In fiscal year 2002, these activities employed about  72,000 civilian employees—about 10 percent of DOD’s civilian workforce. In the other DOD  industrial activities, military personnel are largely in managerial or  supervisory positions. While the DOD depot system has been a key part of the  department’s plan to support military systems, the increased use of the  private sector to perform work previously performed by DOD employees  has decreased the role of the services’ depots and raised questions  regarding their future. Absent a comprehensive DOD plan, the services have in  varying degrees initiated a strategic depot planning effort. Although this guidance has  been issued, questions remain about the guidance and the services are not  accomplishing key analyses to identify essential core capabilities. In addition, 10 U.S.C. This sets aside 50 percent of the funding for public-sector  performance of these workloads. DOD recently considered proposing changes to title 10 depot  maintenance provisions. The work at two government-owned and  government-operated ammunition plants has declined in the past years,  but it is now increasing. Some Depot Workforce Planning Efforts Lack Competency Assessments, Comprehensive Retention Plans, and Evaluative Performance Measures

Depot workforce planning, as done by the services’ depots, generally  does not address elements of three steps identified by OPM and  high-performing organizations as key to effective workforce planning:  (1) the assessment of competencies needed to address skill gaps;  (2) the development of comprehensive retention plans; and (3) the  implementation of performance measures to evaluate the success of the  workforce plans. A Number of Challenges Inhibit Effective Strategic Workforce Planning

The services’ depots face a number of challenges that adversely affect  DOD’s strategic workforce planning for the viability of its civilian  workforce. Private sector industrial activities have also implemented multiskilling. Recommendations for Executive Action

To improve the management and direction of DOD’s strategic planning for  maintenance depots, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct  the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Logistics and Materiel  Readiness to    complete the revisions to DOD’s core policy and develop a schedule  for the services to complete the computation of core requirements;  require the service secretaries and the Commandant of the Marine Corps  to develop revised core capabilities to provide a baseline for defining  workloads that should be performed in government facilities by  government personnel; and  require the service secretaries and the Commandant of the Marine Corps  to develop, or complete the development of, and implement strategic plans  that are linked to the services’ mission and objectives and the Office of the  Secretary of Defense’s depot strategic plan when it is developed and that  delineate industrial workloads to be accomplished in each service’s  depots, other service’s depots, by contractors at their own sites and at  government sites and using partnerships and identify the workforce  requirements to support the performance of this work. The department did not concur with our  recommendation to implement a working group to explore (1) options  for innovative and cost-effective training and (2) appropriate funding  alternatives to help revitalize the depot workforce. To determine the extent to which the services have developed and  implemented strategic workforce plans to position the civilian depot  workforce to meet future requirements, we interviewed officials and  obtained and reviewed    DOD’s Civilian Human Resources Strategic Plan 2002-2008 and the  services’ strategic plans for depot maintenance where available to  identify human capital goals, visions, and objectives and    services’ and depots’ workforce plans (including recruiting/hiring plans,  training plans, succession plans, and retention plans) to determine  whether they had a strategic/long-term perspective or a short-term focus  that was oriented toward the budget process. In doing so, we also determined    civilian depot workforce retirement eligibility and whether the services  will have difficulties replacing an aging workforce if large numbers of  eligible retirees retire over the next 5 to 7 years,   the total weighted average age based on the civilian staffing at each  industrial facility,    whether the services are having difficulties implementing the multiskilling  concept to improve worker efficiency and productivity, and    whether increased funding will be needed to address increased training  requirements. GAO-03-2.
Why GAO Did This Study

Between 1987 and 2002, the Department of Defense (DOD) downsized the civilian workforce in 27 key industrial facilities by about 56 percent. Many of the remaining 72,000 workers are nearing retirement. In recent years GAO has identified shortcomings in DOD's strategic planning and was asked to determine (1) whether DOD has implemented our prior recommendation to develop and implement a depot maintenance strategic plan, (2) the extent to which the services have developed and implemented comprehensive strategic workforce plans, and (3) what challenges adversely affect DOD's workforce planning.

What GAO Found

DOD has not implemented our October 2001 recommendation to develop and implement a DOD depot strategic plan that would delineate workloads to be accomplished in each of the services' depots. The DOD depot system has been a key part of the department's plan to support military systems in the past, but the increased use of the private sector to perform this work has decreased the role of these activities. While title 10 of the U.S. code requires DOD to retain core capability and also requires that at least 50 percent of depot maintenance funds be spent for public-sector performance, questions remain about the future role of DOD depots. Absent a DOD depot strategic plan, the services have in varying degrees, laid out a framework for strategic depot planning, but this planning is not comprehensive. Questions also remain about the future of arsenals and ammunition plants. GAO reviewed workforce planning efforts for 22 maintenance depots, 3 arsenals, and 2 ammunition plants, which employed about 72,000 civilian workers in fiscal year 2002. The services have not developed and implemented strategic workforce plans to position the civilian workforce in DOD industrial activities to meet future requirements. While workforce planning is done for each of the industrial activities, generally it is short-term rather than strategic. Further, workforce planning is lacking in other areas that the Office of Personnel Management guidance and high-performing organizations identify as key to successful workforce planning. Service workforce planning efforts (1) usually do not assess the competencies; (2) do not develop comprehensive retention plans; and (3) sometimes do not develop performance measures and evaluate workforce plans. Several challenges adversely affect DOD's workforce planning for the viability of its civilian depot workforce. First, given the aging depot workforce and the retirement eligibility of over 40 percent of the workforce over the next 5 to 7 years, the services may have difficulty maintaining the depots' viability. Second, the services are having difficulty implementing multiskilling--an industry and government best practice for improving the flexibility and productivity of the workforce--even though this technique could help depot planners do more with fewer employees. Finally, increased training funding and innovation in the training program will be essential for revitalizing the aging depot workforce.