The Council Carries Out Its Responsibilities in a Number of Ways but Faces Challenges

The Council carries out its statutory and regulatory responsibilities in a  number of ways, including by developing requirements documents on the  size and composition of the nuclear weapons stockpile, providing  oversight of nuclear weapons refurbishment programs, and coordinating  budget matters to support the stockpile. The  National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 gave the Council  several new budget-related responsibilities, such as certifying to  Congress whether the annual budget request for NNSA meets stockpile  program requirements, and approving programming and budget matters  pertaining to nuclear weapons programs between DOD and DOE. Specifically, the Council faces challenges in (1) carrying out several new  budget-related responsibilities; (2) planning and providing oversight for  more nuclear weapon refurbishment programs than it has in the past; and  (3) adjusting program priorities in response to budget pressures. Also, some NNSA  nuclear weapon programs have experienced delays and cost growth  during the past 5 years. However, we  identified two areas where the Council’s actions are partially but not fully  consistent with key practices or related key considerations for  implementing collaborative mechanisms: (1) having up-to-date, written  agreements and guidance that establishes compatible policies,  procedures, and other means to operate across agency boundaries and  defines roles and responsibilities and (2) regularly including all relevant  participants. DOD and DOE signed a 1997  memorandum of agreement to guide the Council’s efforts. According to DOD and NNSA officials, the Council has not updated the  1997 memorandum of agreement or developed other formal guidance to  reflect the processes it will use to carry out its responsibilities, because  some officials do not believe it is necessary and want to preserve the  Council’s flexibility in how it carries out its responsibilities by minimizing  written guidance. Without an updated memorandum of  agreement that describes the roles, responsibilities, structure, and  functions of the Council’s two support committees, how the Council and  these groups are to work together, and the general processes and time  frames the Council and its support committees should follow to carry out  statutory responsibilities, it may be difficult for the Council to provide  greater clarity to its members and the support committees on how to  conduct their work—particularly for recently-added responsibilities such  as certifying the annual budget request for NNSA. The Council Does Not Fully Follow Collaboration Practice of Routinely Including All Relevant Participants

A key consideration when implementing collaborative mechanisms is  whether all relevant participants have been included. However,  they said that representatives from NNSA’s budget and program  evaluation offices are invited at the discretion of NNSA members and  generally do not attend Standing and Safety Committee and Action  Officers Group meetings. Without requiring the consistent and routine  participation of budget and program evaluation officials to provide their  expertise, the attendance of these officials is left to the discretion of the  inviting members, and the Council’s support committees may be limited in  their ability to deal with budget and cost questions as they arise,  particularly when the issues on the agenda do not appear to be directly  budget-related. Also, the Council may be limited in its ability to carry out  its new budget-related responsibilities if DOD and NNSA budget and  program evaluation officials are not required to attend all meetings of the  Standing and Safety Committee and the Action Officers Group. Conclusions

The Council’s important role as the focal point for interagency activities is  becoming more challenging as the nuclear weapons stockpile, delivery  systems, and infrastructure all age, while budgets remain constrained. The Council has taken steps to coordinate programs across DOD and  DOE, but its actions are not fully consistent with some key practices and  considerations for interagency collaboration. Recommendations for Executive Action

To enhance collaboration between DOD and NNSA, we recommend that  the Secretaries of Defense and Energy update the 1997 memorandum of  agreement for the Council, and, as part of this update, take the following  two actions: describe the roles, responsibilities, structure, and functions of the  Council’s two support committees, how the Council and these groups  are to work together, and the general processes and time frames the  Council and its support committees should follow to carry out statutory  responsibilities and  include a requirement that budget and program evaluation officials  from both DOD and NNSA will consistently and routinely attend all  meetings of the Council’s two support committees. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

Our review assessed: (1) how the Nuclear Weapons Council (Council)  carries out its statutory and regulatory responsibilities and any challenges  it faces in doing so and (2) the extent to which the Council’s actions are  consistent with key practices for interagency collaboration. To address  these objectives, we reviewed relevant laws, agreements, and guidance  and interviewed officials from the Council; the Department of Defense  (DOD); the Department of Energy (DOE), including the National Nuclear  Security Administration (NNSA); and the Office of Management and  Budget. To evaluate the extent to which the Council’s actions are consistent with  key practices for interagency collaboration, we reviewed documents that  described Council processes, including the 1997 memorandum of  agreement between DOD and DOE; DOD’s unofficial Nuclear Matters  Handbook; and the Council’s Procedural Guideline for the Phase 6.X  Process and interviewed DOD and NNSA officials about the Council’s  structure and processes.
Why GAO Did This Study

DOD and DOE's NNSA are jointly responsible for managing aspects of the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile. The Council, established by Congress in 1986, includes five senior officials from both departments; it facilitates coordination between DOD and NNSA and establishes program priorities. DOD and NNSA are working to modernize the nuclear enterprise, including delivery systems and nuclear weapons that are aging and being used longer than originally intended. DOD and NNSA project this work will cost about $332 billion through 2025.
House Report 113-446 included a provision for GAO to review the Council's role, responsibilities, and effectiveness. This report addresses: (1) how the Council carries out its statutory and regulatory responsibilities and any challenges it faces in doing so and (2) the extent to which the Council's actions are consistent with key practices for interagency collaboration. GAO reviewed laws, agreements, and Council documents such as reports and compared Council actions with key practices and considerations for interagency collaboration that GAO identified in 2005 and 2012.

What GAO Found

The Nuclear Weapons Council (Council)—which serves as the focal point of Department of Defense (DOD) and National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) interagency activities to maintain the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile—carries out its statutory and regulatory responsibilities in a number of ways, but faces challenges in doing so. The Council's actions to carry out its responsibilities include documenting requirements for the size and composition of the nuclear weapons stockpile and setting stockpile priorities. The Council also provides oversight of refurbishment programs through periodic program reviews and coordinates budget matters between DOD and NNSA to support the stockpile. However, the Council faces several challenges in carrying out its responsibilities. The Council's challenges include carrying out several new budget-related responsibilities, such as certifying to Congress whether the annual budget request for NNSA meets stockpile requirements; providing oversight for two more refurbishment programs than it has previously; and adjusting program priorities in response to budget pressures, such as delays and cost growth experienced by some NNSA nuclear weapons programs.
The Council's actions to coordinate DOD's and NNSA's nuclear weapons stockpile responsibilities are generally consistent with most key practices for interagency collaboration, but the Council's actions are not fully consistent with those practices and related key considerations in two areas. First, key practices for interagency collaboration call for agencies to define their respective roles, responsibilities, and steps for decision making and to have a current written agreement on how they will collaborate. The Council does not have an up-to-date agreement that reflects the processes it uses to carry out its responsibilities. The 1997 memorandum of agreement between DOD and the Department of Energy (DOE) that is to guide the Council's efforts has not been updated, although the Council's responsibilities were expanded in 2013, and it does not define the roles, responsibilities, structure, and functions of the two support committees that conduct the Council's day-to-day operations. Council officials said they have not updated the agreement because they do not believe it is necessary and that doing so could restrict their flexibility by being too prescriptive. However, other officials said there has been confusion and disagreement over some Council processes such as certifying the budget request for NNSA and that updating the memorandum of agreement might improve the clarity and consistency of the Council's processes. Without an updated memorandum of agreement that describes Council processes, it may be difficult for the Council to provide greater clarity to support committee members on how their work is to be conducted. Second, a key consideration when implementing collaborative mechanisms is whether all relevant participants have been included in the effort. However, DOD and NNSA budget and program evaluation officials are not required to attend Council support committee meetings. DOD budget and program evaluation officials are invited and generally attend, but NNSA budget and program evaluation officials generally do not attend because they are invited at the discretion of NNSA support committee members. Without a requirement that both DOD and NNSA budget and program evaluation officials consistently attend all support committee meetings, the Council may be limited in its ability to manage and respond to unanticipated budget questions as they arise at meetings.

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that DOD and DOE update the Council's 1997 memorandum of agreement to (1) describe Council processes and its two support committees' roles, responsibilities, structure, and functions and (2) require that DOD and NNSA budget and program evaluation officials attend all support committee meetings. DOD and NNSA generally agreed with GAO's recommendations.