The Majority of Arrests against CBP Employees Are Related to Misconduct; Majority of Allegations Occurred at Locations along the Southwest Border

According to CBP’s data, incidents of arrests of CBP employees from  fiscal years 2005 through 2012 represent less than 1 percent of the entire  CBP workforce per fiscal year. During this time period, 144 current or  former CBP employees were arrested or indicted for corruption—the  majority of which were stationed along the southwest border. The majority of allegations made against OFO  and USBP employees during this time period were against officers and  agents stationed on the southwest U.S. border. In addition, there were 2,170  reported incidents of arrests for misconduct. Examples include domestic  violence and driving under the influence while off duty. Although the total number of corruption convictions (125) is less than 1  percent when compared with CBP’s workforce population by fiscal year,  CBP officials stated that they are concerned about the negative impact  employee corruption cases have on agencywide integrity. CBP Has Implemented Integrity-Related Controls, but Could Better Assess Screening Tools for Applicants and Incumbent Employees

CBP employs integrity-related controls to mitigate the risk of corruption  and misconduct for both applicants and incumbent officers and agents,  such as polygraph examinations and random drug testing, respectively. However, CBP IA does not have a mechanism to track and  maintain data on which of its screening tools (e.g., background  information or polygraph examination) provided the information that PSD  used to determine that applicants were not suitable for hire, making it  difficult for CBP IA to assess the relative effectiveness of its various  screening tools. CBP Has Not Assessed the Feasibility of Expanding Its Polygraph Program to Incumbent Officers and Agents

CBP IA officials stated that they are considering implementing a polygraph  requirement for incumbent employees; however, CBP has not yet  assessed the feasibility of expanding the program beyond applicants. However, CBP has not yet fully assessed the  costs and benefits of implementing polygraph examinations on incumbent  officers and agents, as well as other factors that may affect the agency’s  efforts to expand the program. For example:
Costs. Assessing the feasibility of expanding periodic polygraphs  early on in its planning efforts, consistent with standard practices, could  help CBP determine how to best achieve its goal of strengthening  integrity-related controls over incumbent CBPOs and BPAs. PSD officials stated that  they have performed some of the required checks since 2008. Without a  quality review program that is implemented and documented on a  consistent basis, it is difficult to determine the extent to which  deficiencies, if any, exist in the investigation and adjudication process and  whether individuals that are unsuitable for employment are attempting to  find employment with CBP. CBP Is Developing an Integrity Strategy, but Does Not Have Target Timelines for Its Completion and Implementation

CBP has not completed an integrity strategy that encompasses the  activities of CBP components that have integrity initiatives under way,  including CBP IA, OFO, and USBP, as called for in the CBP Fiscal Year  2009-2014 Strategic Plan. See Homeland Security  Studies and Analysis Institute, U.S. Customs and Border Protection Workforce Integrity  Study. During the course of our review, CBP IA began drafting an integrity  strategy for approval by the components and CBP’s senior management,  in accordance with CBP’s Fiscal Year 2009-2014 Strategic Plan. He indicated  that that there has been significant cultural resistance among some CBP  component entities in acknowledging CBP IA’s authority and  responsibility for overseeing the implementation of all CBP integrity- related activities. Without target timelines, it will be  difficult for CBP to monitor progress made toward the development and  implementation of an agencywide strategy. Recommendations for Executive Action

To enhance CBP’s efforts to mitigate the risk of corruption and  misconduct among CBPOs and BPAs, we recommend that the CBP  commissioner take the following seven actions: develop a mechanism to maintain and track data on the sources of  information (e.g., background investigation or polygraph examination  admissions) that PSD uses to determine what applicants are not  suitable for hire to help CBP IA assess the effectiveness of its  applicant screening tools; assess the feasibility of expanding the polygraph program to  incumbent CBPOs and BPAs, including the associated costs and  benefits, options for how the agency will use the results of the  examinations, and the trade-offs associated with testing incumbent  officers and agents at various frequencies;  conduct quality assurance reviews of CBP IA’s adjudications of  background investigations and periodic reinvestigations, as required  in PSD’s quality assurance program; establish a process to fully document, as required, any deficiencies  identified through PSD’s quality assurance reviews; develop detailed guidance within OFO on the roles and  responsibilities for integrity officers, in consultation with appropriate  stakeholders such as CBP IA;  set target timelines for completing and implementing a comprehensive  integrity strategy; and,  complete OFO and USBP postcorruption analysis reports for all  CBPOs and BPAs who have been convicted of corruption-related  activities, to the extent that information is available. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

To examine data on arrests of and allegations against U.S. Customs and  Border Protection (CBP) employees accused of corruption or misconduct  issues, we analyzed data on 144 CBP employees arrested or indicted  from fiscal year 2005 through fiscal year 2012 for corruption activities.
Why GAO Did This Study

CBPa component within the Department of Homeland Security is responsible for securing U.S. borders and facilitating legal travel and trade. Drug-trafficking and other transnational criminal organizations are seeking to target CBP employees with bribes to facilitate the illicit transport of drugs, aliens, and other contraband across the southwest U.S. border, in particular. CBP IA is responsible for promoting the integrity of CBPs workforce, programs, and operations; and CBP components implement integrity initiatives. GAO was asked to review CBPs efforts to ensure the integrity of its workforce. This report examines (1) data on arrests of and allegations against CBP employees for corruption or misconduct, (2) CBPs implementation of integrity-related controls, and (3) CBPs strategy for its integrity programs. GAO analyzed arrest and allegation data since fiscal year 2005 and 2006, respectively, reviewed integrity-related policies and procedures, and interviewed CBP officials in headquarters and at four locations along the southwest border selected for geographic location, among other factors.

What GAO Found

U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) data indicate that arrests of CBP employees for corruption-related activities since fiscal years 2005 account for less than 1 percent of CBPs entire workforce per fiscal year. The majority of arrests of CBP employees were related to misconduct. There were 2,170 reported incidents of arrests for acts of misconduct such as domestic violence or driving under the influence from fiscal year 2005 through fiscal year 2012, and a total of 144 current or former CBP employees were arrested or indicted for corruption-related activities, such as the smuggling of aliens and drugs, of whom 125 have been convicted as of October 2012. Further, the majority of allegations against CBP employees since fiscal year 2006 occurred at locations along the southwest border. CBP officials have stated that they are concerned about the negative impact that these cases have on agencywide integrity.
CBP employs screening tools to mitigate the risk of employee corruption and misconduct for both applicants (e.g., background investigations and polygraph examinations) and incumbent CBP officers and Border Patrol agents (e.g., random drug tests and periodic reinvestigations). However, CBPs Office of Internal Affairs (IA) does not have a mechanism to maintain and track data on which of its screening tools (e.g., background investigation or polygraph examination) provided the information used to determine which applicants were not suitable for hire. Maintaining and tracking such data is consistent with internal control standards and could better position CBP IA to gauge the relative effectiveness of its screening tools. CBP IA is also considering requiring periodic polygraphs for incumbent officers and agents; however, it has not yet fully assessed the feasibility of expanding the program. For example, CBP has not yet fully assessed the costs of implementing polygraph examinations on incumbent officers and agents, including costs for additional supervisors and adjudicators, or factors such as the trade-offs associated with testing incumbent officers and agents at various frequencies. A feasibility assessment of program expansion could better position CBP to determine whether and how to best achieve its goal of strengthening integrity-related controls for officers and agents. Further, CBP IA has not consistently conducted monthly quality assurance reviews of its adjudications since 2008, as required by internal policies, to help ensure that adjudicators are following procedures in evaluating the results of the preemployment and periodic background investigations. CBP IA officials stated that they have performed some of the required checks since 2008, but they could not provide data on how many checks were conducted. Without these quality assurance checks, it is difficult for CBP IA to determine the extent to which deficiencies, if any, exist in the adjudication process.
CBP does not have an integrity strategy, as called for in its Fiscal Year 2009-2014 Strategic Plan. During the course of our review, CBP IA began drafting a strategy, but CBP IAs Assistant Commissioner stated the agency has not set target timelines for completing and implementing this strategy. Moreover, he stated that there has been significant cultural resistance among some CBP components in acknowledging CBP IAs authority for overseeing all integrity-related activities. Setting target timelines is consistent with program management standards and could help CBP monitor progress made toward the development and implementation of an agencywide strategy.

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that CBP, among other things, track and maintain data on sources of information used to determine which applicants are unsuitable for hire, assess the feasibility of expanding the polygraph program to incumbent officers and agents, consistently conduct quality assurance reviews, and set timelines for completing and implementing a comprehensive integrity strategy. DHS concurred and reported taking steps to address the recommendations.