The purpose  of this program is to develop a standard approach for planning nuclear  weapons refurbishment activities so that the nuclear weapons complex  can extend the operational lives of the weapons in the stockpile by  another 20 to 30 years. NNSA Met the B61 Program Schedule, but Did Not Meet All Refurbishment Objectives

NNSA completed the refurbishment of the B61 bomb on schedule in  November 2008. However, according to NNSA and DOD officials, NNSA  was not able to meet all the refurbishment objectives because it  established an unrealistic schedule and failed to fully implement its Phase  6.X process. NNSA was able to meet its refurbishment schedule and avoid  significant cost overruns for the B61 only because (1) DOD changed some  of the refurbishment objectives, (2) NNSA was able to reuse, rather than  manufacture, a critical component for the B61, and (3) the Nuclear  Weapons Council significantly reduced the number of B61 bombs in the  stockpile. However, the refurbished B61 bombs still do not meet all  refurbishment objectives. Dismantlement of decommissioned B61 bombs allowed NNSA to obtain  the necessary material for the refurbished B61 bombs. DOD Failed to Adequately Oversee Critical NNSA Life Extension Activities for the B61

Some of the B61 refurbishment problems could have been avoided if DOD  had fulfilled its roles and responsibilities in overseeing NNSA’s life  extension program activities. Second, the Air Force did not adequately review NNSA’s design,  engineering, and testing activities—a review that would have alerted it to  the fact that NNSA was unable to meet all refurbishment objectives. NNSA Did Not Adequately Address One of the Highest Risks to the W76 Program, Which Led to Cost Increases, Schedule Delays, and an Unrealistic Production Schedule

NNSA developed a risk mitigation strategy to avoid potential cost overruns  and schedule delays related to the manufacture of Fogbank but failed to  effectively implement it. As a result, NNSA’s original plans to produce the  first refurbished W76 weapon in September 2007 slipped to September  2008. In addition, NNSA spent $69 million to address Fogbank production  problems, and the Navy faced logistical challenges in replacing old W76  warheads with refurbished ones on submarines owing to the delay. Furthermore, NNSA did not use the same criteria and accounting practices  each fiscal year to develop a cost baseline for the W76 program, which  makes it difficult to track refurbishment costs over time. NNSA Lacks a Consistent Approach to Developing the W76 Cost Baseline

NNSA does not have a consistent approach for developing a cost baseline for  the W76 program. We  believe that our report fairly attributes management problems with the B61 life  extension program to both NNSA and DOD. We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Energy, the  Administrator of NNSA, the Secretary of Defense, and interested  congressional committees.
Why GAO Did This Study

As a separately organized agency within the Department of Energy, the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) administers the Stockpile Life Extension Program, whose purpose is to extend, through refurbishment, the operational lives of the weapons in the nuclear stockpile. NNSA encountered significant management problems with its first refurbishment for the W87 warhead. GAO was asked to assess the extent to which NNSA and the Department of Defense (DOD) have effectively managed the refurbishment of two other weapons--the B61 bomb and the W76 warhead. This report summarizes the findings of GAO's classified report on the refurbishment of the B61 bomb and W76 warhead.

What GAO Found

NNSA and DOD have not effectively managed cost, schedule, and technical risks for either the B61 or W76 life extension program. Regarding the B61 program, although NNSA completed the refurbishment of the strategic variants of the B61 bomb--the Mods 7 and 11--on schedule in November 2008, the refurbished weapons do not meet all refurbishment objectives. According to NNSA and DOD officials, NNSA established an unrealistic schedule and failed to fully implement its refurbishment guidance, known as the Phase 6.X process. NNSA was able to meet its refurbishment schedule and avoid significant cost overruns for the B61 program only because (1) some of the refurbishment objectives were changed, (2) NNSA was able to reuse, rather than manufacture, a critical component when B61 bombs were decommissioned, and (3) the Nuclear Weapons Council significantly reduced the number of B61 bombs in the stockpile. Despite DOD concerns about the adequacy of NNSA testing of the B61 bombs under certain conditions, NNSA continued refurbishing the weapons. Some of the B61 refurbishment problems could have been avoided if DOD had fulfilled its roles and responsibilities in overseeing NNSA's life extension program activities. For example, the Air Force did not adequately review NNSA's design, engineering, and testing activities--a review that would have alerted DOD that NNSA was missing some of its refurbishment objectives. Regarding the W76 program, NNSA did not effectively manage a high risk associated with manufacturing an essential material, known as Fogbank, needed to refurbish the W76 warhead. NNSA had developed a risk mitigation strategy to avoid potential cost overruns and schedule delays related to the manufacture of this key material but failed to effectively implement this strategy. As a result, NNSA's original plans to produce the first refurbished W76 weapon in September 2007 slipped to September 2008; NNSA spent $69 million to address Fogbank production problems; and the Navy faced logistical challenges owing to the delay. Furthermore, NNSA did not have a consistent approach to developing a cost baseline for the W76 program, which makes it difficult to track refurbishment costs over time and to know the actual cost of the program.