NNSA also operates the Nevada Test Site. Events over the past several years have served to intensify concern about  how the United States maintains its nuclear deterrent and what the  nation’s strategy should be for transforming the weapons complex. Subsequently, in January 2005, the Secretary of Energy  requested the SEAB to form the Nuclear Weapons Complex Infrastructure  Task Force to assess the implications of presidential decisions on the size  and composition of the stockpile; the cost and operational impacts of the  new Design Basis Threat; and the personnel, facilities, and budgetary  resources required to support a smaller stockpile. As a result of this process, NNSA recently offered a proposal for  transforming the weapons complex that it believes is responsive to the  recommendations in the SEAB task force report. Specifically, NNSA  officials stated that    NNSA will decide on the RRW design competition in November 2006 and,  assuming that the RRW is technically feasible, will seek authorization to  proceed to engineering development and production;   NNSA is requesting an additional $15.6 million in its fiscal year 2007  budget request to dismantle legacy weapons material at the Pantex Plant;  and   NNSA is requesting about $15 million for fiscal year 2007, as well as over  $30 million annually from fiscal years 2008 through 2011, to support the  implementation of its responsive infrastructure strategy, including the  creation of an Office of Transformation within the Office of Defense  Programs. However, NNSA does not plan to adopt the SEAB task force’s  recommendation for a CNPC and the accompanying recommendation of  consolidating all Category I and II quantities of Special Nuclear Material at  the CNPC. Instead, NNSA has proposed the following plan for the 2030 weapons  complex, which it states will achieve many of the benefits of the SEAB  task force’s approach in a way that is technically feasible and affordable  over both the near and longer term:    Consolidated plutonium center. Modernizing the remaining production sites. In addition, NNSA  would build a new, nonnuclear component production facility by 2012 at  an unspecified location. Four Actions Will Be Critical to Successfully Transforming the Complex

Regardless of the approach chosen to transform the weapons complex,  any attempt to change such an extremely complex enterprise must be  based on solid analysis, careful planning, and effective leadership. We  have identified four actions that, in our view, are critical to the successful  transformation of the weapons complex. Given NNSA’s  performance to date with the life extension programs and the current  unresolved questions about the RRW, in our view, DOD will need to  establish clear, long-term requirements for the nuclear stockpile before  NNSA can make any final decisions about transforming the weapons  complex. Specifically, DOD, working with NNSA through the Nuclear  Weapons Council, needs to determine the types and quantities of nuclear  weapons that will provide for our nation’s nuclear deterrent over the long  term. NNSA Will Need to Provide Accurate Estimates of the Costs of Transformation

Once a decision about the size and composition of the stockpile is made,  NNSA will need accurate estimates of the costs of proposals for  transforming the weapons complex. Some cost estimates to transform the weapons complex were included in  the SEAB task force report. As a  result, NNSA will need to develop a transformation plan with clear  milestones that all involved can work toward and that the Congress can  use to hold NNSA accountable. Therefore, in our view, it is imperative that the proposed Office  of Transformation (1) report directly to the Administrator of NNSA; (2) be  given sufficient authority to conduct its studies and implement its  recommendations; and (3) be held accountable for creating real change  within the weapons complex.
Why GAO Did This Study

Over the past several years, a serious effort has begun to comprehensively reevaluate how the United States maintains its nuclear deterrent and what the nation's approach should be for transforming its aging nuclear weapons complex. The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), a separately organized agency within the Department of Energy, is responsible for overseeing this weapons complex, which comprises three nuclear weapons design laboratories, four production plants, and the Nevada Test Site. At the direction of the Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development, the Secretary of Energy Advisory Board's (SEAB) Nuclear Weapons Complex Infrastructure Task Force issued a report in October 2005 that provided a systematic review of the requirements for the weapons complex for the next 25 years and offered its vision for an agile and responsive weapons complex. GAO was asked to discuss (1) the current actions NNSA is taking to address the SEAB task force's recommendations and (2) the critical steps that will be needed to achieve and sustain a meaningful, cost-effective transformation of the weapons complex.

What GAO Found

The SEAB task force report contained the following five recommendations: (1) immediately begin to modernize the cold war nuclear stockpile by designing a Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW); (2) create a Consolidated Nuclear Production Center (CNPC) that contains a modern set of production facilities in one location; (3) consolidate all weapons-grade material and weapons components at the CNPC; (4) aggressively dismantle the cold war stockpile; and (5) create an Office of Transformation to oversee the transformation of the nuclear weapons complex. NNSA has offered a proposal for transforming the nuclear weapons complex that it believes is responsive to the recommendations in the SEAB task force report. Specifically, NNSA officials noted, they (1) will decide on a design competition for the RRW in November 2006, (2) have requested an increase of over $15 million in funding for dismantling legacy weapons in fiscal year 2007, and (3) have requested $15 million in their fiscal year 2007 budget proposal to create an Office of Transformation, among other things. However, NNSA does not support the SEAB task force's recommendation for a CNPC and the accompanying recommendation of consolidating weapons-grade material at the CNPC, primarily because it views these recommendations as too costly. Instead, NNSA has proposed building a consolidated center for processing plutonium, removing weapons-grade material from the three weapons laboratories, and modernizing the remaining production capabilities at their existing locations. Regardless of the approach chosen, any attempt to change an extremely complex enterprise must be based on solid analysis, careful planning, and effective leadership. GAO has identified the following four actions that, in its view, are critical to successfully transforming the weapons complex: (1) the Department of Defense will need to establish clear, long-term requirements for the nuclear stockpile by determining the types and quantities of nuclear weapons needed to provide for our nation's nuclear deterrent; (2) after the Department of Defense determines the size and composition of the future stockpile, NNSA will need to develop accurate cost estimates of the proposals for transforming the weapons complex because current estimates of the costs of transforming the weapons complex contain considerable uncertainty; (3) after NNSA selects a proposal based on accurate cost estimates, it will need to develop a clear transformation plan containing measurable milestones so that it can evaluate progress and the Congress can hold it accountable; and (4) the proposed Office of Transformation must have authority to make and enforce its decisions on transformation and must be held accountable by the Congress for achieving timely and cost-effective results.