	Background

		Ship Manpower Requirements and Manning

The Navy determines the number of sailors and the skills needed to  operate its ships through a standardized manpower requirements  process. A time line of reduced manning initiatives that were  implemented from 2001 to 2016 is included in figure 2. Ship Operating and Support Costs and Maintenance Backlogs Have Continued to Increase for Most Legacy Ship Classes since Optimal Manning Ended

Ship operating and support costs—the total cost of operating,  maintaining, and supporting a ship, including personnel, operations,  maintenance, sustainment, and modernization—increased during the  optimal manning period and have continued to increase for most ship  classes, in part because increases in maintenance costs offset reductions  in personnel costs. Navy officials attributed maintenance cost increases to reduced  crews, longer deployments, and other factors. Maintenance backlogs also  increased during the optimal manning period for the same reasons and  have continued to grow for most ship classes. The Navy Has Partially Restored Crew Sizes since Optimal Manning Ended, and Personnel Costs Have Increased

During the optimal manning period—which varied among ship classes but  generally was around fiscal years 2004 to 2010—the Navy reduced  average crew sizes, as shown in figure 3, resulting in reductions in  personnel costs. Other factors, such as the age of  a ship, may also affect maintenance costs. Our analysis does not isolate  the effects of these factors from the effect of the optimal manning  initiative. The Navy Has Updated Some Manpower Factors but Continues to Use an Outdated Workweek Standard

Since it ended the optimal manning initiative, the Navy has updated or is  in the process of updating several of the factors and allowances it uses to  determine manpower requirements on all ships, but it has not updated the  standard workweek. The Department of Defense (DOD)  agreed with our recommendation. Without accurate manpower requirements, the Navy risks  having ship crews that are not appropriately sized and composed to carry  out missions, maintain ship readiness, and prevent overwork of sailors. The Navy May Be Challenged to Man Its Growing Fleet

Moving forward, the Navy will likely face manning challenges, especially  given its current difficulty in filling authorized positions, as it seeks to  increase the size of its fleet as much as 30 percent over its current size. Crew Sizes on Recently- Inducted Ship Classes Have Grown as the Navy Gains Experience Operating Them

In addition to using the outdated standard workweek and not accounting  for in-port workload, the Navy developed estimates of manpower  requirements and crew size targets for its new ships based on  assumptions that technologies would enable smaller crews. Recommendations for Executive Action

To ensure that the Navy’s manpower requirements are current and  analytically based and will meet the needs of the existing and future  surface fleet, we recommend that the Under Secretary of Defense for  Personnel and Readiness direct the Secretary of the Navy to have the  Navy take the following four actions:  conduct a comprehensive reassessment of the Navy standard  workweek and make any necessary adjustments; update guidance to require examination of in-port workload and  identify the manpower necessary to execute in-port workload for all  surface ship classes; develop criteria and update guidance for reassessing the factors used  to calculate manpower requirements periodically or when conditions  change; and  identify personnel needs and costs associated with the planned larger  Navy fleet size, including consideration of the updated manpower  factors and requirements. To assess the extent to which the Navy’s manpower requirements  process fully accounts for ship workload, we examined the factors and  assumptions used in determining crew sizes for surface and amphibious  ships, and we analyzed various Navy documents and instructions related  to determining crew sizes, including Office of the Chief of Naval  Operations Instruction 1000.16L, Navy Total Force Manpower Policies  and Procedures, in order to identify the steps required in the Navy’s  process to determine crew sizes. We also interviewed Navy officials and ship crews to discuss fleet-wide  manpower and manning challenges.
Why GAO Did This Study

In 2001, the Navy began reducing crew sizes on surface ships through an initiative called optimal manning, which was intended to achieve workload efficiencies and reduce personnel costs. In 2010, the Navy concluded that this initiative had adversely affected ship readiness and began restoring crew sizes on its ships.
The conference report accompanying the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016 included a provision that GAO review the Navy's reduced manning initiatives in the surface fleet. This report examines (1) any trends in ship operating and support costs and maintenance backlogs, (2) the extent to which the Navy's manpower requirements process accounts for ship workload, and (3) any manning challenges and implications for the future.
GAO analyzed and reviewed data from fiscal years 2000 through 2015 (the most current available) on crew sizes, operating and support costs, material readiness, and the Navy's manpower requirements determination process. GAO also interviewed Department of Defense (DOD) officials and ship crews to discuss workload, manning levels, enablers of smaller crew size, and implications for the future.

What GAO Found

Total ship operating and support costs—which include personnel and maintenance costs—and maintenance backlogs increased during the optimal manning period (2003–2012) and have continued to increase for most ship classes since the initiative ended. Since the implementation of optimal manning, the Navy reduced crew sizes, which decreased the associated personnel costs for most ship classes, even as crews were partially restored. However, increased maintenance costs offset the reductions in personnel costs, as shown below. Navy officials attributed maintenance cost increases to reduced crews, longer deployments, and other factors. GAO's analysis did not isolate the relative effects of reduced crews from these other factors. Maintenance backlogs also increased during the optimal manning period and have continued to grow.
The Navy's process to determine manpower requirements—the number and skill mix of sailors needed for its ships—does not fully account for all ship workload. The Navy continues to use an outdated standard workweek that may overstate the amount of sailor time available for productive work. Although the Navy has updated some of its manpower factors, its instruction does not require reassessing factors to ensure they remain valid or require measuring workload while ships are in port. Current and analytically based manpower requirements are essential to ensuring that crews can maintain readiness and prevent overwork that can affect safety, morale, and retention. Until the Navy makes needed changes to its factors and instruction used in determining manpower requirements, its ships may not have the right number and skill mix of sailors to maintain readiness and prevent overworking its sailors.
Moving forward, the Navy will likely face manning challenges as it seeks to increase the size of its fleet. The fleet is projected to grow from its current 274 ships to as many as 355 ships, but the Navy has not determined how many personnel will need to be added to man those ships. In addition, as the Navy has gained experience operating its new ship classes, their crew sizes have grown and may continue to do so. Without updating its manpower factors and requirements and identifying the personnel cost implications of fleet size increases, the Navy cannot articulate its resource needs to decision makers.

What GAO Recommends

GAO is making four recommendations that the Navy (1) reassess the standard workweek, (2) require examination of in-port workload, (3) require reassessment of the factors used to develop manpower requirements, and (4) identify the personnel costs needed to man a larger fleet. DOD concurred with each recommendation.