Primary Guidance Governing Visa Security Program Operations

Since the establishment of the Visa Security Program, ICE and State have  issued four primary forms of guidance governing VSP operations overseas:  (1) a 2003 memorandum of understanding (MOU) concerning  implementation of the Homeland Security Act; (2) a 2004 MOU on  administrative aspects of assigning personnel overseas; (3) a 2008 cable  directing State Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS) officers, VSP agents,  and the senior consular officer at each post to develop standard operating  procedures; and (4) a 2011 MOU delineating the roles and responsibilities  of VSP agents, consular officers, and diplomatic security officers in daily  operations of VSP at posts overseas. Although ICE upgraded the VSP tracking system in April 2010 to collect  additional performance data, the system still does not collect data on all  the performance measures, hampering ICE’s efforts to comprehensively  evaluate the performance of the VSP. While ICE can provide some  examples demonstrating the success of VSP operations, ICE has not  produced reports identifying the progress made toward achieving VSP  objectives. In addition, data collected by ICE on VSP activities prior to  2010 were limited by inconsistencies. ICE Unable to Accurately Assess the Value of the VSP

From 2003 to 2010, ICE did not maintain comprehensive data on its  identified performance measures to fully assess progress toward VSP  objectives. ICE’s 5-year expansion  plan for the VSP, issued in 2007, identified three primary mission  objectives to enhance national security and public safety:  1. identify and counteract threats before they reach the United States, 2. identify not-yet-known threats to homeland security, and 3.  maximize the law enforcement and counterterrorism value of the visa  process. However,  ICE does not track these activities systematically and cannot evaluate the  comprehensive effort of these activities. ICE has presented some  anecdotal examples of VSP participation in the visa process. First, limited guidance from headquarters  regarding VSP operations has led to confusion and inconsistency among  posts. Consular officers at this post stated they did not understand the  VSP’s mission. VSP  agents perform a variety of investigative and administrative functions in  addition to their visa security workload, such as conducting nonconsular  investigations, serving as ICE’s official presence in the region, and  performing the duties of DHS attachés. Furthermore, the VSP tracking system does not  collect data on the time VSP agents spend on visa security activities. Both the VSP agent and  Consul General at this post recommended that all VSP agents receive  language training. According to ICE officials, ICE’s ability to provide  language training for VSP agents is limited by budgetary constraints. Furthermore, ICE has not fully addressed remaining visa risk in  high-risk posts that do not have a VSP presence. Although the expansion plan states that risk  analysis is the primary input to VSP site selection and that the expansion  plan represents an effort to address visa risk, ICE has not expanded the  VSP to some high-risk posts. For example, 11 of the top 20 high-risk posts  identified by ICE and State are not covered by VSP. The expansion of the  VSP may be limited by a number of factors—including budget limitations  and objections from State officials at some posts—and ICE has not  identified possible alternatives that would provide the additional security  of VSP review at those posts that do not have a VSP presence. ICE’s plan  identified 14 posts for expansion in 2009 and 2010, but ICE did not  establish VSP units at 9 of these 14 posts. Recommendations for Executive Action

To ensure that the Visa Security Program enhances the security of the visa  process at posts overseas, we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland  Security take the following four actions:  1. ensure that the VSP tracking system collects reliable data on all  performance measures, to allow ICE to accurately evaluate VSP  performance and report to Congress on progress toward the VSP  mission objectives;  2. issue guidance requiring VSP agents to provide training for consular  officers as mandated by section 428 of the Homeland Security Act;  3.  develop a mechanism to track the amount of time spent by VSP  agents on visa security activities and other investigations, in order to  determine appropriate staffing levels and resource needs for VSP  operations at posts overseas to ensure visa security operations are  not limited; and  4.  develop a plan to provide VSP coverage at high-risk posts where the  possibility of deploying agents may be limited. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

To assess the ability of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to  measure the objectives and performance of the Visa Security Program  (VSP), we reviewed VSP mission objectives and performance measures  identified in Bureau of Immigration and Custom Enforcement’s (ICE) 5- year expansion plan. We reviewed data from the VSP tracking system,  used to collect information on daily VSP activities, and compared the data  collected from the system with the measures and mission objectives  identified in the expansion plan.
Why GAO Did This Study

Since 2003, the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Visa Security Program (VSP) has participated in the visa process by reviewing applications at some embassies and consulates, with the intention of preventing individuals who pose a threat from entering the United States. The attempted bombing of an airline on December 25, 2009, renewed concerns about the security of the visa process and the effectiveness of the VSP. For this report GAO assessed (1) the ability of DHS's Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) to measure the program's objectives and performance, (2) challenges to VSP operations, and (3) ICE efforts to expand the VSP program. To evaluate the VSP, we reviewed VSP data, guidance, and the ICE's 5-year expansion plan. We also interviewed ICE officials, and observed VSP operations at 6 posts overseas.

What GAO Found

ICE cannot accurately assess progress toward its VSP objectives. ICE outlined three primary objectives of the VSP--identifying and counteracting potential terrorist threats from entering the United States, identifying not-yet-known threats, and maximizing law enforcement and counterterrorism value of the visa process--and established performance measures intended to assess VSP performance, including situations where VSP agents provide information that results in a consular officer's decision to deny a visa. ICE's VSP tracking system, used to collect data on VSP activities, does not gather comprehensive data on all the performance measures needed to evaluate VSP mission objectives. In addition, data collected by ICE on VSP activities were limited by inconsistencies. ICE upgraded its VSP tracking system in April 2010 to collect additional performance data, but the system still does not collect data on all the performance measures. Therefore, ICE's ability to comprehensively evaluate the performance of the VSP remains limited. While ICE can provide some examples demonstrating the success of VSP operations, ICE has not reported on the progress made toward achieving all VSP objectives. Several challenges to the implementation of the VSP affected operations overseas. DHS and the Department of State (State) have issued some guidance, including several memorandums of understanding, to govern VSP operations. However, some posts experienced difficulties because of the limited guidance regarding interactions between State officials and VSP agents, which has led to tensions between the VSP agents and State officials at some posts. In addition, most VSP posts have not developed standard operating procedures for VSP operations, leading to inconsistency among posts. Additionally, the mandated advising and training of consular officers by VSP agents varies from post to post, and at some posts consular officers received no training. Finally, VSP agents perform a variety of investigative and administrative functions beyond their visa security responsibilities that sometimes slow or limit visa security activities, and ICE does not track this information in the VSP tracking system, making it unable to identify the time spent on these activities. In 2007, ICE developed a 5-year expansion plan for the VSP, but ICE has not fully followed or updated the plan. For instance, ICE did not establish 9 posts identified for expansion in 2009 and 2010. Furthermore, the expansion plan states that risk analysis is the primary input to VSP site selection, and ICE, with input from State, ranked visa-issuing posts by visa risk, which includes factors such as the terrorist threat and vulnerabilities present at each post. However, 11 of the top 20 high-risk posts identified in the expansion plan are not covered by the VSP. Furthermore, ICE has not taken steps to address visa risk in high-risk posts that do not have a VSP presence. Although the expansion of the VSP is limited by a number of factors, such as budgetary limitations or limited embassy space, ICE has not identified possible alternatives that would provide the additional security of VSP review at those posts that do not have a VSP presence. GAO made several recommendations designed to address weaknesses we identified in the VSP. DHS concurred with the recommendations that the VSP provide consular officer training and develop a plan to provide more VSP coverage at high-risk posts. DHS did not concur with the recommendations that the VSP collect comprehensive data on all performance measures and track the time spent on visa security activities. GAO continues to maintain that these recommendations are necessary to accurately assess VSP performance.