	DOD Organizations Have Issued Coordinated Plans and Established Processes and New Organizations to Facilitate the Drawdown from Iraq

A number of DOD organizations have issued orders outlining a phased  drawdown from Iraq that meet the time frames set forth in the Security  Agreement and presidential guidance, while being responsive to security  conditions on the ground. In support of these plans, processes have been established to monitor,  coordinate, and facilitate the retrograde of equipment out of Iraq. DOD organizations reported that their efforts to reduce personnel,  retrograde equipment, and close bases in the initial months of the  drawdown have exceeded targets. For example, since May 2009, the number  of U.S. servicemembers in Iraq has been reduced by 5,300. While DOD’s progress since May 2009 has exceeded its targets, a large  amount of personnel, equipment, and bases remain to be drawn down  within the established timelines. To meet the presidential target of  reducing the number of U.S. forces in Iraq to 50,000 by August 31, 2010,  MNF-I must reduce its forces by almost 60 percent by next summer. Figure 2  below illustrates the numbers of U.S. forces, contractor personnel, tracked  and wheeled vehicles, and bases that have been drawn down since the  initiation of drawdown; that must be drawn down by the August 31, 2010,  change of mission date; and that must be drawn down before December  31, 2011. Efficient Execution of the Drawdown Requires the Resolution of Several Key Issues

Efficient execution of the drawdown from Iraq may be complicated by  crucial challenges regarding several unresolved issues that, if left  unattended, may hinder MNF-I’s ability to meet the time frames set by the  President, the Security Agreement, and MNF-I’s phased drawdown plan. These challenges include:    contract services that have not been fully identified;    potential costs and other concerns of transitioning key contracts that may  outweigh potential benefits;  longstanding shortages of contract oversight personnel;    some key decisions about the disposition of equipment that have not yet  been made;  longstanding information technology system weaknesses; and    a lack of precise visibility over some equipment. However, as GAO has previously reported, the  drawdown of forces may create additional requirements for contracted  support, and officials in Iraq have acknowledged that additional contractor  personnel will be needed to provide services currently being provided by  U.S. forces. Execution of the Drawdown Is Dependent Upon Key Decisions over the Disposition of Equipment

MNF-I’s execution of the drawdown from Iraq in accordance with  established timelines depends on its obtaining clear guidance as to what  equipment can and will be provided to the Government of Iraq and what  will be retained by the U.S. military; identification of the mechanisms that  are to be used to transfer equipment to the Government of Iraq;  determinations of what will be done with certain types of non-standard  equipment, such as Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles (MRAP);  and resolution of other decisions related to the Army’s modernization and  reset plans. DOD’s Lack of Precise Visibility Over Its Inventory of Equipment and Shipping Containers Inhibits Planning for Retrograde from Iraq

The execution of the drawdown may also be affected by the lack of a  complete and accurate inventory of three broad types of equipment. Concluding Observations

As I have stated today, much has been done in Iraq and Kuwait to facilitate  the drawdown effort.
Why GAO Did This Study

The United States and the Government of Iraq have signed a Security Agreement calling for the drawdown of U.S. forces from Iraq. Predicated on that agreement and U.S. Presidential guidance, Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I) has issued a plan for the reduction of forces to 50,000 U.S. troops by August 31, 2010, and a complete withdrawal of forces by the end of 2011. The drawdown from Iraq includes the withdrawal of approximately 128,700 U.S. troops, over 115,000 contractor personnel, the closure or transfer of 295 bases, and the retrograde of over 3.3 million pieces of equipment. Today's statement will focus on (1) the extent to which the Department of Defense (DOD) has planned for the drawdown in accordance with timelines set by the Security Agreement and presidential directive; and (2) factors that may impact the efficient execution of the drawdown in accordance with established timelines. This statement is based on GAO's review and analysis of DOD and MNF-I plans, and on interviews GAO staff members conducted with DOD officials in the United States, Kuwait, and Iraq. It also draws from GAO's extensive body of issued work on Iraq and drawdown-related issues.

What GAO Found

While DOD's primary focus remains on executing combat missions and supporting the warfighters in Iraq, several DOD organizations have issued coordinated plans for the execution of the drawdown within designated time frames. In support of these plans, processes have been established to monitor, coordinate, and facilitate the retrograde of equipment from Iraq. DOD's organizations have reported that their efforts to reduce personnel, retrograde equipment, and close bases have thus far exceeded targets; since May 2009, for example, DOD reports that the number of U.S. servicemembers in Iraq has been reduced by 5,300, and another 4,000 are expected to be drawn down in October. However, many more personnel, equipment items, and bases remain to be drawn down. For U.S. forces, contractor personnel, selected vehicles, and bases, the graphic below depicts drawdown progress since May 2009, as well as what remains to be drawn down by August 31, 2010 and December 31, 2011, respectively. Efficient execution of the drawdown from Iraq, however, may be complicated by crucial challenges that, if left unattended, may hinder MNF-I's ability to meet the time frames set by the President, the Security Agreement, and MNF-I's phased drawdown plan. First, DOD has yet to fully determine its future needs for contracted services. Second, the potential costs and other concerns of transitioning key contracts may outweigh potential benefits. Third, DOD lacks sufficient numbers of contract oversight personnel. Fourth, key decisions about the disposition of some equipment have yet to be made. Fifth, there are longstanding incompatibility issues among the information technology systems that may undermine the equipment retrograde process. And sixth, DOD lacks precise visibility over its inventory of some equipment and shipping containers. While much has been done to facilitate the drawdown effort, the efficient execution of the drawdown will depend on DOD's ability to mitigate these challenges. We will continue to assess DOD's progress in executing the drawdown from Iraq and plan to issue a report.