	Background

JSF is a joint, multinational acquisition program for the Air Force, Navy,  Marine Corps, and eight cooperative international partners. The program has experienced delays in  several key events including delays in the start of the flight test program,  manufacturing and delivery of the first development aircraft, and delays in  the testing of critical missions systems. These delays reduce the amount of  time available for completing flight testing and development activities. Total Program Cost Estimates Have Increased

JSF program cost estimates have increased by $31.6 billion since the  program’s decision to rebaseline in fiscal year 2004. The net effect of the JSF program cost increases is that DOD will pay more  per aircraft than expected when the program was rebaselined. Design and Manufacturing of Development Aircraft Has Been a Major Source of Delay

The program has completed manufacturing of its first development  aircraft and manufacturing data indicates that the program did not meet its  planned labor hour goals. Major design  modifications can cause substantial and costly changes in the  manufacturing process. The JSF Program Projects Key Performance Parameters Will Be Met Based on Modeling and Simulations

Currently, the JSF program estimates that by the time the development  program ends the aircraft design will meet all but one of its key  performance parameters. Meeting the full interoperability required is currently  dependent on other capabilities being developed outside the JSF program. The degree of concurrency between development  and production in the JSF program’s acquisition strategy still includes  significant risks for cost and schedule overruns or late delivery of  promised capabilities to the warfighter. The flight test program will also hinge on the delivering aircraft with the  expected capabilities. Challenges Created by Continued Concurrent Development and Production

The concurrency between development and production in DOD’s  acquisition strategy for JSF did not substantially change as a result of the  program’s rebaseline in fiscal year 2004. While some concurrency may be beneficial to efficiently transition from  the development stage of a program to production, the JSF is currently  planned to be significantly more concurrent than the F-22A program that  failed to deliver the warfighting capability on time and at predicted costs. Unprecedented Funding Requirements Could Challenge Program Execution

To execute its current plan, the JSF program must obtain unprecedented  levels of annual funding—on average over $12.6 billion annually in  acquisition funds over the next 2 decades. DOD’s approval to enter low-rate initial production this year  committed the program to this high risk strategy. It would also make  cost and schedule more predictable and lessen the risk to DOD’s  production investment. Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense
Why GAO Did This Study

The Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program--a multinational acquisition program for the Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps, and eight cooperative international partners--is the Department of Defense's (DOD) most expensive aircraft acquisition program. DOD currently estimates it will spend $623 billion to develop, procure, and operate and support the JSF fleet. The JSF aircraft, which includes a variant design for each of the services, represents 90 percent of the remaining planned investment for DOD's major tactical aircraft programs. In fiscal year 2004, the JSF program was rebaselined to address technical challenges, cost increases, and schedule overruns. This report--the third mandated by Congress--describes the program's progress in meeting cost, schedule, and performance goals since rebaselining and identifies various challenges the program will likely face in meeting these goals in the future.

What GAO Found

The JSF program has delivered and flown the first development aircraft. However, cost and schedule goals established in the fiscal year 2004 rebaselined program have not been met. Total JSF program acquisition costs (through 2027) have increased by $31.6 billion and now DOD will pay 12 percent more per aircraft than expected in 2004. The program has also experienced delays in several key events, including the start of the flight test program, delivery of the first production representative development aircraft, and testing of critical missions systems. Delays in the delivery of initial development aircraft were driven by incomplete engineering drawings, changes in design, manufacturing inefficiencies, and parts shortages. Despite these delays, the program still plans to complete development in 2013, compressing the amount of time available for flight testing and development activities. Also, the program projects it will meet all but one key performance requirement--line of sight communications--that is currently dependent on other capabilities being developed outside the JSF program. Accurately predicting JSF costs and schedule and ensuring sufficient funding will likely be key challenges facing the program in the future. JSF continues to pursue a risky acquisition strategy that concurrently develops and produces aircraft. While some concurrency may be beneficial to efficiently transition from development to production, the degree of overlap is significant on this program. Any changes in design and manufacturing that require modifications to delivered aircraft or to tooling and manufacturing processes would result in increased costs and delays in getting capabilities to the warfighter. Low-rate initial production will begin this year with almost the entire 7-year flight test program remaining to confirm the aircraft design. Confidence that investment decisions will deliver expected capability within cost and schedule goals increases as testing proves the JSF will work as expected. The JSF program also faces funding uncertainties as it will demand unprecedented funding over the next 2 decades--more than $12.6 billion a year on average through 2027.