DOD Initiatives Assist UOCAVA Voters, but Certain Weaknesses May Limit Their Effectiveness

Since the 2000 federal election, DOD has established several initiatives as  alternatives to the by-mail process to facilitate voter registration and ballot  request, receipt of a ballot, and submission of a voted ballot by electronic  means—such as fax and e-mail—for UOCAVA voters. These include the  Electronic Transmission Service’s fax to e-mail and e-mail to fax  conversion enhancement (hereafter referred to as the e-mail to fax  conversion feature); the 2004 Interim Voting Assistance System (IVAS); the  2006 Integrated Voting Alternative Site (also called IVAS); DOD’s online  voting assistance guidance; and online forms to register, request, receive,  or submit ballots. The e-mail to fax conversion feature allows  UOCAVA voters who do not have access to a facsimile machine to send  ballot requests, via e-mail, to DOD’s Electronic Transmission Service,  which converts e-mail attachments to faxes and sends them to local  election officials. This 2006 IVAS expanded on the 2004 effort, by  providing information on electronic ballot request and receipt options for  all UOCAVA citizens in all 55 states and territories. Officials within Congress, and others, have expressed concerns that voters  could be exposed to a heightened risk of identity theft if they used Tool 1  to send voting materials that contain personally identifiable information  (including Social Security number, date of birth, and address), by  unsecured e-mail. Online Voting Guidance Is Useful but Some Inconsistencies Exist in the Links

In addition to these initiatives, DOD also has established the FVAP Web  site, which contains information on FVAP programs and links to assist  UOCAVA voters in the voting process. Absence of Internet Absentee Voting Guidelines Has Hindered Development of the Mandated Internet- Based Absentee Voting Demonstration Project

The Election Assistance Commission has not yet developed the Internet  absentee voting guidelines, and because it is required by law to develop  them for DOD’s use in the secure, Internet-based, absentee voting  demonstration project, DOD has not moved ahead with the project. Commission officials told us that they have not yet developed the required  Internet absentee voting guidelines because the Commission has been  working on other priorities—including standards for electronic voting  machines, challenges associated with these electronic voting machines,  and a process for certification and accreditation—and it lacks the  resources to work on the Internet absentee voting guidelines or the  mandated study of the issues and challenges for Internet technology at the  same time. Regarding the demonstration project,  DOD officials stated that they had not taken action to develop this project  because the Ronald W. Reagan NDAA for Fiscal Year 2005 requires the  Commission to develop the guidelines first. DOD Was Developing Plans to Expand the Use of Electronic Voting Technology in the Future, but Sound Management Practices Are Key

We observed that DOD was developing, but had not yet completed, plans  to expand the use of electronic voting technology for UOCAVA voters use  in federal elections through November 2010, as required by the John  Warner NDAA for Fiscal Year 2007. DOD officials noted that both  the 2004 and 2006 IVAS initiatives were planned, designed, advertised, and  implemented just months before those two elections. Without a  proactive, integrated, long-term, results-oriented plan that involves all  major stakeholders; includes goals, interim tasks—such as identifying  security risks and addressing privacy concerns—milestones, time frames,  and contingency plans; and follows the sound management practices used  by leading organizations, DOD is not in a position to address congressional  expectations to establish secure and private electronic and Internet-based  voting initiatives. Recommendations for the Election Assistance Commission

To improve the Election Assistance Commission’s efforts to comply with  the direction from Congress to develop the Internet absentee voting  guidelines, we recommend that the Commission take the following two  actions:    Determine, in conjunction with major stakeholders like DOD, whether the  Commission’s 2007 Internet voting study and any other Commission  efforts related to Internet or electronic voting are applicable to DOD’s  plans for Internet-based voting, and incorporate them where appropriate. We  also reviewed and analyzed various DOD requirements documents, GAO  reports, internal DOD reports, and other reports related to DOD’s prior  Internet-based absentee voting initiatives—Voting Over the Internet and  SERVE—to ascertain, among other things, challenges and benefits  associated with Internet voting efforts.
Why GAO Did This Study

The Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act (UOCAVA) protects the rights of military personnel, their dependents, and overseas citizens to vote by absentee ballot. The Department of Defense (DOD) and others have reported that absentee voting, which relies primarily on mail, can be slow and may, in certain circumstances, serve to disenfranchise these voters. In 2004, Congress required DOD to develop an Internet-based absentee voting demonstration project and required the Election Assistance Commission--which reviews election procedures--to develop guidelines for DOD's project. In 2006, Congress required DOD to report, by May 15, 2007, on plans for expanding its use of electronic voting technologies and required GAO to assess efforts by (1) DOD to facilitate electronic absentee voting and (2) the Commission to develop Internet voting guidelines and DOD to develop an Internet-based demonstration project. GAO also assessed DOD's efforts to develop plans to expand its use of electronic voting technologies. GAO interviewed officials and reviewed and analyzed documents related to these efforts.

What GAO Found

Since 2000, DOD has developed several initiatives to facilitate absentee voting by electronic means such as fax or e-mail; however, some of these initiatives exhibited weaknesses or had low participation rates that might hinder their effectiveness. For example, the 2003 Electronic Transmission Service's fax to e-mail conversion feature allows UOCAVA voters who do not have access to a fax machine to request ballots by e-mail and then converts the e-mails to faxes to send to local election officials. DOD officials told us, however, they have not performed, among other things, certification tests and thus are not in compliance with information security requirements. The 2004 Interim Voting Assistance System (IVAS)--which, DOD reported, enabled UOCAVA voters to request and receive ballots securely--cost $576,000, and 17 citizens received ballots through it. The 2006 Integrated Voting Alternative Site (also called IVAS)--which enabled voters to request ballots using one tool, by mail, fax, or unsecured e-mail--raised concerns, from Congress and others, that using unsecured e-mail could expose voters to identity theft if they transmit personal data. While this IVAS displayed a warning that voters had to read to proceed, it did not advise them to delete personal voting information from the computers they used. DOD spent $1.1 million, and at least eight voted ballots were linked to this 2006 IVAS. Both the 2004 and 2006 IVAS were each implemented just 2 months before an election. DOD also has a Web site with links to guidance on electronic transmission options, but some of this guidance was inconsistent and could be misleading. DOD officials acknowledged the discrepancies and addressed them during GAO's review. The Election Assistance Commission has not developed the Internet absentee voting guidelines for DOD's use, and thus DOD has not proceeded with its Internet-based absentee voting demonstration project. Commission officials told GAO that they had not developed the guidelines because they had been devoting constrained resources to other priorities, including challenges associated with electronic voting machines. Furthermore, they have not established--in conjunction with major stakeholders like DOD--tasks, milestones, and time frames for completing the guidelines. The absence of such guidelines has hindered DOD's development of its Internet-based demonstration project. To assist the Commission, however, DOD has shared information on the challenges it faced in implementing prior Internet projects--including security threats. GAO observed that DOD was developing, but had not yet completed, plans for expanding the future use of electronic voting technologies. Because electronic voting in federal elections involves numerous federal, state, and local-level stakeholders; emerging technology; and time to establish the initiatives, developing results-oriented plans that identify goals, time frames, and tasks--including addressing security issues--is key. Without such plans, DOD is not in a position to address congressional expectations to establish secure and private electronic and Internet-based voting initiatives.