Some key recommendations that we have made in the past to improve  DOD’s acquisition process include the following:
Require that systems engineering that is needed to evaluate the  sufficiency of available resources be conducted before weapon  system requirements are formalized;
Require, as a condition for starting a new weapon system program,  that sufficient evidence exists to show there is a match between a  weapon’s system requirements and the resources the program  manager has to develop that weapon;
Require program officials to demonstrate that they have captured  appropriate knowledge at program start (Milestone B), which includes  ensuring that requirements for the product are informed by the  systems engineering process, and establishing cost and schedule  estimates on the basis of knowledge from preliminary design using  system engineering tools;
Have contractors perform more detailed systems engineering analysis  to develop sound requirements before DOD selects a prime contractor  for the systems development contract; and
Define a shipbuilding approach that calls for (1) demonstrating  balance among program requirements, technology demands, and cost  considerations by preliminary design review, and (2) retiring technical  risk and closing any remaining gaps in design requirements before a  contract for detail design is awarded. Military Service Chiefs Are Dissatisfied with Acquisition Outcomes, Citing Requirements Growth as a Key Problem

Most current and former military service chiefs that we interviewed  collectively expressed dissatisfaction with the current acquisition process  and the outcomes it produces. They were concerned that after validated  requirements are handed over to the acquisition process, requirements  are frequently added or changed to increase the scope and capabilities of  a weapon system. According to a number  of both current and former service chiefs, they are not always involved in  the acquisition process and are frequently caught by surprise when these  problems emerge. Current service chiefs and other acquisition leadership generally indicated  the service chiefs have the ability to be more involved in the current  process, such as by attending service and DOD level program reviews. Several current and former service chiefs agreed  that they have been involved in the oversight of some programs, but their  level of involvement is dependent on the importance of the program and  established working relationships with the service acquisition executive. Defining Lower-Level Requirements Is Often the More Significant Contributing Factor to Program Cost Increases

Acting on the chiefs’ concerns, we analyzed all 78 major defense  acquisition programs and found that growth in high-level requirements— and consequent cost growth—was rare. We presented our assessment of the requirements problem to  current and former service chiefs and they generally agreed with it. This allows trade-offs between  requirements and resources to take place, and the establishment of more  realistic cost, schedule, and performance commitments before programs  get underway. Recommendations for Executive Action

To help ensure that requirements are well defined and well understood  before a program is approved to start system development, we  recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the military service  chiefs and service acquisition executives to work together to take the  following two actions:
Assess whether sufficient systems engineering expertise is available  during the requirements development process; and
Develop a better way to make sure sufficient systems engineering is  conducted and opportunities exist to better define requirements and  assess resource trade-offs before a program starts. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

GAO issued a report in 2014 on the military service chiefs’ role in the  acquisition chain of command. This report reviews further related issues  and concerns the military service chiefs have with the Department of  Defense’s (DOD) acquisition process and outcomes it produces. To obtain the views of current and former military service chiefs on the  current acquisition process, we conducted interviews with 12 current and  former military service chiefs and vice chiefs between August and  December 2014. To assess key problems or factors the service chiefs identified with the  acquisition process and our assessment of these issues, we drew upon  our extensive body of work in defense acquisitions and best practices,  and reviewed program execution information from ongoing major defense  acquisition programs.
Why GAO Did This Study

GAO has reported extensively on problems in cost, schedule, and performance for major defense acquisition programs. According to some acquisition reform advocates, expanding the role of the military service chiefs in the process to acquire weapon systems may improve acquisition outcomes.
Following a 2014 GAO report on the service chiefs' role in the acquisition chain of command, GAO was asked to review further related issues and concerns the service chiefs have with the acquisition process and its outcomes. This report examines: (1) the views of current and former military service chiefs on the acquisition process, and (2) key problems or factors the service chiefs identified with the acquisition process and GAO's assessment of these issues.
GAO conducted interviews with 12 current and former military service chiefs and vice chiefs, and with other current and former DOD leadership to discuss the acquisition process. GAO also drew upon its extensive body of work on defense acquisitions and best practices. To assess key problems with the current process, GAO reviewed program execution information on all 78 current major defense programs.

What GAO Found

Most current and former military service chiefs and vice chiefs GAO interviewed from the Army, Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps collectively expressed dissatisfaction with acquisition program outcomes and believed that the Department of Defense's (DOD) requirements development and acquisition processes need to be better integrated. The service chiefs are largely responsible for developing the services' requirements for weapon systems, while the service acquisition executives are responsible for overseeing programs to plan and develop systems. Most service chiefs told GAO they were concerned that after weapon system requirements are handed to the acquisition process, requirements are changed or added by the acquisition community (sometimes referred to as “creep”), increasing the capabilities and cost of the system. Some service chiefs stated that they are not always involved in the acquisition process and are frequently caught by surprise when cost, schedule, and performance problems emerge in programs. Current and former chiefs agreed that the chiefs should be more involved in programs, but their views varied on how best to achieve this.
GAO analyzed requirements for all 78 major defense acquisition programs and found that creep—or growth—in the high-level requirements is rare. Instead, it is after a program has formally started development that the myriad lower-level, technical requirements needed to complete a weapon system's design are defined (see figure). It is the definition of these requirements—most of which occurs after the service chiefs' primary involvement—that leads to the realization that much more time and resources are needed to build the weapon system.
The process of systems engineering translates high-level requirements, such as range, into specifics, like fuel tank size. GAO has previously reported on the importance of conducting systems engineering early so that the consequences of high-level requirements can be confronted before a program starts. When GAO presented its analysis of the problem to the service chiefs, they generally agreed with it. Several noted that trade-offs informed by systems engineering must take place before programs start so that requirements are better defined and more realistic cost, schedule, and performance commitments can be made.

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that DOD ensure sufficient systems engineering is conducted to better define requirements and assess resource trade-offs before a program starts. DOD concurred with the recommendations, citing recent policy changes. GAO believes more focus is needed on implementing actions.