FRP Cycle

FRP represents a change in the way the Navy manages its forces. The plan  changes the manner in which the Navy maintains, trains, mans, and  deploys its ships to allow a greater number of ships to surge on short  notice while at the same time meeting forward- presence requirements. The Navy Has Taken Several Positive Steps to Implement a Sound Management Approach for FRP

The Navy has taken several positive steps toward implementing a sound  management approach for FRP since our prior reports. Our prior work has  shown that key elements of a sound management approach include  defining clear missions and desired outcomes, establishing  implementation goals, measuring performance, and aligning activities with  resources. The Navy’s implementation of FRP has included some of these  elements. As that instruction noted, 3+3+1 means that  the Navy’s goal is to have three carrier strike groups deployed, three ready  to deploy within 30 days of being ordered to do so (in the FRP sustainment  or integrated phases), and one prepared to deploy within 90 days (in the  FRP basic phase). The Navy Has Not Developed Comprehensive Implementation Goals, Fully Developed Performance Measures, or Fully Identified Resources Required to Achieve FRP Goals

The Navy has not developed comprehensive implementation goals for all  Navy assets, finished developing performance measures, or fully identified  all the resources required to achieve FRP goals– which are all key  elements of a sound management approach. Specifically, the Navy has not  yet established a specific implementation goal for expeditionary strike  groups and other forces that is analogous to the 3+3+1 goal for carrier  strike groups. More recently, the Navy established several task forces and initiatives to  help identify training requirements and costs, and to link costs to expected  readiness levels. The task force on readiness  has set a goal of having its results incorporated into the development of  the fiscal year 2010 budget. The Navy Has Not Fully Considered Long-term Risks and Tradeoffs of Changes

The Navy has not fully considered the long-term risks and tradeoffs  associated with the changes it has made in areas such as carrier  operational and maintenance cycles and force structure. Specifically, the Navy has extended the intervals between  carrier dry-dock maintenance periods from 6 years to 8 years and begun a  test program that will extend some carrier dry-dock intervals to as much  as 12 years, or only three times during their life cycles. It has also  lengthened operational cycles for carriers and their airwings to 32 months. We have previously advocated that DOD adopt a comprehensive risk  management approach to aid in its decision making that includes, among  other things, assessing the risks of various courses of action for both near-  and long-term challenges. The Navy has not fully considered the long-term risks and tradeoffs of  these changes to its maintenance and operational cycles because it has not  performed a comprehensive assessment of how the changes, interacting  with one another, might affect its ability to meet FRP goals and perform its  full range of missions. The Navy Has Not Fully Analyzed Ability to Meet FRP Goals during Periods When Less than 11 Carriers Will Be Available

The Navy has reported that FRP is supportable with 11 carriers and has  developed plans to show how it would continue to meet FRP goals during  two upcoming periods when the number of available aircraft carriers  temporarily drops from 11 to 10. The Navy’s plans may have presented optimistic assumptions about the  total length of the gap. Until the Navy develops plans that use realistic schedule assumptions and  that can depict the likely challenges to implementation goals during these  gap periods, senior Navy leadership may not have the information it needs  to make informed trade-off decisions. Conclusions

The Navy considers FRP to be a critical enabler in meeting challenges of  the twenty-first century security environment. Without implementation goals for extending FRP to  expeditionary strike groups and other ship configurations; performance  measures that identify readiness levels and are fully linked to acceptable  levels of performance for FRP phases; and a completed analysis that links  needed resources to FRP phases, goals, and readiness levels, the Navy may  not be able to develop budget requests based on the resources needed to  achieve required readiness levels or demonstrate to senior DOD officials  and Congress whether it can achieve the intended benefits under FRP.
Why GAO Did This Study

The Navy initiated its Fleet Response Plan (FRP) in March 2003 as a critical enabler to help meet the new demands of the twenty-first century security environment. FRP represents a major change in the way the Navy manages its forces, and is intended to more rapidly prepare and then sustain readiness in ships and squadrons. To achieve the desired capabilities under FRP, the Navy has altered its training, maintenance, and manning practices. The Navy expects this new readiness approach will enable its forces to provide presence and engagement in forward areas, as well as surge a greater number of ships on short notice. The Navy intends to achieve this goal without increasing its operations and maintenance budget of about $40 billion for each of the next 5 years. However, GAO previously reported that the Navy had not fully incorporated a sound management approach to guide and assess implementation of FRP. As a result, GAO was asked to examine the extent to which the Navy has (1) made progress in implementing a sound management approach for FRP and (2) evaluated the long-term risks and tradeoffs of FRP-related changes.

What GAO Found

The Navy has taken several positive steps toward implementing a sound management approach for FRP, but has not developed implementation goals, fully developed performance measures, or comprehensively assessed and identified the resources required to achieve FRP goals. GAO's prior work has shown that key elements of a sound management approach include: defining clear missions and desired outcomes, establishing implementation goals, measuring performance, and aligning activities with resources. The Navy has made progress in implementing FRP since GAO's prior reports. For example, it has established a goal of having three carrier strike groups deployed, three ready to deploy within 30 days of being ordered to do so, and one more within 90 days (referred to as 3+3+1). The Navy also has established a framework to set implementation goals for all forces, established some performance measures that are linked to the FRP phases, and begun efforts to identify needed resources. However, the Navy has not yet established a specific implementation goal for expeditionary strike groups and other forces. In addition, the Navy has not fully developed performance measures to enable it to assess whether carrier strike groups have achieved adequate readiness levels to deploy in support of the 3+3+1 goal. Moreover, the Navy has not fully identified the resources required to achieve FRP goals. Until the Navy's management approach fully incorporates the key elements, the Navy may not be able to measure how well FRP is achieving its goals or develop budget requests based on the resources needed to achieve expected readiness levels. The Navy has not fully considered the long-term risks and tradeoffs associated with the changes made as FRP has been implemented, such as carrier operational and maintenance cycles and force structure. The Navy has extended the intervals between carrier dry-dock maintenance periods from 6 years to 8 years and begun a test program that will extend some carrier dry-dock intervals to as much as 12 years, and it has lengthened operational cycles for carriers and their airwings to 32 months. GAO previously advocated that the Department of Defense adopt a risk management approach to aid in its decision making that includes assessing the risks of various courses of action. However, the Navy has not fully considered the long-term risks and tradeoffs of these recent changes because it has not performed a comprehensive assessment of how the changes, taken as a whole, might affect its ability to meet FRP goals and perform its missions. In addition, while the Navy has developed force structure plans that include two upcoming periods when the number of available aircraft carriers temporarily drops from 11 to 10, the plans included optimistic assumptions about the length of the gaps and the availability of existing carriers and did not fully analyze how the Navy would continue to meet FRP goals with fewer carriers. Until the Navy develops plans that use realistic assumptions and accurately identify the levels of risk the Navy is willing to accept during these gap periods, senior Navy leadership may not have the information it needs to make informed trade-off decisions.