Coordination Mechanisms  Mechanisms and networks for collaboration and coordination on  pandemic preparedness between federal and state governments and the  private sector exist, but they could be better utilized. Efforts Are Underway to Improve the Surveillance and Detection of Pandemic-Related Threats in Humans and Animals, but Targeting Assistance to Countries at the Greatest Risk Has Been Based on Incomplete Information

International disease surveillance and detection efforts serve as an early  warning system that could prevent the spread of an influenza pandemic  outbreak. A portion of the $5.62 billion  that Congress appropriated in supplemental funding to HHS for pandemic  preparedness in 2006—$600 million—was allocated for state and local  planning and exercising. We have also reported on the need for more guidance from the federal  government to help states and localities in their planning. Further Actions Are Needed to Address the Capacity to Respond to and Recover from an Influenza Pandemic

Improving the nation’s response capability to catastrophic disasters, such  as an influenza pandemic, is essential. An outbreak will require additional capacity in many areas, including the  procurement of additional patient treatment space and the acquisition and  distribution of medical and other critical supplies, such as antivirals and  vaccines for an influenza pandemic. Federal Agencies Have Provided Considerable Guidance and Pandemic-Related Information, but Could Augment Their Efforts

The National Pandemic Implementation Plan emphasizes that government  and public health officials must communicate clearly and continuously  with the public throughout a pandemic. Performance Monitoring and Accountability For Pandemic Preparedness Needs Strengthening

While the National Pandemic Strategy and Implementation Plan identify  overarching goals and objectives for pandemic planning, the documents  are not altogether clear on the roles, responsibilities, and requirements to  carry out the plan. Moreover, the National Pandemic Strategy and  Implementation Plan do not provide information on the financial  resources needed to implement them, which is one of six characteristics of  an effective national strategy that we have identified. Concluding Observations

The recent outbreak of H1N1 influenza virus should serve as a powerful  reminder that the threat of a pandemic influenza, which seemed to fade  from public awareness in recent years, never really disappeared. While  federal agencies have taken action on many of our recommendations,  almost half the recommendations that we have made over the past 3 years  are still not fully implemented. Likewise, DHS should continue to  work with other federal agencies and private sector members of the  critical infrastructure coordinating councils to help address the challenges  of coordination and clarify roles and responsibilities of federal and state  governments. While the current H1N1  outbreak seems to have been relatively mild, it could return in a second  wave this fall or winter in a more virulent form. Given this risk, the  administration and federal agencies should turn their attention to filling in  some of the gaps our work has pointed out, while time is still on our side. Influenza Pandemic: DOD Has Taken Important Actions to Prepare, but  Accountability, Funding, and Communications Need to be Clearer and  Focused Departmentwide.
Why GAO Did This Study

As the recent outbreak of the H1N1 (swine flu) virus underscores, an influenza pandemic remains a real threat to our nation and to the world. Over the past 3 years, GAO has conducted a body of work to help the nation better prepare for a possible pandemic. In a February 2009 report, GAO synthesized the results of this work, pointing out that while the previous administration had taken a number of actions to plan for a pandemic, including developing a national strategy and implementation plan, much more needs to be done, and many gaps in preparedness and planning still remain. This statement is based on the February 2009 report which synthesized the results of 11 reports and two testimonies covering six thematic areas: (1) leadership, authority, and coordination; (2) detecting threats and managing risks; (3) planning, training, and exercising, (4) capacity to respond and recover; (5) information sharing and communication; and (6) performance and accountability.

What GAO Found

(1) Leadership roles and responsibilities for an influenza pandemic need to be clarified, tested, and exercised, and existing coordination mechanisms, such as critical infrastructure coordinating councils, could be better utilized to address challenges in coordination between the federal, state, and local governments and the private sector in preparing for a pandemic. (2) Efforts are underway to improve the surveillance and detection of pandemic-related threats in humans and animals, but targeting assistance to countries at the greatest risk has been based on incomplete information, particularly from developing countries. (3) Pandemic planning and exercising has occurred at the federal, state, and local government levels, but important planning gaps remain at all levels of government. (4) Further actions are needed to address the capacity to respond to and recover from an influenza pandemic, which will require additional capacity in patient treatment space, and the acquisition and distribution of medical and other critical supplies, such as antivirals and vaccines. (5) Federal agencies have provided considerable guidance and pandemic-related information to state and local governments, but could augment their efforts with additional information on state border closures and other topics. (6) Performance monitoring and accountability for pandemic preparedness needs strengthening. For example, the May 2006 National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza Implementation Plan does not establish priorities among its 324 action items and does not provide information on the financial resources needed to implement them. The recent outbreak of the H1N1 influenza virus should serve as a powerful reminder that the threat of a pandemic influenza, which seemed to fade from public awareness in recent years, never really disappeared. While federal agencies have taken action on 13 of GAO's 23 recommendations, 10 of the recommendations that GAO has made over the past 3 years are still not fully implemented. With the possibility that the H1N1 virus could return in a more virulent form in a second wave in the fall or winter, the administration and federal agencies should turn their attention to filling in the planning and preparedness gaps GAO's work has pointed out.