U.S. and Foreign Rail Transit Operators Have Taken Similar Actions to Secure Rail Systems, and Opportunities for Additional Domestic Security Actions May Exist

U.S. rail transit operators have taken numerous actions to secure their rail  systems since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, in the United  States and the March 11, 2004, attacks in Madrid. We also identified three rail security  practices—covert testing, random screening of passengers and their  baggage, and maintaining a centralized clearinghouse on rail security  technologies—used in foreign countries but not, at the time or our review,  domestically. U.S. and Foreign Rail Operators Employ Similar Security Practices

Both U.S. and foreign rail transit operators we contacted have  implemented similar improvements to enhance the security of their  systems. Covert testing: Two of the 13 foreign rail systems we visited use covert  testing to keep employees alert about their security responsibilities. DHS and DOT Help Fund Security Efforts, and Some Funding Decisions Are Risk- Based

Both DHS and DOT help fund rail transit security investments, and DHS  has promoted risk-based funding decisions in the allocation of transit  security grants. These programs have provided over  $320 million in grants to rail transit agencies for certain security activities  since fiscal year 2003. The Office of Grants and Training has leveraged its  grant-making authority to promote risk-based funding decisions for  passenger rail by requiring, for example, that operators complete a risk  assessment to be eligible for a transit security grant. DHS and DOT Help Fund Rail Transit Security Efforts

With the creation of DHS in 2002, one of its components, the Office of  Grants and Training, became the primary federal source for security  funding for passenger rail systems. For example, transit agencies must spend 1  percent of their urbanized area formula funds—which is FTA’s largest  grant program—on security improvements. Targeting resources to the highest  priority is especially critical given the competition for resources within the  rail transit sector, and between the rail transit sector and the other modes  of transportation. Coordination between DHS and DOT will continue to be  important as both departments move forward with existing programs and  new security initiatives, such as TSA’s deployment of its rail inspectors. For  example, in our September 2005 report on rail security, we noted that TSA  provided limited opportunities for other federal agencies and the rail  industry to collaborate in the development of its passenger rail security  directives, which were issued in May 2004 to provide a consistent baseline  standard of protective measures for all passenger rail operators. These annexes are to delineate the specific security-related roles,  responsibilities, resources, and commitments for mass transit, rail,  research and development, and other matters. Another area requiring continued coordination is the funding of rail transit  security activities. Nevertheless, it is  important that we take steps to identify and mitigate risks to passenger rail  systems. While domestic rail agencies have implemented a number of  security practices that are generally consistent with those of foreign rail  operators, they have not adopted some practices used in other countries,  including covert testing, random screening, and information  clearinghouses for new security technologies and best practices. Despite  the potential political, legal, fiscal, and cultural challenges that  implementing these additional practices in the United States could pose,  we continue to believe that the practices may warrant further  examination, and we stand by our September 2005 recommendations that  DHS, in collaboration with DOT and the passenger rail industry, evaluate  the feasibility of implementing them. With the execution of the MOU  and transit security annex, DHS and DOT have taken important steps  forward in improving coordination among the federal entities involved in  rail transit security matters.
Why GAO Did This Study

The July 2005 bombing attacks on London's subway system dramatically revealed the vulnerability of passenger rail systems worldwide to terrorist attacks and demonstrated the need for an increased focus on security for these systems. This testimony, which is based primarily on GAO's September 2005 report on passenger rail security (GAO-05-851), provides information on (1) the security practices that domestic and selected foreign rail transit operators have implemented to mitigate risks and enhance security; (2) the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) and the Department of Transportation's (DOT) funding of rail transit security and use of risk management in funding decisions; and (3) the steps DHS and DOT have taken to improve coordination on rail transit security matters. As part of its 2005 report, GAO contacted 32 U.S. rail transit operators and 13 passenger rail operators in seven European and Asian countries.

What GAO Found

Domestic and foreign rail transit operators GAO contacted have taken similar actions to help secure their systems, including implementing customer awareness programs, increasing the number and visibility of their security personnel, and upgrading security technology. Also, both domestic and foreign operators have used risk assessments to guide security-related activities and spending. However, GAO also observed security practices that were used by certain foreign passenger rail operators, but were not employed in the United States at the time of GAO's review. For example, some foreign rail operators use covert testing to help keep employees alert to security threats or randomly screen passengers. Centralized clearinghouses on rail security technologies, such as chemical sensors, and best practices are also maintained in some foreign countries. While introducing any of these security practices into the U.S. rail system may pose political, legal, fiscal, and cultural challenges, the practices may nevertheless warrant further examination. Both DHS and DOT help fund rail transit security investments, and DHS has promoted risk-based funding decisions in the allocation of transit security grants. DHS's Office of Grants and Training is the primary source of security funding for passenger rail systems, providing over $320 million in grants to rail transit agencies for fiscal years 2003 to 2006. The Office of Grants and Training has leveraged its grant-making authority to promote risk-based funding decisions for passenger rail by requiring, for example, that operators complete a risk assessment to be eligible for a transit security grant. As we have noted in previous reports, using assessments of risk to target resources to the highest priority is especially critical given the competition for resources within the rail transit sector, and between the rail transit sector and the other modes of transportation. DOT's Federal Transit Administration (FTA) also helps fund rail transit security efforts by providing financial assistance to transit agencies and requiring that they spend 1 percent of their urbanized area formula funds on security improvements. To improve coordination on transportation security matters, including rail transit security, DHS and DOT signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) in September 2004. DHS and DOT also signed a transit security annex to the MOU in September 2005 that delineates specific security-related roles, responsibilities, resources, and commitments for transit issues. In GAO's view, these actions are positive steps forward in addressing the coordination problems GAO previously identified. For instance, federal and rail industry officials raised questions about the feasibility of implementing and complying with TSA's May 2004 security directives, citing limited opportunities to collaborate with TSA to ensure that industry best practices were incorporated. Effective coordination between DHS and DOT will continue to be important as both departments move forward with existing programs and new security initiatives.