The Army also considered DOD’s strategic plan as it restructured to a  brigade-based force. The Army Has Made Progress Establishing Modular Units but Does Not Have a Plan That Links Funding and Results to Guide Its Efforts to Equip and Staff the Modular Force

The Army is making progress establishing modular units, but does not  have a transparent results-oriented plan with clear milestones to guide  efforts to fully equip and staff the modular force. Further, the Army’s equipment and  personnel plans depend on some assumptions related to rehabilitating  equipment used in operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and related to  recruitment and retention that may be uncertain, given the current pace of  operations. According to a key 2004 Army Task Force Modularity study,  the success of modular design rests in part on the availability of key  enablers that are required for modular brigade combat teams to function  as planned. Without providing a detailed plan for equipment and staffing  that links funding with results, the congressional decision makers will not  have information to track the Army’s progress toward equipping and  staffing its forces. Army Projects That It Will Meet Overall Equipment and Personnel Requirements but Faces Challenges in Meeting These Goals

The Army’s equipping and staffing projections indicate that the Army will  have enough equipment and personnel to meet aggregate equipping and  staffing requirements by 2012. Decision makers may not be fully informed of the Army’s  equipment status because the Army has not developed a comprehensive  equipment and personnel plan that details the equipment the Army has in  its inventories as compared with the equipment required for units to  operate effectively in their modular designs and that sets milestones  against which to measure the Army’s progress equipping and staffing the  modular force with key enablers. The Army Has Not Fully Evaluated the Capabilities of the Modular Force across the Full Spectrum of Conflict

The Army uses a variety of approaches in testing unit designs and  capabilities, but these efforts have not yielded a comprehensive evaluation  of modular forces. Testing the modular force is intended to determine  whether modular units are capable of performing potential missions  across the full spectrum of conflict—and therefore needs to be as realistic  as possible. First, the Army has not  fully assessed the effectiveness of its support units because it has not  completed the doctrine that would define how modular support units will  train, be sustained, and support the fight. Second, the  Army has been testing the capability of modular forces primarily at  unconstrained design levels, not the authorized level of personnel and  equipment units that the Army actually plans to provide. To support ongoing operations, the Army has focused its testing and  evaluation efforts thus far on conducting ongoing counterinsurgency  operations. As operations  have continued, the target date for rebuilding the Army has slipped  considerably and is now more than a decade away. Lacking an analysis of  the capabilities of the modular force at authorized levels—which  represents what the Army actually plans to have—the Army will not be in  a position to realistically assess whether the capabilities that it is fielding  can perform mission requirements. To ensure that Congress is kept informed about the progress in  implementing modular designs across the Army’s operating forces and the  capabilities of the modular force and associated risks from personnel and  equipment shortfalls, it should consider revising section 323 Public Law  109-364 to require the Army to report on the status of its transition to  modularity to include assessments of (1)the status of development of  doctrine for how support forces will train, be sustained, and fight, (2)  capabilities of modular units with expected personnel and equipment and  risks associated with any shortfalls against required resources. Without the benefit of a clear plan and  milestones against which to assess progress, the Army cannot assure  Congress that it is on a path to restore readiness or when it will have the  equipment and personnel it needs.
Why GAO Did This Study

Amid ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Army embarked in 2004 on a plan to create a modular, brigade-based force that would be equally capable as its divisional predecessor in part because it would have advanced equipment and specialized personnel. GAO has previously reported that restructuring and rebuilding the Army will require billions of dollars for equipment and take years to complete. For this report, GAO assessed the extent to which the Army has (1) developed a plan to link funding with results and (2) evaluated its modular force designs. GAO analyzed Army equipment and personnel data, key Army reports, planning documents, performance metrics, testing plans, and funding requests. GAO also visited Army Training and Doctrine Command, including selected Army proponents and schools; Army Reserve Command; and the National Guard Bureau.

What GAO Found

The Army will have established over 80 percent of its modular units by the end of 2008 but does not have a results-oriented plan with clear milestones in place to guide efforts to equip and staff those new units. The Army has been focused on equipping and staffing units to support ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan; however, the equipment and personnel level of non-deployed units has been declining. The Army now anticipates that modular units will be equipped and staffed in 2019--more than a decade away--but has provided few details about what to expect in the interim. And while the Army projects that it will have enough equipment and personnel in the aggregate, its projections rely on uncertain assumptions related to restoring equipment used in current operations, as well as meeting recruiting and retention goals while simultaneously expanding the Army. Further, GAO's detailed analysis of Army data shows that the Army could face shortfalls of certain modern equipment. Such items are important because the success of the modular design rests in part on obtaining key enablers needed for modular units to function as planned, such as equipment to provide enhanced awareness of the battlefield. GAO has previously reported that the Army lacks a funding plan that includes interim measures for equipping and staffing the modular force, making it difficult to evaluate progress. Without a plan for equipment and staffing that links funding with results and provides milestones, the Army cannot assure decision makers when modular units will have the required equipment and staff in place to restore readiness. Finally, without this plan the Army risks cost growth and further timeline slippage in its efforts to transform to a more modular and capable force. The Army uses several approaches in testing unit designs and capabilities, but these efforts have not yielded a comprehensive assessment of modular forces. Testing the force is intended to determine whether modular units are capable of performing missions across the full spectrum of conflict. The Army has focused its testing efforts on combat units conducting ongoing counterinsurgency operations. However, gaps in the Army's testing could affect its forces' ability to deliver needed capabilities. First, the Army has not fully assessed the effectiveness of its support units because the doctrine that would define how modular support units will train, be sustained, and support the fight has not been completed. This doctrine provides a benchmark to measure the effectiveness of support units. Further, the Army has not assigned a focal point the responsibility for integrating assessments across activities, such as equipping and training. Second, the Army tested the capability of modular designs primarily unconstrained by resources, not at the level of personnel and equipment that the Army plans to provide units. Lacking an analysis of the capabilities of the modular force at levels that it plans to have, the Army will not be in a position to realistically assess whether the capabilities that it is fielding can perform mission requirements.