	Introduction

This report summarizes the main points of CRS Report RL34070, Fusion Centers: Issues and Options for Congress , by John Rollins. It highlights the value proposition of such centers, as well as the obstacles and risks they face. All of the information provided herein is provided in greater detail in the original report, which will be updated as necessary. Background

The creation of post-9/11 intelligence/information fusion centers does not represent a totally new concept, but suggests an extension of pre-9/11 state and local law enforcement intelligence activities. From the perspective of intelligence collection, the 28 CFR, Part 23 standard is reasonable suspicion. A little more than 40% of fusion centers interviewed for this report describe their center as "all-hazards" as well as all-crimes. At some centers, all-hazards denotes the entity's mission and scope—meaning the fusion center is responsible for preventing and helping to mitigate both man-made events and natural disasters. While some states have seen limited success in integrating federal intelligence community analysis into their fusion centers, research indicates most continue to struggle with developing a "true fusion process" which includes value added analysis of broad streams of intelligence, identification of gaps, and proactive collection of information to fulfill those gaps to prevent criminal and terrorist acts. That is, while fusion centers were largely established by states, if the federal intent is to create a network of fusion centers that can be leveraged for both state, local, and federal public safety and homeland security purposes, there are several challenges that must be overcome. As elements of the states and regions they serve, fusion centers began to develop critical mass or staying power in the years immediately following the terrorist attacks of 2001. Federal versus state, local, and tribal (SLT) roles and responsibilities, to include funding. Ultimate goals and performance measures.
This report summarizes the main points of CRS Report RL34070, Fusion Centers: Issues and Options for Congress, by John Rollins. It highlights the value proposition of such centers, as well as the obstacles and risks they face. All of the information provided herein is provided in greater detail in the original report, which will be updated as necessary.
Although elements of the information and intelligence fusion function were conducted prior to 9/11, often at state police criminal intelligence bureaus, the events of 9/11 provided the primary catalyst for the formal establishment of more than 40 state, local, and regional fusion centers across the country. The value proposition for fusion centers is that by integrating various streams of information and intelligence, including that flowing from the federal government, state, local, and tribal governments, as well as the private sector, a more accurate picture of risks to people, economic infrastructure, and communities can be developed and translated into protective action. The ultimate goal of fusion is to prevent man-made (terrorist) attacks and to respond to natural disasters and man-made threats quickly and efficiently should they occur. Fusion centers are state-created entities largely financed and staffed by the states, and there is no one "model" for how a center should be structured. State and local law enforcement and criminal intelligence seem to be at the core of many of the centers. While many of the centers have prevention of attacks as a high priority, little "true fusion"—analysis of disparate data sources, identification of intelligence gaps, and pro-active collection of intelligence against those gaps which could contribute to prevention—is occurring.