Army National Guard Has Excess Combat Forces While Shortages Continue to Exist in Support Forces

Last week we reported that the Army National Guard’s combat forces far exceed projected requirements for two major regional conflicts. Combat Brigades’ Ability to Be Ready for War in 90 Days Is Uncertain

In the aftermath of the Gulf War, the Army adopted a new training strategy that was designed to prepare combat brigades to deploy within 90 days of mobilization. The adviser program’s efforts to improve training readiness were limited by factors such as (1) an ambiguous definition of the advisers’ role; (2) poor communication between the active Army, advisers, brigades, and other National Guard officials, causing confusion and disagreement over training goals; and (3) difficult working relationships. We also reported that it was highly uncertain whether the Guard’s mechanized infantry and armor brigades could be ready to deploy 90 days after mobilization. Dedicated Continental Air Defense Is No Longer Needed

The continental air defense mission evolved during the Cold War to detect and intercept Soviet bombers attacking North America via the North Pole. The Air Force reduced its dedicated Air National Guard force from 180 to 150 aircraft. On the basis of a force of 150 aircraft, the office estimated a total savings of about $1.8 billion from fiscal years 1997 through 2000.
Why GAO Did This Study

GAO discussed the readiness of armed forces reserve components.

What GAO Found

GAO noted that: (1) reserve components provided crucial support and combat functions in the Persian Gulf War and in various peacekeeping operations; (2) the Army National Guard's combat forces far exceed projected force requirements for two major regional conflicts, while the Army has critical shortages in support functions; (3) none of the enhanced brigades that it reviewed achieved the training proficiency that the Army required for deployment within 90 days of mobilization; (4) active-duty advisers assigned to National Guard brigades were limited by an ambiguous definition of their role, poor management communication, and difficult working relationships; (5) it is uncertain that the Guard's mechanized infantry and armor brigades could deploy within 90 days after mobilization; (6) while it has found that a dedicated continental air defense force is no longer necessary to defend North America against a long-range air threat, the Air Force has only reduced its dedicated Air National Guard force for this mission from 180 aircraft to 150 aircraft; and (7) eliminating continental air defense units and assigning their missions to existing units could save $1.8 billion from fiscal years 1997 through 2000.