Joint Base Officials Have Reported Varying Levels of Progress in Consolidating Functions, but Cited Limited Opportunities and Challenges from Consolidation Efforts

Joint base officials reported varying levels of progress in consolidating  installation-support functions, several limitations that inhibited  consolidation, and challenges resulting from consolidation efforts that  created inefficiencies and inequities. Overall, we found that the 11 joint bases had reported partially  consolidating 80 percent of the functions for which the joint base  commander had some responsibility, but the extent of consolidation  varied from one joint base to another and among the various installation- support functions. Furthermore, joint base officials reported several  challenges resulting from consolidation, such as multiple military service  inspections and employees being disadvantaged in competing for  promotion opportunities, resulting from service-specific personnel  policies. Without a comprehensive  evaluation of the suitability of installation-support functions for  consolidation—and without guidance to address any negative  consequences that emerge from consolidation—individual joint bases will  still be expected to merge support functions, which may result in ongoing  inefficiencies and inequities. Support functions unique to military service mission. For example:
Port services. Small-arms range management. Officials from Joint Region Marianas were not part of our survey, but we  interviewed them to discuss their efforts to consolidate support services. In our  November 2012 report, we found that DOD does not have a fully  developed method for accurately collecting information on cost savings  and efficiencies achieved specifically as a result of joint basing. As a  result, to gain insight into the degree to which DOD has gained  efficiencies and cost savings, our survey asked respondents to identify  the extent to which they have (1) reduced redundant funded positions; (2)  reduced redundant contracts or increased contract efficiencies; and (3)  merged or consolidated redundant procedures. Lack of Direction Has Hindered Joint Base Progress in Achieving Goals

Joint base and military service officials whom we interviewed said OSD  has not provided them with direction on how to achieve greater  efficiencies and cost savings as the goals of joint basing, including  reporting requirements and milestones. However, the officials noted that they do not yet have detailed plans for  such a review. Without a collaborative evaluation of the joint basing  program by OSD and the military services to determine if the stated goals  of the program are still appropriate and continue to be priorities for  DOD—and without clear communication on any revised goals and  additional direction on how to achieve such goals, including reporting  requirements and milestones—it will be difficult for DOD to demonstrate  that the joint basing program has effectively and efficiently achieved its  goals. Matter for Congressional Consideration

To help ensure DOD’s approach to joint basing achieves the goals as  outlined by DOD in its justification for the 2005 BRAC recommendation  and leverages additional opportunities to reduce duplication of effort that  could in turn generate cost savings and increased efficiencies, Congress  should consider directing the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense  (Installations and Environment), in collaboration with the military services  and joint bases, to evaluate the purpose of the program and determine  whether the current goals, as stated in the 2005 BRAC Commission  recommendation, are still appropriate, or whether goals should be  revised; communicate these goals to the military services and joint bases,  and adjust program activities accordingly; provide direction to the joint  bases on requirements for meeting program goals, including determining  reporting requirements and milestones; and determine any next steps for  joint basing, including whether to expand it to other installations. DOD did not provide time frames for completing  such actions. DOD partially concurred with the second recommendation to take policy  actions, as appropriate, such as issuing additional guidance, to address  challenges resulting in inefficiencies and inequities in consolidating  installation-support functions. Also, as stated in the report, joint base officials told us they are unclear to  what extent achieving greater efficiencies and cost savings are still  appropriate for the goals of joint basing, and to what extent they are  required to pursue additional opportunities beyond the consolidation of  installation-support functions in the joint base memorandums of  agreement to achieve these goals. Furthermore, we conducted  a web-based survey of 11 of the 12 joint bases. To determine the extent to which officials have reported consolidating  their installation-support functions, we reviewed DOD’s 2008 Joint Basing  Implementation Guidance to identify DOD’s expectations for  consolidation. GAO’s 2011 High-Risk Series: An Update. Military Base Realignments and Closures: DOD Needs to Update Savings  Estimates and Continue to Address Challenges in Consolidating Supply- Related Functions at Depot Maintenance Locations.
Why GAO Did This Study

GAO designated DOD support infrastructure as a high-risk area to address efficiency challenges. In 2005, DOD recommended to the Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) Commission combining 26 installations into 12 joint bases to generate efficiencies and cost savings, initially estimated to be $2.3 billion. In 2009, DOD reduced this estimate to $273 million. GAO was mandated to assess DOD's progress in consolidating common services across joint bases. This report addresses the extent to which officials reported consolidating installation-support functions, and meeting joint basing goals to achieve greater efficiencies and cost savings. GAO conducted a survey of 11 joint bases, and reviewed applicable guidance. GAO did not survey Joint Region Marianas because it was subject to different expectations.

What GAO Found

Joint base officials reported varying progress in consolidating installation-support functions, and challenges resulting from consolidation efforts that created inefficiencies and inequities. Overall, the joint bases reported partially consolidating 80 percent of their installation-support functions, but the extent of consolidation varied across the bases and among the various functions. None of the joint bases have reported consolidating all functions. However, all 11 joint bases reported consolidating some portion of eight functions, such as custodial services and installation safety. The least consolidated functions were reported to be military service-specific or mission-specific, such as small-arms range management and port services. Also, joint base officials reported several challenges resulting from consolidation, such as multiple inspections and employees being potentially disadvantaged in competing for promotion opportunities due to military service-specific personnel policies. The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and military service officials have not evaluated which functions are still suitable for consolidation or taken policy actions to address any challenges resulting from consolidation. Without an evaluation of the suitability of installation-support functions for consolidation and without actions to address any negative consequences that emerged from consolidation, the Department of Defense (DOD) may continue to experience challenges in its efforts to consolidate these functions.
Note: Not all of the joint bases that GAO surveyed have small-arms range management or port services functions.
Joint base officials reported that consolidation of support functions has resulted in some progress toward achieving the goals of joint basing (achieving efficiencies and cost savings), by reducing redundant positions and finding contracting efficiencies. However, as GAO reported in November 2012, DOD does not have a method to collect cost savings information achieved specifically from joint basing. Thus, GAO recommended that DOD develop a plan for doing so. DOD disagreed and has not yet taken action. GAO continues to believe this recommendation has merit and should be addressed. Also, officials said they are uncertain of the extent to which the goals of joint basing are still appropriate, and to what extent they are required to take actions to pursue them. OSD has not collaborated with the military services to evaluate whether the goals of joint basing remain appropriate and has not provided direction to the joint bases on future priorities. Without a collaborative evaluation of the joint basing program by OSD and military service officials to determine if the goals remain appropriate—and without additional direction to help meet reporting requirements—it will be difficult for DOD to determine the extent to which the joint basing initiative is achieving its intended goals.

What GAO Recommends

Congress should consider directing DOD to evaluate joint basing goals, provide direction on requirements to meet the goals, and determine next steps for joint basing. GAO included this matter because DOD did not concur with GAO's recommendations to conduct such an evaluation and provide direction, in part because DOD stated joint bases have achieved savings. GAO also recommended DOD evaluate which installation-support functions remain suitable for consolidation, with which DOD concurred, and take policy actions to address challenges, with which DOD partially concurred, noting its existing processes to address challenges. GAO continues to believe its findings and recommendations are valid as discussed in this report.