To determine the status of the Army’s Year 2000 program and the appropriateness of its strategy and actions for ensuring successful completion, we evaluated DOD’s Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence (OASD/C3I) efforts to provide Year 2000 support to the Army. The Army’s CIO requested that AAA help evaluate component needs and identify areas that could cause Year 2000 failures. First, it lacks complete and accurate information on systems, interfaces, Year 2000 costs, and the progress of remediation efforts. As a result, there is increased risk that key interfaces will not be corrected prior to the year 2000. Without these plans, it will not be able to minimize the impact of Year 2000 problems on operations. Fourth, the Army has not assessed how much testing capacity is needed and available. Cost Information Is Both Incomplete and Unreliable

At the time of our review, the Army reported that it expected to spend about $429 million to correct its Year 2000 problem. For example, 328 of the 505 AMC systems needing Year 2000 remediation did not have repair cost estimates. All of these data problems seriously impair the Army’s ability to effectively manage Year 2000 remediation efforts. Without complete interface information, the Army cannot ensure that Year 2000 errors are not propagated from one organization’s system to another’s. Without documentation on certification, the Army cannot assess whether systems have been verified as compliant. Thus, it will increase the risk of being unprepared to carry out operational missions after the Year 2000 deadline. In view of these problems, the Army has supplemented its efforts with AAA, the Army Inspector General, and contractor services. Also, until the Army provides increased oversight of components’ efforts to plan for contingencies, prepare interface agreements, and acquire needed testing facilities, it cannot be assured that its mission-critical operations will not be severely degraded or disabled as a result of the Year 2000 problem. Recommendations

We recommend that the Secretary of the Army direct the Army CIO to do the following:
Require by July 30, 1998, that all Army components (1) correct their inventory databases, ensuring that they are accurate and complete, (2) certify all claims of Year 2000 compliance and submit completed certification checklists to the Army Year 2000 Project Office, (3) provide reliable Year 2000 cost estimates that are based on a comprehensive inventory and completed assessments of all mission-critical and major systems so that priorities can be established and informed resource trade-off decisions can be made, (4) prepare contingency plans that include specific actions for ensuring the continuity of the Army’s critical operations at the Year 2000, (5) prepare memorandums of agreement for all identified interfaces, and (6) develop test plans and identify the need for additional testing resources. For example, the CIO noted that, in a February 1998 policy memorandum, he had directed components to (1) provide more complete and accurate data on their systems, (2) ensure that all mission-critical and major systems reported as compliant in the Army Year 2000 database are certified and copies of the certification are provided to the Army Year 2000 Project Office, (3) ensure that all noncompliant mission-critical and major systems are certified following renovation and testing, (4) complete contingency plans for all noncompliant mission-critical and major systems and core business areas, and (5) inventory all system interfaces and coordinate interface agreements with interface partners.
Why GAO Did This Study

Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Army's program for solving its year 2000 computer system problem, focusing on the: (1) status of the Army's efforts to identify and correct its systems; and (2) appropriateness of the Army's strategy and actions to remediate its year 2000 problems.

What GAO Found

GAO noted that: (1) the Army relies on computer systems for virtually every aspect of its operations including strategic and tactical operations, sophisticated weaponry, and routine business functions; (2) failure to successfully address the year 2000 problem in time could severely degrade or disable Army mission-critical operations; (3) the Army has taken many positive actions to increase awareness, promote sharing of information, and encourage components to make year 2000 remediation efforts a high priority; (4) it has also enlisted the services of the Army Audit Agency, the Army Inspector General, and various contractors to help evaluate component needs and identify areas that could impact the successful completion of the Army's Year 2000 program; (5) it lacks key management and oversight controls to enforce good management practices, direct resources, and establish a complete picture of its progress in remediating systems; (6) for example, at the time of GAO's review, the Army: (a) did not have complete and accurate information on systems, interfaces, and the costs and progress of remediation efforts; (b) had not completed interface agreements and contingency plans; and (c) had not determined how much testing capacity was needed and available; (7) each of these problems seriously endangers the Army's chances of successfully meeting the year 2000 deadline for mission-critical systems; (8) for example, without good status and cost information, the Army cannot effectively: (a) ensure that all its mission-critical systems are being corrected; (b) identify areas where additional resources are needed; (c) ensure that year 2000 errors are not propagated from one organization to another; or (d) assess whether systems have been certified as compliant; (9) without prompt attention to interface agreements and contingency plans, there is an increased risk that key interfaces will not work and that core business processes will be adversely impacted; (10) without knowing at the department level how much testing capacity is needed and available, the Army will not be able to help acquire additional resources in the event that insufficient capacity is available to meet its needs; (11) together, these problems greatly increase the risk of failure of some mission-critical systems and operations unless corrective actions are taken; and (12) Army officials recognize that improvements in the year 2000 program are needed and have recently taken actions directed at ensuring that the year 2000 does not pose a threat to the Army's ability to execute its mission.