Antipersonnel mines pose a particularly difficult clearance problem because they are hard to detect, inexpensive, and prone to proliferation. These methods are slow, costly, and labor-intensive. The worldwide challenge is even more daunting. Many individual countries have been working on countermine operations and UXO clearance and are developing clearance technologies and methods. Research and Development Efforts Are Not Well-Coordinated

No formal mechanism or strategic plan exists to ensure that a fully coordinated U.S. research and development effort is leveraged at the problem. The key questions that the forum attempted to address were (1) whether a legitimate UXO requirement—different from the countermine requirement—exists that warrants the pursuit of technological solutions; (2) whether the research and development efforts currently planned or underway constitute a sound approach toward such a solution; (3) what factors (technical, managerial, or otherwise), if any, impede the advancement of detection and clearance technology for landmines and other UXO; (4) what change in approach to technology development (technical, managerial, or otherwise), if any, should be made in the near term and long term; and (5) who or what organizations should take the lead in instituting change and ensuring that the efforts in developing landmine and UXO detection and clearance technology are well orchestrated. Comments From the Department of Defense

The following are GAO’s comments on the Department of Defense’s (DOD) letter dated August 29, 1995. As noted in the report, because of the number of organizations involved and the various projects underway, it is difficult to estimate the current level of U.S. investment in technologies related to detection and clearance of landmines and other UXO.
Why GAO Did This Study

Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO assessed the extent to which existing or foreseeable technologies offer solutions to worldwide landmine and other unexploded ordnance (UXO) problems.

What GAO Found

GAO found that: (1) U.S. research and development requirements for UXO detection and clearance technology are broader today than they were during the Cold War; (2) the Department of Defense's (DOD) technological efforts have supported countermine operations, for which the main priority is making paths through minefields during combat; (3) U.S. research and development efforts cover a group of near-term and advanced technologies that could increase detection and clearance functions; (4) the most effective clearance techniques are time-consuming, expensive, and labor intensive; (5) the current technologies do not perform well against newer, more advanced munitions; (6) no governmentwide strategy exists to ensure that the most is gained from the various clearance efforts; (7) the technologies available today are inadequate and unable to keep pace with the number of landmines being emplaced annually; and (8) the barriers to technical solutions include the relative ease with which inexpensive improvements in mine designs have outstripped detection and clearance methods, the unique clearance challenges that developing countries pose, and the difficulty in controlling the proliferation of antipersonnel landmines.