	Introduction

Russian President Vladimir Putin appears to have made a strategic decision to reorient Russiannational security policy from a posture of antagonism, if not hostility, toward the United States andits allies, to a policy of more cooperation with the United States and the West. Among the more notable results of this shift in Russian national security policy were: Russia's political and military cooperation with the U.S. campaign against the Taliban regime in Afghanistan,including U.S. military deployments in former Soviet states in Central Asia; Moscow's decision toclose its electronic intelligence base in Cuba; and the softening (nearly to the point of abandonmentin some cases) of Russia's previously tough positions on NATO enlargement, the ABM Treaty,missile defense, and strategic nuclear force reductions. Primakov viewed China, India, and Iran askey partners and sought support among other states that opposed U.S. policy and/or resented U.S.power. Putin responded publicly with praise for the new and untested U.S. President. The new dominant issue would be cooperation against international terrorism. Reasons for the New Policy

If Putin really has fundamentally reoriented Russian policy toward cooperation and integration with the West, one may well ask why. As the shift in Russian national security policy became evident in 2001, some in the United States saw it as a short-term tactical response to the September 11 attacks and their aftermath. Those who see the new Russian policy as a strategic decision argue that the numerous changes of position that Putin has made on major issues in relations with the United States are cumulativelyso substantial that they seem too high a price to pay in exchange for some short-term tacticalobjective(s). The change in Russia's strategic relationship with China may also fall into this category. (48)
After September 11, the Bush Administration substantially reduced, although it did not entirely stop, its criticism of Russian human rights abuses in Chechnya. (50)
The Bush Administration has been more forthcoming in addressing what Putin says is his top priority, Russian economic interests. Both countriesexcoriate Al Qaeda and like-minded radical Islamic movements. That leaves missile defense as the principal item remaining from the old strategic arms controlagenda. (81) He alsopledged cooperation with Russia's energy transportation infrastructure. Political support for this idea, however, mightbe adversely affected by Russia's reported plan to build more nuclear reactors in Iran. Beijing and Moscow continue toproclaim good will and harmonious relations between them. Some supporters of U.S. policy toward Russia contend that Putin's repeated concessions to U.S. positions and acceptance of faits accomplis , acknowledging U.S. force majeure , confirmthecorrectness of that policy - that there was, and is, no need to make undue concessions to Moscow,because Russia has no choice but to go along with the United States, due to Russia's weaknessvis-a-vis the United States and because of Russia's objective need to join the western world, on theWest's terms. Others reply that to the extent that there is a danger of Putin's pro-western policies being reversed, it will hinge not on whether the United States and the West reward Russia, but on whetherPutin's domestic economic policies succeed. After all, these observers contend, Putin's fundamentalrationale is that Russia must integrate with the West in order to reconstruct its economy and achievea decent living standard for its people.
Russian President Putin appears to have made a strategic decision to shift Russian policy toward cooperation with the United States and the West. This is a major departure from the policy that Putininherited from his predecessors, which saw Russia as the leader of a coalition aimed at opposing U.S."global domination."
Putin seized upon the events of September 11 to promote his new policy by: cooperating with the United States against Al Qaeda and the Taliban regime in Afghanistan; softening Russianopposition to NATO enlargement, including admission of former Soviet republics, and establishinga new cooperative relationship with NATO; acquiescing in U.S. decisions regarding withdrawal fromthe ABM Treaty, strategic nuclear force reductions, and missile defense; and closing Russia's largemilitary intelligence base in Cuba.
The principal reason given by Putin for the new policy is that Russia must integrate with the West in order to reconstruct its own economy and achieve a decent living standard for its people. Putin also acknowledges Russia's weakness and inability to act globally in opposition to the UnitedStates. He may also have rejected as unwise, the previous policy of de facto alliance with Chinaagainst the United States, instead seeing China as a possible long-term threat to Russia. Putin's new policy does not seem to enjoy strong support among Russian political elites, the military and foreignpolicy establishment, and the general public. Putin's overall political power and prestige, however,may be sufficient to sustain the policy.
The Bush Administration responded positively to the new Russian policy after September 11. The Administration, however, did not make many concessions on key issues related to arms control,missile defense, and NATO. It has been more forthcoming on some economic issues.
The implications of Russia's pro-western policy are overwhelmingly positive for the United States in the war on terrorism and in relations with Russia and China. Russia's strategic choice ofintegration with the West reduces the danger seen by some of Russo-Chinese cooperation againstthe United States. By depriving China of its erstwhile Russian partner, it may encourage China toseek improved relations with the United States - or risk geostrategic isolation.
Some sore points remain between Washington and Moscow in which Congress takes a strong interest, such as Russia's continued and possibly expanded plans to construct nuclear reactors in Iran,its support of Iraq, and its heavy-handed policy in Chechnya. There is also friction on some tradeissues.
Critics of Bush Administration policy argue that it has not been sufficiently responsive to Putin and risks losing the new cooperativeness. Others reply that Russia has no choice but to continue itspro-western course, in view of Russia's weakness and its self-interest in integrating with the West. In this view, the endurance of Russia's pro-western policy ultimately may depend on Putin's successin reviving the economy and improving Russians' well-being.