Mission  planning includes determining whether military or commercial aircraft will  fly a mission. CRAF carriers generally have priority over non-CRAF  carriers for movements of passengers and cargo. DOD’s Process for Monitoring Flying Hours Provides Information That Could Help It Determine When to Shift Eligible Missions to CRAF Participants

DOD has exceeded the flying hours needed to meet military training  requirements for fiscal years 2002 through 2010 due to increased  operational requirements associated with Afghanistan and Iraq; however  it does not know whether it used CRAF participants to the maximum  extent practicable during this period. However, DOD does not use information from its  process for monitoring flying hours to determine when it will use more  hours than it has planned to meet training requirements and shift eligible  airlift missions to CRAF participants to ensure that commercial sources  are used to the maximum extent practicable, as required by DOD  guidance. DOD Exceeded Its Required Military Training Hours for Fiscal Years 2002 through 2010, but Has Reduced the Percentage of Excess Hours in Recent Years

The National Airlift Policy states that the “Department of Defense shall  establish appropriate levels for peacetime cargo airlift augmentation in  order to promote the effectiveness of the Civil Reserve Air Fleet and  provide training within the military airlift system.” Consistent with that  policy, DOD Instruction 4500.57 requires that DOD operate its fleet to  meet its training requirements and also requires that it use commercial  sources of transportation to the “maximum extent practicable.” DOD  officials stated that they have been using military airlift beyond what was  planned, because the operations in Afghanistan and Iraq created  additional airlift requirements, many of which could not be met using U.S.  commercial sources. After the drawdown in Afghanistan concludes, the need for airlift is  expected to decline, which will reduce both training opportunities and the  business available for CRAF participants. As a result, DOD may be using its military fleet more than  necessary thereby risking reduced participation of commercial carriers in  the CRAF program. DOD Restricts Partial Plane Loads on Channel Routes to Promote Efficiency, Meet Training Requirements, and Fulfill Peacetime Business Obligations to CRAF

DOD provided several reasons for restricting commercial carriers from  transporting partial plane loads of cargo over certain routes, based on its  need to promote efficiency, meet its military airlift training requirements,  and fulfill peacetime business obligations to CRAF participants. According  to TRANSCOM officials, in 2001, DOD began restricting commercial air  carriers from transporting partial plane loads of cargo over certain  overseas channel routes in order to improve the efficiency and  effectiveness of the cargo missions flown over these routes and keep  cargo flights in the channel route system that DOD relies on to satisfy its  training requirements and business obligations to CRAF participants. TRANSCOM officials stated that to maximize efficiency, DOD requires  aircraft conducting channel route missions—whether they are military or  commercial—to be completely full of cargo before takeoff. DOD’s policy of restricting commercial carriers from transporting partial  loads over channel routes has allowed DOD to shift cargo into the  channel route system, increase the number of channel route missions  available for aircrews to satisfy flying hour training requirements, and  address DOD’s flying hour shortage. This business consists, in part, of missions flown across  channel routes. Adequacy of CRAF to Meet Future Mission Needs is Unclear until DOD Completes Several Assessments

DOD is conducting several interrelated studies to determine its future  airlift requirements; however it is unclear whether the planned size of  CRAF will be adequate to meet future airlift requirements. DOD’s Mission Needs for CRAF Have Changed Since its Last Assessment of Future Requirements

DOD reports that there are more aircraft committed to the CRAF program  than are needed to fulfill the wartime requirements established by the  Mobility Capability Requirements Study 2016 (MCRS–16), which was  issued in 2010. DOD has taken a number  of steps to strengthen the CRAF program while also ensuring that military  aircrews receive required training. Recommendation for Executive Action

To balance the use of military and civilian aircraft and ensure that  commercial carriers participating in the CRAF program are used to the  maximum extent practicable, we recommend that the Secretary of  Defense direct the Secretary of the Air Force and the Commander, U.S.  Transportation Command—in conjunction with the Commander, Air  Mobility Command—to use the Air Mobility Command’s existing process  for monitoring training hours to determine when it can shift eligible  peacetime airlift workload from military to commercial sources. Agency Comments

We provided a draft of this report to DOD for comment. In its written  comments, reproduced in appendix IV, DOD concurred with our  recommendation and stated that it believes implementing the  recommendation will further improve the Civil Reserve Air Fleet program. To assess whether DOD has established future requirements for the  CRAF program and how the planned size of CRAF compares with those  requirements, we obtained and reviewed various studies conducted by  DOD to assess its strategic airlift capabilities, such as DOD’s Mobility  Requirements and Capabilities Study – 2016, and the AMC 2012 CRAF  study. We also reviewed a provision in the National Defense  Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 that requires DOD to conduct a  new study of mobility capabilities and requirements.
Why GAO Did This Study

To move passengers and cargo, DOD supplements its military aircraft with cargo and passenger aircraft from volunteer commercial carriers participating in the CRAF program. Participating carriers commit their aircraft to support a range of military operations in exchange for peacetime business. A House Armed Services Committee mandated GAO to report on matters related to the CRAF program. GAO assessed whether DOD (1) met its military airlift training requirements while also using CRAF participants to the maximum extent practicable, (2) provided justification for restricting commercial carriers from transporting partial plane loads of cargo over certain routes, and (3) has established future requirements for CRAF and how the planned size of CRAF compares to those requirements. GAO reviewed guidance and policies pertaining to the program, flying hour data, and DOD-sponsored CRAF study reports. GAO also interviewed DOD and industry officials.

What GAO Found

DOD exceeded the flying hours needed to meet military training requirements for fiscal years 2002 through 2010 because of increased operational requirements associated with Afghanistan and Iraq; however it does not know whether it used Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) participants to the maximum extent practicable. DOD guidance requires it to meet training requirements and to use commercial transportation to the "maximum extent practicable." During fiscal years 2002 through 2010, DOD flew its fleet more than needed to train its crews, although its flying has more closely matched its training needs in recent years. DOD has also used CRAF participants extensively to supplement military airlift. Although DOD has taken steps to make more airlift business available to CRAF participants, officials said that overseas operations have provided enough missions to support both training and CRAF business obligations. However, with the drawdown in Afghanistan, DOD officials expect the need for airlift to decline by at least 66 percent--to pre-September 2001 levels--reducing both training hours available for DOD and business opportunities for CRAF. DOD does not use its process for monitoring flying hours to determine when it will exceed required training hours and allocate eligible airlift missions to CRAF participants. Therefore, it cannot determine whether it is using CRAF to the maximum extent practicable. As a result, DOD may be using its military fleet more than necessary--which officials say is less economical--while risking reduced CRAF participation.
DOD provided several reasons for restricting commercial carriers from transporting partial plane loads of cargo over channel routes, including the need to promote efficiency, meet its military airlift training requirements, and fulfill peacetime business obligations to CRAF participants. Channel route missions are regularly scheduled airlift missions used to transport cargo and provide aircrew training time. These missions also help DOD provide business to CRAF participants. According to U.S. Transportation Command (TRANSCOM) officials, DOD generally requires aircraft conducting channel route missions to be completely full of cargo before takeoff. The policy restricting carriers from flying partial loads over channel routes allows DOD to consolidate cargo previously flown by commercial carriers in less than full plane loads and redirect that cargo into the channel route system, where it will be transported by either commercial or military aircraft as part of a full plane load mission. According to DOD, consolidating cargo into full loads flown over the channel route system has increased both the efficiency of these missions and the availability of missions that DOD uses to train its crews and fulfill its business obligations to CRAF.
It is unclear whether the planned size of CRAF will be adequate to meet future airlift requirements. DOD last established its future requirements based on the wartime scenarios in the Mobility Capability Requirements Study 2016, issued in 2010. However, due to changing military strategy and priorities, the 2010 study does not reflect current mission needs. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 requires DOD to conduct a new mobility capabilities and requirements study. DOD has not begun this study or finalized its ongoing reviews of the CRAF program's ability to support future requirements. Once they are finalized, these studies should allow DOD to better understand future requirements for CRAF and whether the CRAF program will meet future airlift requirements.

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Air Force and the Commander, U.S. Transportation Commandin conjunction with the Commander, Air Mobility Commandto use its existing processes for monitoring training to determine when it can shift its distribution of peacetime airlift workload from military to commercial sources. In comments on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with GAOs recommendation and stated that it believes implementing the recommendation will further improve the Civil Reserve Air Fleet program.