We  conducted interviews with federal, state, local, tribal, and Canadian  officials relevant to these Border Patrol sectors. DHS Vision for Integrated Homeland Security

Federal legislation and DHS policy have stressed the need for coordination  between DHS components and across other federal agencies and partners  to most efficiently and effectively secure the homeland and its borders. DHS Used Interagency Forums and Joint Operations to Improve Border Security Coordination, but DHS Oversight Could Address Emerging Challenges

DHS used interagency forums and joint operations to improve federal  coordination of northern border security efforts with law enforcement  partners from state, local, and tribal governments, and Canada according  to officials we interviewed across four northern border sectors. However,  numerous partners cited challenges related to the inability to resource the  increasing number of interagency forums in their area and raised concerns  that some efforts were overlapping. Ongoing DHS oversight of the mission and location of interagency  forums established by its components could help prevent duplication of  efforts, and help ensure that DHS is a mindful steward in conserving the  scarce resources of northern border partners. Additional DHS Action Could Help Address Challenges Hindering Northern Border Coordination among Its Components and with Other Federal Agencies

Federal agency coordination to secure the northern border was reported  to have improved by some Border Patrol, ICE, Forest Service, and DEA  officials operating within the four sectors we visited; however, in all  sectors officials cited problems with others in sharing information and  resources for daily operations. DHS headquarters officials from  several offices agreed, stating that many DHS components do not  consistently enforce information-sharing practices contained in  interagency agreements, and that field agents are left to resolve  coordination challenges without adequate headquarters guidance. Although DHS has relied on component-level management to ensure that  components coordinate information and operations in the field, the long- standing and continuing coordination challenges between ICE and Border  Patrol highlight the importance of developing a permanent solution to  oversee and address these challenges. DHS Reported Limited Progress in Securing the Northern Border, but Assessing Partner Contributions Could Inform Decisions in Addressing Remaining Vulnerabilities

DHS reported limited progress in securing the northern border, but  processes Border Patrol used to assess border security and resource  requirements did not include the extent that northern border partnerships  and resources were available or used to address border security  vulnerabilities. DHS action to develop guidance and policy for including  partner contributions in these processes could provide the agency and  Congress with more complete information in making funding and resource  allocation decisions. Our review of these reports for  2010 showed that for the northern border overall, 32 of the nearly 4,000  border miles had reached an acceptable level of control, with 9 of these  miles included in the four sectors we visited. These border miles are defined as vulnerable to exploitation due to  issues related to accessibility and resource availability and, as a result,  there is a high degree of reliance on law enforcement support from outside  the border zone. As such, the processes in place  reflect the extent that Border Patrol, exclusive of its partners, had  sufficient resources to detect, apprehend, and achieve an effective law  enforcement resolution. Additionally, we previously reported that DHS has not fully  responded to a legislative reporting requirement to link its initiatives— including partnerships—to existing vulnerabilities to inform decisions on  federal resource allocations. Recommendations for Executive Action

To help ensure DHS is maximizing the benefits of its coordination efforts  with northern border partners through interagency forums, documented  agreements, and its resource planning process, we recommend that the  Secretary of Homeland Security take the following three actions:    Provide DHS-level guidance and oversight for interagency forums  established or sponsored by its components to ensure that the missions  and locations are not duplicative and to consider the downstream  burden on northern border partners. Direct CBP to develop policy and guidance necessary to identify,  assess, and integrate the available partner resources in northern border  sector security assessments and resource planning documents. Border Security: Security Vulnerabilities at Unmanned and  Unmonitored U.S. Border Locations.
Why GAO Did This Study

The challenges of securing the U.S.-Canadian border involve the coordination of multiple partners. The results of the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) efforts to integrate border security among its components and across federal, state, local, tribal, and Canadian partners are unclear. GAO was asked to address the extent to which DHS has (1) improved coordination with state, local, tribal, and Canadian partners; (2) progressed in addressing past federal coordination challenges; and (3) progressed in securing the northern border and used coordination efforts to address existing vulnerabilities. GAO reviewed interagency agreements, strategies, and operational documents that address DHS's reported northern border vulnerabilities such as terrorism. GAO visited four Border Patrol sectors, selected based on threat, and interviewed officials from federal, state, local, tribal, and Canadian agencies operating within these sectors. While these results cannot be generalized, they provided insights on border security coordination.

What GAO Found

According to a majority of selected northern border security partners GAO interviewed, DHS improved northern border security coordination through interagency forums and joint operations. Specifically, interagency forums were beneficial in establishing a common understanding of security, while joint operations helped to achieve an integrated and effective law enforcement response. However, numerous partners cited challenges related to the inability to resource the increasing number of interagency forums and raised concerns that some efforts may be overlapping. While guidance issued by GAO stresses the need for a process to ensure that resources are used effectively and efficiently, DHS does not oversee the interagency forums established by its components. DHS oversight could help prevent possible duplication of efforts and conserve resources. DHS component officials reported that federal agency coordination to secure the northern border was improved, but partners in all four sectors GAO visited cited ongoing challenges sharing information and resources for daily border security related to operations and investigations. DHS has established and updated interagency agreements, but oversight by management at the component and local level has not ensured consistent compliance with provisions of these agreements, such as those related to information sharing, in areas GAO visited. As a result, according to DHS officials, field agents have been left to resolve coordination challenges. Ongoing DHS-level oversight and attention to enforcing accountability of established agreements could help address long-standing coordination challenges between DHS components, and further the DHS strategic vision for a coordinated homeland security enterprise. Border Patrol--a component of DHS's U.S. Customs and Border Protection--reported that 32 of the nearly 4,000 northern border miles in fiscal year 2010 had reached an acceptable level of security and that there is a high reliance on law enforcement support from outside the border zone. However, the extent of partner law enforcement resources available to address border security vulnerabilities is not reflected in Border Patrol's processes for assessing border security and resource requirements. GAO previously reported that federal agencies should identify resources among collaborating agencies to deliver results more efficiently and that DHS had not fully responded to a legislative requirement to link initiatives--including partnerships--to existing border vulnerabilities to inform federal resource allocation decisions. Development of policy and guidance to integrate available partner resources in northern border security assessments and resource planning documents could provide the agency and Congress with more complete information necessary to make resource allocation decisions in mitigating existing border vulnerabilities.

What GAO Recommends

GAO is recommending that DHS enhance oversight to ensure efficient use of interagency forums and compliance with interagency agreements; and develop guidance to integrate partner resources to mitigate northern border vulnerabilities. DHS concurred with our recommendations.