Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

This report (1) discusses the aggregate capabilities of the military services to provide close support and the extent to which those capabilities continue to be modernized and enhanced and (2) evaluates the processes the Department of Defense (DOD) uses to assess mission needs, capabilities, and modernization proposals for the close support mission. The Marine Corps also upgraded its AV-8B Harrier aircraft used primarily for CAS. The Army plans to field Crusader in fiscal year 2005. A Comprehensive Assessment of Joint Close Support Mission Needs and Existing Capabilities Is Needed

DOD’s current assessment processes do not yield the information that the Secretary of Defense needs to weigh the merits of service-generated weapons acquisition and modernization proposals for the close support mission. Based on this perspective, the services have focused on unique mission needs or unique weapons system capabilities. Moreover, although a new process for assessing joint warfighting capabilities was introduced in 1994, a separate assessment of joint close support needs and capabilities has not yet been made. This is important because the Air Force plans to spend about $547 million to upgrade 623 fixed wing aircraft specifically for CAS.
Why GAO Did This Study

GAO reviewed the military services' plans to upgrade their close support weapons capabilities, focusing on the processes the Department of Defense (DOD) uses to assess mission needs, capabilities, and modernization proposals for the close support mission.

What GAO Found

GAO found that: (1) over the next 6 years, the Army plans to spend nearly $5.5 billion to develop and field more modern target acquisition systems, the Marine Corps plans to spend $3.2 billion to remanufacture AV-8B aircraft, and the Air Force plans to spend over $547 million to upgrade its target acquisition and night operations capabilities; (2) DOD has not determined the appropriate number and type of weapons needed for the joint close support mission; (3) the services have taken actions to enhance their close support capabilities without adequately considering the capabilities of other weapons systems; (4) although DOD instituted a joint warfighting capabilities assessment process in 1994, a separate assessment of the close support mission has not yet been made; and (5) without a comprehensive assessment of joint mission needs, DOD cannot decide which modernization proposals should be funded.