VR&E Has Strengthened Its Focus on Employment through the Five-Track Employment Process, but Has Not Updated Its Incentive Structure to Align with Its Mission

In response to recommendations from the 2004 Task Force, VR&E has  implemented the Five-Track Employment Process and strengthened the  program’s focus on employment. The delineation of program services into five tracks is designed to  accommodate the different needs of veterans, such as those who need  immediate employment as opposed to those who need training to meet  their career goal. Specifically, the program offers a monthly subsistence allowance those veterans who are enrolled in education or training, but not to those  who receive employment services only. VR&E Has Collaborated with Other Organization s and Added Staff, but Lacks a Strategic Approach to Workforce Planning

Over the last few years, VR&E has increased its capacity to serve veterans  by engaging in a number of collaborative initiatives with other  organizations and by adding staff to its central and regional offices. Despite these staff increases, the VR&E regional offices still reported staff  and skill shortages on our survey. In addition, VR&E officials said they have not fully determined the critical  skills and competencies needed by counselors and employment  coordinators to achieve the program’s goals. These omissions could lead to some misinterpretation of the  program’s performance. Reports Do Not Show Separate Success Rates for Veterans Seeking Employment and Independent Living

Although the VR&E program works with two different groups of veterans,  most of whom are focused on employment with a smaller number seeking  independent living, VA reports an overall rehabilitation rate for all  participants. For example, reporting separate rates would show that those  participants seeking employment—the majority of people in the  program—have a lower success rate than the overall rate currently  reported. VA noted the change in  its fiscal year 2006 Performance and Accountability Report, but did not do  so for its subsequent fiscal year 2007 and fiscal year 2008 Performance and  Accountability Reports, or for its fiscal year 2008 and fiscal year 2009  budget submissions to Congress. Prior to the calculation change, VR&E was having limited success  improving its rehabilitation rate and achieving its performance goals (see  fig. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

Our review examined (1) how the implementation of the Five-Track  Employment Process has affected the Vocational Rehabilitation and  Employment (VR&E) program’s focus on employment, (2) the extent to  which VR&E has taken steps to improve its capacity, and (3) how program  outcomes are reported. To address these objectives, we:  reviewed agency documents and relevant recommendations from key  reports, such as the 2004 VR&E Task Force;   analyzed data from the Department of Veterans Affairs’ (VA) Corporate  WINRS and Benefits Delivery Network (BDN) data systems; interviewed VA and VR&E staff knowledgeable about VR&E planning and  operations, and others such as disability experts, members of the 2004  Task Force, veteran service organization representatives, and staff from  agencies and organizations that collaborate with VR&E;   visited four VA regional offices and conducted interviews with VR&E  officers and staff to observe and gather information on workforce  planning and how services are provided to veterans; and   conducted a survey of VR&E officers at all 57 regional offices to follow up  on several key issues relevant to our research objectives.
Why GAO Did This Study

In 2004, the Veterans Affairs' Vocational Rehabilitation and Employment (VR&E) program was reviewed by a VR&E Task Force. It recommended numerous changes, in particular focusing on employment through a new Five-Track service delivery model and increasing program capacity. Since then, VR&E has worked to implement these recommendations. To help Congress understand whether VR&E is now better prepared to meet the needs of veterans with disabilities, GAO was asked to determine (1) how the implementation of the Five-Track Employment Process has affected VR&E's focus on employment, (2) the extent to which VR&E has taken steps to improve its capacity, and (3) how program outcomes are reported. GAO interviewed officials from VR&E, the 2004 Task Force, and veteran organizations; visited four VR&E offices; surveyed all VR&E officers; and analyzed agency data and reports.

What GAO Found

By launching the Five-Track Employment Process, VR&E has strengthened its focus on employment, but program incentives have not been updated to reflect this emphasis. VR&E has delineated its services into five tracks to accommodate the different needs of veterans, such as those who need immediate employment as opposed to those who need training to meet their career goal. However, program incentives remain directed toward education and training. Veterans who receive those services collect an allowance, but those who opt exclusively for employment services do not. While VR&E officials said they believed it would be helpful to better align incentives with the employment mission, they have not yet taken steps to address this issue. VR&E has improved its capacity to provide services by increasing its collaboration with other organizations and by hiring more staff, but it lacks a strategic approach to workforce planning. Although there have been staff increases, many of VR&E's regional offices still reported staff and skill shortages. The program is not addressing these workforce problems with strategic planning practices that GAO's prior work has identified as essential. For example, VR&E officials have not fully determined the correct number of staff and the skills they need to serve current and future veterans. VA does not adequately report program outcomes, which could limit understanding of the program's performance. Specifically, it reports one overall rehabilitation rate for veterans pursuing employment and those trying to live independently. Computing each group's success rate for fiscal year 2008, GAO found a lower rate of success for the majority seeking employment and a higher rate of success for the minority seeking independent living than the overall rate. GAO also found that VR&E changed the way it calculates the rehabilitation rate in fiscal year 2006, without acknowledgments in key agency reports. VA noted the change in its fiscal year 2006 performance report, but did not do so for its fiscal year 2007 and 2008 reports, or for its fiscal year 2008and 2009 budget submissions. Such omissions could lead to misinterpretation of program performance over time.