CCIC2S Program Has Experienced Cost and Schedule Overruns and Performance Shortfalls

Like its predecessor, the CMU program, the CCIC2S program is over cost,  behind schedule, and some capabilities have been deferred indefinitely. This deferral could pose risks to performing some future operations. The  Air Force’s current program cost estimates through fiscal year 2006  represent about a 51 percent increase over its initial estimate. Additionally,  while the Air Force initially estimated CCIC2S upgrades to be completed  in fiscal year 2006, most critical mission capabilities will not be delivered  by this time, and for some of these capabilities, the Air Force has yet to  estimate a completion date. Deferral of Capabilities and Performance Shortfalls Have Implications for Future Missions

The deferral of capabilities and performance shortfalls that have resulted  from cost and schedule overruns in the CCIC2S program could  significantly impact future missions—especially if program dollars are  needed to maintain legacy systems longer than expected. USSTRATCOM—responsible for protecting U.S. space assets—could be  particularly affected, given that none of the work on CCIC2S’s critical  space mission capabilities has been completed and that estimated  completion dates for this work have yet to be determined. The unreliable cost and schedule estimates that  resulted have forced the program to frequently defer work to later years to  control cost growth. The Air Force has yet to determine when and at what  cost development is to be completed. Additionally, the Air Force’s contract management approach  limited the program office’s ability to thoroughly assess the reliability of  the contractor’s cost and schedule performance information and the  impact of defining, prioritizing, and adding capabilities. Furthermore, the  Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) did not independently  monitor contractor performance. According to DOD officials, actions are  being taken to implement better controls. However, DOD  did not designate the program as a major automated information system  acquisition. Designating the CCIC2S  program as a major automated information system acquisition would put  in place the high-level oversight and rigorous analyses needed to help  ensure (1) the program has top-level accountability and support for the  program, (2) DOD has the knowledge necessary for making trade-offs in  program requirements so that they match available resources, and   (3) DOD has the ability to prioritize and commit to the program within the  context of its other acquisition programs and long-range investment plans. GAO staff who made major contributions to  this report are listed in appendix V.

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

To determine the status of the Combatant Commanders’ Integrated  Command and Control System, or CCIC2S, in terms of meeting its cost,  schedule, and performance goals, we reviewed our past work to determine  whether the CCIC2S program has continued to experience the problems  previous Cheyenne Mountain upgrade efforts had experienced. To assess DOD’s oversight and control mechanisms for Cheyenne  Mountain systems modernization and integration efforts underway and  planned, we reviewed DOD and Air Force acquisition guidance and  interviewed officials in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for  Networks and Information Integration; Office of the Secretary of Defense,  Cost Analysis Improvement Group; Office of the Secretary of Defense,  Program Analysis and Evaluation; Office of the Director, Operational Test  and Evaluation; Defense Contract Management Agency’s CCIC2S Program  Support Team; Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for  Acquisition; Air Force Space Command; Office of the Air Force Program  Executive Officer for Command and Control and Combat Support; Air  Force Electronic Systems Center; Air Force Operational Test and  Evaluation Center; United States Strategic Command; United States  Northern Command; North American Aerospace Defense Command; and  Lockheed Martin Integrated Systems & Solutions.
Why GAO Did This Study

The Cheyenne Mountain Operations Center houses numerous complex computer systems for tracking air, missile, and space events that could threaten homeland security or undermine military operations in theater. To ensure this mission can be met, the systems require ongoing upgrades. The most recent upgrade program--the Combatant Commanders' Integrated Command and Control System (CCIC2S)--was initiated in 2000. Given the critical missions supported by Cheyenne Mountain systems, GAO initiated a review to (1) determine the status of the CCIC2S program in terms of meeting its cost, schedule, and performance goals; (2) gauge the extent to which DOD has followed best practices in managing program requirements; and (3) assess DOD's control and oversight mechanisms for CCIC2S.

What GAO Found

Like its predecessor, the Department of Defense's (DOD) CCIC2S program is over cost, behind schedule, and some capabilities have been deferred indefinitely which could pose risks to performing some future operations. The Air Force, which has overall responsibility for the program, currently estimates program costs will total about $707 million through fiscal year 2006--about a 51 percent increase over initial estimates. Schedules have also expanded significantly, and most critical mission capabilities will not be delivered in fiscal year 2006, as initially planned. The deferral of capabilities and performance shortfalls has significant implications for future missions--especially if program dollars are needed to maintain legacy systems longer than expected. The tracking of space objects could be particularly affected, given that none of the work on CCIC2S's critical space mission capabilities has been completed, and estimated completion dates for this work have yet to be determined. Unstable program requirements and the failure to match requirements to available resources have contributed to the program's cost and schedule overruns. Since the program began in 2000, the Air Force has added, deleted, and modified requirements without adequately determining the effect of these changes on resources. To control cost growth, the Air Force has frequently deferred work to later years and has yet to determine when and at what cost development is to be completed. Several key controls needed to mitigate the CCIC2S program's cost and schedule problems are not in place. First, DOD did not designate the CCIC2S program as a major automated information system acquisition--a designation that would have required high-level oversight other than that provided by the Air Force, which has been ineffective. In addition, the Air Force's contracting approach has limited the program's ability to thoroughly assess the reliability of the contractor's cost and schedule performance information and the impact of defining, prioritizing, and adding capabilities. Despite this risky approach, the Defense Contract Management Agency did not independently monitor contractor performance. According to DOD officials, actions are being taken to implement better controls and to determine whether the CCIC2S program should be categorized as a major automated information system acquisition.