	Introduction

On July 18, 2005, President Bush and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh signed a jointstatement that announced the creation of a "global partnership," which would include "full" civilnuclear cooperation between the United States and India. This is at odds with nearly three decadesof U.S. nonproliferation policy and practice. President Bush committed to persuading Congress toamend the pertinent laws to approve the agreement, as well as persuading U.S. allies to create anexception to multilateral Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) guidelines for India to allow for nuclearcooperation. India committed to separating its civilian from its military nuclear facilities, declaringcivilian facilities to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and placing them under IAEAsafeguards, and signing an Additional Protocol, which provides enhanced access and informationfor IAEA inspectors. P.L. 109-401 , the law that provides the executive branch withauthority to waive restrictions under the Atomic Energy Act with respect to India, requires thePresident to determine that the following actions had occurred:
India has provided the United States and the IAEA with a credible plan toseparate civil and military facilities, materials, and programs, and has filed a declaration regardingits civil facilities with the IAEA;
India and the IAEA have concluded all legal steps required prior to signatureby the parties of an agreement requiring the application of safeguards in perpetuity in accordancewith IAEA standards, principles, and practices (including IAEA Board of Governors DocumentGOV/1621 (1973)) to India's civil nuclear facilities, materials and programs as declared in the plan,including materials used in or produced through the use of India's civil nuclearfacilities;
India and the IAEA are making substantial progress toward concluding anAdditional Protocol consistent with IAEA principles, practices, and policies that would apply toIndia's civil nuclear program;
India is working actively with the United States for the early conclusion of amultilateral treaty on the cessation of the production of fissile materials for use in nuclearweapons;
India is working with and supporting U.S. and international efforts to preventthe spread of enrichment and reprocessing technology to any state that does not already possessfull-scale functioning enrichment or reprocessing plants;
India is taking the necessary steps to secure nuclear and other sensitivematerials and technology through the application of comprehensive export control legislation andregulations, and through harmonization and adherence to Missile Technology Control Regime(MTCR) and Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) guidelines; and
the NSG has decided by consensus to permit supply to India of nuclear itemscovered by the guidelines of the NSG. (12) 
This report provides background on India's nuclear fuel cycle, a discussion of various issuesinvolved in separating civilian and military nuclear facilities and potential concerns for Congress asit considers whether the United States has adequate assurances that its nuclear cooperation does notassist, encourage, or induce India's nuclear weapons development, production, or proliferation. Two pressurized water reactors under construction by the Russians atKudankulam will be under IAEA safeguards also. Spent Fuel Reprocessing. Heavy Water Production. (41)

	The Separation Plan

On March 2, 2006, during President Bush's visit to India, U.S. and Indianofficials agreed upon a final separation plan. (49) 
The Administration has defended the separation plan most recently ascredible and defensible in this way:
For [the separation plan] to be credibleand defensible from a nonproliferation standpoint, it had to capture more than justa token number of Indian nuclear facilities, which it did by encompassing nearlytwo-thirds of India's current and planned thermal power reactors as well as all futurecivil thermal and breeder reactors. Other Facilities. Issues for Congress

U.S. officials acknowledge the importance of a credible Indian separationplan for ensuring that the United States complies with its Article I obligations underthe Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) -- to not in any way assist a nuclearweapons program in a non-nuclear weapon state. For almost thirty years, the U.S.legal standard has been that only nuclear safeguards on all nuclear activities in a stateprovides adequate assurances. The Administration has sought, and Congress hasprovided, backing for a lower level of assurance by proposing that the separation plantake the place of comprehensive safeguards.
On July 18, 2005, President Bush and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh announcedthe creation of a "global partnership," which would include "full" civil nuclear cooperation betweenthe United States and India. This is at odds with nearly three decades of U.S. nonproliferation policyand practice. President Bush promised India he would persuade Congress to amend the pertinentlaws to approve the agreement, as well as persuade U.S. allies to create an exception to multilateralNuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) guidelines for India. India committed to, among other things,separating its civilian nuclear facilities from its military nuclear facilities, declaring civilian facilitiesto the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and placing them under IAEA safeguards, andsigning an Additional Protocol. See CRS Report RL33016 , U.S. Nuclear Cooperation With India:Issues for Congress , by [author name scrubbed], for further details on the agreement.
The separation plan announced by Prime Minister Singh and President Bush on March 2,2006, and further elaborated on May 11, 2006, would place 8 power reactors under inspection,bringing the total up to 14 out of a possible 22 under inspection. Several fuel fabrication and spentfuel storage facilities were declared, as well as 3 heavy water plants that were described as"safeguards-irrelevant." The plan excludes from international inspection 8 indigenous powerreactors, enrichment and spent fuel reprocessing facilities (except as currently safeguarded), militaryproduction reactors and other military nuclear plants and 3 heavy water plants. Administrationofficials have defended the separation plan as credible and defensible because it covers more thanjust a token number of Indian facilities, provides for safeguards in perpetuity, and includes upstreamand downstream facilities.
U.S. officials acknowledge the importance of a credible separation plan to ensuring that theUnited States complies with its Article I obligations under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty(NPT) -- to not in any way assist a nuclear weapons program in a non-nuclear weapon state. Foralmost 30 years, the U.S. legal standard has been that only nuclear safeguards on all nuclear activitiesin a state provides adequate assurances. The Administration is apparently asking Congress to backa lower level of assurance by proposing that the separation plan take the place of comprehensivesafeguards.
Congress is likely to consider this issue as well as others when the Administration eventuallysubmits its cooperation agreement with India for approval by both chambers. P.L. 109-401 , signedon December 18, 2006, provides waivers for a nuclear cooperation agreement with India fromrelevant Atomic Energy Act provisions, and requires detailed information on the separation plan andresultant safeguards. This report, which will be updated as necessary, provides background onIndia's nuclear fuel cycle, a discussion of various issues involved in separating civilian and militarynuclear facilities and potential concerns for Congress as it considers whether the United States hasadequate assurances that its nuclear cooperation does not assist, encourage, or induce India's nuclearweapons development, production, or proliferation.