In addition, DOD stated that the criteria proposed by the Army for entering low-rate initial production would require the successful completion of multiple system tests with the ATACMS as the carrier. A significant portion of the submunition’s test plan remains uncompleted. The project office has added five development flights to the test program because of technical problems, without extending the time to complete all the tests. All of the submunition’s flight testing will be done using a test aircraft with subsonic deployment rather than the supersonic deployment from its intended carrier, the ATACMS Block II missile. The Army has not included a flight test in its submunition’s test plans to evaluate whether or not the carrier can dispense the final tactical submunition configuration. According to Army representatives, data from this test will not be used in making the submunition’s low-rate initial production decision, since a test to dispense the submunition is not required. According to the former ATACMS Block II product manager, if any problems result from the submunition flight tests, the ATACMS Block II dispense tests would not be done until after the December 1997 low-rate initial production decision. The testing completed to date has uncovered numerous problems that have resulted in design changes, additional testing, and schedule delays. Qualification testing was scheduled to be completed in November 1995. However, under the current schedule, qualification testing is not expected to be complete until November 1997. Thus, the primary objective of the developmental flight tests—to verify design and performance—will not be met. Submunition’s Ambitious Schedule Is Unnecessary

The Army built in 8 months of excess time into the submunition’s production delivery schedule, therefore it is unnecessary to make the low-rate initial production decision in December 1997. However, a review of the program office production lead time and delivery requirements shows that the submunition’s initial production contract can be awarded in August 1998 and still allow sufficient time for the submunition to be integrated into the missile. Delaying the decision would allow the Army additional time to complete its development test program. Recommendation

Given the criticality of the dispense to the brilliant antiarmor submunition program, we recommend that the Secretary of the Army require the program office to demonstrate that qualified tactical submunitions can be successfully dispensed from the ATACMS Block II missile before seeking a low-rate initial production decision on the submunition program. Comments From the Department of Defense

The following are GAO’s comments on the Department of Defense’s (DOD) letter dated September 12, 1997. GAO Comments

1. 2. 3. 4. These officials maintain that this is an issue for the Block II missile. 5. 6.
Why GAO Did This Study

Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided its assessment of the Army's brilliant antiarmor submunition (BAT), for which the Army plans to request authority to start low-rate initial production in December 1997, focusing on the status of its acquisition plans and whether it is technically ready to enter production.

What GAO Found

GAO noted that: (1) a decision on low-rate initial production of BAT, scheduled for December 1997, appears to be premature because a crucial technical demonstration will not be accomplished by that time; (2) in 1995, the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Army agreed to relax the performance criteria that BAT was to meet before proceeding into low-rate initial production; (3) under the new criteria, the Army is not required to demonstrate that the submunition can be successfully dispensed from the Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) Block II missile; (4) in September 1994, the Department of Defense (DOD) noted, in its comments to GAO's draft classified report, that the successful completion of multiple tests of the submunition with ATACMS as the carrier would be required; (5) the submunition's test schedule appears to be extremely ambitious; (6) its development program is almost 3 years behind its original schedule, and a significant portion of the test schedule remains uncompleted; (7) the project office added five development flight tests to the schedule because of technical problems; (8) the Army plans to use a test aircraft for all submunition flight testing with subsonic deployment rather than the supersonic deployment from the ATACMS missile; (9) the testing completed to date has uncovered numerous problems that required design changes, additional testing, and schedule delays; (10) although the submunition test plans do not include an evaluation of whether or not the ATACMS Block II can dispense the submunition, the Block II missile test plans do include a test to dispense tactical submunitions in December 1997, the same month that the decision is to be made on low-rate production of the submunition; (11) according to Army representatives, data from this test will not be used in making the submunition production decision, since the test is not required; (12) any delays in qualifying the submunition's subcomponents and developmental flight testing will likely postpone the date of the Block II dispense test; (13) the submunition's low-rate initial production contract can be awarded 8 months later than currently scheduled and still be delivered in time to be integrated into the missile; (14) the Block II missile's currently scheduled production date is uncertain; and (15) if its production date is delayed, the Army would have even more time to sufficiently complete key submunition developmental testing.