The Army has determined that it needs more agile forces. FCS is a family of 18 manned and unmanned ground vehicles, air vehicles,  sensors, and munitions that will be linked by an information network. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

To develop the information on whether the FCS program was following a  knowledge-based acquisition strategy and the current status of that  strategy, we interviewed officials of the Office of the Under Secretary of  Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics); the Secretary of  Defense’s Cost Analysis Improvement Group; the Assistant Secretary of  the Army (Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology); the Army’s Training  and Doctrine Command; Surface Deployment and Distribution Command;  the Program Manager for the Unit of Action (previously known as Future  Combat Systems); the Future Combat Systems Lead Systems Integrator;  and LSI One Team contractors. The FCS Program Is An Unprecedented Challenge

The FCS program faces significant challenges in setting requirements,  developing systems, financing development, and managing the effort. The Requirements Challenge

The Army wants the FCS-equipped unit of action to be as lethal and  survivable as the current heavy force, but to be significantly more  responsive and sustainable. For  example:    First-of-a-kind network will have to be developed that will entail  development of unprecedented capabilities—on-the-move  communications, high-speed data transmission, dramatically increased  bandwidth, and simultaneous voice, data and video;   The design and integration of 18 major weapon systems or platforms has  to be done simultaneously and within strict size and weight limitations;   At least 53 technologies that are considered critical to achieving FCS’  critical performance capabilities will need to be matured and integrated  into the system-of-systems;    Synchronizing the development, demonstration, and production of as  many as 157 complementary systems with the FCS content and schedule. Yet, even with these improvements, the FCS is still at  significant risk for not delivering planned capability within budgeted  resources. This risk stems from the scope of the program’s technical  challenges and the low level of knowledge demonstrated thus far. Key decisions, such as its planned 2007 production decision, are  expected to occur before critical knowledge is captured. It may be several years before the program reaches the  level of knowledge it should have had at program start. The Army  employed lower standards than recommended by best practices or DOD  policy in determining technologies acceptable for the FCS program. While DOD has found it acceptable  to accommodate such problems over the years, this will be a difficult  proposition for the FCS given the magnitude of its cost in an increasingly  competitive environment for investment funds. They are separate programs from  the FCS, and their costs are not included in the costs of the FCS. Consequently, the  Cluster 5 radios are not likely to be available for the first FCS spiral either. Manned Ground Vehicles

FCS includes eight manned ground vehicles, which require critical  individual and common technologies to meet required capabilities. In  2004, GAO reported a similar situation with the Stryker vehicles. Although the program restructuring provides more time to  resolve risk and to demonstrate progress, the knowledge base for making  a confident estimate is still low. For example, a one-year delay late in FCS  development, not an uncommon occurrence for other DOD programs,  could cost over $3 billion. Such a  spiral should meet the standards of providing a worthwhile military  capability, having mature technology, and having firm requirements. Other  capabilities currently in the FCS program could be moved out of system  development and demonstration and instead be bundled into advanced  technology demonstrations that could develop and experiment with  advanced technologies in the more conducive environment of “pre- acquisition” until they are ready to be put into a future spiral. Advancing  technologies in this way will enable knowledge to guide decisions on  requirements, lower the cost of development, and make for more  reasonable cost and schedule estimates for future spirals.
Why GAO Did This Study

FCS is the core of Army efforts to create a lighter, more agile, capable force: a $108 billion investment to provide a new generation of 18 manned and unmanned ground vehicles, air vehicles, sensors, and munitions linked by an information network. Although system development and demonstration began in May 2003, the program was restructured in July 2004, including processes to make FCS capabilities available to current forces. GAO has been asked to assess (1) FCS technical and managerial challenges; (2) prospects for delivering FCS within cost and scheduled objectives; and (3) options for proceeding.

What GAO Found

In its unprecedented complexity, FCS confronts the Army with significant technical and managerial challenges in its requirements, development, finance, and management. Technical challenges include the need for FCS vehicles to be smaller, weigh less, and be as lethal and survivable as current vehicles, which requires (1) a network to collect and deliver vast amounts of intelligence and communications information and (2) individual systems, such as manned ground vehicles, that are as complex as fighter aircraft. Its cost will be very high: its first increment--enough to equip about 1/3 of the force--will cost over $108 billion, with annual funding requests running from $3 billion to $9 billion per year. The program's pace and complexity also pose significant management challenges. The Army is using a Lead System Integrator to manage FCS and is using a contracting instrument--Other Transaction Agreement--that allows for more flexible negotiation of roles, responsibilities, and rights with the integrator. The FCS is at significant risk for not delivering required capability within budgeted resources. Currently, about 9.5 years is allowed from development start to production decision. DOD typically needs this period of time to develop a single advanced system, yet FCS is far greater in scope. The program's level of knowledge is far below that suggested by best practices or DOD policy: Nearly 2 years after program launch and with $4.6 billion invested, requirements are not firm and only 1 of over 50 technologies are mature. As planned, the program will attain the level of knowledge in 2008 that it should have had in 2003, but things are not going as planned. Progress in critical areas--such as the network, software, and requirements--has in fact been slower, and FCS is therefore likely to encounter problems late in development, when they are very costly to correct. Given the scope of the program, the impact of cost growth could be dire. To make FCS an effective acquisition program different approaches must be considered, including (1) setting the first stage of the program to demonstrate a worthwhile military capability, mature technology, and firm requirements; and (2) bundling its other capabilities into advanced technology demonstrators until they can be put in a future stage, which will provide guidance for decisions on requirements, lower the cost of development, and make for more reasonable cost and schedule estimates for future stages.