	GAO’s Work in Iraq Is Broad and Coordinated with Other Audit Authorities

While the IGs are designed to focus primarily on exposing fraud, waste,  and abuse in individual federal agency programs, GAO’s broad audit  authority allows us to support Congress through strategic analyses of  issues that cut across multiple federal agencies and sources of funding. Our work in Iraq spans the three prongs of the U.S. national strategy in  Iraq—security, political, and economic. The broad, cross-cutting nature of  our work helps minimize the possibility of overlap and duplication by  individual IGs. Key Findings and Recommendations from GAO’s Work in Iraq

Let me highlight some of the key findings and recommendations we have  made as a result of our continuing work in Iraq. Assessment of the November 2005 National Strategy for Victory in Iraq and the U.S. Military Campaign Plan

In November 2005, the National Security Council issued the National  Strategy for Victory in Iraq (NSVI) to clarify the President’s strategy for  achieving U.S. political, security, and economic goals in Iraq. We recommended that the NSC improve the current strategy by  articulating clear roles and responsibilities, specifying future  contributions, and identifying current costs and future resources. We have supplemented this work with a series  of classified briefings to the Congress on changes to the campaign plan  and U.S. efforts to train and equip Iraqi security forces and protect  weapons caches throughout Iraq. Limited Transparency on the Costs of the Global War on Terror

Since 2001, Congress has appropriated about $495 billion to U.S. agencies  for military and diplomatic efforts in support of the global war on  terrorism; the majority of this amount has gone to stabilize and rebuild  Iraq. Over the years, we have made a series of recommendations to the  Secretary of Defense intended to improve the transparency and reliability  of DOD’s GWOT obligation data, including recommendations that DOD (1)  revise the cost-reporting guidance so that large amounts of reported  obligations are not shown in “miscellaneous” categories, and (2) take steps  to ensure that reported GWOT obligations are reliable. We also have  recommended that DOD build more funding into the baseline budget once  an operation reaches a known level of effort and costs are more  predictable. In response, the department has implemented many of our  previous recommendations. Transferring security responsibilities to the Iraqi security forces and  provincial governments is a critical part of the U.S. government’s strategy  in Iraq and key to allowing a drawdown of U.S. forces. A  key measure of the capabilities of Iraqi forces is the Transition Readiness  Assessment (TRA) reports prepared by coalition advisors embedded in  Iraqi units. Our work focuses on  the accountability requirements for the transportation and distribution of  U.S.-funded equipment and did not review any requirements relevant to  the procurement of this equipment. DOD faces significant challenges in  maintaining readiness for overseas and homeland missions and sustaining  rotational deployments of duty, especially if the duration and intensity of  current operations continue at the present pace. Ongoing military operations in Iraq are inflicting heavy wear and tear on  military equipment. The Army  and the Marine Corps have initiated programs to reset (repair or replace)  equipment and are likely to incur large expenditures in the future. In December 2006, we recommended that the Chairman of the Joint Staff  conduct a theaterwide survey and risk assessment regarding unsecured  conventional munitions in Iraq and incorporate conventional munitions  storage site security as a strategic planning factor into all levels of  planning policy and guidance. When such  requirements were not clear, DOD often entered into contract  arrangements that posed additional risks. Managing risks when  requirements are in flux requires effective oversight, but DOD lacked the  capacity to provide sufficient numbers of contracting, logistics, and other  personnel, thereby hindering oversight efforts. To achieve this outcome, we set high standards for ourselves in the  conduct of our work. In April 2005, an international peer review team gave our quality assurance  system a clean opinion—only the second time a national audit institution  has received such a rating from a multinational team. Thus, the Congress  and the American people can have confidence that GAO’s work is  independent, objective, and reliable.
Why GAO Did This Study

GAO provided a strategic overview of GAO's work related to securing, stabilizing, and rebuilding Iraq. In our statement today, as requested, GAO highlighted (1) GAO's scope, authority, and coordination; (2) some of the insights stemming from our work in Iraq; and (3) the rigorous quality assurance framework that GAO uses to ensure relevant, reliable, and consistent results in all of our work. This testimony is based upon extensive work spanning several years. Since 2003, we have issued 67 Iraq-related reports and testimonies. For example, GAO sent a report to the Congress last week on a range of key issues for congressional oversight of efforts to secure, stabilize, and rebuild Iraq. Although many of our sources are classified, we strive to report information to the Congress in a public format to promote greater transparency and accountability of U.S. government policies, programs, and activities. As provided for in our congressional protocols, most of our work in Iraq has been performed under my authority to conduct evaluations on my own initiative since it is a matter of broad interest to the entire Congress and numerous committees in both chambers. Our work also helped inform the deliberations of the Iraq Study Group; the Comptroller General personally briefed this group on the results of our Iraq work in June 2006. GAO also provided significant additional information to the Iraq Study Group for its use.

What GAO Found

GAO and the Inspectors General (IG) of individual departments and agencies have different roles and responsibilities. GAO's broad audit authority allows us to support Congress through strategic analyses of issues that cut across multiple federal agencies and sources of funding. Our work spans the security, political, and economic prongs of the U.S. national strategy in Iraq. The broad, cross-cutting nature of this work helps minimize the possibility of overlap and duplication by any individual Inspector General. Based on our work, we have made some unique contributions to Congress. Our past and ongoing work has focused on the U.S. strategy and costs of operating in Iraq, training and equipping the Iraqi security forces, governance issues, the readiness of U.S. military forces, and acquisition outcomes. Some highlights from our work follow. Our analysis of the National Strategy for Victory in Iraq recommended that the National Security Council improve the strategy by articulating clearer roles and responsibilities, specifying future contributions, and identifying current costs and future resources. In our examination of the cost of U.S. military operations abroad, we recommended that the Secretary of Defense improve the transparency and reliability of Department of Defense's (DOD) Global War on Terror (GWOT) obligation data. We also recommended that DOD build more funding into the baseline budget once an operation reaches a known level of effort and costs are more predictable. In assessing the capabilities of Iraqi security forces, we found that overall security conditions in Iraq have deteriorated despite increases in the numbers of trained and equipped security forces. A complete assessment of Iraqi security forces' capabilities is dependent on DOD providing GAO with the readiness levels of each Iraqi unit. We found that DOD faces significant challenges in maintaining U.S. military readiness for overseas and homeland missions and in sustaining rotational deployments of duty, especially if the duration and intensity of current operations continue at the present pace. In assessing the impact of ongoing military operations in Iraq on military equipment, we found that the Army and the Marine Corps have initiated programs to reset (repair or replace) equipment and are likely to incur large expenditures in the future. In reviewing efforts to secure munitions sites and provide force protection, we recommended that DOD conduct a theaterwide survey and risk assessment of unsecured conventional munitions in Iraq and incorporate storage site security into strategic planning efforts. In assessing acquisition outcomes, we found that DOD often entered into contract arrangements with unclear requirements, which posed additional risks to the government. DOD also lacked the capacity to provide sufficient numbers of contracting, logistics, and other personnel, thereby hindering oversight efforts. In April 2005, an international peer review team gave our quality assurance system a clean opinion--only the second time a national audit institution has received such a rating from a multinational team. Thus, the Congress and the American people can have confidence that GAO's work is independent, objective, and reliable.