	Overview

In spite of ongoing international efforts to combat Afghanistan's narcotics trade, U.N. officials estimate that Afghanistan supplies over 90% of the world's illicit opium. Afghanistan's Opium Economy

Opium production has become an entrenched negative element of Afghanistan's fragile political and economic order over the last 30 years in spite of ongoing local, regional, and international efforts to reverse its growth. United Nations and Afghan government officials announced that further reductions in national cultivation and output statistics were recorded for the 2008-2009 season, due in part to bad weather, interdiction efforts, market prices, and improved agricultural assistance in some key poppy growing areas. Estimates for 2010, suggest that production will remain relatively static, with crop disease and poor weather conditions exerting downward pressure on output. Parallel debates focus on the advisability and targeting of interdiction and eradication and the relative importance of and appropriate methods for sustainably replacing poppy cultivation and opium industry labor as income sources for Afghan households. In the most volatile areas of the country, insecurity and corruption create a climate in which poppy cultivators and drug-trafficking groups remain largely free to operate. Recent UNODC/MCN reports attribute sustainable declines in poppy cultivation to political stability, economic integration, alternative livelihood assistance, and effective law enforcement. Survey information from early 2010 suggests this price relationship may be shifting, as wheat prices begin to decline at a faster rate than opium prices. Obama Administration Policy and Funding Requests

The Obama Administration is implementing new counternarcotics policies in conjunction with its strategic reviews of U.S. policy in Afghanistan and Pakistan. SIGAR also reported that Congress had appropriated approximately $3 billion for counternarcotics programs in Afghanistan from 2001 through 2008. Issues for Congress

Experts and government officials have warned that narcotics trafficking jeopardizes international efforts to secure and stabilize Afghanistan. Striking such a balance may continue to create challenges for the United States and its allies. Defining the Role of the U.S. Military and ISAF

Debate over the role of the U.S. military and coalition forces in the International Security Assistance Force has shifted as the roles and missions of those forces have changed. According to the April 2010 report to Congress on current U.S. strategy and operations in Afghanistan, "The Government of Afghanistan has the lead in all CN operations and partners with ANSF, U.S., and international forces to target narcotics traffickers and facilities known to support the insurgency." In areas that have reduced poppy cultivation in the north, east, and west of the country, USAID and its contracting partners are seeking to provide broad-based agricultural development assistance designed to consolidate positive changes in poppy cultivation patterns. In southern and eastern areas of the country where counterinsurgency operations are ongoing amid continued poppy cultivation and drug production, USAID and its contracting partners plan to provide more targeted, quick-impact agricultural and development assistance as a means of reinforcing efforts to secure newly cleared areas. Accounts suggest that the Obama Administration's decision to "phase out" U.S. support to eradication efforts has not eliminated the Afghan government's commitment to continue to support eradication efforts by Afghan governors. Although poppy cultivation and drug trafficking were widespread prior to the fall of the Taliban regime, U.S. counternarcotics programs in the region were limited, and focused on eliminating poppy cultivation and supporting interdiction activities in neighboring countries.
Opium poppy cultivation and drug trafficking have eroded Afghanistan's fragile political and economic order over the last 30 years. In spite of ongoing counternarcotics efforts by the Afghan government, the United States, and their partners, Afghanistan remains the source of over 90% of the world's illicit opium. Since 2001, efforts to provide viable economic alternatives to poppy cultivation and to disrupt drug trafficking and related corruption have succeeded in some areas. However, insecurity, particularly in the southern province of Helmand, and widespread corruption fueled a surge in cultivation in 2006 and 2007, pushing opium output to all-time highs.
In 2008 and 2009, poppy cultivation decreased in north-central and eastern Afghanistan, while drug activity became more concentrated in the south and west. National poppy cultivation and opium production totals dropped in 2009 for the second straight season, as pressure from provincial officials, higher wheat prices, drought, and lower opium prices altered the cultivation decisions of some Afghan poppy farmers. Preliminary estimates for the 2010 season suggest that poor weather conditions, disease, and military operations in key poppy growing areas will limit production to 2009 levels, in spite of backsliding in some areas. Some experts continue to question the sustainability of rapid changes in cultivation patterns and recommend reinforcing recent reductions to replace poppy cultivation in local economies over time.
Across Afghanistan, insurgents, criminal organizations, and corrupt officials exploit narcotics as a reliable source of revenue and patronage, which has perpetuated the threat these groups pose to the country's fragile internal security and the legitimacy of its elected government. The trafficking of Afghan drugs appears to provide financial and logistical support to a range of extremist groups that continue to operate in and around Afghanistan. Although coalition forces may be less frequently relying on figures involved with narcotics for intelligence and security support, many observers have warned that drug-related corruption among appointed and elected Afghan officials creates political obstacles to progress.
As of April 2010, Congress had appropriated approximately $4.2 billion in regular and supplemental foreign assistance and defense funding for counternarcotics programs in Afghanistan from FY2001 through FY2010. The Obama Administration is pursuing a two-pronged interdiction and development policy in support of the government of Afghanistan's implementation of its National Drug Control Strategy. At present, U.S. military and law enforcement personnel are assisting Afghan forces and judicial authorities in targeting drug trafficking organizations while State Department, USAID, and USDA personnel are implementing expanded agricultural development assistance programs. The Administration ended U.S. support for eradication after deciding previous efforts were inefficient and potentially counterproductive. Afghan authorities continue to implement targeted eradication efforts.
This report provides current statistical information, profiles the narcotics trade's participants, explores linkages between narcotics, insecurity, and corruption, and reviews U.S. and international policy responses since late 2001. The report also considers ongoing policy debates regarding the counternarcotics role of coalition military forces, poppy eradication, alternative livelihoods, and funding issues for Congress. See also CRS Report RL30588, Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy, by [author name scrubbed], CRS Report R40699, Afghanistan: U.S. Foreign Assistance, by [author name scrubbed], and CRS Report R40156, War in Afghanistan: Strategy, Military Operations, and Issues for Congress, by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed].