judge and (2) the length of experience as an immigration judge. 3). 4). Affirmative applicants who filed their asylum  application within 1 year of entry to the United States had a grant rate of  42 percent, compared with 26 percent of those who did not file within 1  year. In a later section of this report, we discuss the unavailability of EOIR data to assess  whether applicants’ failure to apply for asylum within 1 year of entry to the United States  was a basis for their being denied asylum. 5). As can be determined from  table 2, in 14 out of 19 immigration courts for affirmative cases, and in 13  out of 19 immigration courts for defensive cases, the likelihood of being  granted asylum was at least 4 times as great for applicants whose cases  were decided by the immigration judge with the highest versus lowest  grant rate in the immigration court. EOIR said it was using information on which  immigration judges had unusually high or low asylum grant rates, in  conjunction with other indicators of performance, to identify immigration  judges in need of greater supervision, and has taken steps to increase  training and make mentoring available for all immigration judges. facility, because of a significant reduction in the  number of detained aliens in EOIR removal proceedings at the facility. However, these studies did not  statistically control for the effects of a number of factors that could affect  the asylum outcome. While we recognize that EOIR does  not currently have the expertise to conduct multivariate statistical  analyses, without doing so, the completeness, accuracy, and usefulness of  EOIR’s grant rate studies are limited, and EOIR is hindered in its efforts to  have the information it seeks to help it identify immigration judges who  require additional training and supervision. EOIR’s deployment of supervisors to field locations was a pilot  program undertaken in response to the results of the Attorney General’s  2006 review of the performance of immigration courts. BIA decisions favorable to asylum  applicants were more than 50 percent lower in the 4 years following the  2002 changes, a period during which BIA members made substantial use of  the authority to affirm immigration judge decisions without writing an  opinion (AWO). 6). 9). Overall, 78 percent of AWOs issued by the BIA after streamlining  resulted in removal orders. In June 2008, EOIR published proposed regulations for  comment in the Federal Register. It is too soon to tell how these regulatory changes  might affect outcomes for asylum appellants. If the Congress believes it is important for EOIR to begin collecting data  on the impact of the 1-year rule on asylum decisions, the applicants, and  their dependents, it would need to direct EOIR to develop a cost effective  method for carrying this effort out. However, EOIR has not determined  how many ACIJs it needs to effectively supervise immigration judges, and  it has not provided ACIJs with guidance on how to carry out their  supervisory role. GAO staff members who were major contributors to this  report are listed in appendix V.

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

Our reporting objectives were to (1) identify what factors affected the  variability in asylum outcomes in immigration courts; (2) identify what  actions DOJ’s Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) has taken  to assist applicants in obtaining legal representation and immigration  judges in rendering asylum decisions, and how, if at all, these actions  could be improved; (3) determine what changes in asylum backlogs and  outcomes occurred following the streamlining of appeals procedures at  the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA); and (4) identify what information  existed on the effects of the 1-year rule on reducing fraudulent asylum  applications and preventing applicants from being granted asylum and  what resources have been expended in adjudicating it. Factors Affecting Variability in Asylum Outcomes in Immigration Court

		Analysis of Data on Immigration Judge Decisions

We used logistic regression multivariate statistical models to examine all  decisions rendered by immigration judges from October 1, 1994, through  April 30, 2007, that involved asylum seekers from the 20 countries that  produced the most asylum cases and the 19 immigration courts that  handled the largest numbers of asylum cases. We examined BIA decisions for fiscal years 1998 through 2006. For defensive cases, we further considered whether  the asylum seeker had ever been detained. Specifically, after simultaneously controlling for the effects of the other  factors, we found that for the six specific immigration court/nationality  combinations in our analysis, asylum outcomes were generally not  significantly affected by    whether or not an immigration judge had previous experience doing  immigration work for a nonprofit organization;    whether or not an immigration judge had previous immigration  the immigration judge’s gender (except for Haitians in Miami, where  both affirmative and defensive applicants were 30 percent as likely to  be granted asylum if the immigration judge was male rather than  female);    The immigration judge’s race/ethnicity (except for Chinese in Los  Angeles and Haitians in Miami, where affirmative applicants were more  than twice as likely to be granted asylum if the immigration judge was  white, nonHispanic rather than other race/ethnicity);  the immigration judge’s veteran status (except for Haitians in Miami,  where defensive applicants were 40 percent as likely to be granted  asylum if the immigration judge was a veteran);    whether the immigration judge was appointed during a Democratic or  Republican presidential administration (except for Chinese in New  York, where affirmative applicants were more than twice as likely to be  granted asylum, and defensive applicants were almost 3 times as likely  to be granted asylum by immigration judges who were appointed  during a Republican presidential administration); or  the age of the immigration judge (except for Haitians in Miami where  affirmative applicants were nearly twice as likely to be granted asylum  by older rather than younger immigration judges).
Why GAO Did This Study

Each year, tens of thousands of people who have been persecuted or fear persecution in their home countries apply for asylum in the United States. Immigration judges (IJ) from the Department of Justice's (DOJ) Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) decide whether to grant or deny asylum to aliens in removal proceedings. Those denied asylum may appeal their case to EOIR's Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA). GAO was asked to assess the variability of IJ rulings, and the effects of policy changes related to appeals and claims. This report addresses: (1) factors affecting variability in asylum outcomes; (2) EOIR actions to assist applicants and IJs; (3) effects associated with procedural changes at the BIA; and (4) effects of the requirement that asylum seekers apply within 1 year of entering the country. GAO analyzed DOJ asylum data for fiscal years 1995 through mid-2007, visited 5 immigration courts in 3 cities, including those with 3 of the top 4 asylum caseloads; observed asylum hearings; and interviewed key officials. Results of the visits provided additional information but were not projectable.

What GAO Found

In the 19 immigration courts that handled almost 90 percent of asylum cases from October 1994 through April 2007, nine factors affected variability in asylum outcomes: (1) filed affirmatively (originally with DHS at his/her own initiative) or defensively (with DOJ, if in removal proceedings); (2) applicant's nationality; (3) time period of the asylum decision; (4) representation; (5) applied within 1 year of entry to the United States; (6) claimed dependents on the application; (7) had ever been detained (defensive cases only); (8) gender of the immigration judge and (9) length of experience as an immigration judge. After statistically controlling for these factors, disparities across immigration courts and judges existed. For example, affirmative applicants in San Francisco were still 12 times more likely than those in Atlanta to be granted asylum. Further, in 14 of 19 immigration courts for affirmative cases, and 13 of 19 for defensive cases, applicants were at least 4 times more likely to be granted asylum if their cases were decided by the judge with the highest versus the lowest likelihood of granting asylum in that court. EOIR expanded its programs designed to assist applicants with obtaining representation and has attempted to improve the capabilities of some IJs. EOIR has conducted two grant rate studies and was using information on IJs with unusually high or low grant rates, together with other indicators of IJ performance, to identify IJs who might benefit from additional training and supervision. However, EOIR lacked the expertise to statistically control for factors that could affect asylum outcomes, and this limited the completeness, accuracy, and usefulness of grant rate information. Without such information, to be used in conjunction with other performance indicators, EOIR's ability to identify IJs who may need additional training and supervision was hindered. EOIR assigned some IJ supervisors to field locations to improve oversight of immigration courts, but EOIR has not determined how many supervisors it needs to effectively supervise IJs and has not provided supervisors with guidance on how to carry out their supervisory role. Following streamlining (procedural changes) at the BIA in March 2002, BIA's appeals backlog decreased, as did the number of decisions favoring asylum seekers. Such decisions were more than 50 percent lower in the 4 years after streamlining compared to 4 years prior. The authority to affirm the IJ's' decisions without writing an opinion was used in 44 percent of BIA's asylum decisions. In June 2008, EOIR proposed regulatory changes to the streamlining rules, but it is too soon to tell how they will affect appeals outcomes. Data limitations prevented GAO from determining the (1) effect of the 1-year rule on fraudulent applications and denials and (2) resources adjudicators have spent addressing related issues. EOIR lacked measures of fraud, data on whether the 1-year rule was the basis for asylum denials, and records of time spent addressing such issues. Congress would need to direct EOIR to develop a cost-effective method of collecting data to determine the effect of the rule.