The Departments of Defense and Transportation have identified 17 seaports on the Pacific, Atlantic, and Gulf Coasts (13 commercial ports, 1 military port, and 3 military ammunition ports) as “strategic,” meaning that they are necessary for use by DOD in the event of a large scale military deployment. Current Risk Management Approach Creates Uncertainties about the Security Environment at Strategic Seaports

The security environment at strategic seaports is uncertain because comprehensive assessments of threats, vulnerabilities, and port infrastructure and functions have not been completed. Assessments of the criticality of seaport infrastructure were not done at all the ports we visited prior to September 11. Weaknesses in DOD Force Protection Process Increase Risks for Deployments through Domestic Seaports

During our review, we identified two significant weaknesses in DOD’s force protection process. First, DOD lacks a central authority responsible for overseeing force protection measures of DOD organizations while carrying out the various domestic phases of military deployments to and through U.S. seaports. Second, there are instances during some phases of these deployments when DOD transfers custody of its military equipment to nongovernment entities. The vessel, GTS Katie, was owned by a U.S. company but registered in St. Vincent and the Grenadines and crewed by non-U.S. citizens. To improve DOD’s oversight and execution of force protection for deployments to and through domestic strategic seaports, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense  designate a single authority (such as the recently established U.S.
Northern Command) to coordinate and execute force protection planning for deployments of units from installations in the United States through seaports and until ships enter the destination areas of operation (this responsibility would be similar to that of the overseas unified combatant commands for their respective areas of operation) and  direct the single coordinating authority (once established), along with the U.S. Transportation Command, to develop and implement measures to maintain greater security over equipment transported by non-DOD carriers. Washington, D.C.: October 12, 2001.
What GAO Found

The October 12, 2000, attack against the Navy destroyer U.S.S. Cole in the port of Aden illustrated the danger of unconventional threats to U.S. ships in seaports. The September 11, 2001, attacks further heightened the need for a significant change in conventional antiterrorist thinking, particularly regarding threats to the U.S. homeland. The new security paradigm assumes that all U.S. forces, be they abroad or at home, are vulnerable to attack, and that even those infrastructures traditionally considered of little interest to terrorists, such as commercial seaports in the continental United States, are now commonly recognized as highly vulnerable to potential terrorist attack. Of the more than 300 seaports in the United States, the Departments of Defense (DOD) and Transportation have designated 17 as "strategic," because in the event of a large-scale military deployment, DOD would need to transport more than 95 percent of all equipment and supplies needed for military operations by sea. If the strategic ports were attacked, not only could massive civilian casualties be sustained, but DOD could also lose precious cargo and time and be forced to rely heavily on its overburdened airlift capabilities. The security environment at strategic seaports remains uncertain because comprehensive assessments of threats, vulnerabilities, and critical port infrastructure and functions have not been completed, and no effective mechanism exists to coordinate and disseminate threat information at the seaports. GAO identified two significant weaknesses in DOD's force protection process for deployments through domestic seaports. First, DOD lacks a central authority responsible for overseeing force protection measures of DOD organizations that move forces from domestic installations through U.S. seaports. Second, during some phases of a deployment, DOD transfers custody of its military equipment to non-DOD entities, including foreign-owned ships crewed by non-U.S. citizens.