Avoidance of multiple transitions and personnel turbulence. Workload stability. We identified significant weaknesses in both the logic and economic rationale presented to support combining workloads at the Sacramento and San Antonio depots into single solicitations at each location. According to the 1998 Defense Authorization Act, alternatives that appear logical and potentially cost-effective should have been evaluated. The Air Force’s position that realizing efficiencies from shared personnel and facilities at Sacramento and San Antonio is best achieved with a single solicitation for combined workloads is questionable. The Air Force data does not support the conclusion that the inherent inefficiencies of the commodity workload are improved by combining it with the more predictable and consistent aircraft workload. Incomprehensive or Inconsistent Comparative Cost Analyses

The Air Force analyses stated that workload combination would save $22 million to $130 million at Sacramento and $92 million to $259 million at San Antonio. Also, the possibility of the cost benefits of increased competition resulting from solicitations for individual workloads was not recognized. Transition costs. Conclusions

The Air Force’s support for DOD’s determinations that it is more logical and economical to combine the workloads being competed at the closing depots is based on a wide variety of information accumulated during the acquisition strategy development process started in September 1995. We also recognize that the determinations ultimately represent a management judgment based on various qualitative and quantitative factors. Consequently, DOD’s determinations may well be appropriate, but its rationale is not well supported. To analyze the rationale for DOD’s determination, we reviewed (1) information contained in the reports; (2) documentation and other data supporting the reports; (3) discussions with Air Force officials responsible for preparing the reports and managing depot maintenance workloads; (4) discussions with contractor officials who are planning to participate in the competitions for workloads currently performed at the Sacramento and San Antonio depots; (5) discussions with Air Force Audit Agency officials who provided advice on the preparation of the Sacramento white paper and San Antonio report; (6) a review of related Air Force studies, reports, and data; (7) our prior work regarding related depot maintenance issues; and (8) a review of applicable laws and regulations. Additional copies are $2 each.
Why GAO Did This Study

Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Department of Defense's (DOD) supporting rationale for combining certain depot-level maintenance and repair workloads.

What GAO Found

GAO noted that: (1) the Air Force's support for DOD's determinations that it is more logical and economical to combine the workloads being competed at the closing depots is based on a wide variety of information accumulated during the acquisition strategy development process started in September 1995; (2) while GAO recognizes that the determinations ultimately represent a management judgment based on various qualitative and quantitative factors and that DOD's determinations may well be appropriate, the rationale presented in the February 24, 1998, Sacramento white paper and San Antonio report for combining the workloads in single solicitations at each location is not well supported; (3) GAO's assessment indicates that there are significant weaknesses in logic, assumptions, and data; (4) DOD did not consider other alternatives that appear to be logical and potentially cost-effective, and its assumption that efficiencies from shared personnel and facilities are best achieved with a single solicitation for combined workloads at each location is questionable; (5) also, the Air Force's claim that the effects of sequential personnel reductions and transition delays can be problematic is questionable in view of DOD's demonstrated success in the past handling multiple transitions and sequential reductions; (6) in addition, the workload stability rationale for Sacramento is questionable because the inherent inefficiencies of the commodity workload are not likely to be improved by combination with the more predictable and consistent aircraft workload; and (7) finally, the Air Force's cost analysis, which concluded that workload combination would save $22 million to $130 million at Sacramento and $92 million to $259 million at San Antonio, is questionable because it did not consider all cost factors, such as the cost benefits of increased competition resulting from solicitations for individual workloads.