Strategic airlift moves cargo and  passengers between the continental United States and overseas theaters or  between overseas theaters. The Extent to Which AMC Used Capacity as Efficiently as Possible on Strategic Military Aircraft Cannot Be Readily Ascertained

Because AMC does not systematically collect and analyze operational  factors that impact payloads on individual missions, DOD does not know  how often it met its secondary goal to use aircraft capacity as efficiently as  possible. In the absence of data about operational  factors that impact payloads on individual missions, we calculated the  average payloads for each type of strategic aircraft and compared these to  the payload planning factors. However, because AMC lacks data to determine  how operational factors impact payloads, we are not able to determine  whether these payloads indicate efficient use of an aircraft’s capacity. Historical Mission Planning Files Have Limitations That Prevent Their Use to Determine Whether AMC Used Aircraft Capacity as Efficiently as Possible

Historical mission planning files identify mission data and operational  factors that may impact aircraft payloads, but we found limitations with  using these files to determine whether AMC used an aircraft’s capacity as  efficiently as possible. Missions  that did not meet minimum requirements for strategic airlift carried an  average of about 5 short tons of cargo and 26 passengers. We found that aircraft payloads for OEF  and OIF were, on average, less than historical average payloads. In general, in the absence of information about operational factors that  could explain why heavier payloads were not transported, command  officials do not know whether and where opportunities existed to use an  aircraft’s capacity more efficiently or if there is the opportunity to reduce  operational tempo, costs, and wear and tear on aircraft. Conclusions

Because DOD emphasizes delivering the “right items to the right place at  the right time” over the efficient use of an aircraft’s capacity, AMC has a  reason for underutilizing aircraft capacity on some missions. Recommendations for Executive Action

To help officials determine whether they used an aircraft’s capacity as  efficiently as possible and improve the reliability and completeness of data  on operational factors that can impact payloads, we recommend that the  Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Air Force to direct the  Commander, Air Mobility Command, to take the following two actions:  Revise and clarify relevant data fields in GATES, and work with DOD  entities that support other transportation information systems, such as  the Global Transportation Network and service deployment systems, to  capture comprehensive, well-defined data on operational factors that  impact payloads for individual missions, and require supervisors to  review these data fields for accuracy. As a result, AMC officials try not to use C-5 aircraft at this and  similar locations unless C-17 aircraft are not available.
Why GAO Did This Study

Airlift is a flexible, but expensive, transportation method. From September 2001 to April 2005, the Department of Defense (DOD) has spent about $9.5 billion using airlift to transport equipment, supplies, and troops for Operations Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Iraqi Freedom (OIF). As of December 2004, airlift accounted for about 13 percent of all cargo and passengers transported for these operations. DOD has stated that high demand for available airlift assets requires the department to use airlift assets as efficiently as possible. However, DOD's primary objective emphasizes delivering "the right items to the right place at the right time" over using aircraft capacity as efficiently as possible. Under the Comptroller General's authority, GAO sought to determine whether DOD used capacity on strategic military aircraft transporting cargo and passengers between the United States and overseas theaters for OEF and OIF as efficiently as possible.

What GAO Found

Because the Air Mobility Command (AMC), which is the Air Force agency responsible for managing airlift, does not systematically collect and analyze operational factors that impact payloads on individual missions, DOD does not know how often it met its secondary goal to use aircraft capacity as efficiently as possible. AMC collects data about short tons transported and information about operational factors, such as weather and runway length, when planning and executing airlift missions. AMC does not capture data about these variables in a manner that allows officials to determine historically whether aircraft capacity was used efficiently. Historical mission planning files and the Global Air Transportation Execution System that is used to track mission data could provide some information about operational factors that affect mission payloads, but limitations associated with these data sources do not allow officials to determine whether DOD used aircraft capacity as efficiently as possible. In the absence of data about operational factors that impact payloads on specific missions, GAO calculated the average payloads for each type of strategic aircraft and compared these to historical average payloads, known as payload planning factors. GAO found that over 97 percent of C-5 missions and more than 81 percent of C-17 missions carried payloads below DOD's payload planning factors. However, because data on operational factors that impact payloads were not available, GAO was not able to determine whether these payloads indicate efficient use of aircraft capacity. Without adequate information about operational variables and how these impact mission payloads, AMC officials do not know the extent to which opportunities exist to use aircraft more efficiently and whether operational tempo, cost, and wear and tear on aircraft could be reduced. In addition, DOD officials do not have the benefit of such analysis to determine future airlift requirements for planning purposes.