A key element of this strategy is the establishment  of the National Infrastructure Protection Center (NIPC) as “a national focal  point” for gathering information on threats and providing the principal  means of facilitating the federal government’s response to computer-based  incidents. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

Our objectives were to evaluate the progress that the NIPC has made in  developing national capabilities regarding cyber threats for analyzing  threat and vulnerability data and issuing warnings;   enhancing its capabilities for responding to cyber attacks; and  outreach and sharing information with government and private-sector  entities, including the progress made regarding the InfraGard Program  and development of the key asset database. Conclusions

While the NIPC has taken some steps to develop analysis and warning  capabilities, the strategic capabilities described in PDD 63 have not been  achieved. Conclusions

The NIPC has provided important support in increasing the FBI’s ability to  investigate computer crimes by coordinating investigations and providing  technical assistance. The NIPC has also developed crisis management  procedures and drafted an emergency law enforcement sector plan, which  is currently being reviewed by sector members. Conclusions

The NIPC’s information-sharing relationships are still evolving and will  probably have limited effectiveness until reporting procedures and  thresholds are defined and trust relationships are established.
Why GAO Did This Study

To better protect the nation's critical computer-dependent infrastructures from computer-based attacks and disruption, the President issued Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 63 in 1998. The directive established the National Infrastructure Protection Center as a national focal point for gathering information on threats and facilitating the federal government's response to computer-based incidents. This report evaluates the center's progress in (1) developing national capabilities for analyzing cyber threat and vulnerability data and issuing warnings, (2) enhancing its capabilities for responding to cyber attacks, and (3) developing outreach and information-sharing initiatives with government and private-sector entities.

What GAO Found

GAO found that although the center has taken some steps to develop analysis and warning capabilities, the strategic capabilities described in PDD 63 have not been achieved. The center has provided important support to the Federal Bureau of Investigation's investigations of computer crimes by coordinating investigations and providing technical assistance. The center has also developed crisis management procedures and drafted an emergency law enforcement sector plan, which is now being reviewed by sector members. The center's information-sharing relationships are still evolving and will probably have limited effectiveness until reporting procedures and thresholds are defined and trust relationships are established.