The Army plans to transform its forces over  a 30-year period. IBCTS Are Expected to Fill a Perceived Gap in Military Capability

The Army expects the IBCT to provide a force capability that it does not  currently have:  a rapidly deployable early-entry combat force that is lethal,  survivable, and capable of operating in all types of military operations,  from small-scale contingencies like the Balkans’ missions to a major  theater war. They generally  agree that the current Army force structure does not meet their  requirements for a rapidly deployable, lethal, and survivable force. Rather,  they saw the IBCT as providing them with a broader choice of capabilities  to meet their operational needs. However, the Army  has encountered challenges in forming the IBCT at Fort Lewis. One  challenge to overcome is a combat capability shortfall in the first IBCT  when it is certified. Further, the interim  armored vehicle delivery schedule has compressed the time available for  soldiers to train on the vehicles; personnel turnover resulted in more time  spent on digital training than planned; and the 96-hour deployment  capability, while a goal rather than a requirement, will not be attained by  the first IBCT. Other requirements for this future force are to be  able to deploy a division in 120 hours and five divisions in 30 days. Without having  the lessons learned available, the Army may repeat mistakes in fielding  subsequent brigades and may lose opportunities that could help it field  subsequent brigades more efficiently. To assist subsequent installations where IBCTs will be formed in their  planning, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary  of the Army to  expedite development of a program to sustain personnel skills on  digitized equipment so that it will be available for subsequent IBCTs,   collect and analyze data on why soldiers leave the IBCTs and take  appropriate action to reduce personnel turnover,  estimate the extent and cost of facility improvements that will be  needed at installations scheduled to accommodate the subsequent  IBCTs to assist them in their planning,  establish a BCC-type organization at subsequent IBCT locations to deal  with day-to-day challenges, and  provide a central collection point for IBCT lessons learned so as to  make the information available to personnel throughout the Army.
What GAO Found

In 1999, the Army announced its plans to transform its forces during the next 30 years to enable them to deploy more rapidly and operate more effectively during all types of military conflicts, from small-scale contingencies to major wars. The Army's goal is to be able to deploy a brigade anywhere in the world within 96 hours, a division within 120 hours, and five divisions within 30 days. The first step is to form and equip six interim brigade combat teams by 2008. Created to fill a gap in military capability, the teams are intended to be a lethal and survivable deterrent force that can be rapidly deployed around the world. The commanders in chief envision different uses for the teams according to the unique requirements of their respective regions. However, they generally agree that the teams should provide them with a broader choice of capabilities to meet their operational needs. The Army faces many challenges in assembling its first team. For example, some planned combat capabilities will not be present when the team is certified for deployment next year. In addition, the interim armored vehicle delivery schedule has compressed the time available for training. Army officials believe that the organization at Fort Lewis that was created to help assemble the brigades has been effective in dealing with day-to-day challenges. The Army is chronicling lessons learned in forming the teams, but this information is not readily available in a central source. As a result, the Army may be unaware of some best practices or may repeat mistakes in forming later teams.