PARM is designated by MD 102 as the lead body responsible for  overseeing the acquisition process of major acquisition programs. DHS Has Taken Steps to Improve Oversight of Major Acquisition Programs, but Lacks Written Guidance and Cost Oversight Mechanism for Some Programs

Although DHS has taken steps to improve oversight of major acquisition  programs, such as clarifying the role of the CAEs, it lacks written  guidance for a consistent approach to oversight. PARM started conducting  monthly high visibility meetings to discuss programs that require  immediate or additional management attention. Sustainment costs can account for more than 80  percent of total costs, and all but one of these programs lack an approved  cost estimate. DHS Lacks Written Guidance for a Consistent Approach to Ongoing Oversight

While DHS has made progress in defining and documenting roles and  responsibilities in the oversight of major acquisitions, such as issuing  guidance describing the roles of CAEs, the roles and responsibilities of  PARM and other DHS headquarters organizations are not clear. We found that their involvement and  relationships with components varies significantly. DHS Lacks Cost Oversight Mechanism for Programs in Sustainment

DHS does not have a structure in place for overseeing the costs of 42  programs whose acquisition documentation requirements were waived   This waiver  through a memorandum issued by the USM in May 2013.covered certain programs in sustainment, meaning that these acquisition  programs have been developed and delivered and they are being  operated and maintained through the disposal phase. We have previously reported that cost estimates are  necessary to support decisions about program funding, develop annual  budget requests, and evaluate resource requirements. Program Data PARM Provided to DHS and Congressional Decision Makers Were Not Consistently Accurate and Up-to-Date

PARM’s fiscal year 2014 CASR, a report mandated by Congress,  provided the status of 82 DHS major acquisition programs but contained  data that were inaccurate and out-of-date. However, data issues—including  inconsistent participation among the programs responsible for entering  data—have led to inaccurate information in nPRS. Finally, DHS provided insufficient information to address  certain CASR reporting requirements. We found a number of problems  with the data. Holding programs accountable for  maintaining their cost, schedule, and performance data, and presenting  contextual information would help make the CASR a more effective  instrument for DHS and congressional oversight. To make the CASR more useful, starting with the report reflecting  fiscal year 2015 program data, adjust the CASR to do the  following:
Report an individual rating for each program’s cost, schedule,
Report a best estimate of procurement quantities or indicate  why this is not applicable, as appropriate;
Report all programs’ significant changes in acquisition cost,  quantity, or schedule from the previous CASR report by  determining a means to account for programs that lack  acquisition program baselines;
Report major program events that are included in acquisition  program baselines, such as scheduled acquisition decision  events; and
Report the level at which the program’s life-cycle cost  estimate was approved. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

The objective of this review was to assess the Department of Homeland  Security’s (DHS) oversight of its major acquisition programs. Specifically,  this review focused on DHS’s Office of Program Accountability and Risk  Management (PARM) and its day-to-day program oversight, rather than  the oversight it conducts at key points in the acquisition life cycle as  defined in policy. We assessed (1) steps DHS has taken to improve  oversight and what gaps, if any, exist and (2) whether the data PARM  provides to DHS and congressional decision makers to carry out their  oversight responsibilities on program cost, schedule, and performance  are accurate and up-to-date. To address our first objective, we selected nine DHS components with  responsibility for at least one Level 1 acquisition—a program with a  reported life-cycle cost estimate exceeding $1 billion—and interviewed  their Component Acquisition Executives (CAE) or designees. In order to assess acquisition oversight  across the spectrum of DHS programs, we selected case study programs  with a variety of characteristics. For the second objective, we collected and reviewed data from DHS’s  official system of record for its acquisition programs, the Next Generation  Periodic Reporting System (nPRS), and compared that data to the fiscal  year 2014 CASR.
Why GAO Did This Study

In fiscal year 2014, DHS reported it planned to spend approximately $10.7 billion on its major acquisition programs. DHS acquires systems to reduce the probability of a terrorist attack, protect against disease, mitigate natural hazards, and secure borders. Partially in response to GAO recommendations, the department has taken steps to improve acquisition management in recent years, but has not yet implemented many of these recommendations.
GAO was asked to review DHS's oversight of its major acquisition programs. This report addresses (1) steps DHS has taken to improve oversight and gaps that exist, if any, and (2) whether the data PARM provides to DHS and congressional decision makers are accurate and up-to-date.
GAO reviewed DHS policies and procedures and interviewed oversight and acquisition officials from all nine DHS components with at least one major acquisition program with a life-cycle cost estimate exceeding $1 billion. From these components, GAO selected a non-generalizable sample of nine major acquisition programs with a variety of characteristics to compare PARM oversight activities and review program data.

What GAO Found

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has taken steps to improve oversight of major acquisition programs, but it lacks written guidance for a consistent approach to day-to-day oversight. Federal Standards for Internal Control call for organizations to define and document key areas of responsibility in order to effectively plan, direct, and control operations to achieve agency objectives. DHS has defined the role of the Component Acquisition Executive, the senior acquisition official within each component, and established monthly meetings to discuss programs that require management attention. However, DHS has not defined all of the roles and responsibilities of the Office of Program Accountability and Risk Management (PARM)—the lead body responsible for overseeing the acquisition process and assessing the status of acquisition programs—and other headquarters organizations. GAO also found that officials' involvement and relationships with components varied significantly. DHS does not have a structure in place for overseeing the costs of 42 programs in sustainment (that is, programs that have been fielded and are operational) for which acquisition documentation requirements were waived in 2013. Sustainment costs can account for more than 80 percent of total costs, and all but one of these programs lack an approved cost estimate. GAO also previously reported that cost estimates are necessary to support decisions about program funding and resources.
The most recent data that PARM provided to DHS and congressional decision makers for oversight were not consistently accurate and up-to-date. Specifically, PARM's fiscal year 2014 Comprehensive Acquisition Status Report (CASR), which was based on fiscal year 2013 data, contained inaccurate information on DHS acquisition programs. To develop the CASR, PARM drew from DHS's official system for acquisition program reporting, the Next Generation Periodic Reporting System (nPRS); however, the system is hampered by data issues, including inconsistent participation by program officials responsible for entering the data. Further, DHS has not provided useful information for certain CASR reporting requirements. DHS interpreted one requirement in a way that eliminated the need to report cost, schedule, or performance changes for almost half of the programs in the CASR. Holding programs accountable for maintaining their data in nPRS and providing decision makers with more in-depth information would enhance future acquisition reports and render the CASR a more effective instrument for DHS and congressional oversight.
GAO Assessment of the DHS Comprehensive Acquisition Status Report Development Process

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that DHS take a number of actions including developing written guidance for a consistent approach to oversight, addressing programs in sustainment, and enhancing data quality and reports to Congress. DHS concurred with GAO's recommendations.