In part as a consequence, Moscow appears to be stepping up efforts to develop closer ties with countries in East Asia, consistent with Vladimir Putin's 2012 presidential campaign promise to "turn to the East." At the same time, Russia's flirting with a partnership with China provides a retort to the U.S. "rebalance" to Asia strategy. Already tense, U.S. relations with Moscow have frayed further since Russia's intervention in Ukraine in February-March 2014 and its initiation of military activities in Syria in 2015. Under President Putin, Russia's outreach to Asia has been inconsistent, and at times contradictory. In addition to their impact on regional dynamics, they have implications for general foreign policy oversight, as well as for more specific issues such as the efficacy of sanctions policy, the developing security competition in the Arctic region, and alternative blocs of influence in international fora like the United Nations Security Council. Interests

		Potential for a China-Russia Bloc

A Chinese-Russian coalition almost inherently embodies a challenge to the U.S. presence in the Asia-Pacific and could hamper U.S. leadership in the region, as well as globally. Washington has adjusted its approach since, and Obama has met directly with Putin.) Impact on U.S. Strategy Toward North Korea

Diplomatic and economic support for North Korea from Russia could undermine U.S. and Chinese efforts to pressure North Korea to change its behavior and re-engage in denuclearization talks. Russia, however, appears to remain concerned about North Korea's nuclear weapons program and the uptick in relations seems to have been arrested by North Korea's provocations. Both are wary of the U.S. military presence in Asia and often criticize U.S. efforts to upgrade the United States' defense capabilities with its treaty allies, Japan and South Korea. While Russia is driven closer to China by economic necessity, China has more options. The Russia-China relationship appears to be characterized by a degree of strategic mistrust. Commercial interests in China are also increasingly wary of investment in Russian projects. Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)

A similar dynamic has played out in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO): Russia seeks to assert its traditional role as a guarantor of security to the Central Asian region while China looks to establish its centrality as an economic powerhouse. Despite joining Japan's G7 partners in imposing sanctions on Russia, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has aggressively pursued better relations with Moscow. Putin appears to view the world and Russia's role in it through a sharply anti-American lens, while Japan continues to identify the U.S.-Japan alliance as the centerpiece of its security strategy. Since Abe's return to office and his initiative to rebuild relations with Russia, his government has restarted efforts to resolve the lingering territorial issue. The SEZ may represent the most promising area for further development of economic relations, but could also be an arena of competition with Chinese investors. Although this suggests that Japan and Russia could view the Arctic as a cooperative arena for energy trade, the proximity of the disputed Northern Territories to the Arctic northern route, particularly given Russia's continued military buildup on the islands, points to an area of potential tension in the relationship. Some Asian customers see the potential for availability of large quantities of natural gas imports from the United States, and the dramatic decline in energy prices has reduced the appetite for costly new development projects in Russia's Far East. Moreover, private firms are reluctant to invest in Russia's market because of the Kremlin's assertion of control over energy companies in Russia and a history of failed deals. China-Russia Energy Ties80

Energy deals have formed the centerpiece of Russia and China's recent partnership, particularly after Moscow's relations with the West soured after the crisis in Ukraine. In considering issues such as the North Korean nuclear problem, maritime challenges in the Pacific, global energy policy and politics, or the U.S. rebalance to Asia, Congress may give additional weight to how Russian involvement affects U.S. interests. Russia's "Turn to the East" could impact several other areas that are of interest to Congress. One is the efficacy of U.S. sanctions policy on Russia given the lighter sanctions imposed on Russia by Japan and South Korea and China's attempt to broaden its economic cooperation with Russia. The Kim regime also stated that Russia's annexation of Crimea was "fully justified."
Since Russia's aggression in Ukraine and its annexation of the Crimea in March 2014, Moscow's already tense relationship with the United States and Europe has grown more fraught. After the imposition of sanctions on Russia by much of the West, Russian President Vladimir Putin has turned to East Asia, seeking new partnerships to counter diplomatic isolation and secure new markets to help Russia's struggling economy. His outreach to Beijing, Tokyo, Seoul, and Pyongyang has met varying degrees of success. The most high-profile outreach was a summit with Chinese President Xi Jinping in May 2014, when the leaders announced dozens of economic cooperation agreements. Putin has met with Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe over a dozen times in an effort to resolve a territorial dispute and improve bilateral relations. Putin has also reached out to both Koreas in his bid to step up engagement with Northeast Asian countries.
Russian engagement in Northeast Asia challenges the U.S. strategic presence in the region in a number of ways and represents a new arena of potential concern for Congress. If Moscow's engagement efforts succeed, it could undermine U.S. efforts to impose sanctions on Russia and isolate Putin diplomatically for his intervention in Ukraine. It could also create mistrust between the United States and its allies Japan and South Korea if those countries' leaders are drawn closer to Russia. Diplomatic initiatives in the region to deal with the threat of North Korea's nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs could suffer if Moscow disrupts international efforts to rein in North Korean provocations. Perhaps most importantly, China and Russia could form a regional bloc whose primary purpose could be to reduce U.S. economic leverage and challenge the U.S. security presence in the region.
The Chinese-Russian relationship is driven in large part by the perceived threat of the U.S. rebalance to Asia and their shared perspective of American unilateralism. Concrete progress on bilateral projects, however, is marked by inconsistency and faltering implementation of agreements. With Russia's economy devastated by falling energy prices since 2014, China appears to view Russia as a junior partner. Although Russia-China military relations have increased rapidly, so too has an element of competition, particularly in the Arctic region. Chinese firms are wary of investing in Russia, seeing it as politically risky and commercially unattractive. In multilateral fora like the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and new Silk Road initiatives, China wants to expand its economic clout while Russia looks to assert its military dominance in Central Asia. These tensions may prevent a full-fledged strategic partnership, but relations continue to grow stronger through regular bilateral summits and global cooperation.
Japan appears enthusiastic about improving relations with Russia and resolving their territorial dispute over four islands at the northern edge of Japan. Even as U.S.-Japan security links grow stronger, Abe continues to respond to Putin's overtures with an eye on balancing China. Russia's economic engagement of Pyongyang has chilled since the Kim regime resumed testing nuclear weapons and missiles. The stalemate in inter-Korean relations and the abandonment of cross-border projects also limit Russia's potential role in facilitating infrastructure and trade links on the Peninsula. Seoul's increasingly close U.S. alliance contracts the space for Moscow's diplomatic maneuver.
Japan, South Korea, and China all have interest in Russia's supply of oil and gas from its resource-rich Far East. Although several partnerships already exist, dealing with Russia's government-controlled energy companies has proved difficult. Private firms are reluctant to invest in a politically risky environment, and the availability of cheap energy from elsewhere has dampened commercial enthusiasm for investing heavily in Russia's energy industry.
Despite obstacles, Russia's pursuit of better relations with countries in East Asia remains a complicating and potentially destabilizing factor for the U.S. policy of rebalancing its security and economic interests to the region. Russia could become a larger factor for Congress to consider when assessing progress on the rebalance to Asia strategy. Russia's "Turn to the East" could also affect areas of congressional concern such as the efficacy of U.S. sanctions policy, U.S. North Korean policy, U.S. strategy in the Arctic region, U.S. priorities at the United Nations, and global energy politics.