TSA is responsible for the security of all modes of transportation, as  outlined in the Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA)   (Pub. Consistent with this goal, GAO has  advocated the need to implement—at TSA and throughout the federal  government—a risk management approach for prioritizing efforts and  focusing resources. For example, since September 11, for example, TSA  has (1) installed EDS and ETD systems at most of the nation’s commercial  airports to provide the capability to screen all checked baggage using  explosive detection systems, (2) expanded screener training and  developed performance measures and indicators for the screening  systems, (3) developed an air cargo strategic plan, and (4) evaluated the  security of airport perimeters and access controls and provided funds for  security equipment. Despite these efforts, however, we have consistently  found—because of circumstances beyond TSA’s control and a lack of  planning—that TSA has not conducted the systematic analysis needed to  inform its decision-making processes and to prioritize security  enhancements. Despite these efforts,  however, we found that in moving forward, TSA had not conducted the  systematic planning needed to optimize the deployment of these  systems—in particular determining at which airports EDS machines  should be integrated in-line with airport baggage conveyor systems to  achieve efficiencies. TSA officials stated that they used EDS machines in a  stand-alone mode and ETD machines as an interim solution in order to  meet the congressional deadline for screening all checked baggage for  explosives. Without such a plan, it will be difficult for TSA to determine  the proper allocation of its resources to the areas of greatest need and to  monitor the progress of its efforts. We applaud DHS’s efforts to achieve efficiencies and cost savings,  leverage resources and technology, and improve internal coordination and  operations. While these organizational changes should assist DHS in  providing a solid foundation from which to manage and oversee its  screening, credentialing, and R&D efforts, restructuring alone will not  resolve all existing challenges or ensure the successful integration and  achievement of DHS’s goals. We have recently reported on challenges DHS  and TSA are facing with regard to some of these programs, including  Secure Flight, the Transportation Worker Identification Credential, and  research and development activities. Researching and developing technologies to detect, prevent, and mitigate  terrorist threats is vital to enhancing the security of the nation’s  transportation system. Concluding Observations

DHS and TSA have undertaken numerous initiatives to strengthen  transportation security, particularly in aviation, and their efforts should be  commended. Our work has  shown—in homeland security and in other areas—that a comprehensive  risk management approach can help inform decision makers in allocating  finite resources to the areas of greatest need. We are encouraged that the  President’s fiscal year 2006 budget request discusses TSA’s plans to  implement a risk management approach in focusing its resources related  to transportation security. Aviation Security: Efforts to Measure Effectiveness and Address  Challenges.
Why GAO Did This Study

Critical transportation systems crisscross the nation and extend beyond our borders to move millions of passengers and tons of freight each day, making them both attractive targets to terrorists and difficult to secure. Securing these systems is further complicated by the need to balance security with the expeditious flow of people and goods through these systems. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) faces the daunting challenge of determining how to allocate its finite resources to manage risks while addressing threats and enhancing security across all transportation modes. To assist the Congress and TSA in focusing resources on the areas of greatest need, we were asked to describe Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and TSA efforts in managing risks and allocating resources across aviation and surface transportation modes, and in integrating screening, credentialing, and research and development (R&D) efforts to achieve efficiencies.

What GAO Found

TSA has undertaken numerous initiatives to strengthen transportation security, particularly in aviation, and its efforts should be commended. For example, since September 11, 2001, TSA has installed explosive detection systems at most of the nation's commercial airports to provide the capability to screen all checked baggage for explosives; expanded screener training and developed performance measures and indicators for the screening systems; and evaluated the security of airport perimeters and access controls and provided funding for security equipment. While these efforts are commendable, we found that TSA has not consistently implemented a risk management approach or conducted the systematic analysis needed to inform its decision-making processes and to prioritize security improvements. Our work has shown that a risk management approach can help inform decision makers in allocating finite resources to the areas of greatest need. For example, we found that since initially deploying equipment to screen checked baggage for explosive at airports in response to congressional mandates, TSA has not conducted the systematic planning needed to optimize the deployment and integration of this equipment. Limited analysis of nine airports showed that the integration of this equipment in-line with airport baggage conveyor systems--rather than continuing to maintain the equipment in a stand-alone mode--could result in significant savings for the federal government. We also found that TSA's efforts to implement a comprehensive risk management approach for its air cargo and rail security programs are ongoing. The President's fiscal year 2006 budget request proposes two key DHS organizational changes designed to leverage resources and increase the efficiency and effectiveness of various screening, credentialing, and R&D programs. While we applaud DHS's efforts, it will be important for DHS to address several program challenges as the integration moves forward because restructuring alone will not resolve all existing challenges or ensure the successful integration and achievement of DHS's goals. These challenges including developing regulations identifying eligibility requirements for the Transportation Workers Identification Credential, establishing goals with measurable objectives in research and development strategic plans, and using risk assessments to select and prioritize research and development efforts.