The Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) programs, funded by the Department of Defense (DOD), are the most visible of these programs. Within a decade, however, CTR took on the goal of reducing the threat of terrorist access to weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Now, however, many analysts support expanding cooperative threat reduction programs beyond Russia to other geographic areas. In the FY2004 National Defense Authorization Act ( P.L. 108-136 , Sec. 1308), Congress authorized the Bush Administration to spend $50 million of unobligated funds from the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program in states outside the former Soviet Union. As of September 2006, the Administration had spent $38.5 million in Albania for the purpose of eliminating chemical weapons stockpiles. The report of the 9/11 Commission called for continued support for threat reduction assistance to keep WMD away from terrorist groups. It describes potential recipients of such funding (those states with WMD programs and terrorism problems); the kinds of assistance that may be possible; potential legal, political, and technical constraints on assistance; and potential costs and benefits to the United States of providing such assistance. A few underlying issues may influence the ultimate success of CTR-like approaches. First, the nonproliferation regime has always focused on controlling ingredients at the source as the most effective first line of defense. How Significant Is the Nexus? Cooperative Threat Reduction Program as Precedent

For over a decade, U.S. government agencies (particularly the Departments of Energy and State) have spent nonproliferation assistance funds in countries outside of the former Soviet Union (FSU). Assistance of this kind in the nuclear area is beginning to be provided under IAEA auspices to India and Pakistan. Legal Constraints: Nonproliferation and Anti-Terrorism Laws

U.S. domestic laws contain the following restrictions that may be relevant to providing assistance to the states covered in this report: restrictions on financial assistance, exports (defense and dual-use) to states that have poor proliferation records (as recipients or suppliers of proliferation-related goods and technology); restrictions on financial assistance, exports to states on state sponsors of terrorism list; and restrictions on nuclear material and nuclear weapons cooperation.
Increasingly, Congress and the Bush Administration are looking to utilize nonproliferation assistance programs, including cooperative threat reduction, to help reduce the risk of terrorist access to weapons of mass destruction (WMD). In the FY2004 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 108-136, Sec. 1308), Congress authorized the Bush Administration to spend $50 million of unobligated funds from the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program in states outside the former Soviet Union. As of September 2006, the Administration had spent such funds only in Albania ($38.5 million) for the purpose of eliminating chemical weapons stockpiles. The report of the 9/11 Commission called for continued support for threat reduction assistance to keep WMD away from terrorist groups. This report, which will be updated as needed, analyzes the range of possible applications of CTR funds, the kinds of assistance that might be supplied, and describes legal, financial, technical, and political constraints on possible assistance.
A key underlying issue is that the countries posing the greatest risks may be the least amenable to cooperative approaches. A second issue is that there is an array of U.S. domestic and international legal restrictions on the most useful kinds of cooperation. Both the executive branch and Congress may need to consider domestic and international legal and political restrictions on cooperation with states outside the nonproliferation regimes, low levels of transparency exhibited by most of the potential recipient states, and the lack of incentives for many of these states to pursue threat reduction measures. In addition, Congress may wish to consider whether potentially expanding the geographic scope of CTR may have a negative effect on existing programs. One school of thought believes Russia, as the largest source of stocks of biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons, should continue to be the main focus of attention. Other observers believe there is now an opportunity to focus on states within the nexus of terrorism and WMD.
This report complements CRS Report RL31957, Nonproliferation and Threat Reduction Assistance: U.S. Programs in the Former Soviet Union; CRS Report RL31589, Nuclear Threat Reduction Measures for India and Pakistan; and CRS Report RS21840, Expanding Threat Reduction and Nonproliferation Programs: Concepts and Definitions (pdf).