2 for details on U.S.- procured weapons shipped to Afghanistan for ANSF.) Defense Cannot Fully Account for Weapons

Defense did not establish clear guidance on what accountability  procedures apply when it is handling, transporting, and storing weapons  obtained for ANSF through U.S. procurements and international  donations. Such accountability  lapses occurred throughout the weapons supply process. As a result, the  Defense organizations involved in providing weapons for ANSF, including  DSCA, USASAC, Navy IPO, U.S. Central Command, and CSTC-A, did not  have a common understanding of what accountability procedures to apply  to these weapons while they were in U.S. control and custody. USASAC and CSTC-A Did Not Maintain Complete Inventory Records for Weapons

On the basis of our data analysis and tests of weapons inventory records,  we estimate that USASAC and CSTC-A did not maintain complete records  for about 87,000 weapons—about 36 percent of over 242,000 weapons they  procured for ANSF and shipped from December 2004 through June 2008. For about 46,000 weapons, USASAC did not maintain serial number  records—information fundamental to weapons accountability—and for an  estimated 41,000 weapons, CSTC-A did not maintain documentation on the  location or disposition, based on our testing of a random sample of  available serial number records. Despite CSTC-A Training Efforts, ANSF Cannot Fully Safeguard and Account for Weapons

CSTC-A and State have deployed hundreds of U.S. military trainers and  contract mentors to help ANSF units, among other things, establish and  implement equipment accountability procedures. Furthermore, CSTC-A did not begin monitoring the end  use of sensitive night vision devices until about 15 months after issuing  them to Afghan National Army Units. In June 2008, Defense  reported to the Congress that it was CSTC-A’s policy not to issue  equipment to ANSF units unless appropriate supply and accountability  procedures were verified. Afghan National Army. Illiteracy. Unclear guidance. To help ensure that ANSF units can safeguard and account for weapons  and other sensitive equipment they receive from the United States and  international donors, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct  CSTC-A to (1) specifically and systematically assess the ability of each  ANSF unit to safeguard and account for weapons in accordance with  Afghan ministerial decrees and (2) explicitly verify that adequate  safeguards and accountability procedures are in place, prior to providing  weapons to ANSF units, unless a specific waiver or exception is granted  based on due consideration of practicality, cost, and mission performance. State did not provide  comments. It noted that  Defense requirements and procedures exist for small arms tracking by  serial number. Key contributors to this  report are listed in appendix V.

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

To determine whether Defense and the Combined Security Transition  Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A) could account for weapons obtained,  transported, stored, and distributed to Afghan National Security Forces  (ANSF), we conducted the following work.
Why GAO Did This Study

The Department of Defense (Defense), through its Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A) and with the Department of State (State), directs international efforts to train and equip Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). As part of these efforts, the U.S. Army Security Assistance Command (USASAC) and the Navy spent about $120 million to procure small arms and light weapons for ANSF. International donors also provided weapons. GAO analyzed whether Defense can account for these weapons and ensure ANSF can safeguard and account for them. GAO reviewed Defense and State documents on accountability procedures, reviewed contractor reports on ANSF training, met with U.S. and Afghan officials, observed accountability practices, analyzed inventory records, and attempted to locate a random sample of weapons.

What GAO Found

Defense did not establishclear guidance for U.S. personnel to follow when obtaining, transporting, and storing weapons for the Afghan National Security Forces, resulting in significant lapses in accountability. While Defense has accountability requirements for its own weapons, including serial number tracking and routine inventories, it did not clearly specify whether they applied to ANSF weapons under U.S. control. GAO estimates USASAC and CSTC-A did not maintain complete records for about 87,000, or 36 percent, of the 242,000 U.S.-procured weapons shipped to Afghanistan. For about 46,000 weapons, USASAC could not provide serial numbers, and GAO estimates CSTC-A did not maintain records on the location or disposition of about 41,000 weapons with recorded serial numbers. CSTC-A also did not maintain reliable records for about 135,000 weapons it obtained for ANSF from 21 other countries. Accountability lapses occurred throughout the supply chain and were primarily due to a lack of clear direction and staffing shortages. During our review, CSTC-A began correcting some shortcomings, but indicated that its continuation of these efforts depends on staffing and other factors. Despite CSTC-A's training efforts, ANSF units cannot fully safeguard and account for weapons and sensitive equipment. Defense and State have deployed hundreds of trainers and mentors to help ANSF establish accountability practices. CSTC-A's policy is not to issue equipment without verifying that appropriate supply and accountability procedures are in place. Although CSTC-A has not consistently assessed ANSF units' ability to account for weapons, mentors have reported major accountability weaknesses, which CSTC-A officials and mentors attribute to a variety of cultural and institutional problems, including illiteracy, corruption, and unclear guidance. Further, CSTC-A did not begin monitoring the end use of sensitive night vision devices until 15 months after issuing them to Afghan National Army units.