In 1985, the Congress directed the Department of Defense (DOD) to destroy the U.S. stockpile of chemical munitions and establish a management organization within the Army to be responsible for the disposal programs. 1.2.) Recognizing the difficulty of satisfactorily resolving the public concerns associated with each individual disposal location, suggestions have been made to change the program’s basic approach to destruction. Historically, reaching agreement has consistently taken longer than the Army anticipated. In addition, the Army is developing other measures to improve program effectiveness and efficiency. The Army cannot implement some of the more significant cost-reduction initiatives without the cooperation and approval of state regulatory agencies. 3.1.) 3.2.) Conclusions, Matters for Congressional Consideration, and Agency Comments

		Conclusions

While there is general agreement about the need to destroy the chemical stockpile and related nonstockpile materiel, progress has slowed due to the lack of consensus among DOD and affected states and localities about the destruction method that should be used. As a result, the cost and schedule for the disposal programs are uncertain. However, the programs are likely to cost more than the estimated $24.4 billion above current expenditures and take longer than currently planned. The key factors impacting the programs include public concerns about the safety of incineration, compliance with environmental laws and regulations, legislative requirements, and the introduction of alternative disposal technologies. The Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program cost and schedule are largely driven by the degree to which states and local communities are in agreement with the proposed disposal method. Furthermore, the recent congressional direction in the 1997 Authorization and Appropriations Acts to research and develop alternative technologies to destroy assembled chemical munitions indicates that there is continued public concern about the proposed disposal method. Until DOD and the affected states and localities reach agreement on a disposal method for individual sites, the Army will not be able to predict the Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program cost and schedule with any degree of accuracy. Moreover, many of the problems experienced in the stockpile program are also likely to affect the Army’s ability to implement the Nonstockpile Chemical Materiel Program. However, the suggestions create tradeoffs for decision makers and would require changes in existing legal requirements. These suggestions have included deferring plans for additional disposal facilities until an acceptable alternative technology to incineration is developed, consolidating disposal operations at a national or regional sites, destroying selected nonstockpile chemical warfare materiel in stockpile disposal facilities, establishing a centralized disposal facility for nonstockpile materiel, and modifying existing laws and regulations to standardize environmental requirements.
Why GAO Did This Study

GAO assessed the Department of Defense's (DOD) programs for destroying the U.S. stockpile of chemical munitions and planning for the disposal of nonstockpile chemical warfare materiel, focusing on: (1) the programs' cost and schedule; (2) alternatives for improving program effectiveness and efficiency; and (3) actions the Army has and is taking to improve the programs.

What GAO Found

GAO found that: (1) while there is general agreement about the need to destroy the chemical stockpile and related materiel, progress has slowed due to the lack of consensus among DOD and affected states and localities about the destruction method that should be used; (2) as a result, the cost and schedule for the disposal programs are uncertain; however, they will cost more than the estimated $24.4 billion above current expenditures and take longer than currently planned; (3) key factors impacting the programs include public concerns over the safety of incineration, compliance with environmental laws and regulations, legislative requirements, and the introduction of alternative disposal technologies; (4) the Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program cost and schedule are largely driven by the degree to which states and local communities are in agreement with the proposed disposal method at the remaining stockpile sites; (5) based on program experience, reaching agreement has consistently taken longer than the Army anticipated; (6) congressional direction to research and develop alternative technologies to destroy assembled chemical munitions indicates that there are continued public concerns about the proposed disposal method; (7) until DOD and the affected states and localities reach agreement on a disposal method for the remaining stockpile sites, the Army will not be able to predict the Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program cost and schedule with any degree of accuracy; (8) many of the problems experienced in the stockpile program are also likely to affect the Army's ability to implement the Nonstockpile Chemical Materiel Program; (9) recognizing the difficulty of satisfactorily resolving public concerns associated with each individual disposal location, suggestions have been made to change the programs' basic approach to destruction; (10) however, the suggestions create trade-offs for decisionmakers and would require changes in existing legal requirements; (11) these suggestions have included deferring plans for additional disposal facilities until an acceptable alternative technology to incineration is developed, consolidating disposal operations at a national or regional sites, destroying selected nonstockpile chemical warfare materiel in stockpile disposal facilities, establishing a centralized disposal facility for nonstockpile materiel, and modifying existing laws and regulations to standardize environmental requirements; (12) DOD and the Army have taken actions in response to congressional direction and GAO recommendations to improve program management; and (13) however, the Army cannot implement some of the more significant initiatives without the cooperation and approval of state regulatory agencies.