The LPP,  as originally approved, was described as a cooperative U.S.-South Korean  effort to consolidate U.S. installations and training areas, improve combat  readiness, enhance public safety, and strengthen the U.S.-South Korean  alliance. Specifically, the LPP covered about  37 percent of the construction costs planned at U.S. military installations  in South Korea over the next 10 years, encompassing about $2 billion of  the $5.6 billion that the U.S. military and South Korea planned to spend to  improve the U.S. military infrastructure in South Korea from 2002 through  2011. It was intended to resolve 55 percent, or 49, of the 89 separate land  disputes that were pending in South Korea in January 2003, which was  considered a significant step forward. Forces Korea officials announced that they were reviewing all  projects and that over $1 billion in ongoing and planned construction had  been put on hold. First, the LPP is dependent on substantial amounts of  funding that South Korea expects to realize through land sales from  property returned by the United States, host-nation-funded construction,  and U.S. military construction funds. Second, U.S. The extent to  which these sources of funding would be required and available for  broader infrastructure changes is not yet clear, particularly for the  relocation of Yongsan Army Garrison. Recently, U.S. For example, U.S. Forces Korea, to (1) reassess planned construction projects in South  Korea as the results of ongoing studies associated with overseas presence  and basing are finalized and (2) prepare a detailed South Korea-wide  infrastructure master plan for the changing infrastructure for U.S. military  facilities in South Korea, updating it periodically as needed, and  identifying funding requirements and division of funding responsibilities  between the United States and South Korea. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

To determine the scope and cost of the plan in relation to total  infrastructure issues in South Korea, we analyzed provisions of the  Land Partnership Plan (LPP), identified the scope and cost of construction  projects outside of the LPP, compared the scope and cost of LPP  construction projects to the scope and cost of all construction projects  in South Korea, and analyzed some of the key unresolved infrastructure  issues not included in the plan, such as the relocation of U.S. troops from  Yongsan Army Garrison. We used this information to identify the costs  of ongoing and planned construction associated with improving  military infrastructure in areas where there is uncertainty about future  U.S. presence—such as Yongsan Army Garrison and U.S. installations  located north of Seoul. We discussed challenges that must be  addressed during implementation of the LPP and implementation issues  associated with the plan that could affect future construction projects  throughout South Korea.
Why GAO Did This Study

The U.S.-South Korean Land Partnership Plan (LPP), signed in March 2002, was designed to consolidate U.S. installations, improve combat readiness, enhance public safety, and strengthen the U.S.-South Korean alliance by addressing some of the causes of periodic tension associated with the U.S. presence in South Korea. The Senate report on military construction appropriations for fiscal year 2003 directed GAO to review the LPP. GAO adjusted its review to also address the effect of ongoing reassessments of U.S. overseas presence upon the LPP and other infrastructure needs. In this report, GAO assessed (1) the scope of the LPP, (2) the implications on the LPP and other construction projects of proposals to change basing in South Korea, and (3) implementation challenges associated with the LPP that could affect future U.S. military construction projects in South Korea.

What GAO Found

Although broad in scope, the LPP was not designed to resolve all U.S. military infrastructure issues. Specifically, the plan was intended to resolve 49 of the 89 separate land disputes that were pending in South Korea. Of the land disputes the plan did not address, the most politically significant, complex, and expensive dispute involves the potential relocation of U.S. forces from Yongsan Army Garrison, located in the Seoul metropolitan area. As a result, the LPP, as approved, covered about 37 percent of the $5.6 billion in construction costs planned at U.S. military installations in South Korea over the next 10 years. Ongoing reassessments of U.S. overseas presence and basing requirements could diminish the need for and alter the locations of many construction projects in South Korea, both those associated with the LPP and those unrelated to it. For example, over $1 billion of ongoing and planned construction associated with improving military infrastructure at Yongsan Army Garrison and U.S. installations located north of Seoul--areas where there is uncertainty about future U.S. presence--has recently been put on hold, canceled, or redirected to an installation located south of Seoul. GAO identified some key challenges that could adversely affect the implementation of the LPP and future U.S. military construction projects throughout South Korea. First, the plan relies on various funding sources, including funding realized through land sales from property returned by the United States. The extent to which these sources of funding would be required and available for broader infrastructure changes is not yet clear. Second, a master plan would be needed to guide future military construction to reposition U.S. forces and basing in South Korea.