For example, some  countries do not have their own database systems with terrorist screening  information or access to other countries’ terrorist screening information,  which contains biographical or biometric information about individuals  who are known or suspected terrorists. Several U.S. Foreign Capacity-Building Efforts Address the Use of Fraudulent Travel Documents but Some Efforts Lack Coordination

			Multiple Agencies Fund and Implement Training Courses in Fraudulent Travel Document Recognition

Seven different U.S. government entities across three federal agencies are  involved in providing fraudulent travel document training to foreign  government officials, as shown in figure 2. These courses were provided to law  enforcement officials from 17 of the approximately 60 countries that  received ATA training in fiscal year 2010. State’s Bureau of Consular Affairs, with its mission of issuing secure U.S.  passports to traveling Americans, is involved in some efforts to enhance  foreign countries’ passport issuance security. The U.S. Government Has Anticorruption Efforts Overseas although Not Specifically Aimed at Passport Issuance and Immigration Agencies

While the U.S. government, through USAID and Millennium Challenge  Corporation (MCC) anticorruption foreign capacity-building programs and  State-led diplomatic efforts, has many efforts aimed at helping foreign  countries to combat corruption, no U.S. government effort focuses directly  on combating corruption in countries’ passport issuance and immigration  agencies. No Performance Measures to Gauge Governmentwide Progress in Closing Key Gaps in Foreign Partners’ Ability to Prevent Terrorist Travel Have Been Established

The U.S. government lacks performance measures to assess  governmentwide progress in closing the key gaps in foreign partners’  capacity to prevent terrorist travel overseas. Some agency components have made efforts to track the performance of  their specific program efforts aimed at improving information sharing  about known and suspected terrorists—one of the four key gaps. Recommendations for Executive Action

In order to institute a coordinated approach for delivering fraudulent  travel document recognition training overseas to ensure that U.S. agencies  prevent overlap and duplication; and given State’s role in working with all  appropriate elements of the U.S. government to ensure integrated and  effective international counterterrorism efforts, we recommend that:    State develop a mechanism for agencies involved in funding and  implementing fraudulent travel document recognition training at  overseas posts to coordinate the delivery of such training to foreign  partners. To allow the U.S. government to determine the extent to which it is  building foreign partners’ ability to prevent terrorist travel abroad and to  make adjustments to improve its programs accordingly, we recommend  that:    The National Security Council, in collaboration with relevant agencies,  develop a mechanism to measure, track, and report on U.S. progress  across the government toward its goal of enhancing foreign partners’  capacity to prevent terrorist travel. DOD, the Department of Transportation,  USAID, and the National Security Staff did not provide any comments on  the draft. At that time, we will send copies of the report to the  Secretaries of Defense, Homeland Security, Justice, State, and  Transportation; the Administrator of the U.S. Agency for International  Development; the Director of the National Counterterrorism Center; the  National Security Staff of the National Security Council; and other  interested parties or interested congressional committees. GAO staff members that made key contributions to this  report are listed in appendix V.

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

In this report, we (1) identified the key gaps the U.S. government has  assessed in foreign countries’ capacity to prevent terrorist travel overseas,  (2) evaluated how U.S. foreign capacity-building efforts address those  gaps, and (3) assessed the extent to which the U.S. government is  measuring progress in its efforts to close those gaps. Our work focused on the efforts of the Departments of State (State),  Homeland Security (DHS), Defense (DOD), and Justice (DOJ) to build  foreign partners’ capacity to prevent terrorist travel overseas. We also reviewed the relevant  agency strategic documents for State, DHS, DOD, DOJ, and USAID.
Why GAO Did This Study

Eliminating the threat of terrorist attacks continues to be a primary U.S. national security focus. According to the 9/11 Commission, constraining the mobility of terrorists is one of the most effective weapons in fighting terrorism. This report (1) describes key gaps the U.S. government has identified in foreign countries' capacity to prevent terrorist travel overseas, (2) evaluates how U.S. capacity-building efforts address those gaps, and (3) assesses the extent to which the U.S. government is measuring progress in its efforts to close those gaps. To identify the key gaps, GAO reviewed governmentwide assessments of vulnerabilities in the international travel system. GAO reviewed the strategies and documentation of U.S. agencies funding and/or implementing foreign capacity-building efforts to prevent terrorist travel overseas, including those of the Departments of State (State)--which coordinates U.S. efforts overseas--Defense (DOD), Homeland Security (DHS), Justice (DOJ), and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). GAO also interviewed officials from the National Security Staff, of the National Security Council (NSC), which oversees counterterrorism policy. GAO met with these agencies and conducted field work in Kenya, Pakistan, the Philippines, and Thailand.

What GAO Found

The U.S. government has identified four key gaps in foreign countries' capacity to prevent terrorist travel overseas. U.S. government foreign capacity-building programs and activities address these gaps to varying degrees. For instance, as one of the U.S. efforts to enhance foreign partners' sharing of information about known and suspected terrorists, State's Terrorist Interdiction Program provides participating countries with hardware and software to develop, maintain, and use terrorist screening information. In fiscal year 2010, nearly 150 ports of entry overseas were using this program. With regard to addressing the use of fraudulent travel documents, GAO found the potential for overlap and duplication since seven components of three federal agencies are involved in providing training on fraudulent travel document recognition to foreign government officials, with no mechanism to coordinate such training. In two countries GAO visited, there was a lack of collaboration among agencies funding and implementing training on this topic. For example, in Pakistan, State and DHS were both planning to hold fraudulent travel document training for the same Pakistani agency during the same month without knowing of the other's plans. Regarding helping countries improve the security of their passport issuance, State and USAID have multiple efforts, including State's Bureau of Consular Affairs bringing delegations from foreign passport offices to the United States for briefings at passport-related agencies. Finally, the U.S. government has many efforts aimed at combating corruption overseas, such as encouraging countries to pass anticorruption laws. While these efforts are not aimed specifically at countries' passport and immigration agencies, they are intended to improve the effectiveness of all government functions. The U.S. government lacks performance measures to assess governmentwide progress in closing the key gaps in foreign partners' capacity to prevent terrorist travel overseas. None of the governmentwide or individual agency strategic documents GAO reviewed contained such measures. While components of State and DOJ have some performance measures related to information sharing, these measures do not provide decision makers with comprehensive information on governmentwide progress in enhancing foreign partners' capacity.

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that (1) State develop a mechanism to improve coordination of various agencies' efforts to provide fraudulent travel document training to foreign partners, and (2) NSC develop a mechanism to measure, track, and report on overall progress toward the goal of enhancing foreign partners' capacity to prevent terrorist travel overseas. State concurred with the first recommendation. NSC did not comment on the draft report.