Also, National Guard personnel have served in a  state active duty status in response to natural disasters. National Guard Has Been Adapting to Meet Current Warfighting Requirements, but Readiness Challenges Remain for Future Operations

Both at home and overseas, the Army and the Air National Guard have  been adapting in several ways to meet the demands of current warfighting  requirements, but some of the measures taken may challenge the Army  National Guard’s efforts to provide ready forces for future operations. The Air National Guard has also adapted to  meet new warfighting requirements, but its readiness has not been as  negatively affected because it has not experienced continued high usage  as the Army National Guard has and because its units are more fully  equipped and manned for war. Army Has Retrained Some Guard Units and Made Other Adjustments

To meet the high demand for Army National Guard personnel for recent  operations, the Army has alerted or mobilized over one-half of the Army  National Guard’s personnel since September 11. By July 2004, the National Guard had initiated over  74,000 personnel transfers to meet the combatant commander’s needs. However, these measures will require additional funding. However, these initiatives are in the  early stages of implementation and the extent to which they will alleviate  the strain on Army National Guard forces due to the continuing high pace  of operations is uncertain. Second, the Air National Guard has not been required to  sustain the same high level of activations as the Army National Guard. National Guard Has Supported Homeland Security Needs, but Its Readiness for Future Homeland Missions Is Not Measured

While Army and Air National Guard forces have, thus far, supported the  nation’s homeland security needs, the Guard’s preparedness to perform  homeland defense and civil support missions that may be needed in the  future cannot be measured because its role in these missions is not  defined, requirements have not been identified, and standards have not  been developed against which to measure preparedness. Since September  11, the Guard has performed a number of missions, including flying patrols  over U.S. cities and guarding critical infrastructure. However, state and  National Guard officials voiced concerns about preparedness and  availability of Guard forces as overseas deployments continue at a high  pace. DOD plans to publish a comprehensive strategy  for the homeland defense. Without this  information, policy makers are not in the best position to manage risks to  the nation’s homeland security by targeting investments to the highest  priority needs and ensuring that the investments are having the desired  effect. However, in the post-September 11 environment, Guard forces may be  expected to perform missions that differ greatly from their warfighting or  traditional state missions and may require different equipment, training,  and specialized capabilities than they currently possess. The current demands for large  numbers of fully manned and equipped forces to support overseas  operations have forced the Guard to transfer personnel and equipment  from nondeploying units to deploying units, degrading the readiness of the  nondeployed units. This continued decline in readiness of nondeployed  units hinders the Army National Guard’s ability to continue to provide the  ready forces in the short term that DOD estimates will be needed to meet  operational needs over the next 3 to 5 years. Until it has these  standards and measures, DOD does not have the means to determine  whether the Guard is prepared to meet homeland security needs with its  current structure and assets. As DOD completes its homeland defense strategy and the Northern  Command refines its concept and operational plans for homeland defense  and support to civil authorities and defines requirements, we recommend  that the Secretary of Defense direct the Under Secretaries of Defense for  Policy and for Personnel and Readiness, in consultation with the Chairman  of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Commander of the U.S. Northern Command,  Commander of the U.S. Pacific Command, the Chiefs of the Army and the  Air Force, the Chief of the National Guard Bureau, and appropriate  officials in the Department of Homeland Security, to take the following  four actions:    Establish the full range of the National Guard’s homeland missions,  including those led by DOD and those conducted in support of civilian  authorities. DOD partially agreed with our recommendation that DOD develop and  submit to Congress a strategy that addresses the Army National Guard’s  short- and long-term needs for the global war on terrorism, including the  Army National Guard’s role, missions, and requirements for personnel and  equipment, and its plans to manage the risk associated with the declining  readiness of nondeployed Army National Guard forces.
Why GAO Did This Study

The September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks and the global war on terrorism have triggered the largest activation of National Guard forces since World War II. As of June 2004, over one-half of the National Guard's 457,000 personnel had been activated for overseas warfighting or domestic homeland security missions in federal and state active duty roles. In addition to increased usage, the Guard has also experienced long deployments and high demand for personnel with specific skills, such as military police. The high pace of operations and the Guard's expanded role since September 11 have raised concerns about whether the Guard is capable of successfully performing its multiple missions within existing and expected resource levels, especially given the challenges it faces in meeting future requirements. GAO was asked to assess the extent to which the Guard is: (1) adapting to meet warfighting requirements in the post-September 11 security environment and (2) supporting immediate and emerging homeland security needs.

What GAO Found

The Army and the Air National Guard have begun adapting their forces to meet new warfighting requirements since the September 11 attacks, but some measures taken to meet short-term requirements have degraded the readiness of nondeployed units, particularly in the Army National Guard. To deploy ready units for overseas missions, the Army National Guard has had to transfer equipment and personnel from nondeploying units. Between September 11, 2001, and July 2004, the Army National Guard had performed over 74,000 personnel transfers. Similarly, as of May 2004, the Army National Guard had transferred over 35,000 equipment items to prepare deploying units, leaving nondeployed Army National Guard units short one-third of the critical equipment they need for war. The Army has developed plans, such as the Army Campaign Plan, to restructure its forces to better prepare them for future missions. However, it has not finalized detailed plans identifying equipment needs and costs for restructuring Guard units. Moreover, the Army is still structured and funded according to a resourcing plan that does not provide Guard units all the personnel and equipment they need to deploy in wartime, so the Army National Guard will be challenged to continue to provide ready units for operations expected in the next 3 to 5 years. The Air National Guard is also adapting to meet new warfighting requirements, but it has not been as negatively affected as the Army National Guard because it has not been required to sustain the same high level of operations. In addition, the Air National Guard generally maintains fully manned and equipped units. While the Army and the Air National Guard have, thus far, also supported the nation's homeland security needs, the Guard's preparedness to perform homeland security missions that may be needed in the future is unknown because requirements and readiness standards and measures have not been defined. Without this information, policy makers are not in the best position to manage the risks to the nation's homeland security by targeting investments to the highest priority needs and ensuring that the investments are having the desired effect. Since September 11, the Guard has been performing several unanticipated homeland missions, such as flying patrols over U.S. cities and guarding critical infrastructure. However, states have concerns about the preparedness and availability of Guard forces for domestic needs and natural disasters while overseas deployments continue at a high pace. The Department of Defense (DOD) plans to publish a comprehensive strategy for homeland security missions that DOD will lead. However, DOD has not reached agreement with multiple federal and state authorities on the Guard's role in such missions. Also, the National Guard Bureau has proposed initiatives to strengthen the Guard's homeland security capabilities. However, many of these initiatives are at an early stage and will require coordination and approval from other stakeholders, such as DOD and the states. In the absence of clear homeland security requirements, the Guard's preparedness to perform missions at home cannot be measured to determine whether it needs additional assets or training.