Transportation Security Officers

TSOs screen all passengers and their carry-on baggage prior to allowing  passengers access to their departure gates. Between April 2005 and December 2005, based on  available documentation, TSA deliberated 189 proposed changes to  passenger checkpoint screening SOPs, 92 of which were intended to  modify the way in which passengers and their carry-on items are  screened. When deciding whether to implement the proposed  modification, TSA officials considered not only the impact that the bulk- item pat-down procedure would have on security, but also the impact that  the procedure would have on screening efficiency and customer service. Nevertheless, TSA officials acknowledged the importance of  evaluating whether proposed screening procedures, including USP and the  bulk-item pat-down, would enhance detection capability. While we commend TSA’s efforts to supplement professional judgment  with data and metrics in its decision to modify passenger checkpoint  screening procedures, TSA did not conduct the necessary analysis of the  data collected to determine the extent to which the removal of small  scissors and tools from the prohibited items list could free up TSO  resources. However, TSA’s methods  for data collection and analysis could be improved. However, TSA only documented the reasoning behind its  decisions for about half (26 of 44) of the proposed modifications that were  not implemented. There are three elements of the TSO technical proficiency component of  PASS that are intended to measure TSO compliance with passenger  checkpoint screening procedures: (1) quarterly observations conducted by  FSD management staff of TSOs’ ability to perform particular screening  functions in the operational environment, such as pat-down searches and  use of the hand-held metal detector, to ensure they are complying with  checkpoint screening SOPs; (2) quarterly quizzes given to TSOs to assess  their knowledge of the SOPs; and (3) an annual, multipart knowledge and  skills assessment. TSA Uses Local and National Covert Testing, in Part, to Assess TSO Compliance with SOPs

TSA also conducts local and national covert tests, which are used to  evaluate, in part, the extent to which noncompliance with the SOPs affects  TSOs’ ability to detect simulated threat items hidden in accessible  property or concealed on a person. Conclusions

The alleged August 2006 terrorist plot to detonate liquid explosives  onboard multiple U.S.-bound aircraft highlighted the need for TSA to  continuously reassess and revise, when deemed appropriate, existing  passenger checkpoint screening procedures to address threats against the  commercial aviation system. We believe that TSA has implemented a reasonable approach to modifying  passenger checkpoint screening procedures through its consideration of  risk factors (threat and vulnerability information), day-to-day experience  of TSA airport staff, and complaints and concerns raised by passengers  and by making efforts to balance security, efficiency, and customer  service. While we are encouraged that TSA’s documentation of its  decisions regarding the SOP modifications made in response to the alleged  August 2006 liquid explosives terrorist plot was improved compared to  earlier documentation, it is important for TSA to continue to work to  strengthen its documentation efforts. Recommendations for Executive Action

To help strengthen TSA’s evaluation of proposed modifications to  passenger checkpoint screening SOPs and TSA’s ability to justify its  decisions to implement or not implement proposed SOP modifications, in  the March 2007 report that contained sensitive security information, we  recommended that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct the  Assistant Secretary of Homeland Security for TSA to take the following  two actions:    when operationally testing proposed SOP modifications, develop sound  evaluation methods, when possible, that can be used to assist TSA in  determining whether proposed procedures would achieve their  intended result, such as enhancing TSA’s ability to detect prohibited  items and suspicious persons and freeing up existing TSO resources  that could be used to implement proposed procedures, and  for future proposed SOP modifications that TSA senior leadership  determines are significant, generate and maintain documentation to  include, at minimum, the source, intended purpose, and reasoning  behind decisions to implement or not implement proposed  modifications. The documentation included a list of proposed changes considered, as  well as the source, the intended purpose, and in some cases the basis for  recommending the SOP modification—that is, the information,  experience, or event that encouraged TSA officials to propose the  modifications—and the reasoning behind decisions to implement or reject  proposed SOP modifications. In addition, we interviewed TSA headquarters officials who  were responsible for overseeing efforts to monitor TSO compliance with  standard operating procedures. Thirty of the screening changes considered by TSA between April 2005 and  December 2005 were proposed by TSA headquarters officials, including  Security Operations officials, who are responsible for overseeing  implementation of checkpoint screening. Aviation Security: Management Challenges Remain for the  Transportation Security Administration’s Secure Flight Program. Aviation Security: Challenges in Using Biometric Technologies.
Why GAO Did This Study

The Transportation Security Administration's (TSA) most visible layer of commercial aviation security is the screening of airline passengers at airport checkpoints, where travelers and their carry-on items are screened for explosives and other dangerous items by transportation security officers (TSO). Several revisions made to checkpoint screening procedures have been scrutinized and questioned by the traveling public and Congress in recent years. For this review, GAO evaluated (1) TSA's decisions to modify passenger screening procedures between April 2005 and December 2005 and in response to the alleged August 2006 liquid explosives terrorist plot, and (2) how TSA monitored TSO compliance with passenger screening procedures. To conduct this work, GAO reviewed TSA documents, interviewed TSA officials and aviation security experts, and visited 25 airports of varying sizes and locations.

What GAO Found

Between April 2005 and December 2005, proposed modifications to passenger checkpoint screening standard operating procedures (SOP) were made for a variety of reasons, and while a majority of the proposed modifications--48 of 92--were ultimately implemented at airports, TSA's methods for evaluating and documenting them could be improved. SOP modifications were proposed based on the professional judgment of TSA senior-level officials and program-level staff. TSA considered the daily experiences of airport staff, complaints and concerns raised by the traveling public, and analysis of risks to the aviation system when proposing SOP modifications. TSA also made efforts to balance the impact on security, efficiency, and customer service when deciding which proposed modifications to implement, as in the case of the SOP changes made in response to the alleged August 2006 liquid explosives terrorist plot. In some cases, TSA tested proposed modifications at selected airports to help determine whether the changes would achieve their intended purpose. However, TSA's data collection and analyses could be improved to help TSA determine whether proposed procedures that are operationally tested would achieve their intended purpose. For example, TSA officials decided to allow passengers to carry small scissors and tools onto aircraft based on their review of threat information, which indicated that these items do not pose a high risk to the aviation system. However, TSA did not conduct the necessary analysis of data it collected to assess whether this screening change would free up TSOs to focus on screening for high-risk threats, as intended. TSA officials acknowledged the importance of evaluating whether proposed screening procedures would achieve their intended purpose, but cited difficulties in doing so, including time pressures to implement needed security measures quickly. Finally, TSA's documentation on proposed modifications to screening procedures was not complete. TSA documented the basis--that is, the information, experience, or event that encouraged TSA officials to propose the modifications--for 72 of the 92 proposed modifications. In addition, TSA documented the reasoning behind its decisions for half (26 of 44) of the proposed modifications that were not implemented. Without more complete documentation, TSA may not be able to justify key modifications to passenger screening procedures to Congress and the traveling public. TSA monitors TSO compliance with passenger checkpoint screening procedures through its performance accountability and standards system and through covert testing. Compliance assessments include quarterly observations of TSOs' ability to perform particular screening functions in the operating environment, quarterly quizzes to assess TSOs' knowledge of procedures, and an annual knowledge and skills assessment. TSA uses covert tests to evaluate, in part, the extent to which TSOs' noncompliance with procedures affects their ability to detect simulated threat items hidden in accessible property or concealed on a person. TSA airport officials have experienced resource challenges in implementing these compliance monitoring methods. TSA headquarters officials stated that they are taking steps to address these challenges.