Consequently, the Courtheld that a state could not be liable for damages under the ADEA. of Community and Economic Development

Judge Alito wrote the opinion for a unanimous court in the case of Chittister v. Departmentof Community and Economic Development , (20) which also considered if Congress had validly abrogated states'Eleventh Amendment immunity when it enacted the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993. Judge Alito found, however, that there did not appear to be similar findings concerningthe existence of intentional discrimination by employers against women in the provision of personalsick leave practices. (43) In Lopez , theCourt held that, because the act neither regulated a commercial activity nor contained a requirementthat the possession be connected to interstate commerce, the act exceeded the authority of Congressunder the Commerce Clause. Â§922(o), which states that "it shall be unlawful for any person to transfer or possess a machine gun"unless one of two exceptions applied. (59) 
Finally, Judge Alito undertook an analysis of the statute under the "substantial effects" prongof the Court's Commerce Clause jurisprudence. In general, it appears that Judge Alito's opinion in the Chittister case was consistentwith Supreme Court precedent at the time. Although Judge Alito has been criticized because hisopinion did not anticipate the result in the subsequent case of Nevada Department of HumanResources v Hibbs , the Hibbs case actually addressed a separate provision of the FMLA. The Chittister case is arguably distinguishable from the Hibbs case, a conclusion which has been reachedby other federal circuits. Judge Alito's dissent in the Rybar case, however, seems to have anticipated a more expansiveapplication of the Lopez and Morrison decisions than was adopted by most other circuits at the time. Further, his reasoning in Rybar may have been largely repudiated in the subsequent Supreme Courtcase of Gonzales v. Raich . Consequently, it would appear that Judge Alito's dissent was an argumentfor a more limited interpretation of the Commerce Clause than is consistent with current case law.
During his 15 years as a federal appellate judge on the Third Circuit, Judge Samuel Alito haswritten several opinions related to federalism. Two of these cases appear to be of particularsignificance. In Chittister v. Department of Community and Economic Development , Judge Alitoauthored a unanimous opinion which held that an individual could not sue a state under the FamilyMedical Leave Act (FMLA). This opinion addressed an issue which has been controversial in recentyears -- the parameters of the 11th Amendment and Section 5 of the 14th Amendment. The decisionheld that a provision of the Family Medical Leave Act which mandates the provision of sick leavefor employees with serious health conditions could not be enforced by employees against statesagencies or instrumentalities.
In United States v. Rybar , Judge Alito authored a dissent to a decision that upheld a lawproviding that "it shall be unlawful for any person to transfer or possess a machine gun" as withinthe authority of the Congress under the Commerce Clause. Judge Alito, noting that the statute lackedboth a requirement for a specific connection to interstate commerce and findings that the purelyintrastate possession of machine guns had a substantial effect on interstate commerce, would havestruck the law down.
In general, it appears that Judge Alito's opinion in the Chittister case was consistent withSupreme Court precedent at the time. Although Judge Alito has been criticized because his opiniondid not anticipate the result in the subsequent case of Nevada Department of Human Resources v.Hibbs , the Hibbs case actually addressed a separate provision of the FMLA. The Chittister case isarguably distinguishable from the Hibbs case, a conclusion which has been reached by other federalcircuits.
Judge Alito's dissent in the Rybar case, however, seems to have anticipated a more expansiveapplication of the Supreme Court decisions in Lopez and Morrison than was being utilized by mostother circuits at the time. Further, his reasoning in Rybar may have been repudiated by the SupremeCourt in Gonzales v. Raich . Consequently, it would appear that Judge Alito's dissent was anargument for a more limited interpretation of the Commerce Clause than is consistent with currentcase law.