White- collar crime ranked seventh in the priority list, and violent crime ranked  eighth. About 550 of  these positions (more than 80 percent of the permanently shifted  positions) came from the FBI’s drug program, with substantially smaller  reductions from the white-collar and violent crime programs. Additionally, the FBI has had a continuing need to temporarily redirect  special agent resources from other criminal investigative programs to  address counterterrorism and other higher-priority needs. The FBI  continues to redirect agents from drug, white-collar, and violent crime  programs to address the counterterrorism-related workload demands. Also, as expected with the significant shift in resources to address national  security priorities, the FBI’s referrals of counterterrorism matters to U.S.  Attorneys’ Offices for prosecution have increased since September 11,  while referrals of drug, white-collar, and violent crime matters have  decreased. In fiscal year 2001, which ended just after September 11, 2001,  the FBI referred 236 counterterrorism matters to U.S. The combined  number of newly opened FBI and DEA drug matters has declined by about  10 percent since September 11. Attorneys from all federal sources  decreased about 2 percent. Combined FBI and DEA Drug Program Agent Resources Have Decreased, but More DEA Positions Are Planned

As figure 4 shows, the combined number of FBI and DEA nonsupervisory  field agent positions has decreased about 10 percent since the terrorist  attacks, from about 4,500 nonsupervisory field agents at the end of fiscal  year 2001 to about 4,000 field agent positions in the second quarter of  fiscal year 2004. Law Enforcement Practitioners We Interviewed Valued the FBI’s Role but Had Mixed Views on the Effect of the FBI’s Shift in Resources on Drug Enforcement Efforts

Law enforcement practitioners we interviewed had mixed views about the  impact of the FBI’s shift in resources on drug enforcement efforts. While  many interviewees representing each of the locations and criminal justice  organizations we visited generally described the FBI as a valuable law  enforcement partner, some of them said that they did not think the FBI’s  shift in resources had a significant impact on drug enforcement efforts in  their communities. On the other hand, some law enforcement officials said that drug  investigations have suffered as a result of the FBI shift in resources to new  priority areas. Current Data Should Be Viewed as Short-Term Indicators with Limitations

Our analyses provide perspectives in the short term (less than 3 years) and  are not necessarily indicative of long-term trends. Our Analysis Did Not Identify Conclusive Effect on Federal White-Collar and Violent Crime Enforcement Resulting from FBI Priority Shifts

We did not conclusively identify an effect on federal white-collar and  violent crime enforcement resulting from the FBI’s shift in priorities after  September 11. Overall, all federal agencies referred about   6 percent fewer white-collar crime matters to U.S. Attorneys—-down from  12,792 matters in fiscal year 2001 to 12,057 matters in fiscal year 2003. However, violent crime referrals  increased about 29 percent during this period, from 14,546 matters in fiscal  year 2001 to 18,723 matters in fiscal year 2003. Major contributors to this report  are listed in appendix IV. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

To examine the effect of the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) post- September 11 priority shifts on federal efforts to combat domestic drug  crime, we analyzed (1) the impact of resource shifts on the combined FBI  and Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) nonsupervisory field special  agent resources devoted to drug enforcement; (2) changes in the number  of newly opened FBI and DEA drug crime matters; (3) changes in the  number of drug crime matters referred from all federal agencies to U.S.  Attorneys’ Offices for prosecution; and (4) impacts, if any, observed by  headquarters and field law enforcement officials we interviewed.
Why GAO Did This Study

As a result of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has committed to a transformation to increase its focus on national security. The FBI has shifted agent resources to its top priorities of counterterrorism, counterintelligence, and cyber crime. Some of these agent resources were shifted away from drug, white-collar, and violent crime enforcement programs. The FBI's drug program has sustained, by far, the largest reduction in FBI agent workforce--about 550 positions, or more than 80 percent of the nonsupervisory field agents who were permanently reprogrammed. In addition, the FBI has had a continuing need to temporarily redirect agents from drug, white-collar, and violent crime enforcement to address counterterrorism-related workload demands. While GAO and other organizations have focused considerable attention on the progress of the FBI's transformation, this report addresses questions about the extent to which the shift in resources has affected federal efforts to combat drug, white-collar, and violent crime and whether other agencies, including the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) in the drug enforcement area, are filling gaps created by FBI resource shifts.

What GAO Found

The data GAO examined are inconclusive about the effect of the shifts in the FBI's priorities after September 11 on federal efforts to combat drug, white-collar, and violent crime. Indicators are mixed on the effect of the FBI shift on federal drug, white-collar, and violent crime enforcement. Further, GAO's analyses should be cautiously viewed as short-term indicators that are not necessarily indicative of long-term trends. Data GAO examined on federal drug enforcement efforts did not show a conclusive effect of the FBI's shift in agent resources to priority areas. GAO found that combined FBI and DEA nonsupervisory field agent resources decreased by about 10 percent since September 11 but that DEA is expecting significant increases in positions over the next 2 fiscal years. The combined number of newly opened FBI and DEA drug matters has declined by about 10 percent since 2001, from 22,736 matters in fiscal year 2001, which ended just after September 11, to 20,387 matters in fiscal year 2003. This decline may be attributed, at least in part, to an increased emphasis on cases targeting major drug organizations rather than to fewer investigative resources. In addition, referrals of drug matters to U.S. Attorneys from all federal sources decreased about 2 percent. Similarly, data do not show a conclusive impact on federal efforts to combat white-collar and violent crime resulting from the FBI's shift in priorities. For example, while the number of white-collar crime referrals from federal agencies to U.S. Attorneys declined by about 6 percent, from 12,792 in fiscal year 2001 to 12,057 in fiscal year 2003, violent crime referrals from all federal sources have increased by about 29 percent, from 14,546 in fiscal year 2001 to 18,723 in fiscal year 2003. Views of law enforcement practitioners GAO interviewed were mixed on the effect of the FBI's shift in resources on drug, white-collar, and violent crime enforcement efforts. Although these views are not representative of all practitioners, some did not think the FBI's shift had a significant impact on these crime enforcement efforts in their communities, while others said that drug, white-collar and violent-crime investigations had suffered.