The Future Force is to be offensively oriented and  will employ revolutionary concepts of operations, enabled by new  technology. The Army will be  challenged to convincingly demonstrate the knowledge necessary to  warrant an unqualified commitment to FCS at the 2009 milestone review. Actual  demonstrations (versus modeling and simulation) of the FCS concept,  including its critical survivability aspects, have been limited to date;  demonstrated network performance is particularly limited with many key  questions yet to be answered. Table 1 illustrates both  the actual progress the Army has made maturing FCS critical technologies  and projected progress through the production decision. While full details are not yet available, the Army is  considering plans to request additional funds for FCS beyond the current  cost estimate of $159 billion. This tension seems only  likely to worsen, as indications are that FCS costs are about to increase  again at the same time competition for funds—both between near-term  and far-term needs within DOD and between defense and other needs  within the federal government—is intensifying. On several scores, the current FCS program falls short. Its  acquisition strategy is more schedule-driven than it is knowledge–based  and is unlikely to be executable, with a significant amount of development  and demonstration yet to be completed. While an incremental approach is generally preferable, it would represent  the fourth different strategy for the FCS program that DOD and the  Congress will be asked to evaluate and oversee. By the time of that decision,  in fiscal 2013, the Army plans to have invested about $12 billion in FCS  procurement funds and more than $50 billion for FCS overall. A final version of that  sensor will not be available until February 2010. These include: establishment of configuration steering boards that are tasked to  review all requirements changes and any significant technical  configuration changes that have the potential to result in cost and  schedule impacts to the program; a post-preliminary design review assessment to be conducted  where the results of the PDR and the program manager’s  assessment are considered to determine whether remedial action is  necessary to achieve the program’s objectives; a critical design review, which is an opportunity to assess design  maturity by measures such as completion of subsystem critical  design reviews, the percentage of software and hardware product  specifications and drawings completed, planned corrective actions  to hardware and software deficiencies; adequate developmental  testing, the maturity of critical manufacturing processes, and an  estimate of system reliability based on demonstrated reliability  rates; a post-critical design review, which assesses the program  manager’s report on the critical design review to determine  whether the program can meet its approved objectives or if  adjustments should be made; and before production, a demonstration that the system meets  requirements in its intended environment using a production- representative article, manufacturing processes have been  effectively demonstrated in a pilot line environment, and industrial  capabilities are reasonably available. At this point, there are at least three programmatic directions, or some  combination thereof, that DOD could take at the milestone review to  shape investments in combat systems for the Army, each of which  presents challenges. Recommendations for Executive Action

We recommend that the Secretary of Defense ensure that the investment program that emerges from the 2009  milestone review be conformed with current DOD acquisition  policy, particularly regarding technology maturity, critical design  reviews, and demonstrating production-representative prototypes  before making production commitments; direct the Secretary of the Army to convene, following the  preliminary design reviews and in time to inform the 2009 FCS  milestone review, an FCS Configuration Steering Board to provide  assistance in formulating acceptable trade-offs to bridge the gaps  between the FCS requirements and the system designs; ensure that if an incremental approach is selected for FCS, the first  increments are justifiable on their own as worthwhile capabilities  that are not dependent on future increments for their value,  particularly regarding the order in which the information network  and individual manned ground vehicles will be developed; ensure that FCS systems to be spun out to current forces have  been successfully tested in production-representative form before  they are approved for initial production; and  reassess the appropriate role of the LSI in the FCS program,  particularly regarding its involvement in production.
Why GAO Did This Study

The Future Combat System (FCS) program is the centerpiece of the Army's effort to transition to a lighter, more agile, and more capable combat force. By law, GAO is to report annually on the FCS program. Also, law requires the Department of Defense (DOD) to hold a milestone review of the FCS program, now planned for 2009. This report addresses (1) what knowledge will likely be available in key areas for the review, and (2) the challenges that lie ahead following the review. To meet these objectives, GAO reviewed key documents, performed analysis, attended demonstrations and design reviews, and interviewed DOD officials.

What GAO Found

The Army will be challenged to demonstrate the knowledge needed to warrant an unqualified commitment to the FCS program at the 2009 milestone review. While the Army has made progress, knowledge deficiencies remain in key areas. Specifically, all critical technologies are not currently at a minimum acceptable level of maturity. Neither has it been demonstrated that emerging FCS system designs can meet specific requirements or mitigate associated technical risks. Actual demonstrations of FCS hardware and software--versus modeling and simulation results--have been limited, with only small scale warfighting concepts and limited prototypes demonstrated. Network performance is also largely unproven. These deficiencies do not necessarily represent problems that could have been avoided; rather, they reflect the actual immaturity of the program. Finally, there is an existing tension between program costs and available funds that seems only likely to worsen, as FCS costs are likely to increase at the same time as competition for funds intensifies between near- and far-term needs in DOD and between DOD and other federal agencies. DOD could have at least three programmatic directions to consider for shaping investments in future capabilities, each of which presents challenges. First, the current FCS acquisition strategy is unlikely to be executed within the current $159 billion cost estimate and calls for significant production commitments before designs are demonstrated. To date, FCS has spent about 60 percent of its development funds, even though the most expensive activities remain to be done before the production decision. In February 2010, Congress will be asked to begin advancing procurement funds for FCS core systems before most prototype deliveries, critical design review, and key system tests have taken place. By the 2013 production decision, Congress will have been asked for over $50 billion in funding for FCS. Second, the program to spin out early FCS capabilities to current forces operates on an aggressive schedule centered on a 2009 demonstration that will employ some surrogate systems and preliminary designs instead of fully developed items, with little time for evaluation of results. Third, the Army is currently considering an incremental FCS strategy--this is to develop and field capabilities in stages versus in one step. Such an approach is generally preferable, but would present decision makers with a third major change in FCS strategy to consider anew. While details are yet unavailable, it is important that each increment be justified by itself and not be dependent on future increments.