The proposed system would have included 10 silo-based interceptor missiles to be deployed in Poland, a fixed radar installation in the Czech Republic, and another transportable radar to be deployed in a country closer to Iran (which was never publicly identified). Deployment of the GMD European capability was scheduled to be completed by 2013 at an official estimated cost of at least $4 billion (including fielding and Operation and Support). The Bush proposal raised a number of issues within Europe and encountered strong opposition in Russia. The United States signed agreements with Poland and Czech Republic in summer 2008. On September 17, 2009, the Obama Administration announced it would cancel the Bush Administration's proposed European 3 rd site. Instead, Defense Secretary Gates announced U.S. plans to develop and deploy a regional BMD capability that could be surged on relatively short notice during crises or as the situation may demand called the PAA (Phased Adaptive Approach). Gates argued this new capability, based initially on expanding existing BMD sensors, communication systems, and interceptors into Europe, would be more responsive and adaptable to the growing threat from short- and medium-range Iranian ballistic missiles. This capability would continue to evolve and expand over the next decade. Secretary Gates argued this new direction is needed to address growing concerns over the pace and direction of Iranian short- and medium-range ballistic missile proliferation in a manner that can be deployed more quickly and effectively than the Bush-proposed European site. However, Moscow eventually found reason to object to the Obama Administration's PAA, and sought unsuccessfully to oppose the plan as a bargaining chip in arms treaty negotiations with the United States. Most of this report that follows is designed to retain background information and analysis of the Bush-proposed European BMD initiative up to the Obama Administration's decision to cancel it. This report will be available primarily for historical purposes. It will not be updated. Russia

The Bush Administration's proposed missile defense program in Europe significantly affected U.S.-Russian relations. The committee reserves $343.1 million from funds available for the MDA in fiscal years 2009 and 2010 to develop missile defenses in Europe for one of two purposes: 
(1) either the Secretary of Defense continue with research, development, test and evaluation of the proposed radar and interceptor site in Poland and the Czech Republic pending Czech and Polish ratification, and certification by the Secretary of Defense that the proposed interceptors will be operationally effective, or 
(2) the Secretary may pursue development, testing, procurement and deployment of an alternative integrated missile defense system to protect Europe from threats posed by all types of ballistic missiles.
In early 2007, after several years of internal discussions and consultations with Poland and the Czech Republic, the Bush Administration formally proposed to defend against an Iranian missile threat by deploying a ground-based mid-course defense (GMD) element in Europe as part of the global U.S. BMDS (Ballistic Missile Defense System). The system would have included 10 interceptors in Poland, a radar in the Czech Republic, and another radar that would have been deployed in a country closer to Iran, to be completed by 2013 at a reported cost of at least $4 billion. The proposed European BMD capability raised a number of foreign policy challenges in Europe and with Russia. The United States negotiated and signed agreements with Poland and the Czech Republic, but for a number of reasons those agreements were not ratified by the end of the Bush Administration.
On September 17, 2009, the Obama Administration announced it would cancel the Bush-proposed European BMD program. Instead, Defense Secretary Gates announced U.S. plans to develop and deploy a regional BMD capability in Europe that could be surged on relatively short notice during crises or as the situation may demand. Gates argued this new capability in the near-term would be based on expanding existing BMD sensors and interceptors. Gates argued this new Phased Adaptive Approach (PAA) would be more responsive and adaptable to the pace and direction of Iranian short- and medium-range ballistic missile proliferation. This capability would continue to evolve and expand over the next decade to include BMD capabilities against medium- and long-range Iranian ballistic missiles.
The Polish and Romanian governments have signaled their willingness to host facilities for the new system. However, Russia, though initially positive over the abandonment of the Bush Administration's BMD plan, soon found reasons to object to the Obama Administration's alternative.
Although the terms of the debate over the Bush-proposed European BMD capability have changed significantly in the wake of President Obama's decision, this report will be retained for historical purposes to include background information and analysis through the Obama Administration's decision to cancel it. It will not be updated.