The Navy envisioned the LCS as a ship that could operate with a much  smaller crew size than other surface combatants, with preventative  maintenance duties performed primarily by contractors. USS Freedom Deployment Provided Some Data on LCS Operations, but the Navy Still Lacks Key Operational Data on LCS Ships and Concepts

The USS Freedom’s deployment to Singapore was an opportunity for the  Navy to learn lessons about the feasibility and sustainability of unique  LCS operational support and sustainment concepts in an operational  environment. The Navy was able to collect data during the deployment on  items such as systems usage and reliability and crew sleep hours. Additionally, the Navy  continues to lack overseas deployment data for the Independence variant  ships and for additional operational and warfighting concepts—such as  overseas mission-package swaps and deployment with the mine  countermeasures and antisubmarine-warfare mission packages. The Navy Continues to Lack Operational Data on the Other LCS Variant

The Navy continues to lack operational data, specifically overseas  deployment data, on the other LCS variant—the Independence variant— which, under current plans, is expected to comprise half of the LCS ship  class (see fig. The Navy Has Not Yet Fully Addressed Risks to Its Operational Support and Sustainment Concepts That Were Identified by the USS Freedom Deployment

Although the Navy is adjusting some operational support and sustainment  concepts based on data collected and lessons learned during the USS  Freedom deployment, it has not yet addressed some risks that remain in  executing and sustaining key manning, training, maintenance, and  logistics concepts. Available LCS Cost Data Are Limited, but Annual Per-Ship Costs May Be Approaching Those of Other Multimission Surface Ships with Larger Crews

Although the Navy’s life-cycle cost estimates for the LCS seaframe and  mission modules contain uncertainty, they indicate that the annualized  per ship costs for the LCS may be approaching those of other  multimission surface ships with larger crews. Although the Navy’s LCS cost estimates contain uncertainty, especially in  regard to operations and support costs, and there are inherent difficulties  associated with comparing the life-cycle costs of various surface ships  with differing capabilities and mission sets, we found that the per ship per  year cost estimates for the LCS program are nearing or may exceed the  costs of other surface ships, including multimission ships with greater size  and more crew members, such as guided-missile frigates and destroyers. As we noted in the report, the Navy also has used these  data from other surface ship classes to build its LCS life-cycle cost  estimates. Despite the known limitations, we believe our analysis uses the best  available data to provide a reasonable comparison of the life-cycle costs  across the ship classes. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

To address the benefits and limitations of the operational data that have  been collected on Littoral Combat Ships (LCS), we analyzed and  compared the planned USS Freedom deployment schedule with the  actual executed schedule. To assess the extent to which the Navy has evaluated risk in its  operational support and sustainment concepts for the LCS in the areas of  manning, training, maintenance, and logistics, we reviewed relevant data- collection and analysis plans and mid-point and final reports on the  Freedom deployment to Singapore in 2013 from Commander Naval  Surface Forces Pacific, 7th Fleet, and the Center for Naval Analyses, and  we interviewed officials from organizations responsible for collecting and  analyzing data from this deployment.
Why GAO Did This Study

The LCS was intended to be a low-cost surface combatant that uses innovative operational concepts, such as minimal crew size, to lower operations and support costs. In 2013, the Navy deployed USS Freedom , one of two LCS variants, to Singapore to “prove its concept,” demonstrate operational capabilities, and collect data on the ship's manning, training, maintenance, and logistics needs.
The House report accompanying the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014 mandated that GAO analyze the Navy's sustainment plans for its LCS program—including lessons from the USS Freedom deployment. This report addressed (1) the benefits and limitations of the operational data that have been collected on LCS ships; (2) the extent to which the Navy has evaluated risk in its operational support and sustainment concepts for LCS; and (3) how LCS life-cycle cost estimates compare with those for other surface-ship classes. GAO analyzed documents from the 2013 deployment, and LCS and surface-ship life-cycle costs, and interviewed program officials and USS Freedom crews.

What GAO Found

The USS Freedom deployment provided beneficial data on operational support and sustainment concepts for the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS), but these data have limitations, and the Navy still lacks key data on LCS ships and concepts. The USS Freedom deployed for 10 months with a surface-warfare mission package, and the Navy collected data on items such as systems reliability and crew sleep hours. However, several factors limited the operational lessons learned. For example, mechanical problems prevented the ship from spending as much time at sea as planned. Further, the Navy continues to lack operational data for key operational and warfighting concepts, such as deployment with the other mission packages—mine countermeasures and antisubmarine warfare—and data on the other LCS variant which, under current plans, will comprise half the ship class.
Although the Navy is adjusting some operational support and sustainment concepts, it has not yet addressed risks that remain in executing key concepts.
Manning: The crew experienced high workload and fell short of the Navy's sleep standards despite adding personnel for the deployment.
Training: Gaps remain in fully training LCS sailors prior to deployment.
Maintenance: The Navy is adjusting maintenance requirements and has not yet determined the optimal mix of contractor and crew workload to perform preventative maintenance.
Logistics: The Navy is reallocating duties among crew and shore support, but the infrastructure needed to support both variants is incomplete.
Without fully analyzing risks in key concepts, the LCS may have operational limitations, deficits in personnel and materiel readiness, and higher costs.
The Navy has produced life-cycle cost estimates for the LCS seaframes and mission modules. Although those estimates contain uncertainty and there are inherent difficulties in comparing the life-cycle costs of ships with differing capabilities and missions, the best available Navy data indicate that the annual per ship costs for LCS are nearing or may exceed those of other surface ships, including those with greater size and larger crews, such as frigates.

What GAO Recommends

GAO is emphasizing its prior recommendations that, before buying more LCS ships, the Navy (1) conduct and consider the results of a risk assessment and (2) collect additional data and update cost estimates. The Department of Defense expressed concerns that its life-cycle cost data are not comparable across ship types. GAO believes the analysis provides a reasonable comparison using the best available data from the Navy, as discussed in the report.