	Background

In 2007, we identified eight key programs that aim to protect critical  technologies: Arms and Dual-Use Export Controls, Anti-Tamper Policy,  the Foreign Military Sales Program, the National Disclosure Policy  Committee, the Militarily Critical Technologies Program, the National  Industrial Security Program, and the Committee on Foreign Investment in  the United States. As shown in table 1, multiple agencies either have the lead or are  stakeholder agencies for the programs for the identification and protection  of critical technologies. Agencies Have Made Progress in Addressing Previously Identified Weaknesses for Critical Technologies Programs, But Face Some Implementation Challenges

The cognizant agencies have taken actions in each of the programs  designed to protect critical technologies since our January 2007 high-risk  update, in response to changes in law, our prior recommendations, or  their own internal identification of weaknesses. For instance, initiatives  are under way in the area of export controls, which comprises two of the  eight programs, based on an April 2010 framework announced by the  administration. However, some of these eight programs are  facing implementation or additional challenges. An additional three categories of the U.S. GAO, Export Controls: U.S. U.S. A Newly Created Steering Group Supports the Foreign Military Sales Program and National Disclosure Policy Process

Each year, the U.S. government sells billions of dollars of defense articles  and services to foreign governments through the Foreign Military Sales  program. However, DOD has not  formally determined the best approach to meet users’ needs for a  technical reference and to ensure that resources are coordinated and  efficiently devoted to sustain the approach chosen. Interagency Collaboration Exists among Agencies but Improvements Could Be Made

Recent initiatives in response to identified weaknesses in the critical  technologies programs have resulted in improved interagency  collaboration. Some Agencies’ Policies and Mechanisms Support Interagency Collaboration in the Critical Technologies Portfolio

There are both existing mechanisms and new initiatives among the critical  technologies programs that support collaboration. Collaboration among Lead and Stakeholder Agencies Remains a Challenge Across the Critical Technologies Portfolio

Agencies have taken steps to collaborate with other agencies to manage  their individual critical technologies programs; however, current  collaboration mechanisms do not involve direct communication among all  the programs in the protection of critical technologies portfolio. Past work on interagency  collaboration notes that many of the results that the federal government  seeks to achieve require the coordinated efforts of more than one federal  agency and often more than one sector and level of government. For these reasons, it is important  that the agencies responsible for the protection of critical technologies  continue to promote and strengthen mechanisms for effective  collaboration, both within their programs and agencies, as well as across  the interagency community. Doing so would improve their ability to protect  critical technologies and national security interests. Recommendation for Executive Action

To ensure a consistent and more collaborative approach to the protection  of critical technologies, we recommend that the Secretaries of  Commerce, Defense, Homeland Security, State, and the Treasury; as  well as the Attorney General of the United States, who have lead and  stakeholder responsibilities for the eight programs within the critical  technologies portfolio, take steps to promote and strengthen collaboration  mechanisms among their respective programs while ongoing initiatives  are implemented and assessed.
Why GAO Did This Study

Each year, the federal government spends billions of dollars to develop and acquire advanced technologies in order to maintain U.S. superiority in military technology. The U.S. government permits and facilitates the sale and transfer of its technologies to allies in order to promote U.S. national security, foreign policy, and economic interests. However, these technologies can be targets for theft, espionage, reverse engineering, illegal export, and other forms of unauthorized transfer. Accordingly, the U.S. government administers programs to identify and protect its critical technologies.
GAO (1) assessed the progress of the various agencies' efforts and identified implementation challenges, if any, to reform programs and processes to protect critical technologies; and (2) determined the extent to which cognizant agencies are coordinating with stakeholder agencies on their respective reform efforts to ensure effective collaboration. GAO reviewed laws, regulations, and guidance, as well as documentation of agency initiatives to reform programs that protect critical technologies and interviewed officials from lead and stakeholder agencies.

What GAO Found

The agencies responsible for eight programs designed to protect critical technologies have implemented several initiatives since 2007, but face some implementation challenges. Agencies have made progress addressing previously identified weaknesses in response to changes in law, GAO recommendations, or agencies' own internal identification of them. For instance, the area of export controls has seen significant action for reform, based on an April 2010 framework announced by the administration. Other programs, such as the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States, have undergone reform through legislative requirements. As shown in the table below, multiple agencies have responsibility for these eight programs designed to protect critical technologies.
However, some of these eight programs have additional challenges that remain to be addressed. For example, the Department of Defense (DOD) has not yet completed an evaluation of the Militarily Critical Technologies List or potential alternatives in response to GAO recommendations regarding the need to determine the best approach for meeting users' requirements for a technical reference. Further, DOD and the Department of Homeland Security still need to take additional actions to improve shipment tracking and verification procedures of arms sales to foreign allies for the Foreign Military Sales program.
Both existing mechanisms and some new initiatives among the critical technologies programs support collaboration, but collaboration among lead and stakeholder agencies remains a challenge. GAO's September 2012 work on interagency collaboration mechanisms notes that many of the meaningful results the federal government seeks to achieve require the coordinated efforts of more than one federal agency. Recent initiatives have resulted in improved interagency collaboration. For example, DOD offices now communicate with non-DOD agencies through a formally instituted group to discuss potential technology transfers to foreign governments. However, current collaboration mechanisms do not involve direct communication among all the programs in the protection of critical technologies portfolio. Improved collaboration among the programs and agencies involved in the protection of critical technologies could help increase their efficiency and effectiveness.

What GAO Recommends

To ensure a consistent and collaborative approach to the protection of critical technologies, GAO recommends that agencies with lead and stakeholder responsibilities take steps to promote and strengthen collaboration mechanisms among their respective programs.