After that time, Iran held multiple rounds of talks with China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States (collectively known as the P5+1). The resolutions also imposed sanctions on Iran. The P5+1 and Iran reached a framework of a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) on April 2, 2015, and the JCPOA was finalized on July 14, 2015. With the JPA remaining in effect until the JCPOA entered into implementation, the IAEA certified on January 16, 2016, that Iran had completed its required JCPOA nuclear-related tasks for Implementation Day. The "Joint Plan of Action" (JPA)

The JPA, also widely known as the JPOA, essentially froze most aspects of Iran's nuclear program to allow time to negotiate the JCPOA. Additional Pledges/ Information . The parties strived to meet the June 30 deadline because the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act ( P.L. Resolution 2231 was adopted for that purpose on July 20, 2015, placing Adoption Day at October 18, 2015. The Obama Administration argued that these provisions will prevent Iran from developing a nuclear weapon covertly. Sanctions Relief under the JCPOA and Reimposition

Under the JCPOA, the overwhelming bulk of sanctions relief occurred at Implementation Day. The U.S. sanctions laws waived and executive orders revoked are discussed in detail in CRS Report RS20871, Iran Sanctions , by Kenneth Katzman, which also analyzes the reimposition of all U.S. sanctions that were suspended or revoked, in accordance with President Trump's May 8, 2018, announcement of the U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA. According to the JCPOA, the United States (or any veto-wielding member of the U.N. Security Council) would be able to block a U.N. Security Council resolution that would continue the lifting of U.N. sanctions despite Iran's refusal to resolve the dispute. 114-17 ). 411 , asserting that the President did not comply with P.L. The JCPOA in the Trump Administration

During the 2016 presidential campaign, Donald Trump was a vocal critic of the agreement. Throughout some of its first year, the Trump Administration indicated support for the agreement. A senior Administration official explained the same day that Trump "hopes to see an amendment to the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act" which must
"demand that Iran allow timely, sufficient and immediate inspections at all sites that are requested by international inspectors from the IAEA"; "ensure" that Iran does not become capable of producing enough fissile material for a nuclear weapon in less than one year; allow the United States for an indefinite period of time to reimpose U.S. nuclear sanctions if Iran does not comply with these new criteria; and "state explicitly ... that we view Iran's long-range missile programs and nuclear weapons as inseparable and that Iran's development and testing of missiles should be subject to severe sanctions." Congress has not acted on such legislation. U.S. Exit from the JCPOA

On May 8, President Trump, noting that the two sides had been unable to reach an agreement, announced that the United States would no longer participate in the JCPOA and would reimpose sanctions that had been suspended pursuant to the JCPOA. U.S. officials have argued that the JCPOA is not legally binding. On May 16, 2018, in an apparent effort to meet Iran's demands for remaining in the agreement, the EU announced "practical measures" for continued implementation of the JCPOA, including the following:
maintaining and deepening economic relations with Iran; the continued sale of Iran's oil and gas condensate petroleum products and petrochemicals and related transfers; effective banking transactions with Iran; continued sea, land, air, and rail transportation relations with Iran; provision of export credit and special provisions in financial banking to facilitate economic and financial cooperation and trade and investment; further memoranda of understanding and contracts between European companies and Iranian counterparts; further investments in Iran; and the protection of European Union economic operators and ensuring legal certainty; and finally further development of a transparent, rules-based business environment in Iran.
On July 14, 2015, Iran and the six powers that had negotiated with Tehran about its nuclear program since 2006 (the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Russia, China, and Germany—collectively known as the P5+1) finalized a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). The JCPOA required constraints that seek to ensure that Iran's nuclear program can be used for purely peaceful purposes in exchange for a broad lifting of U.S., European Union (EU), and United Nations (U.N.) sanctions on Iran. The agreement replaced the Joint Plan of Action (JPA), an interim nuclear accord in effect from 2014 to 2016. Congress did not enact a resolution of disapproval of the JCPOA by the deadline of September 17, 2015, which was set by the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act (P.L. 114-17); the JCPOA formally took effect on "Adoption Day" (October 18, 2015). "Implementation Day" was declared by the P5+1 on January 16, 2016, representing the completion of Iran's nuclear requirements; entry into effect of U.N. Security Council Resolution 2231, which endorsed the JCPOA; and the start of sanctions relief stipulated in the agreement. Officials from both the Barack Obama and Donald Trump Administrations have certified that Iran has abided by its JCPOA commitments.
The Obama Administration and other P5+1 leaders asserted that the JCPOA is the most effective means to ensure that Iran cannot obtain a nuclear weapon and that all U.S. options to prevent Iran from developing a nuclear weapon are available indefinitely. The agreement contains provisions for U.N. sanctions to be reimposed if Iran violates its commitments.
Top Trump Administration officials have argued that the JCPOA does not adequately serve U.S. interests because the extensive sanctions relief provided under the accord gives Iran additional resources to conduct "malign activities" in the region, and does not restrict Iran's development of ballistic missiles. Resolution 2231, which was adopted in July 2015, prohibits arms transfers to or from Iran, but only for five years, and contains a voluntary restriction on Iran's development of nuclear-capable ballistic missiles for only up to eight years.
On May 8, President Trump announced that the United States would no longer participate in the JCPOA and would reimpose sanctions that had been suspended pursuant to the agreement. The other powers that negotiated the accord with Iran—Russia, China, France, Britain, and Germany—opposed the U.S. decision and have been meeting with Iranian officials to continue implementing the JCPOA. Iran's President Hassan Rouhani has pledged to continue implementing the accord, provided Iran continues to receive the economic benefits of the agreement.
In the 114th and 115th Congresses, legislation has been introduced with the stated purpose of redressing asserted weaknesses of the deal or preventing any U.S. sanctions relief beyond that explicitly promised in the JCPOA. The Countering America's Adversaries through Sanctions Act (P.L. 115-44) mandates sanctions on Iranian proliferation, human rights abuses, and support for terrorist activities. For details on the sanctions relief aspects of the JCPOA, see CRS Report RS20871, Iran Sanctions, by Kenneth Katzman.