Army Is Well Under Way in Its Modular Combat Brigade Conversions, but Its Ability to Meet Near- and Long-Term Equipping Goals Is Unclear

The Army has made progress in creating active component modular  combat brigades, but it is not meeting its equipping goals for these  brigades and has yet to complete the development of its rotational  equipping strategy, which raises concerns about the extent to which  brigades will be equipped in the near and longer term. As such, National  Guard combat units will enter into the Army’s new force rotational model  in which, according to the Army’s plans, Guard units would be available  for deployment 1 year out of 6 years. To Mitigate Equipment Shortages, Army Plans to Rotate Equipment among Units Based on Their Movement through Training, Readiness, and Deployment Phases

Because the Army realized that it would not have enough equipment in the  near term to simultaneously equip modular combat brigades at 100 percent  of their requirements, the Army is developing a new equipping strategy as  part of its force rotation model; however, this strategy is not yet completed  because the Army has not finalized equipping requirements for this new  strategy or assessed the operational risk of not fully equipping all units. Army Faces Challenges in Managing Active Component Personnel Requirements for Its New Modular Force Structure

The Army has made some progress toward meeting modular personnel  requirements in the active component, but faces significant challenges in  achieving its modular restructuring without permanently increasing its  active component end strength above 482,400, as specified by the QDR. The Army plans to increase the size of its modular combat force but doing  so without permanently increasing its overall end strength is an ambitious  undertaking that will require the Army to eliminate or realign many  positions in its noncombat force. As a  result, it is not clear to what extent the Army will be able to meet its  overall end-strength goals and what risks exist if these goals are not met. Army Has Overall Objectives and Time Frames for Modularity, but Lacks a Long-Term Comprehensive Approach to Assess Progress and Monitor Implementation

While the Army has established overall objectives and time frames for  modularity, it lacks a long-term comprehensive and transparent approach  to effectively measure its progress against stated modularity objectives,  assess the need for further changes to its modular unit designs, and  monitor implementation plans. Without such an  approach, neither the Secretary of Defense nor Congress will have full  visibility into the capabilities of the modular force and the Army’s  implementation plans. GAO and DOD, among others, have identified the  importance of establishing objectives that can be translated into  measurable, results-oriented metrics, which in turn provide accountability  for results. Third, to improve information available for decision makers on progress of  the Army’s modular force implementation plans, we recommend that the  Army develop and provide the Secretary of Defense and Congress with a  comprehensive plan for assessing the Army’s progress toward achieving  the benefits of modularity to include    specific, quantifiable performance metrics to measure progress toward  meeting the goals and objectives established in the Army Campaign Plan;  and    plans and milestones for conducting further evaluation of modular unit  designs that discuss the extent to which unit designs provide sufficient  capabilities needed to execute National Defense Strategy and 2006 QDR  objectives for addressing a wider range of both traditional and irregular  security challenges. Matter for Congressional Consideration

Given the significant cost and far-reaching magnitude of the Army’s plans  for creating modular forces, Congress should consider requiring the  Secretary of  Defense to provide the information outlined in our  recommendations including;    details about the Army’s equipping strategy and an assessment of the  operational risk associated with this equipping strategy;  the status of the Army’s personnel initiatives and an assessment of how  the Army will fully staff its modular operational combat force and manage  the risk to its noncombat force structure; and  the Army’s plan for assessing its progress toward achieving the benefits of  modularity, plans and milestones for conducting further evaluation of  modular unit designs, and a testing plan for conducting comprehensive  assessments of the modular force as it is being implemented. II).
Why GAO Did This Study

The Army considers its modular force transformation its most extensive restructuring since World War II. Restructuring units from a division-based force to a modular brigade-based force will require an investment of over $52 billion, including $41 billion for equipment, from fiscal year 2005 through fiscal year 2011, according to the Army. Because of broad congressional interest in this initiative, GAO prepared this report under the Comptroller General's authority and assessed (1) the Army's progress and plans for equipping modular combat brigades, (2) progress made and challenges to managing personnel requirements of the modular force, and (3) the extent to which the Army has developed an approach for assessing the results of its modular conversions and the need for further changes to designs or implementation plans.

What GAO Found

The Army is making progress in creatingactive and National Guard modular combat brigades while fully engaged in ongoing operations, but it is not meeting its equipping goals for active brigades and has not completed development of an equipping strategy for its new force rotation model. This raises uncertainty about the levels to which the modular brigades will be equipped both in the near and longer term as well as the ultimate equipping cost. The Army plans to employ a force rotation model in which units nearing deployment would receive required levels of equipment while nondeploying units would be maintained at lower readiness levels. However, because the Army has not completed key details of the equipping strategy--such as defining the specific equipping requirements for units in various phases of its force rotation model--it is unclear what level of equipment units will have, how this strategy may affect the Army's equipment funding plans, and how well units with low priority for equipment will be able to respond to unforeseen crises. While the Army has several initiatives under way to meet its modular force personnel requirements in the active component, it faces challenges in achieving its modular restructuring without permanently increasing its active component end strength above 482,400, as specified by the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review. The Army plans to increase its active combat force but doing so without permanently increasing its overall active end strength will require the Army to eliminate or realign many positions in its noncombat force. The Army has made some progress in reducing military personnel in noncombat positions by converting some to civilian positions and pursuing other initiatives, but Army officials believe future initiatives may be difficult to achieve and could lead to difficult trade-offs. Without information on the progress of these initiatives and what risks exist if the Army's goals are not met, Congress and the Secretary of Defense lack the information they need to understand challenges and risks. Finally, the Army does not have a comprehensive and transparent approach to measure progress against its modularity objectives, assess the need for further changes to modular designs, and monitor implementation plans. While GAO and DOD have identified the importance of establishing objectives that can be translated into measurable metrics that in turn provide accountability for results, the Army has not established outcome-related metrics linked to most of its modularity objectives. Further, although the Army is analyzing lessons learned from Iraq and training events, the Army does not have a long-term comprehensive plan for further analysis and testing of its modular combat brigade designs and fielded capabilities. Without performance metrics and a comprehensive testing plan, neither the Secretary of Defense nor Congress will have full visibility into how the modular force is currently organized, staffed, and equipped. As a result, decision makers lack sufficient information to assess the capabilities, cost, and risks of the Army's modular force implementation plans.