DOD Has Not Effectively Managed and Overseen the Acquisition and Deployment of DRRS

DOD has not effectively managed and overseen the acquisition and  deployment of DRRS in accordance with a number of key program  management disciplines that are recognized in DOD acquisition policies  and guidance, along with other relevant guidance, and are fundamental to  delivering a system that performs as intended on time and within budget. In particular, DRRS requirements have not been effectively developed and  managed, and DRRS testing has not been adequately performed and  managed. Further, DRRS has not been guided by a reliable schedule of the  work needed to be performed and the key activities and events that need  to occur. These program management weaknesses can be attributed in  part to long-standing limitations in program office staffing and oversight. Specifically, key users  have only recently become fully engaged in developing requirements, and  requirements have been experiencing considerable change and are not yet  stable. Until April 2009, DRRS was not subject to any of DOD’s established  mechanisms and processes for overseeing information technology  systems. This absence of effective oversight  has contributed to a void in program accountability and limited prospects  for program success. Some DRRS Features Are Operational but Are Not Fully Consistent with Legislative Requirements and DOD Guidance

DOD has implemented DRRS features that allow users to report certain  mission capabilities that were not reported under the legacy system, but  these features are not fully consistent with legislative requirements and  DOD guidance; and DOD has not yet implemented other envisioned  features of the system. In addition, DRRS has not fully addressed the challenges  with metrics that were identified prior to 1999 when Congress required  DOD to establish a new readiness reporting system. Users have also noted  that DRRS lacks some of the current and historical data and connectivity  with DOD’s planning systems necessary to manage and deploy forces. DOD Is Providing Congress with DRRS Capability Data from the Combatant Commands, but Services Have Not Consistently Reported Capability Data

The geographic combatant commands are capturing enhanced capability  data in DRRS, and DOD’s quarterly readiness reports to Congress  currently contain this information, as well as information that is drawn  from DOD’s legacy readiness reporting system, GSORTS. However, the  military services have not consistently used the enhanced capability  reporting features of DRRS. Because DRRS does not yet fully interface  with legacy systems to allow single reporting of readiness data, the Army  and Navy developed additional system interfaces and are reporting in  DRRS. While some Marine Corps units are reporting their capabilities in DRRS,  the Marine Corps had not yet directed its units to report in the system as  of May 2009. However, after investing about 7 years and about $96.5 million in  developing and implementing DRRS, the system’s schedule has been  extended, requirements are not stable, and the system still does not meet  congressional and DOD requirements for a comprehensive readiness  reporting system to assess readiness and help decision makers manage  forces needed to conduct combat and contingency operations around the  world. Recommendations for Executive Action

To address the risks facing DOD in its acquisition and deployment of  DRRS, and to increase the chances of DRRS meeting the needs of the DOD  readiness community and Congress, we recommend that the Secretary of  Defense direct the Deputy Secretary of Defense, as the Chair of the  Defense Business Systems Management Committee, to reconsider the  committee’s recent approval of DRRS planned investment for fiscal years  2009 and 2010, and convene the Defense Business Systems Management  Committee to review the program’s past performance and the DIO’s  capability to manage and deliver DRRS going forward. We did not evaluate the department’s overall ability to assess the readiness  of its forces or the extent that data contained in any of its readiness  reporting systems, including DRRS and the Global Status of Resources and  Training System (GSORTS), reflect capabilities, deficiencies,  vulnerabilities, or performance issues. Specifically, (1) the test events for already acquired, as well as currently  deployed and operating, DRRS releases and subreleases were not based on  well-defined plans, and test events have not been fully executed in  accordance with plans or executed in a verifiable manner, or both; (2) the  results of executed test events have not been captured and used to ensure  that problems discovered were disclosed to decision makers and  ultimately corrected; and (3) the DIO has not established an effective test  management structure to include, for example, a clear assignment of test  management roles and responsibilities, or a reliable schedule of planned  test events.
Why GAO Did This Study

The Department of Defense (DOD) reports data about the operational readiness of its forces. In 1999, Congress directed DOD to create a comprehensive readiness system with timely, objective, and accurate data. In response, DOD started to develop the Defense Readiness Reporting System (DRRS). After 7 years, DOD has incrementally fielded some capabilities, and, through fiscal year 2008, reported obligating about $96.5 million. GAO was asked to review the program including the extent that DOD has (1) effectively managed and overseen DRRS acquisition and deployment and (2) implemented features of DRRS consistent with legislative requirements and DOD guidance. GAO compared DRRS acquisition disciplines, such as requirements development, test management, and DRRS oversight activities, to DOD and related guidance, and reviewed the system's current and intended capabilities relative to legislative requirements and DOD guidance. We did not evaluate DOD's overall ability to assess force readiness or the extent that readiness data reflects capabilities, vulnerabilities, or performance issues.

What GAO Found

DOD has not effectively managed and overseen the DRRS acquisition and deployment, in large part because of the absence of rigorous and disciplined acquisition management controls and an effective governance and accountability structure for the program. In particular, system requirements have not been effectively developed and managed. For example, user participation and input in the requirements development process was, until recently, limited, and requirements have been experiencing considerable change, are not yet stable, and have not been effectively controlled. In addition, system testing has not been adequately performed and managed. For example, test events for already acquired system increments, as well as currently deployed and operating increments, were not based on well-defined plans or structures, and test events have not been executed in accordance with plans or in a verifiable manner. Moreover, DRRS has not been guided by a reliable schedule of work to be performed and key activities to occur. These program management weaknesses can, in part, be attributed to long-standing limitations in program office staffing and program oversight and accountability. Despite being a DOD-wide program, until April, 2009 DRRS was not accountable to a DOD-wide oversight body, and it was not subject to DOD's established mechanisms and processes for overseeing business systems. Collectively, these acquisition management weaknesses have contributed to a program that has fallen well short of expectations, and is unlikely to meet future expectations. DOD has implemented DRRS features that allow users to report certain mission capabilities that were not reported under the legacy system, but these features are not fully consistent with legislative requirements and DOD guidance; and DOD has not yet implemented other features. The geographic combatant commands are currently reporting their capabilities to execute most of their operations and major war plans in DRRS, and DOD is reporting this additional information to Congress. However, because DRRS does not yet fully interface with legacy systems to allow single reporting of readiness data, the military services have not consistently used DRRS's enhanced capability reporting features. For example, as of May 2009, the Army and Navy had developed interfaces for reporting in DRRS, while the Marine Corps required units to only report in their legacy system. Recently, the Marine Corps also began developing an interface and has done limited reporting in DRRS. In addition, DRRS has not fully addressed the challenges with metrics that led Congress to require a new readiness reporting system. DRRS metrics are less objective and precise, and no more timely than the legacy system metrics. Users have also noted that DRRS lacks some of the current and historical data and connectivity with DOD's planning systems necessary to manage and deploy forces. Until these limitations are fully addressed, DRRS will not have the full complement of features necessary to meet legislative and DOD requirements, and users will need to rely on legacy reporting systems to support mission-critical decisions.