Development is in its final stages, and low rate initial production has  begun. Since fiscal year 1997, funds have been appropriated to acquire  production aircraft, and the F/A-22 acquisition plan calls for steadily  increasing annual production rates. The aircraft’s development problems and schedule delays have caused  congressional concerns, particularly in light of DOD’s planned increase in  production rates. The National Defense Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year  2003 prohibited the obligation of funds for the acquisition of more than  16 production aircraft in fiscal year 2003, until the Under Secretary of  Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics submits the following  to the congressional defense committees: (1) a formal risk assessment that  identifies and characterizes the potential cost, technical, schedule, or  other significant risks resulting from increasing the F/A-22 production  quantities prior to the Dedicated Initial Operational Test and Evaluation  (DIOT&E) of the aircraft and (2) either a certification that increasing the  F/A-22 production quantity for fiscal year 2003 beyond 16 aircraft involves  lower risk and lower total program cost than staying at that quantity or  implementing a revised production plan, funding, and test schedule. F/A-22 Technical Problems Continue to Affect Performance

The F/A-22 developmental program did not meet key performance goals  established for fiscal year 2002 and continues to confront numerous  technical challenges. Major technical problems include instability of the  avionics software, violent movement, or “buffeting,” of vertical fins,  overheating in portions of the aircraft, weakening of materials in the  horizontal tail, and the inability to meet airlift support and maintenance  requirements. The Air Force implemented these recommendations. However, Air Force officials stated that they do not yet  understand the problems associated with the instability of the avionics  software well enough to predict when they will be able to resolve  this problem. Consequently, the Air Force extended flight test schedules and  reduced the number of flight tests. Based on F/A-22 flight test accomplishment data and current flight test  plans, we project that the start of operational testing might be delayed  until January 2004. As a result, operational testing could be delayed by  several months beyond the current planned date of August 2003. In December 2002, in response to the increase in development costs, the  Under Secretary of Defense, Comptroller, approved the restructuring of  the F/A-22 program. This is a very risky strategy, because, as we have previously reported,  the Air Force may encounter higher production costs as a result of  acquiring significant quantities of aircraft before adequate testing. Figure 3 shows the Air Force’s acquisition plan. The performance capabilities of the F/A-22 and its schedule  will remain uncertain until technical problems have been addressed,  including testing of modifications or fixes necessary to potentially  alleviate these problems. To determine whether the program is likely to meet the cost goal, we  examined (1) the extent to which the development program is likely to be  completed within the current cost estimate, (2) the Air Force’s plans to  fund the program for fiscal year 2003, and (3) the program’s funding plan  compared to the current cost estimate. F-22 Aircraft: Progress of the Engineering and Manufacturing  Development Program. Tactical Aircraft: F-15 Replacement Issues.
Why GAO Did This Study

The Air Force is developing the F/A-22 aircraft to fly at higher speeds for longer distances, be less detectable, and improve the pilot's awareness of the surrounding situation. The F/A-22 will replace the Air Force's existing fleet of F-15 aircraft. Over the past several years the program has experienced significant cost overruns and schedule delays. Congress mandated that GAO assess the development program and determine whether the Air Force is meeting key performance, schedule, and cost goals. GAO also assessed the implications of the progress of the development program on production.

What GAO Found

The F/A-22 development program did not meet key performance, schedule, and cost goals in fiscal year 2002, and delays in the flight test program have led to an increase in the development cost estimate of $876 million. In response to this increase, DOD restructured the development program and reduced production aircraft by 27. If additional delays occur, further changes may be required. The program also continues to address technical problems that have limited the performance of test aircraft, including violent movement or "buffeting" of the vertical fins, overheating in portions of the aircraft, weakening of materials in the horizontal tail, and instability of avionics software. Air Force officials cannot predict when they will resolve these problems. These technical problems, along with the late delivery of aircraft to the flight test center, have delayed the development program. Based on F/A-22 flight test accomplishment data and current flight test plans, we believe that operational testing will likely be delayed several months beyond the planned August 2003 start date. The F/A-22 program is in its final stages of development, and low-rate initial production has begun. Since fiscal year 1997, funds have been appropriated to acquire production aircraft, and the F/A-22 acquisition plan calls for steadily increasing annual production rates. However, GAO considers the Air Force's acquisition strategy at high risk for increases in production costs. In past reports, GAO has reported that acquiring aircraft while significant technical challenges remain does not allow for adequate testing of the aircraft. The uncertainties regarding performance capabilities of the F/A-22 aircraft and its development schedule will persist until technical problems have been addressed, including testing of modifications or fixes necessary to potentially alleviate these problems. In light of those uncertainties, steadily increasing annual production rates could result in the Air Force having to modify a larger quantity of aircraft after they are built.