	Background

Since the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United States, DOD  has launched three major military operations requiring significant military  personnel: Operation Noble Eagle, which covers military operations related  to homeland security; Operation Enduring Freedom, which includes  ongoing military operations in Afghanistan and certain other countries; and  Operation Iraqi Freedom, which includes ongoing military operations in  Iraq. Many congressional and military observers have expressed concern  that the current operations tempo, combined with the level of casualties in  Iraq, might lead to lower recruiting and retention rates, thereby raising  questions about DOD’s ability to sustain long-term force requirements. In  addition, there are growing concerns that a number of stress factors, such  as back-to-back and/or lengthy overseas deployments and heavier reliance  on the reserve components in the Army and Marine Corps, may  significantly hinder DOD’s overall ability to effectively recruit and retain  forces. Military Components Generally Met Overall Recruiting and Retention Goals for the Past 5 Fiscal Years (2000-2004), but Some Components Have Missed Early 2005 Goals

The military components generally met their overall recruiting and  retention goals over the past 5 fiscal years. However, some are beginning to  experience difficulties in meeting their overall recruiting and retention  goals for fiscal year 2005. However, it should be noted that the “stop loss” policy implemented by  several components shortly after September 11, 2001, might have  facilitated these components in meeting their overall recruiting goals for  fiscal year 2002 and beyond. A “stop loss” policy requires some  servicemembers to remain in the military beyond their contract separation  or retirement date. The Marine Corps missed its  January goal of 3,270 new recruits by 84 people, or 2.6 percent, and  narrowly missed its goal again in February. This  is significant, given that the Army has also called members of the Individual  Ready Reserve into active duty and moved thousands of recruits from its  delayed entry program into basic training ahead of schedule. The Army  Reserve and Army National Guard achieved 87 and 80 percent of their  overall recruiting goals, respectively. DOD has noted that the Army Reserve  components will be particularly challenged, since more active Army  soldiers are staying in the active force, and of those leaving, fewer are  joining the reserve components. Most Overall Retention Goals Met for Past 5 Years

According to DOD data, the four active components generally met their  enlisted aggregate retention goals from fiscal year 2000 through fiscal year  2004. Table 3 shows that the Army is the only active component that met all of its  retention goals for fiscal years 2000 through 2004. The Air Force also missed two  of its reenlistment goals for active duty enlisted personnel in the first  quarter of fiscal year 2005. Aggregate Recruitment and Retention Data Do Not Identify Over- or Under-staffing within Certain Military Occupations

Recruitment and retention rates, when shown in the aggregate, do not  provide a complete representation of occupations that are either over- or  under-filled. We requested the active, reserve, and Guard components  provide us with their list of hard-to-fill occupations. On the basis of data for  7 of 10 components, we identified several hundred occupations that have  been consistently designated as hard-to-fill because the components had  not been able to successfully recruit and retain sufficient numbers of  personnel in these areas to meet current or projected needs. Of these, we  identified 73 occupations as being consistently hard to fill. Further analysis of the data shows that 7 of the Army’s occupations  (infantry, fire support specialist, cavalry scout, chemical operations  specialist, motor transport operator, petroleum supply specialist, and food  service specialist) and 6 of the Air Force’s occupations (airborne linguist;  combat control; imagery analysis; linguist; SERE [survival, evasion,  resistance, escape operations]; pararescue, and explosive ordnance  disposal) are on both the services’ “hard to recruit” and “hard to retain”  lists. DOD, for example, expanded the pool of servicemembers who are eligible  to receive a selective reenlistment bonus. The Army, for  instance, increased the amount of cash bonuses it offers to new recruits in  hard-to-fill military occupations up to $20,000. The Army increased the maximum  college scholarship from $50,000 to $70,000, while the Army National  Guard doubled the amount it will provide to repay a recruit’s student loan  to $20,000. The Army  plans to add 965 recruiters to its recruiter force in fiscal year 2005, for a  total force of 6,030 recruiters, and the Marine Corps plans to add 425  recruiters to its recruiter force by fiscal year 2007, bringing its total  recruiter force to 3,025 recruiters.
Why GAO Did This Study

To meet its human capital needs, the Department of Defense (DOD) must convince several hundred thousand people to join the military each year while, at the same time, retain thousands of personnel to sustain its active duty, reserve, and National Guard forces. Since September 11, 2001, DOD has launched three major military operations requiring significant military personnel--Operation Noble Eagle, Operation Enduring Freedom, and Operation Iraqi Freedom. The high pace of military operations combined with the level of casualties in Iraq and other factors, such as lengthy overseas deployments, have raised concerns about DOD's ability to recruit and retain sufficient numbers of personnel who possess the skills and experience needed. This testimony presents GAO's preliminary findings on (1) the extent to which the active duty, reserve, and Guard components have met their overall recruiting and retention goals, (2) the degree to which the components have met their recruiting and retention goals for selected hard-to-fill critical occupations, and (3) steps the components have taken to enhance their recruiting and retention efforts. This testimony focuses on enlisted personnel. In continuing its work, GAO will assess the reliability of DOD-provided data and plans to issue a report on these issues this fall.

What GAO Found

DOD's 10 military components generally met their overall recruitment and retention goals for each of the past 5 fiscal years (FY), but some of the components experienced difficulties in meeting their overall goals in early FY 2005. However, it should be noted that several components introduced a "stop loss" policy shortly after September 11, 2001. The "stop loss" policy requires some servicemembers to remain in the military beyond their contract separation date, which may reduce the number of personnel the components must recruit. During FY 2000-2004, each of the active components met or exceeded their overall recruiting goals. However, for January 2005, the Marine Corps missed its overall active duty recruiting goal by 84 recruits and narrowly missed its goal again for February 2005. The Army also missed its overall recruiting goal for February 2005 by almost 2,000 recruits. This is significant, given that the Army has also already called up members from the Individual Ready Reserve and moved new recruits from its delayed entry program into basic training earlier than scheduled. Four of the six reserve components mostly met their overall recruiting goals for FYs 2000 through 2004, but many experienced difficulties in early FY 2005. DOD has noted that the Army Reserve components will be particularly challenged, since fewer active Army soldiers leaving active duty are joining the reserves. In terms of retention, the active components generally met their overall retention goals for the past 5 FYs. The Army, for example, met or exceeded overall retention goals from FY 2000 through FY 2004. The Army and the Air Force, however, missed retention goals in the first quarter of FY 2005. Overall recruitment and retention data do not provide a complete representation of military occupations that are either over- or under-staffed. For example, GAO's analysis of early FY 2005 data shows that 63 percent of the Army's active component specialties are overfilled and 32 percent are underfilled. Also, several hundred hard-to-fill occupations exist within the 10 DOD components. GAO identified 73 occupations that have been consistently designated as hard-to-fill occupations. GAO's analysis also shows that 7 of the Army's current occupations (e.g., infantry and cavalry scout) and 6 of the Air Force's current occupations (e.g., combat control and linguist) are on both their "hard-to-recruit" and "hard-to-retain" lists. DOD's components have been taking a number of steps to enhance their recruiting and retention efforts. For example, DOD has expanded eligibility for selective reenlistment bonuses and has also begun offering reenlistment bonuses of as much as $150,000 to special operation forces personnel with 19 or more years of experience who reenlist for an additional 6 years. The Army increased the amount of cash bonuses it offers to new recruits in hard-to-fill military occupations to as much as $20,000. The Army also increased its maximum college scholarship from $50,000 to $70,000. In addition, the Army plans to add 965 recruiters in FY 2005, and the Marine Corps plans to add 425 recruiters by FY 2007.