We identified 12 broad  elements in the act that should be included in the strategy, such as  descriptions of the presence, activities, and operations of Iran and its  proxy actors in the Western Hemisphere; a description of the federal law  enforcement capability and military forces in the Western Hemisphere  that may organize to counter the threat posed by Iran and its proxy  actors; and a plan to address any efforts by foreign persons, entities, and  governments in the region to assist Iran in evading United States and  international sanctions. State Uses a Variety of Mechanisms to Collaborate with Other Stakeholders to Address Iranian Activities in the Western Hemisphere

In accordance with the act, officials in State’s Bureau of Western  Hemisphere Affairs developed the strategy based on consultations with  officials representing DOD, DHS, DOJ, Treasury, ODNI, and USTR in  headquarters and also conducted some outreach to overseas posts and  partner governments. According to State officials, the strategy represents a consensus view of  key agencies, including DOD, DHS, DOJ, and the Intelligence  Community. Of note, while DOD as a whole joined in this consensus,  one part of DOD—the Southern Command—disagreed with the strategy’s  characterization of the Iranian threat in the hemisphere at the time the  strategy was prepared. For the 12 strategy elements shown in table 1: of the 6 that the act states should include a description of Iranian  activities or Latin American government capabilities to address Iranian  activities, the strategy fully addresses 2 and partially addresses 4; of the 6 that the act states should include plans to address potential  threats to U.S. interests, the strategy partially addresses 2 and does  not address 4. Second, ODNI officials reported several reasons why the Intelligence  Community Assessment only partially addressed some of the  elements. The strategy fully addresses problem definition and risk assessment. The strategy partially addresses three other desirable characteristics of  national strategies: purpose, scope, and methodology; goals, subordinate  objectives, activities, and performance measures; and organizational  roles, responsibilities, and coordination. The strategy does not address two desirable characteristics of national  strategies: resources, investments, and risk management; and integration  and implementation. Recommendation for Executive Action

For elements identified in the Countering Iran in the Western Hemisphere  Act of 2012 that were not fully addressed in the strategy, we recommend  that the Secretary of State provide the relevant congressional committees  with information that would fully address these elements. In the absence  of such information, State should explain to the congressional committees  why it was not included in the strategy. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

In December 2012, Congress enacted the Countering Iran in the Western  Hemisphere Act of 2012, which, among other things, required the  Department of State (State) to assess the threats posed to the United  States by Iran’s activities in the Western Hemisphere and submit to the  relevant congressional committees the results of the assessment and a  strategy to address these threats. In this report, we examine (1) State’s  collaboration with other key U.S. agencies and foreign partners to  address Iranian activities in the Western Hemisphere, (2) the extent to  which the strategy on addressing Iranian activities in the Western  Hemisphere included elements identified in the act, and (3) the extent to  which the strategy on addressing Iranian activities in the Western  Hemisphere included desirable characteristics of national strategies. We chose these  countries based on a number of factors including whether they had  experienced instances of Iran-linked terrorist attacks, their bilateral  relationship with the United States, and our ability to meet with host  governments. Similar to our analysis of the extent to  which the strategy addressed elements identified in the act, we analyzed  all three documents that make up the strategy and assessed how, if at all,  the strategy addressed the elements in the act. As we discuss in our report, State and the Office of the Director of  National Intelligence (ODNI) did not address elements for which State  and ODNI sought but did not find relevant information.
Why GAO Did This Study

The activities of Iranian government elements, such as a 2011 attempt to assassinate the Saudi Ambassador in the United States, could pose a threat to U.S. national security. Congress enacted the Countering Iran in the Western Hemisphere Act of 2012, requiring State to assess the threats posed to the United States by Iran's presence and activity in the Western Hemisphere and to develop a strategy to address those threats. This report examines (1) State's collaboration with other key U.S. agencies and foreign partners to address Iranian activities in the Western Hemisphere, (2) the extent to which the strategy addresses elements identified in the act, and (3) the extent to which the strategy includes desirable characteristics of national strategies.
GAO analyzed agency documents and interviewed agency officials in Washington, D.C.; Argentina; Brazil; Colombia; and Mexico. GAO chose these countries based on factors such as past instances of Iran-linked terrorist attacks and their bilateral relationships with the United States.

What GAO Found

The Department of State (State) uses a variety of mechanisms to collaborate with interagency partners and host governments to address activities of Iran in the Western Hemisphere. In developing the strategy, which includes an Intelligence Community Assessment developed by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), State's Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs worked with other U.S. agencies at the headquarters level and relied on cable reporting from posts. According to State officials, the strategy represents a consensus view of key agencies. While the Department of Defense (DOD) as a whole joined in this consensus, one part of DOD—the Southern Command—disagreed with the strategy's characterization of the Iranian threat at the time the strategy was prepared. State also uses venues such as country team meetings and law enforcement working groups to address Iranian activities.
While the strategy contains information on Iranian activities in the Western Hemisphere, it does not contain all the information that the Countering Iran in the Western Hemisphere Act of 2012 stated it should include. GAO identified 12 distinct elements that the act stated should be included in the strategy. As shown in the figure, the strategy fully addresses 2, partially addresses 6, and does not address 4 of 12 elements. For example, the strategy contains information describing the operations of Iran, but does not include a plan to address U.S. interests to ensure energy supplies from the Western Hemisphere are free from foreign manipulation. State and ODNI officials reported several reasons why the strategy may not fully address the information identified in the law. For example, State said it only included information in the strategy if it deemed the activity identified in the law to be a threat to the United States.
Note: ODNI officials did not provide documentation for three of the elements that were fully or partially addressed in the Intelligence Community Assessment.
State is not legally required to address the six desirable characteristics of effective national strategies GAO has identified, but the strategy does include some of them. The strategy fully addresses problem definition and risk assessment. It partially addresses purpose, scope, and methodology; goals, subordinate objectives, activities, and performance measures; and organizational roles, responsibilities, and coordination. The strategy does not, however, address resources, investments, and risk management; and integration into other strategies and implementation by other levels of government.

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that the Secretary of State provide the relevant congressional committees with additional information that would fully address the elements in the act. In the absence of such information, State should explain why it was not included in the strategy. State generally disagreed with our assessment of the extent to which the strategy addressed the elements in the act but agreed to continue to provide Congress with information regarding Iranian activities in the Western Hemisphere.