	Mine Countermeasures

Sea mines threaten the Navy’s ability to conduct amphibious landings and logistical support operations. The Navy’s current forces of specialized ships, helicopters, and other assets that have been developed for and dedicated to detecting and neutralizing enemy sea mines are not effectively capable of breaching and clearing mines in very shallow water near the shore. This capability is required to assure access to beach- landing sites by combat and support forces. The Navy has made some progress in these areas. 1). Antisubmarine Warfare

Although the Navy is making some progress in overcoming shortfalls identified in the 1997 Anti-Submarine Warfare Assessment, a lack of resources and priorities among competing programs is still prevalent. Antiship Cruise Missile Defense

The Navy’s ship defense capabilities against currently deployed cruise missiles are marginal, and none of the acquisitions that the Navy is currently pursuing will provide adequate protection against improved versions of these weapons. Consequently, surface ships will be at risk when operating within the range of these weapons. Naval Surface Fire Support

The Marine Corps will not have the ship-based fire support it needs for at least another decade. Figure 4 illustrates the Marine Corps’ naval surface fire support requirements. Additional progress in overcoming shortfalls identified in the Navy’s 1997 Anti-Submarine Warfare Assessment may be limited by a lack of funding and the Navy’s failure to establish priorities among competing antisubmarine warfare acquisition programs.
Why GAO Did This Study

According to the Navy, the primary purpose of forward-deployed naval forces is to project power from the sea to influence events ashore. To be successful, naval forces must be able to gain access to, and operate in the coastal areas of potential adversaries. Consequently, they must be able to detect and neutralize enemy sea mines and other antiship weapons. Finally, they must be able to launch and support offensive operations against enemy forces ashore. This report assesses the Navy's (1) existing mine countermeasures, (2) antisubmarine warfare, (3) ship self-defense, (4) surface fire support capabilities, and (5) progress in the acquisition programs the Navy is pursuing to address shortfalls in these areas.

What GAO Found

GAO found that the Navy's current force of specialized ships, helicopters, and other assets developed to detect and neutralize enemy sea mines lack several key warfighting capabilities it needs for shoreline operations. Although the Navy is making some progress in overcoming shortfalls in antisubmarine warfare, a lack of resources and priorities among competing programs persists. The Navy's ship defense capabilities against cruise missiles are marginal, and surface ships will be at risk when operating within the range of these weapons. The Navy will not meet the Marine Corps' naval surface fire support requirements for at least another decade. The Navy has shown limited progress in overcoming shortfalls in the acquisition programs it is pursuing.