The decisions made to date have been informed by several major field  tests, including  the 2014 Census test, which was conducted in the Maryland and  Washington, D.C., areas to test new methods for conducting self- response and non-response follow-up;  the 2015 Census Test in Arizona, which tested, among other things,  the use of a field operations management system to automate data  collection operations and provide real-time data and the ability to  reduce the non-response follow-up workload using data previously  provided to the government, as well as enabling enumerators to use  their personally owned mobile devices to collect census data; and  the 2015 Optimizing Self-Response test in Savannah, Georgia, and  the surrounding area, which was intended to explore methods of  encouraging households to respond using the Internet, such as using  advertising and outreach to motivate respondents, and enabling  households to respond without a Bureau-issued identification number. CEDCAP Program Structure and Relationship to the 2020 Census Program

Several of the key systems needed to support the 2020 Census redesign  are expected to be provided as CEDCAP enterprise systems under the  purview of the Bureau’s IT Directorate. The Bureau Lacks Processes for Effectively Managing Interdependencies between CEDCAP and 2020 Census Programs CEDCAP and 2020 Census Programs Do Not Have an Effective Process for Integrating Schedule Dependencies

Despite significant interdependencies between the CEDCAP and 2020  Census Programs, our ongoing audit work determined that the Bureau is  not effectively managing these interdependencies. Consequently, the two programs have been  manually identifying activities within their master schedules that are  dependent on each other, and rather than establishing one dependency  schedule, as best practices dictate, the programs have developed two  separate dependency schedules for each program, and meet weekly with  the intent of coordinating these two schedules. These tests were intended to, among other things, help  define requirements around critical functions. With less than a year and a  half remaining before the 2018 Census end-to-end test begins, the lack of  experience and specific requirements related to non-ID response  validation is especially concerning, as incomplete and late definition of  requirements proved to be serious issues for the 2010 Census. Census Bureau Faces Several Information Security Challenges in Implementing the 2020 Census

While the Bureau plans to extensively use IT systems to support the 2020  Census redesign in an effort to realize potentially significant efficiency  gains and cost savings, this redesign introduces the following critical  information security challenges. Adequately protecting mobile devices—The 2020 Census will be  the first one in which the Census Bureau will provide mobile devices  to enumerators to collect personally identifiable information from  households who did not self-respond to the survey. For  example, we reported that organizations can require that devices  meet government specifications before they are deployed, limit  storage on mobile devices, and ensure that all data on the device are  cleared before the device is disposed of. The Bureau’s acting Chief Information Officer and its Chief Information  Security Officer have acknowledged these challenges and described the  Bureau’s plans to address them. We have previously reported on Census Bureau weaknesses that are  related to many of these information security challenges. For  example, the Bureau developed and implemented a risk management  framework with a goal of better management visibility of information  security risks; this framework addressed a recommendation to document  acceptance of risks for management review. Additionally, while the large-scale technological changes for the 2020  Decennial Census introduce great potential for efficiency and  effectiveness gains, it also introduces many information security  challenges, including educating the public to offset inevitable phishing  scams. Continued focus on these considerable security challenges and  remaining open recommendations will be important as the Bureau begins  to develop and/or acquire systems and implement the 2020 Census  design. Our draft report, which is currently with Commerce and the Bureau for  comment, includes several recommendations that, if implemented, will  help address the issues we identified and improve the management of the  interdependencies between the CEDCAP and 2020 Census programs. Regarding our finding that the two programs do not  have an integrated list of risks facing both programs, Bureau officials  stated that they have an enterprise-wide risk management program, in  which the Deputy Director has visibility into risks affecting both programs.
Why GAO Did This Study

The U.S. Census Bureau (which is part of the Department of Commerce) plans to significantly change the methods and technology it uses to count the population with the 2020 Decennial Census. The Bureau's redesign of the census relies on the acquisition and development of many new and modified systems. Several of the key systems are to be provided by an enterprise-wide initiative called CEDCAP, which is a large and complex modernization program intended to deliver a system-of-systems for all the Bureau's survey data collection and processing functions.
This statement summarizes preliminary findings from GAO's draft report on, among other things, the Bureau's management of the interdependencies between the CEDCAP and 2020 Census programs, and key information security challenges the Bureau faces in implementing the 2020 Census design. To develop that draft report, GAO reviewed Bureau documentation such as project plans and schedules and compared them against relevant guidance; and analyzed information security reports and documents.

What GAO Found

The 2020 Census program is heavily dependent upon the Census Enterprise Data Collection and Processing (CEDCAP) program to deliver the key systems needed to support the 2020 Census redesign. However, GAO's preliminary findings showed that while the two programs have taken steps to coordinate their schedules, risks, and requirements, they lacked effective processes for managing their interdependencies. Specifically:
Among tens of thousands of schedule activities, the two programs are expected to manually identify activities that are dependent on each other, and rather than establishing one integrated dependency schedule, the programs maintain two separate dependency schedules. This has contributed to misalignment in milestones between the programs.
The programs do not have an integrated list of interdependent program risks, and thus they do not always recognize the same risks that impact both programs.
Among other things, key requirements have not been defined for validating responses from individuals who respond to the census using an address instead of a Bureau-assigned identification number, because of the Bureau's limited knowledge and experience in this area. The lack of knowledge and specific requirements related to this critical function is concerning, given that there is less than a year and a half remaining before the Census end-to-end test begins in August 2017 (which is intended to test all key systems and operations to ensure readiness for the 2020 Census).
Officials have acknowledged these weaknesses and reported that they are taking, or plan to take, steps to address the issues. However, until these interdependencies are managed more effectively, the Bureau will be limited in understanding the work needed by both programs to meet milestones, mitigate major risks, and ensure that requirements are appropriately identified.
While the large-scale technological changes for the 2020 Decennial Census introduce great potential for efficiency and effectiveness gains, they also introduce many information security challenges. For example, the introduction of an option for households to respond using the Internet puts respondents more at risk for phishing attacks (requests for information from authentic-looking, but fake, e-mails and websites). In addition, because the Bureau plans to allow its enumerators to use mobile devices to collect information from households who did not self-respond to the survey, it is important that the Bureau ensures that these devices are adequately protected. The Bureau has begun efforts to address many of these challenges; as it begins implementing the 2020 Census design, continued focus on these considerable security challenges will be critical.

What GAO Recommends

GAO's draft report includes several recommendations to help the Bureau better manage CEDCAP and 2020 Census program interdependencies related to schedule, risk, and requirements. The draft report is currently with the Department of Commerce and the Bureau for comment.