Federal agencies, such as the Coast Guard, U.S.  Customs and Border Protection (CBP), and TSA, have been tasked with  responsibilities and functions intended to make seaports more secure,  such as monitoring vessel traffic or inspecting cargo and containers, and  procuring new assets such as aircraft and cutters to conduct patrols and  respond to threats. In addition to these federal agencies, seaport  stakeholders in the private sector and at the state and local levels of  government have taken actions to enhance the security of seaports, such  as conducting security assessments of infrastructure and vessels operated  within the seaports and developing security plans to protect against a  terrorist attack. The actions taken by these agencies and stakeholders are  primarily aimed at three types of protections: (1) identifying and reducing  vulnerabilities of the facilities, infrastructure, and vessels operating in  seaports, (2) securing the cargo and commerce flowing through seaports,  and (3) developing greater maritime domain awareness through enhanced  intelligence, information-sharing capabilities, and assets and technologies. Given the wide range of potential targets, an effective security response  includes identifying targets, assessing risks to them, and taking steps to  reduce or mitigate these risks. This security framework includes  assessment of risks, access controls over personnel and facilities, and  development and implementation of security plans, among other activities. The amount of effort involved in carrying out these actions and  implementing these programs has been considerable. While some of these challenges will be resolved with time, analysis, and  oversight, there are other challenges that bear even more careful watching,  because they may prove to be considerably more difficult to overcome. These three challenges involve (1) design and  implementing programs, (2) coordinating between different agencies and  stakeholder interests, and (3) determining how to pay for these efforts. As we noted in a July 2003  report, the former U.S. Customs Service, part of which is now CBP  initiated the Container Security Initiative (CSI) in January 2002 in  response to security vulnerabilities created by ocean container trade and  the concern that terrorists could exploit these vulnerabilities to transport  or detonate WMDs in the United States. Lack of Goals and Measures Makes Determining Progress Difficult

Although there is widespread agreement that actions taken so far have led  to a heightened awareness of the need for security and an enhanced ability  to identify and respond to many security threats, it is difficult to translate  these actions into a clear sense of how far we have progressed in making  seaports more secure. However, although it has been more than 3 years since the  September 11, 2001, attacks, the Coast Guard is still in the process of  developing a performance indicator for its seaport security activities that  can be used to indicate what progress has been made to secure seaports. Similarly, as discussed earlier in describing  the actions taken to secure the cargo transiting through seaports in  containers, performance measures are needed to determine the progress  such actions are making to reduce vulnerabilities of the international  supply chain. In a homeland security setting, possible uses of  data produced from risk management efforts include informing decisions  on where the federal government might spend billions of dollars within  and between federal departments, as well as informing decisions on grants  awarded to state and local governments. These activities will thus continue  to demand close attention. Port Security: Planning Needed to Develop and Operate Maritime Worker  Identification Card Program. Maritime Security: Progress Made in Implementing Maritime  Transportation Security Act, but Concerns Remain.
Why GAO Did This Study

More than 3 years after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, concerns remain over the security of U.S. seaports and waterways. Seaports and waterways are vulnerable given their size, easy accessibility by water and land, large numbers of potential targets, and close proximity to urban areas. Seaports are also a critical link in the international supply chain, which has its own potential vulnerabilities that terrorists could exploit to transport a weapon of mass destruction to the United States. Federal agencies such as the Coast Guard and Customs and Border Protection and other seaport stakeholders such as state and local law enforcement officials as well as owners and operators of facilities and vessels have taken actions to try to mitigate these vulnerabilities and enhance maritime security. This testimony, which is based on previously completed GAO work, reports on (1) the types of actions taken by the federal government and other stakeholders to address maritime security, (2) the main challenges that GAO observed in taking these actions, and (3) what tools and approaches may be useful in planning future actions to enhance maritime security.

What GAO Found

Federal agencies and local stakeholders have taken many actions to secure seaports. For example, federal agencies have stepped up vessel monitoring, cargo and container inspection, and security patrol activities. Port stakeholders in the private sector and in state and local government have taken such actions as conducting security assessments of infrastructure and vessels and implementing security plans. These actions provide three types of protections: identifying and reducing vulnerabilities of seaports, securing the cargo moving through seaports, and developing an informed view of maritime activities through intelligence, information-sharing, and new technologies to identify and respond to threats. Due in large part to the urgency with which these actions were implemented, challenges have been encountered in implementing them. While some challenges may be resolved with time, others are more difficult to resolve and could hinder the actions' effectiveness. The main challenges GAO has identified include failure to develop necessary planning components to carry out the programs; difficulty in coordinating the activities of federal agencies and port stakeholders to implement programs; and difficulty in maintaining the financial support to continue implementation of security enhancements. As intensified homeland security efforts continue, assessing their contribution to security and their sustainability over time will become more important. Assessing the progress made in securing seaports is difficult, as these efforts lack clear goals defining what they are to achieve and measures that track progress toward these goals. As Congress and the nation consider how much security is enough, more attention will likely be needed to define these goals and measures. Doing so is important because no amount of money can totally protect seaports from attack by a determined enemy. These realities suggest that the future focus in applying resources and efforts needs to incorporate an approach to assess critical infrastructure, determine what is most at risk, and apply measures designed to make cost effective use of resources and funding.