However, the State Department’s ability to assess  progress toward reducing MANPADS proliferation is limited by the  multilateral forums’ lack of mechanisms to monitor countries’  implementation of their commitments. The department also obtained— through bilateral diplomatic channels—foreign governments’ commitments  to destroy or secure MANPADS. The multilateral forums have no mechanisms to allow them to monitor or  measure members’ implementation of their political commitments. Although DOD has  strengthened the requirements for monitoring Stinger missile systems after  they have been sold to foreign countries, DOD has no requirement for DOD  organizations responsible for end-use monitoring to keep records on the  number and destinations of these Stingers. Stinger Inventory Inspections Are Impaired by Inconsistent Practices and Incomplete Inventory Records

DOD’s inventory inspection efforts are impaired because DOD lacks  procedures for conducting Stinger inspections and requirements for  keeping inspection records. Such challenges include establishing system requirements,  maturing technology and design, and setting reliable cost estimates. In January 2004, DHS awarded the initial contracts  for a 2-year program to develop and demonstrate a counter-MANPADS  system for commercial aircraft. DHS faces significant challenges in  adapting a military counter-MANPADS system to commercial aircraft in the  initial phases of its program. Knowledge Point 2—The product design is stable. A knowledge-based approach also involves the use of controls or exit  criteria to ensure that the required knowledge has been attained at each  critical juncture. Beginning  in 2003, U.S. multilateral and bilateral diplomatic efforts to reduce this  threat of MANPADS increased foreign governments’ commitments to  reduce MANPADS proliferation. Because DOD lacks Stinger inspection procedures, DOD officials overseas  use inconsistent practices to perform Stinger inspections. To assess the U.S. government efforts to control the worldwide  proliferation of MANPADS, we reviewed documents and interviewed  officials in State Department’s Nonproliferation Bureau Office of Export  Control and Conventional Arms Nonproliferation Policy, Office of Export  Control Cooperation, Office of Policy, Public Affairs and Congressional  Relations; the State Department’s Political and Military Affairs Bureau  Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement (whose MANPADS officials  formerly were in the Office of Plans, Policy and Analysis until September  2003); and the State Department’s Arms Control Bureau Office of  Conventional Arms Control; as well as the Department of Defense’s (DOD)  Defense Threat Reduction Agency On-site Inspection Directorate  Interagency Liaison for Europe. To assess the Department of Homeland Security’s efforts to develop  technical countermeasures to minimize the threat of a MANPADS attack,  we compared DHS’s plan for its counter-MANPADS system development  and demonstration program plan against the best practices of commercial  and military acquisitions identified in our past reports. GAO Comments

1. 3.
Why GAO Did This Study

The proliferation of man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS) has been of growing concern to the United States and other governments. The United States is pursuing a wide variety of activities internationally and domestically to address this threat. GAO was asked to assess efforts by (1) the State Department to control global proliferation of MANPADS, (2) the Department of Defense (DOD) to monitor end-use of U.S.-exported Stingers, and (3) the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to develop technical countermeasures to minimize the threat of a MANPADS attack.

What GAO Found

In 2003, the State Department made important progress in its efforts to control the global proliferation of MANPADS. Thirty-two foreign governments made multilateral commitments to better control MANPADS and prevent their acquisition by terrorists. However, the State Department's ability to assess further progress in MANPADS nonproliferation is limited because the multilateral forums have no mechanisms to monitor members' implementation of commitments. In addition, the State Department obtained foreign government commitments to destroy or better secure MANPADS. DOD is required annually to inventory every Stinger missile system sold overseas. However, DOD's inventory inspection process has flaws. First, DOD records on the number and destination of Stingers sold overseas are incomplete, unreliable, and largely in hard-copy form. Because DOD has not required DOD agencies responsible for end-use monitoring to retain these records, it does not know how many Stingers have been sold overseas. Second, DOD officials overseas use inconsistent practices when inspecting Stinger inventories because DOD lacks procedures for conducting these inspections. To develop technical countermeasures to minimize the MANPADS threat to aircraft, the DHS initiated a 2-year program to adapt military aircraft defense systems to commercial aircraft. However, DHS faces significant challenges such as establishing system requirements and setting reliable cost estimates. The department adopted GAO's January 2004 recommendations to implement a knowledge-based approach to this development program. For example, DHS plans to use GAO-recommended criteria that ensure product knowledge is attained at key points in system development.