Both CENTCOM and the services have  issued predeployment training requirements. Some of CENTCOM’s Training Requirements Do Not Clearly Define Conditions and Standards, and Confusion Exists over to Whom the Requirements Apply

CENTCOM has issued a list of training tasks that all individuals assigned  to its area of responsibility, including support unit personnel, must  complete before deploying in support of ongoing operations in Iraq and  Afghanistan. The Services Are Providing Training on Most of CENTCOM’s Required Tasks, but Have Not Included Certain Tasks

While the Army and Marine Corps have provided most of the CENTCOM  required training, in some cases, they have not provided training on the  specific tasks called for by CENTCOM. However, without visibility over the completion of remediation, Army and  Marine Corps support forces may not successfully complete all CENTCOM  or service required training tasks prior to deploying. CENTCOM and the Services Lack Complete Information on Servicemembers’ Completion of Required Combat Skills Training

The Army and Marine Corps take steps to document the completion of  required combat skills training tasks, but face inconsistencies in the way  the services track completion of training. While the Army issued guidance requiring tracking of training completion  through a servicewide system, the system has not been fully utilized. The Marine Corps also uses inconsistent approaches to track completion  of required training and relies instead on paper rosters and stand-alone  spreadsheets for tracking. There is no clearly defined process for waiving these training  requirements, and there is no clear or established method for the services  to report to CENTCOM that some servicemembers are not completing  CENTCOM’s required training. The Army and Marine Corps Have Made Significant Changes to Combat Skills Training as a Result of Lessons Learned, but Information Concerning These Changes Is Not Being Consistently Shared

The Army and Marine Corps have made significant changes to their  combat skills training for support forces as a result of lessons learned, but  the services have not uniformly applied lessons learned. Army and Marine Corps doctrine require the formal  collection of lessons learned and designate after action reports as the  primary vehicle for this formal collecting of lessons learned information. While the services  have formal and informal means to facilitate the sharing of lessons learned  information, trainers at the various training sites are not consistently  sharing information about the changes they have made to their training  programs. As a result, servicemembers are trained inconsistently and units  that are deploying for similar missions sometimes receive different types  and amounts of training. Conclusions

U.S. forces deployed to CENTCOM’s area of responsibility, including  support forces, are operating in an environment that lacks clear  distinctions between the front lines and rear support areas. As a result,  support units such as military police, engineers, and medical personnel  may be exposed to hostile fire and other battlefield conditions. clearly outline the conditions under which CENTCOM’s mandatory  training requirements are to be accomplished and the standards to  which the tasks should be trained. To improve commanders’ visibility over the extent to which support forces  are completing required combat skills training, we recommend that the  Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Army to fully implement  the service’s system of record for tracking training completion—the  Digital Training Management System by (1) developing a schedule for fully  implementing the system, including the work to be performed and the  resources to be used, and (2) including the actual start and completion  dates of work activities performed so that the impact of deviations on  future work can be proactively addressed. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

To assess the extent to which Army and Marine Corps support forces are  completing required combat skills training, we reviewed combatant  commander and service individual and unit predeployment training  requirements, including CENTCOM’s Theater Entry Requirements, the U.S.  Army Forces Command’s Predeployment Training Guidance for Follow-on  Forces Deploying In Support of Southwest Asia, and Marine Corps Order  3502.6, Marine Corps Force Generation Process. We reviewed the means these organizations use to  document the extent to which servicemembers were completing required  training—paper records, automated spreadsheets, and databases.
Why GAO Did This Study

In conventional warfare, support forces such as military police, engineers, and medical personnel normally operate behind the front lines of a battlefield. But in Iraq and Afghanistan--both in U.S. Central Command's (CENTCOM) area of responsibility--there is no clear distinction between front lines and rear areas, and support forces are sometimes exposed to hostile fire without help from combat arms units. The House report to the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2010 directed GAO to report on combat skills training for support forces. GAO assessed the extent to which (1) Army and Marine Corps support forces are completing required combat skills training; (2) the services and CENTCOM have information to validate completion of required training; and (3) the services have used lessons learned to adjust combat skills training for support forces. To do so, GAO analyzed current training requirements, documentation of training completion, and lessons learned guidance; observed support force training; and interviewed headquarters officials, trainers, and trainees between August 2009 and February 2010.

What GAO Found

Army and Marine Corps support forces undergo significant combat skills training, but additional actions could help clarify CENTCOM's training requirements, ensure the services fully incorporate those requirements into their training requirements, and improve the consistency of training that is being conducted. CENTCOM has issued a list of training tasks to be completed, in addition to the services' training requirements, before deploying to its area of operations. However, there is confusion over which forces the CENTCOM requirements apply to, the conditions under which the tasks are to be trained, and the standards for successfully completing the training. As a result, interpretations of the requirements vary and some trainees receive detailed, hands-on training for a particular task while others simply observe a demonstration of the task. In addition, while the Army and Marine Corps are training their forces on most of CENTCOM's required tasks, servicemembers are not being trained on some required tasks prior to deploying. While units collect information on the completion of training tasks, additional actions would help higher level decision-makers assess the readiness of deploying units and servicemembers. Currently, both CENTCOM and the services lack complete information on the extent to which Army and Marine Corps support forces are completing required combat skills training. The Army has recently designated the Digital Training Management System as its system of record for tracking the completion of required training, but guidance concerning system implementation is unclear and the system lacks some needed capabilities. As a result, support forces are not fully utilizing the system, and are inconsistently tracking completion of individual and unit training using paper records, stand-alone spreadsheets, and other automated systems. The Marine Corps also uses inconsistent approaches to document training completion. Furthermore, as GAO reported in May 2008, CENTCOM does not have a clearly defined waiver process to provide visibility over the extent to which personnel are deploying to its area of operations without having completed its required training tasks. As a result, CENTCOM and the services have limited visibility over the extent to which servicemembers have or have not completed all required training. While trainers at Army and Marine Corps training sites have applied lessons learned information and made significant changes to the combat skills training they provide support forces, the changes to training have varied across sites. Army and Marine Corps doctrine requires the collection of after action reports, the primary formal vehicle for collecting lessons learned. Lessons are also shared informally, such as through communication between deployed forces and units training to replace them. While the services have these formal and informal means to facilitate the sharing of lessons learned information, trainers at the various training sites are not consistently sharing information about the changes they have made to their training programs. As a result, servicemembers are trained inconsistently and units that are deploying for similar missions sometimes receive different types and amounts of training.