The Air Force’s Process for Developing Combat Aircrew Annual Training Requirements for the Full Range of Core Missions Is Based on Dated Assumptions

The Air Force establishes combat aircrew training requirements for the  full range of core missions based on an annual process, but these  requirements may not reflect current and emerging training needs,  because the Air Force has not comprehensively reassessed the  assumptions underlying them. Since 2012, Air Combat Command has set the same requirement for the  minimum number of live-fly sorties across all combat aircraft platforms,  regardless of the number of core missions assigned to each platform. Combat Fighter Squadrons Are Not Meeting All of Their Annual Training Requirements across the Full Range of Core Missions, and Completed Training Is Not Being Evaluated for Effectiveness

		Combat Fighter Squadrons Are Not Meeting All of Their Annual Training Requirements across the Full Range of Core Missions

Based on our analysis of data on the completion of annual training, we  found that combat fighter squadrons were generally able to complete  mission training requirements for ongoing contingency operations, such  as close air support to ground forces, but were unable to meet annual  training requirements across the full range of core missions. The Air Force Does Not Systematically Evaluate the Effectiveness of Completed Training against Expectations

Air Force processes used to record and monitor combat fighter  squadrons’ annual training are focused on the frequency of training  completed to meet annual requirements and do not include a systematic  evaluation of the effectiveness of that training against established  expectations. First, Air Combat Command has not established the desired learning  objectives and training support elements needed to accomplish the  training expectations in its annual Ready Aircrew Program tasking  memorandums. Air Force Planning Documents for Virtual Training Do Not Include All Desirable Characteristics of a Comprehensive Strategy

The Air Force’s virtual training plans do not include all desirable  characteristics of a comprehensive strategy, such as a risk-based  investment strategy or a time line for addressing training needs. Having a consistent basis for  monitoring training results is critical for tracking progress in achieving the  Air Force’s goal of training units for the full range of core missions. Further, the Air Force lacks a comprehensive  strategy for virtual training, because it has not fully refined its planning  documents to achieve its training vision, for example by developing a risk- based investment strategy and a time line for prioritizing its needs. Recommendations for Executive Action

To ensure that annual training plans are aligned with the Air Force’s  stated goals to ensure that its forces can successfully achieve missions  across a broad range of current and emerging threats, we recommend  that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Air Force to  comprehensively reassess the assumptions underlying its annual training  requirements—including, but not limited to, the total annual training  requirements by aircraft, the criteria for designating aircrews as  experienced or inexperienced, and the mix between live and simulator  training—and make any appropriate adjustments in future training plans. To improve the Air Force’s ability to consistently monitor training results  and better position it to allocate resources to address factors that limit the  effectiveness of training, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense  direct the Secretary of the Air Force to establish desired learning objectives and training support elements  needed to accomplish the training expectations in its annual Ready  Aircrew Program tasking memorandums and develop a process to collect data to assess the effectiveness of  annual training against these features. Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

In written comments on the non-public sensitive version of this report,  DOD did not concur with the first and second recommendations, and  concurred with the third recommendation. Therefore, we believe the recommendation remains  valid. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

The objectives of this report are to determine the extent to which the Air  Force has (1) determined requirements to train its combat aircrews for the  full range of core missions, (2) met annual training requirements for  combat fighter squadrons across the full range of core missions and  evaluated the effectiveness of this training, and (3) established virtual  training plans that include desirable characteristics of a comprehensive  strategy. This report is a public version of the prior sensitive report that we issued  in August 2016. Therefore, this report omits  FOUO information and data on some of the Air Force’s training priorities,  completion of annual training requirements for active-duty fighter  squadrons, and aircraft maintenance generation capabilities.
Why GAO Did This Study

For more than a decade, the Air Force focused its training on supporting operations in the Middle East. The Air Force has established goals for its combat aircrews to conduct training for the full range of core missions. Both the Senate and House Reports accompanying bills for the FY 2016 National Defense Authorization Act included a provision for GAO to review the Air Force's training plans.
This report discusses the extent to which the Air Force has (1) determined requirements to train combat aircrews for the full range of core missions, (2) met annual training requirements for combat fighter squadrons across the full range of core missions and evaluated the effectiveness of this training, and (3) established virtual training plans that include desirable characteristics of a comprehensive strategy. GAO reviewed Air Force training requirements and plans and interviewed officials with a non-generalizable sample of units based on the units' range of core missions.

What GAO Found

The Air Force establishes combat aircrew training requirements for the full range of core missions based on an annual process, but these requirements may not reflect current and emerging training needs, because the Air Force has not comprehensively reassessed the assumptions underlying them. Specifically, assumptions about the total annual live-fly sortie requirements by aircraft, the criteria for designating aircrews as experienced or inexperienced, and the mix between live and simulator training have remained the same since 2012. For example, Air Combat Command has set the same minimum number of live-fly sortie requirements across aircraft platforms, but has not conducted the analysis needed to determine if requirements should differ based on the number of core missions for each platform. Reassessing the assumptions underlying annual training requirements would better position the Air Force to meet its stated goals for its forces to achieve a range of missions for current and emerging threats.
Combat fighter squadrons were generally able to complete mission training requirements for ongoing contingency operations, such as close air support to ground forces, but were unable to meet annual training requirements across the full range of core missions. Further, the Air Force does not systematically evaluate the effectiveness of training that has been completed against established expectations. Selected unit commanders that GAO interviewed cited four common factors that limited their ability to complete training, such as high deployment rates, and other factors that affected the training that aircrews were able to accomplish. However, Air Force processes used to record and monitor annual training do not include a systematic evaluation of training effectiveness against expectations. Specifically, Air Combat Command has not established the desired learning objectives or training support elements needed to accomplish training expectations and does not collect data to assess effectiveness. A more consistent basis for monitoring results is critical in tracking the Air Force's progress in training units for the full range of core missions.
Air Force plans for virtual training do not include all desirable characteristics of a comprehensive strategy, such as a risk-based investment strategy or a time line for addressing training needs. A strategy that included these elements would help ensure that the Air Force's plans addressed its capability needs.
This is a public version of a sensitive report GAO issued in August 2016. It omits sensitive information and data on some of the Air Force's training priorities, completion of annual training requirements for active-duty fighter squadrons, and aircraft maintenance generation capabilities.

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that the Air Force (1) reassess assumptions for annual training requirements, (2) establish and collect data on desired learning objectives and training support elements for its training expectations, and (3) develop a risk-based investment strategy for its virtual training plans. DOD concurred with the third recommendation and did not concur with the first and second recommendations, stating that existing initiatives and policies address these issues. GAO believes the recommendations remain valid for the reasons discussed in this report.