Individuals attempting to legally  enter the United States by land present themselves to a CBP officer at one  of the 170 ports of entry located along these borders. Prior to the implementation of this initiative, U.S. citizens entering the  country by air from such locations as the Bahamas, Mexico, and Jamaica  could establish their citizenship by oral assertions and documents such as  drivers’ licenses and birth certificates. The U.S. Border Patrol, a component of CBP, patrols and monitors  areas between ports of entry. As mentioned above, in the September 2007 hearing  on border security before your Committee, a CBP official stated that  roughly 250 U.S. Border Patrol agents were patrolling the U.S.–Canada  border at any given time—about a quarter of all agents reportedly assigned  to patrol the northern border during that period. Ports of Entry

We found two types of security vulnerabilities in our covert testing at ports  of entry. First, we found that, in the majority of cases, the government  inspectors who reviewed our undercover investigators’ counterfeit  documentation did not know that they were bogus and allowed them to  enter the country. We consider our attempts to enter the country through sea and air ports of  entry as different from our land crossings. Similar  follow-up work was performed throughout 2003 and 2004, resulting in  successful entry at locations in Washington, New York, California, Texas,  and Virginia using counterfeit identification. In 2006, investigators  successfully entered the United States using counterfeit drivers’ licenses  and other bogus documentation through seven land ports of entry on the  northern and southern borders, adding the states of Michigan, Idaho, and  Arizona to the list of states they had entered. They also used bogus U.S. passports and, in one case, a  fake employee identification card in the name of a major U.S. airline. Undercover Investigators Did Not Show Identification in All Cases

For our 2003 testimony, we found that INS inspectors did not request  identification at a sea port of entry in Washington and a land port of entry  in California. For example, on February 23, 2006, two investigators crossed the border  from Mexico into Texas on foot. The officer replied, “OK, that would be  good.” The investigator began to remove his counterfeit Virginia driver’s  license from his wallet when the officer said “That’s fine, you can go.” The  CBP officer never looked at the license. Security Vulnerabilities at Unmanned and Unmonitored U.S. Border Locations

We first reported on potential security vulnerabilities at unmanned and  unmonitored border areas in our 2003 testimony. While conducting testing  at U.S.–Canada ports of entry, we found that one of our investigators was  able to walk into the United States from Canada at a park straddling the  border. The unmanned and unmonitored border areas we visited were  defined as locations where CBP does not maintain a manned presence 24  hours per day or where there was no apparent monitoring equipment in  place. We found three main vulnerabilities during this limited security  assessment. First, we found state roads close to the border that appeared  to be unmanned and unmonitored, allowing us to simulate the cross- border movement of radioactive materials or other contraband from  Canada into the United States. Second, we also located several ports of  entry that had posted daytime hours and which, although monitored, were  unmanned overnight. Investigators observed that surveillance equipment  was in operation but that the only observable preventive measure to stop a  cross-border violator from entering the United States was a barrier across  the road that could be driven around. Selected details related to these covert tests are discussed below. We identified state roads close to the border that appeared  to be unmanned and unmonitored, allowing us to simulate the cross- border movement of radioactive materials or other contraband from  Canada into the United States. However, the U.S.  Border Patrol was not able to locate the investigators with the duffel bag,  even though they had parked nearby to observe traffic passing through the  port of entry. Ports of Entry with Posted Hours

We also identified several ports of entry with posted daytime hours in one  state on the northern border. Federally Managed Lands

Investigators identified potential security vulnerabilities on federally  managed land adjacent to the U.S.–Mexico border. Our investigators were not challenged  regarding their activities. CBP stated that the northern border presents more of a challenge  than the southern border for several reasons, including the wide expanse  of the border and the existence of many antiquated ports of entry. In response to this report, DHS provided a written update on numerous  border protection efforts it has taken to enhance border security since  2003. We did not attempt to verify the information provided by  DHS, but have included its full response in appendix I.
Why GAO Did This Study

From January 2003 to September 2007, GAO testified before the Committee on three occasions to describe security vulnerabilities that terrorists could exploit to enter the country. GAO's first two testimonies focused on covert testing at ports of entry--the air, sea, and land locations where international travelers can legally enter the United States. In its third testimony, GAO focused on limited security assessments of unmanned and unmonitored border areas between land ports of entry. GAO was asked to summarize the results of covert testing and assessment work for these three testimonies. This report discusses the results of testing at land, sea, and air ports of entry; however, the majority of GAO's work was focused on land ports of entry. The unmanned and unmonitored border areas GAO assessed were defined as locations where the government does not maintain a manned presence 24 hours per day or where there was no apparent monitoring equipment in place. GAO assessed a nonrepresentative selection of these locations and did not attempt to evaluate all potential U.S. border security vulnerabilities. Further, GAO's work was limited in scope and cannot be projected to represent systemic weaknesses. In response to this report, DHS provided a written update on numerous border protection efforts it has taken to enhance border security since 2003. GAO did not attempt to verify the information provided by DHS, but has included the response in this report.

What GAO Found

GAO investigators identified numerous border security vulnerabilities, both at ports of entry and at unmanned and unmonitored land border locations between the ports of entry. In testing ports of entry, undercover investigators carried counterfeit drivers' licenses, birth certificates, employee identification cards, and other documents, presented themselves at ports of entry and sought admittance to the United States dozens of times. They arrived in rental cars, on foot, by boat, and by airplane. They attempted to enter in four states on the northern border (Washington, New York, Michigan, and Idaho), three states on the southern border (California, Arizona, and Texas), and two other states requiring international air travel (Florida and Virginia). In nearly every case, government inspectors accepted oral assertions and counterfeit identification provided by GAO investigators as proof of U.S. citizenship and allowed them to enter the country. In total, undercover investigators made 42 crossings with a 93 percent success rate. On several occasions, while entering by foot from Mexico and by boat from Canada, investigators were not even asked to show identification. For example, at one border crossing in Texas in 2006, an undercover investigator attempted to show a Customs and Border Protection (CBP) officer his counterfeit driver's license, but the officer said, "That's fine, you can go" without looking at it. As a result of these tests, GAO concluded that terrorists could use counterfeit identification to pass through most of the tested ports of entry with little chance of being detected. In its most recent work, GAO shifted its focus from ports of entry and primarily performed limited security assessments of unmanned and unmonitored areas between ports of entry. The names of the states GAO visited for this limited security assessment have been withheld at the request of CBP. In four states along the U.S.-Canada border, GAO found state roads that were very close to the border that CBP did not appear to monitor. In three states, the proximity of the road to the border allowed investigators to cross undetected, successfully simulating the cross-border movement of radioactive materials or other contraband into the United States from Canada. For example, in one apparently unmanned, unmonitored area on the northern border, the U.S. Border Patrol was alerted to GAO's activities through the tip of an alert citizen. However, the responding U.S. Border Patrol agents were not able to locate the investigators and their simulated contraband. Also on the northern border, GAO investigators located several ports of entry in one state on the northern border that had posted daytime hours and were unmanned overnight. Investigators observed that surveillance equipment was in operation, but that the only preventive measure to stop an individual from crossing the border into the United States was a barrier across the road that could be driven around. GAO also identified potential security vulnerabilities on federally managed lands adjacent to the U.S.-Mexico border. GAO concluded that CBP faces significant challenges on the northern border, and that a determined cross-border violator would likely be able to bring radioactive materials or other contraband undetected into the United States by crossing the U.S.-Canada border at any of the assessed locations.