Interests Outweighed Directive 25 Shortfalls

Executive branch officials extensively considered all Directive 25 factors before deciding to support the authorization or expansion of the U.N. operations. At the time the eight decisions were made, executive branch assessments identified at least one Directive 25 shortfall in all of the proposed operations and several shortfalls in six of them. As shown in figure 2, assessments questioned whether the operation’s duration was linked to realistic criteria for ending the operation. As before, factors considered in this decision included U.S. interests in aiding Australia and ending the violence in East Timor. This information described how the proposed operations advanced U.S. interests, the conflicts that the proposed operations were intended to address, and other related considerations. However, we found no evidence that the Congress was informed about most shortfalls identified in executive branch assessments of the proposed operations for East Timor and Sierra Leone. In contrast, our analysis showed that the Congress was informed about most shortfalls identified in executive branch assessments of the proposed operations in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Toward this end, Directive 25 stated that the “Congress must…be actively involved in the continuing implementation of U.S. policy on peacekeeping” and that the “Congress and the American people must…be genuine participants in the processes that support U.S. decision-making on new and on-going peace operations.” Directive 25 recognized that the executive branch traditionally “has not solicited the involvement of Congress or the American people on matters related to U.N. peacekeeping.” It concluded that this “lack of communication is not desirable in an era when peace operations have become numerous, complex, and expensive.” Directive 25 instructed executive branch officials to undertake six specific initiatives “to improve and regularize communication and consultation” with the Congress about U.N. peacekeeping to ensure that sufficient public and congressional support existed for proposed operations.
What GAO Found

Presidential Decision Directive 25 states that U.S. involvement in international peacekeeping operations must be selective and effective. Toward this end, the directive established guidance that U.S. officials must consider before deciding whether to support proposed operations, including whether the operations advanced U.S. interests, had realistic criteria for ending the operations, and had appropriate forces and financing to accomplish their missions. The directive established these factors as an aid for executive decision-making and not as criteria for supporting particular operations. Executive branch officials thoroughly considered all Presidential Decision Directive 25 factors before deciding to support the authorization or expansion of peacekeeping operations in East Timor, Sierra Leone, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. At the time the decisions were made, executive branch assessments identified at least one Directive 25 shortfall in all of the proposed operations and several shortfalls in six of them. Executive branch officials nonetheless decided to support the operations because they believed that these shortfalls were outweighed by the presence of other Directive 25 factors and various other factors, including U.S. interests in the region. Executive branch officials provided Congress with considerable information about the conflicts that the proposed operations were intended to address. However, GAO found no evidence that Congress was informed about most Directive 25 shortfalls identified in executive branch assessments of the proposed operations in East Timor and Sierra Leone or about U.S. plans to address the risks posed by these shortfalls. Congress was informed, about most shortfalls identified in executive branch assessments of the proposed U.N. operations in the Congo.