Hurricane Katrina severely tested disaster management at the federal,  state, and local levels and revealed weaknesses in the basic elements of  preparing for, responding to, and recovering from a catastrophic disaster. Our findings about the response to Hurricane  Katrina in a March 2006 testimony and a September 2006 report focused  on the need for strengthened leadership, capabilities, and accountability to  improve emergency preparedness and response. For most of the  provisions we examined, FEMA and DHS had at least preliminary efforts  under way to address them. We also identified a number of areas that still  required action, and noted that it was clear that FEMA and DHS had work  remaining to implement the provisions of the act. Throughout this  statement, unless otherwise noted, the actions reported that DHS and  FEMA have taken to address provisions of the Post-Katrina Act are drawn  from our November 2008 report. We further noted that the  experience of Hurricane Katrina showed the need to improve leadership at  all levels of government to better respond to a catastrophic disaster. Specifically, we reported that in the response to Hurricane Katrina there  was confusion regarding roles and responsibilities under the NRP,  including the roles of the Secretary of Homeland Security and two key  federal officials with responsibility for disaster response—the Principal  Federal Official (PFO), and the Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO). Updating the National Response Framework and Clarifying the Role of the FEMA Administrator

The Post-Katrina Act clarified FEMA’s mission within DHS and set forth  the role and responsibilities of the FEMA Administrator. The Post-Katrina Act required that the Secretary of Homeland Security,  through the FEMA Administrator, provide a clear chain of command in the  NRF that accounts for the roles of the FEMA Administrator, the FCO, and  the PFO. According to the NRF, the primary role and responsibilities of the FCO  include four major activities:  representing the FEMA Administrator in the field and discharging all  FEMA responsibilities for the response and recovery efforts under way;    administering Stafford Act authorities, including the commitment of FEMA  resources and the issuance of mission assignments to other federal  departments or agencies;    coordinating, integrating, and synchronizing the federal response, within  the Unified Coordination Group at the Joint Field Office; and  interfacing with the State Coordinating Officer and other state, tribal, and  local response officials to determine the most urgent needs and set  objectives for an effective response in collaboration with the Unified  Coordination Group. The annex was revised and released in November  2008. The response to Hurricane Katrina highlighted the limitations in the  nation’s capabilities to respond to catastrophic disasters. Among other things, in 2006 we  reported on problems during Hurricane Katrina with (1) emergency  communications, (2) evacuations, (3) logistics, (4) mass care, (5) planning  and training, and (6) human capital. Among other provisions aimed at strengthening emergency  communications capabilities, the Post-Katrina Act established an Office of  Emergency Communications (OEC) within DHS. Technical Assistance

Through the Interoperable Communications Technical Assistance  Program, OEC has been working with Urban Area Working Groups and  states to assess their communications infrastructure for gaps and  determine technical requirements that can be used to design or enhance  interoperable communications systems. Human Capital Issues

In 2006, we reported that the various Congressional reports and our own  work on FEMA’s performance before, during, and after Hurricane Katrina  suggest that FEMA’s human resources were insufficient to meet the  challenges posed by the unprecedented degree of damage and the  resulting number of hurricane victims. We reported in February 2006 that  weak or nonexistent internal controls in processing applications left the  government vulnerable to fraud and abuse, such as duplicative payments. We estimated that through February 2006, FEMA made about 16 percent  ($1 billion) in improper and potentially fraudulent payments to applicants  who used invalid information to apply for disaster assistance. The Post-Katrina Act required the development of a system, including an  electronic database, to counter improper payments in the provision of  assistance to individuals and households. FEMA has established a process to identify and collect duplicative  Individual and Households Program (IHP) payments.
Why GAO Did This Study

Hurricane Katrina severely tested disaster management at the federal, state, and local levels and revealed weaknesses in the basic elements--leadership, capabilities, and accountability--of preparing for, responding to, and recovering from disasters. In its 2006 work on the response to Hurricane Katrina, GAO noted that these elements needed to be strengthened. In October 2006, Congress enacted the Post-Katrina Act to address issues identified in the response to Hurricane Katrina. GAO reported in November 2008 that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) had at least preliminary efforts under way to address most of the provisions, but also identified a number of areas that required further action. This statement discusses select issues within the basic elements related to (1) findings from the response to Hurricane Katrina, (2) provisions of the Post-Katrina Act, and (3) specific actions DHS and FEMA have taken to implement these provisions. GAO's comments are based on GAO products issued from February 2006 through November 2008, and selected updates in March 2009. To obtain updated information, GAO consulted program officials.

What GAO Found

GAO reported in September 2006 that the experience of Hurricane Katrina showed the need to improve leadership at all levels of government to respond to catastrophic disasters. For example, GAO reported that, in the response to Hurricane Katrina, there was confusion over roles and responsibilities under the National Response Plan, including the roles of the DHS Secretary, the FEMA Administrator, the Principal Federal Official (PFO), and the Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO). The Post-Katrina Act clarified FEMA's mission within DHS and set forth the role and responsibilities of the FEMA Administrator. The act also required that the FEMA Administrator provide a clear chain of command that accounts for these roles. In revising the National Response Plan--now called the National Response Framework--FEMA articulated specific roles for the PFO and FCO, which are described in GAO's November 2008 report. GAO reported in September 2006 that various congressional reports and GAO's own work on FEMA's performance before, during, and after Hurricane Katrina suggested that FEMA's capabilities were insufficient to meet the challenges posed by the degree of damage and the number of hurricane victims. The capabilities issues GAO identified related to, among others, (1) emergency communications, (2) evacuations, (3) logistics, (4) mass care, (5) planning and training, and (6) human capital. The Post-Katrina Act included a variety of provisions that related to these issues. For example, related to emergency communications, the act established an Office of Emergency Communications (OEC) within DHS. GAO reported in November 2008 that, in response to specific responsibilities outlined in its authorizing provision, OEC has been working with Urban Area Working Groups and states to assess gaps in communications infrastructure and to determine technical requirements to enhance interoperable communications systems. GAO reported in February 2006 that accountability mechanisms--specifically, internal controls--were lacking or nonexistent in processing applications for individual and household assistance following Hurricane Katrina, which left the government vulnerable to fraud and abuse. For example, GAO estimated that through February 2006, FEMA made about 16 percent ($1 billion) in improper and potentially fraudulent payments to applicants who used invalid information to apply for disaster assistance. The Post-Katrina Act required the development of a system, including an electronic database, to counter improper payments. GAO reported in November 2008 that FEMA established a process to identify and collect duplicative payments by, among other things, enabling its disaster assistance database to check automatically for duplicate applications.