Somesystems are used only by military units; others are national systems operated by Washington-leveldefense agencies. Understanding the procedures for acquiring ISR systems is, however, complicated by the factthat different ISR systems are acquired in entirely different ways, by different intelligence agenciesor military services, and are designed for different users. Congressional Concerns with ISR: Lack of Coordination

Although procedures for coordinating the budgeting of ISR programs have long been inplace, some Members of Congress have concluded that the procedures have not been whollyeffective. The council would be charged with developing a comprehensiveroadmap "to guide the development and integration" of DOD ISR capabilities for 15 years. (26) The provision was not,however, included in the version of the bill that was enacted as P.L. (28) 
The publication of the 9/11 Commission's report in July 2004 provided the impetus forcongressional action in an election year. (42) For example, there has been for a number of years a program,known as Tactical Exploitation of National Capabilities (TENCAP), which is designed to facilitatethe use of satellite imagery and other NIP products by military commanders. The same types of coordinativemechanisms that have long existed will undoubtedly continue to be required. The National Security Act assigns to theSecretary of Defense the responsibility to ensure, in consultation with the DCI, that:
(1) the budgets of the elements of the intelligencecommunity within the Department of Defense are adequate to satisfy the overall intelligence needsof the Department of Defense, including the needs of the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff andthe commanders of the unified and specified commands and, wherever such elements are performinggovernment-wide functions, the needs of other departments andagencies;
(2) ensure appropriate implementation of the policiesand resource decisions of the Director of Central Intelligence by elements of the Department ofDefense within the National Foreign Intelligence Program;
(3) ensure that the tactical intelligence activities of theDepartment of Defense complement and are compatible with intelligence activities under theNational Foreign Intelligence Program.... (47)
Executive Order (EO) 12333, United States Intelligence Activities , required that the DCI,together with the Secretary of Defense, "ensure that there is no unnecessary overlap between nationalforeign intelligence programs and Department of Defense intelligence programs...." (48) There have been, inaddition, a number of inter-agency agreements within the executive branch that govern thecoordination of intelligence programs and budget processes. In addition, U.S. post-cold war defense planning continues to evolveinto new, and uncertain, approaches to a wide variety of possible conflict situations. In regard to ISR systems, the act provides the DNI with an opportunity and a staff (theCommunity Management Staff is to be transferred to the Office of the DNI) to assess whethergovernment-wide ISR requirements are being effectively addressed. Appendix A: A Case Study in ISR Acquisition: The Future Imagery Architecture (FIA) and Global Hawk UAVs

Efforts to procure a new generation of reconnaissance satellites and high altitude unmannedaerial vehicles (UAVs) serve as a case study that illustrates the dilemmas involved in the acquisitionsof intelligence platforms and systems. (68) Some observers have,accordingly, suggested that many of the capabilities of reconnaissance satellites could be realizedby relying on less expensive, high-altitude unmanned aerial vehicles such as Global Hawk, whichhas recently become available for operational missions and has been used during Operation IraqFreedom.
Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) functions are principal elements of U.S.defense capabilities, and include a wide variety of systems for acquiring and processing informationneeded by national security decisionmakers and military commanders. ISR systems range in sizefrom hand-held devices to orbiting satellites. Some collect basic information for a wide range ofanalytical products; others are designed to acquire data for specific weapons systems. Some are"national" systems intended primarily to collect information of interest to Washington-area agencies;others are "tactical" systems intended to support military commanders on the battlefield. Collectively, they account for a major portion of U.S. intelligence spending that, according to mediaestimates, amounts to some $40 billion annually.
For some time Congress has expressed concern about the costs and management of ISRprograms. With minor exceptions, ISR acquisition has been coordinated by the Defense Departmentand the Intelligence Community. Although there are long-existing staff mechanisms for reviewingand coordinating ISR programs in the context of the annual budget submissions, many in Congressbelieve that existing procedures have not avoided duplication of effort, excessive costs, and gaps incoverage. Examples that some observers cite are separate efforts to acquire a new generation ofreconnaissance satellites and a high altitude unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) known as Global Hawk. Both systems acquire some of the same sorts of information and serve similar customers, but theyare acquired in distinctly different ways; moreover, in both cases procurement efforts have beenbeset by increasing costs and schedule delays.
Recently enacted statutes mandate better integration of ISR capabilities and require that theDefense Department prepare a roadmap to guide the development and integration of ISR capabilitiesover the next fifteen years. An effective roadmap, if developed, could potentially ensure morecomprehensive coverage of targets and save considerable sums of money. To establish responsibilityfor an Intelligence Community-wide effort, the 9/11 Commission recommended that a new positionof Director of National Intelligence be established to manage the national intelligence program (butnot joint military and tactical intelligence programs, which would continue to be managed by theDefense Department). This position was included, after extended debate, in the Intelligence Reformand Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 ( P.L. 108-458 ) that was approved by the President onDecember 17, 2004. The implications of this legislation for ISR programs are as yet uncertain, butCongress may seek to assess the effectiveness of the statute in addressing long-existing concernswith ISR programs. This report will be updated as circumstances warrant.