This is what happened at Indian Point 2. Conclusions

A more proactive approach by Consolidated Edison to fix recurring weaknesses that had been identified over several years could have improved the implementation of its emergency preparedness plan during the February 2000 event. This event also demonstrated the importance of effective, clear communication networks, both on-site in regard to the need to ensure that pagers work well to notify key personnel of an emergency, as well as off-site, in regard to communicating about the extent and magnitude of the emergency. Exercises, while playing a valuable role in preparing for and assessing such readiness, more than likely will not identify the human reactions and all communications issues that could arise in a real radiological emergency. This was demonstrated during the February 2000 event. In this regard, NRC’s and FEMA’s interacting primarily with the states for routine communications needs to be reassessed at least for the 17 states where another entity is responsible for radiological emergency responses. The four Indian Point counties' lack of knowledge regarding the flexibility in FEMA’s regulations to spend more time at various emergency levels and its proposed streamlined exercise process demonstrate that FEMA’s reliance on the state to communicate with the local communities did not work in this case. Third, NRC noted that despite the problems at the plant, Consolidated Edison's emergency preparedness program would protect the public in the event of a radiological emergency. Water leaks from the reactor coolant system in excess of The Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s allowed limits. 2.
Why GAO Did This Study

Consolidated Edison Company shut down the Indian Point 2 commercial nuclear power plant in February 2000 because a tube had ruptured in a steam generator, raising the possibility that radioactively contaminated water could leak into the environment. In this case, the total amount of radioactivity released posed no threat because the amount of radioactivity released was about one thousandth of the dose an individual receives from a chest X-ray. However, in the event of a more serious emergency at Indian Point 2, protecting the public from a radioactive release presents more substantial challenges because the plant is located in a heavily populated area. This report reviews issues associated with emergency preparedness protocols associated with the plant.

What GAO Found

GAO found that a more proactive approach to correct recurring weaknesses could have improved the emergency preparedness plan during the February 2000 emergency. This emergency demonstrated the importance of effective, clear communication networks, both on-site regarding the need to ensure that pagers work well to notify key personnel of an emergency, as well as off-site, regarding communication about the extent and magnitude of the emergency. Exercises, although playing a valuable role in preparing for and assessing radiological emergency readiness, more than likely will not identify the human reactions and all communications issues that could arise in a real radiological emergency. In this regard the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC) and Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) interact interactions with the states for routine communications needs to be reassessed--at least for the 17 states where another entity is responsible for radiological emergency responses. The lack of knowledge by the four Indian Point counties regarding the flexibility in FEMA's regulations to spend more time at various emergency levels and its proposed streamlined exercise process demonstrate that FEMA's reliance on the state to communicate with the local communities did not work in this case.