Determining Top Secret Clearances for Industry Personnel Averaged More than One Year and Government Statistics Did Not Portray All Delays

Industry personnel contracted to work for the federal government waited  more than one year on average to receive top secret security clearances,  and government statistics did not portray the full length of time it takes  many applicants to obtain a clearance. Delays in the  clearance process may cost money and pose threats to national security. Delays in the Application- Submission and Investigation Phases Are Caused by Many Factors

Industry personnel granted eligibility for top secret clearances from  DISCO in January and February 2006 waited an average of 446 days for  their initial clearance or 545 days for their clearance update. Investigative Phase Took Longer Than the Goal Specified

Investigations for the initial top secret clearances of industry personnel  took an average of 286 days for DISCO cases adjudicated in January and  February 2006 (see table 2). The shorter period of 171 days is less than  the 180 days provided as a goal in the governmentwide plan. In December  2006, IRTPA will require that at least 80 percent of the adjudications be  completed within 30 days. We have noted in the past that focusing on completing initial clearance  investigations could negatively affect the completion of clearance-update  investigations and thereby increase the risk of unauthorized disclosure of  classified information. In addition, use of incomplete investigative  reports and not fully documenting adjudicative considerations may  undermine the government’s efforts to increase the acceptance of security  clearances granted by other federal agencies. Almost All of the Sampled Investigative Reports Were Incomplete

In our review of 50 initial investigations randomly sampled from the  population used in our timeliness analyses, we found that almost all (47 of  50) of the investigative reports were missing documentation required by  the federal investigative standards. At least half of the 50 reports that we examined did not contain the  required documentation in three investigative areas: residence,  employment, and education (see fig. Although federal standards indicate that investigations may be expanded  as necessary to resolve issues, according to OPM, (1) issue resolution is a  standard part of all initial investigations and periodic reinvestigations for  top secret clearances and (2) all issues developed during the course of an  investigation should be fully resolved in the final investigative report  provided to DOD. We found a total of 36 unresolved issues in 27 of the  investigative reports. Foreign influence issues were unresolved. DISCO Adjudicators Granted Top Secret Clearance Eligibility for Cases with Missing Information

DISCO adjudicators granted top secret clearance eligibility for the 27  industry personnel whose investigative reports contained unresolved  issues without requesting additional information or documenting in the  adjudicative report that the information was missing. In November 2005, we were optimistic that the  government plan for improving the clearance process prepared under the  direction of OMB’s Deputy Director for Management would be a living  document that would provide the strategic vision for correcting long- standing problems in the personnel security clearance process. Recommendations for Executive Action

To improve the timeliness of the processes used to determine whether or  not industry personnel are eligible for a top secret clearance, we are  making the following recommendations to the Director of the Office of  Management and Budget to direct the Deputy Director for Management, in  his oversight role of the governmentwide clearance process, to take the  following actions:    Direct OPM and DOD to fully measure and report all of the time that  transpires between when the application is initially received by the federal  government to when the clearance-eligibility determination has been  provided to the customer. To improve the completeness of the documentation for the processes used  to determine whether or not industry personnel are eligible for a top  secret clearance and to decrease future concerns about the reciprocal  acceptance of clearances issued by other agencies, we are recommending  that the Director of the Office of Management and Budget direct the  Deputy Director for Management, in his oversight role of the  governmentwide clearance process, to take the following actions:    Require OPM and DOD to (1) submit to the Deputy Director their  procedures for eliminating the deficiencies that we identified in their  investigative and adjudicative documentation and (2) develop and report  metrics on completeness and other measures of quality that will address  the effectiveness of the new procedures. GAO’s High-Risk Program. DOD Personnel Clearances: Government Plan Addresses Some Long- standing Problems with DOD’s Program, But Concerns Remain. GAO’s 2005 High-Risk Update.
Why GAO Did This Study

The damage that unauthorized disclosure of classified information can cause to national security necessitates the prompt and careful consideration of who is granted a security clearance. However, long-standing delays and other problems with DOD's clearance program led GAO to designate it a high-risk area in January 2005. DOD transferred its investigations functions to the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) in February 2005. The Office of Management and Budget's (OMB) Deputy Director for Management is coordinating governmentwide efforts to improve the clearance process. Congress asked GAO to examine the clearance process for industry personnel. This report addresses the timeliness of the process and completeness of documentation used to determine the eligibility of industry personnel for top secret clearances. To assess timeliness, GAO examined 2,259 cases of personnel granted top secret eligibility in January and February 2006. For the completeness review, GAO compared documentation in 50 randomly sampled initial clearances against federal standards.

What GAO Found

GAO's analysis of timeliness data showed that industry personnel contracted to work for the federal government waited more than one year on average to receive top secret clearances, longer than OPM-produced statistics would suggest. GAO's analysis of 2,259 cases in its population showed the process took an average of 446 days for initial clearances and 545 days for clearance updates. While OMB has a goal for the application-submission phase of the process to take 14 days or less, it took an average of 111 days. In addition, GAO's analyses showed that OPM used an average of 286 days to complete initial investigations for top secret clearances, well in excess of the 180-day goal specified in the plan that OMB and others developed for improving the clearance process. Finally, the average time for adjudication (determination of clearance eligibility) was 39 days, compared to the 30-day requirement that starts in December 2006. An inexperienced investigative workforce, not fully using technology, and other causes underlie these delays. Delays may increase costs for contracts and risks to national security. In addition, statistics from OPM, the agency with day-to-day responsibility for tracking investigations and adjudications, underrepresent the time used in the process. For example, the measurement of time does not start immediately upon the applicant's submission of a request for clearance. Not fully accounting for all the time used in the process hinders congressional oversight of the efforts to address the delays. OPM provided incomplete investigative reports to DOD, and DOD personnel who review the reports to determine a person's eligibility to hold a clearance (adjudicators) granted eligibility for industry personnel whose investigative reports contained unresolved issues, such as unexplained affluence and potential foreign influence. In its review of 50 investigative reports for initial clearances, GAO found that that almost all (47 of 50) cases were missing documentation required by federal investigative standards. At least half of the reports did not contain the required documentation in three investigative areas: residence, employment, or education. Moreover, federal standards indicate expansion of investigations may be necessary to resolve issues, but GAO found at least one unresolved issue in 27 of the reports. We also found that the DOD adjudicators granted top secret clearance eligibility for all 27 industry personnel whose investigative reports contained unresolved issues without requesting additional information or documenting that the information was missing in the adjudicative report. In its November 2005 assessment of the government plan for improving the clearance process, GAO raised concerns about the limited attention devoted to assessing quality in the clearance process, but the plan has not been revised to address the shortcomings GAO identified. The use of incomplete investigations and adjudications in granting top secret clearance eligibility increases the risk of unauthorized disclosure of classified information. Also, it could negatively affect efforts to promote reciprocity (an agency's acceptance of a clearance issued by another agency) being developed by an interagency working group headed by OMB's Deputy Director.