Iran, partly because of U.S.efforts during the Iran-Iraq war to shut off worldwide arms sales to Iran, lacked a wide choice of willing suppliers,and the Soviet Union saw arms sales toIran as one way to broaden its influence in the Gulf. Attempting to curb Russia's arms and technology relationships with Iran, U.S. officials have consistently impressed upon their Russian counterparts thepossibility that Iran's historic resentment of past Russian actions in Iran might some day make Russia itself a targetof Iranian WMD. These arguments have not dissuadedRussia from selling arms and technology to Iran, and the Clinton Administration and Congress tried to use the threatof sanctions in efforts to achievenonproliferation goals. Russian Pledge to the United States. The Bush Administration could choose to impose sanctions on Russia for the new sales to Iran under legislation passed by Congress in 1996; the legislationattempts to punish suppliers of conventional arms to Iran and other countries on the U.S. "terrorism list." Ballistic Missiles

Since late 1996, U.S. officials and published reports have cited Russia, which has been a formal member of the MTCR since August 8, 1995, as a primarysupplier of Iran's ballistic missile programs. The sanctions authorized by the new law include:
a ban on U.S. government procurement from or contracts with the entity;
a ban on U.S. assistance to the entity; (21)
a prohibition of U.S. sales to the entity of any defense articles or services; and
denial of U.S. licenses for exports to the entity of items that can have military applications ("dual use items"). The Bush Administration has not added any Russian entities to those alreadysanctioned for WMD technology sales to Iran. Chemical and Biological Programs

Recent U.S. proliferation reports say that Iran has sought chemical weapons technology and chemical precursors from Russia (and China) in order to create amore advanced and self-sufficient chemical warfare infrastructure. Others note that China has not cultivated Iran exclusively, but has sought to expand its influence broadlywithin the Middle East. Anti-Ship Cruise Missiles And Other Advanced Conventional Weapons

Over the past five years, China has supplied Iran with artillery pieces , tanks, the Chinese version of the SA-2 surface-to-air missile, and 24 F-7 combataircraft, but it is China's past sales to Iran of anti-ship cruise missiles that have caused the most significant U.S.concern. Nuclear Issues

In the nuclear field, the Clinton Administration extracted significant pledges from China to limit its relationship with Iran. This certification, required by P.L. In their statements and cooperation, Iran and North Koreaappear to try to reinforce each other'scriticism of the United States as a global hegemon bent on dominating developing nations. The Clinton Administration's engagement of North Korea began gradually in 1994 with a U.S. effort to halt North Korea's nuclear program and, later, itsdevelopment of missiles capable of hitting the United States. Majorexamples of suppliers to Iran, other than its three key supplier countries, include the following:
Poland sold Iran 100 T-72 tanks in 1994, and subsequently pledged to the United States not to sell Iran any additionaltanks.
Successive U.S. administrations since Iran's 1979 Islamic revolution have viewed Iran as a potential threat to U.S. allies and forces in the Persian Gulf andin the broader Middle East and have sought to limit its strategic capabilities. The greater visibility of moderateelements inside Iran since 1997 led theUnited States to seek to engage Iran in a formal governmental dialogue, but the Clinton and George W. BushAdministration did not reduce U.S. efforts todeny Iran advanced conventional arms and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) technology. Iran's moderatesappear to see regional threats to Iran as doIran's hardliners and have made no apparent effort to curb Iran's efforts to acquire WMD. Even if moderate leadershad sought to do so, they have beenlargely outmaneuvered on defense and other issues by hardliners who still control the armed forces, internal securityservices, the judiciary, and keydecision-making bodies.
In the past, Iran has generally lacked the indigenous skills to manufacture sophisticated conventional arms or independently develop weapons of massdestruction (WMD), and one of Iran's objectives over the past decade has been to obtain the technology and skillsto become self-sufficient. Iran has come along way toward that objective in certain areas, including ballistic missiles and chemical weapons, but in theaggregate, Iran remains reliant on foreignsuppliers. This dependence has given the United States some opportunity to work with potential suppliers to containIran's WMD capabilities. Europeanallies of the United States have agreed not to sell conventional weaponry to Iran, and the United States haspersuaded its European allies not to sell anytechnology that could have military applications ("dual use items") to Iranian military or security entities.
To try to thwart U.S. efforts, Iran has cultivated close relationships with foreign suppliers that are not allied to the United States, especially Russia, China,and North Korea. Curtailing arms and technology supplies to Iran has formed an important part of the U.S. agendawith all three of these countries, but morepressing U.S. objectives with each of them have sometimes hampered the U.S. ability to dissuade them fromassisting Iran. Iran apparently continues toreceive critical technology from all three, but U.S. efforts appear to be limiting their supply relationships with Iran.
Congress and successive Administrations have enacted several laws and executive orders, many of which are similar to each other, that impose sanctions oncountries and firms that sell WMD technology to Iran. The most recent measure enacted is the Iran NonproliferationAct ( P.L. 106-178 ), signed in March2000. The Clinton Administration generally preferred diplomacy and engagement with supplier states, and it usedthe threat of sanctions to obtain suppliercooperation. The Bush Administration has taken much the same approach, although it has appeared more willingthan its predecessor to sanction entities insome supplier states.
This report will be updated as events warrant.