C-130 avionics modernization quantities were also cut  more than half and the schedule was delayed due to cost increases. Additional costs and changes in the force structure for the C-5 and C-17  are possible pending decisions on future modifications and retirements of  older C-5s. Strategic Airlift Gap Has Been Addressed, but a Potential Tactical Airlift Gap for Moving Medium Weight Equipment and Other Questions Have Not Been Resolved

Additional funds provided by Congress for C-17 procurement more than  offset the strategic airlift gaps associated with reduced C-5 modernization  plans. However, there is a potential future gap in tactical airlift capabilities  for transporting medium weight Army equipment that cannot fit on C-130  aircraft. The JFTL is envisioned to eventually  replace the C-130H and perform this and other roles, but will not be  available for 15 years or more under the current acquisition strategy. While  the various mobility studies acknowledge the C-17s’ significant dual role,  they did not comprehensively evaluate an expanded future use of the C-17  for the transport of medium weight equipment and how this could affect  the force structure, the C-17s’ service life, and when to shut down the C-17  production line. Two studies reached  somewhat different conclusions about the cost effectiveness of using C- 130Js and C-27Js for this mission. DOD’s recently established  portfolio management structure is supposed to provide a useful forum to  address the broad range of airlift investment decisions. However, efforts  so far have been primarily focused on new programs rather than  addressing gaps and redundancies across the current portfolio, as well as  making other airlift decisions, such as when and how many C-5s to retire  or the appropriate mix of C-130s and C-27Js needed to perform Army  missions. Mix of C-130s and C-27Js Needed to Support Army Missions Has Not Been Determined

Questions remain about the number of C-130s and C-27Js needed to  support Army direct support missions. Officials stated that to date, the logistics portfolio managers have not  provided input to recent or upcoming airlift decisions related to the  appropriate mix of strategic and tactical airlifters, changes in  modernization programs, C-5 retirements, C-17 production shutdown, and  changes in the Air Force’s roles and missions for airlift. This would also include  identifying alternatives for using existing common user aircraft to meet  service-specific missions and considering new roles and missions for the  Air Force;  the Office of the Secretary of Defense (Cost Assessment and Program  Evaluation) and Commander, U.S. Transportation Command to develop a  specific airlift plan that would identify when C-5s will be retired and  identify the total number of additional C-17s, if any, that would be needed  to replace C-5s or perform tactical heavy lift missions until the time the  JFTL is fielded;  the Commander, Air Mobility Command, to determine the appropriate mix  of C-27Js and C-130s that are needed to meet Army time-sensitive, mission- critical requirements and common user pool requirements; the Air Force and Army to reach agreement on plans detailing how Army  time-sensitive, mission-critical requirements will be addressed and  prioritized against other Air Force priorities; and the joint Air Force and Army program office to develop a plan to follow an  evolutionary approach for developing the JFTL based on DOD acquisition  policy that includes selecting mature technologies, normally developing  increments in less than 5 years, and fully funding each increment. In 2007, over 20 percent of the C-17 missions were for tactical  missions and this could grow given that it is the only aircraft that is  capable of moving certain types of equipment within a theater of  operations that are too large or bulky for the C-130. DOD initially expected to spend about $12 billion on the C-5 AMP and  RERP efforts. C-130s also have the  capability to augment strategic airlift forces, as well as support  humanitarian, peacekeeping, and disaster relief operations. As part of this restructuring, program quantities were reduced by  about 50 percent, from 78 to 38 aircraft. With DOD’s decision to procure fewer aircraft, it is  unclear whether Alenia will proceed with construction of the facility. GAO Observations

A potential capability gap exists in the department’s ability to airlift  medium-weight vehicles to access-challenged areas within a theater of  operations using dedicated tactical airlifters. C-17 aircraft have been  employed to transport medium weight vehicles in theater, but cannot  access austere, short, or unimproved landing areas.
Why GAO Did This Study

Department of Defense (DOD) used nearly 700 aircraft, as well as commercial and leased aircraft, to carry about 3 million troops and 800,000 tons of cargo in support of wartime, peacetime, and humanitarian efforts in 2008. C-5s and C-17s move troops and cargo internationally (strategic airlift) and C-130s are the primary aircraft that moves them within a theater of operation (tactical airlift). Over the next 4 years, DOD plans to spend about $12 billion to modernize and procure airlifters and is currently studying how many it needs. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) was asked to (1) identify the status of DOD's modernization and acquisition efforts and (2) determine how well DOD is addressing any capability gaps and redundancies. In conducting this work, GAO identified the cost, schedule, and performance of airlift programs, as well as DOD's plan for addressing gaps and redundancies. GAO also discussed mobility study efforts with DOD, Institute for Defense Analysis (IDA), and RAND Coporation officials.

What GAO Found

DOD has recently revamped airlift investments due to modernization cost increases and requirement changes. For strategic airlift, the number of C-5s that will be fully modernized were cut in half because of substantial reengining cost increases and C-17 quantities were increased from 180 to 213 aircraft. These twin changes resulted in a net cost increase of about$3 billion. Additional costs and force structure changes are possible pending decisions on C-5 retirements, other modifications, the potential need for more C-17s to meet tactical airlift needs, and the planned shutdown of C-17 production. For tactical airlift, substantial cost increases for modernizing C-130 avionics tripled unit costs, delayed its schedule, and resulted in almost 60 percent fewer aircraft being modernized. There have been large increases in the C-130J quantity to replace older C-130s, but modest increases in unit costs. The joint Army-Air Force C-27J program was recently transferred to the Air Force and quantities were cut from 78 to 38 aircraft, with an uncertain effect on the Army's airlift missions. The Army and Air Force must also resolve fundamental differences in operating requirements and employment strategy for the Joint Future Theater Lift (JFTL). DOD appears to have addressed its strategic airlift gap, but there is a potential future tactical airlift gap for moving medium weight equipment. Also, questions regarding how the Air Force will meet the Army's direct support mission have not been resolved. DOD is using $5.5 billion appropriated by Congress to procure 23 additional C-17s, which DOD officials believe more than offsets the strategic airlift gap associated with the restructured C-5 modernization program. However, there is a potential gap in the tactical airlift of medium weight loads beyond the capability of the C-130s. The C-17 is the only aircraft capable of moving this type of Army equipment within a theater of operation, although not to austere, short, or unimproved landing areas. The JFTL is envisioned to provide this capability, but will not be available for 15 years or more under the current acquisition strategy. While the various mobility studies acknowledge the C-17's significant dual role, they did not comprehensively evaluate the expanded use of the C-17 to transport medium weight equipment in theater and how this could impact the force structure, the C-17's service life, and decisions related to when to shut down the production line. In addition, questions remain about the number of C-130s and C-27Js needed to fulfill Army direct support missions. Two studies reached somewhat different conclusions about the cost effectiveness of using C-130Js and C-27Js for this mission. The Air Force and Army have not completed a plan for meeting Army direct support requirements, which could affect future decisions on both the C-27J and the C-130J. DOD's recently established portfolio management structure is supposed to provide a useful forum to address the broad range of airlift investment decisions. However, efforts so far have primarily focused on new programs rather than addressing gaps and making other airlift decisions such as when and how many C-5s to retire or the appropriate mix of C-130s and C-27Js needed to perform Army missions.