DOD officials said that they have not been able to estimate U.S.

	DOD’s Initial Estimate for the Current Marine Corps Realignment Plan Is Not Reliable

Although DOD has developed a preliminary rough-order-of-magnitude  cost estimate for its current plan to relocate Marines from Okinawa and  realign them to Guam and other locations in the Pacific, it is not reliable,  because it is missing costs and is based on limited data. According to  DOD officials, DOD has not yet been able to put together a more reliable  cost estimate for its current plan, because it will not have the information  needed to do so until the completion of several key studies, including  environmental analyses for Guam and Hawaii. As part of its preliminary rough-order-of-magnitude  cost estimate, DOD currently estimates that it would cost approximately  $12.1 billion to implement the current realignment plan—not including the  Australia segment of the realignment. According to DOD officials, specific requirements and  their associated costs cannot be developed for each cost component until  the necessary analyses and host nation negotiations have been  completed. Additionally, DOD based its estimate on  several assumptions, but there was no evidence that DOD identified risk  impacts or parameters for any of these assumptions. Marine Corps Requirements for Hawaii and Other U.S. Locations. Mobility Support. Unoccupied housing will be discussed in  greater detail later in this report. However, until estimates are developed that address the  seven cost components described in this report, DOD will not be able to  provide Congress and other stakeholders with a reliable cost estimate to  make informed funding decisions regarding the realignment of Marines. DOD Has Not Yet Completed an Integrated Master Plan to Synchronize Realignment Initiatives in the Pacific or a Strategy to Support Japanese Construction

In April 2012, DOD announced that it would be revising its previous  Marine Corps realignment plan; however, DOD has not yet completed two  key planning mechanisms: an integrated master plan that synchronizes  the various realignment initiatives with all geographic segments of the  realignment and a construction support strategy. However, DOD has not developed and finalized a master plan in support  of the realignment. DOD Has Taken Initial Steps but Has Not Fully Identified Sustainment Needs and Costs on Okinawa and Guam

DOD has taken some steps to plan for sustaining its forces on both  Okinawa and Guam until the Marine Corps realignment is implemented  and consolidation initiatives on Okinawa are complete, but it has not yet  fully identified what will need to be done to sustain the facilities at these  locations and what it will cost for the immediate future. capture facility requirements and propose solutions to meet those  requirements from the options available. Still, we found that DOD did not include some up-front  practices that could have provided a more reliable estimate and could  have been done despite the fact that the environmental analyses and  host nation negotiations are not complete. DOD currently has not developed a  strategy to identify the resources it needs to assist with the development  and oversight of these projects that may involve a surge in concurrent  construction. DOD concurred with our recommendation to conduct an economic  analysis to include assessing the costs of maintaining vacant housing on  Guam. For this review, we  collected DOD plans and cost estimates associated with the original and  current Marine realignment plans, DOD budget data on U.S. projects  related to the Defense Posture Review Initiative (DPRI) and the Marine  realignment, budget data on DPRI and Host Nation Support expenditures  provided to DOD by the government of Japan, military base master plans  and housing requirements analyses, and other relevant documentation. We collected sustainment planning  documentation, base master plans, and historical host nation support and  U.S. sustainment cost data for Okinawa and compared them to GAO cost  estimating guidance and DOD guidance on installation master planning to  determine the extent to which DOD has planned for the sustainment of  U.S. forces on Okinawa until realignment efforts are completed. (a) RESTRICTION ON USE OF FUNDS.—Except as provided in  subsection (c), notwithstanding any other provision of law, none of the  funds authorized to be appropriated under this Act, and none of the  amounts provided by the Government of Japan for military  construction activities on land under the jurisdiction of the Department  of Defense, may be obligated to implement the realignment of United  States Marine Corps forces from Okinawa to Guam as envisioned in  the United States–Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation  issued May 1, 2006, until—  (1) the Commandant of the Marine Corps, in consultation with the  Commander of the United States Pacific Command, provides the  congressional defense committees the Commandant’s preferred  force lay-down for the United States Pacific Command Area of  Responsibility;  (2) the Secretary of Defense submits to the congressional defense  committees a master plan for the construction of facilities and  infrastructure to execute the Commandant’s preferred force lay- down on Guam, including a detailed description of costs and a  schedule for such construction;  (3) the Secretary of Defense certifies to the congressional defense  committees that tangible progress has been made regarding the  relocation of Marine Corps Air Station Futenma;  (4) a plan coordinated by all pertinent Federal agencies is  provided to the congressional defense committees detailing  descriptions of work, costs, and a schedule for completion of  construction, improvements, and repairs to the non-military  utilities, facilities, and infrastructure on Guam affected by the  realignment of forces; and  (5) the Secretary of Defense—  (A) submits to the congressional defense committees the  report on the assessment of the United States force posture in  East Asia and the Pacific region required under section 346 of  this Act; or  (B) certifies to the congressional defense committees that the  deadline established under such section for the submission of  such report has not been met.
Why GAO Did This Study

DOD has stated that it intends to rebalance its defense posture toward the Asia-Pacific region. Japan hosts the largest U.S. forward-operating presence in this region; the majority of the U.S. forces in Japan are located in Okinawa. The United States and Japan planned to reduce the U.S. military presence on Okinawa by relocating approximately 9,000 Marines. DOD had originally planned to move the Marines only to Guam, but revised its plans in 2012 to include other locations in the Pacific. Congressional committees have directed GAO to examine DOD's initiatives in the Pacific, focusing on planning and costs. This report discusses the extent to which DOD has (1) developed a comprehensive cost estimate for the realignment of Marines, (2) planned for and synchronized other movements to coincide with the realignment, and (3) identified plans to sustain the force until all initiatives are implemented. To address these objectives, GAO reviewed relevant policies and procedures, reviewed and analyzed cost documents related to the realignment initiatives, interviewed DOD officials, and conducted site visits at U.S. military installations in the Pacific.

What GAO Found

The Department of Defense's (DOD) preliminary cost estimate for its current realignment plan is not reliable, because it is missing costs and is based on limited data. According to DOD officials, DOD has not yet been able to put together a more reliable cost estimate because it will not have specific detailed information on the plan's requirements until the completion of environmental analyses and host nation negotiations. Currently, DOD estimates that it would cost approximately $12.1 billion to implement its realignment plan--not including the Australia segment of the realignment. Still, GAO found that DOD did not include some up-front practices that could have provided a more reliable estimate that are not dependent on the completion of the environmental analyses and host nation negotiations. Specifically, DOD omitted any costs associated with mobility support, a critical component of the implementation, from its cost estimate. Furthermore, although DOD based its cost estimate on several assumptions, there was no evidence DOD conducted analysis needed to determine the reliability of those assumptions. Without a reliable estimate, DOD will not be able to provide Congress and other stakeholders with the information Congress needs to make informed decisions regarding the realignment.
DOD has not developed an integrated master plan for its current realignment plan, and it has not developed a strategy to support the development and oversight of the Japanese construction projects associated with other realignment initiatives. DOD has taken initial steps to develop an integrated scheduling document based on currently known data, but indicated that specific requirements, schedules, and costs cannot be formalized in an integrated master plan until several studies and host nation negotiations are completed, which will take several years. Developing a master plan could enhance the management of the realignment by creating a systematic approach to planning, scheduling, and execution. In addition, DOD has not developed a strategy that identifies the resources needed to support the development of and oversight for these projects. According to best practices, a strategy identifies goals and resources and supports the implementation of a program. Without the information contained in an integrated master plan and a construction support strategy, Congress will be unable to make informed decisions about the order in which it needs to provide funding to support the realignment.
DOD has taken some steps to plan for the sustainment of U.S. forces on Okinawa and Guam, but it has yet to fully identify sustainment needs and costs for both locations during this period. At several installations on Okinawa, some of the infrastructure has severely deteriorated. DOD facilities planning guidance calls for updated facility master plans that capture requirements and propose solutions. On Guam, DOD has been maintaining an inventory of unoccupied family housing that could potentially be used for Marines relocating to Guam. However, DOD has not determined all the costs and benefits of maintaining this housing or the Marines' potential housing requirements--information needed to perform an economic analysis. Without an estimate of the sustainment requirements for Okinawa, the costs for maintaining housing, and the potential Marine requirements for housing on Guam, DOD will be unable to make informed decisions on whether continued investment in sustaining these facilities is warranted.

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that DOD develop more reliable cost estimates and an integrated master plan for the realignment of Marines, develop a mechanism to share annual updates on the status of each, and identify sustainment requirements for affected facilities until realignment initiatives are complete. DOD generally agreed with GAO's recommendations.