U.S. and Coalition Forces Were Unable to Adequately Secure Conventional Munitions Storage Sites, Resulting in Widespread Looting

According to knowledgeable DOD officials, field unit reports, lessons  learned reports, and intelligence information, U.S. and coalition forces  were unable to adequately secure conventional munitions storage sites in  Iraq, resulting in widespread looting of munitions. The costs of not securing these conventional munitions storage sites have  been high, as looted explosives and ammunition from these sites have  been used to construct IEDs that have killed and maimed people. Forces Were Overwhelmed by the Number and Size of Conventional Munitions Storage Sites, Leaving Those Sites Vulnerable to Looting

U.S. forces were overwhelmed by the number and size of conventional  munitions storage sites in Iraq and they did not adequately secure these  sites during and immediately after the conclusion of major combat  operations, according to senior-level military officials, field unit reports,  lessons learned reports, and intelligence reports. Pre-OIF estimates of  Iraq’s conventional munitions varied significantly with the higher estimate  being five times greater than the lower estimate. Forces Had Insufficient Troop Levels to Provide Adequate Security Because of OIF Planning Priorities and Assumptions

DOD senior-level officials and lessons learned reports stated that U.S.  forces did not have sufficient troop levels to provide adequate security for  conventional munitions storage sites in Iraq because of OIF planning  priorities and certain assumptions that proved to be invalid. Several critical planning assumptions upon which the February 2003 OIF  war plan was based also contributed to the number of U.S. troops being  insufficient for the mission of securing conventional munitions storage  sites, including the following:    The Iraqi regular army would “capitulate and provide security.”
The OIF war plan assumed that large numbers of Iraqi military and  security forces would opt for unit capitulation over individual  surrender or desertion. According to a  study prepared by the Center for Army Lessons Learned, this  assumption was central to the decision to limit the amount of combat  power deployed to Iraq. According to Multi-National Coalition-Iraq officials, unsecured  conventional munitions from the former regime continue to pose a risk to  U.S. forces and others. For example, some conventional munitions storage  sites in remote locations have not been assessed recently to verify whether  they pose any residual risk. Estimates indicate that the weapons and explosives looted  from unsecured conventional munitions storage sites will likely continue  to support terrorist attacks throughout the region. Government agencies  also have assessed that looted munitions are being used in the  construction of IEDs. DOD’s Actions in Response to OIF Lessons Learned Have Not Focused on Securing Conventional Munitions Storage Sites during Future Operations

While DOD has taken many actions in response to OIF lessons learned, we  found that to date DOD has not taken action to incorporate the security of  an adversary’s conventional munitions storage sites as a strategic planning  and priority-setting consideration during planning for future operations. A  critical OIF lesson learned is that unsecured conventional munitions  storage sites can be an asymmetric threat to U.S. forces, as illustrated by  intelligence assessments that show one potential adversary, for example,  also has considerable munitions stockpiles that would require a sizable  occupying force to secure or destroy. Because of DOD’s understandable focus on current operations, the  department’s actions in response to OIF lessons learned generally have  emphasized countering the use of IEDs by an insurgency or terrorists  during posthostility operations. Unsecured conventional munitions storage sites can represent  an asymmetric threat to U.S. forces that would require significant  manpower or other resources during and after major combat operations to  secure. Accordingly, the intent behind our recommendation is to  have DOD assess the risks associated with unsecured conventional  munitions sites on a strategic, theaterwide basis to develop an effective  risk mitigation strategy.
Why GAO Did This Study

GAO is releasing a report today on lessons learned concerning the need for security over conventional munitions storage sites which provides the basis for this testimony. Following the invasion of Iraq in March 2003--known as Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF)--concerns were raised about how the Department of Defense (DOD) secured Iraqi conventional munitions storage sites during and after major combat operations. This testimony addresses (1) the security provided by U.S. forces over Iraqi conventional munitions storage sites and (2) DOD actions to mitigate risks associated with an adversary's conventional munitions storage sites for future operations on the basis of OIF lessons learned. To address these objectives, GAO reviewed OIF war plans, joint doctrine and policy, intelligence reports, and interviewed senior-level DOD officials.

What GAO Found

The overwhelming size and number of conventional munitions storage sites in Iraq combined with certain prewar planning assumptions that proved to be invalid, resulted in U.S. forces not adequately securing these sites and widespread looting, according to field unit, lessons learned, and intelligence reports. Pre-OIF estimates of Iraq's conventional munitions varied significantly, with the higher estimate being 5 times greater than the lower estimate. Conventional munitions storage sites were looted after major combat operations and some remained vulnerable as of October 2006. According to lessons learned reports and senior-level DOD officials, the widespread looting occurred because DOD had insufficient troop levels to secure conventional munitions storage sites due to several OIF planning priorities and assumptions. DOD's OIF planning priorities included quickly taking Baghdad on a surprise basis rather than using an overwhelming force. The plan also assumed that the regular Iraqi army units would "capitulate and provide internal security." According to an Army lessons learned study, this assumption was central to the decision to limit the amount of combat power deployed to Iraq. GAO analysis showed that the war plan did not document risk mitigation strategies in case assumptions were proven wrong. Furthermore, DOD did not have a centrally managed program for the disposition of enemy munitions until August 2003, after widespread looting had already occurred. According to officials from Multi-National Coalition-Iraq, unsecured conventional munitions continue to pose a threat to U.S. forces and others. Not securing these conventional munitions storage sites has been costly, as government reports indicated that looted munitions are being used to make improvised explosive devices (IED) that have killed or maimed many people, and will likely continue to support terrorist attacks in the region. As of October 2006, the Multi-National Coalition-Iraq stated that some remote sites have not been revisited to verify if they pose any residual risk nor have they been physically secured. DOD has taken many actions in response to OIF lessons learned, however, DOD has given little focus to mitigating the risks to U.S. forces posed by an adversary's conventional munitions storage sites in future operations planning. DOD's actions generally have emphasized countering the use of IEDs by resistance groups during post-hostility operations. GAO concludes that U.S. forces will face increased risk from this emerging asymmetric threat when an adversary uses unconventional means to counter U.S. military strengths. For example, potential adversaries are estimated to have a significant amount of munitions that would require significant manpower to secure or destroy. GAO concludes that this situation shows both that Iraqi stockpiles of munitions may not be an anomaly and that information on the amount and location of an adversary's munitions can represent a strategic planning consideration for future operations. However, without joint guidance, DOD cannot ensure that OIF lessons learned about the security of an adversary's conventional munitions storage sites will be integrated into future operations planning and execution.