The Megaports Initiative coordinates with and  complements DHS’s Container Security Initiative (CSI), a related program  that targets and examines high-risk containers for weapons of mass  destruction before they are shipped to the United States. To ensure that countries are able to independently operate  and maintain the radiation detection equipment after NNSA transfers the  equipment, NNSA has (1) implemented a training program for foreign  personnel operating the radiation detection equipment, (2) developed a  sustainability program, and (3) developed new technology to address  challenges faced at some ports. As of December 2011, NNSA had spent  about $850 million on Megaports Initiative activities. As a result, DOE’s fiscal year 2013 Congressional Budget  Request states that DOE plans to shift the program’s focus from  establishing new Megaports to sustaining existing ones. NNSA has taken a number of actions as a result of proposed budget cuts,  including suspending ongoing negotiations for installing Megaports in 17  countries and cancelling planned deployments of new equipment in 5  other countries. Countries Cite Benefits of the Megaports Initiative, but Several Factors Limit Its Effectiveness

Foreign officials from countries that we visited reported benefits of the  Megaports Initiative, such as gaining a greater capacity to interdict  radiological materials, but we also identified several factors that reduce  the Initiative’s effectiveness. However, NNSA does not have a long-term plan for  ensuring the ongoing sustainability of these Megaports operations. For  example, NNSA is not systematically following up with partner countries  to ensure that they are effectively operating and maintaining Megaports- funded equipment after NNSA’s final transfer of equipment, maintenance,  and related financial responsibilities. We have previously reported  that agencies successfully assess performance when they use measures  that demonstrate results, cover multiple program priorities, and provide  useful information for decision making. These two performance measures, however, have limitations and do not  provide sufficient information for decision making. In our December 2011 report, we noted that NNSA  officials told us that this performance measure was difficult to quantify and  that it would be eliminated for fiscal year 2012 as a result of a DOE  “performance measures streamlining initiative.”
According to a 2011 House Committee on Appropriations report, the  committee is concerned that the Initiative’s performance measures are  not adequate to assess the effectiveness of SLD’s activities, and the  report states, “the true effectiveness of  detectors in preventing  proliferation is largely dependent on how well individual countries employ  these capabilities in their security operations.” that it is difficult to measure the Megaports Initiative’s outcomes because  of its limited performance measures and said that the Initiative does not  routinely report what materials it has successfully interdicted. However, in both countries,  the Megaports Initiative had functioning RPMs and handheld radiation  detection equipment that, according to the Megaports Initiative’s former  program manager, CSI officials could have used if they had asked  Megaports equipment operators. Conclusions

Under its Megaports Initiative, NNSA has installed radiation detection  equipment at more than 40 foreign seaports since 2003 and has trained  foreign personnel in partner countries to scan shipping containers  entering and leaving these seaports—regardless of the containers’  destination—for nuclear or radiological material. NNSA has not finalized a long-term plan for ensuring the sustainability of  Megaports operations after NNSA transfers all equipment maintenance,  operations, and related financial responsibilities to partner countries. CSI officials in two countries told us that  they were using personal radiation detectors—which is a type of  equipment intended for personal safety but not appropriate for scanning  containers—to scan containers, while more appropriate radiation  detection equipment that the Megaports Initiative has provided its  partners is located at the same port. Develop and maintain useful and reliable measures to assess the  performance of the Megaports Initiative. To strengthen efforts to combat nuclear smuggling overseas, we also  recommend that the Administrator of the National Nuclear Security  Administration and the Secretary of Homeland Security take the following  action:
On a periodic basis, jointly assess the extent to which the Megaports  Initiative and CSI are effectively leveraging resources and  coordinating at foreign seaports where the two Initiatives are co- located. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

The objectives of our review were to assess (1) the status of the  Megaports Initiative (Initiative) and the National Nuclear Security  Administration’s (NNSA) plans for completing and sustaining it and (2)  benefits of the Initiative and factors, if any, that reduce its effectiveness. NNSA agreed with this  recommendation and stated that it intends to finalize the sustainability  plan.
Why GAO Did This Study

NNSA established the Megaports Initiative in 2003 to deter, detect, and interdict nuclear or other radiological materials smuggled through foreign seaports. The Initiative funds the installation of radiation detection equipment at select seaports overseas and trains foreign personnel to use this equipment to scan shipping containers entering and leaving these seaports—regardless of destination. NNSA provides partner countries with maintenance and technical support for about 3 years, after which it transfers the equipment and all related responsibilities to partner countries. GAO was asked to examine (1) the status of the Megaports Initiative and NNSA’s plans for completing and sustaining it and (2) the benefits of the Initiative and factors that reduce its effectiveness. GAO analyzed key documents; interviewed agency officials; and visited eight Megaports in five countries, selected on the basis of port size and unique characteristics, among other things.

What GAO Found

As of August 2012, the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) had completed 42 of 100 planned Megaports projects in 31 countries and, as of December 2011, NNSA had spent about $850 million on the Megaports Initiative (Initiative). NNSA’s Initiative has equipped these seaports with radiation detection equipment, established training programs for foreign personnel, and created a sustainability program to help countries operate and maintain the equipment. However, the administration’s fiscal year 2013 budget proposal would reduce the Initiative’s budget by about 85 percent, and NNSA plans to shift the Initiative’s focus from establishing new Megaports to sustaining existing ones. As a result, NNSA has suspended ongoing negotiations and cancelled planned deployments of equipment in five countries.
Officials from the five countries GAO visited reported benefits of the Megaports Initiative, including increased capacity to interdict nuclear and radiological materials. However, GAO identified several factors that reduce the Initiative’s effectiveness. For example, NNSA has not finalized a long-term plan for ensuring the sustainability of Megaports operations after NNSA transfers radiation detection equipment to partner countries. Without a long-term plan for ensuring countries’ ability to continue Megaports operations, NNSA cannot be assured that its $850 million investment will be sustained. Moreover, the Initiative’s performance measures do not provide sufficient information for decision making because they do not evaluate the impact and effectiveness of the Initiative. GAO has previously reported that agencies successfully assess performance when they use measures that demonstrate results, cover multiple program priorities, and provide useful information for decision making. GAO also found that the Megaports Initiative and the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) Container Security Initiative (CSI)—a related program that examines high-risk shipping containers for weapons of mass destruction before they are shipped to the United States—are not sufficiently coordinating. The two Initiatives are co-located at 29 foreign seaports. In two countries, DHS officials told GAO that they were using personal radiation detectors—a type of equipment intended for personal safety but not appropriate for scanning containers—to inspect containers if their radiation detection equipment is broken. However, in both countries, the Megaports Initiative had more suitable equipment that DHS officials could have used.

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that NNSA take actions, including (1) finalizing its long-term plan for ensuring the sustainability of Megaports operations after NNSA’s final transfer of equipment to partner countries and (2) developing and maintaining useful and reliable measures to assess the performance of the Initiative. GAO also recommends that NNSA and DHS jointly assess the extent to which the two Initiatives are effectively coordinating. NNSA and DHS agreed with GAO’s recommendations.