The Plan Does Not Fully Address All Elements of a Results- Oriented Management Framework

		Air Force Plan Does Not Fully Address Elements of a Results-Oriented Management Framework and Lacks Clear Linkages in Planning Documents

While the Air Force plan focuses Air Force efforts on weapon system and  equipment operational availability, it does not fully address the elements  of a results-oriented management framework, nor does it clearly link  information between the two planning documents. The Air Force plan fully  addresses one of the seven elements, partially addresses four elements,  and does not address the remaining two elements that our prior work has  shown to be critical in a comprehensive strategic plan. For example, the plan identifies a strategy to achieve its  infrastructure goal. While the plan includes some metrics, it does not discuss any metrics that  directly assess the degree to which the depots are achieving the plan’s  goals. Moreover, the plan does not discuss the desired  levels for each of these metrics. Similarly, the plan does not identify how the Air Force will evaluate its  programs and use the results of these evaluations to adjust the plan’s long- term goals and strategies to achieve desired levels of performance. The Lack of Clear Linkage in the Plan’s Two Documents May Limit the Plan’s Usefulness

The content of the Air Force depot maintenance Strategy and Master Plan  are not clearly linked to one another, which may make the collective plan  difficult to use as a decision-making tool. For example, the goals listed in the Strategy are not  clearly repeated in the Master Plan, and the Master Plan includes goals  that are unrelated to depot maintenance. In addition, the Master Plan does not clearly align its  content to the five long-term goals described in the Strategy. However, that team did not review any of the services’  plans. The Air Force Lacked an Effective Oversight Mechanism to Systematically Evaluate the Plan

At the time the Air Force developed its plan, it lacked an effective  oversight mechanism to help ensure that its plan fully addresses the  elements of a results-oriented management framework and that the plan’s  two documents are clearly linked to one another. The Plan Does Not Fully Respond to OUSD (AT&L)’s Direction Designed to Meet Future Challenges

While the Air Force depot maintenance strategic plan describes many  initiatives and programs important to the Air Force depots, it is not fully  responsive to OUSD (AT&L)’s direction to the services that was designed  to provide the services with a framework to meet future challenges. Specifically, the plan does not fully address logistics transformation, core  logistics capability assurance, workforce revitalization, and capital  investment—the four areas that OUSD (AT&L) directed each service, at a  minimum, to include in its plan. Within these four general areas are 10  issues that OUSD (AT&L) also identified. The Air Force’s plan partially  addresses 8 and does not address the remaining 2. However, at present, information missing from the Air  Force plan may limit the service’s assurance that its depots are postured  and resourced to meet future maintenance requirements. To address reengineering existing  employees’ skills, the plan indicates that the depots are partnering with  local universities and technical schools to provide training. Neither the benchmarks for evaluating the  adequacy of investment funding nor the Air Force’s basis for selecting the  benchmarks are in the Air Force’s plan despite OUSD (AT&L)’s direction  to address this issue. To strengthen the oversight mechanism for depot maintenance strategic  planning, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Under  Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics and the  Secretary of the Air Force to develop and implement procedures to review  revisions of the depot maintenance strategic plan to ensure they fully  address all key elements of a results-oriented management framework,  explicitly address any OUSD (AT&L) direction for the plans, and  periodically assess progress and corrective actions to the extent needed in  meeting the plans’ goals.
Why GAO Did This Study

The Air Force's maintenance depots provide critical support to ongoing operations around the world. Previously, the Department of Defense's (DOD) increased reliance on the private sector for depot maintenance support, coupled with downsizing, led to a general deterioration in the capabilities, reliability, and cost-effectiveness of the military services' depots. In March 2007, the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (OUSD (AT&L)) directed each service to submit a depot maintenance strategic plan and provided direction for the content of those plans. The Air Force issued two documents in response to this direction--a Strategy and a Master Plan. GAO used qualitative content analyses to determine the extent to which the Air Force's collective plan addresses (1) key elements of a results-oriented management framework and (2) OUSD's (AT&L) direction for the plan's content.

What GAO Found

While the Air Force plan focuses efforts on weapon system and equipment operational availability, it does not fully address the elements of a results-oriented management framework, nor does it clearly link information between the plan's two component documents. GAO's prior work has shown that seven elements of a results-oriented management framework are critical for comprehensive strategic planning. The plan fully addresses one of these elements by including a mission statement that summarizes the Air Force depots' major functions and operations, but it partially addresses or does not address the remaining six elements. For example, while the plan describes goals for the depots' mission-related functions, it does not provide time frames to achieve them. Additionally, the plan does not discuss any factors beyond the Air Force's control that could affect its ability to achieve the plan's goals nor does it identify how the Air Force will evaluate its programs and use the results of such evaluations to adjust the plan's long-term goals and strategies to achieve desired levels of performance. Moreover, the content of the plan's two component documents are not clearly linked to one another. For example, the goals listed in the Strategy are not clearly repeated in the Master Plan, and the Master Plan includes goals that are unrelated to depot maintenance. Nor does the Master Plan clearly align its content to the five long-term goals described in the Strategy. The plan does not fully address the elements of a results-oriented management framework and the plan's two documents are not clearly linked to one another in part because of weaknesses in oversight. Specifically, although OUSD (AT&L) established an oversight body, which included senior representatives from OUSD (AT&L) and the services, to review the services' plans, this body did not review the plan. Also, the Air Force did not establish an oversight mechanism to review its plan. The plan's weaknesses may limit the Air Force's ability to use its plan as a tool to meet future challenges. In addition, the Air Force plan is not fully responsive to OUSD's (AT&L) direction to the services that was designed to provide the services with a framework to meet future challenges. OUSD (AT&L) directed the services to address 10 specific issues in four general areas: logistics transformation, core logistics capability assurance, workforce revitalization, and capital investment. The plan partially addresses 8 of these issues and does not address the remaining two. For example, while the plan notes that the Air Force is partnering with local universities and technical schools to provide training to reengineer existing employees' skills, the plan does not address Air Force actions to identify new and emerging skill requirements, as directed. Furthermore, the plan does not discuss any benchmarks to evaluate the adequacy of investment funding, as directed. As discussed for the elements of a results-oriented management framework, the plan does not fully respond to OUSD (AT&L)'s direction for the plan's content in part because of weaknesses in oversight in both OUSD (AT&L) and the Air Force. The plan's shortcomings may limit the Air Force's assurance that its depots are postured and resourced to meet future maintenance challenges.