DOE Officials Reported Varied Reasons for Work Stoppages at Tank Farms and the Waste Treatment Plant, but Supporting Documentation Is Limited

DOE officials reported that from January 2000 through December 2008,  work on the Hanford tank farms and the waste treatment plant  temporarily stopped at least 31 times to address various safety or  construction concerns. Sixteen of the work stoppages  reportedly resulted from concerns about safety. Information on Work Stoppages Is Not Consistently Collected

DOE does not routinely collect or formally report information about work  stoppages, in part because federal regulations governing contracts do not  require contractors to track work stoppages and the reasons for them. DOE Generally Pays Costs Associated with Work Stoppages

Under the terms of the cost-reimbursement contracts for the tank farms  and the waste treatment plant, DOE generally pays the costs for corrective  action or construction rework associated with temporary work stoppages  and does not require the contractor to separately track these costs. These were all considered allowable costs, and DOE has  reimbursed the contractor for them. Even though the contractors are being reimbursed for the costs associated  with work stoppages, they can experience financial consequences, either  through loss of performance fee or fines and penalties assessed by DOE or  its regulators. For example, DOE may withhold payment of a performance  award, called a fee, from contractors for failure to meet specified  performance objectives or measures or to comply with applicable  environmental, safety, and health requirements. Inadequate Oversight Cited as Contributing to Some Work Stoppages

For the majority of DOE’s reported work stoppages, no supporting  documentation was available to evaluate whether better oversight or  regulation could have prevented them. For two incidents for which  documentation was available—internal investigations and prior GAO  work—a lack of oversight contributed to both. Specifically, the accident investigation report for the tank farm spill found  that oversight and design reviews by DOE’s Office of River Protection  failed to identify deficiencies in CH2M Hill’s tank pump system, which did  not meet nuclear safety technical requirements. GAO in 2006 found that DOE’s failure to effectively  implement nuclear safety requirements, including requirements that all  waste treatment plant facilities would survive a potential earthquake,  contributed substantially to delays and growing costs at the plant. Work was halted at the two facilities for 2 years as a  result. With regard to regulations, however, officials we interviewed from DOE,  the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, and the Office of Inspector  General said they did not believe that insufficient regulation was a factor  in these two events. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

To determine the number of times work was suspended at the Hanford  site, we obtained from the Department of Energy’s (DOE) Office of River  Protection officials a listing of work stoppages occurring from January  2000 through December 2008 at either the waste treatment plant or the  tank farms. We sought to independently verify the 31 work stoppages identified by  DOE and to uncover additional information about them, including the  nature of the event and the duration and the scope of each, by reviewing  the following:    DOE’s Occurrence Reporting and Processing System, a database of  reportable accidents and other incidents affecting worker, public, and  environmental safety;   DOE’s database of investigation reports on accidents causing serious  injury to workers or serious damage to the facility or the environment;   DOE citations issued against contractors for violating nuclear safety    Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board reports addressing Hanford Site    Bechtel National Inc. and CH2M Hill Hanford Group Problem Evaluation  Requests, internal reports of incidents or accidents involving safety issues.
Why GAO Did This Study

The Department of Energy's (DOE) Hanford Site in Washington State stores 56 million gallons of untreated radioactive and hazardous wastes resulting from decades of nuclear weapons production. DOE is constructing facilities at the site to treat these wastes before permanent disposal. As part of meeting health, safety, and other standards, work at the site has sometimes been suspended to address safety or construction quality issues. This report discusses (1) work stoppages from January 2000 through December 2008 and what is known about them, (2) the types of costs associated with work stoppages and who paid for them, and (3) whether more effective regulation or oversight could have prevented the work stoppages. GAO interviewed knowledgeable DOE and contractor officials about these events. When documentation was available, GAO obtained DOE and contractor accident and safety incident reports, internal DOE and independent external evaluations, and costs.

What GAO Found

DOE officials reported that from January 2000 through December 2008, activities to manage hazardous wastes stored in underground tanks and to construct a waste treatment facility have been suspended at least 31 times to address safety concerns or construction quality issues. Federal regulations governing contracts do not require contractors to formally report work stoppages and the reasons for them, and DOE does not routinely collect information on them. As a result, supporting documentation on work stoppages was limited. DOE reported that work stoppages varied widely in duration, with some incidents lasting a few hours, and others lasting 2 years or more. Officials reported that about half the work stoppages resulted from concerns about worker or nuclear safety and included proactive safety "pauses," which typically were brief and taken to address an unsafe condition that could potentially harm workers. The remainder of the work stoppages occurred to address concerns about construction quality at the waste treatment plant. Under the terms of the cost-reimbursement contracts for managing the tanks and constructing the waste treatment plant, DOE generally pays all costs associated with temporary work stoppages and does not require the contractor to separately track these costs, although DOE and the contractors do track some costs under certain circumstances. For example, the costs for cleaning up, investigating, and implementing corrective actions were collected for a July 2007 hazardous waste spill at one of the tank farms; these costs totaled over $8 million. The contractors, too, can face financial consequences, such as reduction in earned fee or fines and penalties assessed by DOE or outside regulators. For example, DOE may withhold payment of a performance award, called a fee, from contractors for failure to meet specified performance objectives or to comply with applicable environmental, safety, and health requirements. For the majority of DOE's reported work stoppages, supporting documentation was not available to evaluate whether better oversight or regulation could have prevented them. For 2 of 31 work stoppages where some information was available--specifically, accident investigations or prior GAO work--inadequate oversight contributed to the work stoppages. For example, the accident investigation report for the tank farm spill found that oversight and design reviews by DOE's Office of River Protection failed to identify deficiencies in the tanks' pump system design, which did not meet nuclear technical safety requirements. Similarly, in 2006, GAO found that DOE's failure to effectively implement nuclear safety requirements contributed substantially to schedule delays and cost growth at Hanford's waste treatment plant. With regard to regulations, however, officials from DOE, the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, and DOE's Office of Inspector General said they did not believe that insufficient regulation was a factor in these events.