National Policies and Procedures Were in Place to Guide the Process for Acquiring Firefighting Resources

National policies and procedures were in place and provided the  framework to guide personnel in the local dispatch center in Grants Pass,  Oregon, who were responsible for acquiring firefighting resources for the  Biscuit Fire. To facilitate the swift  suppression of new fires—called the “initial attack” phase of a fire—local  dispatch center personnel can first contact neighboring dispatch centers  directly, including those in adjacent regions, before elevating resource  requests to the regional or national level. Grants Pass Dispatch Center Personnel Sought a Variety of Firefighting Resources for the Initial Attack of the Biscuit Fire

When the first two fires were found on the afternoon of July 13, 2002, the  Grants Pass dispatch center did not have the firefighting resources needed  locally to fight the fires. The fires, located in the Siskiyou  National Forest, were initially small—two trees and 1 acre. Figure 6 shows the new  fires found in southern Oregon and Northern California on July 13 and 14. At 6:40 p.m., in response to the July 13 request for a helicopter, a regional  dispatch official in Portland working with officials in the Northern  California regional dispatch center in Redding, the Fortuna dispatch center,  and the Grants Pass dispatch center arranged for a CDF helicopter with a  water bucket to respond to the Biscuit fires, as allowed under the  provisions of the mutual aid agreement. However, a Forest Service official also working at  Fortuna to dispatch firefighting resources had a differing opinion, saying  that even if Fortuna had sent the helicopter to Oregon, he believes that it  likely would have been diverted back to California to suppress other higher  priority fires in Fortuna’s direct protection area. Because Grants Pass  dispatch did not request assistance from Fortuna on the first day of the  Biscuit Fire, there was no discussion at that time about whether this would  have been the best use of the helicopter. Reduced Availability of Key Personnel Hampered the Ability to Effectively Fight the Biscuit Fire

Following the initial attack of the Biscuit Fire, delays in obtaining needed  personnel hampered efforts to effectively fight the Biscuit Fire in three key  ways. This was largely because the Biscuit fires were not threatening  lives and property. Some Differences in Certification Standards Exist between State and Federal Firefighting Agencies, but No Effect Was Identified

There are some differences in certification standards for personnel  between state and federal wildland firefighting agencies, but these  differences did not appear to have affected efforts to respond to the Biscuit  Fire. In the case of the Biscuit Fire,  Grants Pass dispatch personnel did communicate resource needs to their  regional dispatch center in Portland, but no resources were immediately  available due to other higher priority fires in the region. Whether this would have  resulted in any resources being provided for the initial attack of the Biscuit  Fire is unclear because personnel in the Fortuna dispatch center disagree  on whether any resources could have been spared, given that fires were  also burning in Northern California at the time. Since no request was made,  the priority of the Biscuit Fire relative to other ongoing fires within the  Fortuna dispatch center’s direct protection area was not discussed on the  first day of the Biscuit Fire, and the outcome of such a request, had it been  made, remains unclear. The Forest Service commented that  the report appears to be accurate and the agency generally agrees with its  contents. The  Department of the Interior did not provide comments. Scope and Methodology

To determine whether policies and procedures were in place for acquiring  needed firefighting resources during the initial days of the Biscuit Fire, and  the extent to which these policies and procedures were followed when the  fire was first identified, we reviewed national policies and procedures that  included the National Interagency Standards for Fire and Fire Aviation  Operations and the National Interagency Mobilization Guide. To determine what differences, if any, existed in key personnel certification  standards at federal and state agencies involved in fighting wildland fires— particularly in Oregon—we reviewed the interagency qualification  standards established by NWCG.
Why GAO Did This Study

In 2002, the United States experienced one of the worst wildland fire seasons in the past 50 years--almost 7 million acres burned. These fires included the largest and costliest fire in Oregon in the past century--the Biscuit Fire. Following a lightning storm, five fires were discovered in the Siskiyou National Forest over a 3- day period beginning July 13. These fires eventually burned together to form the Biscuit Fire, which burned nearly 500,000 acres in southern Oregon and Northern California and cost over $150 million to extinguish. GAO evaluated (1) whether policies and procedures were in place for acquiring needed firefighting resources during the initial days of the Biscuit Fire, and the extent to which these policies and procedures were followed when the fire was first identified; (2) what resource management issues, if any, affected the ability of personnel to fight the fire; and (3) what differences, if any, existed in key certification standards for personnel among federal and state agencies and whether these differences affected efforts to respond to the fire. In commenting on a draft of this report, the Forest Service stated that the report appears to be accurate and the agency generally agrees with its contents. The Department of the Interior did not provide comments.

What GAO Found

National policies and procedures were in place and provided the framework to guide personnel in the local interagency dispatch center in Grants Pass, Oregon, who were responsible for acquiring resources to fight the Biscuit Fire. These policies and procedures provide for a multilevel dispatching system where, if sufficient firefighting personnel and equipment are not available locally, resource requests can be elevated to other dispatch centers at the regional and, if necessary, national level. To facilitate the swift suppression of new fires, local dispatch center personnel can contact neighboring centers directly, including those in adjacent regions, before elevating resource requests. When the first two fires were found on July 13, the Grants Pass dispatch center did not have sufficient firefighting resources available locally. Grants Pass personnel requested resources from the responsible regional center in Portland, as well as from a dispatch center in central Oregon, but no resources were immediately available in the region due to other higher priority fires that were threatening lives and property. Grants Pass personnel did not request resources from a neighboring interagency dispatch center in Fortuna, California, located in an adjoining dispatch region, because they believed the center had no available resources due to fire activity there. State officials working at the Fortuna dispatch center later said that a Fortuna-based helicopter fighting fires in Northern California near the first of the five Biscuit fires could have been made available to suppress this fire. However, Forest Service officials working with Fortuna personnel disagreed, saying that the helicopter had been needed to fight fires in California. Because no request was made, there was no discussion on that first day about whether the Biscuit Fire would have been the best use of the helicopter, and it is unclear, in any case, what the outcome of such a request would have been. Following the initial days of the Biscuit Fire, delays in obtaining needed personnel hampered efforts to fight the rapidly growing fire. Specifically, officials faced problems obtaining (1) highly experienced management teams to direct suppression strategies and crews to carry the strategies out, (2) supervisors to manage crews and equipment, and (3) support staff to monitor the training and experience of contracted crews. An unusually severe fire season, with many other higher priority fires, affected the availability of personnel needed to fight the Biscuit Fire. Finally, while some differences exist in certification standards for personnel between federal and state agencies responsible for fighting wildland fires, these differences did not appear to affect efforts to respond to the Biscuit Fire.