Background

SBR represents the first time that DOD has taken the lead on developing a  major national security space capability with the intelligence community  as a partner. DOD’s warfighting community is particularly  interested in tracking targets moving over land or sea as well as other  objects of interest. A key advantage of radar in space is having the ability to “see”  through clouds and sand storms and any type of weather, day or night. With the ability to perform these functions  almost simultaneously, SBR is expected to help analysts gain a better  understanding of what is occurring in specific locations. Our reports have shown that  these problems, common among many weapon acquisitions, are largely  rooted in a failure to match the customer’s requirements (desired  capabilities) with the developer’s resources (technical knowledge, timing,  and funding) when starting an acquisition program. This best practices  model enables decision makers to be reasonably certain about their  products at critical junctures during development and helps them make  informed investment decisions. This makes it difficult  for DOD as a whole to make corporate-level and trade-off decisions— which will likely be needed when DOD begins the SBR acquisition because  (1) costs are significantly increasing for other critical space systems such  as the Space-Based Infrared System High, the Transformational Satellite,  and the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle and (2) DOD is planning to  undertake additional new programs, such as the Space-Based Space  Surveillance system and a new version of the Global Positioning System. DOD Moving Forward on Acquiring Critical Knowledge but Gaps Remain in Approval for SBR Requirements

DOD has bolstered the SBR acquisition program by increasing senior  leader and stakeholder involvement in setting requirements. Figure 2 shows how these groups work with  SBR’s joint program office and requirements review boards for DOD and  the intelligence community. Moreover, it is unclear how disagreements that may occur  after initial approval will be resolved. The  Joint Requirements Oversight Council reviewed the concept of operations,  provided comments, but did not approve it. DOD Taking Proactive Steps to Gain Knowledge about Resources, but Critical Gaps May Remain at Product Development

DOD is also taking positive steps to attain the knowledge needed to  understand what resources will be needed to develop SBR’s capabilities  and to mitigate risks. These include:  relying on systems engineering to translate requirements into specific,  achievable capabilities and to close gaps between requirements and  resources;    adopting a more comprehensive cost estimating technique to identify  SBR’s life-cycle costs;    exploring alternatives for SBR if TCA—the infrastructure that DOD is  depending on to transmit SBR’s data—incurs schedule slips; and    asking two concept development contractors to each propose at least two  different operations concepts for SBR with and without TCA. Specifically, one of TCA’s  primary components, the Transformational Satellite, may not be ready in  time to support SBR. DOD has undertaken an analysis to  weigh the merits of space-based radar. DOD  officials told us that when SBR initiates product development in 2006, it  would know whether TCA will be available to support SBR or whether to  pursue a TCA alternative. Technologies Will Not Be Mature at Product Development Start

DOD officials have said that SBR will likely be the most technically  challenging, software-intensive, and complex space system ever built by  DOD. Table 2 shows the current TRL for each of SBR’s  critical technologies and the expected TRL at product development start  in 2006. In  November 2003, the Air Force completed an analysis of alternatives (AOA)  for SBR, which was supposed to evaluate whether space- or air-based  radar platforms (such as manned and unmanned aircraft with radar  capabilities) or a combination of both are better suited for tracking  moving targets on land or at sea and analyze the capabilities and costs of  each suitable option. Recommendations for Executive Action

To better ensure that DOD and its intelligence community partners obtain  the additional knowledge they need to determine whether and when to  begin the SBR acquisition program, we recommend that the Secretary of  Defense direct the Under Secretary of the Air Force to:    Direct the SBR Executive Steering Group to ensure that outcomes from  the requirements management process are formally approved and  documented as the program proceeds through product development  before an investment is made beyond technology and concept  development for the SBR program. If the Under Secretary  determines that the program should go forward with less mature  technologies, then we recommend that the Under Secretary (1) undertake  an assessment of the backup technologies that may lessen capability and  add cost to the program and the additional time and money that may be  required to meet SBR’s performance objectives to address those risks,  (2) undertake an assessment of trade-offs that may need to be made with  other space programs to assure SBR’s successful outcome, and (3) secure  formal commitments from DOD to provide funding for total estimated  costs as well as costs estimated to address potential technical risks.
Why GAO Did This Study

Missing among the Department of Defense's (DOD) portfolio of systems is a capability to track stationary and moving enemy vehicles on land or at sea in any type of weather, day or night, from space. To meet this need, DOD and the intelligence community are collaborating on the ambitious Space-Based Radar (SBR) program. By leveraging the newest generation of radar technologies, the SBR concept promises to deliver high-quality data to a wide array of users. DOD intends to start product development in 2006 and to field SBR satellites as quickly as possible so that warfighters, the intelligence community, and national decision makers can gain a better understanding of what adversaries are doing in specific locations around the world. GAO reviewed the SBR program to assess DOD's progress in attaining the knowledge it needs by 2006 in terms of customer needs (or requirements) and resources.

What GAO Found

Although SBR is 2 years away from product development, the program already faces major challenges. DOD officials say SBR will likely be the most expensive and technically challenging space system ever built by DOD. The acquisition time frame is much shorter than what has been achieved in the past for other complex satellite systems. Finally, DOD is setting precedence by taking the lead on developing SBR with the intelligence community as a partner. Most DOD space programs that GAO has reviewed in the past several decades were hampered by schedule and cost growth and performance shortfalls. Problems were largely rooted in a failure to match requirements with resources when starting product development. Commitments were made without knowing whether technologies being pursued would work as intended. To avoid these problems, leading commercial firms have adopted a knowledge-based model that enables decision makers to be reasonably certain about their products at critical junctures and helps them make informed investment decisions. Although DOD has taken positive steps to strengthen the involvement of senior leaders within DOD and the intelligence community in setting requirements, SBR's concept of operations has not been approved and signed by requirements boards for either of the two partners. Without documentation and formal approval, it is unclear who will be held accountable for setting requirements or how disagreements among SBR's partners will be resolved when DOD moves SBR into ensuing phases of acquisition. DOD has adopted noteworthy practices to gain knowledge about SBR's resources. These include maximizing the use of systems engineering to close gaps between requirements and resources; estimating all of SBR's costs; exploring alternatives for SBR if the Transformational Communications Architecture (TCA)--the communications infrastructure that is expected to relay SBR data across a network of users--incurs schedule and performance shortfalls; and asking contractors to propose multiple operations concepts for SBR with or without TCA. Despite these accomplishments, DOD is at risk of knowledge gaps. SBR's critical technologies will not be mature when product development starts, as called for by best practices. One of TCA's primary components may not be ready in time to support SBR data. These knowledge gaps make it harder for DOD to reliably estimate how much time and money are needed to complete SBR's development. If TCA is delayed, DOD's alternatives may involve reducing SBR's capabilities or significantly increasing program cost. Without sufficient knowledge, DOD may not be able to determine by the time SBR's product development starts in 2006 whether space-based radar is best suited to tracking moving targets on land or at sea or whether air-based radar would provide enough capabilities at far less cost. More specific analyses would help DOD weigh the merits of various alternatives and assess how much to invest in the SBR acquisition program versus air platforms with similar capabilities.