For example, the U.S. Central Command is charged with identifying the  ISR capabilities required to support his theater of operations. These steps are  important in DOD’s efforts to formulate a strategy for meeting future ISR  requirements in a more integrated manner by considering how existing  and future assets will fit together to provide needed information to  support combatant commanders and national decision makers. Specifically, the  Roadmap does not (1) identify overall ISR requirements and how DOD  plans to achieve them, (2) identify funding priorities, and (3) establish  mechanisms to enforce an investment strategy or measure progress. In September 2006, the Deputy  Secretary of Defense decided to bring ISR systems across DOD together  into a capability portfolio as part of a test case for the joint capability  portfolio management concept. The intent of the ISR portfolio management test case is to enable DOD to  develop and manage ISR capabilities across the entire department—rather  than by military service or individual program—and by doing so, to  improve the interoperability of future capabilities, minimize capability  redundancies and gaps, and maximize capability effectiveness. Future GAO Work Will Continue to Focus on DOD’s Approach for Developing ISR Capabilities

While our preliminary work has focused on the new processes that DOD  has established to address what it has acknowledged are weaknesses in its  planning for integrated future capabilities, our future work will investigate  DOD’s processes for integrating requirements and developing an  investment strategy. Among the issues that we plan to address are the  extent to which:    DOD’s ISR Integration Roadmap, or other DOD initiatives, establish a  framework for developing an overarching joint ISR architecture and an  investment strategy;    DOD’s review processes enable it to identify gaps and redundancies in    DOD has considered comprehensive analyses of new ISR capabilities,  to include consideration of all available ISR assets and  cost/performance evaluations. Currently, DOD’s approach to allocation and tasking do  not provide full visibility for managing its current ISR assets. Furthermore, DOD does  not have metrics and feedback for systematically measuring the  effectiveness of ISR missions. Without better visibility and performance  evaluation, DOD does not have all the information it needs to validate the  demand for ISR assets, to ensure it is optimizing the use of existing assets,  and to acquire new systems that best support warfighting needs. That process is managed by  USSTRATCOM’s Joint Functional Component Command-ISR (JFCC-ISR),  which is tasked with making recommendations to the Secretary of Defense  on how best to allocate ISR resources for theater use across the  combatant commands. However, while the Air Component Commander has visibility  into how all theater-level ISR assets, like the Air Force’s Predator, are  being used, it does not currently have visibility into how ISR assets,  embedded in and controlled by tactical units, such as the Army’s Hunter,  are being used on a daily basis. With greater visibility at all levels into the tasking of all ISR assets,  including those tactical assets controlled by the military services, there is  an opportunity for DOD to gain greater synergies and optimize the use of  its ISR assets, reduce the potential for unnecessary duplicative taskings,  and determine whether additional perceived demand for these assets is  well-founded. ISR Development Programs Have Opportunities for Greater Synergies and Have Experienced Some Cost and Schedule Growth That Impact Legacy Systems

Without a comprehensive and integrated approach to managing current  ISR assets and balancing demands for the ISR capabilities required for the  future, some of DOD’s current ISR acquisitions are not benefiting from  collaboration among the services that could save time and money. We also found cases where more collaboration is needed to  provide greater efficiencies in developing more affordable new systems to  close gaps in capabilities. Most of the 13 airborne ISR programs that we  reviewed have experienced some cost and/or schedule growth. As a result of the schedule delays in some  programs, the services will have to make investments in legacy systems to  keep them in the inventory longer than planned. DOD’s acquisition policy endorses this knowledge-based  approach to acquisition.
Why GAO Did This Study

As operations overseas continue, the Department of Defense (DOD) is experiencing a growing demand for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets to provide valuable information in support of military operations. While the 2006 Quadrennial Review emphasized the need for the ISR community to improve the integration and management of ISR assets, DOD plans to make significant investments in ISR capabilities for the future. Congress has been interested in DOD's approach for managing and integrating existing assets while acquiring new systems. This testimony addresses preliminary observations based on GAO's ongoing work regarding (1) the status of DOD initiatives intended to improve the management and integration of ISR requirements and challenges DOD faces in implementing its initiatives, (2) DOD's approach to managing current ISR assets to support military operations, and (3) the status of selected ISR programs in development and the potential for synergies between them. GAO's ongoing work included document review, interviews with officials at relevant organizations, observations of some U.S. Central Command operations, and review of 12 airborne ISR development programs.

What GAO Found

DOD's first steps to formulate a strategy for improving the integration of future ISR requirements include developing an ISR Integration Roadmap and designating ISR as a test case for its joint capability portfolio management concept. DOD developed an ISR Roadmap that assessed current and planned ISR capabilities. Our preliminary work, however, has shown that the Roadmap does not (1) identify future requirements, (2) identify funding priorities, or (3) measure progress. DOD's second initiative to improve the integration of the services' ISR programs is assigning management of ISR issues as a test case of its joint capability portfolio management concept. The intent of the test case is to explore whether managing groups of ISR capabilities across DOD will enable interoperability of future capabilities and reduce redundancies and gaps. Although in its early stages, GAO identified challenges, such as the extent to which the services will adopt suggestions from portfolio managers. DOD's approach to managing its current ISR assets limits its ability to optimize its use of these assets. U. S. Strategic Command is charged with making recommendations to the Secretary of Defense on how best to allocate to combatant commanders theater-level assets used to support operational requirements. While it has visibility into the major ISR programs supporting theater-level requirements, it does not currently have visibility into all ISR assets. Also, the commander responsible for ongoing joint air operations does not currently have visibility over how tactical assets are being tasked. Nor do tactical units have visibility into how theater-level and ISR assets embedded in other units are being tasked. Further, DOD lacks metrics and feedback to evaluate its ISR missions. Without better visibility and performance evaluation, DOD does not have all the information it needs to validate the demand for ISR assets, to ensure it is maximizing the use of existing assets, and to acquire new systems that best support warfighting needs. Opportunities exist for different services to collaborate on the development of similar weapon systems as a means for creating a more efficient and affordable way of providing new capabilities to the warfighter. We have identified development programs where program managers and services are working together to gain these efficiencies and where less collaborative efforts could lead to more costly stovepiped solutions. Additionally, most of the 12 airborne ISR development programs that we reviewed had either cost growth or schedule delays. These problems resulted from not following a knowledge-based approach to weapon system development as provided for in Defense policy. In some cases, delay in delivering new systems to the warfighter led to unplanned investments to keep legacy systems relevant.