	Background

NEDCTP’s mission is to deter and detect the introduction of explosive  devices into the transportation system. TSA Has Taken Steps to Analyze Canine Team Data to Identify Program Trends

Since our January 2013 report, TSA has taken steps to analyze key data  on the performance of its canine teams to better identify program trends,  as we recommended. Specifically, field canine  coordinators reviewed CWS data to determine how many training and  utilization minutes canine teams conducted on a monthly basis. Short notice assessments (covert tests): We found that when TSA  was performing short notice assessments (prior to their suspension in  May 2012), it was not analyzing the results beyond the pass and fail  rates. We concluded that without conducting the assessments and  analyzing the results of these tests to determine if there were any  search areas or type of explosives in which canine teams were more  effective compared with others, and what, if any, training may have  been needed to mitigate deficiencies, TSA was missing an opportunity  to fully utilize the results. In January 2013, we recommended that TSA regularly analyze available  data to identify program trends and areas that are working well and those  in need of corrective action to guide program resources and activities. TSA  concurred with our recommendation and has taken actions to address it. TSA also reinstated short notice  assessments in July 2013, and in the event a team fails, the FCC  completes a report that includes an analysis of the team’s training records  to identify an explanation for the failure. We believe that these actions  address the intent of our recommendation and could better position TSA  to identify program trends to better target resources and activities based  on what is working well and what may be in need of corrective action. TSA Has Conducted Additional PSC Team Effectiveness Assessments and Deployed Some Teams to Highest- Risk Airports, but Additional Actions Are Needed

		TSA Has Conducted Additional PSC Team Effectiveness Assessments, but Has Not Compared PSC Teams with Conventional Canine Teams

In our January 2013 report, we found that TSA began deploying PSC  teams in April 2011 prior to determining the teams’ operational  effectiveness. We recommended that TSA expand and complete testing, in conjunction  with DHS S&T, to assess the effectiveness of PSCs and conventional  canines in all airport areas deemed appropriate prior to making additional  PSC deployments to help (1) determine whether PSCs are effective at  screening passengers, and resource expenditures for PSC training are  warranted, and (2) inform decisions regarding the type of canine team to  deploy and where to optimally deploy such teams within airports. TSA  concurred and has taken some actions to address our recommendation,  but further action is needed to fully address it. TSA Deployed Some PSC Teams to Highest-Risk Airports

In our January 2013 report, we found that TSA’s 2012 Strategic  Framework calls for the deployment of PSC teams based on risk;  however, airport stakeholder concerns about the appropriateness of  TSA’s response resolution protocols for these teams resulted in PSC  teams not being deployed to the highest-risk airports. We recommended that if PSCs are determined to provide an enhanced  security benefit, TSA should coordinate with airport stakeholders to  deploy future PSC teams to the highest-risk airports, and ensure that  deployed PSC teams are utilized as intended, consistent with its statutory  authority to provide for the screening of passengers and their property. Specifically, as of June 2014, the PSC teams for which TSA  had funding and not already deployed to a specific airport at the time our  report was issued have been deployed to, or allocated to, the highest-risk  airports.
Why GAO Did This Study

TSA has implemented a multilayered system composed of people, processes, and technology to protect the nation's transportation system. One of TSA's security layers is NEDCTP, composed of over 800 deployed explosives detection canine teams, including PSC teams trained to detect explosives on passengers.
This testimony addresses the extent to which TSA has (1) regularly analyzed data to identify program trends and areas working well or in need of corrective action, and (2) comprehensively assessed the effectiveness of PSCs, and coordinated with stakeholders to deploy PSC teams to the highest-risk airports and utilize them as intended. This statement is based on a report GAO issued in January 2013 and selected updates obtained from October 2013 through June 2014. For the selected updates, GAO reviewed TSA documentation, including the results of PSC effectiveness assessments, and interviewed agency officials on the status of implementing GAO's recommendations.

What GAO Found

In January 2013, GAO reported that the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) collected and used key canine program data in support of its National Explosives Detection Canine Team Program (NEDCTP), but could better analyze these data to identify program trends. For example, GAO found that in reviewing short notice assessments (covert tests), TSA did not analyze the results beyond the pass and fail rates. Therefore, TSA was missing an opportunity to determine if there were any search areas or types of explosives in which canine teams were more effective compared with others, and what, if any, training may be needed to mitigate deficiencies. GAO recommended that TSA regularly analyze available data to identify program trends and areas that are working well and those in need of corrective action to guide program resources and activities. TSA concurred and has taken actions that address the intent of our recommendation. For example, in the event a team fails a short notice assessment, TSA now requires that canine team supervisors complete an analysis of the team's training records to identify an explanation for the failure.
In January 2013, GAO found that TSA began deploying passenger screening canine (PSC) teams—teams of canines trained to detect explosives being carried or worn on a person—in April 2011 prior to determining the teams' operational effectiveness and where within an airport PSC teams would be most effectively utilized. GAO recommended that TSA expand and complete testing to assess the effectiveness of PSCs and conventional canines (trained to detect explosives in stationary objects) in all airport areas deemed appropriate prior to making additional PSC deployments. This would help (1) determine whether PSCs are effective at screening passengers, and resource expenditures for PSC training are warranted, and (2) inform decisions regarding the type of canine team to deploy and where to optimally deploy such teams. TSA concurred and has taken steps to address the recommendation, but additional action is needed. Specifically, TSA launched a PSC training and assessment initiative and determined PSCs to be most effective when working at the airport checkpoint, but TSA does not plan to conduct a comparison of PSC teams with conventional canine teams as GAO recommended. In January 2013, GAO also found that TSA's 2012 Strategic Framework calls for the deployment of PSC teams based on risk; however, airport stakeholder concerns related to the composition and capabilities of PSC teams resulted in the teams not being deployed to the highest-risk airports. GAO recommended that if PSCs are determined to provide an enhanced security benefit compared with conventional canine teams, TSA should coordinate with airport stakeholders to deploy future PSC teams to the highest-risk airports. TSA concurred and has taken steps to address the recommendation. Specifically, the PSC teams for which TSA had funding and not already deployed to a specific airport at the time GAO's report was issued have been deployed to, or allocated to, the highest-risk airports.

What GAO Recommends

GAO is making no new recommendations in this statement.