In fiscal  year 2006, CBP detected 21,292 fraudulent U.S. passports, visas, and BCCs  presented by travelers attempting to enter the United States through a U.S.  port of entry. See appendix V for an  overview of the inspection process at U.S. ports of entry. New Passports and Visas Have Been Enhanced, but Prior Generations of Travel Documents Remain More Vulnerable to Fraud, and Document Designs Are Not Periodically Reassessed

State has made enhancements to strengthen new generations of passports  and visas, which contain a variety of security features that, in combination,  are intended to deter attempts to alter or counterfeit the documents;  however, prior generations of these documents have been fraudulently  used and remain more vulnerable to fraudulent attempts for the duration  of their life span. State Does Not Have a Structured Process for Periodically Reassessing and Planning for New Generations of Passports and Visas

State updates or changes the security features of its passports and visas in  response, in part, (1) to detected attempts to counterfeit or alter these  documents and (2) to recommended international standards for secure  travel documents. Steps Taken to Secure Passports and Visas in the Issuance Process, but Additional Measures Are Needed to Address Weaknesses in Oversight of Passport Acceptance Facilities

State and GPO have enacted several measures to ensure the security and  physical quality of passports and are working to address weaknesses  identified in the passport issuance process; however, additional measures  are needed to strengthen the process and minimize vulnerabilities. Limitations in Technology and Training Affect Inspection Officers’ Ability to Fully Utilize Security Features in Passports and Visas

The inspection of U.S. passports and visas at ports of entry is a key  element in ensuring the security of these documents. For example, in advance of State’s issuance of the e-passport and the  emergency passport, State did not provide a sufficient quantity of  exemplars and CBP did not update its training for all inspection officers to  include information on the security features of these new travel  documents. Officers Lack Sufficient Training on the Security Features and Fraudulent Trends of U.S. Despite some improvements,  however, the passport issuance process remains vulnerable, especially at  the application acceptance stage, where oversight of the thousands of  acceptance facilities—responsible for verifying the identity of applicants— remains weak. However, at land  border ports this capability is not available in primary inspection. We also interviewed officials at Department of State’s  Consular Affairs Bureau, Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS)  Forensic Document Laboratory (FDL), the Department of Commerce’s  National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), and the  Government Printing Office (GPO). To identify how State obtains, analyzes,  and shares information on the features and fraudulent use of these  documents, we reviewed relevant documentation, including fraud bulletins  and alerts, and met with State officials from the Diplomatic Security and  Consular Affairs Bureaus, including the fraud prevention units of passport  and visa services, as well as with DHS officials from CBP and FDL. We also conducted site visits  and interviewed officials at seven domestic passport offices and two U.S.  consulates in Mexico. To examine the measures taken to ensure the integrity of the  border crossing card (BCC), we visited two production facilities in  Vermont and Nebraska where BCCs are produced. To observe inspections processes and measures, we conducted site visits  to nine U.S. ports of entry. 3.
Why GAO Did This Study

Travel documents are often used fraudulently in attempts to enter the United States. The integrity of U.S. passports and visas depends on the combination of well-designed security features and solid issuance and inspection processes. GAO was asked to examine (1) the features of U.S. passports and visas and how information on the features is shared; (2) the integrity of the issuance process for these documents; and (3) how these documents are inspected at U.S. ports of entry. We reviewed documents such as studies, alerts, and training materials. We met with officials from the Departments of State, Homeland Security, and Commerce's National Institute of Standards and Technology, and U.S. Government Printing Office, and with officials at seven passport offices, nine U.S. ports of entry, two U.S. consulates in Mexico, and two Border Crossing Card production facilities.

What GAO Found

The Department of State (State) has developed passports and visas, including border crossing cards (BCC), that are more secure than older versions of these documents; however, older versions have been fraudulently used and remain more vulnerable to fraud during their lifespan. For example, earlier versions valid until 2011, of which there are more than 20 million in circulation, remain vulnerable to fraudulent alteration by such means as photo substitution. Although State has updated or changed the security features of its travel documents, State does not have a structured process to periodically reassess the effectiveness of the security features in its documents against evolving threats and to actively plan for new generations. State has taken a number of measures to ensure the security and quality of passports and visas, including establishing internal control standards and quality assurance measures, training of acceptance agents, and initiating new visa policies and procedures. However, additional measures are needed in the passport issuance process to minimize the risk of fraud. State lacks a program for oversight of the thousands of passport acceptance facilities that serve an important function in verifying the identity of millions of passport applicants each year. Officers in primary inspection--the first and most critical opportunity to identify fraudulent travel documents at U.S. ports of entry--are unable to take full advantage of the security features in passports and visas. These officers rely on both their observations of travelers and visual and manual examination of documents to detect fraudulent documents. However, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has not yet provided most ports of entry with the technology tools to read the new electronic passports and does not have a process in place for primary inspectors to utilize fingerprints collected for visas, including BCCs, at all land ports of entry. Moreover, DHS has provided little regular training to update its officers on the security features and fraud trends in passports and visas.