It requires CSBs to  include the appropriate service acquisition executive as chair and  include representatives from USD (AT&L), the Chief of Staff for the  armed forces, representatives from other armed forces as  appropriate, the Joint Staff, the comptroller of the military department,  the military deputy to the service acquisition executive, the program  executive officer for the program concerned, and others as  appropriate;    prevent unnecessary changes to programs that could have an  adverse impact on program cost or schedule, mitigate adverse cost  and schedule effects of changes that may be required, and ensure  that each program delivers as much planned capability as possible at  or below the planned cost and schedule;  review and approve or disapprove any proposed changes to program  requirements or system configuration with the potential to adversely  affect cost and schedule; and  review and recommend proposals that could reduce requirements and  improve cost and schedule. The Air Force and Navy did not fully comply with the requirement  to hold annual CSB meetings for all major defense acquisition programs  in 2010; the Army did comply. In total, the military departments held an  annual CSB meeting for 74 of 96 major defense acquisition programs  they managed in 2010. According to our survey results, when the military  departments held CSB meetings, 19 programs endorsed requirements or  configuration changes. In most of these cases, strategies were developed  to mitigate any effect on a program’s cost and schedule—a key provision  in the statute and DOD policy. However, key acquisition and requirements  personnel were often absent from Air Force and Navy CSB meetings  when these issues were discussed. Two Major Defense Acquisition Programs Are Not Covered By The CSB Statute

Two major defense acquisition programs—the Ballistic Missile Defense  System (BMDS) and the Chemical Demilitarization-Assembled Chemical  Weapons Alternatives programs, which are managed by DOD  components rather than military departments—are not subject to the CSB  provisions in statute because the statute only applies to major defense  acquisition programs overseen by the military departments. CSB Meetings Had Some Positive Effects on Programs’ Efforts to Control Requirements and Costs

Individual programs varied in the extent to which they utilized CSBs to  control requirements and mitigate cost and schedule risks. According to  our survey results, the majority of CSB meetings neither reviewed  requirement changes nor discussed options to reduce requirements or  the scope of programs. We found a number of instances in which CSB  meetings were effective in mitigating the effect of necessary changes,  rejecting other changes, facilitating discussion of requirements, and  endorsing descoping options with the potential to improve or preserve  cost or schedule. In an effort  to increase descoping proposals, the Army and Air Force have issued  additional descoping guidance and set savings or budget targets. To  further increase effectiveness and efficiency of CSBs, some of the military  departments have taken steps to coordinate CSB meetings among  programs that provide similar capabilities and align CSB meetings with  other significant reviews. Program managers may be reluctant to recommend descoping options to  moderate requirements during a CSB meeting because of cultural biases  about the role of a program manager, a preference not to elevate  decisions to higher levels of review, and concerns that future funding will  be cut. CSBs’ Effects Differ for Programs in Development and Production

The types of discussions for which CSBs were useful changed based on  whether programs were in development or production. Recommendations for Executive Action

We recommend that the Secretary of Defense take the following seven  actions directing:  the Navy to amend its policy on CSBs to ensure that all statutorily  required participants, particularly the Joint Staff, are included;  the MDA to amend its policy to ensure that all statutorily required  participants for military department CSBs are included in MDA’s  Program Change Board, particularly the Joint Staff, if it is to serve as  an equivalent review;    USD (AT&L) to amend its acquisition instruction to:    ensure that all statutorily required participants, in particular the  comptroller, are included on CSBs;  require CSB meetings for major defense acquisition programs in  production as well as development but also coordinate with the  military departments and the Congress to evaluate the  effectiveness of CSB meetings for programs well into production;  and    develop the means to better track CSBs and ensure compliance  with the requirement that CSBs hold a meeting at least once each  year;    USD (AT&L) to work with DOD components to determine whether  paper CSBs are as effective as in-person meetings and, if not, amend  the acquisition instruction accordingly; and    DOD components to amend their policies to encourage alignment  between CSB meetings and other complementary reviews whenever  possible. In its  comments, DOD concurred or partially concurred with all seven of our  recommendations and agreed to take action to address six of them. This report  presents information on all of these programs.
Why GAO Did This Study

GAO has previously reported that requirements changes are factors in poor cost and schedule outcomes on Department of Defense (DOD) weapon programs. In 2007, DOD introduced Configuration Steering Boards (CSBs) to review requirement and configuration changes that could adversely affect programs. In 2008, Congress made annual CSB meetings a requirement for all of the military departments' major defense acquisition programs. In response to the Senate report accompanying the bill for the Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011, GAO assessed (1) the extent to which DOD has complied with the statutory requirements for CSBs, and (2) the extent to which CSBs have been effective in controlling requirements and mitigating cost and schedule risks. To conduct this work, GAO surveyed DOD's major defense acquisition programs, reviewed CSB documentation, and interviewed relevant military service and program officials.

What GAO Found

The military departments varied in their compliance with the CSB requirements in statute. The Air Force and Navy did not fully comply with the requirement to hold annual CSB meetings for all major defense acquisition programs in 2010, while the Army did. In total, the military departments held an annual CSB meeting for 74 of 96 major defense acquisition programs they managed in 2010. According to GAO's survey results, when the military departments held CSB meetings, 19 programs endorsed requirements or configuration changes. In most of these cases, strategies were developed to mitigate the effects of these changes--a key provision in the statute and DOD policy. However, key acquisition and requirements personnel were often absent from Air Force and Navy CSB meetings when these issues were discussed. Two major defense acquisition programs--the Ballistic Missile Defense System and the Chemical Demilitarization-Assembled Chemical Weapons Alternatives programs--are not subject to the CSB provisions in statute because the statute only applies to programs overseen by military departments; the programs are managed by other DOD components. These programs are subject to DOD's CSB policy, which differs from the statute in that it only requires major defense acquisition programs that are in development to hold annual CSB reviews. Individual programs varied in the extent to which they utilized CSBs to control requirements and mitigate cost and schedule risks. According to GAO's survey results, the majority of CSB meetings neither reviewed requirement changes nor discussed options to moderate requirements or reduce the scope of programs. There were a number of specific instances where CSB meetings were effective in mitigating the effect of necessary changes, rejecting other changes, facilitating discussion of requirements, and endorsing "descoping" options with the potential to improve or preserve cost or schedule. However, in response to a survey, program officials cast some doubts about the effectiveness of CSBs, and in interviews, acquisition officials indicated that program managers may be reluctant to recommend descoping options due to cultural biases that encourage meeting warfighters' stated needs rather than achieving cost savings, a preference not to elevate decisions to higher levels of review, and concerns that future funding may be cut if potential savings are identified. In response, the Army and Air Force have issued additional descoping guidance and set savings or budget targets. The types of discussions for which CSBs were useful changed based on whether programs were in development or production. Development programs found them more useful to consider requirements changes and descoping options, and production programs found CSBs more useful to prevent changes. In an effort to further increase effectiveness and efficiency of CSBs, some of the military departments have taken steps to coordinate CSB meetings among programs that provide similar capabilities and align CSB meetings with other significant reviews. Among GAO's recommendations for DOD components are that they amend their CSB policies to be consistent with statute and align CSBs with other reviews when possible. In comments on a draft of this report, DOD concurred or partially concurred with all seven of GAO's recommendations and agreed to take action to address six of them.