DOD has  developed procedures and guidance, created an organization to integrate  contingency plans, and planned and conducted some training and  exercises. DOD’s operational planning is incomplete because  it is developing BMDS in a unique way and exempted BMDS from the  department’s traditional requirements guidance. DOD Has Made Progress in Planning to Operate the Ballistic Missile Defense System

DOD has taken positive steps in planning to operate the BMDS. DOD officials agreed that  planning for new weapon systems articulated in requirements guidance  generally includes critical planning elements such as establishing  operational criteria, identifying personnel requirements, developing  training programs, completing successful testing, and establishing  readiness reporting. This  was done, in part, to identify budget requirements. We and DOD have repeatedly recognized the need to  link resources to capabilities to facilitate DOD’s decision making and  congressional oversight. Without the ability to clearly identify and  assess the total ballistic missile defense operational costs, neither the  Secretary of Defense nor Congress has complete information to use when  making funding and trade-off decisions among competing priorities;  provide assurance that DOD’s plans to field ballistic missile defense  capabilities are affordable over time; and assess the costs of operating the  New Triad. Complete and Transparent Ballistic Missile Defense Operational Costs Are Not Visible in DOD’s FYDP

Complete costs to operate ballistic missile defense elements that will be  fielded between fiscal years 2006-2011 are not visible to DOD or Congress  in the FYDP because the current FYDP structure does not provide a way  to identify and aggregate all ballistic missile defense system operational  costs. Several Factors Impair the Completeness and Transparency of Ballistic Missile Defense Operational Costs

The completeness and transparency of operational costs for ballistic  missile defense system elements are impaired by four primary factors:   (1) operational costs are included in many program elements and there is  no mechanism to link and compile these costs, (2) the Missile Defense  Agency is authorized to use research and development funds to pay for  operational costs, (3) DOD has not included all known operational costs in  its budget estimates, and (4) DOD has not yet identified all costs  associated with the New Triad, of which the ballistic missile defense  system is an important part. Without  operational criteria, it may be difficult for the Secretary of Defense to  objectively assess combatant commands’ and services’ preparations to  conduct BMDS operations and the Secretary may not have a transparent  basis for declaring BMDS operational, which will become more important  as capabilities are added in subsequent blocks and Congress considers  requests to fund operations. Without adequate planning, clear criteria, and  identifying responsibility for ensuring necessary actions, it may be difficult  for DOD to identify and prioritize actions and assure itself or Congress  that all of the necessary pieces will be in place before declaring either  limited defense operations or subsequent blocks of capability operational. In addition, it will be difficult for DOD to determine whether the return on  its significant development investment in BMDS can be realized. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

To determine the extent to which the Department of Defense (DOD) has  made progress in planning to operate the Ballistic Missile Defense System  (BMDS), and to determine whether the Future Years Defense Program  (FYDP) provides complete and transparent data on total ballistic missile  defense operational costs, we conducted various analyses, reviewed key  documentation, and interviewed relevant DOD officials.
Why GAO Did This Study

The Department of Defense (DOD) has spent about $91 billion since the mid-1980s to develop a capability to destroy incoming ballistic missiles. In 2002, recognizing the new security environment after the September 11 attacks, President Bush directed that an initial set of defensive ballistic missile capabilities be put in place in 2004. Although DOD is developing the Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) to meet an urgent need, preparing to operate and support a system under continuous development poses significant challenges. GAO was asked to assess the extent to which (1) DOD has made progress in planning to operate the BMDS, and (2) the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) provides complete and transparent data on BMDS operational costs.

What GAO Found

DOD has made progress in planning to operate BMDS; however, it has not established criteria that would have to be met before declaring BMDS operational, nor has DOD resolved security issues or completed training and personnel plans. DOD officials agree that operational criteria are typically established and met prior to declaring a system operational, and that planning for new systems includes identifying personnel requirements, developing training programs, and identifying logistics and maintenance requirements. DOD has developed BMDS procedures and guidance, created an organization to integrate planning and operational support, and conducted some training and exercises. However, DOD has not established formal criteria for declaring that limited defensive operations or subsequent blocks of capability are operational or completed planning for security, training, and personnel. DOD has not done this because it is developing BMDS in a unique way and BMDS is exempted from traditional requirements guidance. Without specific operational criteria, the Secretary of Defense will not be in a sound position to objectively assess combatant commands' and services' preparations to conduct BMDS operations nor have a transparent basis for declaring BMDS operational, which will become more important as capabilities are added in subsequent blocks and Congress considers requests to fund operations. Without adequate planning, clear criteria, and identification of responsibility for ensuring necessary actions have been completed, it may be difficult for DOD to identify and prioritize actions, assure itself or Congress that the necessary pieces are in place before declaring the system operational, and determine whether the return on its significant development investment in BMDS can be realized. The FYDP, a major source of budget information, does not provide complete and transparent data on ballistic missile defense operational costs. DOD and GAO have repeatedly recognized the need to link resources to capabilities to facilitate decision making and oversight. However, complete and transparent ballistic missile defense operational costs are not visible in the FYDP because the FYDP's structure does not provide a way to identify and aggregate these costs. Four primary factors impair the visibility of ballistic missile defense operational costs in the current FYDP structure: (1) operational costs are included in many program elements and there is no mechanism to link and compile these costs, (2) the Missile Defense Agency is authorized to use research and development funds to pay for operational costs, (3) DOD has not included all known operational costs in its budget estimates, and (4) DOD has not identified all costs associated with the New Triad, of which BMDS is an important part. Without the ability to identify and assess total ballistic missile defense operational costs, neither the Secretary of Defense nor Congress has complete information to make funding and trade-off decisions among competing priorities; provide assurance that ballistic missile defense capabilities are affordable over time; and assess the costs of employing the New Triad.