The United States has long engaged in civil nuclear commerce with other countries, buying and selling nuclear fuel, reactors, and related components. Current Proliferation Barriers and Disincentives

The international community has adopted a variety of means to address the potential for ostensibly peaceful enrichment and reprocessing facilities to enable nuclear weapons programs. (See Appendix D .) All U.N. member-states except for India, Israel, and Pakistan are parties to the NPT. An NPT state-party is obligated to conclude a safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). An increasing number of countries, particularly those with significant nuclear activities, have been signing Additional Protocols and bringing them into force. (See Appendix F .)
Although many analysts and observers have expressed concerns about the possibility that a country seeking nuclear weapons might use dual-use technology supplied to a peaceful nuclear energy program in a covert weapons program, all legitimate transfers of nuclear technology to NPT non-nuclear-weapon states are under IAEA safeguards and no country with comprehensive safeguards in place, and a record in good standing with the IAEA, has used declared nuclear facilities to produce fissile material for weapons. These policies were voluntary, but resulted in no contractual transfers of enrichment or reprocessing technology to additional states. In addition, the amended guidelines require a recipient state to have brought into force an Additional Protocol to its IAEA safeguards agreement or, "pending this," to implement "appropriate safeguards agreements in cooperation with the IAEA, including a regional accounting and control arrangement for nuclear materials, as approved by the IAEA Board of Governors." Multilateral Nuclear Fuel Arrangements

In 2004, the United States proposed that the international community adopt a ban on all future transfers of enrichment and reprocessing technology. Another proposal has been the establishment of an international spent fuel repository. For example, the U.N. Security Council has adopted resolutions prohibiting the transfer of such technologies to Iran and North Korea. Moreover, individual states can refrain from transferring enrichment and reprocessing technologies; as noted, no such transfers are planned. Policy Goals of U.S. Nuclear Cooperation Agreements

The United States often has diverse policy goals when deciding to conclude a nuclear cooperation agreement with another country, including promoting nonproliferation, supporting the U.S. nuclear industry, satisfying the needs of the U.S. domestic nuclear energy program, and improving or sustaining overall bilateral and strategic relations. Nuclear Nonproliferation

A major U.S. goal of concluding nuclear cooperation agreements has been to ensure the peaceful use of any transferred nuclear technology. The Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 1978, which amended Section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, added new requirements for nuclear cooperation with the United States. The United States and other countries have become increasingly concerned that with the spread of nuclear energy facilities, additional countries may obtain enrichment and reprocessing technology, the most sensitive components of the nuclear fuel cycle. Promoting the U.S. Nuclear Industry

U.S. nuclear cooperation agreements with foreign countries are also designed to help promote growth in the U.S. nuclear industry by facilitating U.S. nuclear exports. Additional Issues for Consideration

This report has focused on nonproliferation and bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements. Some argue that the U.S. nuclear industry is at a disadvantage when competing for foreign contracts because the U.S. government does not provide similar liability protections. As discussed above, the U.S. nuclear industry's market power has declined and foreign competitors have been concluding nuclear supply agreements with other countries. Moreover, some influential governments have demonstrated limited enthusiasm for such regulations. In the future, Congress may choose to consider such factors as the 2011 Nuclear Suppliers Group's (NSG) decision on the supply of enrichment and reprocessing technology; the extent to which the U.S. nuclear industry is dependent on foreign suppliers; the magnitude of the proliferation threat from nuclear power programs; the efficacy of current nonproliferation mechanisms, including IAEA safeguards; and whether and to what extent the United States can influence other governments' nuclear supply policies. Status of World Wide Nuclear Power Plants
Appendix C. U.S. Nuclear Cooperation Agreements
The following states and other entities had civilian nuclear cooperation (Section 123) agreements with the United States in force as of November 1, 2014:
Appendix D. Articles I, II, and IV of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty
Article I
Each nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices.
U.S. civil nuclear cooperation agreements ("123" agreements), which are bilateral agreements with other governments or multilateral organizations, have several important goals, including promoting the U.S. nuclear industry, which is increasingly dependent on foreign customers and suppliers, and preventing nuclear proliferation. Increased international interest in nuclear power has generated concern that additional countries may obtain fuel-making technology that could also be used to produce fissile material for nuclear weapons. Ensuring the peaceful use of transferred nuclear technology has long been a major U.S. objective, and Congress has played a key role. For example, the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 1978, which amended the Atomic Energy Act (AEA) of 1954, added new requirements for nuclear cooperation with the United States. Moreover, the United States has been a longtime proponent of restrictive international nuclear export policies.
In recent years, some observers and Members of Congress have advocated that the United States adopt new conditions for civil nuclear cooperation. These would include requiring potential recipients of U.S. civil nuclear technology to forgo fuel-making enrichment and reprocessing technologies and to bring into force an Additional Protocol to their International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards agreements. Such protocols augment the IAEA's legal authority to inspect nuclear facilities.
The near-term proliferation threat posed by civil nuclear commerce, particularly reactor transfers, is far from clear: All but three states (India, Israel, and Pakistan, all of which have nuclear weapons) are parties to the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT); all legitimate transfers of nuclear technology to NPT non-nuclear-weapon states are subject to IAEA safeguards; and no country with comprehensive safeguards in place and a record in good standing with the IAEA has used declared nuclear facilities to produce fissile material for weapons. Further, the international community has multiple mechanisms to dissuade countries from developing domestic enrichment or reprocessing facilities. States such as India, Iran, Israel, North Korea, and Pakistan did acquire enrichment or reprocessing technology, but did so either clandestinely or prior to the establishment of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) in the mid-1970s.
Key factors and issues for Congress:
The United States concludes nuclear cooperation agreements for a variety of reasons, including promoting nonproliferation, supporting the U.S. nuclear industry, and improving or sustaining overall bilateral and strategic relations. (See "Policy Goals of U.S. Nuclear Cooperation Agreements.") The U.S. nuclear industry's market share has declined in recent years; foreign customers and suppliers are important to the industry's viability. Some argue that the absence of U.S. government liability protections for U.S. reactor exports puts that industry at a disadvantage relative to foreign competitors who enjoy such protections. (See "U.S. Nuclear Industry" and "Liability.") Fears of additional states obtaining enrichment or reprocessing technologies may not materialize. Neither the United States nor any other states possessing enrichment or reprocessing technology have plans to transfer any such technologies (although the United States is currently conducting joint reprocessing research with South Korea). Moreover, the market for nuclear fuel currently functions well and the international community has begun to implement mechanisms to support the market. Although countries have the right under the NPT to develop their own nuclear fuel production capabilities, a functioning nuclear fuel market should reduce the need for them to do so. Nevertheless, as noted, states have previously managed to acquire these technologies. (See "Enrichment and Reprocessing Worldwide.") The number of NPT states-parties that have signed Additional Protocols has been steadily increasing; most states with significant nuclear activities have signed such protocols, giving the IAEA greater inspection authority over civil nuclear programs. (See "The NPT and IAEA Safeguards.") Some argue that the United States should use its influence to persuade other countries to adopt additional constraints on nuclear transfers. However, the relative decline of the U.S. nuclear industry, as well as some key states' demonstrated lack of willingness to accept such constraints, suggests that U.S. influence in this area is limited. (See "Additional Issues for Consideration.")
This report discusses broad themes related to U.S. nuclear cooperation with other countries. More details of specific legislative proposals from the 113th Congress are found in CRS Report RS22937, Nuclear Cooperation with Other Countries: A Primer, by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed].