Army’s and Marine Corps’ Major Training Facilities Require Few Adjustments to Support Force Increase in Afghanistan

The Army and Marine Corps have shifted their operational priority from  Iraq to Afghanistan; however, few adjustments were required at the Army’s  major training facilities for a number of reasons, including the similarities  in the Army’s training requirements for both operations. Because of the similarities  in requirements, the Army has had to make few adjustments at its major  training facilities to support the increase in forces deploying to  Afghanistan. These  major training facilities also use the same training ranges, mock towns and  villages, and instrumentation to train for both operations. With the drawdown of forces in Iraq, however, the Marine Corps has  shifted its focus to missions in Afghanistan; as of the summer of 2009, the  Marine Corps was conducting limited training for missions in Iraq at its  CTC at Twentynine Palms. Like the Army, the Marine Corps, because of similarities in training  requirements, had to make few adjustments at Twentynine Palms to  support its shift in focus from Iraq to Afghanistan. For example, the  Marine Corps uses the same training ranges, trainers, and mock towns and  villages as it did when training forces for Iraq. The Army and Marine Corps Face Challenges in Adjusting Training Capacity to Meet Their Identified Future Requirements

The Army and Marine Corps face challenges as they look to broaden the  scope and size of their training rotations in the future. The Army projects  capacity shortfalls at its maneuver CTCs to meet its identified future  requirements to train brigade combat teams for both continuing  operations and a broader range of offensive, defensive, and stability  operations. Further, the Army has not developed a plan to use its existing  training capacity to meet these full-spectrum training requirements for its  smaller reserve-component units. To support this process, the Army has identified the need to  conduct 36 to 37 brigade combat team rotations annually. The Army currently is projecting that its National  Training Center–Exportable Training Capability will reach its initial  operating capability in fiscal year 2012 and full operating capability in  fiscal year 2013. As the Army  plans to meet its future requirements, its plans call for continuing to train  its smaller reserve-component forces at its seven mobilization training  centers. The six alternatives for land acquisition range  in size from approximately 131,000 to 200,000 acres. The Army has not completed an  assessment to determine its full range of options for meeting its future  brigade combat team requirements or the risks associated with not  conducting the desired number of training rotations. In  addition, while the Army has identified its training requirements and  locations for its smaller reserve-component units that will be deploying for  ongoing operations, it has not finalized the training requirements for its  smaller reserve-component units that will serve as contingency forces,  including where or when these contingency forces should be trained. Until the Army finalizes its  reserve-component training strategy it will not be able to determine  whether it can leverage existing capacities to meet future reserve- component training requirements, or whether any excess reserve- component training capacity exists. Specifically, DOD partially  concurred with our recommendation that the Secretary of Defense direct  the Secretary of the Army to address the challenges associated with  training its brigade combat teams for both ongoing operations and a fuller  range of missions  by developing and implementing a plan to evaluate the  full range of available options for training its brigade combat teams;  assessing the risks of not conducting the desired number of training  rotations; and determining how, if necessary, risks will be mitigated. DOD further noted that the Army agrees a risk and mitigation plan is  required to address CTC capacity shortfalls. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

To assess the extent to which the Army and Marine Corps have made  adjustments at their major training facilities to support larger deployments  to Afghanistan while still preparing forces for deployments to Iraq, we  reviewed Army and Marine Corps training policies and guidance, such as  Army regulation 350-50, Combat Training Center Program, the Army’s  Combat Training Center Master Plan, and the Marine Corps’ OIF/OEF  Predeployment Training Continuum, and Marine Corps Order 3502.6,  Marine Corps Force Generation Process. We interviewed officials with the  Department of the Army, the Combat Training Center Directorate, U.S.  Army Forces Command, the Army’s three maneuver CTCs, and the  Exportable Training Capability at the National Training Center regarding  the likelihood of this capability meeting its current timelines and  milestones and the availability of risk assessments or plans to assist the  Army in conducting its desired number of training rotations in the future.
Why GAO Did This Study

The Army's and Marine Corps' major training facilities--Army and Marine Corps combat training centers and Army mobilization training centers--have focused on training units for counterinsurgency missions in Iraq and Afghanistan. As troop levels decrease in Iraq and increase in Afghanistan, larger numbers of forces will be training for Afghanistan. To meet future requirements, the services plan to adjust training to train forces on a fuller range of missions. The House report to the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 directed GAO to report on any challenges the Department of Defense faces as it adjusts training capacities. GAO assessed the extent to which the Army and Marine Corps have (1) made adjustments at their major training facilities to support larger deployments to Afghanistan; and (2) developed plans to adjust training capacity to meet future requirements. GAO analyzed service training guidance, future training requirements, and related plans, and interviewed headquarters officials and personnel from the services' major training facilities.

What GAO Found

Due to similarities in training requirements, the Army and Marine Corps did not need to make significant adjustments at their major training facilities to support the shift in operational priority from Iraq to Afghanistan. While the Army had to adapt training scenarios to more closely resemble the operating environment in Afghanistan, it did not have to adjust trainers, training ranges, and mock towns and villages as these are the same regardless of whether forces are preparing for missions in either Iraq or Afghanistan. Since the summer of 2009, the Marine Corps had withdrawn most of its forces from Iraq and shifted the focus of training at its combat training center to exclusively train forces for missions in Afghanistan. Like the Army, the Marine Corps noted that, because of similarities in training requirements, it had to make few adjustments beyond changing some cultural role players and signs in mock towns and villages to support its shift in focus from Iraq to Afghanistan. The Army and Marine Corps face several challenges as they plan to broaden the scope and size of training rotations to meet future training requirements. The Army projects capacity shortfalls at its combat training centers as it seeks to train brigade combat teams to meet future requirements for both ongoing operations and full-spectrum operations--offensive, defensive, and stability operations. The Army has identified the need to conduct 36 to 37 annual training rotations for its brigade combat teams by fiscal year 2011; the centers can currently conduct 28 rotations a year. The Army is developing an exportable capability, expected to increase its capacity by 6 rotations each year when it reaches full operational capability in 2013. However, this will not be sufficient to meet the total projected requirements. To address the gap, the Army plans to give priority to deploying units. The Army has not completed an assessment to determine its full range of options for meeting future brigade combat team training requirements, or the risks associated with not conducting the desired number of training rotations. The Army's force generation model calls for smaller reserve-component units to train for both ongoing and full-spectrum operations, but the Army has not finalized its training strategy for these reserve-component forces. The Army has identified training requirements and locations where deploying forces will train for ongoing operations, but it has not determined where or when it will train its reserve-component contingency forces for full spectrum operations. The Army has the capacity to train 86,000 reserve-component personnel at its seven mobilization training centers each year. It is also conducting enhanced training at other locations, which could expand capacity. Until the Army finalizes its reserve-component training strategy it will not be able to determine whether it can leverage existing resources to meet future training requirements, or whether any excess reserve-component training capacity exists. In the future, the Marine Corps plans to expand training to allow larger numbers of forces to train together, but it lacks sufficient space at its combat training center. It is considering alternatives for acquiring land, ranging in size from approximately 131,000 to 200,000 acres, and expects to reach a decision by fiscal year 2012.

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends the Army develop a risk-assessment and mitigation plan to address gaps in training capacity, and assess how it can maximize existing resources to conduct reserve-component training called for under its force generation model. DOD generally agreed with our recommendations.