The plan  identified three federal priorities for enhancing the security and resilience  of the grid: (1) developing and deploying tools and technologies to  enhance awareness of potential disruptions, (2) planning and exercising  coordinated responses to disruptive events, and (3) ensuring actionable  intelligence on threats is communicated between government and industry in a time-sensitive manner. Three Federal Agencies Implemented 27 Grid Resiliency Efforts since 2013 and Reported a Variety of Results

DOE, DHS, and FERC reported implementing 27 grid resiliency efforts  since 2013 that supported a range of activities and that addressed  multiple hazards and federal priorities for enhancing the resilience of the  electricity grid. Agency officials reported a variety of results stemming  from these efforts. II for more information on each effort). In addition, DHS reported that its Recovery  Transformer Program supported research and development activities by  designing and demonstrating a type of rapidly deployable large, high- power transformer for use in the event of the unexpected loss of multiple  large, high-power transformers. As table 3 shows, the agencies reported that their federal grid resiliency  efforts addressed a range of threats and hazards, including cyberattacks  (i.e. attacks on physical  infrastructure such as targeted shooting of transformers or intentional  downing of power lines); natural disasters (e.g. As  shown in the selected examples in table 5, these results included the  development, and in some cases the deployment, of new technologies  and analytical tools; the planning and exercising of coordinated  responses to disruptive events; and improved coordination and  information sharing between the federal government and industry related  to potential cyberattacks and other threats or hazards to the electricity  grid. Federal Efforts Were Fragmented with Some Overlap but Were Not Duplicative, and Agencies Have Taken Actions to Coordinate Their Efforts

We found that the 27 federal efforts to enhance the resilience of the  electricity grid were fragmented across DOE, DHS, and FERC and  overlapped to some degree, but we did not find any instances of  duplication among these efforts. These activities and  mechanisms include serving as members on formal coordinating bodies  that bring together federal, state, and industry stakeholders in the energy  sector to discuss resiliency issues on a regular basis; contributing to the  development of federal plans and reviews that address grid resiliency  gaps and priorities; and participating in direct coordination activities at the  program level. Efforts Were Fragmented Across Agencies with Some Overlap but Were Not Duplicative

According to our analysis of agency questionnaire responses, federal grid  resiliency efforts were fragmented and overlapped to some degree, but  none were duplicative. The 27 federal efforts to enhance the resilience of the  electricity grid were fragmented in that they were implemented by three  different agencies—DOE, DHS, and FERC—and addressed the same  broad area of national need: enhancing the resilience of the electricity  grid. In the case of federal grid resiliency efforts, we found that DOE,  DHS, and FERC generally have tailored their efforts to contribute to their  specific missions and needs. For example, DOE’s 11 efforts related to its  strategic goal to support a more secure and resilient U.S. energy  infrastructure; DHS’s 3 efforts addressed its strategic priority to enhance  critical infrastructure security and resilience by, among other things,  promoting resilient critical infrastructure design; and FERC’s 13 efforts  related to the agency’s roles in reviewing and approving reliability  standards and regulating the interstate transmission of electricity. We did not find any instances of duplication among the 27  federal grid resiliency efforts because none of the efforts had the same  goals or engaged in the same activities. DOE, DHS, and FERC provided technical  comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. Appendix I: GAO’s Questionnaire for Federal Agencies with Efforts Aimed at Enhancing the Resilience of the Electricity Grid

Appendix II: Characteristics of Efforts to Enhance the Resilience of the Electricity Grid at Three Federal Agencies

We identified 27 efforts across three agencies—the Department of  Energy (DOE), the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and the  Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC)—that aimed to enhance  the resilience of the electricity grid.
Why GAO Did This Study

In light of increasing threats to the nation's electricity grid, national policies have stressed the importance of enhancing the grid's resilience—its ability to adapt to changing conditions; withstand potentially disruptive events, such as the loss of power lines; and, if disrupted, to rapidly recover. Most of the electricity grid is owned and operated by private industry, but the federal government has a significant role in promoting the grid's resilience. DOE is the lead agency for federal grid resiliency efforts and is responsible for coordinating with DHS and other relevant federal agencies on these efforts.
GAO was asked to review federal efforts to enhance the resilience of the electricity grid. This report (1) identifies grid resiliency efforts implemented by federal agencies since 2013 and the results of these efforts and (2) examines the extent to which these efforts were fragmented, overlapping, or duplicative, and the extent to which agencies had coordinated the efforts.
GAO reviewed relevant laws and guidance; identified a list of federal grid resiliency efforts; sent a questionnaire to officials at DOE, DHS, and FERC to collect information on each effort and its results; analyzed questionnaire responses and agency documents to assess whether federal efforts were fragmented, overlapping, or duplicative and how agencies coordinated those efforts; and interviewed agency officials and industry group representatives.
This report contains no recommendations. DOE, DHS, and FERC provided technical comments, which GAO incorporated as appropriate.

What GAO Found

The Department of Energy (DOE), the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) reported implementing 27 grid resiliency efforts since 2013 and identified a variety of results from these efforts. The efforts addressed a range of threats and hazards—including cyberattacks, physical attacks, and natural disasters—and supported different types of activities (see table). These efforts also addressed each of the three federal priorities for enhancing the security and resilience of the electricity grid: (1) developing and deploying tools and technologies to enhance awareness of potential disruptions, (2) planning and exercising coordinated responses to disruptive events, and (3) ensuring actionable intelligence on threats is communicated between government and industry in a time-sensitive manner. Agency officials reported a variety of results from these efforts, including the development of new technologies—such as a rapidly-deployable large, high-power transformer—and improved coordination and information sharing between the federal government and industry related to potential cyberattacks.
Federal grid resiliency efforts were fragmented across DOE, DHS, and FERC and overlapped to some degree but were not duplicative. GAO found that the 27 efforts were fragmented in that they were implemented by three agencies and addressed the same broad area of national need: enhancing the resilience of the electricity grid. However, DOE, DHS, and FERC generally tailored their efforts to contribute to their specific missions. For example, DOE's 11 efforts related to its strategic goal to support a more secure and resilient U.S. energy infrastructure. GAO also found that the federal efforts overlapped to some degree but were not duplicative because none had the same goals or engaged in the same activities. For example, three DOE and DHS efforts addressed resiliency issues related to large, high-power transformers, but the goals were distinct—one effort focused on developing a rapidly deployable transformer to use in the event of multiple large, high-power transformer failures; another focused on developing next-generation transformer components with more resilient features; and a third focused on developing a plan for a national transformer reserve. Moreover, officials from all three agencies reported taking actions to coordinate federal grid resiliency efforts, such as serving on formal coordinating bodies that bring together federal, state, and industry stakeholders to discuss resiliency issues on a regular basis, and contributing to the development of federal plans that address grid resiliency gaps and priorities. GAO found that these actions were consistent with key practices for enhancing and sustaining federal agency coordination.