JIEDDO and DOD Have Taken Steps to Improve the Management of Counter-IED Efforts

Since its creation, JIEDDO has taken several steps to improve its  management and operation of counter-IED efforts in response to our past  work as well as to address congressional concerns. For example, in our  ongoing work, we have noted that JIEDDO has been improving its  strategic planning. In  response, JIEDDO, in November 2007, issued a strategic plan that  provided an overarching framework for departmentwide counter-IED  efforts. Additionally, as we note in our report being issued today, JIEDDO and the  services have taken some steps to improve visibility over their counter- IED efforts. Several Challenges Affect DOD’s Ability to Oversee the Management of JIEDDO

While JIEDDO has taken some steps toward improving its management of  counter-IED efforts, several significant challenges remain that affect  DOD’s ability to oversee JIEDDO. Some of these challenges are identified  in the report we are issuing today and include a lack of full visibility by  JIEDDO and the services over counter-IED initiatives throughout DOD,  difficulties coordinating the transition of funding responsibility for joint  IED defeat initiatives to the military services once counter-IED solutions  have been developed, and a lack of clear criteria for defining what  counter-IED training initiatives it will fund. Additionally, our ongoing work  has identified other challenges including a lack of a means to gauge the  effectiveness of its counter-IED efforts, a lack of consistent application of  its counter-IED initiative acquisition process, and a lack of adequate  internal controls required to provide DOD assurance that it is achieving its  objectives. Although JIEDDO and  various service organizations are developing and maintaining their own  counter-IED initiative databases, JIEDDO and the services lack a  comprehensive database of all existing counter-IED initiatives, which  limits their visibility over counter-IED efforts across the department. JIEDDO is required to lead, advocate, and coordinate all DOD actions to  defeat IEDs. Without incorporating service and other DOD  components’ counter-IED initiatives, JIEDDO’s efforts to develop a  counter-IED initiative database will not capture all efforts to defeat IEDs  throughout DOD. JIEDDO Faces Difficulties Coordinating the Transition of Funding Responsibility for Joint IED Defeat Initiatives to the Military Services

Although JIEDDO has recently taken several steps to improve its process  to transition IED defeat initiatives to the military services following the  development of new capabilities, JIEDDO still faces difficulties in this  area. JIEDDO’s transitions of initiatives to the services are hindered by  funding gaps between JIEDDO’s transition timeline and DOD’s budget  cycle as well as by instances when service requirements are not fully  considered during JIEDDO’s acquisition process. In  response to these recommendations, DOD concurred with our  recommendation to develop a comprehensive plan and noted steps to be  taken to address this issue. As a  result, JIEDDO has funded training initiatives that may have primary uses  other than defeating IEDs, such as role players and simulated villages to  replicate Iraqi conditions at various service combat training centers. Our ongoing work has  identified three areas in which the data JIEDDO uses to measure  effectiveness and progress is unreliable or is inconsistently collected. However, the data collected contradicted the  intended result because the number of IED incidents increased in areas  where the initiative was implemented. We expect to provide  further information and recommendations, if appropriate, on JIEDDO’s  efforts to gauge the effectiveness of its counter-IED efforts—including  issues involving data collection and reliability—in the report we will be  issuing in early 2010. OMB defines a material weakness as a  deficiency or combination of deficiencies that could adversely affect the  organization’s ability to meet its objectives and that the agency head  determines to be significant enough to be reported outside the agency. For  example, in our ongoing work we have identified, and JIEDDO officials  have confirmed, that JIEDDO’s internal controls system has not: (1)  provided for the identification and analysis of the risks JIEDDO faces in  achieving its objectives from both external and internal sources; and (2)  assessed its performance over time and ensured that the findings of audits  and other reviews have been promptly resolved.
Why GAO Did This Study

Improvised explosive devices (IED) are the number-one threat to troops in Iraq and Afghanistan, accounting for almost 40 percent of the attacks on coalition forces in Iraq. Although insurgents' use of IEDs in Iraq has begun to decline, in Afghanistan the number of IED incidents has significantly increased. The Joint IED Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) was created to lead, advocate, and coordinate all DOD efforts to defeat IEDs. Its primary role is to provide funding to the military services and DOD agencies to rapidly develop and field counter-IED solutions. Through fiscal year 2009, Congress has appropriated over $16 billion to JIEDDO. In addition, other DOD components, including the military services, have devoted at least $1.5 billion to the counter-IED effort--which does not include $22.7 billion for Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles. This testimony is based on a report that GAO is issuing today as well as preliminary observations from ongoing work that GAO plans to report in early 2010. In the report being issued today, GAO is recommending that JIEDDO (1) improve its visibility of counter-IED efforts across DOD, (2) develop a complete plan to guide the transition of initiatives, and (3) define criteria for its training initiatives to help guide its funding decisions. DOD generally concurred with GAO's recommendations and noted actions to be taken.

What GAO Found

Since its creation, JIEDDO has taken several steps to improve its management of counter-IED efforts. For instance, GAO's ongoing work has found that JIEDDO has been improving the management of its efforts to defeat IEDs, including developing and implementing a strategic plan that provides an overarching framework for departmentwide efforts to defeat IEDs, as well as a JIEDDO-specific strategic plan. Also, as noted in the report GAO is issuing today, JIEDDO and the services have taken steps to improve visibility over their counter-IED efforts, and JIEDDO has taken several steps to support the ability of the services and defense agencies to program and fund counter-IED initiatives. However, several significant challenges remain that affect DOD's ability to oversee JIEDDO. Some of these challenges are identified in GAO's report being released today along with recommendations to address them. For example, one challenge is a lack of full visibility by JIEDDO and the services over counter-IED initiatives throughout DOD. Although JIEDDO and various service organizations are developing and maintaining their own counter-IED initiative databases, JIEDDO and the services lack a comprehensive database of all existing counter-IED initiatives, which limits their visibility over counter-IED efforts across the department. In addition, JIEDDO faces difficulties coordinating the transition of funding responsibility for joint counter-IED initiatives to the services, due to gaps between JIEDDO's transition timeline and DOD's base budget cycle. JIEDDO's initiative transitions also are hindered when service requirements are not fully considered during JIEDDO's acquisition process. JIEDDO also lacks clear criteria for defining what counter-IED training initiatives it will fund and, as a result, has funded training activities that may have primary uses other than defeating IEDs. Additionally, GAO's ongoing work has identified other oversight challenges. For example, JIEDDO lacks a means as well as reliable data to gauge the effectiveness of its counter-IED efforts. GAO's work has identified several areas in which data on the effectiveness and progress of IED-defeat initiatives are unreliable or inconsistently collected. In some cases, data are not collected in-theater because the initiatives may not be designed with adequate data-collection procedures. Another challenge facing JIEDDO is its inconsistent application of its counter-IED initiative acquisition process, allowing initiatives to bypass some or all of the process's key review and approval steps. Further, JIEDDO lacks adequate internal controls to ensure DOD that it is achieving its objectives. For example, in July 2009, JIEDDO reported that its internal controls system had a combination of deficiencies that constituted a material weakness. Such a weakness could adversely affect JIEDDO's ability to meet its objectives. Finally, JIEDDO has not developed a process for identification and analysis of the risks it faces in achieving its objectives from both external and internal sources, and it has not assessed its performance over time or ensured that the findings of audits and other reviews have been promptly resolved. As GAO completes its ongoing work it expects to issue a report with recommendations to address these issues.