In 1991, we reported that continued problems in the program indicated that increased costs and additional time to destroy the chemical stockpile should be expected. Stockpile Program’s Cost and Schedule Are Uncertain but Will Exceed Current Estimates

The stockpile program will likely exceed its $12.4 billion estimate and take longer than the legislative completion date of December 2004. This is because reaching agreement on site-specific disposal methods has consistently taken longer than the Army anticipated. Public concerns about the safety of incineration have (1) resulted in additional environmental requirements, (2) slowed the permitting of new incinerators, and (3) required the Army to research disposal alternatives. Reaching Agreement on Environmental Issues Has Been a Lengthy Process

Predicting the disposal schedule for the various sites is difficult. Nonstockpile Program’s Cost and Schedule Are Also Uncertain

Through fiscal year 1997 the Congress has appropriated $221 million for the nonstockpile program. Proposed Disposal Systems Are Not Yet Proven Effective and Acceptable by the Public

Although Army officials are confident that the proposed disposal systems will function as planned, the Army needs more time to prove that the systems will safely and effectively destroy all nonstockpile materiel and be accepted by the affected states and communities. In December 1994, DOD designated the Army’s chemical demilitarization program, consisting of both stockpile and nonstockpile munitions and materiel, as a major defense acquisition program. The objectives of the designation were to stabilize the disposal schedules, control costs, and provide more discipline and higher levels of program oversight. Army officials estimated that the initial cost-reduction initiatives, which are in various stages of assessment, could potentially reduce program costs by $673 million. The current process of individual states establishing their own environmental laws and requirements and the prevalent public attitude that the Army’s disposal facilities should not be located in their vicinity have been obstacles to the stockpile disposal program and are also likely to affect the nonstockpile program. Conclusions

In summary, implementation of the disposal programs has been slowed due to the lack of consensus among DOD and the affected states and localities over the process to dispose of chemical munitions and materiel. Recognizing the difficulty of satisfactorily resolving the public concerns with the disposal of chemical munitions, suggestions have been made by members of the Congress, DOD officials, and others to change the Army’s basic approach to destruction. However, these suggestions create trade-offs for decisionmakers and would require changes in legal requirements. The Army issued the Final Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement for the Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program. It also required the Army to report on (1) disposal alternatives to the baseline incineration method and (2) plans for destroying U.S. nonstockpile chemical weapons and materiel identified in the Chemical Weapons Convention. Related GAO Products

Chemical Weapons and Materiel: Key Factors Affecting Disposal Costs and Schedule (GAO/NSIAD-97-18, Feb. 10, 1997).
Why GAO Did This Study

Under its basic legislative responsibilities, GAO assessed the Department of Defense's (DOD) chemical weapons and related materiel disposal programs, focusing on: (1) the key factors affecting the costs and schedules; (2) actions the Army has taken to improve the programs; and (e) alternatives for improving the programs' effectiveness and efficiency.

What GAO Found

GAO noted that: (1) while there is general agreement about the need to destroy the chemical stockpile and related materiel, progress has slowed due to the lack of consensus among DOD and affected states and localities about the destruction method that should be used; (2) as a result, the costs and schedules for the disposal programs are uncertain; (3) however, they will cost more than the estimated $23.4 billion above current appropriations and take longer than currently planned; (4) the key factors affecting the programs include the public concerns about the safety of incineration, the environmental process, the legislative requirements, and the introduction of alternative disposal technologies; (5) the Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program's cost and schedule are largely driven by the degree to which states and local communities are in agreement with the proposed disposal method at the remaining stockpile sites; (6) based on program experience, reaching agreement has consistently taken longer than the Army anticipated; (7) until DOD and the affected states and localities reach agreement on a disposal method for the remaining stockpile sites, the Army will not be able to predict the Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program's cost and schedule with any degree of accuracy; (8) moreover, many of the problems experienced in the stockpile program are also likely to affect the Army's ability to implement the Nonstockpile Chemical Materiel Program; (9) in addition, more time is needed for the Army to prove that its proposed disposal method for the nonstockpile program will be safe and effective and accepted by the affected states and localities; (10) in December 1994, DOD designated the Army's chemical demilitarization program, consisting of both stockpile and nonstockpile munitions and materiel, as a major defense acquisition program; (11) the objectives of the designation were to stabilize the disposal schedules, control costs, and provide more discipline and higher levels of program oversight; (12) in addition, Army officials have identified cost-reduction initiatives, which are in various stages of assessment, that could reduce program costs by $673 million; (13) recognizing the difficulty of satisfactorily resolving the public concerns associated with each individual disposal location, suggestions have been made by members of the Congress, DOD officials, and others to change the programs' basic approach to destruction; and (14) however, the suggestions create trade-offs for decisionmakers and would require changes in the existing legal requirements.