The financial regulators were created between 1863 (Office of the Comptroller of the Currency [OCC]) and 2010 (Consumer Financial Protection Bureau [CFPB]). Financial regulators set policy, conduct rulemaking to implement law, and supervise financial institutions. For example, the Federal Reserve System (Fed) is responsible for monetary policy and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) and National Credit Union Administration (NCUA) provide deposit insurance. Recent Congresses have considered legislation that would alter the structure and design of some of the federal financial regulators. This could be desirable if there is a presumption that the agency's work is relatively more technical and less political in nature. Congressional oversight of independent agencies takes the form of statutory requirements to submit semi-annual or annual reports to Congress; testimony before Congress by agency officials (some are statutorily required to do so periodically); GAO audits and investigations, subject to some statutory limitations; and Senate confirmation of presidential nominees for top agency leadership. Many of these structural elements influence the agency's independence from the President and Congress. Term in Office

Statutes specify term length, succession, and renewability. Statute typically does not rule out the reappointment of incumbents for financial regulators, with the exception of Fed governors and NCUA board members (for both, members are allowed one full term and can be reappointed only if initially appointed to an expiring term). In the case of an agency with a single head, the term might or might not coincide with the President's term. Grounds for Removal

Although not always specified in statute, it appears that the heads of financial regulators, in contrast with Cabinet Secretaries, typically do not serve at the pleasure of the President ("at will"). OMB/Executive Oversight

Legislative proposals and congressional testimony by executive agencies are typically subject to the approval of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), which is part of the Executive Office of the President. Cost-Benefit Analysis

Independent agencies that are not subject to E.O. Different funding structures across regulators with similar missions have led to congressional proposals to make funding structures more uniform. For example, the OCC: "may collect an assessment, fee, or other charge ... as the Comptroller determines is necessary or appropriate to carry out the responsibilities of the Office," whereas the CFPB is allowed funding in "the amount determined by the Director to be reasonably necessary to carry out the authorities of the Bureau under Federal consumer financial law." The two financial regulators that do not largely raise their own revenues are the CFTC and the CFPB. Congress has granted federal financial regulators independence in ways obvious ("for cause" removal, self-financing) and subtle (exemption of agency testimony and budget requests from OMB review). Federal financial regulators that are relatively more independent in some areas are relatively less independent in others.
Conventional wisdom regarding regulators is that the structure and design of the organization matters for policy outcomes. Financial regulators conduct rulemaking and enforcement to implement law and supervise financial institutions. These agencies have been given certain characteristics that enhance their day-to-day independence from the President and Congress, which may make policymaking more technical and less "political" or "partisan," for better or worse. Independence may also make regulators less accountable to elected officials and can reduce congressional influence, at least in the short term.
Although independent agencies share many characteristics, there are notable differences. Some federal financial regulators are relatively more independent in some areas but relatively less so in others. Major structural characteristics of federal financial regulators that influence independence include
agency head: the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), Federal Reserve (Fed), National Credit Union Association (NCUA), and Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) have multi-member boards or commissions led by a chair, and the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA), and Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) are led by single directors. party affiliation: for multi-member boards or commissions, statute sets a party balance among members for all except the Fed. term in office: terms in office are fixed in length, varying among the regulators from 5 years to 14 years, and do not coincide with the President's term. Terms for Fed governors and NCUA board members are not renewable. grounds for removal: although not always specified in statute, it appears that the regulator heads can only be removed "for cause" (e.g., malfeasance or neglect of duty), with the exception of the Comptroller of the Currency. executive oversight: rulemaking, testimony, legislative proposals, and budget requests are not subject to Office of Management and Budget (OMB) review. congressional oversight: agencies are statutorily required to submit periodic reports to Congress. Agency officials testify before Congress upon request; some are also statutorily required to do so periodically. Agencies are subject to Government Accountability Office (GAO) audits and investigations. Top leadership is subject to Senate confirmation. Agency rulemaking can be overturned under the Congressional Review Act. funding: the SEC's and CFTC's budgets are set through congressional authorization and appropriations, whereas other regulators set their own budgets. These budgets are funded through the collection of fees or other revenues, with the exception of the CFTC and CFPB.
From time to time, Congress has considered legislation that would alter the structure and design of some of the federal financial regulators, including changes to their leadership and funding structure, the Congressional Review Act, and cost-benefit analysis requirements.