	TWIC Reader Pilot Results Are Not Sufficiently Complete, Accurate, and Reliable for Informing Congress and the TWIC Card Reader Rule

Our review of the pilot test identified several challenges related to pilot  planning, data collection, and reporting, which affected the completeness,  accuracy, and reliability of the results. For example, the independent  test agent reported that the logs from the TWIC readers and related  access control systems were not detailed enough to determine the  reason for errors, such as biometric match failure, an expired TWIC  card, or that the TWIC was identified as being on the list of revoked  credentials. Baseline data, which were to be collected prior to  piloting the use of TWIC with readers, were to be a measure of  throughput time, that is, the time required to inspect a TWIC card and  complete access-related processes prior to granting entry. Specifically,  TSA and the independent test agent did not require pilot participants  to document when individuals were granted access based on a visual  inspection of the TWIC, or deny the individual access as may be  required under future regulation. In addition to these challenges, the independent test agent  identified the lack of a database to track and analyze all pilot data in a  consistent manner as an additional challenge to data collection and  reporting. Reporting

As required by the SAFE Port Act and the Coast Guard Authorization Act  of 2010, DHS’s report to Congress on the TWIC reader pilot presented  several findings with respect to technical and operational aspects of  implementing TWIC technologies in the maritime environment. Given that the results of the pilot are unreliable for informing the TWIC  card reader rule on the technology and operational impacts of using  TWIC cards with readers, we recommended that Congress should  consider repealing the requirement that the Secretary of Homeland  Security promulgate final regulations that require the deployment of card  readers that are consistent with the findings of the pilot program; and that  Congress should consider requiring that the Secretary of Homeland  Security complete an assessment that evaluates the effectiveness of  using TWIC with readers for enhancing port security. These results could then be used to promulgate a final regulation as  appropriate. GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

For questions about this statement, please contact Steve Lord at (202)  512-4379 or lords@gao.gov. Key contributors for the previous work that this testimony is  based on are listed within each individual product.
Why GAO Did This Study

This testimony discusses GAO's work examining the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC) program. Ports, waterways, and vessels handle billions of dollars in cargo annually, and an attack on our nation's maritime transportation system could have serious consequences. Maritime workers, including longshoremen, mechanics, truck drivers, and merchant mariners, access secure areas of the nation's estimated 16,400 maritime-related transportation facilities and vessels, such as cargo container and cruise ship terminals, each day while performing their jobs.
The TWIC program is intended to provide a tamper-resistant biometric credential to maritime workers who require unescorted access to secure areas of facilities and vessels regulated under the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 (MTSA). TWIC is to enhance the ability of MTSA-regulated facility and vessel owners and operators to control access to their facilities and verify workers' identities. Under current statute and regulation, maritime workers requiring unescorted access to secure areas of MTSA-regulated facilities or vessels are required to obtain a TWIC, and facility and vessel operators are required by regulation to visually inspect each worker's TWIC before granting unescorted access. Prior to being granted a TWIC, maritime workers are required to undergo a background check, known as a security threat assessment.

What GAO Found

This statement today highlights the key findings of a report GAO released yesterday on the TWIC program that addressed the extent to which the results from the TWIC reader pilot were sufficiently complete, accurate, and reliable for informing Congress and the TWIC card reader rule. For the report, among other things, GAO assessed the methods used to collect and analyze pilot data since the inception of the pilot in August 2008. GAO analyzed and compared the pilot data with the TWIC reader pilot report submitted to Congress to determine whether the findings in the report are based on sufficiently complete, accurate, and reliable data. Additionally, we interviewed officials at DHS, TSA, and USCG with responsibilities for overseeing the TWIC program, as well as pilot officials responsible for coordinating pilot efforts with TSA and the independent test agent (responsible for planning, evaluating, and reporting on all test events), about TWIC reader pilot testing approaches, results, and challenges.