	Background

DOD’s MCRS-16, which was completed in February 2010, was to provide  senior leaders with a detailed understanding of the range of mobility  capabilities needed for possible future military operations and help  leaders make investment decisions regarding mobility systems. MCRS-16 had several objectives, including to determine capability  shortfalls (gaps) and excessesmobility force structure, provide a risk assessment, and identify the  capabilities and requirements to support national strategy. DOD Did Not Clearly Identify Some Important Mobility Issues in the MCRS-16 and Its New Strategic Guidance Raises Questions

While the MCRS-16 included some useful information concerning air  mobility systems, the report did not clearly meet two of its objectives  because it did not provide decision makers with specific information  concerning (1) shortfalls and excesses associated with the mobility force  structure or (2) risks associated with shortfalls or excesses of its mobility  capabilities. For each of the  three cases of potential conflicts or natural disasters DOD used in the  MCRS-16, the department identified the required capabilities for air  mobility systems. Using DOD data from the  MCRS-16, we were able to discern possible shortfalls or potential  capacity that could be considered excess or used as an operational  reserve even though the MCRS-16 report was ambiguous regarding  whether actual shortfalls or excess capabilities existed (see figure). In our  December 2010 report, we recommended that DOD explicitly identify the  shortfalls and excesses in the mobility systems that DOD analyzed for the  MCRS-16 and provide this additional analysis to DOD and congressional  decision makers. Study Did Not Identify Associated Risks of Shortfalls or Excesses in Air Mobility Systems

The MCRS-16 also did not clearly achieve its study objective to provide   Assessing risk related to shortfalls and excesses is  risk assessments.important—the risk associated with shortfalls is that the mission might not  be accomplished, while the risk associated with excesses is that  resources may be expended unnecessarily on a mobility capability. DOD’s New Strategic Guidance May Affect Required Air Mobility Capabilities

In January 2012, DOD issued new strategic guidance, Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense, that will help  guide decisions regarding the size and shape of the force. However, the strategic guidance includes  changes from previous strategy—for example, U.S. forces will no longer  be sized to conduct large-scale, prolonged stability operations.past, DOD has translated strategic guidance into specific planning   In the  scenarios, which DOD has used in studies (such as the MCRS-16) to  generate requirements that inform force structure decisions. Based on the  new strategic guidance, the Air Force has proposed changes to the  mobility air fleet, including the retirement or cancellation of procurement  of 130 mobility aircraft. According to Air Force officials, the proposals  ensure that the Air Force can deliver the capabilities required by the new  strategic guidance and remain within funding levels. However, the Air  Force’s February 2012 document that outlines its proposed aircraft  retirements does not provide details of any analyses. Given the new  strategic guidance—which articulates priorities for a 21st century  defense—it is unclear the extent to which the requirements developed  from the MCRS-16 are still relevant. Decision makers would benefit from a clear  understanding from DOD of the basis for the proposed aircraft retirements  and DOD’s ability to execute its new strategic guidance with its planned  air mobility force structure.
Why GAO Did This Study

Over the past 30 years, the Department of Defense (DOD) has invested more than $140 billion in its airlift and tanker forces. In 2010, DOD published its Mobility Capabilities and Requirements Study 2016 (MCRS-16), which was intended to provide an understanding of the range of mobility capabilities needed for possible military operations. In January 2012, DOD issued new strategic guidance, Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense , affecting force structure decisions. This testimony addresses GAOs previous findings on the MCRS-16 and air mobility issues to consider in light of DODs new strategic guidance.
GAOs December 2010 report on the MCRS-16 (GAO-11-82R) is based on analysis of DODs executive summary and classified report, and interviews with DOD officials.

What GAO Found

The Mobility Capabilities and Requirements Study 2016 (MCRS-16) provided some useful information concerning air mobility systemssuch as intratheater airlift, strategic airlift, and air refuelingbut several weaknesses in the study raised questions about its ability to fully inform decision makers. In particular, the MCRS-16 did not provide decision makers with recommendations concerning shortfalls and excesses in air mobility systems. In evaluating capabilities, the MCRS-16 used three cases that it developed of potential conflicts or natural disasters and identified the required capabilities for air mobility systems. Based on data in the MCRS-16, GAO was able to discern possible shortfalls or potential capacity that could be considered excess or an operational reserve, even though the MCRS-16 was ambiguous regarding whether actual shortfalls or excess capabilities exist. It also did not identify the risk associated with potential shortfalls or excesses. Identifying the risk associated with specific mobility systems could help with decisions to allocate resources.
The Department of Defense (DOD) issued new strategic guidance in January 2012, which is intended to help guide decisions regarding the size and shape of the force. In the past, DOD has translated strategic guidance into specific planning scenarios, which it used in studies (such as the MCRS-16) to generate requirements that inform force structure decisions. Based on the new strategic guidance, the Air Force has proposed reducing its mobility air fleet by 130 aircraft, which would leave 593 mobility aircraft in the airlift fleet. According to Air Force officials, the proposals will enable the Air Force to deliver the airlift capabilities required to implement the new strategic guidance and remain within funding levels. However, the Air Forces document that outlines its proposed aircraft retirements does not provide details of any analyses used to support the reductions. Given the new strategic guidance, it is unclear the extent to which the requirements developed from MCRS-16 are still relevant. In weighing the Air Forces proposal, decision makers would benefit from a clear understanding from DOD of the basis for the proposed aircraft retirements and DODs ability to execute its new strategic guidance with its planned air mobility force structure.

What GAO Recommends

GAO previously recommended that DOD clearly identify shortfalls and excesses in the mobility force structure and the associated risks. DOD did not concur with the recommendations, stating that the MCRS-16 identified shortfalls and excesses and included a risk assessment. GAO disagreed, noting for example, that DODs MCRS-16 study did not explicitly identify excess aircraft and did not include mobility system risk assessments when potential shortfalls existed.