To  develop the first TacSat, DOD effectively managed requirements,  employed mature technologies, and built the satellite in the science and  technology environment, all under the guidance of a leader who provided  a clear vision and prompt funding for the project. Once TacSat 1’s requirements were set, OFT did not change them. According to a number of DOD officials, the ultimate success of the  TacSat 1 procurement was largely the result of the former OFT director,  who    provided the original impetus and obtained support for the experiment  from high levels within DOD and the Congress;    negotiated a customized mission assurance agreement with Air Force  leaders to launch TacSat 1 from Vandenberg Air Force Base at a cost  that was affordable given the experiment’s budget;    empowered TacSat 1’s project manager at the Naval Research  Laboratory to make appropriate trade-off decisions to deliver the  satellite on time and within cost; and    helped OFT staff develop an efficient work relationship with the Naval  Research Laboratory team and provided the laboratory with prompt  decisions. These efforts are generally in the early stages. FALCON is expected to flight-test hypersonic technologies and  be capable of launching small satellites such as TacSats. DOD Faces Several Challenges in Pursuing Responsive Tactical Capabilities for Warfighters

DOD has several challenges to overcome in pursuing a responsive tactical  capability for the warfighter. DOD Has Yet to Provide a Low-Cost, Small Launch Vehicle

While DOD has delivered TacSat 1 on time and within budget, the satellite  is not yet operational because it lacks a reliable low-cost—under   $10 million—small launch vehicle to place it in orbit. However, in pursuing a low-cost, on-demand tactical  capability, the science and technology and acquisition communities have  moved forward on somewhat separate tracks, and it is unclear to what  extent the work and knowledge gained by the labs will be leveraged when  the TacSat experiments are transferred to the acquisition community. Specifically, DOD’s process for developing TacSat 1 reflects best  practices that larger space system programs could employ to achieve  better acquisition outcomes. In addition, some DOD officials believe that  these efforts—focusing on delivering capabilities to the warfighter through  TacSats and small, low-cost launch vehicles—could lead to long-term  benefits, including providing opportunities for major space systems to test  new technologies, enhancing the skills of DOD’s space workforce, and  broadening the space industrial base. Second, developing small, low-cost launch vehicles could provide an  avenue for testing new technologies in space. According to industry  representatives and DOD officials, efforts to develop a small, low-cost  launch vehicle could improve the acquisition process because testing  technologies in an operational environment could lower the risk for  program managers by providing mature technologies that could be  integrated into their acquisition programs. Third, giving space professionals the opportunity to manage small-scale  projects like TacSats from start to finish may better prepare them for  managing larger, more complex space system acquisitions in the future. Finally, building low-cost, responsive satellites and launch vehicles  could create opportunities for small, innovative companies to compete  for DOD contracts and thereby increase competition and broaden the  space industrial base. Conclusions

For more than two decades, DOD has invested heavily in space assets to  provide the warfighter with critical information needed to successfully  conduct military operations. To understand the challenges to DOD’s efforts and to determine whether  DOD’s experiences with TacSats and small, low-cost launch vehicles could  inform major space system acquisitions, we analyzed a wide body of GAO  and DOD studies that discuss acquisition problems and associated  challenges, including our work on best practices in weapon system  development that we have conducted over the past decade. Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense
Why GAO Did This Study

For more than two decades, the Department of Defense (DOD) has invested heavily in space assets to provide the warfighter with mission-critical information. Despite these investments, DOD commanders have reported shortfalls in space capabilities. To provide tactical capabilities to the warfighter sooner, DOD recently began developing TacSats--a series of small satellites intended to be built within a limited time frame and budget--and pursuing options for small, low-cost vehicles for launching small satellites. GAO was asked to (1) examine the outcomes to date of DOD's TacSat and small, low-cost launch vehicle efforts, (2) identify the challenges in pursuing these efforts, and (3) determine whether experiences with these efforts could inform DOD's major space system acquisitions.

What GAO Found

Through effective management of requirements and technologies and strong leadership, DOD was able to deliver the first TacSat satellite in 12 months and for less than $10 million. The Office of Force Transformation, TacSat 1's sponsor, set requirements early in the satellite's development process and kept them stable. DOD modified existing technologies for use in space, significantly reducing the likelihood of encountering unforeseen problems that could result in costly design changes. The satellite was also built within DOD's science and technology environment, which enabled service laboratory scientists to address problems quickly, inexpensively, and innovatively. The vision and support provided by leadership were also key to achieving the successful delivery of TacSat 1. DOD has also made progress in developing three additional TacSats and is working toward developing a low-cost launch vehicle available on demand. Despite this achievement, DOD faces several challenges in providing tactical capabilities to the warfighter sooner. First, DOD has yet to develop a low-cost, small launch vehicle available to quickly put tactical satellites, including TacSat 1, into orbit. Second, limited collaboration between the science and technology and the acquisition communities--as well as the acquisition community's tendency to expand requirements after program start--could impede efforts to quickly procure tactical capabilities. Securing funding for future TacSat experiments may also prove difficult because they are not part of an acquisition program. Finally, DOD lacks a departmentwide strategy for implementing these efforts, and because key advocates of the experiments have left DOD, it is unclear how well they will be supported in the future. Regardless of these challenges, DOD's experiences with the TacSat experiments thus far could inform its major space system acquisitions. DOD's approach to developing the TacSats--matching requirements to available resources, using proven technologies, and separating technology development from product development--reflects best commercial practices that lead to quicker delivery with less risk. According to some DOD officials, the TacSats and small, low-cost launch vehicles--once they are developed--could also provide an avenue for large space system acquisitions to prove out technologies in the space environment, something DOD has avoided because of the high cost of launching such experiments. These officials also believe that giving space professionals the opportunity to manage small-scale projects like TacSats may better prepare them for managing larger, more complex space system acquisitions. Finally, these officials noted that building small-scale satellite systems and launch vehicles could create opportunities for small, innovative companies to compete for DOD contracts and thereby broaden the space industrial base.