This report addresses various legal issues related to sexual harassment and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), the federal statute that generally prohibits discrimination in the workplace, including discrimination based on sex. As the statute contains neither an express prohibition against harassment nor a definition of harassment, this report examines (1) how the Supreme Court and federal appellate courts have mapped out the scope of protection that Title VII provides employees against sexual harassment, including the Supreme Court's "severe or pervasive" standard that harassment victims must meet to show a Title VII violation (which applies to most Title VII sexual harassment claims); (2) limits on employer liability for harassment; and (3) retaliation for reporting harassment, among other issues. When a plaintiff raises a Title VII harassment claim, federal courts often describe the action as alleging "harassment" or a "hostile work environment." A plaintiff can also show a violation of Title VII based on quid pro quo harassment, also discussed in this report. Constructive Discharge

Rather than firing an employee, employers may compel employees to resign, for example, by creating intolerable working conditions. Because federal courts interpret Title VII to prohibit sexual harassment, employees who report such harassment in the workplace may be protected from unlawful retaliation—such as termination or demotion—for making that report. Though the Supreme Court has not addressed whether an employee's disclosures in an internal harassment investigation constitute protected participation under Title VII, the Court has expressly held that an employee's report of sexual harassment made in the context of an employer's internal investigation may constitute protected opposition . By contrast, the Court observed, the anti-retaliation provision contains "[n]o such limiting words," and interpreted this difference in statutory language to be intentional.
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII) generally prohibits discrimination in the workplace, but does not contain an express prohibition against harassment. The Supreme Court, however, has interpreted the statute to prohibit certain forms of harassment, including sexual harassment. Since first recognizing the viability of a Title VII harassment claim in a unanimous 1986 decision, the Court has also established legal standards for determining when offensive conduct amounts to a Title VII violation and when employers may be held liable for such actionable harassment, and created an affirmative defense available to employers under certain circumstances.
Given this judicially created paradigm for analyzing sexual harassment under Title VII, this report examines key Supreme Court precedent addressing Title VII sexual harassment claims, the statutory interpretation and rationales reflected in these decisions, and examples of lower federal court decisions applying this precedent. The report also discusses various types of harassment recognized by the Supreme Court—such as "hostile work environment," quid pro quo, constructive discharge, and same-sex harassment—and explores tensions, disagreements, or apparent inconsistencies among federal courts when analyzing these claims.
Finally, this report examines sexual harassment in the context of retaliation. Does Title VII's anti-retaliation provision protect an employee from being fired, for example, for reporting sexual harassment? How do federal courts approach the analysis of a Title VII claim alleging that an employer retaliated against an employee by subjecting him or her to harassment? The report discusses Supreme Court and federal appellate court precedent relevant to these questions.