The A-10 is one of a number of DOD aircraft—both manned and  unmanned—that conduct the CAS mission. Air Force and DOD Do Not Have Needed Information to Fully Understand Implications of A-10 Divestment and Could Face Similar Challenges with Future Divestments

The Air Force and DOD do not have needed information on the full  implications of A-10 divestment, including the gaps that could be created  by divestment and options for mitigating any potential gaps. Further, DOD may face similar  decisions to divest other weapon systems before the end of their service  lives in the future and does not have guidance to ensure that the services  and the department overall are collecting quality information to inform  these decisions. The Air Force has not formally determined what  aircraft, if any, will replace the A-10 for this mission, according to Air  Force officials. Without clearly  understanding the capability gaps and risks that could result from A-10  divestment before again proposing to divest the A-10, it is unclear how  effective or necessary the Air Force’s mitigation strategies will be. The  A-10 divestment proposal is a case study of this kind of difficult decision. In its fiscal year 2015 divestment proposal, we  found the Air Force’s cost estimates partially met best practices for being  comprehensive, minimally met best practices for being well-documented  and accurate, and did not meet best practices for being credible. In  addition, we found in June 2015 that, in presenting its budget to  Congress, the Air Force provided a number of alternatives to A-10  divestment that it said would also result in approximately $4.2 billion in  cost savings. The GAO Cost Estimating and  Assessment Guide lists 20 best practices for a reliable cost estimate. By applying similar cost estimation practices from its  fiscal year 2015 budget process, the Air Force’s fiscal year 2016 and  2017 A-10 divestment cost estimates may continue to overstate or  understate the actual figure and may not be reliable, as we found the  2015 estimate to be. Overall,  since the A-10 divestment estimate did not meet all best practices, the Air  Force cannot ensure that it has a reliable estimate of the cost savings it  could generate by divesting the A-10. By developing a high-quality, reliable cost estimate of  savings from A-10 divestment, the Air Force would have a sound basis  from which to develop and compare alternatives and their associated  risks that achieve similar savings or make adjustments to other fighter- attack programs or mission areas like air superiority or global strike. However, the  fiscal year 2017 budget request marks the third consecutive year that the  Air Force proposed divesting the A-10 without having determined its  requirements for the A-10’s missions and the gaps and risks resulting  from divestment. Should it continue to  pursue the early divestment of the A-10 fleet as a way to balance current  demands and future needs, the Air Force would benefit from quality  information that fully identifies capacity and capability gaps and  associated risks resulting from divestment and it could use that  information to develop mitigation strategies. Recommendations for Executive Action

To make a well-informed decision about the future of its A-10 aircraft, we  recommend that before again recommending divestment of the A-10, the  Secretary of the Air Force:
Develop quality information that fully identifies gaps in capacity or  capability that would result from A-10 divestment, including the timing  and duration of any identified gaps, and the risks associated with  those gaps; and
Use that information to develop strategies to mitigate any identified  gaps. As DOD faces future decisions on how to balance its existing capabilities  and capacities against future modernization requirements, it will need  quality information to help inform such decisions. As we describe in our  report, though the Air Force and DOD are taking steps to mitigate  potential gaps, they have not established clear requirements for the  missions that the A-10 performs, including CAS, FAC(A), and CSAR- Sandy, and in the absence of these requirements, have not fully identified  the capability gaps and risks that could result from A-10 divestment and  the effectiveness or necessity of the Air Force’s and the department’s  mitigation strategies. A high-quality,  reliable cost estimate would provide the Air Force with a sound basis from  which to consider alternatives to achieve its budget targets. Without this guidance, DOD may continue to divest  weapon systems and overlook the kinds of capability, capacity, and cost  issues we point out in this report, which ultimately hinders DOD’s ability to  best balance current demands and future needs. Appendix III: Scope and Methodology

To assess the extent to which the Air Force and the Department of  Defense (DOD) have the quality information needed to understand the  implications of A-10 divestment, we assessed strategic guidance,  memorandums, aircraft inventory, training syllabi, and other  documentation against DOD guidance on economic analysis for decision- making, Air Force guidance on business case analysis procedures, and  GAO knowledge-based criteria. The additional  details can be found in the classified version of this report  (GAO-16-525C).
Why GAO Did This Study

DOD faces difficult decisions on how to best balance current demands and future needs within fiscal constraints. Decisions regarding the A-10 aircraft exemplify the difficulty. In the fiscal year 2015 budget request, DOD and the Air Force prioritized modern multi-role aircraft and proposed divesting the A-10 fleet, but Congress prohibited this action. DOD and the Air Force have continued to propose divesting the A-10 in two subsequent budget requests.
The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015 included a provision for GAO to review the A-10 divestment proposal. This report reviews the extent to which (1) the Air Force and DOD have quality information needed to understand the implications of A-10 divestment; and (2) the Air Force followed best practices when estimating cost savings from A-10 divestment and evaluating alternatives. GAO analyzed agency documents and interviewed knowledgeable officials for this review.

What GAO Found

The Department of Defense (DOD) and Air Force do not have quality information on the full implications of A-10 divestment, including gaps that could be created by A-10 divestment and mitigation options. While A-10 pilots are recognized as the Air Force experts in providing close air support (CAS) to friendly forces, the A-10 and its pilots also perform other missions that are important to ongoing operations or to combatant commander operational plans and divestment will result in reduced capacity and capability in these other areas. The Air Force is taking a number of steps to try to mitigate any potential negative impacts from its proposed A-10 divestments. However, the Air Force has not established clear requirements for the missions the A-10 performs, and in the absence of these requirements, has not fully identified the capacity or capability gaps that could result from the A-10 divestment. Without a clear understanding of the capability or capacity gaps and risks that could result from A-10 divestment, it is also unclear how effective or necessary the Air Force's and the department's mitigation strategies will be. For example, although the Air Force has several efforts underway to generally mitigate the loss of capabilities that would result from A-10 divestment, it has not identified how or if it will replace the A-10's role in combat search and rescue missions. Depending on the specific mitigation strategy chosen, the Air Force may have to address a number of different secondary impacts that could affect its ability to execute existing missions. The A-10 is one example of a challenge DOD could continue to face as it balances current needs against investing in the future force to replace aging systems. For example, in June 2014, GAO reported on a Navy challenge in balancing current capability and capacity with future modernization needs. Overall, the department does not have guidance to ensure that the services and DOD are collecting quality information to inform divestment decisions on major weapon systems before the end of their service lives. Without quality information that fully identifies gaps and associated risks resulting from divestment that can be used to develop mitigation strategies, DOD and the Air Force may not be well-positioned to best balance current demands and future needs.
According to the GAO Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide , a high-quality, reliable cost estimate is comprehensive, well-documented, accurate, and credible. GAO's analysis found that the Air Force's cost estimate for its fiscal year 2015 divestment proposal partially met best practices for being comprehensive, minimally met best practices for being well-documented and accurate, and did not meet best practices for being credible. Additionally, Air Force officials stated they used similar practices when developing fiscal years 2016 and 2017 budget requests that included A-10 divestment. As a result, the Air Force cannot ensure that it has a reliable estimate of the cost savings it would generate by divesting the A-10. Further, without developing a reliable estimate, the Air Force does not have a sound basis from which to develop and consider alternatives to achieve budget targets, such as making adjustments to other fighter-attack programs or mission areas like air superiority or global strike.
This is a public version of a classified report GAO issued previously. It excludes classified information which described specific intelligence assessments, scenarios, and operational details.

What GAO Recommends

With regard to the A-10, GAO recommends that the Air Force fully identify mission gaps, risks, and mitigation strategies, and also develop high-quality, reliable cost estimates of the savings from divestment before again proposing to divest its A-10 fleet, and that DOD establish quality information requirements to guide major weapon system divestments. DOD non-concurred with the recommendations, but GAO continues to believe that they remain valid as discussed in the report.