According to NNSA’s Future Years Nuclear Security Program  plan, between fiscal years 2007 and 2011, NNSA is proposing to spend  almost $48.5 billion on its nuclear weapons, nuclear nonproliferation, and  naval reactors programs. However, we highlighted  the need for NNSA to clearly define the roles and responsibilities of  headquarters and field staff and to establish clear lines of authority  between NNSA and its contractors, among other things. Finally, in June 2004, we found that NNSA’s reorganization had addressed  some past problems by better delineating lines of authority and improving  communication. Additional Action Needed to Improve NNSA’s Security Program

Although NNSA has begun to build an effective headquarters security  organization, it still cannot demonstrate that all of its security program  objectives are being met at all of its sites. Specifically, we found that the  results of internal and independent security oversight assessments have  identified weaknesses in physical security at several NNSA sites, including  the Nevada Test Site, the Sandia National Laboratories, and the Y-12  National Security Complex; and weaknesses in cyber security throughout  NNSA. The following factors have contributed to this situation:    Lack of consistent leadership and direction for its security activities. Security personnel staffing shortages at site offices. Lack of adequate training resources and opportunities for site office  security staff. Lack of data to gauge program effectiveness. DOE and NNSA Have Not Yet Fully Determined How NNSA Should Operate as a Separately Organized Agency within DOE

While NNSA has focused considerable attention on reorganizing its  internal operations, it and DOE have continued to struggle with  establishing how NNSA should operate as a separately organized agency  within the department. Second, DOE’s January 2000 implementation plan,  which was required by the NNSA Act, did not define how NNSA would  operate as a separately organized agency within DOE. Specifically, as our report documents, NNSA  and DOE counterintelligence officials have disagreed over (1) the scope  and direction of the counterintelligence program, (2) their ability to jointly  direct staff in the headquarters counterintelligence program offices, (3) the  allocation of counterintelligence resources, (4) counterintelligence  policymaking and (5) their roles and responsibilities in handling specific  counterintelligence matters—in particular with regard to the department’s  handling of the well-publicized mid-2005 intrusion into an unclassified  NNSA computer system and removal of the names and social security  numbers of 1,502 individuals working for NNSA. Several Management Issues Need to be Resolved for NNSA to Become Fully Effective

In addition to identifying the underlying issue of NNSA’s relationship to  DOE, we identified the following four other management areas where  additional NNSA actions could strengthen its ability to manage the nuclear  weapons complex if it took further action. NNSA has made progress in developing a human capital  strategy. Project management. Recognizing the  important role of program managers, NNSA has taken several actions,  such as developing a program management policy. However, NNSA has yet  to identify all of its program managers or train them to a certified level of  competency. Financial management. However,  the Administrator does not have an independent group to review program  proposals, confirm cost estimates, and analyze alternatives. While NNSA has taken some  action in this direction, it is not clear when such a group will be  established. As discussed earlier, while there have been continuing calls for removing  NNSA from DOE and establishing it a separate agency, we do not believe  that such drastic change is necessary to produce an organization that can  provide effective oversight of the nation’s nuclear weapons complex. Department of Energy: Views on the Progress of the National Nuclear  Security Administration in Implementing Title 32, GAO-01-602T  (Washington, D.C.: Apr.
Why GAO Did This Study

During the late 1990s, the Department of Energy (DOE) experienced difficulties with a lack of clear management authority and responsibility that contributed to security problems at the nation's nuclear weapons laboratories and management problems with major projects. In response, Congress created the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) as a separately organized agency within DOE under Title 32 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000--the NNSA Act. Since its creation, NNSA has continued to experience security problems, such as unauthorized access to NNSA computer systems, and cost and schedule overruns on major projects, such as the National Ignition Facility. GAO was asked to review the extent to which NNSA has taken steps to (1) improve security at its laboratories and plants and (2) improve its management practices and revise its organizational structure. In January 2007, GAO issued a report--National Nuclear Security Administration: Additional Actions Needed to Improve Management of the Nation's Nuclear Programs, (GAO-07-36)--that addressed these matters. To carry out its work, GAO reviewed legislation; NNSA policies, plans and budgets; collected and analyzed security performance ratings and interviewed current and former DOE and NNSA officials.

What GAO Found

While NNSA has better delineated lines of authority and improved communication through a reorganization and has made progress in establishing critical management systems, especially in the development of its Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Evaluation process, important weaknesses remain with respect to security; the Administration's relationship with DOE; and project, program and financial management. Although NNSA has begun to build an effective headquarters security organization, it still cannot demonstrate that all of its security program objectives are being met at all of its sites. Specifically, GAO identified weaknesses in physical security at several NNSA sites, including the Nevada Test Site, the Sandia National Laboratories, and the Y-12 National Security Complex; and weaknesses in cyber security throughout NNSA. Four factors have contributed to these problems: (1) lack of consistent NNSA headquarters leadership and direction for security; (2) security personnel staffing shortages at NNSA site offices; (3) lack of adequate training resources and opportunities for site office security staff; and (4) incomplete security data to gauge the effectiveness of NNSA's security program. While NNSA has focused considerable attention on reorganizing its internal operations, it and DOE have continued to struggle with agreeing on how NNSA should operate as a separately organized agency within the department. This lack of agreement has resulted in organizational conflicts that have inhibited effective operations. While there have been continuing calls for removing NNSA from DOE and establishing it as a separate agency, GAO does not believe that such drastic change is necessary to provide effective oversight of the nuclear weapons complex. Rather, DOE and NNSA need to clearly define their working relationships and determine how conflicts will be resolved. Finally, GAO identified several other management weaknesses where additional NNSA actions could strengthen its ability to manage the nuclear weapons complex. For example, among other things, NNSA has not (1) implemented a plan for improving its project management efforts; (2) identified all of its program managers and trained them to a certified level of competency; and (3) established an independent analysis unit to review program budget proposals and analyze budget alternatives. In its recent report, GAO made recommendations to the Secretary of Energy and the Administrator of NNSA to (1) improve NNSA's security oversight program; (2) clearly define NNSA's status as a separately organized agency within DOE; and (3) improve project and program management, and the Administration's planning, programming, budgeting, and evaluation process. NNSA generally agreed with the report and its recommendations. NNSA considered the agency a success but acknowledged there was considerable work yet to be accomplished.