DOE’s R&D Plan Lays Out a Systematic Approach to Selecting and Demonstrating Nuclear Fuel Cycles but Lacks Important Details

DOE’s R&D plan details a systematic approach—that is, the use of  scientific methods and engineering principles—to select and eventually  demonstrate nuclear fuel cycles and associated technologies. However,  the plan does not explain the current readiness of the critical technologies  and the estimated time and costs of further developing these  technologies; it also does not explain how DOE will collaborate with the  nuclear industry and other countries with experience in conducting  nuclear R&D in achieving its goals. Development of systems, including nuclear  reactors, that would transmute radioactive materials recovered from  spent fuel to improve the use of the nuclear fuel and significantly  reduce the radioactivity associated with these materials.   Security. DOE Plans to Assess Technology Readiness, but It Has Not Explained the Current Readiness of Fuel Cycle Technologies or the Estimated Time and Cost Associated with Their Development

DOE’s R&D plan states that it is necessary to assess the readiness of  technologies associated with the nuclear fuel cycles in selecting fuel cycle  options for further review. As we have reported, assessing the readiness of technology is  a best practice to help control schedule and costs. DOE’s R&D Plan Identifies the Need to Collaborate with the Nuclear Industry but Does Not Include a Long-term Collaboration Strategy

DOE’s R&D plan identifies the importance of collaborating with the  nuclear industry—the ultimate user of any nuclear fuel cycle and  associated technologies that are developed—and the department has  made some efforts to obtain industry advice, but the plan does not include  a long-term strategy for how to conduct such collaboration. We note, however, that DOE has an independent role in  deciding on a nuclear fuel cycle and associated technologies that best  serve U.S. interests in minimizing waste and reducing proliferation and  terrorism risks. As we have reported,  defining organizational roles and responsibilities in formal mechanisms  can help agencies strengthen their commitment to work collaboratively by  clarifying who will lead or participate in which activities and how decisions  will be made. French and British Experiences in Reprocessing and Recycling Can Provide Insights for U.S. Decision Making

France and the United Kingdom’s experiences in developing and  operating reprocessing and recycling infrastructures can provide some  insights into the decisions DOE may need to make in selecting and  demonstrating nuclear fuel cycles and associated technologies. However, the effect of reprocessing and  recycling spent nuclear fuel on the amount of space needed for a  geologic repository is under review, including whether to dispose of  radioactive materials that are being stored but that are potentially  reusable, primarily plutonium. Without such a strategy, DOE cannot be assured that  the nuclear industry will accept and use the technologies that it develops. Recommendations for Executive Action

For the Office of Nuclear Energy to reach its goal of selecting sustainable  nuclear fuel cycles and associated technologies by 2020 and  demonstrating them by 2050, we recommend that the Secretary of  Energy direct the Assistant Secretary of the Office Nuclear Energy to take  the following actions:  (1) Revise the R&D plan to  include the current readiness levels of the technologies associated  with the fuel cycle options being considered and the estimated time  and cost for developing these technologies in relationship to the R&D  plan’s schedules and goals,  include a strategy for sustaining long-term collaboration with the  nuclear industry, including a formal mechanism that clarifies the role  industry will have at critical points in selecting fuel cycle options and  associated technologies, and  specify how DOE will use collaborative agreements with other  countries to advance its R&D efforts and use available facilities and  expertise in these other countries to more efficiently and effectively  meet its R&D goals. DOE did not rule out the future use of a formal memorandum of  understanding between its Office of Nuclear Energy and NNSA to help  ensure that they coordinate to avoid overlap and duplication in their  efforts to minimize proliferation and terrorism risks. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

We reviewed the (1) approach the Department of Energy (DOE) is taking  to select and demonstrate sustainable nuclear fuel cycles and associated  technologies; (2) efforts DOE is making to understand and minimize  nuclear proliferation and terrorism risks associated with nuclear fuel  cycles and associated technologies; and (3) experiences of France and  the United Kingdom in reprocessing and recycling spent nuclear fuel that  may be useful to the United States in selecting sustainable nuclear fuel  cycles and associated technologies. AREVA did not provide information on the amount of this  trace material. 2. 3. 4.
Why GAO Did This Study

More demand for electricity and concerns about greenhouse gas emissions have increased interest in nuclear power, which does not rely on fossil fuels. However, concerns remain about the radioactive spent fuel that nuclear reactors generate. The Department of Energy (DOE) issued a research and development (R&D) plan to select nuclear fuel cycles and technologies, some of which reprocess spent fuel and recycle some nuclear material, such as plutonium. These fuel cycles may help reduce the generation of spent fuel and risks of nuclear proliferation and terrorism. GAO was asked to review (1) DOE's approach to selecting nuclear fuel cycles and technologies, (2) DOE's efforts to reduce proliferation and terrorism risks, and (3) selected countries' experiences in reprocessing and recycling spent fuel. GAO reviewed DOE's plan and met with officials from DOE, the nuclear industry, and France and the United Kingdom.

What GAO Found

DOE's R&D plan relies on a systematic approach--that is, the use of scientific methods and engineering principles--to select and demonstrate nuclear fuel cycles and associated technologies. However, it does not explain the current readiness levels of the technologies associated with the fuel cycles and the estimated time and cost of further development; it also does not explain how DOE will collaborate with the nuclear industry and other countries experienced in nuclear R&D in achieving its goals. In particular: (1) In 2010, DOE screened 863 previously identified nuclear fuel cycles and technologies and grouped them into 266 fuel cycles for further exploration. Independent reviewers found this screening process useful and recommended changes that DOE officials stated they would act on. (2) DOE's R&D plan states that it is necessary to assess the readiness levels of technologies associated with nuclear fuel cycles. However, neither the plan nor the screening process describe the current readiness levels of all critical technologies or the time or estimated costs for further development. As GAO has reported, assessing the readiness of technology is a best practice to help control schedule and costs. (3) DOE's R&D plan states the importance of collaborating with the nuclear industry--the ultimate user of any fuel cycle and technologies that are developed--and DOE continues to get industry advice. However, the plan does not include a strategy for long-term collaboration with industry, without which DOE cannot be assured that the nuclear industry will accept and use the fuel cycles and technologies that the department may develop. (4) DOE has agreements with other countries that provide collaborative opportunities to share research results and leverage DOE's R&D efforts, such as using the countries' research facilities. However, the plan does not explain how DOE will use these agreements to advance its R&D goals. As stated in DOE's R&D plan, the Office of Nuclear Energy has efforts under way to minimize proliferation and terrorism risks associated with nuclear power, but faces challenges. These challenges include developing reliable and cost-effective fuel cycles while minimizing the attractiveness to potential adversaries of radioactive materials resulting from these cycles. NNSA is also working on these issues, and the two agencies have worked together informally to avoid duplication and overlap but do not have a formal mechanism to collaborate on future efforts, which can help agencies strengthen their commitment to work collaboratively by clarifying who will lead or participate in which activities and how decisions will be made. GAO reviewed France's and the United Kingdom's decades of experiences in developing and operating reprocessing and recycling infrastructures. These experiences can provide some insights into the decisions DOE may need to make in selecting nuclear fuel cycles and technologies. For example, reprocessing and recycling is likely to reduce the amount of space needed for a nuclear waste repository because some of the radioactive materials are reused, but the amount of this reduction would depend on how much of the radioactive materials that are reused might ultimately require disposal in such a repository.

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that DOE revise its plan to include the current readiness levels of fuel cycle technologies and the estimated time and cost to develop them, include a strategy for long-term collaboration with the nuclear industry, and specify how DOE will use international agreements to advance its efforts. GAO also recommends that DOE's Office of Nuclear Energy and its National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) complete a memorandum of understanding (MOU) to avoid duplication and overlap of efforts. DOE agreed with the first three recommendations and did not rule out the future use of a MOU. GAO continues to believe that this formal collaboration mechanism is needed.