Unclear Jurisdiction May Lead to Inappropriate Exports of Militarily Sensitive Stealth-Related Commodities

Unclear jurisdiction over stealth-related commodities increases the likelihood that militarily sensitive stealth technology will be exported under the less restrictive Commerce export control system. Export applications that Commerce refers based on missile technology concerns are sent to the Missile Technology Export Control group (MTEC). Recommendations

In light of the more stringent controls under the AECA and the sensitivity of stealth technology, we recommend that the Secretary of State, with the concurrence of the Secretary of Defense and in consultation with the Secretary of Commerce, clarify the licensing jurisdiction between the USML and the CCL for all stealth-related commodities and technologies with a view toward ensuring adequate controls under the AECA for all sensitive stealth-related items and the Secretary of Commerce revise current licensing referral procedures on all stealth-related items that remain on the CCL to ensure that Commerce refers all export applications for stealth-related commodities and technology to DOD and State for review, unless the Secretaries of Defense and State determine their review of these items is not necessary. To assess whether current referral procedures allow DOD to review all stealth-related exports, we examined the referral histories for the stealth-related exports we identified. GAO Comments

1. Munitions List (USML). 3. Comments From the Department of Commerce

The following are GAO’s comments on the Department of Commerce’s letter dated May 2, 1995. GAO Comments

1. 2. In addition, as noted in our report, the Department of Defense (DOD) and State officials agree that jurisdiction over stealth-related technology and commodities is ill defined and should be clarified. 3. 4. 5. 6. Commerce states that it has sufficient authority to deny validated license applications for products the U.S. government does not want to export.
Why GAO Did This Study

Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed export controls over stealth-related commodities and technology, focusing on: (1) how control over stealth technology and related commodities is split between the Department of State's U.S. Munitions List (USML) and the Department of Commerce's Commodity Control List (CCL); (2) the impact of shared jurisdiction over stealth-related items; and (3) whether current referral procedures allow the Department of Defense (DOD) to review all stealth-related exports.

What GAO Found

GAO found that: (1) stealth technology materials fall under the jurisdiction of both USML and CCL; (2) Commerce believes that stealth-related commodities should be placed on USML to avoid confusion and possible seizure by the Customs Service; (3) the unclear jurisdiction over stealth technology may lead to the inappropriate export of militarily-sensitive stealth materials and technology; (4) the less restrictive export controls governing CCL commodities give exporters an incentive to apply for CCL export licenses for USML-covered material; (5) Commerce can deny CCL export licenses only under limited circumstances or for certain destinations, while State has broader authority to deny applications that are against national interests; and (6) the United States cannot ensure that export licenses for stealth-related technology are properly reviewed and controlled because Commerce does not refer all stealth technology export applications to DOD or State for review.