The Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) maintains considerable administrative autonomy under Iraq's constitution, and held a controversial advisory referendum on independence from Iraq on September 25, 2017. The Trump Administration has sustained a cooperative relationship with the Iraqi government and has requested funding to continue security training for Iraqi forces beyond the completion of major military operations against the Islamic State. U.S. assistance to the KRG since 2014 has been provided with the national government's consent, and the Trump Administration has not publicly signaled any planned changes in U.S. assistance programs for either the national government or the Kurdistan region. Iran and Iraq's Popular Mobilization Forces

Since its founding in 2014, Iraq's Popular Mobilization Commission (PMC) and its associated militias—the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF)—have contributed to Iraq's fight against the Islamic State, even as some of its leaders and units have raised concerns among Iraqis and outsiders about the PMF's future. U.S. Foreign Aid and Security Assistance

Legislation under consideration in the first session of the 115 th Congress would provide for the continuation of U.S. military operations, foreign assistance, training, and lending support to Iraq on current terms ( H.R. 3354 , H.R. 3362 , and S. 1780 ). 2810 ) would extend the authorization for the U.S. train and equip program in Iraq through December 2019 and would modify the mandate of the Office of Security Cooperation at the U.S. Embassy in Iraq (OSC-I) to widen the range of forces the office may engage to include all "military and other security forces of or associated with the Government of Iraq." Since 2014, the United States has contributed more than $1.7 billion to humanitarian relief efforts in Iraq and more than $265 million to the United Nations Funding Facility for Stabilization (FFS)—the main conduit for post-IS stabilization assistance in liberated areas. During his March 2017 visit to Washington, DC, Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al Abadi reviewed progress in Iraq's campaign against the Islamic State and appealed for U.S. and international aid to help meet Iraq's short term humanitarian needs and longer term stabilization and reconstruction costs. Issues for the 115th Congress

		U.S. Strategy and Engagement

Iraq's strategic location, its potential, and its diverse population's ties to neighboring countries underlie its enduring importance to U.S. national security policymakers. In general, U.S. engagement with Iraqis since 2011 has sought to reinforce Iraqi unity and avoid fragmentation. These various views are rooted in competing Iraqi visions for their government and for Iraq's relations with its neighbors and other foreign governments. To date, Prime Minister Abadi and other Iraqis have rejected requests by some Iran-linked militia leaders and fighters to formally pursue the fight against the Islamic State across Iraq's western border in Syria. For FY2018, President Trump requested a total of $347.86 million in bilateral foreign assistance and $1.3 billion in defense assistance to Iraq, most of which would support post-conflict stabilization in areas liberated from the Islamic State and the continuation of U.S. military train and equip programming ( Table 2 ). Through November 2017, Congress has appropriated more than $3.6 billion for the program and is considering President Trump's request for an additional $1.269 billion for FY2018 ( Table 3 ). The December 2016 CR authorized the use of FY2017 ESF-OCO funds for sovereign loan guarantees in support of Iraq's current IMF agreement. The United States provides humanitarian assistance specifically for programs in the KRI, with approximately $175 million in FY2016 funding having been directed for KRI-based humanitarian responses and comparable FY2017 funding planned. Iraq's fiscal resources are constrained, stabilization and reconstruction needs are daunting, and more robust reform efforts may prompt opposition from entrenched interests. Prominent considerations in this regard may include: 
the relative success or failure of national authorities in integrating and depoliticizing forces mobilized to fight the Islamic State, including the PMF; Baghdad-KRG disputes over territory, security, resources, and revenue transfers; the future of Iraqis uprooted by fighting, who are returning to damaged, underserved areas and some of whom may remain wary of empowered militias; re-emergent rivalries within the Shia Arab majority, some of whose members may fear a resurgence of Sunni radicalism and remain skeptical of Kurdish and U.S. intentions; and the future mission, extent, and terms of any enduring U.S. military presence.
The 115th Congress and the Trump Administration are considering options for U.S. engagement with Iraq as Iraqis look beyond the immediate security challenges posed by their intense three-year battle with the insurgent terrorists of the Islamic State organization (IS, aka ISIL/ISIS). While Iraq's military victory over Islamic State forces is now virtually complete, Iraq's underlying political and economic challenges are daunting and cooperation among the forces arrayed to defeat IS extremists has already begun to fray. The future of volunteer Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) and the terms of their integration with Iraq's security sector are being determined, with some PMF groups maintaining ties to Iran and anti-U.S. Shia Islamist leaders. In September 2017, Iraq's constitutionally recognized Kurdistan Regional Government held an advisory referendum on independence, in spite of opposition from Iraq's national government and amid its own internal challenges. More than 90% of participants favored independence.
With preparations for national elections in May 2018 underway, Iraqi leaders face the task of governing a politically divided and militarily mobilized country, prosecuting a likely protracted counterterrorism campaign against IS remnants, and tackling a daunting resettlement, reconstruction, and reform agenda. More than 3 million Iraqis have been internally displaced since 2014, and billions of dollars for stabilization and reconstruction efforts have been identified. Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al Abadi is linking his administration's decisions with gains made to date against the Islamic State, but his broader reform platform has not been enacted by Iraq parliament. Oil exports, the lifeblood of Iraq's public finances and economy, are bringing diminished revenues relative to 2014 levels, leaving Iraq's government more dependent on international lenders and donors to meet domestic obligations.
The United States has strengthened its ties to Iraq's security forces and provided needed economic and humanitarian assistance since 2014, but Iraqis continue to disagree over how U.S.-Iraqi relations should evolve. President Trump and Prime Minister Abadi met in Washington, DC, in March 2017 and, according to the White House, "agreed to promote a broad-based political and economic partnership based in the [2008] Strategic Framework Agreement," including continued security cooperation. Some Iraqis have welcomed U.S. engagement with and assistance to Iraq, whereas other Iraqis view the United States with hostility and suspicion for various reasons. Prime Minister Abadi has expressed the desire for the United States to provide continued support and training for Iraq's security forces, but some Iraqis—particularly those with close ties to Iran—are deeply critical of proposals for a continued U.S. military presence in the country. U.S. decisions on issues such as policy toward Iran, the conflict in Syria, the Israel-Palestinian conflict, and U.S. relations with Iraqi Kurds and other subnational groups may influence future bilateral negotiations and prospects for cooperation.
Congress has authorized a Defense Department train and equip program for Iraqi security forces through December 31, 2019, and has appropriated more than $3.6 billion requested for the program from FY2015 through FY2017, including funds specifically for the equipping and sustainment of Kurdish peshmerga. U.S. military operations against the Islamic State continue with the consent of Iraq's elected government. Congress has authorized the use of FY2017 funds for sovereign loan guarantees to Iraq and for continued lending for Iraqi arms purchases from the United States. President Trump has requested $1.269 billion to train Iraqis for FY2018 and seeks $347.86 million for foreign aid to Iraq, including $300 million for further U.S. contributions to United Nations-coordinated post-IS stabilization efforts. Appropriations and authorization legislation enacted and under consideration in the 115th Congress generally would provide for the continuation of U.S. assistance and engagement with Iraq on current terms (H.R. 2810, H.R. 3354, S. 1780 and S. 1519).