	Scope and Methodology

To determine the challenges FPS faces in managing its guard contractors  and guards, we conducted site visits at 6 of FPS’s 11 regions. We conducted  covert testing at 10 judgmentally selected level IV facilities. To determine what actions, if any, FPS has taken to address challenges  with managing its contract guard program, we reviewed new contract  guard program guidance issued since our July 2009 testimony. FPS Faces Challenges Managing Its Guard Contractors That Hamper Its Ability to Protect Federal Facilities

		Some FPS Guard Contractors Did Not Always Comply with the Terms of Contracts

FPS continues to face challenges with overseeing its guard contractors  that hamper its ability to protect federal facilities. On the basis of our review of FPS’s contractual requirements and guard  training and certification records maintained by FPS and/or the  contractor, we reported in July 2009 that 62 percent, or 411, of the 663  guards employed by 7 of FPS’s 38 guard contractors and subsequently  deployed to a federal facility had at least one expired certification. FPS’s data showed that of the 663 guards, 435 are now fully certified and  trained, 167 are not fully certified and trained, and 61 guards are no longer  working on the contract. For example,    At a level IV facility, the guards did not follow evacuation procedures and  left two access points unattended, thereby leaving the facility vulnerable. According to  the documentation in the contract files, FPS did not take any enforcement  action against them for not complying with the terms of the contract, a  finding consistent with DHS’s Inspector General’s 2009 report. In fact,  FPS exercised the option to extend the contracts of these 7 contractors. These evaluations were for 38 contractors. FPS Faces Challenges with Overseeing Guards That Raise Concern about Protection of Federal Facilities

		FPS Is Not Providing All Guards with X-ray and Magnetometer Training in Some Regions

While FPS has given its guard contractors the responsibility to conduct  most of the training of guards, FPS is responsible for conducting the 8  hours of X-ray and magnetometer training that all guards are required to  have. For example, in one region, FPS has not provided the required X-ray or  magnetometer training to its almost 1,500 guards since 2004. As of January 2010, these guards had not received  the 16 hours of training but continued to work at federal facilities in this  region. FPS Has Limited Assurance That Guards Are Complying with Post Orders once They Are Deployed to Federal Facilities

FPS has limited assurance that its 15,000 guards are complying with post  orders. Each time they tried, our  investigators successfully passed undetected through security checkpoints  monitored by FPS guards with the components for an improvised  explosive device (IED) concealed on their persons at 10 level IV facilities  in four cities in major metropolitan areas. Since July 2009, FPS has  conducted 53 penetration tests in the six regions we visited. Recent Actions Taken by FPS May Help Improve Oversight of the Contract Guard Program

		FPS Is Increasing Guard Inspections at Facilities in Some Metropolitan Areas, while the Number of Inspections at Other Facilities May Not Increase

In response to our July 2009 testimony, FPS has increased the number of  guard inspections at federal facilities in some metropolitan areas. However, as of December 2009, about half  of the 752 inspectors had not received RAMP training. However, FPS  decided not to pursue federalizing guard positions because of the cost. Moreover, maintaining accurate and reliable data on whether the 15,000  guards deployed at federal facilities have met the training and certification  requirements is important for a number of reasons. Recommendations for Executive Action

Given the long-standing and unresolved issues related to FPS’s contract  guard program and challenges in protecting federal facilities, employees,  and the public who use these facilities, we recommend that the Secretary  of Homeland Security direct the Under Secretary of NPPD and the  Director of FPS to take the following eight actions:  identify other approaches and options that would be most beneficial and  financially feasible for protecting federal facilities;  rigorously and consistently monitor guard contractors’ and guards’  performance and step up enforcement against contractors that are not  complying with the terms of the contract;    complete all contract performance evaluations in accordance with FPS  issue a standardized record-keeping format to ensure that contract files  have required documentation;    develop a mechanism to routinely monitor guards at federal facilities    provide building-specific and scenario-based training and guidance to its    develop and implement a management tool for ensuring that reliable,  comprehensive data on the contract guard program are available on a real- time basis; and    verify the accuracy of all guard certification and training data before  entering them into RAMP, and periodically test the accuracy and reliability  of RAMP data to ensure that FPS management has the information needed  to effectively oversee its guard program.
Why GAO Did This Study

To accomplish its mission of protecting about 9,000 federal facilities, the Federal Protective Service (FPS) currently has a budget of about $1 billion, about 1,225 full-time employees, and about 15,000 contract security guards. FPS obligated $659 million for guard services in fiscal year 2009. This report assesses the challenges FPS faces in managing its guard contractors, overseeing guards deployed at federal facilities, and the actions, if any, FPS has taken to address these challenges. To address these objectives, GAO conducted site visits at 6 of FPS's 11 regions; interviewed FPS officials, guards, and contractors; and analyzed FPS's contract files. GAO also conducted covert testing at 10 judgmentally selected level IV facilities in four cities. A level IV facility has over 450 employees and a high volume of public contact.

What GAO Found

FPS faces a number of challenges in managing its guard contractors that hamper its ability to protect federal facilities. FPS requires contractors to provide guards who have met training and certification requirements, but 7 of 7 guard contractors we reviewed were not in compliance with this requirement. Specifically, we reported in July 2009 that 62 percent, or 411, of the 663 guards employed by 7 of FPS's 38 contractors and deployed to federal facilities had at least one expired certification, including those showing that the guard has not committed domestic violence, which make the guards ineligible to carry firearms. As of February 2010, according to FPS data, 435 of the 663 guards are now fully certified, 167 are not fully certified, and 61 guards are no longer working on the contract. FPS's guard contract also states that a contractor who does not comply with the contract is subject to enforcement action. FPS did not take any enforcement actions against these 7 contractors for noncompliance. In fact, FPS exercised the option to extend their contracts. FPS also did not comply with its requirement that a performance evaluation of each contractor be completed annually and that these evaluations and other performance-related data be included in the contract file. FPS also faces challenges in ensuring that many of the 15,000 guards have the required training and certification to be deployed at a federal facility. In July 2009, we reported that since 2004, FPS had not provided X-ray and magnetometer training to about 1,500 guards in one region. As of January 2010, these guards had not received this training and continued to work at federal facilities in this region. X-ray and magnetometer training is important because guards control access points at federal facilities. In addition, once guards are deployed to a federal facility, they are not always complying with assigned responsibilities (post orders). For example, we identified security vulnerabilities when GAO investigators successfully passed undetected through security checkpoints monitored by FPS guards with components for an improvised explosive device concealed on their persons at 10 level IV facilities in four cities in major metropolitan areas. Since July 2009, FPS has conducted 53 similar tests, and in over half of these tests some guards did not identify prohibited items, such as guns and knives. In response to GAO's July 2009 testimony, FPS has taken a number of actions that once fully implemented could help address challenges it faces in managing its contract guard program. For example, FPS has increased the number of guard inspections at federal facilities in some metropolitan areas. FPS also revised its X-ray and magnetometer training; however, guards will not all be fully trained until the end of 2010, although they are deployed at federal facilities. FPS recognized that its guard program has long-standing challenges and in 2009 contemplated a number of changes to the program, including assuming responsibility for all guard training and/or federalizing some guard positions at some federal facilities. However, FPS has not taken any actions in pursuing these ideas.