In Afghanistan,  DCMA teams include administrative contracting officers, and quality  assurance representatives, who ensure that the contractors perform work  to the standards written in the contracts and oversee the CORs assigned  to DCMA-administered contracts. DOD’s CORs Are Not Fully Prepared for Their Roles and Responsibilities in Afghanistan

		DOD’s Training Does Not Fully Prepare Most CORs for Their Roles and Responsibilities of Contract Management and Oversight

DOD has added new training for CORs serving in contingencies, but  some gaps in training remain and not all of the required training is being  conducted or completed. DOD has taken some actions to  improve the capability of CORs to provide management and oversight of  contracts in contingency operations such as Afghanistan. These actions  include developing a new COR training course, with a focus on  contingency operations, and developing a COR certification program. According to personnel in  Afghanistan, none of the required COR training provides enough specifics  about contract management and oversight in Afghanistan. For example,  the required training does not provide CORs with information regarding  important issue areas like the Afghan First Program, which encourages  an increased use of local personnel and vendors for goods and services  as part of the U.S. counterinsurgency strategy, and working with private  security contractors. For example, military personnel have been appointed to  oversee construction contracts without the necessary engineering or  construction experience, in part because their units lack personnel with  those technical skills. As a result, according to officials  there have been newly constructed buildings used by both U.S. and  Afghan troops that had to be repaired or rebuilt before being used  because the CORs providing the oversight were not able to adequately  ensure proper construction. According to personnel we interviewed, this  resulted in a waste of money as well as lower morale due to substandard  facilities; and in an increased risk to bases and installations because  required infrastructure such as guard towers, fire stations, and gates were  lacking. Contracting officials from one regional contracting center told us  that guard towers at a forward operating base were so poorly constructed  that they were unsafe to occupy; they were subsequently torn down and  reconstructed. In  addition, in some cases units did not assign enough CORs to provide  oversight. As a  result, units may not always use the tools available to help prepare for  contract management operations in Afghanistan. DOD, USAID, and State Efforts to Vet Non-U.S. The purpose of this vetting  process—which includes the examination of available background and  intelligence information—is to reduce the possibility that insurgents or  criminal groups could use U.S. contracting funds to finance their  operations. Also CENTCOM Contracting Command officials said that  when the contract was established, it was with the intention of  determining a non-U.S. vendor’s eligibility to be awarded a contract in  Afghanistan prior to award. To address these vendor vetting limitations in Afghanistan, in our June  2011 report we made several recommendations to DOD. USAID Has Recently Begun to Implement A Vendor Vetting Process

In January 2011, in order to counter potential risks of U.S. funds being  diverted to support criminal or insurgent activity, USAID created a  process for vetting prospective non-U.S. contract and assistance  recipients (i.e., implementing partners) in Afghanistan. State Has Not Created a Vendor Vetting Process for Afghanistan

As of May 2011, the State Department (State) was not vetting vendors in  Afghanistan. To help ensure that State resources are not diverted to insurgent or  criminal groups, we recommended that State assess the need and  develop possible options for vetting non-U.S. vendors—for example,  these could include leveraging existing vendor vetting processes, such as  USAID’s, or developing a unique process. DOD  and USAID both concurred with our recommendation, but State did not  comment on it. DOD Has Not Fully Addressed GAO Recommendations

Since the beginning of our work on operational contract support in 1997,  we have made numerous recommendations to DOD to help improve the  oversight and management of contractors used to support contingency  operations. Specifically, we have made recommendations in the areas of  developing guidance, planning for contractors in future operations,  tracking contractor personnel, providing sufficient numbers of oversight  personnel, and training non acquisition personnel including CORs and  other key leaders such as unit commanders and senior staff. Concluding Observations

DOD and the services have taken some important steps to institutionalize  OCS—for example, by issuing joint doctrine, including some training in  professional military education, and establishing a vetting cell to vet non- U.S. vendors in Afghanistan, to minimize the risk of criminal groups using  contracts to fund their operations but DOD’s efforts have not gone far  enough.
Why GAO Did This Study

The Departments of Defense (DOD) and State (State) and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) have collectively obligated billions of dollars for contracts and assistance to support U.S. efforts in Afghanistan. The work of GAO and others has documented shortcomings in DOD's contract management and oversight, and its training of the non-acquisition workforce. Addressing these challenges can help DOD meet warfighter needs in a timely and costconscious manner; mitigate the risks of fraud, waste, and abuse; and minimize the operational risks associated with contractors. This testimony addresses the extent to which (1) DOD's Contracting Officer's Representatives (COR) are prepared for their roles and responsibilities and provide adequate contract oversight in Afghanistan; (2) DOD, State, and USAID vet non-U.S. firms for links to terrorist and insurgent groups in Afghanistan; and (3) DOD has implemented GAO's past recommendations. The testimony is based on GAO's recently published reports and testimonies on operational contract support, including a June 2011 report on vetting of non-U.S. vendors in Afghanistan, as well as providing preliminary observations as a result of ongoing audit work in Afghanistan. GAO's work included analyses of a wide range of agency documents, and interviews with defense officials including CORs, contracting officers, and contract management officials in the United States and Afghanistan.

What GAO Found

DOD has taken actions to better prepare CORs to conduct contract oversight and management in Afghanistan; however, CORs are not fully prepared for their roles and responsibilities to provide adequate oversight there. To improve the capability of CORs to provide contract management and oversight in contingencies, DOD has developed a new, contingency-focused COR training course, issued new guidance, and developed a COR certification program. Nonetheless, gaps in the training exist. For example, according to DOD personnel in Afghanistan, the required training does not provide CORs with enough specificity about contracting in Afghanistan, such as information about the Afghan First Program, which encourages an increased use of local goods and services, or working with private security contractors. Also, whether a COR has relevant technical expertise is not always considered prior to assigning an individual to oversee a contract, even though CORs have a significant role in determining if products or services provided by the contractor fulfill the contract's technical requirements. However, according to officials, some CORs appointed to oversee construction contracts have lacked necessary engineering or construction experience, in some cases resulting in newly constructed buildings that were to be used by U.S. or Afghan troops having to be repaired or rebuilt. According to CORs and commanders in Afghanistan, poor performance on construction contracts has resulted in money being wasted, substandard facilities, and an increased risk to bases. For example, contracting officials from one regional contracting center told GAO that construction of guard towers at a forward operating base was so poor that they were unsafe to occupy. DOD and USAID have both established processes to vet non-U.S. vendors in Afghanistan, but GAO has identified limitations; additionally, State has not yet developed a vendor vetting process. The purpose of DOD's vetting process begun in August 2010--which includes the examination of available background and intelligence information--is to reduce the possibility that insurgents or criminal groups could use U.S. contracting funds to finance their operations. Additionally, in January 2011 USAID also began to implement a process to vet prospective non-U.S. contract and assistance recipients (i.e., implementing partners) in Afghanistan. GAO made recommendations, such as to formalize their vetting processes, which, both agencies concurred with. For example, USAID signed a mission order in May 2011 codifying the details of its vetting process. As of May 2011, State had not developed a vendor vetting process for non-U.S. vendors in Afghanistan, though officials stated they are considering several options.

What GAO Recommends

GAO has made numerous recommendations in areas such as developing guidance, tracking contractor personnel, providing oversight personnel, and training, and DOD has made strides in addressing some of them. However, it has not fully implemented other previous recommendations, such as ensuring training for commanders and senior leaders and improvements to the contracting personnel tracking system in Afghanistan.