For example, the NRC Authorization  Act for fiscal year 1980 established a requirement for off-site emergency  planning around nuclear power plants and allowed NRC to issue a nuclear  plant operating license only if it determines that there is either a  related state or local emergency preparedness plan that provides for  responding to accidents at the specific plant and complies with NRC’s  emergency planning guidelines or    state, local, or facility plan that provides reasonable assurance that  public health and safety are not endangered by the plants’ operation in  the absence of a related state or local emergency preparedness plan. Indian Point 2 is one of the 104 commercial nuclear power plants  nationwide licensed to operate. In 2001, We Noted That Indian Point 2 Had Struggled to Resolve Emergency Preparedness Weaknesses

Over the years, Consolidated Edison’s efforts to improve emergency  preparedness at Indian Point 2 were not completely successful, and the  company experienced recurring weaknesses in its program, as we  reported in July 2001. Despite these initiatives, in April 2001, NRC reported that it had found  problems similar to those previously identified at Indian Point 2. In commenting on a draft of our July 2001 report, NRC noted  that its April 2001 inspection report concluded that Consolidated Edison’s  emergency preparedness program would provide reasonable assurance of  protecting the public. The Four Counties Strengthened Their Emergency Preparedness Programs but Suggested Better Communication Among NRC, FEMA, and Nonstate Entities

The need to improve communication between Consolidated Edison and  the counties about the extent of the emergency and the potential impact  on the public was highlighted during the February 2000 event. The counties had also taken some other actions to improve their  radiological emergency programs. In particular, county officials said that  since they are responsible for radiological emergency preparedness for  Indian Point 2, NRC and FEMA should communicate directly with them  during nonemergency situations. FEMA generally implements its programs through the states and relies on  the states to communicate relevant information to local jurisdictions. In  commenting on a draft of our report, FEMA said that the emergency plans  for the four New York counties require them to conduct off-site  monitoring and dose calculations at the alert level. Emergency Preparedness Weaknesses at Indian Point 2 Have Continued

In reviewing NRC’s reports on its on-site inspections and evaluations of  the plant’s emergency preparedness exercises or drills completed since we  issued our 2001 report, we found that the facility’s emergency  preparedness program has continued to experience problems or  weaknesses. For example, NRC reported that, in an emergency exercise  conducted last fall, the facility gave out unclear information about the  release of radioactive materials, which also happened during the February  2000 event. In addition, NRC reported that several actions to correct  previously identified weaknesses had not been completed. With respect to our 2001 recommendation that NRC and FEMA reassess  their practices of primarily communicating with state officials during  nonemergency situations, federal and local officials indicated that little  has changed since our report. In addition to improving the  plant’s program, a better track record in addressing these problems could  go a long way in helping alleviate the heightened concerns in the  surrounding communities about the plant’s safety and preparedness for an  emergency. The Witt Report Raises Emergency Preparedness Issues at Indian Point and Other Nuclear Power Plants

On August 1, 2002, the Governor of New York announced that James Lee  Witt Associates would conduct a comprehensive and independent review  of emergency preparedness around the Indian Point facility and for that  portion of New York State in proximity to the Millstone nuclear power  plant in Waterford, Connecticut. According to Witt Associates, the review  encompassed many related activities that were designed, when taken  together, to shed light on whether the jurisdictions’ existing plans and  capabilities are sufficient to ensure the safety of the people of the state in  the event of an accident at one of the plants, and how the existing plans  and capabilities might be improved. We have not evaluated the Witt report or verified the accuracy of its  findings and conclusions. The draft Witt report concludes that NRC and  FEMA regulations need to be revised and updated. According to  the agency, the draft report raises a number of issues that should be  considered for enhancing the level of preparedness in the communities  surrounding the Indian Point facility, such as better public education,  more training of off-site responders, and improved emergency  communications. According to NRC, the draft report  gives “undue weight” to the impact of a terrorist attack.
Why GAO Did This Study

After the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, emergency preparedness at nuclear power plants has become of heightened concern. Currently, 104 commercial nuclear power plants operate at 64 sites in 32 states and provide about 20 percent of the nation's electricity. In July 2001, GAO reported on emergency preparedness at the Indian Point 2 nuclear power plant in New York State. This testimony discusses GAO's findings and recommendations in that report and the progress the plant, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) have made in addressing these problems. GAO also provides its thoughts on the findings of a soon-to-be-issued report (the Witt report) on emergency preparedness at Indian Point and the Millstone nuclear power plant in Connecticut, and the implications of that report for plants nationwide. Since 2001, the Entergy Corporation has assumed ownership of the Indian Point 2 plant from the Consolidated Edison Company of New York (ConEd).

What GAO Found

In 2001, GAO reported that, over the years, NRC had identified a number of emergency preparedness weaknesses at Indian Point 2 that had gone largely uncorrected. ConEd had some corrective actions underway before a 2000 event raised the possibility of a leak of radioactively contaminated water into the environment. ConEd took other actions to address problems during this event. According to NRC, more than a year later, the plant still had problems similar to those previously identified--particularly in the pager system for activating emergency personnel. However, NRC, in commenting on a draft of GAO's report, stated that ConEd's emergency preparedness program could protect the public. Four counties responsible for responding to a radiological emergency at Indian Point 2 had, with the state and ConEd, developed a new form to better document the nature and seriousness of any radioactive release and thus avoid the confusion that occurred during the February 2000 event. Because they are the first responders in any radiological emergency, county officials wanted NRC and FEMA to communicate more with them in nonemergency situations, in addition to communicating through the states. However, NRC and FEMA primarily rely on the states to communicate with local jurisdictions. Since GAO's 2001 report, NRC has found that emergency preparedness weaknesses have continued. For example, NRC reported that, during an emergency exercise in the fall of 2002, the facility gave out unclear information about the release of radioactive materials, which had also happened during the February 2000 event. Similarly, in terms of communicating with the surrounding jurisdictions, little has changed, according to county officials. County officials told GAO that a videoconference system--promised to ensure prompt meetings and better communication between the plant's technical representatives and the counties--had not been installed. In addition, NRC and FEMA continue to work primarily with the states in nonemergency situations. Although they note that there are avenues for public participation, none of these is exclusively for the county governments. GAO did not evaluate the draft Witt report or verify the accuracy of its findings. The draft Witt report is a much larger, more technical assessment than the 2001 GAO report. While both reports point out difficulties in communications and planning inadequacies, the draft Witt report concludes that the current radiological response system and capabilities are not adequate to protect the public from an unacceptable dose of radiation in the event of a release from Indian Point, especially if the release is faster or larger than the release for which the programs are typically designed. GAO is aware that, in commenting on a draft of the Witt report, FEMA disagreed with some of the issues raised but said the report highlights several issues worth considering to improve emergency preparedness in the communities around Indian Point and nationwide. NRC concluded that the draft report gives "undue weight" to the impact of a terrorist attack.