Congress also passed legislation that  clarifies USDA’s responsibilities over agriculture and food security. 3.) Presidential Directives Define Agency Responsibilities for Protecting against Agroterrorism

Following the creation of DHS, the President issued four directives that  further define agencies’ roles and responsibilities for protecting against  terrorism. USDA, in collaboration with other agencies including DHS,  were tasked with writing the sections of the National Response Plan  guiding U.S. efforts to respond to an attack on U.S. agriculture. Since the Terrorist Attacks of 2001, Federal Agencies Have Taken Steps to Manage the Risks of Agroterrorism

In carrying out their new roles and responsibilities, federal agencies have  taken steps to manage the risks of agroterrorism, including the  development of a comprehensive national strategy that did not exist before  September 11, 2001. Exercises have also been conducted to  test response capability to address plant diseases. A Number of Agency- Specific Actions Are Under Way

In addition to the broad national planning efforts discussed, other specific  actions that federal agencies responsible for protecting against  agroterrorism have taken since 2001 include the following:  FDA and USDA are in various stages of developing vulnerability  assessments of the agriculture and food sectors, as called for in HSPD-9. The United States Still Faces Complex Challenges and Management Problems in Protecting against Agroterrorism

Although many important steps have been taken to prevent or reduce the  impact of agroterrorism, the United States still faces complex challenges  that limit the nation’s ability to quickly and effectively respond to a  widespread attack on animal agriculture. The only  vaccines currently stored in the United States against foreign animal  diseases are for various strains of FMD because this disease is so highly  contagious. Agricultural Inspections and Interceptions Have Declined, and Fewer Inspectors Are Available to Respond to Agricultural Emergencies since the Transfer of USDA Inspectors to DHS

Since the transfer of most USDA Plant Protection and Quarantine (PPQ)  inspectors to DHS in March 2003, government officials, reports, and data  indicate that the nation may be more vulnerable to the introduction of  foreign animal and plant diseases through ports of entry into the United  States. Once diseases have been accurately diagnosed, the United States  needs to quickly decide whether vaccines should be used to control an  outbreak and have the ability to deploy ready-to-use vaccines within 24  hours. To address management problems that reduce the effectiveness of  agencies’ routine efforts to protect against agroterrorism, we recommend  the following seven actions:  the Secretaries of Homeland Security and Agriculture work together to  identify the reasons for declining agricultural inspections and to identify  potential areas for improvement;   the Secretaries of Homeland Security and Agriculture streamline the  flow of information between USDA and DHS agricultural inspectors,  and expedite the integration of the two agencies’ databases and  information technology systems at the port level;  the Secretary of Homeland Security develop a mechanism to promptly  and effectively seek input from key stakeholders on national guidance  that affects their roles in protecting agriculture and responding to an  emergency;  the Secretaries of Homeland Security, Agriculture, and Health and  Human Services, and the Acting Administrator of the Environmental  Protection Agency compile relevant after-action reports from test  exercises and real-life emergencies and disseminate the reports through  the Homeland Security Information Network that DHS is developing;   the Secretary of Agriculture develop a strategy to increase the number  of Area and Regional Emergency Coordinator positions so that the  agency faces less difficulty filling these positions and is better able to  assist states in preparing for an agriculture emergency, including a  terrorist attack;  the Secretary of Homeland Security work to ensure that task lists for the  various agencies and working groups engaged in securing agriculture  are consistent with national plans and guidelines; and  the Secretary of Homeland Security develop controls to better  coordinate and track federally funded research efforts with other  agencies to protect against agroterrorism. Finally, we interviewed numerous agency officials from the U.S.  Department of Agriculture (USDA), the Department of Homeland Security  (DHS), the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), the  Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the Department of Defense  (DOD), and the Department of Justice. GAO Comments

1. GAO Comments

1. 2.
Why GAO Did This Study

U.S. agriculture generates more than $1 trillion per year in economic activity and provides an abundant food supply for Americans and others. Since the September 11, 2001, attacks, there are new concerns about the vulnerability of U.S. agriculture to the deliberate introduction of animal and plant diseases (agroterrorism). Several agencies, including the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and the Department of Defense (DOD), play a role in protecting the nation against agroterrorism. GAO examined (1) the federal agencies' roles and responsibilities to protect against agroterrorism, (2) the steps that the agencies have taken to manage the risks of agroterrorism, and (3) the challenges and problems that remain.

What GAO Found

After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, federal agencies' roles and responsibilities were modified in several ways to help protect agriculture from an attack. First, the Homeland Security Act of 2002 established DHS and, among other things, charged it with coordinating U.S. efforts to protect against agroterrorism. The act also transferred a number of agency personnel and functions into DHS to conduct planning, response, and recovery efforts. Second, the President signed a number of presidential directives that further define agencies' specific roles in protecting agriculture. Finally, Congress passed legislation that expanded the responsibilities of USDA and HHS in relation to agriculture security. In carrying out these new responsibilities, USDA and other federal agencies have taken a number of actions. The agencies are coordinating development of plans and protocols to better manage the national response to terrorism, including agroterrorism, and, along with several states, have conducted exercises to test these new protocols and their response capabilities. Federal agencies also have been conducting vulnerability assessments of the agriculture infrastructure; have created networks of laboratories capable of diagnosing animal, plant, and human diseases; have begun efforts to develop a national veterinary stockpile that intends to include vaccines against foreign animal diseases; and have created new federal emergency coordinator positions to help states develop emergency response plans for the agriculture sector. However, the United States still faces complex challenges that limit the nation's ability to respond effectively to an attack against livestock. For example, USDA would not be able to deploy animal vaccines within 24 hours of an outbreak as called for in a presidential directive, in part because the only vaccines currently stored in the United States are for strains of foot and mouth disease, and these vaccines need to be sent to the United Kingdom (U.K.) to be activated for use. There are also management problems that inhibit the effectiveness of agencies' efforts to protect against agroterrorism. For instance, since the transfer of agricultural inspectors from USDA to DHS in 2003, there have been fewer inspections of agricultural products at the nation's ports of entry.