DOD, DOE, and State fund,  manage, and implement the global nuclear detection architecture’s  international programs. DNDO Has Begun to Develop Programs to Enhance the Initial Architecture, but It Lacks an Overarching Strategic Plan for Achieving Future Architecture Improvements

In October 2005, a few months after its inception, DNDO completed its  initial inventory of federal programs associated with detecting the illicit  transport of radiological and nuclear materials. As part of this effort,  DNDO defined the architecture’s general approach: a multilayered  detection framework of radiation detection equipment and interdiction  activities to combat nuclear smuggling in foreign countries, at the U.S.  border, and inside the United States. DNDO identified  several gap areas with respect to detecting potential nuclear smuggling,  such as (1) land border crossings into the United States between formal  points of entry, (2) small maritime craft (any vessel less than 300 gross  tons) that enter the United States, and (3) international general aviation. To address the gaps identified in the domestic portions of the architecture,  DNDO has initiated pilot programs to address primary areas of concern or  potential vulnerability. To date, we have received briefings on each of these programs from  DNDO, but we have not yet fully reviewed how they are being  implemented. While each agency that has a role  in the architecture may have its own planning documents, DNDO has not  produced an overarching strategic plan that can guide its efforts to  address the gaps and move to a more comprehensive global nuclear  detection architecture. For example, such a plan would define how DNDO will achieve and  monitor the goal of detecting the movement of radiological and nuclear  materials through potential smuggling routes, such as small maritime craft  or land borders in between ports of entry. DNDO and Other Agencies Face Coordination, Technological, and Management Challenges

DNDO and other agencies face a number of challenges in developing a  global nuclear detection architecture, including (1) coordinating detection  efforts across federal, state, and local agencies and with other nations, (2)  dealing with the limitations of detection technology, and (3) managing the  implementation of the architecture. In  order for the architecture to be effective, all parts need to be well thought  out, managed, and coordinated. DNDO has been charged with developing  an architecture that depends on programs implemented by other agencies. This lack of control over these programs poses a challenge for DNDO in  ensuring that all individual programs within the global nuclear detection  architecture will be effectively integrated. In spite of these challenges, DNDO’s efforts to develop a global nuclear  detection architecture have yielded some benefits, according to DOD,  DOE, and State officials. Approximately $2.8 Billion in Fiscal Year 2007 Funded Programs Associated with Detecting the Transport of Radiological and Nuclear Weapons or Materials

DNDO reported that approximately $2.8 billion was budgeted in fiscal year  2007 for 74 programs focused on preventing and detecting the illicit  transport of radiological or nuclear materials. Specifically:    $1.1 billion funded 28 programs focused on the international aspects of the    $221 million funded 9 programs to support detection of radiological and  nuclear material at the U.S. border;   $918 million funded 16 programs dedicated to detecting and securing  radiological or nuclear materials within the U.S. borders; and   $577 million funded 34 cross-cutting programs that support many different  layers of the architecture by, for example, research and development or  technical support to users of the detection equipment. Although DNDO  has taken some steps to achieve these ends, it has not done so within the  larger context of an overarching strategic plan with clearly established  goals, responsibilities, priorities, resource needs, and mechanisms for  assessing progress along the way. Recommendations for Executive Action

We recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security, in coordination  with the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Energy, and the Secretary  of State, develop a strategic plan to guide the development of a more  comprehensive global nuclear detection architecture.
Why GAO Did This Study

In April 2005, a Presidential Directive established the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) within the Department of Homeland Security to enhance and coordinate federal, state, and local efforts to combat nuclear smuggling domestically and abroad. DNDO was directed to develop, in coordination with the departments of Defense (DOD), Energy (DOE), and State (State), an enhanced global nuclear detection architecture--an integrated system of radiation detection equipment and interdiction activities. DNDO implements the domestic portion of the architecture, while DOD, DOE, and State are responsible for related programs outside the U.S. This testimony provides preliminary observations based on ongoing work addressing (1) the status of DNDO's efforts to develop a global nuclear detection architecture, (2) the challenges DNDO and other federal agencies face in implementing the architecture, and (3) the costs of the programs that constitute the architecture. This statement draws on prior GAO reviews of programs constituting the architecture, and GAO's work on strategic planning

What GAO Found

According to GAO's preliminary work to date, DNDO has taken steps to develop a global nuclear detection architecture but lacks an overarching strategic plan to help guide how it will achieve a more comprehensive architecture. Specifically, DNDO has developed an initial architecture after coordinating with DOD, DOE, and State to identify 74 federal programs that combat smuggling of nuclear or radiological material. DNDO has also identified gaps in the architecture, such as land border crossings into the United States between formal points of entry, small maritime vessels, and international general aviation. Although DNDO has started to develop programs to address these gaps, it has not yet developed an overarching strategic plan to guide its transition from the initial architecture to a more comprehensive architecture. For example, such a plan would define across the entire architecture how DNDO would achieve and monitor its goal of detecting the movement of radiological and nuclear materials through potential smuggling routes, such as small maritime craft or land borders in between points of entry. The plan would also define the steps and resources needed to achieve a more comprehensive architecture and provide metrics for measuring progress toward goals. DNDO and other federal agencies face a number of coordination, technological, and management challenges. First, prior GAO reports have demonstrated that U.S.-funded radiological detection programs overseas have proven problematic to implement and sustain and have not been effectively coordinated, although there have been some improvements in this area. Second, detection technology has limitations and cannot detect and identify all radiological and nuclear materials. For example, smugglers may be able to effectively mask or shield radiological materials so that it evades detection. Third, DNDO faces challenges in managing implementation of the architecture. DNDO has been charged with developing an architecture that depends on programs implemented by other agencies. This responsibility poses a challenge for DNDO in ensuring that the individual programs within the global architecture are effectively integrated and coordinated to maximize the detection and interdiction of radiological or nuclear material. According to DNDO, approximately $2.8 billion was budgeted in fiscal year 2007 for the 74 programs included in the global nuclear detection architecture. Of this $2.8 billion, $1.1 billion was budgeted for programs to combat nuclear smuggling internationally; $220 million was devoted to programs to support the detection of radiological and nuclear material at the U.S. border; $900 million funded security and detection activities within the United States; and approximately $575 million was used to fund a number of cross-cutting activities. The future costs for DNDO and other federal agencies to address the gaps identified in the initial architecture are not yet known or included in these amounts.