Acquisition Strategy Was Tailored and Had Special Priority

DOD used a tailored acquisition approach to rapidly acquire and field  MRAP vehicles. The program established minimal operational  requirements, decided to rely on only proven technologies, and relied  heavily on commercially available products. The program also undertook a  concurrent approach to producing, testing, and fielding the most  survivable vehicles as quickly as possible. To expand limited existing  production capacity, the department expanded competition by awarding  IDIQ contracts to nine commercial sources. To evaluate design,  performance, producibility, and sustainability, DOD committed to buy at  least 4 vehicles from each vendor. According to program officials,  subsequent delivery orders were based on a phased testing approach with  progressively more advanced vehicle test results and other assessments. To expedite the fielding of the vehicles, the government retained the  responsibility for final integration of mission equipment packages  including radios and other equipment into the vehicles after they were  purchased. DOD also designated the MRAP program as DOD’s highest  priority acquisition, which helped contractors and other industry partners  to more rapidly respond to the urgent need and meet production  requirements. Finally, some of the contractors involved in the acquisition  responded to the urgency communicated by the department by investing  their own capital early to purchase needed steel and other critical  components in advance of orders. DOD leadership took several steps to communicate the importance of  producing survivable vehicles as quickly as possible, for example  In May 2007, the Secretary of Defense designated MRAP as DOD’s  single most important acquisition program and established the MRAP  Task Force to integrate planning, analysis, and actions to accelerate  MRAP acquisition. MRAP Schedule and Performance Results Have Been Very Good

Schedule and performance results for the MRAP have been very good  overall. At the time of our review in July 2008, nearly all of the  developmental and operational testing had been completed; the Marine  Corps, the buying command for the MRAP, had placed orders for 14,173  MRAPs; and, as of May 2008, a little more than a year after the first  contracts were awarded, 9,121 vehicles had been delivered. As of July  2009, 16,204 vehicles have been produced and 13,848 vehicles have been  fielded in two theaters of operation. Total procurement funding for the  MRAP vehicles, mostly through supplemental appropriations, was about  $22.7 billion. Production began in  February 2007 with one vendor producing 10 vehicles. On  the positive side, it appears that quick action by the Secretary of Defense  to declare the MRAP program DOD’s highest priority and give it a DX  rating allowed the government and the contractors access to more critical  materials than otherwise would have been available. The availability of  funding mostly through supplemental appropriations was essential. In  addition, the decisions to 1) use only proven technologies, 2) keep  requirements to a minimum, 3) infuse significant competition into the  contracting strategy, and 4) keep final integration responsibility with the  government are all practices that led to positive outcomes. Challenges  remain in the form of reliability, mobility, and safety, which have required  some modifying of the designs, postproduction fixes, and adapting how  vehicles were to be used. Also, long term sustainment costs for MRAP are  not yet well understood and the services are only now deciding how  MRAP will fit into their longer term organizations. Another lesson, based on operational use of the  MRAP vehicles, was their lack of maneuverability and off-road capability. The question is, can this formula be applied to all of  DOD’s major acquisitions and the broader acquisition process? GAO has issued multiple reports under our “best practices” body of work  that underscore the need for faster development cycles and the need for  mature technologies, well understood requirements, systems engineering  knowledge, and incremental delivery of capabilities to enable quicker  deliveries. Finally, a broader lesson learned is that it may be time to invest the  time, money, and management skills in the S&T community to enable the  effectiveness we expect from the acquisition community.
Why GAO Did This Study

As of July 2008, about 75 percent of casualties in combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan were attributed to improvised explosive devices. To mitigate the threat from these weapons, the Department of Defense (DOD) initiated the Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) program in February 2007, which used a tailored acquisition approach to rapidly acquire and field the vehicles. In May 2007, the Secretary of Defense affirmed MRAP as DOD's most important acquisition program. To date, about $22.7 billion has been appropriated for the procurement of more than 16,000 MRAP vehicles. This testimony today describes the MRAP acquisition process, the results to date, lessons learned from that acquisition, and potential implications for improving the standard acquisition process. It is mostly based on the work we have conducted over the past few years on the MRAP program. Most prominently, in 2008, we reported on the processes followed by DOD for the acquisition of MRAP vehicles and identified challenges remaining in the program. To describe DOD's approach for and progress in implementing its strategy for rapidly acquiring and fielding MRAP vehicles, we reviewed DOD's plans to buy, test, and field the vehicles and discussed the plans with cognizant department and contractor officials. To identify the remaining challenges for the program, we reviewed the results of testing and DOD's plans to upgrade and sustain the vehicles

What GAO Found

DOD use of a tailored acquisition approach to rapidly acquire and field MRAP vehicles was successful. The program relied only on proven technologies and commercially available products; established minimal operational requirements; and undertook a concurrent approach to producing, testing, and fielding the vehicles. To expand limited production capacity, indefinite delivery, indefinite quantity contracts were awarded to nine commercial sources, with DOD agreeing to buy at least 4 vehicles from each. Subsequent orders were based on a concurrent testing approach with progressively more advanced vehicle test results and other assessments. To expedite fielding of the vehicles, the government retained the responsibility for final integration in them of mission equipment packages including radios and other equipment. DOD also made MRAP its highest priority acquisition, which helped contractors and others more rapidly respond to the need and meet production requirements, in part by early investing of their own capital to purchase steel and other critical components in advance of orders. Schedule and performance results for MRAP were very good overall. In July 2008, nearly all testing was completed; the Marine Corps had placed orders for 14,173 MRAPs; and, as of May 2008, 9,121 vehicles had been delivered. As of July 2009, 16,204 vehicles have been produced and 13,848 vehicles fielded in two theaters of operation. Total MRAP production funding was about $22.7 billion, mostly through supplemental appropriations. In terms of lessons learned, MRAP's success was driven by several factors, including quick action to declare its acquisition DOD's highest priority and giving it a DX rating, which allowed access to more critical materials than was otherwise available. The availability of supplemental appropriations was also essential. However, while neither of these factors are practically transferable to other programs, decisions to 1) use only proven technologies, 2) keep requirements to a minimum, 3) infuse significant competition into contracting, and 4) keep final integration responsibility with the government all led to positive outcomes and may be transferable. Challenges to MRAP remain in its reliability, mobility, and safety, which required some modifying of designs and postproduction fixes, and adapting how vehicles were used. Also, long term sustainment costs are not understood and the services are only now deciding how MRAP fits them in the longer term. GAO's multiple best practices reports have underscored the need for the use of mature technologies, well understood requirements, systems engineering knowledge, and incremental delivery of capabilities to enable quicker deliveries. Finally, a broader lesson learned is that it is time to invest the time, money, and management skills in the science and technology community to enable the effectiveness we expect from the acquisition community.