Founded and led by Joseph Kony, the LRA currently operates in the remote border areas between the Central African Republic (CAR), Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), South Sudan, and Sudan. In May 2010, Congress enacted the Lord's Resistance Army Disarmament and Northern Uganda Recovery Act of 2009 ( P.L. The Administration's approach to the LRA, submitted to Congress in November 2010 as required under P.L. In October 2011, the Obama Administration announced the deployment of about 100 U.S. military personnel to act as advisors in support of Ugandan-led military efforts to capture or kill senior LRA leaders. The United States has provided significant logistical support for Uganda's counter-LRA operations beyond its borders since late 2008. Campaigns by U.S.-based advocacy groups have contributed to U.S. policymakers' interest in, and U.S. public awareness of, the LRA issue. The LRA's strength has significantly decreased since the U.S. advisors first deployed, and several senior LRA figures have been captured or killed by Ugandan troops in U.S.-supported operations. Despite these successes, Kony apparently remains at large, and the LRA "has demonstrated a remarkable ability to survive." Key questions include
What is, or should be, the relative priority of counter-LRA activities compared to other humanitarian, national security, and budgetary goals? What are the benchmarks for success and/or withdrawal of U.S. forces? Advocates of a continuing U.S. role in efforts to counter the LRA nevertheless warn that the group continues to pose a threat and could rebound, reporting that attacks and abductions attributed to the group increased in 2014, a trend that has continued into 2015, reversing a decline in 2011-2013. In 2005, following a request by the Ugandan government, the International Criminal Court (ICC) unsealed warrants for five LRA commanders, including Kony. A fourth, Dominic Ongwen, surrendered to U.S. forces in CAR in January 2015 and has been delivered to the ICC at The Hague, where he faces seven counts of war crimes and crimes against humanity. U.S. involvement in counter-LRA efforts is largely premised on the group's infliction of widespread human suffering. In March 2014, the President notified Congress, "consistent with the War Powers Act," that he was deploying U.S. military aircraft to assist with counter-LRA operations, and that this would involve the deployment of additional military personnel to Uganda and LRA-affected countries to "principally operate and maintain U.S. aircraft to provide air mobility support to foreign partner forces." Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2012 ( P.L. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 ( P.L. 113-291 , January 3, 2014). Expresses that the U.S. advise and assist operation in support of regional counter-LRA operations "has made significant progress in achieving its objectives" and that "the Department of Defense should continue its support of Operation Observant Compass, particularly through the provision of key enablers, such as mobility assets and targeted intelligence collection and analytical support, to enable regional partners to effectively conduct operations against Joseph Kony and the Lord's Resistance Army," Also requires that Operation Observant Compass be "integrated into a comprehensive strategy to support the security and stability in the region." 113-235 , December 16, 2014). The Administration's Strategy document does not define the relative importance of the LRA issue compared to other U.S. policy initiatives and priorities, although it does note that "the extent to which the United States is able to engage in the full range of objectives described in the strategy is dependent on the availability of resources." Congress has—as described above (" Legislation ")—authorized and/or appropriated funds for certain aspects of the U.S. response to the LRA, while other aspects have been funded through regional and country-specific programs or through the Administration's reallocation of funds initially appropriated for other purposes, in consultation with Congress. Some might question whether ongoing U.S. support to the Ugandan military is having unintended consequences for U.S. policy and the region, for example in relation to Uganda's military role in the internal conflict in South Sudan. However, despite efforts by affected countries and multilateral entities to foster regional cooperation, African states have not fulfilled their troop commitments to the AU Regional Task force in full, and the coordination of counter-LRA efforts remains a thorny diplomatic issue. President Obama has waived in part the application of the Child Soldiers Protection Act of 2008 ( P.L. 110-457 ; CSPA) to facilitate the participation of DRC and South Sudanese troops in counter-LRA operations. 111-172 and the LRA Strategy provide a possible model for responding to other groups responsible for mass atrocities?
The Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), led by Joseph Kony, is a small, dispersed armed group active in remote areas of Central Africa. The LRA's infliction of widespread human suffering and its potential threat to regional stability have drawn significant attention in recent years, including in Congress. Campaigns by U.S.-based advocacy groups have contributed to policymakers' interest.
Since 2008, the United States has provided support to Ugandan-led military operations to capture or kill LRA commanders, which since 2012 have been integrated into an African Union (AU) "Regional Task Force" against the LRA. The Obama Administration expanded U.S. support for these operations in 2011 by deploying U.S. military advisors to the field. In 2014, the Administration notified Congress of the deployment of U.S. military aircraft and more personnel to provide episodic "enhanced air mobility support" to African forces. The United States has also provided humanitarian aid, pursued regional diplomacy, helped to fund "early-warning" systems, and supported multilateral programs to demobilize and reintegrate ex-LRA combatants. The Administration has referred to these efforts as part of its broader commitment to preventing and mitigating mass atrocities. Growing U.S. involvement may also be viewed in the context of Uganda's role as a key U.S. security partner in East and Central Africa. U.S. security assistance to Uganda, including for counter-LRA efforts, has continued despite U.S. officials' criticism of Ugandan efforts to enact laws that would make homosexuality punishable by life in prison.
The Administration's current strategy toward the LRA was formulated in response to the Lord's Resistance Army Disarmament and Northern Uganda Recovery Act (P.L. 111-172), enacted by Congress in 2010. Congress has since supported the Administration's approach through legislation providing the executive branch with new funding and authorities to counter the LRA. Since the U.S. military advisors first deployed in 2011, LRA attacks have significantly decreased, as have population displacements related to LRA activity. Several senior LRA figures have been captured or killed by U.S.-supported Ugandan troops. Dominic Ongwen, one of five LRA commanders against whom the International Criminal Court (ICC) issued arrest warrants in 2005, surrendered in January 2015 and was transferred to The Hague, where his trial is expected to begin in 2016. Kony, however, appears to remain at large, and the LRA has demonstrated a high degree of resilience. The LRA has been increasingly linked to poaching and illicit wildlife trafficking in recent years, and some observers fear that the group is exploiting insecurity in the region, including in the Central African Republic, to rebound.
The U.S. approach to the LRA raises a number of policy issues, some of which have implications far beyond Central Africa. Some observers view the U.S. response to the LRA as a possible model for addressing mass atrocities, and decisions on this issue could potentially be viewed as a precedent for U.S. responses to similar situations in the future. At the same time, a key question for some is whether the response is commensurate with the degree to which the LRA impacts U.S. national interests. Other potential issues for Congress include funding levels for counter-LRA efforts; the prospects and benchmarks for "success" and the withdrawal of U.S. forces; and the relative priority of counter-LRA activities compared to other foreign policy and budgetary goals. Possible policy challenges include regional militaries' capacity and will to conduct U.S.-supported operations and these militaries' relative level of respect for human rights. President Obama has waived in part the application of the Child Soldiers Protection Act of 2008 (P.L. 110-457) to facilitate the participation of troops from the Democratic Republic of Congo and South Sudan in counter-LRA operations. The FY2015 Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 113-235) and National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 113-291), and other recent authorization and appropriations measures, include relevant provisions. See also CRS Report R43377, Crisis in the Central African Republic.