(2)
U.S. nuclear warheads include a primary and a secondary stage. All weapons now in the U.S. stockpile use pits made there. (5)

	The National Nuclear Security Administration's Program for Pit Production

The Pit Manufacturing and Certification Campaign is NNSA's effort to restore pit production. (8)

		Short-Term Goal: W88 Pits

Rocky Flats Plant ceased production abruptly when it was only part-way through the planned production run of pits for the W88, a nuclear warhead used on the Trident II submarine-launchedballistic missile. Only one W88 pit remains for destructive evaluation. Table 1. To meet the need for W88 pits, NNSA decided to create at Los Alamos a facility that could produce pits at a low rate. Los Alamos manufactured thefirst certifiable W88 pit in April 2003. NNSA's view is thatmaintaining the stockpile indefinitely therefore requires, in the longer term, a higher pit fabricationcapacity than PF-4 can offer in order to replace pits removed due to aging or destructive testing. NNSA estimates that MPF operations will start in FY2019 and that the plant willachieve full production capability in FY2021. The SenateArmed Services Committee in 2002 estimated the cost of MPF at $2 billion to $4 billion. MPF's schedule has slipped between June 2003 and February 2004, as Table 2 shows. Table 2. Congressional Actions

Congress has expressed interest in the pit program for many years. Both Houses haverepeatedly raised concerns over such management issues as budgeting and planning, and over theslow pace of pit certification. (48)
For FY2002, the House Appropriations Committee recommended the requested amount, $128.5 million, for the Pit Manufacturing and Certification Campaign, but asserted that DOE cannot show"that it has a viable plan to manufacture and certify pits on the schedule dictated by national securityneeds," criticized the project as "years behind schedule and hundreds of millions of dollars over theoriginal cost estimate," and stated that it would judge NNSA's success on how well the pit projectsucceeds. NNSA stated its plans to "certify a W88 pit built at [Los Alamos National Laboratory] without underground nuclear testing by FY 2009, with a goal ofachieving an earlier date of FY 2007." (59)

		The FY2004 Request

For FY2004, the Administration requested a substantial increase to items in this campaign: $126.8 million for manufacturing the pit for the W88 warhead, $108.6 million for W88 pitcertification, $19.7 million for pit activities not specifically supporting the W88, and $22.8 millionfor planning for the Modern Pit Facility. In addition, it requested $42.4 million for "subcriticalexperiments [at Nevada Test Site] which support the certification of the W88 pit." Table 3. Issues dealt with include pit certification; theneed for new pits (beyond limited quantities for W88 warheads); if new pits are needed, what is therequired capacity; how might that capacity be obtained, and how quickly could or should that bedone. Is NNSA's Plan for Certification Reasonable? Does the United States Need New Pits (Beyond Limited Quantitiesfor W88)? Yes: In one view, greater pit manufacturing capability is needed tohedge against uncertainty in pit life in order to ensure that the U.S. nuclear deterrent remainseffective. If So, What Capacity Is Needed? PF-4 could replace the few pitswithout spares that are destroyed during surveillance. Can NNSA Expand PF-4 to Build Enough Pits Without MPF? While the FY2004 National Defense AuthorizationAct provided the funding requested for the entire pit program, including MPF, the Energy and WaterDevelopment Appropriations Act cut MPF funding from $22.8 million to $10.8 million and theconferees, as noted, stated it was premature to pursue further decisions on MPF pending a report onthe stockpile plan. Should Congress and the Administration Delay MPF's Schedule? If at that time plutonium aging did notappear to be a problem, or if the stockpile were projected to shrink, or if fewer types of nuclearweapons were deployed, or the likelihood of using nuclear weapons had become more remote thanat present, then the United States would, for a fraction of the cost of MPF, have purchased a hedgein case MPF needed to be built on the current schedule. Table 4. 1, esp.
A "pit" is the fissile core of a nuclear warhead. In modern warheads, it creates a nuclear explosion that triggers a substantially larger thermonuclear explosion. All pits currently in the U.S.nuclear stockpile were made at the Rocky Flats Plant near Denver, CO, which opened in 1952. TheDepartment of Energy (DOE) halted pit manufacturing operations there in 1989; the United Stateshas been unable to make stockpile-quality pits -- and therefore complete nuclear warheads -- sincethen.
Inability to make pits may have adverse consequences. For example: (1) The United States cannot replace pits for the W88 warhead (for the Trident II missile) that are destroyed duringevaluation; currently, only one W88 evaluation pit remains, so use of more W88 pits would reducedeployable warheads. (2) Pits deteriorate over time, though the rate at which that happens is understudy. If pits of a given type deteriorate so much as to be no longer reliable, or if an unanticipateddefect arises, then hundreds to thousands of deployed warheads might have to be withdrawn.
The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), which manages the U.S. nuclear weapons program, has a five-part plan to restore pit production capability: (1) Establish a smallfacility (PF-4) at Los Alamos National Laboratory (NM) to fabricate pits, initially for the W88. LosAlamos manufactured the first pit to stockpile standards in April 2003. (2) Develop procedures tocertify W88 pits -- to provide high confidence without nuclear testing that the pits will work asintended. NNSA expects that, in 2007, Los Alamos will be able to certify W88 pits that it makes.Only certified pits can enter the stockpile. (3) Conduct experiments (not nuclear tests) in supportof W88 pit certification at the Nevada Test Site. (4) Conduct pit manufacturing and certification forother pits. (5) Plan a Modern Pit Facility (MPF) with a higher capacity than PF-4, to reach fulloperational capability in FY2021. NNSA estimates total cost at $1.46 billion for items (1) and (2),smaller amounts for items (3) and (4), and $2 billion to $4 billion for item (5).
Congress has long shown interest in the program. It generally supports low-rate production at Los Alamos. It raised concern over budgeting and the pace of pit certification, but now praisesNNSA for "turning around" the W88 pit program. On MPF, the FY2004 defense authorization actsupported the Administration's schedule. The appropriations act reduced funding; conferees statedthat until Congress reviews nuclear stockpile plans, "it is premature to pursue further decisions" onMPF. MPF's schedule to reach full operational capability slipped a year between 2003 and 2004.
Congress faces several issues as it considers the pit program. Is NNSA's plan for certification reasonable? Does the United States need new pits (beyond limited quantities for the W88)? If so,what capacity is needed? Can PF-4 be expanded to build enough pits to avoid the need for MPF? Could MPF's schedule be accelerated? Should its schedule be delayed?
This report is intended for those interested in the U.S. nuclear weapons program. It will track the pit budget request and program, and will be updated as needed.