	Background

ROTC is the largest of the three major officer commissioning programs  for DOD. However, each service reported that various factors may affect  their ability to meet these goals, and that they have faced challenges  commissioning officers for certain occupational specialties. In addition,  half of all ROTC units did not produce the minimum average annual  production of officers over a 5-year period required by DOD to justify  investment in an ROTC unit. The Services Met Some, but Not All, of Their Overall ROTC Officer Production Goals for Newly Commissioned Officers

In fiscal years 2008 through 2012, each service came within a few  percentage points of meeting or exceeding its overall ROTC officer  production goals for newly commissioned officers. In  addition, over the past decade, the services have conducted a total of 11  evaluations to identify units for consolidation or closure. However, the  evaluations have largely occurred on an ad hoc basis and are narrowly  focused on assessing the productivity of individual ROTC units, rather  than the overall performance of the program. DOD Has Not Established Clearly Defined, Comprehensive Performance Measures

DOD’s management of ROTC programs is hampered by not having  performance measures that provide a comprehensive understanding of  the overall cost-effectiveness and efficiency of ROTC programs. Key  attributes of successful performance measures include clearly defined,  comprehensive measures that enable an organization to evaluate  accomplishments, make decisions, and balance competing priorities. DOD’s instruction specifies five factors for the military services to  consider before closing a unit, including, the (1) quality of the officers  produced by the unit, (2) operations and maintenance cost of maintaining  the unit, (3) numbers of officers produced to meet service commissioning  goals from categories that are difficult to achieve, (4) number of officers  produced by the unit, and (5) number and location of units in an area or  state where the unit being considered for closure resides. Specifically,  DOD’s instruction directs the services to consider the quality of officers  produced by a unit that is being evaluated for closure. Our prior work  has shown that results-oriented program management practices include  routine program evaluations, which are a key source of information about  how well a program is working and whether it is achieving its intended  results. Although the Under Secretary  of Defense for Personnel and Readiness conducts some oversight  functions such as setting policy, DOD’s Instruction 1215.08 does not  specify department-level review of performance measures. Further,  services do not consistently communicate with key stakeholders, such as  members of Congress and schools, about performance of ROTC  programs, except when closure decisions are being considered. This has  contributed to difficulty gaining political support for such closures. OSD and the Military Services Do Not Regularly Communicate with Key Stakeholders on ROTC Program Performance

The military services have had difficulty gaining buy-in for  recommendations to close dozens of underproductive ROTC units  collectively across the services, in part because they do not have an  effective strategy for communicating with stakeholders such as Congress  or school administrators about ROTC program performance. Until the military services establish a formal strategy to communicate with  key stakeholders on ROTC program performance, the military services  will find it difficult to obtain the support that is needed to make the  necessary changes to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of ROTC  programs. Recommendations for Executive Action

To help ensure that OSD, the military services, and congressional  decision makers have a comprehensive understanding of whether ROTC  programs are achieving desired results in a cost-effective and efficient  manner, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Under  Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, in conjunction with  the Secretaries of the military services, to establish a systematic process  to routinely evaluate ROTC program performance that includes taking the  following three actions: establish performance measures that are clearly defined and  require routine evaluations of ROTC programs that measure  progress against the strategic goals and objectives of ROTC  programs; and use the performance information resulting from ROTC program  evaluations to assess and document the need for the existing  number of units,  To help improve the oversight and accountability of the military services’  ROTC programs, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the  Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness to take the  following three actions:   reexamine and clarify DOD Instruction 1215.08 to clearly delineate  roles and responsibilities for oversight of ROTC programs; coordinate with the military services to ensure that service ROTC  guidance aligns with the updated DOD instruction; and develop and implement, in conjunction with the Secretaries of the  military services, a strategy to periodically communicate with  Congress and other key stakeholders on ROTC program  performance. GAO staff who made major contributions to  this report are listed in appendix V.

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

To assess the extent to which the military services’ ROTC programs met  goals and minimum requirements for producing officers over a 5-year  period, we obtained and analyzed ROTC unit production data from each  of the military services for fiscal years 2008 through 2012 and fiscal year  2012 enrollment data. To assess the extent to which the military services’ ROTC programs are  subject to oversight and have effective processes for communicating with  key stakeholders, we reviewed and analyzed relevant OSD and military  service guidance to identify guidelines and responsibilities for conducting  oversight of ROTC programs and communicating with key stakeholders  about ROTC program performance. Reserve Officers’ Training Corps: Questions Related to Organizational  Restructuring.
Why GAO Did This Study

ROTC is the largest source of newly commissioned officers for DOD. GAO's analysis of DOD data identified more than 9,000 officers commissioned from ROTC in fiscal year 2012. ROTC is critical for producing officers from the nation's colleges and universities to meet the leadership and readiness needs of the armed forces. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 mandated GAO to review the services' ROTC programs. This report assesses the extent that ROTC programs (1) met goals and minimum annual requirements for producing officers over a 5-year period, (2) have established performance measures and conducted evaluations for managing ROTC programs, and (3) are subject to oversight and have effective processes for communicating with key stakeholders. GAO analyzed ROTC production data from fiscal years 2008 through 2012; reviewed relevant legislation and DOD and service policies and guidance for ROTC; and reviewed and discussed assessments of ROTC efficiency and effectiveness, and oversight of ROTC with officials from OSD and the services.

What GAO Found

From fiscal years 2008 through 2012, each military service met at least 91 percent of their overall Reserve Officers' Training Corps (ROTC) goals for producing the number of officers needed to meet service end strength authorizations, but each has reported challenges in commissioning officers for some certain occupational specialties, such as engineers and nurses. Further, GAO's analysis found that half of the Department of Defense's (DOD) ROTC units did not meet DOD's minimum average annual production requirement over the 5-year period reviewed. Further, cost per commissioned officer varies greatly depending on unit production. For example, excluding tuition costs, the average cost per officer produced across all units was about $68,000, compared to an average cost of about $95,000 per officer for units that produced fewer than 15 officers on average annually from fiscal years 2008 through 2012.
DOD's instruction specifies factors to consider before closing ROTC units, but these factors do not constitute clearly defined performance measures that provide a comprehensive understanding of the effectiveness and efficiency of ROTC programs, and service evaluations of ROTC programs are ad hoc. DOD's instruction specifies that in assessing units for closure, the services are to consider the quality of officers produced by a unit but it does not clearly define characteristics that comprise quality, which has led to the inconsistent application of the measure by the services. The services conducted 11 evaluations over the past decade to assess performance and identify units for consolidation or closure. However, the evaluations have largely occurred on an ad hoc basis because the services have not established a systematic process to routinely evaluate ROTC program performance. Key attributes of successful performance measures include clearly, defined measures. Moreover, results-oriented program management practices include routine program evaluations that determine how well a program is working. Without clearly defined performance measures and routinely conducted evaluations, it will be difficult for the services to accurately determine if ROTC programs are effectively and efficiently operating.
The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) conducts some oversight functions, such as setting policy for the ROTC program. However, although specified in guidance, OSD does not review the services' methodologies for closing ROTC units because OSD officials believe this is a service responsibility. Further, the services do not consistently communicate with key stakeholders, such as members of Congress and schools, about performance of ROTC programs, except when closure decisions are being considered. This may have contributed to the difficulty the services have experienced in gaining political support for such closures. GAO has noted that regular communication with stakeholders helps build trusting relationships to gain buy-in. Without clearly delineated responsibilities for oversight of ROTC programs and a formal strategy to communicate with key stakeholders on ROTC program performance, DOD will find it difficult to obtain the support that is needed to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of ROTC programs.

What GAO Recommends

GAO is making six recommendations to DOD, to include establishing clearly defined performance measures and conducting routine program evaluations; reexamining oversight roles and responsibilities; and developing a strategy for communicating with Congress and other key stakeholders on program performance. DOD concurred with each of GAO's recommendations.