These include reports on the numbers of enlistment waivers, recruiting  resources, recruiting production data, and recruiter irregularities. DOD partially concurred with our recommendations but did not implement them. The ARNG Has Recently Taken Steps to Increase Oversight of the Recruiting Process but Has Not Permanently Established a Program to Monitor State-Level Activities

The ARNG Strength Maintenance Division has recently taken steps to  increase oversight of how states and territories adhere to recruiting  policies and procedures; however, the ARNG Strength Maintenance  Division has not permanently established the Recruiting Standards  Branch to ensure ongoing monitoring of state-level recruiting activities. As of July 16, 2015 this office had completed inspections in 16 states. The approval for permanent staff may not take  place until early 2017. ARNG Strength Maintenance Division officials  stated that they believe that continued oversight of state recruiting  activities is important and that currently they are using positions for the  ARNG Recruiting Standards Branch that are intended for use in other  areas. Without  permanently establishing an entity, such as the ARNG Recruiting  Standards Branch or other entity, to conduct inspections of state-level  recruiting activities, the Director, ARNG may be limited in its ability to  ensure that ARNG policies and procedures are being properly  implemented by the states. The ARNG Has Had Mixed Results in Meeting Goals for Recruiting and Nearly Met Goals for Completing Training, but Does Not Track Completion of Initial Term of Service

The ARNG had mixed results in meeting its overall recruiting goals and  nearly met its goals for initial military training; however, the ARNG does  not track whether soldiers are completing their initial term of service or  military obligation. Further, from fiscal years  2011 through 2014, the ARNG nearly met its goals for completion of initial  military training, but we found that the ARNG does not have consistent,  complete, and valid data on why soldiers do not complete training and  when soldiers separate during the training process. Our analysis for fiscal years 2010 through 2014 is consistent with  this historical trend as ARNG only met its recruiting goals in 2 of the 5  years. Having this information could be particularly  important in light of our analysis above showing that about 40 percent of  soldiers who joined from fiscal years 2001 through 2007 did not complete  their initial term of service. ARNG Has Not Ensured That Recruiters Understand Financial Incentives, and OSD, Army and ARNG Have Not Conducted Oversight of ARNG’s Financial Incentives Programs

The ARNG has some internal controls for processing its financial  incentives but has not ensured that recruiting officials understand  available financial incentives to fill critical military positions, and OSD, the  Department of the Army, and ARNG-HRM have not exercised all of their  oversight responsibilities for ARNG financial incentives programs. Financial incentives are a tool  available to recruiters, and ARNG incentives policy states that the  incentives assist leadership in meeting and sustaining ARNG readiness  requirements and provides incentives to assist in filling critical shortages. The Department of the Army and the ARNG Have Not Evaluated and Documented the Effectiveness of the ARNG’s Financial Incentives Programs

The Department of the Army has reviewed and approved the ARNG’s  financial incentives policy and has recently issued a directive that  expands its oversight; however, the Department of the Army and ARNG- HRM have not evaluated and documented the effectiveness of the  financial incentives programs in achieving overall objectives. To help ARNG officials in using financial incentives to fill critical  positions as required by Army and National Guard regulation, direct  the Director, ARNG, to provide recruiters with training to better enable  the use of available financial incentives. To help determine whether ARNG officials are effectively using  financial incentives, in conjunction with the Director, ARNG, exercise  their oversight responsibilities by evaluating and documenting the  effectiveness of ARNG’s incentives program in meeting its goals. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope and Methodology

The objectives of our review were to evaluate the extent to which (1) the  Army National Guard (ARNG) has provided oversight of its recruiting  process; (2) the ARNG met its goals for recruiting, completion of initial  military training, and completion of initial term of service in recent  years; and (3) the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), Department  of the Army, and ARNG have conducted their oversight responsibilities of  the ARNG’s financial incentives programs. Except in the case of reasons  why soldiers left the ARNG before completing their military training and  data on when soldiers separated during the training process, we found  that the data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of determining (1)  the extent to which enlisted soldiers completed their initial military  training; (2) the length of time it took these soldiers to complete their initial  military training and become qualified for their military occupational  specialty; (3) the extent to which enlisted soldiers completed their initial  term of service; (4) the length of time enlisted soldiers who did not  complete their initial term of service served in the ARNG; and (5) the  reasons why enlisted soldiers who graduated from their training but did  not complete their initial term of service left the ARNG.
Why GAO Did This Study

Recruiters are often referred to as the “face” of the ARNG. In the past, there have been allegations of recruiter misconduct and misuse of financial incentives, making it important for recruiters to ensure procedures are followed when working with applicants and that incentives to join the ARNG are awarded properly and effectively.
House Report 113-446 included a provision for GAO to review the ARNG's recruiting practices. This report evaluates the extent to which (1) ARNG has provided oversight of its recruiting process; (2) ARNG met its goals for recruiting, completion of initial military training, and initial term of service; and (3) OSD, Department of the Army, and ARNG have conducted oversight of ARNG's enlistment financial incentives programs. For this work, GAO reviewed DOD and ARNG recruiting policy and procedures and interviewed cognizant officials. GAO analyzed data on recruiting from FY2010 through FY2014, training from FY2011 through FY2014, and initial term of service for FY2015. GAO visited four states representing a range of size and locations.

What GAO Found

The Army National Guard (ARNG) has taken steps to increase oversight of its recruiting process primarily conducted by recruiters dispersed at the state-level but has not established a permanent program to monitor state-level recruiting activities. In June 2014, the ARNG created a Recruiting Standards Branch that has started to conduct inspections of state offices. The Recruiting Standards branch completed inspections in 16 states from October 2014 through July 2015 and found that 2 states did not achieve full compliance in their inspections. However, this is not a permanent program, and ARNG officials stated that they are using positions to staff it intended for use in other areas. The ARNG is seeking approval for permanent staff by early 2017 to continue its oversight. Continued monitoring of state-level recruiting activities, such as through a permanent recruiting standards branch, will be important to ARNG's oversight functions.
The ARNG had mixed results in meeting its overall recruiting goals and nearly met its goals for initial military training; however, the ARNG does not track whether soldiers are completing their initial term of service or military obligation. The ARNG met its recruiting goals in 2 of the 5 years from fiscal years (FY) 2010 through 2014. While the ARNG nearly met its goals for training completion from FY 2011 through 2014, GAO found that the ARNG does not have complete, consistent, and valid data on why soldiers do not complete training and when they separate during training. Without consistent, complete, and valid data, decision makers do not have information to determine why a higher number of soldiers are not completing training. The ARNG also does not track whether soldiers are completing their initial term of service. GAO's analysis shows that about 40 percent of enlisted soldiers who joined the ARNG from FY 2001 through 2007 did not complete their initial term of service. Without tracking completion of initial term of service, ARNG officials cannot assess whether their programs are effective in meeting personnel requirements and do not have visibility to ensure the ARNG is maximizing its investment in its soldiers.
The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), Department of the Army (Army), and ARNG have not fully conducted their oversight responsibilities of ARNG enlistment financial-incentives programs. OSD has not enforced a requirement that ARNG report incentives obligated through the ARNG incentives programs. Further, although Army and National Guard regulations require evaluations of the effectiveness of the ARNG financial incentives programs, the Army and ARNG have not evaluated and documented the effectiveness of the programs. Without evaluating and documenting the effectiveness of ARNG incentives programs, officials may not know whether changes are needed for effective use of incentives or they may determine that certain financial incentives are not needed. Moreover, the ARNG has not ensured that recruiters have an understanding of available financial incentives. Financial incentives are a tool available to recruiters and agency policy states that incentives are available to assist in meeting and sustaining readiness requirements and to assist in filling critical shortages. ARNG has not provided recruiters with training on using financial incentives. With additional training, recruiters could better understand when and how to offer financial incentives to fill critical positions.

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends, among other things, that ARNG take actions to collect consistent, complete, and valid data on soldiers who do not complete training and initial term of service, and evaluate and document its incentives programs. DOD concurred with GAO's recommendations but stated that it did not concur with the report due to GAO's depiction of waivers. GAO disagrees with DOD's characterization as discussed in the report.