Air Force Has Not Accurately Identified the Number of UAS Pilots Required to Accomplish Its Mission

We found in April 2014 that the Air Force had not accurately identified  optimum personnel requirements, or the crew ratio, for the number of  UAS pilots it requires. The Air Force Has Taken Steps to Recruit More UAS Pilots, but May Face Retention Challenges and Continues to Rely on Pilots Trained on Manned Aircraft to Meet Requirements

We found in April 2014 that the Air Force faced challenges recruiting UAS  pilots and had not achieved its recruiting goals for UAS pilots in fiscal  years 2012 and 2013. At the same  time, issues related to recruiting UAS pilots may warrant the Air Force’s  attention. The Air Force Is Planning to Use Enlisted Personnel to Operate the Global Hawk but has not Evaluated the Possible Use of DOD Civilians

In April 2014, we found that the Air Force had not evaluated whether  using alternative personnel populations such as enlisted or civilian  personnel as UAS pilots is a viable option to help it meet and sustain  required UAS pilot staffing levels. However, as of March 2016, Air Force officials stated that the Air Force  has not formally evaluated using DOD civilian personnel as UAS pilots, as  we recommended. Without also evaluating DOD civilian personnel, the  Air Force may lack valuable information on whether additional options  exist for meeting personnel requirements. However, as we noted in May 2015, fully implementing all four  recommendations we made in our April 2014 report pertaining to  management of Air Force UAS pilots should better position the Air Force  to address the UAS pilot shortages that contribute to training challenges. However, In May 2015, we found that  the Air Force had staffed its UAS training squadrons at Holloman Air  Force Base at 63 percent of their planned staffing levels due to shortages  of UAS pilots across the Air Force, which Air Force officials stated in turn  impacted the Air Force’s ability to produce new pilots. The Air Force Monitors UAS Pilot Promotion Rates but Has Not Analyzed Factors Related to Those Rates

In April 2014, we found that the Air Force monitors the promotion rates of  UAS pilots but had not analyzed factors that may relate to their low  promotions rates. As  of January 2016, the Air Force had not taken any steps to implement our  recommendation and when we sought additional information in March  2016, the Air Force did not respond in time for this statement. Army Has Not Fully Addressed Challenges Related to UAS Pilots Completing Required Training and the Use of Less Experienced Instructors

The Army has not fully addressed challenges related to UAS pilots  completing their required training and its use of less experienced  instructors, which could affect training quality. These officials stated that they review  Army unit status reports to determine if a unit is prepared to deploy. To provide greater  visibility over the extent to which Army UAS units have completed  required training to leaders responsible for deployment decisions, we  recommended that the Army require unit status reports to include  information on the readiness levels of UAS pilots in UAS units and the  Army concurred. While the steps that Army has taken to date should address our  recommendation, its efforts are ongoing and thus it is too early to know  their impact. In order to increase  the number of its instructors in response to an increase in the number of  UAS units, the Army waived course prerequisites for about 40 percent of  the UAS pilots attending the course to become instructor pilots from the  beginning of fiscal year 2013 through February 2015.These  prerequisites—such as a minimum number of flight hours— are important  because they help ensure that UAS pilots volunteering to become  instructors to help ensure that instructors are fully trained and ready to  instruct UAS pilots. As a  result, we found that Army UAS pilots may not have been receiving the  highest caliber of training needed to prepare them to successfully perform  UAS missions. To help ensure that Army UAS pilots receive the highest  caliber of training, we recommended, in May 2015, that the Army take  additional steps to mitigate potential risks posed by waiving course  prerequisites for less experienced UAS pilots attending the course to  become instructors and the Army concurred. He stated that if the services  coordinated on training their UAS pilots the department as a whole may  be able to train its UAS pilots more effectively and efficiently.
Why GAO Did This Study

In recent years, the size, sophistication, and cost of the Department of Defense's (DOD) UAS portfolio has grown considerably, as has the demand for trained UAS pilots.
This testimony discusses, among other things, DOD's progress in (1) taking actions to strengthen the management of Air Force UAS pilots and (2) addressing challenges the Army faces to ensure that its UAS pilots complete their required training and receive high-quality training.
GAO's statement is based on information from its reports issued in April 2014 on the Air Force UAS pilots and May 2015 on Army and Air Force UAS pilot training. For those reports, GAO reviewed DOD guidance on training UAS pilots and other relevant documents, examined nongeneralizeable training records of Air Force UAS units, conducted nongeneralizeable focus groups with active duty UAS pilots who were selected to cover a range of ranks and other factors at 6 installations, and interviewed DOD and military services officials. GAO obtained updates from DOD and military services officials for this statement.

What GAO Found

In April 2014, GAO reported on several issues the Air Force faced in managing its UAS pilots, and while the Air Force has taken some actions since then, it has not fully implemented GAO's recommendations to strengthen its management.
Personnel Requirements : GAO reported that the Air Force had not accurately identified the number of UAS pilots required to accomplish its mission nor had it established a minimum number of pilots needed. As of March 2016, the Air Force had not updated personnel requirements and until it does, the Air Force will not know if it is assuming unacceptable levels of risk to accomplishing the mission and ensuring pilot safety.
Recruiting and Retaining : GAO reported that the Air Force had faced challenges recruiting UAS pilots and might also face retention challenges in the future. The Air Force has taken steps to recruit more UAS pilots and offers a monthly assignment incentive pay to help retain pilots, but issues related to recruiting UAS pilots may warrant the Air Force's attention.
Alternative Sources : GAO reported that the Air Force had not evaluated the use of alternative personnel populations such as enlisted or civilian personnel to help it sustain required UAS pilot staffing levels. In 2015, the Air Force announced it would test using enlisted personnel but has not formally evaluated using DOD civilian personnel as UAS pilots and thus may lack information on potential options for meeting personnel requirements.
Training : GAO reported that the Air Force had faced challenges training its UAS pilots due to UAS pilot shortages, which impacted its ability to produce new pilots. Fully implementing GAO's recommendations pertaining to management of UAS pilots would better position the Air Force to address its training challenges.
Promotions : GAO reported that the Air Force monitors the promotion rates of UAS pilots but had not analyzed factors that may relate to their low promotion rates. Until the Air Force does this analysis, it is unclear whether its actions to raise promotion rates are appropriate.
The Army has initiated steps to address challenges related to UAS pilots completing their required training and its use of less experienced instructors, which could affect training quality. In May 2015, GAO found that Army unit status reports did not require UAS pilot training information, and thus the Army did not know the extent pilots had been trained and were ready to deploy. GAO recommended that the Army require unit status reports to include UAS pilot readiness information. In March 2016, officials stated that the Army had taken steps to implement the recommendation, but its efforts are ongoing and thus it is too early to know their impact. Also, the Army had waived course prerequisites for about 40 percent of the UAS pilots attending a course to become instructor pilots from the beginning of fiscal year 2013 through February 2015. As a result, Army UAS pilots may not have been receiving the highest caliber of training to prepare them for UAS missions. GAO recommended in May 2015 that the Army mitigate risks posed by waiving prerequisites for less experienced UAS pilots, and in March 2016, Army officials stated that they have addressed the underlying causes that led it to waive the prerequisites, but they did not provide information for GAO to be able to determine whether they were continuing to waive these prerequisites.

What GAO Recommends

In April 2014 and May 2015, GAO made ten recommendations to DOD to improve the Air Force's management of UAS pilots, address Army UAS pilot training challenges, and enhance DOD coordination of UAS pilot training. DOD initiated action on most of these recommendations.