Tools Used to Identify and Track CBRN Materials

First responders have two primary tools in CBRN events: (1) equipment to  identify CBRN materials in the atmosphere and (2) information from  plume models and field measurements that track the atmospheric  dispersion of CBRN materials. Second, according to DHS,  chemical detection equipment is generally inadequate to provide  information on the presence of chemical warfare agents at less than lethal  but still potentially harmful levels. Current Radiological and Nuclear Detection Equipment First Responders Use Cannot Detect the Dispersion of Releases in the Atmosphere

While equipment first responders use for detecting radiological and  nuclear materials can detect the presence of significant amounts of these  materials, they cannot predict their dispersion in the atmosphere. Under the current BioWatch system, a threat agent is  not identified until several hours to more than a day after the release of the  agent, and the system does not determine how much material was  released. One official said that first  responders are purchasing biodetection equipment that is “junk” because  there are no standards and testing programs. DHS has two programs in place to provide first responders with  information about CBRN detection equipment. U.S. interagency  studies, however, have concluded that these models have major  limitations. First responders’ key questions are, What was  released, when, where, and how much? Data Are Insufficient on How Exposure to CBRN Materials Affects Health

Significant gaps exist in first responders’ information for determining the  effects of exposure to CBRN materials on heterogeneous urban  populations. Scientific research on the effects of low-level exposure to  CBRN material on civilian populations is severely lacking, especially for  vulnerable populations such as elderly people, children, and individuals  with compromised immune systems. Conclusions

Despite several initiatives and investments DHS and other agencies have  undertaken since 2001, first responders do not have effective tools to  respond to events involving the release of CBRN materials in urban areas. While DHS indicated it  has missions to develop, independently test, and certify CB detection  equipment for first responders’ use, its testing and certification are limited  to equipment DHS is developing and does not extend to equipment  developed by commercial manufacturers. While existing urban plume models have several limitations as a primary  tool for tracking the release of CBRN materials in urban areas, the  TOPOFF exercises demonstrated the larger problem of confusion among  first responders about the timing, value, and limitations of plume models  and other analyses following a CBRN event. Recommendations for Executive Action

We recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security  reach agreement with DOD, DOE, EPA, and other agencies involved  with developing, testing, and certifying CBRN detection equipment on  which agency should have the missions and responsibilities to  develop, independently test, and certify detection equipment that first  responders can use to detect hazardous material releases in the  atmosphere;  ensure that manufacturers’ claims are independently tested and  validated regarding whether their commercial off-the-shelf CBRN  detection equipment can detect given hazardous material at specific  sensitivities;  refine IMAAC’s procedures by working with other federal, state, and  local agencies to (1) develop common/joint IMAAC emergency  response practices, including procedures for dealing with  contradictory plume modeling information from other agencies  during a CBRN event; (2) refine the concept of operations for  chemical, biological, and radiological releases; and (3) delineate the  type and scale of major CBRN incidents that would qualify for IMAAC  assistance; and  in conjunction with IMAAC, work with the federal plume modeling  community to accelerate research and development to address plume  model deficiencies in urban areas and improve federal modeling and  assessment capabilities. However, DHS has adopted few  performance standards for CBRN detection equipment. We also interviewed operations staff of  the Interagency Modeling and Atmospheric Assessment Center (IMAAC) at  LLNL.
Why GAO Did This Study

First responders are responsible for responding to terrorist-related and accidental releases of CBRN materials in urban areas. Two primary tools for identifying agents released and their dispersion and effect are equipment to detect and identify CBRN agents in the environment and plume models to track the dispersion of airborne releases of these agents. GAO reports on the limitations of the CBRN detection equipment, its performance standards and capabilities testing, plume models available for tracking urban dispersion of CBRN materials, and information for determining how exposure to CBRN materials affects urban populations. To assess the limitations of CBRN detection equipment and urban plume modeling for first responders' use, GAO met with and obtained data from agency officials and first responders in three states.

What GAO Found

While the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and other agencies have taken steps to improve homeland defense, local first responders still do not have tools to accurately identify right away what, when, where, and how much chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear (CBRN) materials are released in U.S. urban areas, accidentally or by terrorists. Equipment local first responders use to detect radiological and nuclear material cannot predict the dispersion of these materials in the atmosphere. No agency has the mission to develop, certify, and test equipment first responders can use for detecting radiological materials in the atmosphere. According to DHS, chemical detectors are marginally able to detect an immediately dangerous concentration of chemical warfare agents. Handheld detection devices for biological agents are not reliable or effective. DHS's BioWatch program monitors air samples for biothreat agents in selected U.S. cities but does not provide first responders with real-time detection capability. Under the BioWatch system, a threat agent is identified within several hours to more than 1 day after it is released, and how much material is released cannot be determined. DHS has adopted few standards for CBRN detection equipment and has no independent testing program to validate whether it can detect CBRN agents at the specific sensitivities manufacturers claim. DHS has a mission to develop, test, and certify first responders' CB detection equipment, but its testing and certification cover equipment DHS develops, not what first responders buy. Interagency studies show that federal agencies' models to track the atmospheric release of CBRN materials have major limitations in urban areas. DHS's national TOPOFF exercises have demonstrated first responders' confusion over competing plume models' contradictory results. The Interagency Modeling and Atmospheric Assessment Center (IMAAC), created to coordinate modeling predictions, lacks procedures to resolve contradictory predictions. Evaluations and field testing of plume models developed for urban areas show variable predictions in urban environments. They are limited in obtaining accurate data on the characteristics and rate of CBRN material released. Data on population density, land use, and complex terrain are critical to first responders, but data on the effects of exposure to CBRN materials on urban populations have significant gaps. Scientific research is lacking on how low-level exposure to CBRN material affects civilian populations, especially elderly persons, children, and people whose immune systems are compromised.