	The Rise of Islamist Militancy in Southeast Asia

		Overview

While there has been significant anti-Western terrorist activity in Southeast Asia, counter-terror measures in recent years appear to have significantly degraded anti-Western terrorist groups' ability to launch attacks against Western targets in the region. U.S. attention in the region has been focused on radical Islamist groups, particularly the Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) terrorist network, that are known or alleged to have ties to the Al Qaeda network. Despite mutual interests in combating terrorism, Southeast Asian governments have to balance these security concerns with domestic political considerations. Although proponents of violent, radical Islam remain a very small minority in Southeast Asia, many governments view increased American pressure and military presence in their region with concern because of the political sensitivity of the issue with both mainstream Islamic and secular nationalist groups. Jemaah Islamiyah is believed to have carried out the October 12, 2002 bombing in Bali, Indonesia, that killed approximately 200 people, mostly Western tourists. Al Qaeda reportedly provided funds and trainers for camps operated by local groups in Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines. Since the Bali bombing in 2002, which JI is suspected of carrying out, crackdowns by various governments in the region are believed to have severely weakened the organization. They have shared training camps in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Mindanao. The sophistication of the simultaneous July 2009 hotel bombings in Jakarta (discussed in " The July 2009 Jakarta Hotel Bombings ") triggered speculation that Al Qaeda had renewed ties with some Indonesian radicals, particularly the cell led by Noordin Mohammed Top. Many analysts believe that years of arrests have weakened JI to such an extent that it essentially is no longer a regional organization, but rather is one confined to Indonesia, with some individuals still operating in the southern Philippines. Marriot and Ritz-Carlton hotels in Jakarta killed nine and injured more than 50, including 6 Americans. The bombings were the first successful anti-Western terrorist attack in Indonesia in four years. Like Indonesia, the United States has faced terrorist threats and terrorist attacks. Indonesia has been effective in the apprehension and conviction of terrorists and extremists organizations. Indonesia also has strong bilateral counter-terror cooperation with Australia. Indonesia's attractiveness to Islamist terrorist groups appears to derive primarily from relatively weak central government control and considerable social and political instability and its overwhelmingly Muslim population. The bombings, the most deadly terrorist attack since the September 11, 2001 attacks in the United States, appeared to mark a shift in JI's strategy; the FBI reported that in early 2002, senior JI leaders—meeting in Thailand—decided to attack "softer targets" in Asia such as tourist sites frequented by Westerners. Other bombings believed to have been carried out by JI since 2002 include the bombing of the Marriott Hotel in Jakarta in August 2003 that killed more than ten people and injured dozens; the bombing of the Australian Embassy in September 2004, killing 10 and wounding around 200; and the Bali II bombing of October 2005, in which three suicide bombers exploded bombs within minutes of one another in Bali, killing more than 20 people and wounding more than 100. Philippine President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and President Bush agreed on the deployment of U.S. military personnel to the southern Philippines to train and assist the Philippine military against the terrorist Abu Sayyaf group, making the Philippines one of the most extensive examples of U.S. counterterrorism cooperation in Southeast Asia. U.S. Support for Philippine Military Operations

The Bush Administration has supported the Philippine government's policy of applying military pressure on Abu Sayyaf and seeking a negotiated settlement with the MILF. The KMM is a small, militant group calling for the overthrow of the Malaysian government and the creation of a pan-Islamic state encompassing Indonesia, Malaysia, and the southern Philippines. Since 9/11, Singapore has increased intelligence cooperation with regional countries and the United States.
Since September 2001, the United States has increased focus on radical Islamist and terrorist groups in Southeast Asia, particularly those in the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, and Singapore. Southeast Asia has been a base for terrorist operations. Al Qaeda penetrated the region by establishing local cells, training Southeast Asians in its camps in Afghanistan, and by financing and cooperating with indigenous radical Islamist groups. Indonesia and the southern Philippines have been particularly vulnerable to penetration by Islamic terrorist groups.
Members of one indigenous network, Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), which has had extensive ties to Al Qaeda, helped two of the September 11, 2001 hijackers and have confessed to plotting and carrying out attacks against Western targets. These include the deadliest terrorist attack since September 2001: the October 2002 bombing in Bali, Indonesia, that killed approximately 200 people, mostly Westerners. Since the Bali bombing in 2002, crackdowns by various governments in the region—encouraged and in some cases supported by the U.S. government and military—are believed to have weakened JI to such an extent that it essentially is no longer a regional organization, but rather is one confined to Indonesia, with some individuals still operating in the southern Philippines. The degrading of JI's leadership structure is believed to have altered the group's strategy. More violent, anti-Western JI members have formed breakaway cells. In September 2009, Indonesian authorities claimed they had killed the leader of one such cell, Noordin Mohammed Top. Noordin is believed to have been responsible for organizing the near-simultaneous July 17, 2009 bombings of the J.W. Marriot and Ritz-Carlton hotels in Jakarta. The bombings were the first successful anti-Western terrorist attack in Indonesia in four years. Their sophistication triggered speculation that Al Qaeda had renewed ties with Top.
To combat the threat, the U.S. has pressed countries in the region to arrest suspected terrorist individuals and organizations, funded and trained Indonesia's elite counter-terrorist unit, and deployed troops to the southern Philippines to advise the Philippine military in their fight against the violent Abu Sayyaf Group. It has also launched a Regional Maritime Security Initiative to enhance security in the Straits of Malacca, increased intelligence sharing operations, restarted military-military relations with Indonesia, and provided or requested from Congress substantial aid for Indonesia and the Philippines. Also, since 2001, Thailand and the United States have substantially increased their anti-terrorism cooperation.
The responses of countries in the region to both the threat and to the U.S. reaction generally have varied with the intensity of their concerns about the threat to their own stability and domestic politics. In general, Singapore, Malaysia, and the Philippines were quick to crack down on militant groups and share intelligence with the United States and Australia, whereas Indonesia began to do so only after attacks or arrests revealed the severity of the threat to its citizens. Since that time, Indonesian authorities have been aggressive in their pursuit of terrorists and extremist groups. Many governments view increased American pressure and military presence in their region with ambivalence because of the political sensitivity of the issue with both mainstream Islamic and secular nationalist groups. The Muslim insurgency in southern Thailand has escalated in recent years as has terrorist activity in southern areas of the Philippines.
The report looks at the rise of Islamist militancy and the JI network, and discusses terrorism in the region, concluding with options for U.S. policy. Strategies include placing greater emphasis on attacking institutions that support terrorism, building up regional governments' capacities for combating terrorist groups, and reducing the sense of alienation among Muslim citizens.