Mechanisms to Integrate DHS Analysis Activities to Support Departmental Intelligence Priorities Are Not Functioning as Intended but Help Reduce Overlap and Duplication

DHS has established mechanisms—including a governance board,  intelligence framework, and analysis planning process—intended to better  integrate analysis activities across the enterprise and help ensure that  activities support strategic departmental intelligence priorities. Specifically, we identified two  gaps in the implementation of these mechanisms that limit DHS’s  assurance that component analytic activities support strategic  departmental intelligence priorities:
The Framework does not establish strategic departmental  priorities: The Framework does not establish strategic departmental  intelligence priorities that can be used to inform annual intelligence  planning decisions—such as what analytic activities to pursue and  what level of investment to make, as called for in DHS guidance. According to I&A officials, it can be challenging for components  to focus on both overall strategic departmental intelligence priorities and  their more tactical intelligence priorities that support their specific  operations and component customers. Customers Reported Mixed Views on the Usefulness of I&A Products and Services; I&A Is Taking Steps to Better Understand Customers’ Analytic Support Needs

Results from customer feedback surveys that are attached to I&A  intelligence products indicate general satisfaction with these products, but  the results have limitations that prevent I&A from drawing readership-wide  conclusions. Our discussions with representatives of I&A’s five customer  groups indicate that customers in two groups—DHS leadership and state  and local officials at fusion centers—found I&A’s products to be useful,  while customers in the other three groups—DHS components, the  Intelligence Community, and private critical infrastructure sectors— generally did not. Selected Officials from Two of I&A’s Five Customer Groups Said Products Were Useful, and Officials from Four of the Five Groups Said Other Types of Analytic Services Were Useful

According to I&A’s strategic plan, because of resource constraints and  other factors, I&A gives priority in its intelligence analysis efforts to the  needs of DHS leadership and state and local customers. I&A has deployed analysts to fusion centers on a limited basis. To support this assessment, and in  response to our September 2012 report, I&A initiated a survey in March  2014 to gain a better understanding of its customers’ satisfaction with and  use of I&A intelligence products and services.survey covers the types of I&A products the customers read in 2013,  including finished intelligence and current intelligence (e.g., alerts and   Among other things, the  warnings); the extent to which the products were useful in informing  actions and decisions, such as in making resource investments; and  satisfaction with I&A services, such as threat briefings and tradecraft  assistance. I&A Has Taken Steps to Address Challenges It Faces in Maintaining a Skilled Workforce, but Assessing Results Could Help Strengthen Future Human Capital Efforts

		I&A Has Taken Steps to Address Challenges Related to Recruiting, Hiring, and Professional Development

I&A has faced human capital challenges in recruiting and hiring the skilled  workforce it needs and providing training and professional development  opportunities that keep morale high and attrition low. Specifically,  according to I&A’s recruitment strategy, I&A’s hiring authority under  competitive service put it at a disadvantage compared with other  organizations that were able to process hiring actions more quickly and   For  offer career advantages associated with excepted service status. I&A has also faced challenges in providing professional development  opportunities for its workforce, and experienced low morale scores and  high rates of attrition, particularly among its lower-level analysts. According to I&A officials, these mechanisms are not in place because  I&A leadership was focused on other priorities. Consistent with this guidance, establishing  mechanisms to monitor and evaluate workforce efforts, such as changes  to I&A’s hiring authority and grade levels restructuring, could help the  Office of Analysis determine if the efforts are achieving their intended  results. In addition, using the results from these evaluations to determine  any need for changes will help ensure that I&A is making sound  workforce decisions. Recommendations for Executive Action

To help ensure that the intelligence analysis activities and resources  throughout the enterprise align to an integrated set of strategic  departmental intelligence priorities, we recommend that the Under  Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis, Homeland Security take the  following two actions: establish strategic departmental intelligence priorities in the Homeland  Security Intelligence Priorities Framework that can be used to guide  annual enterprise planning efforts, including intelligence analysis and  resource management and ensure that once strategic departmental intelligence priorities are  established, the Framework is used to inform the planned analytic  activities of the DHS Intelligence Enterprise, as articulated in the  Program of Analysis. With regard to the third recommendation, that I&A establish mechanisms  to monitor and evaluate workforce initiatives and use results to determine  any needed changes, DHS concurred and stated that I&A is developing  specific performance indicators to monitor and evaluate workforce  initiatives and plans to develop a complete set of measures by the end of  fiscal year 2014. What challenges does I&A face in maintaining a skilled analytic  workforce and what steps has it taken to address these challenges? We  also met with representatives from four of the five I&A customer groups:  DHS components; the Intelligence Community; state, local, tribal, and  territorial governments; and the private sector.
Why GAO Did This Study

DHS plays a vital role in securing the nation, and its intelligence analysis capabilities are a key part of this effort. Within DHS, I&A has a lead role for intelligence analysis, but other operational components also perform their own analysis activities. GAO was asked to review the management of departmental analysis efforts.
This report addresses the extent to which (1) DHS intelligence analysis activities are integrated to support departmental intelligence priorities, (2) I&A customers find analytic products and services useful, and (3) I&A has addressed challenges in maintaining a skilled analytic workforce.
GAO examined mechanisms DHS used to coordinate analysis across components, I&A reports and feedback surveys, and human capital plans. GAO also interviewed officials from I&A, the five DHS components with intelligence analysis as a core function, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence who represent the Intelligence Community, 7 of 78 fusion centers (focal points within states that analyze and share information), and the private sector. The fusion center and sector interviews, chosen based on geographic location and other factors, are not generalizable, but provided insight on progress.

What GAO Found

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has established mechanisms—including an intelligence framework and an analytic planning process—to better integrate analysis activities throughout the department, but the mechanisms are not functioning as intended. For example, the framework does not establish strategic departmental intelligence priorities that can be used to inform annual planning decisions, such as what analytic activities to pursue and the level of investment to make, as called for in DHS guidance. According to officials from DHS's Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A), it can be challenging for DHS components to focus on developing both strategic priorities and more tactical priorities that support their specific operations. Absent strategic priorities, DHS used component subject matter experts and other information to develop key questions of common interest they would address through analysis. As a result, DHS does not have reasonable assurance that component analytic activities and resource investments are aligned to support departmental priorities. The mechanisms to integrate analysis, however, gave components insight into one another's work and helped them avoid unnecessary overlap and duplication.
I&A customers had mixed views on the extent to which its analytic products and services are useful. GAO's interviews with representatives of I&A's five customer groups indicate that two groups—DHS leadership and state, local, tribal, and territorial partners—found products to be useful, while three groups—DHS components, the Intelligence Community, and the private sector—generally did not. Representatives of four of the five groups said that they found other types of services, such as briefings, to be useful. Results from surveys that are attached to I&A products indicate that most customers were very satisfied with the products' usefulness, but the results are not generalizable because they reflect only the views of customers who chose to respond. To address this issue, I&A is conducting more comprehensive surveys and interviews with customers to evaluate the products and services that best meet their needs. I&A expects to complete this effort by the end of June 2014.
I&A has taken steps to address challenges it faced in maintaining a skilled workforce, but has not assessed whether its efforts are resolving the challenges. For example:
I&A faced challenges in recruiting and hiring analysts, in part because of its hiring authority, which put it at a disadvantage compared with other agencies that were able to process hiring actions more quickly. I&A's hiring authority was changed in 2013, a fact that could help ease these challenges.
I&A experienced low morale and high rates of attrition, particularly among its lower-level analysts. To help address these issues, I&A restructured its grade levels in 2012 to provide additional career advancement opportunities.
However, I&A has not established mechanisms to evaluate its efforts and use the results to make any needed changes because I&A leadership has focused on other priorities. Such mechanisms will help I&A evaluate if efforts are achieving their intended results of improving recruiting and hiring, bolstering morale, and reducing attrition. In addition, using the evaluation results to determine any needed changes will help ensure that I&A is making sound workforce decisions.

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends, among other things, that DHS (1) establish strategic intelligence priorities and use them to inform analytic activities and (2) establish mechanisms to evaluate workforce initiatives and use results to determine any needed changes. DHS concurred with our recommendations.