A large majority of scientists and governments accept that stabilizing the concentrations of greenhouse gases (GHG) in the atmosphere and avoiding further GHG-induced climate change would require concerted effort by all major emitting countries. Toward this end, 195 governments attending the 21 st Conference of Parties (COP) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in Paris, France, adopted an agreement in 2015 outlining goals and a structure for international cooperation to address climate change and its impacts over decades to come. The "Paris Agreement" (PA) is subsidiary to the UNFCCC, a treaty that the United States ratified with the advice and consent of the Senate and that entered into force in 1994. On June 1, 2017, President Donald Trump announced his intent to withdraw the United States from the PA. He also stated that his Administration would seek to reopen negotiations on the PA or on a new "transaction." The PA creates a structure for nations to pledge to abate their GHG emissions, adapt to climate change, and cooperate toward these ends, including financial and other support. The PA is intended to be legally binding on Parties, though not all provisions are mandatory. For the first time under the UNFCCC, all Parties will participate in a common framework with common guidance, although some Parties will have flexibility in line with their capacities. The commonality largely supersedes the bifurcation into wealthier and developing countries that has held the negotiations in often-adversarial stasis for many years. The PA defines a quantitative (though collective) long-term objective to hold the GHG-induced increase in temperature to well below 2 o Celsius (C) and pursue efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5 o C above the pre-industrial level. The PA establishes a process, with a "ratchet mechanism" in five-year increments, for countries to set and achieve GHG abatement targets until the long-term goal is met. To promote compliance, the PA works to balance accountability necessary to build and maintain trust (if not certainty) with the potential for public and international pressure ("name-and-shame"). A compliance mechanism is defined to be expert-based and facilitative rather than punitive. Many Parties and observers will closely monitor the effectiveness of this strategy. The PA also requires "as appropriate" that Parties prepare and communicate their plans to adapt to climate change. Adaptation communications, too, will be recorded in a public registry. The PA reiterates the obligation in the UNFCCC for developed country Parties to provide public and private financial support to assist developing country Parties with mitigation and adaptation efforts. It also urges scaling up of financing. Negotiators intended the PA to be a legal instrument, though not all provisions in it are mandatory. Some are recommendations or collective commitments to which it would be difficult to hold an individual Party accountable. In addition, the Parties to the COP agreed to set, prior to their 2025 meeting, a new collective quantified goal for mobilizing financial resources of not less than $100 billion annually to assist developing country Parties. On August 29, 2016, President Obama, on behalf of the United States, signed an instrument of acceptance of the PA, effectively providing U.S. consent to be bound by the PA. In 2015, Members of the 114 th Congress introduced several resolutions (e.g., S.Res. 329 , S.Res. 290 , H.Res. 544 , S.Con.Res. 25 ) to express the sense that the PA should be submitted for the advice and consent of the Senate. Additionally, resolutions were introduced in the House ( H.Con.Res. 97 , H.Con.Res. 105 , H.Res. 218 ) to oppose the PA or set conditions on its signature or ratification by the United States. None received further action. In the 115 th Congress, a number of resolutions have also been introduced to oppose or support U.S. participation in the PA (e.g., H.Con.Res. 55 , H.Res. 85 , H.Res. 390 , S.Con.Res. Some key issues that may attract oversight, should the United States proceed with the President's intent to withdraw from the agreement include:
Options for withdrawing from the PA; The degree and content of U.S. participation in the PA activities while the United States is a Party and after withdrawal occurs; Objectives and options for renegotiation of the PA, or of a new "transaction," should other Parties be willing to engage; The possible implications for the United States of decisions Parties make following U.S. withdrawal (for example, regarding technology cooperation and trade); or Evaluation of bilateral cooperation in areas such as development of advanced technologies and information-sharing. As long as the United States remains a Party, issues include the following:
Development of methods and guidance to which PA Parties will be expected to conform concerning reporting on and achievement of NDCs; Protection of intellectual property and opportunities for market access in technology-related provisions; Balancing and evaluating outcomes of appropriations, partnership programs, regulations, and other federal activities to advance technologies, inform the public, and influence GHG emissions and adaptation to climate change; Use and outcomes of any appropriated funding, such as for operations of the Secretariat, bilateral cooperation with other Parties, or the GCF; and Overall outcomes of Parties' actions in light of the objectives of the UNFCCC and PA and in view of domestic concerns about potential economic and trade implications and climate effectiveness of the agreement.
The Paris Agreement (PA) to address climate change internationally entered into force on November 4, 2016. The United States is one of 149 Parties to the treaty; President Barack Obama accepted the agreement rather than ratifying it with the advice and consent of the Senate. On June 1, 2017, President Donald J. Trump announced his intent to withdraw the United States from the agreement and that his Administration would seek to reopen negotiations on the PA or on a new "transaction." Following the provisions of the PA, U.S. withdrawal could take effect as early as November 2020.
Experts broadly agree that stabilizing greenhouse gas (GHG) concentrations in the atmosphere to avoid dangerous GHG-induced climate change would require concerted efforts by all large emitting nations. The United States is the second largest emitter of GHG globally after China. Toward this purpose, the PA outlines goals and a structure for international cooperation to slow climate change and mitigate its impacts over decades to come.
The PA is subsidiary to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), which the United States ratified in 1992 with the advice and consent of the Senate and which entered into force in 1994. The PA requires that nations submit pledges to abate their GHG emissions, set goals to adapt to climate change, and cooperate toward these ends, including mobilization of financial and other support. The negotiators intended the PA to be legally binding on its Parties, though not all provisions in it are mandatory. Some are recommendations or collective commitments to which it would be difficult to hold an individual Party accountable. Key aspects of the agreement include:
Temperature goal. The PA defines a collective, long-term objective to hold the GHG-induced increase in temperature to well below 2o Celsius (C) and to pursue efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5o C above the pre-industrial level. A periodic "global stocktake" will assess progress toward the goals. Single GHG mitigation framework. The PA establishes a process, with a ratchet mechanism in five-year increments, for all countries to set and achieve GHG emission mitigation pledges until the long-term goal is met. For the first time under the UNFCCC, all Parties participate in a common framework with common guidance, though some Parties are allowed flexibility in line with their capacities. This largely supersedes the bifurcated mitigation obligations of developed and developing countries that held the negotiations in often-adversarial stasis for many years. Accountability framework. To promote compliance, the PA balances accountability to build and maintain trust (if not certainty) with the potential for public and international pressure ("name-and-shame"). Also, the PA establishes a compliance mechanism that will be expert-based and facilitative rather than punitive. Many Parties and observers will closely monitor the effectiveness of this strategy. Adaptation. The PA also requires "as appropriate" that Parties prepare and communicate their plans to adapt to climate change. Adaptation communications will be recorded in a public registry. Collective financial obligation. The PA reiterates the collective obligation in the UNFCCC for developed country Parties to provide financial resources—public and private—to assist developing country Parties with mitigation and adaptation efforts. It urges scaling up of financing. The Parties agreed to set, prior to their 2025 meeting, a new collective quantified goal for mobilizing financial resources of not less than $100 billion annually to assist developing country Parties.
Obama Administration officials stated that the PA is not a treaty requiring Senate advice and consent to ratification. President Obama signed an instrument of acceptance on behalf of the United States on August 29, 2016, without submitting it to Congress. In 2015, Members of the 114th Congress introduced several resolutions (e.g., S.Res. 329, S.Res. 290, H.Res. 544, S.Con.Res. 25) to express the sense that the PA should be submitted for the advice and consent of the Senate. Additionally, resolutions were introduced in the House (H.Con.Res. 97, H.Con.Res. 105,H.Res. 218) to oppose the PA or set conditions on its signature or ratification by the United States. None received further action. In the 115th Congress, a number of resolutions have also been introduced to oppose or support U.S. participation in the PA (e.g., H.Con.Res. 55, H.Res. 85, H.Res. 390, S.Con.Res. 17).
Beyond the Senate's role in giving advice and consent to a treaty, Congress continues to exercise its powers through authorizations and appropriations for related federal actions. Additionally, numerous issues may attract congressional oversight, such as:
procedures for withdrawal; foreign policy, technological, and economic implications of withdrawal; possible objectives and provisions of renegotiation of the PA or of a new "transaction" for cooperation internationally; international rules and guidance to carry out the PA; financial contributions and uses of finances mobilized; and assessment of the effectiveness of other Parties' efforts.