As part of its mission and as  required by the Homeland Security Act of 2002, the department is  also responsible for coordinating efforts across all levels of  government and throughout the nation, including with federal, state,  tribal, local, and private sector homeland security resources. In addition, the  department has deployed HSIN, a homeland security information- sharing application that operates on the public Internet. In addition, the total cost to develop,  operate, and maintain these networks and HSIN in fiscal years 2005  and 2006, as reported by DHS, was $611.8 million. A  key state and local-based initiative is the Regional Information  Sharing Systems (RISS) program. The RISS program helps state and local jurisdictions to, among  other things, share information in support of their homeland  security missions. This nationwide program, operated and managed  by state and local officials, was established in 1974 to address crime  that operates across jurisdictional lines. ●  Bulletin board. ●  Chat tool. Efforts to Coordinate HSIN with Key State and Local Information- Sharing Initiatives Have Been Limited

DHS did not fully adhere to the previously mentioned key practices  in coordinating its efforts on HSIN with key state and local  information-sharing initiatives. The department’s limited use of  these practices is attributable to a number of factors: in particular,  after the events of September 11, 2001, the department expedited its  schedule to deploy HSIN capabilities, and in doing so, it did not  develop an inventory of key state and local information initiatives. DHS has  efforts planned and under way to improve coordination and  collaboration, including implementing the recommendations in our  recent report. DHS did not engage the  RISS program to determine how resources could be leveraged to  meet mutual needs. Finally, DHS has yet to fully develop coordination policies,  procedures, and other means to operate across agency boundaries  with the RISS program. DHS’s Expedited Schedule Was Major Cause for Limited Coordination, Increasing the Risk of Ineffective Information Sharing and Duplication

The extent of DHS’s adherence to key practices (and the resulting  limited coordination) is attributable to DHS’s expedited schedule to  deploy an information-sharing application that could be used across  the federal government in the wake of the September 11 attacks; in  its haste, DHS did not develop a complete inventory of key state and  local information initiatives. Specifically:  ●  HSIN and RISS ATIX currently target similar user groups. ●  Document library. For example, the department is in the process of  developing an integration strategy that is to include enhancing HSIN  so that other applications and networks can interact with it. This  would promote integration by allowing other federal agencies and  state and local governments to use their preferred applications and  networks—such as RISSNET and RISS ATIX—while allowing DHS  to continue to use HSIN. We also recommended that this  include (1) identifying and inventorying such initiatives to determine  whether there are opportunities to improve information sharing and  avoid duplication, (2) adopting and institutionalizing key practices  related to OMB’s guidance on enhancing and sustaining agency  coordination and collaboration, and (3) ensuring that the  department’s coordination efforts are consistent with the  Administration’s recently issued Information Sharing Environment  plan. In closing, DHS has not effectively coordinated its primary  information-sharing system with two key state and local initiatives. Consequently, the department faces the risk  that effective information sharing is not occurring and that its HSIN  application may be duplicating existing state and local capabilities. This also raises the issue of whether similar coordination and  duplication issues exist with the other federal homeland security  networks and associated systems and applications under the  department’s purview. Until all the key  coordination and collaboration practices are fully implemented and  institutionalized, DHS will continue to be at risk that the  effectiveness of its information sharing is not where it needs to be to  adequately protect the homeland and that its efforts are  unnecessarily duplicating state and local initiatives.
Why GAO Did This Study

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is responsible for coordinating the federal government's homeland security communications with all levels of government, the private sector, and the public. In support of its mission, the department has deployed a Web-based information-sharing application--the Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN)--and operates at least 11 homeland security networks. The department reported that in fiscal years 2005 and 2006, these investments cost $611.8 million to develop, operate, and maintain. In view of the significance of information sharing for protecting homeland security, GAO was asked to testify on the department's efforts to coordinate its development and use of HSIN with two key state and local initiatives under the Regional Information Sharing Systems--a nationwide information-sharing program operated and managed by state and local officials. This testimony is based on a recent GAO report that addresses, among other things, DHS's homeland security networks and HSIN. In performing the work for that report, GAO analyzed documentation on HSIN and state and local initiatives, compared it against the requirements of the Homeland Security Act and federal guidance and best practices, and interviewed DHS officials and state and local officials.

What GAO Found

In developing HSIN, its key homeland security information-sharing application, DHS did not work effectively with two key Regional Information Sharing Systems program initiatives. This program, which is operated and managed by state and local officials nationwide, provides services to law enforcement, emergency responders, and other public safety officials. However, DHS did not coordinate with the program to fully develop joint strategies and policies, procedures, and other means to operate across agency boundaries, which are key practices for effective coordination and collaboration and a means to enhance information sharing and avoid duplication of effort. For example, DHS did not engage the program in ongoing dialogue to determine how resources could be leveraged to meet mutual needs. A major factor contributing to this limited coordination was that the department rushed to deploy HSIN after the events of September 11, 2001. In its haste, it did not develop a comprehensive inventory of key state and local information-sharing initiatives, and it did not achieve a full understanding of the relevance of the Regional Information Sharing Systems program to homeland security information sharing. As a result, DHS faces the risk that effective information sharing is not occurring and that HSIN may be duplicating state and local capabilities. Specifically, both HSIN and one of the Regional Information Sharing Systems initiatives target similar user groups, such as emergency management agencies, and all have similar features, such as electronic bulletin boards, "chat" tools, and document libraries. The department has efforts planned and under way to improve coordination and collaboration, including developing an integration strategy to allow other applications and networks to connect with HSIN, so that organizations can continue to use their preferred information-sharing applications and networks. In addition, it has agreed to implement recommendations made by GAO to take specific steps to (1) improve coordination, including developing a comprehensive inventory of state and local initiatives, and (2) ensure that similar coordination and duplication issues do not arise with other federal homeland security networks, systems, and applications. Until DHS completes these efforts, including developing an inventory of key state and local initiatives and fully implementing and institutionalizing key practices for effective coordination and collaboration, the department will continue to be at risk that information is not being effectively shared and that the department is duplicating state and local capabilities.