Space systems can take a long  time to develop and often consist of multiple components, including  satellites, ground control stations, terminals, and user equipment. DOD  satellite systems are also expensive to acquire. Unit costs for current  DOD satellites can range from $500 million to over $3 billion. Many major DOD space programs have experienced significant cost and  schedule increases. For instance, program costs for the Advanced  Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) satellite program, a protected satellite  communications system, had grown 118 percent since its first estimate as  of our March 2017 review and its first satellite was launched over 3.5  years late. For the Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS), a missile  warning satellite program, costs grew nearly 300 percent and the launch  of the first satellite was delayed roughly 9 years. Both programs are now  in the production phase where fewer problems tend to surface, and where  there is typically less risk of cost and schedule growth. The only major  satellite program with systems in the development phase is the Global  Positioning System (GPS), which has seen an almost 4-year delay and  unit cost growth of 9 percent due to technical issues. Cost and schedule growth has also been a challenge for satellites and  their ground systems. In fact, delays with ground systems have been so  lengthy, that satellites sometimes spend years in orbit before key  capabilities can be fully exploited. Figure 1 provides more details on the  current status of DOD’s major space programs. Cost and schedule growth in DOD’s space programs is sometimes driven  by the inherent risks associated with developing complex space  technology; however, over the past 8 years we have identified a number  of other management and oversight problems that can worsen the  situation. Ongoing Work Shows GPS Acquisitions Are Still High Risk

In 2015, we reported that the Air Force was experiencing significant  difficulties developing the GPS ground system, OCX, and consistently  overstated its progress to the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). Preliminary results from our ongoing review of GPS shows that the  satellites, ground systems, and user equipment are all still on a high risk  path; though satellite delays are still somewhat mitigated by the longer  than anticipated performance of older GPS satellites. Fragmented Space Leadership Exacerbates Acquisition Problems

We have reported over the years that DOD’s culture has generally been  resistant to changes in space acquisition approaches and that fragmented  responsibilities have made it difficult to coordinate and deliver  interdependent systems. For example, in 2012 we found that although  some improvements in leadership have been made, there was no single  person or organization held accountable for balancing acquisition needs  against wants, ensuring coordination among the many organizations  involved with space systems acquisitions, and ensuring that resources  are directed where they are most needed. In 2016 we determined it was too early to gauge  whether the PDSA has sufficient authority to consolidate space  leadership responsibilities. In our ongoing work on the Global Positioning System, Army officials  have also observed that the lack of a central point of authority and  accountability is hampering coordination on GPS user equipment. In conclusion, given the long-standing fragmentation in space leadership  and consequent challenges faced by DOD in synchronizing its extensive  space enterprise, other, more significant reform measures may deserve a  closer look. They include  allowing time for the recent PDSA change to work; combining military  space functions into one agency; combining Air Force and NRO space  acquisition functions into a space acquisition agency; and creating a new  military department for the space domain - a Space Force. Space Acquisitions: Challenges Facing DOD as it Changes Approaches  to Space Acquisitions. GPS: Actions Needed to Address Ground System Development Problems  and User Equipment Production Readiness. Launch Enterprise: Acquisition Best Practices Can Benefit Future  Efforts.
Why GAO Did This Study

DOD's space systems provide critical capabilities that support military and other government operations and can take a long time to develop, produce, and launch. These systems can also be expensive to acquire and field, amounting to billions of dollars each year. Given the time and resource demands of DOD's space systems and the need to ensure taxpayer dollars are used effectively, especially in light of today's constrained government budget environment, it is essential that DOD manage system acquisitions carefully and avoid repeating past problems.
This statement focuses on (1) the current status and cost of major DOD space system acquisitions, (2) GPS, which is the only large DOD satellite program with systems currently in the development cycle, and (3) leadership for space acquisitions.
This statement highlights the results of GAO's work on space acquisitions over the past 8 years and presents preliminary observations from ongoing work on the Global Positioning System. For the ongoing work, GAO analyzed program documents and interviewed DOD and contractor officials.

What GAO Found

Many major Department of Defense (DOD) space programs GAO reviewed have experienced cost and schedule increases. For example, costs for the Advanced Extremely High Frequency satellite program grew 118 percent and its first satellite was launched more than 3.5 years late. Costs for the Space Based Infrared System grew nearly 300 percent and its scheduled launch was delayed roughly 9 years. Both programs are now in the production phase during which fewer technical problems tend to surface. Satellite ground systems have also been challenged by cost and schedule growth. In fact, ground system delays have been so lengthy that satellites sometimes spend years in orbit before key capabilities can be fully utilized. The table below provides some examples of program status.
GAO's preliminary results from an ongoing review of the Global Positioning System (GPS) show that the satellites, ground systems, and user equipment continue to be on a high-risk path. The launch of the first GPS satellite has been delayed almost 4 years because of technical problems. Additionally, development challenges for the satellite's ground system have resulted in delays so significant that the Air Force has started two other ground system efforts as workarounds to mitigate risk of delayed GPS capability. Additionally, it remains unclear how DOD will overcome a number of challenges that create high risk to the timely fielding of upgraded GPS user equipment for the warfighter.
GAO has reported over the years that DOD's culture has generally been resistant to changes in space acquisition approaches and that fragmented responsibilities have made it difficult to coordinate and deliver interdependent systems. Although some changes in leadership have been made, such as providing the Secretary of the Air Force with additional space responsibilities, it is too early to gauge whether these changes are sufficient to provide leadership for balancing needs against wants, ensure coordination among the many organizations involved with space, and ensure that resources are directed where they are most needed. Given the long-standing fragmentation in space leadership and consequent challenges DOD faces in synchronizing its extensive space enterprise, discussions with DOD officials and experts indicate further-reaching changes, ranging from establishing a space acquisition agency to instituting a new military department for space, may deserve a closer look.

What GAO Recommends

Past GAO reports have generally recommended that DOD adopt acquisition best practices to help ensure cost and schedule goals are met. DOD has generally agreed and taken some actions to address space acquisition problems; however, additional actions are still needed.