1). Army Faces Major Challenges to Identify a Feasible, Cost- Effective, and Executable GCV Solution

Over the next 2 years during the technology development phase, the  Army faces major challenges to identify a feasible, cost-effective, and  executable solution that meets the Army’s needs. Among these are  making choices on which capabilities to pursue and include in a GCV  vehicle design and determining whether the best option is a new vehicle  or a modified current vehicle. In our March 2011 testimony, we identified  key questions about GCV pertaining to how urgently it is needed,  robustness of the analysis of alternatives, plausibility of its 7-year  schedule, cost and affordability, and whether mature technologies would  be used. DOD and the Army have taken positive  steps to increase their oversight of the program; however, the timely  resolution of issues surrounding the areas previously identified will be a  major challenge. Since GCV was  originally conceived in 2009, the Army has already reduced some  requirements and encouraged interested contractors to use mature  technologies in their proposals. However, the schedule remains  ambitious and USD/ATL has stipulated that the Army will need to  demonstrate that the schedule is both feasible and executable. Ambitious Army Information Network Strategy Has Noteworthy Aspects but Unresolved Issues Could Affect Long- Term Implementation

The Army has taken a number of steps to put together a more realistic  strategy to develop and field an information network for its deployed  forces than the network envisioned for the Future Combat System  program. However, the Army is proceeding without defining requirements  for the network and articulating clearly defined capabilities. As a result,  the Army runs the risk of developing a number of stovepipe capabilities  that may not work together as a network, thus wasting resources. The  Army has moved away from its plan for a single network development  program under Future Combat System to an incremental approach with  which feasible technologies can be developed, tested, and fielded. With this baseline, the Army expects to  build on elements of the network already in place with an emphasis on  capturing emerging technologies that deliver capability incrementally  to multiple units at the same time.   The network integration evaluations are a key enabler of the Army’s  new network strategy and assess systems that may provide potential  benefits and value to the Army while identifying areas requiring  additional development. The evaluation process provides the Army an  opportunity to improve its knowledge of current and potential network  capability. Additionally, it provides soldier feedback on the equipment  being tested. For example,    The Army has not yet announced requirements nor has it established  cost and schedule projections for development and fielding of its  network. With the termination of the ground mobile radio, it is unclear how  waveform maturation will continue. Services to Rely on Industry to Provide Potential Solutions for Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Needs

To reduce risk in the JLTV program, the Army and Marine Corps entered  a technology development phase with multiple vendors to help increase  their knowledge of the needed technologies, determine the technologies’  maturity level, and determine which combination of requirements were  achievable. Because of the knowledge gained through the technology  development phase, the services have worked together to identify trades  in requirements to reduce weight and to drive down the cost of the  vehicle. For example, the services found that JLTV could not  achieve both protection levels and transportability, with weight being the  issue. HMWWV Recapitalization Effort

Both the Army and the Marine Corps have articulated a significant role for  the Up-Armored HMMWV in combat, combat support, and combat service  support roles beyond fiscal year 2025 but their fleets are experiencing  reduced automotive performance, loss of transportability, higher operation  and sustainment costs, and the need for better protection as the threats  have evolved. The Army plans to recapitalize a portion of its Up-Armored  HMMWV fleets by establishing requirements, seeking solutions from  industry through full and open competition, and testing multiple prototype  vehicles before awarding a single production contract. The Army’s  emerging effort—the Modernized Expanded Capacity Vehicle program— aims to modernize vehicles to increase automotive performance, regain  mobility, extend service life by 15 years, and improve blast protection. As plans for GCV move forward, it will be important for  DOD, the Army, and the Congress to focus attention on what GCV will  deliver and at what cost and how that compares to other needs within the  combat vehicle portfolio.
Why GAO Did This Study

After the Army canceled the Future Combat System in June of 2009, it began developing modernization plans, including developing a new Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV) and additional network capability. At the same time, the Army was considering options on how to improve its light tactical vehicles. This statement addresses potential issues related to developing (1) the new GCV, (2) a common information network, and (3) the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV) in a constrained budget environment. The statement is based largely on previous GAO work conducted over the last year in response to congressional requests and results of other reviews of Army modernization. To conduct this work, GAO analyzed program documentation, strategies, and test results; interviewed independent experts and Army and Department of Defense (DOD) officials; and witnessed demonstrations of current and emerging network technologies. DOD reviewed the facts contained in this statement and provided technical comments, which were incorporated as appropriate.

What GAO Found

Delivering a feasible, cost-effective, and executable GCV solution presents a major challenge to the Army, with key questions about the robustness of the analysis of alternatives, the plausibility of its 7-year schedule, and cost and affordability. DOD and the Army have taken steps to increase oversight of the program, but resolving these issues during technology development will remain a challenge. For example, the Army has already reduced some requirements and encouraged contractors to use mature technologies in their proposals, but the 7-year schedule remains ambitious, and delays would increase development costs. Independent cost estimates have suggested that 9 to 10 years is a more realistic schedule. Over the next 2 years during the technology development phase, the Army faces major challenges in deciding which capabilities to pursue and include in a GCV vehicle design and determine whether the best option is a new vehicle or modifications to a current vehicle. The Army's new information network strategy moves away from a single network development program to an incremental approach with which feasible technologies can be developed, tested, and fielded. The new strategy has noteworthy aspects, such as using periodic field evaluations to assess systems that may provide potential benefit and getting soldier feedback on the equipment being tested. However, the Army has not articulated requirements, incremental objectives, or cost and schedule projections for its new network. It is important that the Army proceed in defining requirements and expected capabilities for the network to avoid the risk of developing individual capabilities that may not work together as a network. With the cancellation last week of its ground mobile radio and continuing problems in developing technology to provide advanced networking capability, the Army will still need to find foundational pieces for its network. The Army is reworking earlier plans to develop and acquire the JLTV and is planning to recapitalize some of its High Mobility, Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMWWV). These efforts have just begun, however, and their results are not yet assured. To reduce risk in the JLTV program, the services relied on multiple vendors during technology development to increase their knowledge of the needed technologies, determine the technology maturity level, and determine which requirements were achievable. As a result, the services identified trades in requirements to drive down the cost of the vehicle. For example, the services found that JLTV could not achieve both protection level and transportability goals, so the services are accepting a heavier vehicle. A potential risk for the services in allowing industry to build vehicles for testing is that the prototypes may not be mature; the Army will need to keep its options open to changes that may result from these tests. Both the Army and the Marine Corps have articulated a significant future role for their Up-Armored HMMWV fleets, yet the fleets are experiencing reduced automotive performance, the need for better protection as threats have evolved, and other issues. The Army is planning to recapitalize a portion of its Up-Armored HMMWV fleet to increase automotive performance and improve blast protection. The Marine Corps' plans to extend the service life of some of its HMMWVs used in light tactical missions are not yet known.

What GAO Recommends

GAO is not making any recommendations with this statement; however, consistent with previous work, this statement underscores the importance of developing sound requirements and focusing up front on what modernization efforts will deliver and at what cost.