	CBP and APHIS Have Taken Steps Intended to Strengthen the AQI Program

CBP and APHIS have taken four major steps intended to strengthen the  AQI program since the transfer of responsibilities following passage of the  Homeland Security Act of 2002. To date, we have not done work to assess  the implementation and effectiveness of these actions. First, CBP and APHIS expanded the hours of training on agricultural  issues for CBP officers, whose primary duty is customs and immigration  inspection, and for CBP agriculture specialists, whose primary duty is  agricultural inspection. Many Agriculture Specialists Believe that the Agricultural Mission Has Been Compromised

In fiscal year 2006, we surveyed a representative sample of CBP  agriculture specialists regarding their experiences and opinions since the  transfer of the AQI program from APHIS to CBP. GAO  has previously reported on lessons learned from major private and public  sector experiences with mergers that DHS could use when combining its  various components into a unified department. Among other things,  productivity and effectiveness often decline in the period following a  merger, in part because employees often worry about their place in the  new organization. Nonetheless, based on the survey results, while 86 percent of specialists  reported feeling very well or somewhat prepared for their duties as an  agriculture specialist, many believed that the agriculture mission had been  compromised by the transfer. We identified common themes in the agriculture specialists’ responses to  our first question about what is going well with respect to their work as an  agriculture specialist. Nothing. Salary and Benefits. Training. General job satisfaction. An estimated 6 percent of agriculture specialists  were generally satisfied with their jobs, reporting, among other things, that  they were satisfied in their working relationships with CBP management  and coworkers and that they believed in the importance of their work in  protecting U.S. agriculture from foreign pests and diseases. Working relationships. CBP chain of command. Training. An estimated 17 percent of agriculture specialists were  concerned about a lack of equipment and supplies. Management Problems May Leave U.S. Agriculture Vulnerable to Foreign Pests and Diseases

Although CBP and APHIS have taken a number of actions intended to  strengthen the AQI program since its transfer to CBP, several management  problems remain that may leave U.S. agriculture vulnerable to foreign  pests and diseases. Moreover, at the time of  our May 2006 review, CBP had not developed sufficient performance  measures to manage and evaluate the AQI program, and the agency had  allowed the agricultural canine program to deteriorate. CBP agriculture specialists record  monthly data in the Work Accomplishment Data System for each port of  entry, including (1) arrivals of passengers and cargo to the United States  via airplane, ship, or vehicle; (2) agricultural inspections of arriving  passengers and cargo; and (3) inspection outcomes, i.e., seizures or  detections of prohibited (quarantined) agricultural materials and  reportable pests. Further, these performance  measures did not provide information about changes in inspection and  interception rates, which could help assess the efficiency and  effectiveness of agriculture inspections in different regions of the country  or at individual ports of entry. In early 2007, a joint team from CBP  and APHIS agreed to implement additional performance measures for AQI  activities in all major pathways at ports of entry. However, we  have not evaluated the adequacy of these new performance measures for  assessing the AQI program’s effectiveness at intercepting foreign pests and  diseases. Subsequently, CBP developed a  staffing model for its ports of entry and provided GAO with its results. Specifically, as of mid-August 2007, CBP said it had 2,116 agriculture  specialists on staff, compared to 3,154 such specialists needed according  to the model. While morale issues, such as the ones we identified, are to  be expected in the merger establishing DHS, CBP had not used key data to  evaluate the program’s effectiveness and could not explain significant  increases and decreases in inspections and interceptions. Homeland Security: Agriculture Specialists’ Views of Their Work  Experiences after Transfer to DHS. Homeland Security: Management and Coordination Problems Increase  the Vulnerability of U.S. Agriculture to Foreign Pests and Disease.
Why GAO Did This Study

U.S. agriculture generates over $1 trillion in economic activity annually, but concerns exist about its vulnerability to foreign pests and diseases. Under the agricultural quarantine inspection (AQI) program, passengers and cargo are inspected at U.S. ports of entry to intercept prohibited material and pests. The Homeland Security Act of 2002 transferred responsibility for inspections from the U.S. Department of Agriculture's (USDA) Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) to the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Customs and Border Protection (CBP). APHIS retained some AQI-related responsibilities, such as policy setting and training. This testimony is based on issued GAO reports and discusses (1) steps DHS and USDA took that were intended to strengthen the AQI program, (2) views of agriculture specialists of their work experiences since the transfer, and (3) management problems. As part of these reports, GAO surveyed a representative sample of agriculture specialists on their work experiences, analyzed inspection and interception data, and interviewed agency officials.

What GAO Found

CBP and APHIS have taken steps intended to strengthen the AQI program since transfer of inspection responsibilities from USDA to DHS in March 2003. Specifically, CBP and APHIS have expanded the hours and developed a national standard for agriculture training; given agricultural specialists access to a computer system that is to better target inspections at ports; and established a joint review process for assessing compliance with the AQI program on a port-by-port basis. In addition, CBP has created new agricultural liaison positions at the field office level to advise regional port directors on agricultural issues. We have not assessed the implementation and effectiveness of these actions. However, GAO's survey of CBP agriculture specialists found that many believed the agriculture inspection mission had been compromised by the transfer. Although 86 percent of agriculture specialists reported feeling very well or somewhat prepared for their duties, 59 and 60 percent of specialists answered that they were conducting fewer inspections and interceptions, respectively, of prohibited agricultural items since the transfer. When asked what is going well with respect to their work, agriculture specialists identified working relationships (18 percent), nothing (13 percent), salary and benefits (10 percent), training (10 percent), and general job satisfaction (6 percent). When asked what areas should be changed or improved, they identified working relationships (29 percent), priority given to the agriculture mission (29 percent), problems with the CBP chain of command (28 percent), training (19 percent), and inadequate equipment and supplies (17 percent). Based on private and public sector experiences with mergers, these morale issues are not unexpected because employees often worry about their place in the new organization. CBP must address several management problems to reduce the vulnerability of U.S. agriculture to foreign pests and diseases. Specifically, as of May 2006, CBP had not used available inspection and interception data to evaluate the effectiveness of the AQI program. CBP also had not developed sufficient performance measures to manage and evaluate the AQI program. CBP's measures focused on only two pathways by which foreign pests and diseases may enter the country and pose a threat to U.S. agriculture. However, in early 2007, CBP initiated new performance measures to track interceptions of pests and quarantine materials at ports of entry. We have not assessed the effectiveness of these measures. In addition, CBP has allowed the agricultural canine program to deteriorate, including reductions in the number of canine teams and their proficiency. Lastly, CBP had not developed a risk-based staffing model for determining where to assign agriculture specialists. Without such a model, CBP did not know whether it had an appropriate number of agriculture specialists at each port. Subsequent to our review, CBP developed a model. As of mid-August 2007, CBP had 2,116 agriculture specialists on staff, compared with 3,154 specialists needed, according to the staffing model.