DOD plans significant investments in airborne ISR systems. For example,  between fiscal years 2007 and 2013, DOD plans to invest $28.8 billion in  the 20 systems we reviewed. Some ISR Development Programs Have Experienced Problems That Have Led to Cost Growth, Delays, and Additional Investments in Legacy Systems

Nearly all of the 13 airborne ISR programs in development that we  reviewed have experienced some cost or schedule growth. Cost and  schedule growth in these programs is largely the result of a poor business  case or acquisition strategy that failed to capture sufficient knowledge  about the product technologies and design before committing to the  development and demonstration of a new system. These additional  investments, totaling about $900 million, represent opportunity costs that  could have been used for other needs within DOD. Development costs alone have increased over 260 percent. Collaboration Slow to Occur on Warrior and Predator

Despite similarities in the Predator and Warrior programs, the Air Force  and Army have repeatedly resisted collaboration. Others still choose a stovepiped  approach to provide a unique system for the specific military service’s  needs. DOD  suggests that the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System  (JCIDS) has been implemented to identify joint warfighting capabilities. This difference  emphasizes the need for a single point for ISR investment decisions within  OSD. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

This report examines the Department of Defense (DOD) development and  acquisition of airborne intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR)  systems. The primary focus of this work is to identify practices and  policies that lead to successful fielding of weapon systems to the  warfighter at the right time and for the right price. Specifically, our  objectives were to (1) evaluate various ISR platforms for potential  synergies and assess their cost and schedule status and the impact of any  increases or delays on legacy systems and (2) evaluate the effectiveness of  ISR investment decisions. We selected 20 major airborne ISR programs in technology or systems  development, already fielded but undergoing significant upgrade, or  operating in the field but due to be replaced by a system in development  and one space-based program in technology development. Appendix II: System Descriptions

The Army is planning to develop the Aerial Common Sensor (ACS) as an  airborne ISR and target acquisition system and is designing it to provide  timely intelligence data on threat forces to the land component  commander. As part of this system of systems, the Fire Scout  is designed to support air-ground operations and reconnaissance,  surveillance, and target acquisition missions.
Why GAO Did This Study

The Department of Defense (DOD) is experiencing a growing demand for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets to provide vital information in support of military operations. Over the next 7 years, DOD plans to invest over $28 billion in existing and new airborne ISR acquisition systems. This represents a marked increase over prior ISR investments. Given the significant investments, GAO was asked to (1) evaluate various ISR platforms for potential synergies and assess their cost and schedule status and the impact of any increases or delays on legacy systems and (2) assess the effectiveness of ISR investment decisions. To assess cost and schedule status, we reviewed programmatic and budget documentation. To evaluate investment decisions, we collected information on system capability, mission, and concept of operation and analyzed the data for similarities.

What GAO Found

DOD plans to invest over $28 billion over the next 7 years to develop, procure, and modernize 20 major airborne intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance systems. Nearly all of the systems in development have experienced cost growth or schedule delays. These problems have delayed the fielding of a warfighting capability and have resulted in program restructuring, cancellation, or unplanned investments in older legacy ISR systems. For example, problems in developing the Aerial Common Sensor affected three legacy programs, increasing their collective budgets by 185 percent, or nearly $900 million. In many cases, GAO found that the newer ISR programs lacked a solid business case or a knowledge-based acquisition strategy before entering the development process. A good business case requires the manager to match the system requirements with mature technologies and a system design that can be built. This requires sufficient knowledge about the system gained through basic system engineering concepts and practices. Although it fights jointly, DOD does not always procure new systems jointly. Instead, each service typically develops and procures systems independently. Opportunities exist for different services to collaborate on the development of similar weapon systems as a means for creating a more efficient and affordable way of providing new capabilities to the warfighter. GAO identified development programs where program managers and services are working together to gain these efficiencies and other programs that have less collaborative efforts and could lead to more costly stovepiped solutions. For example, the Navy and Army have collaborated successfully on the Fire Scout, but in contrast, the Air Force and Army have not been as collaborative on the Predator and Warrior systems, as they each currently plan unique solutions to their similar needs.