DOD Has Identified Potential Minuteman III Follow-on Options but DOD and NNSA Are Not Preparing Complete Cost Estimates or Effectively Involving the Nuclear Weapons Council

DOD has identified capability requirements and potential basing options  for the Minuteman III follow-on ICBM; however, neither the Air Force nor  NNSA are required to estimate the total system costs for both the missile  and warhead for the Nuclear Weapons Council to review; moreover, the  Air Force does not identify the council as a stakeholder to synchronize the  Minuteman III follow-on study with the W78/88-1 life-extension program. Although the Nuclear Weapons Council is responsible for coordinating  budget matters pertaining to nuclear weapons programs between DOD  and DOE, and is engaging in an effort to broadly synchronize warhead  life-extension programs with delivery system modernization efforts, it has  not requested that either the Air Force or NNSA estimate the total system  costs of the missile and warhead. Without timely and  relevant information on the projected costs and findings of the Minuteman  III follow-on study, the Nuclear Weapons Council may be unable to  provide guidance to the Air Force on the study, or consider the study’s  implications and potential effects on other nuclear weapons  modernization efforts as it revises its baseline plan. GAO’s work on cost estimating has found  that a reliable cost estimate is critical to the success of any program  because it provides the basis for informed decision making. DOD and DOE’s Long- Term Plan for the Nuclear Weapons Enterprise Incorporates Interoperable Warheads, but the Navy’s Participation in the Warhead Feasibility Study Has Been Limited

DOD and DOE, through the Nuclear Weapons Council, have prepared a  long-term, baseline plan for the nuclear weapons enterprise that  incorporates interoperable warheads, and the Air Force and NNSA have  begun examining the feasibility of designing such a warhead, but the  modernization of existing weapons is a higher Navy priority and has  limited the Navy’s participation in the warhead feasibility study. The  2010 Nuclear Posture Review recommended that the Nuclear Weapons  Council study options for extending the life of the W78 ICBM warhead,  including the possibility of using the resulting warhead also on Navy  SLBMs, and in June 2012 the Nuclear Weapons Council requested the  Air Force, Navy, and NNSA to commit resources to the W78/88-1 life- extension program study. Lastly, if the  guidance governing life-extension programs is not updated, the services  may not be prepared to align their programs and resources in support of  joint interoperable warhead studies. The Navy has concerns about changing the warhead design. In the longer term, the Navy has not identified the resources needed to  support the life-extension program, should the Nuclear Weapons Council  approve of an interoperable design once the warhead feasibility study is  completed. Additionally, DOD’s instruction  currently states that the military departments are to develop procedures  for certain joint DOD-DOE activities. Both DOD and DOE have requirements to review and, as needed, update  their respective guidance regularly. However, unless the Navy identifies the long-term  resources needed for the W78/88-1 life-extension program, it may be  poorly positioned to undertake the more-detailed analyses needed to  validate the interoperable warhead on Navy systems, resulting in further  program delays and potentially costly modifications. To ensure that the services are able to support the consideration of  interoperable warhead concepts during future life-extension programs, we  recommend the following two actions:  the Secretaries of Defense and Energy direct the Nuclear Weapons  Council to revise the Procedural Guideline for the Phase 6.X Process  to require the services to align their programs and resources before  beginning concept or feasibility studies jointly with another service;  and the Secretary of Defense issue or revise existing guidance to require  the services to align their programs and resources before beginning  concept or feasibility studies jointly with another service. DOD concurred with all seven recommendations, and DOE  concurred with the three recommendations requiring joint action between  the departments. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

For this review, we addressed the extent to which (1) the Department of  Defense (DOD) has assessed the capability requirements, potential  basing options, and costs for the follow-on to the Minuteman III  intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM); and (2) DOD and the National  Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) have explored the feasibility of  incorporating an interoperable warhead concept into the long-term  nuclear weapons stockpile plan.
Why GAO Did This Study

U.S. nuclear weapons--both the bombs and warheads and their delivery systems--are aging beyond their intended service lives. The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review recommended that the Nuclear Weapons Council study options for extending the life of ICBM warheads, including the potential for developing a warhead that is interoperable on both Air Force and Navy missiles. In 2013 DOD will initiate a study to identify a replacement for the Minuteman III missile. This report addresses the extent to which (1) DOD has assessed the capability requirements, potential basing options, and costs for the follow-on to the Minuteman III ICBM; and (2) DOD and DOE have explored the feasibility of incorporating an interoperable warhead concept into the long-term nuclear weapons stockpile plan. GAO analyzed DOD and NNSA policies, plans, guidance, and other documents; and interviewed officials responsible for planning the Minuteman III follow-on and the warhead life-extension program.

What GAO Found

The Department of Defense (DOD) has identified capability requirements and potential basing options for the Minuteman III follow-on intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), and the Department of Energy (DOE) has begun a parallel study of options to extend the life of its warhead, but neither department plans to estimate the total system costs for the new missile and its warhead. GAO's work on cost estimating has found that a reliable cost estimate is critical to any program by providing the basis for informed decision making. The Nuclear Weapons Council--the joint activity of DOD and DOE for nuclear weapons programs--is responsible for coordinating budget matters related to nuclear weapons programs between the departments, and is engaging in an effort to broadly synchronize nuclear weapons life-extension programs with delivery-system modernization efforts, but has not asked either department to provide estimates of the total system cost. In the absence of such a request, neither department is developing total cost estimates. Further, DOD's plan to study ICBM follow-on options does not include the council as a stakeholder to synchronize the missile and warhead efforts to help ensure that the study considers an enterprise-wide perspective. Without timely cost estimates and updates on the status of the ICBM follow-on study, the council may be unable to provide guidance and direction on the study, or consider its implications and potential effects on other nuclear weapons modernization efforts.
DOD and DOE have prepared a long-term plan that incorporates interoperable warheads into the stockpile, and although they have begun studying the feasibility of designing such a warhead, the Navy has had limited participation thus far. The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review recommended the Nuclear Weapons Council study the development of an interoperable warhead that could be deployed on both Air Force and Navy ballistic missiles, and the council has requested the Air Force, Navy, and the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) to commit resources to the study. Although the Air Force and NNSA have been examining warhead concepts, the Navy has not fully engaged in the effort because (1) other, ongoing modernization programs are higher Navy priorities, and (2) it has concerns about changing the design of the warhead. The Navy's further participation is uncertain because it has not identified the resources needed to continue with the program once the study is completed, if the interoperable warhead is adopted. Consequently, the Navy will be poorly positioned to perform the more-detailed analyses needed to validate the approved design, potentially resulting in program delays. The Nuclear Weapons Council guidelines governing nuclear weapons refurbishments, and the corresponding DOD instruction, do not require the Air Force and Navy to align their programs and resources before beginning joint-service warhead studies. For example, DOD's instruction states that the military departments are to develop procedures for certain joint DOD-DOE activities, but it is unclear about aligning their programs and resources with each other. If the guidance and DOD instruction are not updated, the services may not be prepared to participate in future joint-service studies.

What GAO Recommends

GAO is making seven recommendations to provide complete cost estimates to the Nuclear Weapons Council and improve synchronization between DOD and DOE; to identify long-term Navy funding to support the interoperable warhead life-extension program; and to issue or revise existing DOD and Nuclear Weapons Council guidance. In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with all of GAO's recommendations, and DOE concurred with the three recommendations requiring joint action between the two departments.