In December 2005, President Bush issued NSPD-44 to improve the  coordination, planning, and implementation of reconstruction and  stabilization operations. It also requires  State to lead the development of a civilian response capability, including  the capacity to ensure that the United States can respond quickly and  effectively to overseas crises. NSC has  adopted two of three elements of the framework—the Interagency  Management System and procedures for initiating its use. One element—a  guide for planning stabilization and reconstruction operations—is still in  progress. In addition, guidance on roles and responsibilities for  State’s bureaus and offices is unclear and inconsistent, and the lack of an  agreed-upon definition of a stabilization and reconstruction operation  poses an obstacle to interagency collaboration. In addition, some  interagency partners have shown limited support for the framework and  S/CRS. S/CRS is taking steps to  strengthen the framework’s effectiveness by addressing agencies’  concerns and providing training to interagency partners, but differences  between the planning capacities and procedures of U.S. government  civilian agencies and the military pose obstacles to effective coordination. S/CRS Has Led the Development of an Interagency Framework for Planning and Coordinating U.S. Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations

S/CRS has led an NSC interagency group to create a framework for  developing specific reconstruction and stabilization plans under NSPD-44. Key elements of the framework include  the Interagency Management System (IMS) for managing high-priority and  highly complex crises and operations,   a guide for planning specific reconstruction and stabilization operations,    procedures for initiating government-wide planning, including the IMS and  the planning guide. As of October 2007, the framework has not been fully applied to any  stabilization and reconstruction operation. Third, interagency partners believe the planning process, as outlined in the  draft planning guide, is too cumbersome and time consuming for the  results it produces. State Has Not Addressed Key Details for Establishing and Maintaining Rapid Deployment Corps

State has begun developing three civilian corps to deploy rapidly to  international crises but has not addressed key details for establishing and  maintaining these units. First, State created two units within the  department—the Active Response Corps (ARC) and the Standby Response  Corps (SRC)—and has collaborated with several other U.S. government  agencies to create similar units. State and other agencies, however, face  challenges in establishing these units, including (1) difficulties in achieving  planned staffing levels for ARC and providing training opportunities for  State’s SRC volunteers, (2) agencies’ inabilities to secure resources for  operations not viewed as part of their core missions, and (3) the possibility  that deploying volunteers could result in their home units having  insufficient staff. Second, in May 2007, State began an effort to establish  the Civilian Reserve Corps (CRC), which would be made up of U.S.  civilians who have skills and experiences useful for stabilization and  reconstruction operations, such as civil engineers, police officers, judges,  and public administrators, that are not readily available within the U.S.  government. If deployed, reservists would become federal employees. In  addition, State has not clearly defined the types of missions for which CRC  would be deployed. In 2007, Congress granted State the authority to  reallocate up to $50 million of Diplomatic and Consular Programs to  support and maintain CRC. However, the pending legislation to authorize CRC does  not include similar rights for deployed CRC personnel. S/CRS estimates that the annual costs for sustaining at home a 2,000- volunteer CRC would be up to $47 million. To determine the Department of State’s (State) efforts to improve  interagency planning and coordination for stabilization and reconstruction  operations, we interviewed current and former staff from the Office of the  Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) and reviewed  documentation on its development, roles, and responsibilities.
Why GAO Did This Study

In 2004, the Department of State created the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization to coordinate U.S. planning and implementation of stabilization and reconstruction operations. In December 2005, President Bush issued National Security Presidential Directive 44 (NSPD-44), charging State with improving coordination, planning, and implementation of such operations and ensuring that the United States can respond quickly and effectively to overseas crises. GAO was asked to report on State's efforts to improve (1) interagency planning and coordination for stabilization and reconstruction operations, and (2) deployment of civilians to these operations. To address these objectives, we conducted interviews with officials and reviewed documents from U.S. agencies and government and private research centers.

What GAO Found

The office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) is developing a framework for planning and coordinating U.S. reconstruction and stabilization operations. The National Security Council (NSC) has adopted two of three primary elements of the framework--the Interagency Management System and procedures for initiating the framework's use. However, the third element--a guide for planning stabilization and reconstruction operations--is still in progress. We cannot determine how effective the framework will be because it has not been fully applied to any stabilization and reconstruction operation. In addition, guidance on agencies' roles and responsibilities is unclear and inconsistent, and the lack of an agreed-upon definition for stabilization and reconstruction operations poses an obstacle to interagency collaboration. Moreover, some interagency partners stated that senior officials have shown limited support for the framework and S/CRS. Some partners described the new planning process, as presented in early versions of the planning guide, as cumbersome and too time consuming for the results it has produced. S/CRS has taken steps to strengthen the framework by addressing some interagency concerns and providing training to interagency partners. However, differences in the planning capacities and procedures of civilian agencies and the military pose obstacles to effective coordination. State has begun developing three civilian corps that can deploy rapidly to international crises, but key details for establishing and maintaining these units remain unresolved. First, State created the Active Response Corps (ARC) and the Standby Response Corps (SRC) comprised of U.S. government employees to act as first responders to international crises and has worked with several agencies to create similar units. However, these efforts are limited due to State's difficulty in achieving planned staffing levels for ARC, a lack of training available to SRC volunteers, other agencies' inability to secure resources for operations unrelated to their core domestic missions, and the possibility that deploying employees to such operations can leave units without sufficient staff. Second, in 2004, State began developing the Civilian Reserve Corps (CRC). CRC would be comprised of U.S. civilians who have skills and experiences useful for stabilization and reconstruction operations, such as police officers, civil engineers, public administrators, and judges that are not readily available within the U.S. government. If deployed, volunteers would become federal workers. S/CRS developed a plan to recruit the first 500 volunteers, and NSC has approved a plan to increase the roster to 2,000 volunteers in 2009. In May 2007, State received the authority to reallocate up to $50 million to support and maintain CRC, but it does not yet have the authority to obligate these funds. In addition, issues related to volunteers' compensation and benefits that could affect CRC recruitment and management would require congressional action. Furthermore, State has not clearly defined the types of missions for which CRC would be deployed. State has estimated the costs to establish and sustain CRC at home, but these costs do not include costs for deploying and sustaining volunteers overseas.