On September 5, 2006, the White House released the 2006 National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (NSCT or "Strategy"). The 2006 National Strategy for Combating Terrorism Strategy follows on an earlier strategy released by the Bush Administration in 2003. This report examines the 2006 National Strategy in the context of its predecessor in 2003, and identifies issues and options for consideration by Congress. The 2006 National Strategy for Combating Terrorism :
provides a framework for protecting the United States and its allies from terrorist attacks. Core components of the Strategy include disrupting and disabling terrorist networks across the globe and fostering international cooperation. Creating a global environment intolerant of terrorism is central as well. However, the 2006 Strategy differs from the 2003 version primarily in that it sets different priorities for the strategic elements designed to achieve those ultimate goals. Perhaps the most significant of these differences is a major increase in emphasis in the 2006 document on democratization as a method of combating terrorism. Additionally, the 2006 Strategy places greater emphasis on denying terrorists sanctuary in underdeveloped, failed, and rogue states. The use of economic and political tools to strengthen nations vulnerable to the spread of terrorist influence appears to receive less emphasis in the 2006 Strategy than in the 2003 version. These include (1) effectiveness of democratization as a counterterrorism strategy; (2) the underlying factors fueling the spread of terrorism and the motives of terrorists; (3) implications of the war in Iraq for U.S. counterterrorism strategy; (4) effectiveness of the policy of U.S. non-engagement with states that support or harbor terrorists (i.e., rogue states), as well as select terrorist groups; (5) alignment of the Strategy with recent National Intelligence Estimates; (6) mitigation of extremist indoctrination of the young, disenfranchised, and economically marginal; and (7) efficacy of public diplomacy. Congress may wish to further examine this issue, to determine whether possible adjustments to the Strategy, its funding, and its implementation are warranted.
On September 5, 2006, the White House released the 2006 National Strategy for Combating Terrorism. This report examines the Strategy in the context of its predecessor, released in 2003, and identifies issues and options for consideration by Congress.
The 2006 National Strategy for Combating Terrorism provides a framework for protecting the United States and its allies from terrorist attacks. Core components of the Strategy are to disrupt and disable terrorist networks across the globe, and foster international cooperation in these efforts. Creating a global intolerance of terrorism is central as well.
The 2006 Strategy differs from the 2003 version primarily in that it sets different priorities for the strategic elements designed to achieve its goals. Perhaps most significant of these differences is a major increase in emphasis on democratization as a method of combating terrorism. Additionally, the 2006 strategy places greater emphasis on denying terrorists sanctuary in underdeveloped, failed, and rogue states. The use of economic and political tools to strengthen nations vulnerable to the spread of terrorist influence appears to receive less emphasis in the 2006 Strategy than in the 2003 version.
Inherent in the National Strategy are a number of issues for Congress. These include (1) democratization as a counterterrorism strategy; (2) the validity of the Strategy's assumptions about terrorists; (3) whether the Strategy adequately addresses the situation in Iraq including the U.S. presence there as a catalyst for international terrorism; (4) the Strategy's effectiveness against rogue states; (5) the degree to which the Strategy addresses threats reflected in recent National Intelligence Estimates; (6) mitigating extremist indoctrination of the young; and (7) the efficacy of public diplomacy. To the degree that the 2006 National Strategy for Combating Terrorism may not adequately address the importance of these and other relevant factors, some adjustment of the strategy and its implementation may be warranted.
This report will not be updated.