	Disapproval of Regulations Under the Congressional Review Act

The Congressional Review Act ("CRA" or the act) establishes a statutory procedure by which Congress can disapprove a regulation issued as a final rule by a federal agency. If a disapproval resolution under the CRA is enacted into law, the disapproved rule becomes of no force and effect; even if it has already taken effect, the CRA specifies that it is to be treated as though it had never taken effect. In addition, if a rule is disapproved under the CRA, the issuing agency may not reissue the same or a substantially similar rule without subsequent statutory authorization from Congress. In the House, similarly, although the time for consideration of any measure always either is limited, or can be limited by majority vote (for example, by adoption of a special rule), significant time might also be consumed not only in debate, but also in roll call votes (such as on ordering the previous question on each special rule and adoption of each special rule itself, as well as on adoption of each disapproval resolution). Section 802(a) of the CRA, however, specifies that, for purposes of its congressional disapproval procedure:
the term 'joint resolution' means only a joint resolution introduced in the period beginning on the date when [Congress receives the rule, as described earlier] and ending 60 days thereafter (excluding days either House of Congress is adjourned for more than 3 days during a session of Congress), the matter after the resolving clause of which is as follows: 'That Congress disapproves the rule submitted by the _____ relating to _____, and such rule shall have no force or effect.' Possible Form of and Proceedings on Consolidated Measures

		Framing and Effect

Although it appears that a joint resolution "bundling" several disapproval provisions into a single measure could not have standing as a disapproval resolution under the CRA, it may be possible to frame such a measure in a form that would allow it to accomplish effects similar to those intended by the CRA with respect to multiple rules. For example, the text required by the CRA permits disapproval under the act only of a single regulation in its entirety. Consideration

A consolidated measure that lacked the form prescribed by the CRA also would not be eligible for consideration under the terms provided by the CRA, including the statutory expedited procedures for Senate consideration and the automatic procedures to facilitate clearance for Presidential action. Presumably, as a result, the Senate would have to choose between considering either (1) a consolidated measure under its regular procedures or (2) a series of individual disapproval resolutions, each under the expedited procedures of the CRA (or, perhaps, both). Assuming sufficient support to invoke cloture, nevertheless, action on the consolidated measure might permit the Senate to dispose, in a relatively limited time, of a significant number of disapproval proposals. In this way, the House would still retain the opportunity to reject any individual disapproval resolution. Additional complications could arise if certain regulations are disapproved by one chamber in a consolidated measure and by the other in separate resolutions under the CRA. This chamber might be able to provide that, upon passage of its own measure, if any disapproval resolution already received from the other corresponds to a provision of the consolidated measure, it be deemed to have passed the received resolution, or that it be in order immediately to consider and pass that resolution without debate. In the House, it might be possible to provide for these proceedings through the terms of a special rule for considering the consolidated measure, but in the Senate unanimous consent would presumably be required. If each of these separately engrossed joint resolutions had the text required by section 802(a) and originated during the period required by that section, it might be possible for it to be regarded as satisfying the requirements for a disapproval resolution under the CRA, so that it could be eligible for the expedited procedure in the Senate, automatic clearance for presentation to the President, and the additional effects of enactment prescribed by the statute. In either chamber, however, it appears that separate engrossment of provisions in this way might be feasible only by unanimous consent.
The Congressional Review Act (CRA) establishes expedited procedures for Congress to disapprove regulations issued by Federal agencies. Disapproval under these procedures requires enactment of a joint resolution that has a specified text and is submitted within 60 days (excluding recesses) after Congress receives the regulation. For these disapproval resolutions, the act provides expedited procedures for Senate consideration and to clear the measure for Presidential action. If the resolution becomes law, the rule not only becomes of no force and effect, but is treated as if it had never taken effect, and the issuing agency may issue no "substantially similar" rule without subsequent authorization by law.
If vetoed, a disapproval resolution can become law only if Congress overrides the veto. For regulations submitted 60 or fewer session days before a sine die adjournment, however, the CRA provides a further 60-day period for submitting disapproval regulations, starting on the 15th session day of the next session. Interest has arisen in using the CRA in this way in the 111th Congress to disapprove regulations issued late in the Bush Administration. Using the CRA in this way for numerous regulations, however, could consume large amounts of floor time. The question has accordingly been raised whether the CRA permits multiple disapproval resolutions to be "bundled," or consolidated into a single measure.
Congress could always overturn regulations through a consolidated measure under its general legislative powers. Even if such a consolidated measure was submitted during the required time period, however, it would not have the text required by the CRA, which permits the statement only of a single disapproval. If enacted, as a result, it would not have the special effects for which the act provides. A consolidated measure, nevertheless, could include provisions specifying that the component disapproval provisions have the same effects as if they were separate disapproval resolutions enacted pursuant to the CRA.
Any consolidated measure also would not be eligible for the expedited procedures provided in the CRA. In the Senate, as a result, its approval might be possible only by constructing it to include provisions that could attract sufficient support to invoke cloture. If the Senate could dispose of some disapprovals in this way, moreover, it might be able to deal with others through individual disapproval resolutions under the expedited procedure, especially by persistent use of its provisions for limiting debate by majority vote. In the House, a special rule could limit debate and amendment of a consolidated measure. Alternatively, a single special rule might provide for limited and consolidated debate on a group of individual disapproval resolutions. House rules protecting the motion to recommit would require final action on each resolution to be separate.
If each chamber agreed to some disapprovals in a consolidated measure and others in separate resolutions under the CRA, the two chambers would have to resolve differences between the consolidated measures under their general rules. Either chamber might also provide for routine passage, when received, of any separate disapproval resolution of the other that corresponded to a provision in its own consolidated measure. The House might provide for this treatment of Senate disapproval resolutions, through a provision in its special rule for considering its consolidated measure, more easily than could the Senate for those of the House. No update of this report is planned.