While CBP Has Enhanced Its Ability to Target Containers Overseas, Limitations Remain

We identified both positive and negative factors that affect CBP’s ability to  target shipments at overseas seaports. According to CBP officials, the CSI  program has produced factors that contribute to CBP’s ability to target  shipments at overseas seaports, including improved information sharing  between the CSI teams and host government officials regarding U.S.- bound shipments and a heightened level of bilateral cooperation on and  international awareness of the need for securing the global shipping  system. Although CBP’s goal  is to target all U.S.-bound containers at CSI ports before they depart for  the United States, it has not been able to place enough staff at some CSI  ports to do so. CBP has been unable to staff the CSI teams at the levels called for in the  CSI staffing model because of diplomatic and practical considerations. It  does not consider whether some of the targeting functions could be  performed in the United States. However,  considering that the inspection equipment used at CSI ports varies in  detection capability and that there are no minimum requirements for the  detection capability of equipment used for CSI, CBP has no absolute  assurance that inspections conducted under CSI are effective at detecting  and identifying WMD. These containers were inspected using  nonintrusive inspections and physical examinations. In addition, technologies to detect other WMD have  limitations. CBP Has Made Progress Developing a Strategic Plan and Performance Measures for CSI, but Further Refinements Are Needed

Although CBP has made some improvements in the management of CSI,  we found that further refinements to the bureau’s management tools are  needed to help achieve program goals. In July 2003, we recommended that  CBP develop a strategic plan and performance measures, including  outcome-oriented measures, for CSI. In February 2004, CBP finalized a  strategic plan for CSI containing three of the six key elements identified by  the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 (GPRA) for an  agency strategic plan: a mission statement, objectives, and implementation  strategies. CBP has also made progress in the  development of outcome-oriented performance measures for some  objectives, particularly for the objective of increasing information sharing  and collaboration among CSI and host country personnel. In February 2005, CBP officials told us that CBP is revising the CSI  strategic plan to address the elements we raise in this report. While it  appears that the bureau’s initial efforts in this area meet the intent of our  prior recommendation to develop a strategic plan for CSI, we cannot  determine the effectiveness of further revisions to the plan without first  reviewing and evaluating them. We will continue to monitor CBP’s efforts  in this area. Proxy measures are used to assess the effectiveness of program  functions, such as the targeting and inspection processes of CSI, rather  than directly assess the effectiveness of the program. Recommendations for Executive Action

To help ensure that the objectives of CSI are achieved, we recommend  that the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security direct the  Commissioner of U.S. Customs and Border Protection take the following  three actions:  revise the CSI staffing model to consider (1) what functions need to be  performed at CSI ports and what functions can be performed in the  United States, (2) the optimum levels of staff needed at CSI ports to  maximize the benefits of targeting and inspection activities in  conjunction with host nation customs officials, and (3) the cost of  locating targeters overseas at CSI ports instead of in the United States;    establish minimum technical requirements for the capabilities of  nonintrusive inspection equipment at CSI ports, to include imaging and  radiation detection devices, that help ensure that all equipment used  can detect WMD, while considering the need not to endorse certain  companies and sovereignty issues with participating countries;    develop performance measures that include outcome-based measures  and performance targets (or proxies as appropriate) to track the  program’s progress in meeting all of its objectives. Under CSI, to what extent have high-risk containers been inspected  overseas prior to their arrival at U.S. destinations?
Why GAO Did This Study

In January 2002, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) initiated the Container Security Initiative (CSI) to address the threat that terrorists might use maritime cargo containers to ship weapons of mass destruction. Under CSI, CBP is to target and inspect high-risk cargo shipments at foreign seaports before they leave for destinations in the United States. In July 2003, GAO reported that CSI had management challenges that limited its effectiveness. Given these challenges and in light of plans to expand the program, GAO examined selected aspects of the program's operation, including the (1) factors that affect CBP's ability to target shipments at foreign seaports, (2) extent to which high-risk containers have actually been inspected overseas, and (3) extent to which CBP formulated and documented strategies for achieving the program's goals.

What GAO Found

Some of the positive factors that have affected CBP's ability to target shipments overseas are improved information sharing between U.S. and foreign customs staff and a heightened level of bilateral cooperation and international awareness of the need to secure the whole global shipping system. Although the program aims to target all U.S.-bound shipments from CSI ports, it has been unable to do so because of staffing imbalances. CBP has developed a staffing model to determine staffing needs but has been unable to fully staff some ports because of diplomatic considerations (e.g., the need for host government permission) and practical considerations (e.g., workspace constraints). As a result, 35 percent of these shipments were not targeted and were therefore not subject to inspection overseas. In addition, the staffing model's reliance on placing staff at CSI ports rather than considering whether some of the targeting functions could be performed in the United States limits the program's operational efficiency and effectiveness. CBP has not established minimum technical requirements for the detection capability of nonintrusive inspection and radiation detection equipment used as part of CSI. Ports participating in CSI use various types of nonintrusive inspection equipment to inspect containers, and the detection and identification capabilities of such equipment can vary. In addition, technologies to detect other weapons of mass destruction have limitations. Given these conditions, CBP has limited assurance that inspections conducted under CSI are effective at detecting and identifying terrorist weapons of mass destruction. A lthough CBP has made some improvements in the management of CSI, we found that further refinements to the bureau's management tools are needed to help achieve program objectives. In July 2003, we recommended that CBP develop a strategic plan and performance measures, including outcome-oriented measures, for CSI. CBP developed a strategic plan for CSI in February 2004 that contains three of the six key elements required for agency strategic plans, and CBP officials told us they continue to develop the other three elements. While it appears that the bureau's efforts in this area meet the intent of our prior recommendation to develop a strategic plan for CSI, we will continue to monitor progress in this area. CBP has also made progress in the development of outcome-oriented performance measures, particularly for the program objective of increasing information sharing and collaboration among CSI and host country personnel. However, CBP continues to face challenges in developing performance measures to assess the effectiveness of CSI targeting and inspection activities. Therefore, it is difficult to assess progress made in CSI operations over time, and it is difficult to compare CSI operations across ports.