Coordination between the U.S. Military and Private Security Providers Continues to Be a Problem

Despite improvements in coordination between private security providers  and the U.S military, military officials we met with in Iraq in May 2006 and  those who recently returned from Iraq said that coordination continues to  be a problem. U.S. military and contractor officials we spoke with prior to issuing  our July 2005 report had indicated that coordination had improved. If private security providers do not coordinate their  movements with military units, it places both the U.S. military and the  private security providers at risk. Although the Department of  Defense agreed with our recommendation and tasked the Joint Staff to  develop the training package, no action had been taken. Missing or Inaccessible Data May Make Criminal Background Screening of Private Security Provider Employees Difficult

Private security providers and DOD have difficulty conducting  comprehensive criminal background screening when data are missing and  inaccessible. In addition, DOD’s program to biometrically screen  all Iraqi private security provider employees as well as most third country  nationals who are private security provider employees seeking access to  U.S. installations is not as effective as it could be because of the limited  number of international and foreign databases available for screening. The Effectiveness of DOD’s Biometric Screening in Iraq Is Limited Because of Missing Data

DOD conducts biometric screening of most non-U.S. private security  provider employees needing access to installations in Iraq; however, the  value of the screening process is limited because the databases used to  screen the applicants have little international biometric data. As we reported in our 2005 report, reconstruction contractors had  difficulty hiring suitable security providers. Contractors replaced their  security providers on five of the eight reconstruction contracts awarded in  2003 that we reviewed. Contractor officials attributed this turnover to  various factors, including their lack of knowledge of the security market  and of the potential security providers and the absence of useful agency  guidance in this area. In our report, we recommended that the State Department, USAID, and  DOD explore options that would enable contractors to obtain security  services quickly and efficiently. Rather, they determined that they could best  assist contractors by providing access to information related to industry  best practices and other security-related material. Specifically, we  believe private security provider operations would be improved by   (1) developing a training package for deploying units to Iraq that would  provide information on the ROC, private security providers operating  procedures, and any MNF-I or MNC-I guidance on private security  providers and (2) further exploring options to assist contractors in  obtaining suitable security providers. Additionally, based on our  preliminary observations, incomplete criminal background screenings may  contribute to an increased risk to military forces and civilians in Iraq. The  military would benefit by reviewing the installation security measures in  place in Iraq to ensure that the risk private security contractors may pose  has been minimized.
Why GAO Did This Study

GAO was asked to address (1) the extent to which coordination between the U.S. military and private security providers has improved since GAO's 2005 report, (2) the ability of private security providers and the Department of Defense (DOD) to conduct comprehensive background screenings of employees, and (3) the extent to which U.S. or international standards exist for establishing private security provider and employee qualifications. For this testimony, GAO drew from its July 2005 report on private security providers, and its preliminary observations from an ongoing engagement examining contractor screening practices.

What GAO Found

Coordination between the U.S. military and private security providers still needs improvement. First, private security providers continue to enter the battle space without coordinating with the U.S. military, putting both the military and security providers at a greater risk for injury. Second, U.S. military units are not trained, prior to deployment, on the operating procedures of private security providers in Iraq and the role of the Reconstruction Operations Center, which is to coordinate military-provider interactions. While DOD agreed with our prior recommendation to establish a predeployment training program to help address the coordination issue, no action has been taken. Many private security providers and DOD have difficulty completing comprehensive criminal background screenings for U.S. and foreign nationals when data are missing or inaccessible. For example, a DOD policy requires biometric screening of most non-U.S. private security providers accessing U.S. bases in Iraq. Biometric screening (e.g., fingerprints and iris scans) measures a person's unique physical characteristics. Biometric screening is not as effective as it could be because the databases used to screen contractor employees include limited international data. Based on its work to date, GAO believes that incomplete criminal background screening may contribute to an increased risk to military forces and civilians in Iraq, and the military would benefit by reviewing the base security measures to ensure that the risk private security contractors may pose has been minimized. A report on screening will be issued in Fall 2006. No U.S. or international standards exist for establishing private security provider and employee qualifications. Reconstruction contractors told GAO during its review for its July 2005 report that they had difficulty hiring suitable security providers. Contractors replaced their security providers on five of the eight reconstruction contracts awarded in 2003 that were reviewed by GAO. Contractor officials attributed this turnover to various factors, including their lack of knowledge of the security market and of the potential security providers and the absence of useful agency guidance in this area. In our report, we recommended that the State Department, United States Agency for International Development, and DOD explore options that would enable contractors to obtain security services quickly and efficiently. In response to our recommendation, the agencies met in November 2005 and agreed that our recommendation was not practical. They determined that they could best assist contractors by providing access to information related to industry best practices and other security-related material.