For example, for pandemic  planning purposes, essential functions may be more inclusive and extend  longer than the 30-day traditional COOP-essential functions. Agencies Report Being in Various Stages of Planning for the Protection of Their Employees in the Event of a Pandemic

Our survey questions for the 24 agencies were drawn from pandemic  planning checklists and federal guidance to help agencies plan for  protecting their employees during a pandemic. Nineteen  agencies reported that they had identified essential functions at both the  department and component levels that cannot be continued through  telework in the event of pandemic influenza or, in the case of the Office of  Personnel Management (OPM), the U.S. Agency for International  Development (USAID), and the National Science Foundation (NSF),  determined that all of their essential or important government functions  could be performed remotely. Although many of  the agencies’ pandemic influenza plans rely on social distancing strategies,  primarily telework, to carry out the functions of the federal government in  the event of a pandemic outbreak, only one agency, NSF stated that it  tested its IT infrastructure to a great extent. On the other hand, five agencies reported testing their IT  systems to little or not extent. Pandemic Preparations for Correctional Workers, Production Staff Responsible for Disbursing Federal Payments, and Air Traffic Controllers Are in Various Stages of Development

		BOP Has Taken Steps to Protect Correctional Workers in the Event of a Pandemic

BOP, a component of DOJ, has the mission of protecting society by  confining offenders in the controlled environments of prisons and  community-based facilities that are safe, humane, cost-efficient, and  appropriately secure and that provide work and other self-improvement  opportunities to assist offenders in becoming law-abiding citizens. The Air Traffic Organization, FAA’s line of business responsible for the air  traffic management services that air traffic controllers provide, had not  directed facilities, such as its air route traffic control centers, to develop  pandemic-specific plans or incorporate these pandemic plans into their all- hazards contingency plans. FAA recently completed a study examining the feasibility of air  traffic controllers using powered air purifying respirators. Because of a  number of concerns with using the respirators, such as noise, visibility,  and comfort, FAA officials concluded that their long-term use during a  pandemic appears to be impractical. The Office of Aviation Medicine’s  policy on the use of antiviral medication for prophylactic use by on-duty  controllers was still in draft as of early 2009. Monitoring and Reporting on Agencies’ Pandemic Workforce Protection Plans Could Improve Efforts to Protect Employees in the Event of a Pandemic

The survey results from the 24 CFO Act agency pandemic coordinators, as  well as information from the case study agencies, indicate that a wide  range of pandemic planning activities are under way and that all of the  agencies are taking steps to some degree to protect their workers in the  event of a pandemic. Under the HSC’s Implementation Plan, DHS was charged with, among  other things, monitoring and reporting to the Executive Office of the  President on the readiness of departments and agencies to continue their  operations while protecting their workers during an influenza pandemic. DHS  officials said they were informed that they did not have to prepare a  report. Concluding Observations and Prior Recommendations

The spring 2009 outbreak of H1N1 influenza accentuates the responsibility  of agencies to have pandemic plans that ensure their ability to continue  operations while protecting their workers who serve the American public. In addition, there is no real monitoring mechanism in place to ensure  that agencies’ workforce pandemic plans are complete. A monitoring  process should be in place that would ensure that federal agencies are  making progress in developing their plans to protect their workforce in the  event of a pandemic and that agencies have the information and guidance  they need to develop operational pandemic plans. To address this issue, our report recommended that the HSC request that  the Secretary of Homeland Security monitor and report to the Executive  Office of the President on the readiness of agencies to continue their  operations while protecting their workers during an influenza pandemic. We also suggested that to help support its oversight  responsibilities, the Congress may want to consider requiring DHS to  report to it on agencies’ progress in developing and implementing their  pandemic plans, including any key challenges and gaps in the plans. DHS commented that our recommendations would contribute  to its future efforts to ensure that government entities are well prepared  for what may come next.
Why GAO Did This Study

As evidenced by the spring 2009 outbreak of the H1N1 virus, an influenza pandemic remains a real threat to the nation and the world and has the potential to shut down work critical to the smooth functioning of society. This testimony addresses (1) the extent to which federal agencies have made pandemic plans to protect workers who cannot work remotely and are not first responders; (2) the pandemic plans selected agencies have for certain occupations performing essential functions other than first response; and (3) the opportunities to improve agencies' workforce pandemic plans. The issues discussed in the testimony are based on the GAO report, Influenza Pandemic: Increased Agency Accountability Could Help Protect Federal Employees Serving the Public in the Event of a Pandemic ( GAO-09-404 , June 12, 2009). In this report, GAO recommended that the Homeland Security Council (HSC) request that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) monitor and report to the Executive Office of the President on the readiness of agencies to continue operations while protecting their employees in the event of a pandemic. To help carry out its oversight role, the Congress may want to consider requiring a similar report from DHS. The HSC noted that it will give serious consideration to the findings and recommendations in the report, and DHS said the report will contribute to its efforts to ensure government entities are well prepared for what may come next.

What GAO Found

GAO surveyed the 24 agencies employing nearly all federal workers to gain an overview of governmentwide pandemic influenza preparedness efforts and found that a wide range of pandemic planning activities are under way. However, as of early 2009, several agencies reported that they were still developing their pandemic plans and their measures to protect their workforce. For example, several agencies had yet to identify essential functions during a pandemic that cannot be performed remotely. In addition, although many of the agencies' pandemic plans rely on telework to carry out their functions, five agencies reported testing their information technology capability to little or no extent. To get a more in-depth picture of agency planning, GAO selected three case study agencies that represent essential occupations other than first response that cannot be performed remotely. The three case study occupations--correctional workers, production staff disbursing federal checks, and air traffic controllers--showed differences in the degree to which their individual facilities had operational pandemic plans. For example, the Bureau of Prisons' correctional workers had only recently been required to develop pandemic plans for their correctional facilities. Nevertheless, the Bureau of Prisons has considerable experience limiting the spread of infectious disease within its correctional facilities and had also made arrangements for antiviral medications for a portion of its workers and inmates. The Department of the Treasury's Financial Management Service, which has production staff involved in disbursing federal payments such as Social Security checks, had pandemic plans for its four regional centers and had stockpiled personal protective equipment such as respirators, gloves, and hand sanitizers at the centers. Air traffic control management facilities, where air traffic controllers work, had not yet developed facility pandemic plans or incorporated pandemic plans into their all-hazards contingency plans. The Federal Aviation Administration had recently completed a study to determine the feasibility of the use of respirators by air traffic controllers and concluded that their long-term use during a pandemic appears to be impractical. There is no mechanism in place to monitor and report on agencies' progress in developing workforce pandemic plans. Under the National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza Implementation Plan, DHS was required to monitor and report on the readiness of departments and agencies to continue operations while protecting their employees during an influenza pandemic. The HSC, however, informed DHS in late 2006 or early 2007 that no specific reports on this were required to be submitted. Rather, the HSC requested that agencies certify to the council that they were addressing in their plans the applicable elements of a pandemic checklist in 2006 and again in 2008. This process did not include any assessment or reporting on the status of agency plans. Given agencies' uneven progress in developing their pandemic plans, monitoring and reporting would enhance agencies' accountability for protecting their employees in the event of a pandemic.