	Certification is a Key Component of FAA’s Aviation Safety Oversight

Among its responsibilities for aviation safety, FAA issues certificates that  approve the design and production of new aircraft and equipment before  they are introduced into service; these certificates demonstrate that the  aircraft and equipment meet FAA’s airworthiness requirements. In addition, in  September 2011 we reported that FAA did a good job following its  certification processes in assessing the composite fuselage and wings of  Boeing’s 787 against its airworthiness standards. FAA recognizes the value of certification as a safety tool, however the  agency faces some significant challenges, including resources and  maintaining up-to-date knowledge of industry changes. In response to a provision in the  2012 FAA Reauthorization, FAA is assessing the certification process and  identifying opportunities to streamline the process. Better Quality and More Complete Data Could Help FAA Further Improve Safety Oversight

As we stated above, FAA plans to continue using data reactively to  understand the causes of accidents and incidents, and is implementing a  proactive approach—called an SMS approach—in which it analyzes data  to identify and mitigate risks before they result in accidents. FAA is also  overseeing SMS implementation throughout the aviation industry. Safety  management systems are intended to continually monitor all aspects of  aviation operations and collect appropriate data to identify emerging  safety problems before they result in death, injury, or significant property  damage. Data limitations and the lack of data  may inhibit FAA’s ability to manage safety risks. Our recent work on aviation safety and FAA oversight issues has  identified a number of specific areas where FAA’s risk-based oversight  could be improved through improved data collection and analysis,  including: runway and ramp safety, airborne operational errors, general  aviation, pilot training, unmanned aircraft systems, and commercial  space. FAA has taken steps to address safety oversight issues in many of  these areas, including making changes to or committing to make changes  to its data collection practices in response to our recommendations in  most of these areas. Nonetheless, sustained FAA attention will be  necessary to ensure that the agency’s ability to comprehensively and  accurately assess and manage risk is not impaired. Runway and ramp safety. Safety in the terminal area could  be improved by additional information about surface incidents, which  is currently limited to certain types of incidents, notably runway  incursions and certain airborne incidents, but does not include runway  overruns or incidents in ramp areas. FAA is planning to develop a program to collect and  analyze data on runway overruns, something we recommended in  2011, but it will be several years before FAA has obtained sufficient  information about these incidents to be able to assess risks.still collects no comprehensive data on ramp area incidents and NTSB  does not routinely collect data on ramp accidents unless they result in  serious injury or substantial aircraft damage. We  reported that FAA’s risk-based process for assessing airborne losses  of separation is too narrow to account for all potential risk and  changes in how errors are reported affect FAA’s ability to identify  trends. General aviation. In 2010, FAA estimated that  there were more than 220,000 aircraft in the active general aviation  fleet, comprising more than 90 percent of the U.S. civil aircraft fleet. For example, FAA estimates of annual general  aviation flight hours may not be reliable because of methodological  and conceptual limitations with the survey upon which flight activity  estimates are based. data found that, while FAA requires its inspectors to conduct on-site  inspections of each of these schools and their pilot examiners at least  once per year, the agency does not have a comprehensive system in  place to adequately measure its performance in meeting its annual  inspection requirements. Standards for UAS operations are a key step in the  process of safely integrating regular UAS operations into the national  airspace. FAA is responsible for licensing and monitoring the safety of  such launches and of spaceports (sites for launching spacecraft). Aviation Safety: FAA Has An Opportunity to Enhance Safety and Improve  Oversight of Initial Pilot Training.
Why GAO Did This Study

Even with nearly 80,000 flights each day within the national airspace system, there has not been a fatal commercial aviation accident in more than 4 years. The U.S. airspace system is arguably one of the safest in the world, with key aviation stakeholdersthe FAA, airlines, airports, aircraft manufacturers, and the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB)working together to ensure these results.
As the federal agency responsible for regulating the safety of civil aviation in the United States, FAA is responsible for, among other things: setting aircraft certification standards, collecting fleet and flight activity data, conducting safety oversight of pilot training and general aviation operations, and safely integrating aircraft into the national airspace. As the aviation industry evolves, FAA must remain diligent in its efforts to ensure the continued safety of aviation. In 2010, Congress passed the Airline Safety and Federal Aviation Administration Extension Act, which, in part, called for FAA to better manage safety risks.
This testimony focuses on (1) FAAs aircraft certification process and (2) FAAs use of data to enhance safety and improve aviation oversight. The testimony is based on GAOs previous work and updated with industry reports and information provided by FAA officials.
GAO has previously recommended that FAA address several data quality weaknesses. FAA concurred with most of these recommendations and has taken steps toward addressing some.

What GAO Found

The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) is responsible for approving the design and airworthiness of new aircraft and equipment before they are introduced into service. FAA approves changes to aircraft and equipment based on evaluation of industry submissions against standards set forth in federal aviation regulations and related guidance documents. In September 2011, we reported that, overall, FAA did a good job following its certification processes in assessing the composite fuselage and wings of Boeing's 787 against its airworthiness standards. However, the approval process--referred to as certification--presents challenges for FAA in terms of resources and maintaining up-to-date knowledge of industry practices, two issues that may hinder FAA's efforts to conduct certifications in an efficient and timely manner. FAA is currently assessing its certification process and identifying opportunities to streamline it.
FAA plans to continue analyzing data reactively to understand the causes of accidents and incidents, and to augment this approach through implementation of a safety management system (SMS). SMS is a proactive approach that includes continually monitoring all aspects of aviation operations and collecting and analyzing appropriate data to identify emerging safety problems before they result in death, injury, or significant property damage. FAA has put in place various quality controls for its data; however, GAO has identified a number of areas where FAA does not have comprehensive risk-based data or methods of reporting that capture all incidents. The following are among the key areas GAO identified as needing improved data collection and analysis.
Runway and ramp safety . Additional information about surface incidents could help improve safety in the airport terminal area, as data collection is currently limited to certain types of incidents, notably runway incursions, which involve the incorrect presence of an aircraft, vehicle, or person on a runway and certain airborne incidents, and does not include runway overruns, which occur when an aircraft veers off a runway or incidents in ramp areas, which can involve aircraft and airport vehicles.
Airborne operational errors . FAA's metric for airborne losses of separation--a type of operational error--is too narrow to account for all potential risk.
General aviation . FAA estimates of annual flight hours for the general aviation sector, which includes all forms of aviation except commercial and military, may not be reliable.
Pilot training . FAA does not have a comprehensive system in place to measure its performance in meeting its annual pilot school inspection requirements.
FAA has taken steps to address safety oversight issues and data challenges in many of these areas. For example, FAA is planning to develop a program to collect and analyze data on runway overruns, but it will be several years before FAA has obtained enough information about these incidents to assess risks. Sustained attention to these data collection and analysis issues will be necessary to ensure that FAA can more comprehensively and accurately assess and manage risk.