Under this presidential directive, DHS is now  the lead agency for the chemical infrastructure sector, a change from  national strategies issued in July 2002 and February 2003, which named  EPA as the lead federal agency. Experts Agree that Chemical Facilities Are an Attractive Target for Terrorists

Experts agree that the nation’s chemical facilities present an attractive  target for terrorists intent on causing massive damage. Terrorist attacks involving the theft or release of certain chemicals could  have a significant impact on the health and safety of millions of  Americans. Similarly, a 2002 Brookings Institution report ranks  an attack on toxic chemical plants behind only biological and atomic  attacks in terms of possible fatalities. In addition to the potential loss of life, a terrorist attack on a chemical  facility could also disrupt the local or regional economy or impact other  critical infrastructures. Currently, no one has comprehensively assessed security across the nation  at facilities that house chemicals. In total, about 15,000 RMP facilities  produce, use, or store more than threshold amounts of one or more of the  140 toxic and flammable chemicals that EPA has estimated pose the  greatest risk to human health and the environment if accidentally released  into the air. For example, about 2,000 of these facilities are community water  systems that are part of the water infrastructure sector. Some facilities may be at higher risk of a terrorist attack than others  because of the chemicals they house and their proximity to population  centers. These estimates include the residential population located within  the range of a toxic gas cloud produced by a “worst-case” chemical  release, called the “vulnerable zone.” According to 2003 EPA data, 123  chemical facilities located throughout the nation had toxic “worst-case”  scenarios where more than one million people would be in the “vulnerable  zone” and could be at risk of exposure to a cloud of toxic gas. While officials believe these scenarios are overstated,  there are situations where an attack could result in larger consequences. Few Federal Requirements Address Security at the Nation’s Chemical Facilities

Currently, few federal requirements address security at U.S. chemical  facilities. While some chemical facilities must comply with the Public  Health Security and Bioterrorism Response Act of 2002 (Bioterrorism Act)  and the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 (MTSA), many are  not subject to any federal security requirements. According to the Coast Guard, 238 chemical facilities are located on  waterways and handle “bulk liquid chemicals” are subject to MTSA  requirements. While the federal government does not require all chemical facilities to  take security measures to protect against a terrorist attack, it does impose  safety and emergency response requirements on chemical facilities, which  may incidentally reduce the likelihood and mitigate the consequences of  terrorist attacks. DHS’ Information Analysis  and Infrastructure Protection Directorate has a number of initiatives  underway to develop a strategy for protecting the chemical sector, identify  high-risk facilities, and integrate chemical sector protection efforts into a  national program. Without specific authority to require that chemical facilities make security  improvements, DHS has worked voluntarily with the chemical industry to  provide financial assistance, share information about critical  infrastructure protection, provide training and exercises, and assess  facility vulnerabilities and recommend security improvements. The primary security initiative undertaken by the industry directs  participating chemical facilities to assess vulnerabilities and develop  security plans to address them. Despite these efforts, the overall extent of security preparedness at  chemical facilities is unknown. In this  context, a comprehensive national chemical security strategy that would,  among other actions, identify high-risk facilities and require facilities to  assess their vulnerabilities and take any needed corrective actions would  help to ensure that security vulnerabilities at chemical facilities are  addressed. Both  the federal government and the chemical industry have taken steps to  improve security at chemical facilities. However, these efforts have not  involved all facilities with significant quantities of hazardous chemicals on  site.
Why GAO Did This Study

Terrorist attacks on chemical facilities could severely damage the U.S. economy and public health. About 15,000 facilities produce, use, or store large amounts of chemicals that pose the greatest risk to human health and the environment. While the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) formerly had the lead role in federal efforts to ensure chemical facility security, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is now the lead federal agency responsible for coordinating government and private efforts to protect these facilities from terrorist attacks. This testimony is based on GAO's past work on chemical facility security and focuses on (1) the attractiveness of chemical facilities as terrorist targets, (2) their diversity and risks, (3) federal security requirements for these facilities, and (4) federal and industry efforts to improve facility security.

What GAO Found

Experts agree that the nation's chemical facilities are attractive targets for terrorists. The theft or release of certain chemicals could disrupt the local economy, impact other critical infrastructures that rely on chemicals, or impact the health and safety of millions of Americans. For example, a 2002 Brookings Institution report ranks an attack on toxic chemical plants behind only biological and atomic attacks in terms of possible fatalities. While several efforts are underway, no one has yet comprehensively assessed security at the nation's chemical facilities. The chemical sector includes a variety of facilities and risks. The 15,000 facilities with large amounts of the most dangerous chemicals include chemical manufacturers, water supply facilities, and fertilizer facilities, among others. Some facilities may be at higher risk of a terrorist attack than others because of the specific chemicals on site and their proximity to population centers. According to 2003 EPA data, 123 U.S. chemical facilities had "worst-case" scenarios where more than one million people could be at risk of exposure to a cloud of toxic gas. While EPA and DHS believe that these scenarios overstate the potential consequences of a chemical release, there are situations where an attack could have potentially more severe consequences. Only about one-sixth of the 15,000 facilities with large amounts of dangerous chemicals are covered by federal security requirements. About 2,000 community water systems and 238 facilities that are located on waterways and handle "bulk liquid chemicals" must conduct vulnerability assessments, among other things, under the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Response Act of 2002 and the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002, respectively. However, the federal government places requirements on chemical facilities to address accidental releases, which may also reduce the likelihood and mitigate the consequences of terrorist attacks. A number of federal and industry efforts are underway to enhance chemical facility security. DHS is developing a strategy to protect the chemical sector, identify high-risk facilities, and integrate chemical sector protection efforts into a national program. With no authority to require facilities to improve security, DHS has provided the industry with financial assistance, information, and training, assessed facility vulnerability, and recommended security improvements. About 1,100 facilities participate in a voluntary industry effort in which they assess vulnerabilities, develop security plans, and undergo a third party verification that the facilities implemented the identified physical security enhancements. The extent to which the remaining facilities are addressing security is unclear and the extent of chemical facilities' security preparedness is unknown. In this context, a comprehensive national strategy to identify high-risk facilities and require facilities to assess their vulnerabilities, among other actions, would help to ensure that security vulnerabilities at chemical facilities are addressed.