MSHA Devoted Substantial Effort to Approving Mine Plans, but Did Not Provide Adequate Oversight of the Approval Process

MSHA had extensive procedures and highly qualified staff for approving  two of the three types of plans we reviewed—ventilation and roof support  plans—and most of these plans were reviewed and approved on a timely  basis. In addition, MSHA did not always effectively coordinate its inspections of  mine plans with the comprehensive quarterly inspections of underground  coal mines in order to avoid duplication of effort by district staff. Although MSHA had extensive inspection procedures, we found that some  of them were unclear and were located in so many different sources that  they could be difficult to find. However, MSHA headquarters did not  monitor district office performance to ensure that inspectors followed up  with mine operators to determine that unsafe conditions identified during  these inspections were corrected. In addition, although we found that, as of 2003, about 44 percent of  MSHA’s highly trained and experienced underground coal mine inspectors  would be eligible to retire within 5 years—and the agency’s historic  attrition rates indicated that many of them would actually retire—the  agency had not developed a plan for replacing these inspectors. We recommended that the Secretary of Labor direct  the Assistant Secretary for Mine Safety and Health to monitor the timeliness of inspections of ventilation and roof control  plans to ensure that all inspections are completed by district offices as  required; monitor follow-up actions taken by its district offices to ensure that  mine operators are correcting hazards identified during inspections on  a timely basis; update and consolidate guidance provided to its district offices on plan  approval and inspections to eliminate inconsistencies and outdated  instructions, including clarifying guidance on coordinating regular  quarterly inspections of mines with other inspections; develop a plan for addressing anticipated shortages in the number of  qualified inspectors due to upcoming retirements, including  considering options such as streamlining the agency’s hiring process  and offering retention allowances; amend the guidance provided to independent contractors engaged in  high-hazard activities requiring them to report information on the  number of hours worked by their staff at specific mines so that MSHA  can use this information to compute the injury and fatality rates used  to measure the effectiveness of its enforcement efforts; and  revise the systems MSHA uses to collect information on accidents and  investigations to provide better data on accidents and make it easier to  link injuries, accidents, and investigations.
Why GAO Did This Study

The Chairman, Subcommittee on Labor, HHS and Education, Senate Committee on Appropriations, asked GAO to submit a statement for the record highlighting findings from our 2003 report on how well the Department of Labor's Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA) oversees its process for reviewing and approving critical types of mine plans and the extent to which MSHA's inspections and accident investigations processes help ensure the safety and health of underground coal miners.

What GAO Found

As of 2003, to help ensure the safety and health of underground coal miners, MSHA staff reviewed and approved mine plans, conducted inspections, and investigated serious accidents. In these three areas, MSHA had extensive procedures and qualified staff. However, we concluded that MSHA could improve its oversight, guidance, and human-capital-planning efforts. We found that MSHA was not effectively monitoring a few key areas. MSHA headquarters did not ensure that 6-month inspections of ventilation and roof support plans were being completed on a timely basis. This failure could have led to mines operating without up-to-date plans or mine operators not following all requirements of the plans. Additionally, MSHA officials did not always ensure that hazards found during inspections were corrected promptly. Gaps were found in the information that MSHA used to monitor fatal and nonfatal injuries, limiting trend analysis and agency oversight. Specifically, the agency did not collect information on hours worked by independent contractors staff needed to compute fatality and nonfatal injury rates for specific mines, and it was difficult to link information on accidents at underground coal mines with MSHA's investigations. We also concluded that the guidance provided by MSHA management to agency employees could be strengthened. Some inspections procedures were unclear and were contained in many sources, leading to differing interpretations by mine inspectors. The guidance on coordinating inspections conducted by specialists and regular inspectors was also unclear, resulting in some duplication of effort. Finally, as of 2003, although about 44 percent of MSHA's underground coal mine inspectors were going to be eligible to retire within 5 years, the agency had no plan for replacing them or using other human capital flexibilities available to retain its highly qualified and trained inspectors.