NORTHCOM and PACOM Are Including a Complex Catastrophe in Their Civil Support Plans but Are Delaying Identification of Capability Requirements

NORTHCOM and PACOM are updating their existing civil support plans  to include a complex catastrophe, as directed, but the plans will not  identify capabilities needed to execute their plans that could be provided  to execute the plans, as required, until FEMA completes its regional  planning efforts in 2018. NORTHCOM officials told us that they  expect the command to update its civil support plan by September 2014,  and that the plan would describe some general strategic-level complex  catastrophe scenarios and identify general force requirements, such as  the types of military units that would be needed to respond to a complex  catastrophe. However, according to NORTHCOM officials, the command  will not identify DOD capabilities that could be provided to civil authorities  during a complex catastrophe until FEMA completes its plans. DOD has defense coordinating officers in each of FEMA’s 10  regions who work closely with federal, state, and local officials to  determine what specific capabilities DOD can provide to mitigate the  effects of major disasters and emergencies when FEMA requests  assistance. For example, the defense coordinating officer in FEMA Region IX, one of  the regions that has completed its all-hazards plan, has helped the region  develop bundled mission assignments for its regional plan that pre- identify a group of capabilities the region will require from DOD for a  complex catastrophe to fill an identified capability gap, such as aircraft,  communications, medical, and mortuary for responding to an earthquake  in southern California. This doctrine further states that DOD should interact with non-DOD  agencies to gain a mutual understanding of their response capabilities  and limitations. By working through the defense coordinating officers to  identify an interim set of specific capabilities that DOD could provide in  response to a complex catastrophe—instead of waiting for FEMA to  complete its five-year regional planning processes and then updating civil  support plans—NORTHCOM and PACOM can enhance their  preparedness and more effectively mitigate the risk of an unexpected  capability gap during the five-year period until FEMA completes its  regional plans in 2018. However, the command and  control structure for federal military forces during incidents affecting  multiple states such as complex catastrophes is unclear because DOD  has not yet prescribed the roles, responsibilities, and relationships of  command elements that may be involved in responding to such incidents. This gap in the civil support framework was illustrated by recent  events such as National Level Exercise 2011—which examined DOD’s  response to a complex catastrophe in the New Madrid Seismic Zone— and the federal military response to Hurricane Sandy led by NORTHCOM  in 2012. For example, officials from U.S. Army  North told us that the exercise revealed that not having a level of  command between the dual-status commanders and NORTHCOM did  not work well for such a large-scale, multistate incident, in part, because  NORTHCOM, in the absence of an operational-level command element,  faced challenges in managing the operations of federal military forces  across a widespread area. DOD after action reports covering the federal military response to  Hurricane Sandy also found that the command and control structure for  federal military forces operating in the affected area was not clearly  defined, resulting in the degradation of situational awareness and unity of  effort, and the execution of missions without proper approval. By identifying roles, responsibilities, and command  relationships during multistate incidents such as complex catastrophes,  DOD will be better positioned to manage and allocate forces across a  multistate area, and ensure effective and organized response operations. Recommendations for Executive Action

We recommend that the Secretary of Defense take the following two  actions:  (1) To reduce the department’s risk in planning for a complex catastrophe  and enhance the department’s ability to respond to a complex  catastrophe through at least 2018, direct the Commanders of  NORTHCOM and PACOM to work through the defense coordinating  officers to identify an interim set of specific DOD capabilities that could be  provided to prepare for and respond to complex catastrophes while FEMA  completes its five-year regional planning cycle. (2) To facilitate effective and organized civil support response operations,  direct the Commander of NORTHCOM—in consultation with the Joint  Staff and Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, acting through the  Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas’  Security Affairs—to develop, clearly define, communicate, and implement  a construct for the command and control of federal military forces during  multistate civil support incidents such as complex catastrophes—to  include the roles, responsibilities, and command relationships among  potential command elements. DOD  concurred with both recommendations and cited ongoing activities to  address our recommendations. To determine the extent to which DOD has established a command and  control construct for complex catastrophes and other multistate incidents,  we analyzed DOD doctrine and plans related to operational planning and  command and control. Homeland Defense: DOD Can Enhance Efforts to Identify Capabilities to  Support Civil Authorities during Disasters.
Why GAO Did This Study

The United States continues to face an uncertain and complicated security environment, as major disasters and emergencies, such as the Boston Marathon bombings and Hurricane Sandy illustrate. DOD supports civil authorities' response to domestic incidents through an array of activities collectively termed civil support. In July 2012, DOD began to plan for federal military support during a complex catastrophe--such as a large earthquake that causes extraordinary levels of casualties or damage, and cascading failures of critical infrastructure. GAO was asked to assess DOD's planning and capabilities for a complex catastrophe. This report assesses the extent to which DOD has (1) planned for and identified capabilities to respond to complex catastrophes, and (2) established a command and control construct for complex catastrophes and other multistate incidents. To do so, GAO analyzed civil support plans, guidance, and other documents, and interviewed DOD and FEMA officials.

What GAO Found

U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) and U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) are updating their existing civil support plans to include a complex catastrophe scenario, as directed by the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff. However, the commands are delaying the identification of capabilities that could be provided to execute the plans until the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), the lead federal response agency, completes its regional planning efforts in 2018. NORTHCOM officials told us that the command's civil support plan would describe some general force requirements, such as types of military units, but that it will not identify specific capabilities that could be provided to civil authorities during a complex catastrophe. Similarly, according to PACOM officials, PACOM's plan also will not identify such capabilities. Still, defense coordinating officers--senior military officers who work closely with federal, state, and local officials in FEMA's regional offices--have taken some initial steps to coordinate with FEMA during its regional planning process to identify capabilities that the Department of Defense (DOD) may be required to provide in some regions. For example, a defense coordinating officer has helped one of the FEMA regions that has completed its regional plan to develop bundled mission assignments that pre-identify a group of capabilities that region will require during a complex catastrophe. DOD doctrine states that the department should interact with non-DOD agencies to gain a mutual understanding of their response capabilities and limitations. By working through the defense coordinating officers to identify an interim set of specific capabilities for a complex catastrophe-- instead of waiting for FEMA to complete its five-year regional planning process-- NORTHCOM and PACOM can enhance their preparedness and mitigate the risk of an unexpected capability gap during the five-year period until FEMA completes its regional plans in 2018.
DOD has established a command and control framework for a federal military civil support response; however, the command and control structure for federal military forces during complex catastrophes is unclear because DOD has not developed a construct prescribing the roles, responsibilities, and relationships among command elements that may be involved in responding to such incidents across multiple states. This gap in the civil support framework was illustrated by recent events such as National Level Exercise 2011--which examined DOD's response to a complex catastrophe--and the federal military response to Hurricane Sandy in 2012. For example, officials from NORTHCOM's Army component told us that the exercise revealed that the absence of an operationallevel command element created challenges for NORTHCOM in managing the operations of federal military forces during a large-scale, multistate incident. Similarly, DOD after action reports on Hurricane Sandy found that the command and control structure for federal military forces was not clearly defined, resulting in the degradation of situational awareness and unity of effort, and the execution of missions without proper approval. DOD doctrine states that operational plans should identify the command structure expected to exist during their implementation. By identifying roles, responsibilities, and command relationships during multistate incidents such as complex catastrophes, DOD will be better positioned to manage and allocate resources across a multistate area and ensure effective and organized response operations.

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that combatant commands (1) work through the defense coordinating officers to develop an interim set of specific DOD capabilities that could be provided to prepare for and respond to complex catastrophes, as FEMA completes its five-year regional planning cycle; and (2) develop, clearly define, communicate, and implement a construct for the command and control of federal military forces during multistate civil support incidents such as complex catastrophes. DOD concurred with both recommendations.