In the aftermath of September 11, 2001, there is heightened concern that  terrorists may try to smuggle nuclear or radiological materials into the  United States. DOE Has Unique Capabilities and Assets to Prevent and Respond to a Nuclear or Radiological Attack in the United States

DOE has unique capabilities and assets to prevent and respond to a nuclear  or radiological attack in the United States. These include specialized teams  and equipment to search for, locate, and deactivate nuclear or radiological  devices and to help manage the consequences of a nuclear or radiological  attack. DOE’s Current Physical Security Measures May Not Be Sufficient to Protect Its Key Emergency Response Facilities

DOE’s two Remote Sensing Laboratories are protected at the lowest level  of physical security allowed by DOE guidance because, according to DOE,  their emergency response capabilities and assets have been dispersed  across the country and are not concentrated at the laboratories. DOE Has Not Fully Dispersed the Capabilities and Assets at These Facilities, and Their Loss Would Significantly Hamper DOE’s Ability to Respond to Nuclear and Radiological Threats

Contrary to DOE’s assessment that the Remote Sensing Laboratories’  capabilities and assets have been fully dispersed to other parts of the  country, we found that the laboratories housed a number of unique  emergency response capabilities and assets whose loss would significantly  undermine DOE’s ability to respond to a nuclear or radiological threat. The  critical capabilities and assets that exist only at the laboratories include (1)  the teams that help minimize the consequences of a nuclear or radiological  attack, (2) the planes and helicopters designed to measure contamination  levels and assist search teams in locating nuclear or radiological devices,  and (3) a sophisticated mapping system that tracks contamination and the  location of radiological sources in U.S. cities. Despite the Benefits of Conducting Aerial Background Radiation Surveys, They Remain Underutilized Because Neither DOE Nor DHS Has Mission Responsibility for Funding and Conducting Them

There are significant benefits to conducting aerial background radiation  surveys of U.S. cities. Once surveys are complete, they can later be used to  compare changes in radiation levels to (1) help detect radiological threats  in U.S. cities more quickly and (2) measure radiation levels after a  radiological attack to assist in and reduce the costs of cleanup efforts. Despite the benefits, there has been a survey of only one major U.S. city. A number of critical capabilities and assets for  preventing and responding to nuclear and radiological attacks reside at  DOE’s two Remote Sensing Laboratories. Because these capabilities and assets have not  been fully dispersed, current physical security measures may not be  sufficient for protecting the facilities against a terrorist attack.
Why GAO Did This Study

The Department of Energy (DOE) maintains an emergency response capability to quickly respond to potential nuclear and radiological threats in the United States. This capability has taken on increased significance after the attacks of September 11, 2001, because there is heightened concern that terrorists may try to detonate a nuclear or radiological device in a major U.S. city. This report discusses (1) the capabilities and assets DOE has to prevent and respond to potential nuclear and radiological attacks in the United States, (2) the physical security measures in place at DOE's two key emergency response facilities and whether they are consistent with DOE guidance, and (3) the benefits of using DOE's aerial background radiation surveys to enhance emergency response capabilities.

What GAO Found

DOE has unique capabilities and assets to prevent and respond to a nuclear or radiological attack in the United States. These include specialized teams to search for, locate, and deactivate nuclear or radiological devices and to help manage the consequences of a nuclear or radiological attack. These capabilities are primarily found at DOE's two key emergency response facilities--the Remote Sensing Laboratories at Nellis Air Force Base, Nevada, and Andrews Air Force Base, Maryland. DOE's two Remote Sensing Laboratories are protected at the lowest level of physical security allowed by DOE guidance because, according to DOE, capabilities and assets to prevent and respond to nuclear and radiological emergencies have been dispersed across the country and are not concentrated at the laboratories. However, we found a number of critical capabilities and assets that exist only at the Remote Sensing Laboratories and whose loss would significantly hamper DOE's ability to quickly prevent and respond to a nuclear or radiological emergency. These capabilities include the most highly trained teams for minimizing the consequences of a nuclear or radiological attack and the only helicopters and planes that can readily help locate nuclear or radiological devices or measure contamination levels after a radiological attack. Because these capabilities and assets have not been fully dispersed, current physical security measures may not be sufficient for protecting the facilities against a terrorist attack. There are significant benefits to conducting aerial background radiation surveys of U.S. cities. Specifically, the surveys can be used to compare changes in radiation levels to (1) help detect radiological threats in U.S. cities more quickly and (2) measure contamination levels after a radiological attack to assist in and reduce the costs of cleanup efforts. Despite the benefits, only one major city has been surveyed. Neither DOE nor the Department of Homeland Security has mission responsibility for conducting these surveys, and there are no plans to conduct additional surveys.