In 1985, following a report from the National Academy of Sciences asserting that openness in science leads to stronger long-term security, President Reagan issued National Security Decision Directive 189 (NSDD-189), reiterating that fundamental research results were to be controlled only through classification. Historically, the areas where the balance between scientific openness and national security required consideration have been centered in the mathematical and physical sciences and their applications, such as aerospace engineering, advanced computer technology, and cryptography. Whether the current method of using classification to limit the dissemination of fundamental research results is the best or most effective method of maintaining national security is an open question. It is unclear whether classification will be effective when applied to research areas that have not historically been classified, and whether a system of classified research will be embraced by scientists working in these areas. Some scientific professional societies have suggested that self-regulation, either by scientists themselves or through the editors of scientific journals, would be an appropriate mechanism for limiting the publication of research results that might aid terrorist groups. A fundamental trade-off between scientific progress and security concerns is the crux of the policy debate. This consensus statement formed the starting point for research rules developed by the National Institutes of Health Recombinant DNA Advisory Committee, which was formed to oversee such research. In the wake of the terrorist attacks of September 2001, then-Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Condoleezza Rice reaffirmed this position in a letter to the Center for Strategic and International Studies, by stating,
...this Administration will review and update as appropriate the export control policies that affect basic research in the United States. Mechanisms of Governmental Control

Current mechanisms for federal agencies to control the publication of federally funded extramural research results include classification, export and arms trafficking regulations, and specifications in federal contracts, such as prepublication review. Classification

Generally, classification is to be used when it is necessary to control scientific information. The Department of State implements the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), which regulate the export of items, technology, and technological information maintained on the Munitions Control List. Both EAR and ITAR possess exemptions for "fundamental research." There have been cases where export control of information and scientific research have coincided. Response to this proposal has been mixed. Policy Options

The balance between publication of federally funded research results and protecting national security raises numerous questions, such as: Should there be regulation of the publication of federally-funded research results? How might the federal government encourage scientists to develop guidelines for self-regulation? They assert that, in line with NSDD-189, information which is not classified should be freely publishable and distributable. These proponents claim that the continued publication of such information will harm national security, and that changes should be made so that such federally funded research results can be classified before they are distributed. That said, implementation of export control regulations has posed some challenges to researchers. Another concern is the effectiveness of such a federally based review. Additional oversight may focus on the activities underway in the Department of Health and Human Services, where the National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity has been established.
The federal government has historically supported the open publication of federally funded research results. In cases where such results presented a challenge to national security concerns, several mechanisms have been employed. For fundamental research results, the federal policy has been to use classification to limit dissemination. For advanced technology and technological information, a combination of classification and export and arms trafficking regulation has been used to inhibit its spread. The terrorist attacks of 2001 increased scrutiny of nonconventional weapons, including weapons of mass destruction, and publication of some research results have increased concerns over whether publication of federally funded extramural research results could threaten national security.
The current federal policy, as described in National Security Decision Directive 189, is that fundamental research should remain unrestricted and that in the rare case where it is necessary to restrict such information, classification is the appropriate mechanism. Other mechanisms restrict international information flow, such as Export Administration Regulations (EAR) and International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) that control export of items and technical information on specific lists. Both EAR and ITAR do not apply to sharing fundamental research results, so long as they are not subject to any governmental prepublication review.
Historically, the areas where export regulation and classification have predominantly occurred have been in mathematical, engineering, and physical sciences. Other contentious research areas, such as genetic engineering and manipulation, have been overseen through scientists' self-regulation and monitoring. The 1975 Asilomar conference produced a consensus statement on recombinant DNA research that formed the basis for the National Institutes of Health Recombinant DNA Advisory Committee. Recent research publications that have raised national security concerns have fallen outside of the areas traditionally regulated through classification and export control, and it is unclear how effective these mechanisms will be. The National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity was established to aid in determining whether proposed federally funded research presents a biosecurity threat.
Stakeholders do not agree on the best method of balancing scientific publishing and national security. Some believe that the current method of selective classification of research results is the most appropriate. They assert that imposing new restrictions will only hurt scientific progress, and that the usefulness of research results to terrorist groups is limited. Others believe that self-regulation by scientists, using an "Asilomar-like" process to develop a consensus statement, is a better approach. They believe that, through inclusion of scientists, policymakers, and security personnel in the development phase, a process acceptable to all will be found. Relying on publishers to scrutinize articles for information which might potentially have security ramifications is third option. Finally, mandatory review by federal funding agencies, either before funding or publication, is seen as a potential federally based alternative. This report will not be updated.