State and Local Fusion Centers Vary in Their Stages of Development and Characteristics

Established by state and local governments to improve information  sharing among federal, state, and local entities and to prevent terrorism or  other threats, fusion centers across the country vary in their stages of  development—from operational to early in the planning stages. Officials in 43 of the 58 fusion centers we contacted described their  centers as operational as of September 2007. The majority of the operational fusion centers we contacted were  primarily led by law enforcement entities, such as state police or state  bureaus of investigation. Federal Agencies’ Efforts to Support Fusion Centers Help to Address Some Reported Challenges and Provide Further Assistance

In light of the importance of fusion centers in facilitating information  sharing among levels of government, DHS and DOJ have several efforts  under way that begin to address challenges that fusion center officials  identified in establishing and operating their centers. Finally, DHS and DOJ have taken steps to develop  guidance and provide technical assistance and training, but fusion center  officials cited the need for clearer and more specific guidance in a variety  of areas to help address operational challenges. DHS, FBI, and the PM-ISE Have Some Actions Under Way to Address Challenges Some Fusion Center Officials Cited with Accessing and Managing Multiple Information Systems

As described earlier, DHS and FBI have provided access to their primary  unclassified systems (HSIN and LEO) to many of the 43 operational fusion  centers we contacted. In these centers, fusion center personnel must rely on  federal personnel who are assigned to the center or other state personnel  assigned to FBI task forces to access these systems, obtain the relevant  information and share it with them. For example, both DHS and the FBI could each be  conducting a separate security clearance investigation and determining  eligibility for access to classified information on the same individual. Fusion Center Officials We Contacted Cited Challenges with Personnel and Funding; DHS and FBI Are Helping to Address These Issues to Some Extent but Have Not Defined Plans for Long- Term Support

Officials in 43 of the 58 fusion centers we contacted reported facing  several challenges related to obtaining personnel, and officials in 54 of the  centers reported encountering funding challenges when establishing and  operating their centers, challenges which some of these officials also  indicated affected their centers’ sustainability. The FBI had assigned personnel to about three  quarters of the operational fusion centers we contacted. Further, officials in 22 of the fusion centers said that they  encountered challenges related to the sustainability of federal funding,  such as the potential for, or actual, declining federal funding, which  created concerns for the officials about their centers’ ability to sustain  capability for the long term. For  example, DHS expanded grant funding in fiscal year 2006 in the area of  allowable costs for information sharing and collaborative efforts. However, it is also important for fusion center management to understand  the federal government’s longer-term role with respect to these centers. Recommendation

To improve efforts to create a national network of fusion centers, we  recommend that the NFCCG, through the Information Sharing Council and  the PM-ISE, determine and articulate the federal government’s role in, and  whether it expects to provide resources to, fusion centers over the long- term to help ensure their sustainability. GAO staff who made major contributions to  this report are listed in appendix V.

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

The objectives of our review were to (1) describe the stages of  development and characteristics of state and local fusion centers and  (2) identify to what extent efforts under way by the Program Manager for  the Information Sharing Environment (PM-ISE), Department of Homeland  Security (DHS), and Department of Justice (DOJ) help to address some of  the challenges identified by fusion centers. Data were not available  to determine the total number of local fusion centers. The officials articulated several reasons why they are not planning to  establish a fusion center, including the state’s commitment to support the  efforts of the U.S. Attorney’s Office to conduct threat analyses and share  information, political concerns about the role of the government in  information sharing, local agencies’ lack of interest in participating in a  fusion center because they perceive the centers to be intelligence- gathering entities, and local communities do not want law enforcement to  be involved in gathering intelligence, the state’s low risk for international  terrorism, and difficulties staffing a center because state and local  agencies would not have the capacity to provide personnel to work in a  fusion center. DHS has  assigned a full-time intelligence analyst to the center. However, the center is planning to diversify and focus on  all hazards in the future. However, the FBI analyst at  STAC has access to them.
Why GAO Did This Study

In general, a fusion center is a collaborative effort to detect, prevent, investigate, and respond to criminal and terrorist activity. Recognizing that fusion centers are a mechanism for information sharing, the federal government--including the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Department of Justice (DOJ), and the Program Manager for the Information Sharing Environment (PM-ISE), which has primary responsibility for governmentwide information sharing and is located in the Office of the Director of National Intelligence--is taking steps to partner with fusion centers. In response to Congressional request, GAO examined (1) the status and characteristics of fusion centers and (2) to what extent federal efforts help alleviate challenges the centers identified. GAO reviewed center-related documents and conducted interviews with officials from DHS, DOJ, and the PM-ISE, and conducted semistructured interviews with 58 state and local fusion centers. The results are not generalizable to the universe of fusion centers. Data are not available on the total number of local fusion centers.

What GAO Found

Most states and many local governments have established fusion centers to address gaps in information sharing. Fusion centers across the country vary in their stages of development--from operational to early in the planning stages. Officials in 43 of the centers GAO contacted described their centers as operational, and 34 of these centers had opened since January 2004. Law enforcement entities, such as state police or state bureaus of investigation, are the lead or managing agencies in the majority of the operational centers GAO contacted; however, the centers varied in their staff sizes and partnerships with other agencies. Nearly all of the operational fusion centers GAO contacted had federal personnel assigned to them. For example, DHS has assigned personnel to 17, and the FBI has assigned personnel to about three quarters of the operational centers GAO contacted. DHS and DOJ have several efforts under way that begin to address challenges fusion center officials identified. DHS and DOJ have provided many fusion centers access to their information systems, but fusion center officials cited challenges accessing and managing multiple information systems. Both DHS and the FBI have provided security clearances for state and local personnel and set timeliness goals. However, officials cited challenges obtaining and using security clearances. Officials in 43 of the 58 fusion centers contacted reported facing challenges related to obtaining personnel, and officials in 54 fusion centers reported challenges with funding, some of which affected these centers' sustainability. The officials said that these issues made it difficult to plan for the future and created concerns about the fusion centers' ability to sustain their capability for the long-term. To support fusion centers, both DHS and the FBI have assigned personnel to the centers. To help address funding issues, DHS has made several changes to address restrictions on the use of federal grants funds. These individual agency efforts help address some of the challenges with personnel and funding. However, the federal government has not clearly articulated the long-term role it expects to play in sustaining fusion centers. It is critical for center management to know whether to expect continued federal resources, such as personnel and grant funding, since the federal government, through the information sharing environment, expects to rely on a nationwide network of centers to facilitate information sharing with state and local governments. Finally, DHS, DOJ, and the PM-ISE have taken steps to develop guidance and provide technical assistance to fusion centers, for instance, by issuing guidelines for establishing and operating centers. However, officials at 31 of the 58 centers said they had challenges training their personnel, and officials at 11 centers expressed a need for the federal government to establish standards for training fusion center analysts to help ensure that analysts have similar skills. DHS and DOJ have initiated a technical assistance program for fusion centers. They have also developed a set of baseline capabilities, but the document was still in draft as of September and had not been issued.