-effective workforces to achieve UAS missions.

What GAO Recommends

GAO's 11 recommendations include that the Air Force tailor its strategy to address UAS pilot shortages; the Army revise its strategy to address UAS training shortfalls; and that both services evaluate their workforce mix for UAS pilot positions and conduct analysis to ensure cost effectiveness of workforce decisions. DOD concurred with 2 recommendations and partially concurred with 9, noting actions that it believed addressed the intent of GAO's recommendations. GAO continues to believe that DOD needs to take actions to fully address the recommendations.