Status of the Migration Effort

Defense reported that it has selected 363 systems for migration. Defense has identified 1,938 legacy systems for potential termination. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

We were asked (1) for information on the number and cost of systems designated for migration, the number of legacy systems already terminated or scheduled for termination, and savings resulting from terminations of legacy systems and (2) whether Defense’s management control and oversight processes for migration systems are ensuring that the investments are economically sound and in compliance with Defense’s technical and data standards. However, Defense’s primary corporate-level control mechanism for ensuring that sound management and development practices were followed for each migration investment has not been effective. Had there been more rigorous attention to oversight in both areas, Defense may well have avoided the migration problems we identified in previous reviews that cost the Department hundreds of millions of dollars. In implementing the migration strategy, Defense did not ensure that it had adequate visibility over status, costs, and progress. As a result, it has not been able to (1) demonstrate whether the migration strategy has been successful, (2) provide the Congress with accurate and reliable information needed for oversight purposes, and (3) provide its own decisionmakers at the headquarters level with information needed to oversee the strategy. However, both the PSAs and the ASD C3I did not adhere to this oversight process. Ineffective Review and Preparation of Economic Analyses

A principal tool of acquisition oversight is the economic analysis because it helps to ensure that the system chosen for development is cost-effective. Thus, many of the benefits that could be derived from this tool have not been realized. DOD Implementation of the Clinger-Cohen Act

As a first step in implementing the Clinger-Cohen Act, on June 2, 1997, the Secretary of Defense outlined his expectations for improvements in information technology-related management processes and information resources. We believe the expectations identified by the Secretary are an excellent starting point for implementing the Clinger-Cohen Act and bringing meaningful change to the current information technology management process. DOD still has not established information technology performance measures. Modify the DIST system or acquire/develop a new Defense-wide management information system or systems for tracking and reporting key schedule, progress, and performance information on migration systems and other Defense information systems and ensure the system or systems contain complete, current, and accurate schedule data necessary to track the progress of each migration system’s development/deployment and each legacy system’s termination; budgeted and actual cost data on each system for which the Department maintains such data (an alternative to putting budget and cost data in DIST is to establish the capability to directly interface with other systems in the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller’s) Office or other Defense organizations containing systems’ budget and/or cost data); data necessary to track the progress of each migration system in complying with applicable Defense technical and data standards, including whether each system has been independently certified to be in compliance with applicable technical and data standards; data for tracking progress in accomplishing the mission-based performance goals and information management performance goals for the functional areas supported by each system once these data have been identified; information determined to be needed for oversight by the Defense Acquisition Board (DAB), MAISRC, and PA&E; and other information determined to be needed for management and oversight by the Defense CIO, the CIO Council, other Defense senior managers, and the Congress. However, even here, we found that DOD for the most part, was not providing sufficient assurance that migration investments were worthwhile.
Why GAO Did This Study

Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on the Department of Defense's (DOD) Corporate Information Management (CIM) initiative, focusing on: (1) the number and cost of systems designated for migration, the number of legacy systems already terminated or scheduled for termination, and savings resulting from terminations of legacy systems; and (2) whether DOD's management control and oversight processes for migration systems are ensuring that the investment in CIM-related technology is economically sound and in compliance with its technical and data standards.

What GAO Found

GAO noted that: (1) from fiscal years 1995 through 2000, DOD plans to spend at least $18 billion on migration; (2) DOD has selected 363 migration systems and has targeted 1,938 legacy systems for potential termination; (3) despite this substantial investment, DOD did not adhere to decisionmaking and oversight processes it established to ensure that the economical and technical risks associated with migration projects have been mitigated; (4) DOD's primary corporate-level control mechanism for ensuring that sound management and development practices were followed for each migration investment has not been effective; (5) DOD does not have assurance that the migration systems being developed will help achieve its technology goals and that sound business decisions were made in selecting the systems; (6) DOD's traditional acquisition oversight processes also did not support the migration effort because they have not fully ensured that economic analyses for migration projects are prepared and reviewed and that the systems comply with technical and data standards; (7) had there been more rigorous attention to established oversight procedures and sound business practices, DOD might well have avoided the migration problems GAO identified in previous reviews, which unnecessarily cost it hundreds of millions of dollars; (8) in implementing the migration strategy, DOD did not ensure that it had adequate departmentwide visibility over status, costs, and progress; (9) as a result, it could not provide accurate and reliable information, as requested, on the number and cost of systems designated for migration, and the numbers of systems terminated and scheduled to be terminated; (10) DOD has not been able to convincingly demonstrate whether the migration strategy has been successful, and it has not been able to provide the Congress with accurate and reliable information needed for decisionmaking purposes; (11) DOD has taken a positive step to turn around its information technology investment process as part of its implementation of the Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996; (12) the Secretary of Defense outlined his expectations for improvements in management processes and information resources related to information technology; and (13) these expectations incorporate some of the most important elements of the Clinger-Cohen Act and are an excellent starting point for bringing meaningful change to the current information technology management process.