	Background

Survivability and lethality in warfare are increasingly dependent on  smaller, highly mobile, joint forces that rely on superior information and  communication capabilities. Investment in Key Tactical Radio Systems Has Shifted Dramatically in Both Size and Composition

Over the past 5 years, investments in key tactical radios systems have  exceeded planned investments by more than double and shifted  dramatically in scope. At the same time,  investment in legacy radios was expected to be relatively small and  diminish almost entirely as JTRS became available. Not only did  spending between fiscal years 2003 and 2007 increase significantly, from  about $3.2 billion to about $8.3 billion, it shifted away from procuring  JTRS to procuring tens of thousands of additional legacy radios. In 2003, DOD and the services planned to spend approximately $3 billion  on JTRS over the next 5 years—$1 billion for research and development,  and $2 billion to procure the first JTRS radios. In actuality, DOD and the services invested over twice as much as planned  to develop JTRS capabilities—about $2.5 billion—while no JTRS  networking radios were produced during this time. Legacy radio spending,  on the other hand, ballooned to approximately $5.7 billion, about 24 times  what was planned. Of this, the Army spent approximately $4.1 billion,  including $2.3 billion on SINCGARS radios and $1.8 billion on handheld  and manpack radios. First, cost, schedule,  and performance problems delayed development of JTRS capabilities by  several years. The demand was driven by a desire to  equip deploying units with modern radios and a change in concept of  operations that calls for more radios per unit. Several other users depending on JTRS have had to invest in legacy radio  systems to meet their needs because of the delays with the program. DOD, however,  does not yet have a strategy for guiding the services’ acquisition of tactical  radios over the next several years. According to the services, the legacy radios purchased in the past several  years provide effective communications capabilities to meet current  operational demands. Recommendations for Executive Action

To improve DOD’s ability to plan for and manage the development and  fielding of tactical radios across the department, we recommend that the  Secretary of Defense    develop a comprehensive strategy and implementation plan for making  sound investment decisions for tactical radios that:  is based on operational architectures that define the  communications and networking functions needed on the  battlefield,    assesses and prioritizes the capabilities and requirements needed in  the near- and long-term,    sets bounds for the funding that will be committed to address these  needs,  lays out an effective migration and fielding plan for delivering  capabilities to the warfighter, and  identifies contingencies in case there are further problems and  delays with JTRS. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

To assess how the services’ planned investments in key tactical radio  systems changed over the last 5 years, we compared the services’ fiscal  year 2003 to 2007 tactical radio procurement plans to actual procurements. ;  Office of the Chief of  Naval Operations , Directorate for Communication Networks, Arlington,  Va.;  Marine Corps Combat Development Command, Quantico, Va.;  Marine  Corps Systems Command, Quantico, Va.;  Army Aviation, Arlington, Va.;    Office of the Army’s Deputy Chief of Staff, Arlington, Va.; Office of the  Army’s Chief Information Officer, Washington, D.C.;  Office of the  Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition, Rosslyn, Va.; and the  Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Arlington, Va.
To determine what challenges will confront the services as they plan  tactical radio investments to provide future capabilities, we obtained and  analyzed briefings from JTRS program managers, reviewed the JTRS  Board of Directors quarterly reports for the first and second quarters of  fiscal year 2008, the 2003 JTRS joint migration plan, as well as service  migration plans for the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps; reviewed the  services’ estimates for future JTRS procurements and interviewed officials  from the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,  Technology and Logistics; the National Security Agency; the Assistant  Secretary of Defense for Networks and Information Integration; Office of  the Army’s Deputy Chief of Staff (G-8); and the Office of the Chief of Naval  Operations, Directorate for Air Warfare.
Why GAO Did This Study

The Department of Defense (DOD) has spent an estimated $12 billion on the development and production of tactical radios over the last 5 years--about as much as was spent producing Virginia Class submarines ($10.8 billion) in the same period. Survivability and lethality in warfare are increasingly dependent on superior information and communication capabilities. DOD is counting on the Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) to deliver the breakthroughs in this area. At the same time as it is developing JTRS, DOD wants to ensure that current forces are equipped with sufficient legacy radios. To address Subcommittee concerns regarding DOD's approach to meeting current and future radio needs, GAO examined this subject. In response, this report addresses (1) how planned investments in key tactical radio systems changed over the last 5 years, (2) why these changes occurred, and (3) the challenges ahead. To assess these topics, GAO's work included reviewing 2003 through 2007 budget requests, legacy radio procurements, and the status of the JTRS program; and interviewing officials from DOD organizations.

What GAO Found

Over the past 5 years, DOD investments in key tactical radios have shifted dramatically, both in size and composition. In 2002, when JTRS first began system development, DOD planned to invest close to $3 billion in JTRS over fiscal years 2003-2007. However, as shown below, actual investments more than doubled and shifted to producing thousands more legacy radios. Compared with the $3.2 billion that was slated to be spent on JTRS and the Army and Marine Corps legacy radios, about $8.3 billion was actually spent. Of this, about $5.7 billion was spent on the legacy radios, while $2.5 billion was spent on JTRS development. The change in tactical radio investments was brought about by (1) delays in the development and production of JTRS and (2) urgent demands for more radios to equip current forces. JTRS has encountered significant cost, schedule, and performance problems, causing some users to buy more legacy radios instead. Moreover, the military services' demand for tactical radios soared because of combat operations, the need to equip Guard and Reserve forces with modern radios, and to add more radios per combat unit. Supplemental funding of $5.5 billion paid for most of these legacy radios. Over the next 5 years, DOD faces several challenges in providing needed tactical communications capabilities to the warfighter, including: (1) overcoming technology hurdles, size and power constraints, and security architecture issues to complete JTRS development; (2) managing investments within defined fiscal constraints. A legacy vehicle radio costs about $20,000, while its more capable JTRS replacement is estimated to cost up to 10 times more; and (3) phasing in JTRS without prematurely retiring a relatively young inventory of legacy radios. DOD does not have a strategy to meet these challenges and thus runs the risk of having its future communications capabilities decided ad hoc.