In 2002, roughly 7 million containers entered U.S. seaports. CSI Placed Customs Officials Overseas to Screen Containers

Announced in January 2002, CSI allows Customs to screen for high-risk,  U.S.-bound containers at key foreign ports, a task previously carried out  only at U.S. seaports. C-TPAT Works with Private Sector to Improve Supply Chain Security

Announced in November 2001, C-TPAT is a voluntary partnership program  between the business community and Customs, designed to enhance the  security of international supply chains and thus reduce the number of  containers that otherwise might be screened for WMDs because of risk  considerations. Customs is still developing critical aspects of the  program intended to ensure that member companies respond to C-TPAT  recommendations for improving and maintaining supply chain security  practices. By January 2003, Customs had  entered into bilateral arrangements with foreign governments to place  Customs officials at 24 ports and soon deployed CSI teams to 5 of them. Customs Has Not Adequately Incorporated Factors Critical to Programs’ Success and Accountability

Although CSI and C-TPAT are evolving into major tools in the U.S. war  against terrorism, in implementing the programs, Customs has not taken  adequate steps to incorporate human capital planning, develop  performance measures, and plan strategically—factors essential to the  programs’ long-term success and accountability. While Customs was able  to meet the programs’ initial staffing needs, it has not devised a systematic  plan to recruit, train, and retain the expected fivefold increase in CSI  overseas staff by fiscal year 2004. Although Customs had  created some performance measures, such as tallying the number of  countries and companies that have enrolled in the CSI and C-TPAT,  respectively, it has not developed measures that establish accountability  and measure program achievements. In  its effort to rapidly implement the programs and enroll participants,  Customs focused on short-term operational planning. As a result, Customs  lacks the elements of strategic planning that would allow it to establish  program accountability for approximately $73 million in funds budgeted for  fiscal year 2004. Furthermore, Customs has proposed to commit significantly  more resources to both of these programs. Recommendations for Executive Action

To help ensure that CSI and C-TPAT achieve their objectives as they  transition from smaller start-up programs to larger programs with an  increasingly larger share of the Department of Homeland Security’s budget,  we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security, working with the  Commissioner of Customs and Border Protection and the CSI and C-TPAT  program directors, takes the following steps:   Develops human capital plans that clearly describe how CSI and C-TPAT  will recruit, train, and retain staff to meet their growing demands as they  expand to other countries and implement new program elements. To examine Customs’ implementation of CSI and C-TPAT during the first  year, we interviewed Customs officials at the Washington, D.C.,  headquarters as discussed earlier. We assessed the  extent to which Customs expansion plans incorporated human capital  planning, the development of performance measures, and strategic  planning.
Why GAO Did This Study

Since September 11, 2001, concern has increased that terrorists could smuggle weapons of mass destruction in the 7 million ocean containers that arrive annually at U.S. seaports. In response to this concern, the U.S. Customs Service (Customs) implemented the Container Security Initiative (CSI) to screen for high-risk containers at overseas ports and Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (CTPAT) to improve global supply chain security in the private sector. GAO (1) describes the purpose and elements of these new programs, (2) examines Customs' implementation of CSI and C-TPAT during the first year, and (3) assesses the extent to which Customs has focused on factors critical to the programs' long-term success and accountability.

What GAO Found

Announced in January 2002, CSI places Customs staff at designated foreign seaports to screen containers for weapons of mass destruction. In November 2001, Customs also initiated C-TPAT, in which private companies improve the security of their supply chains in return for the reduced likelihood that their containers will be inspected for weapons of mass destruction. Customs quickly implemented both programs in the first year. It concluded bilateral arrangements with foreign governments to place Customs personnel at 24 foreign ports and deployed staff to 5 of these ports under CSI, and it enrolled more than 1,700 companies in C-TPAT. Customs is developing critical program elements intended to ensure that C-TPAT companies improve and maintain their security practices. GAO found that Customs' implementation of these programs evolved in response to challenges it encountered. Although Customs is preparing to devote significantly more resources to CSI and C-TPAT as it expands the programs, it has not taken adequate steps to incorporate factors necessary for the programs' long-term success and accountability. These factors include human capital planning, development of performance measures, and strategic planning. GAO found the following: (1) although CSI seeks to staff Customs officials at more than 30 overseas ports and C-TPAT expects to hire more than 150 additional staff, Customs has not devised systematic human capital plans to meet longterm staffing needs for both programs; (2) while Customs has created some performance measures to quantify operational activities and efforts, it has not developed measures to establish accountability and measure program achievement; and (3) in its efforts to rapidly implement the programs and enroll participants, Customs focused on short-term planning. Customs lacks a strategic plan that would allow it to establish accountability for approximately $73 million in planned expenditures for fiscal year 2004.