In response to our audit questions, the Army revised some of its estimates and, on the basis of these revisions, increased it to about $85 million. However, we found that the revised estimate excluded training costs that the Guard will likely incur and included savings in aircraft operating costs that resulted from another initiative. We could not estimate the agreement’s impact on readiness for 152 of the 182 units affected by the swap and migration. Thirteen units will be replaced by units with lower readiness ratings, while 17 units will be replaced by units having the same or higher readiness ratings. For example, we cannot identify the readiness impact for 20 of the 28 Reserve to Guard transfers involved in the swap because the Guard did not designate specific units that will assume the missions of the 20 Reserve units. The 107 new Reserve units have up to 1 year to organize and build up their readiness ratings before the Guard units are inactivated. For some units, this time could be very short. Because we cannot anticipate what future actions the reserve components will take to accommodate displaced personnel, we focused our attention in three primary areas affected in fiscal years 1994 and 1995 by the agreement—the 157th Separate Infantry Brigade, aviation units, and special operations units. Pennsylvania Army National Guard officials told us that, except for senior officers and enlisted persons, they would welcome the transfer of troops from the 157th. Aviation Units

Most Reserve helicopter pilots, technicians, and civilians associated with aviation units will have difficulty finding new units in the Guard. We found no evidence that the Guard’s status would hinder the Special Operations Command’s training responsibilities under the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. As a combatant command, the U.S. Special Operations Command is responsible for preparing active and reserve component special operations forces to carry out assigned missions, including the training of assigned forces. We spoke with Department of the Army, Army Reserve, and Army National Guard officials to obtain documents and other information pertaining to the cost and readiness implications of the agreement, the reserve components’ efforts to absorb displaced personnel, and the agreement’s impact on control of special forces in the reserve components. GAO Comment

1.
Why GAO Did This Study

Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Offsite Agreement, a major restructuring of the Army National Guard and Army Reserve, focusing on the agreement's: (1) implementation costs; (2) impact on readiness; (3) efforts to absorb displaced personnel; (4) effect on the implementation of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986; and (5) impact on the Special Operations Command's training of special Guard forces.

What GAO Found

GAO found that: (1) implementation of the Offsite Agreement could cost over $180 million; (2) the Army's latest cost estimate is about $85 million; (3) GAO believes that the Army's estimate excludes training costs that the Guard will likely incur and includes savings in operating costs that would have resulted regardless of the agreement; (4) it is too early to tell how the agreement will affect readiness for most units; (5) the Guard did not identify specific units that will assume the missions of 20 inactivating Reserve units; another 107 Reserve units are new and have 1 year to establish their readiness ratings; (6) GAO estimated the readiness impact for some units; 13 units will be replaced by units with lower readiness ratings, while 18 units will be replaced by units having the same or higher readiness ratings; (7) the Guard and Reserve have primarily left it up to the reserve component commands and individual units to help affected persons find new units; (8) in three areas already affected by the agreement (the 157th Separate Infantry Brigade, aviation units, and special operations units) some of the commands' and units' initiatives appear to be working well; (9) others, however, appear to discourage the transfer of personnel, even if a transfer would result in a more effective use of their skills; (10) senior and experienced officers and enlisted persons in inactivating units appear to have the most difficulty obtaining positions in other units in the Reserve and the Guard; (11) reserve helicopter pilots and technicians are also experiencing difficulties; and (12) GAO found no evidence indicating that the Special Operations Command will have problems exercising control over the training of Guard special operations forces.