Greater investment is desired because high-quality, well maintained infrastructure is believed to increase private-sector productivity and improve public health and welfare. Debt incurred on wholly owned government projects may be repaid with taxes, user fees, or a combination of the two. Proponents argue that an infrastructure bank offers three main advantages over traditional methods of federal support for infrastructure:
A federal infrastructure bank could increase the total amount of investment in infrastructure by leveraging state, local, and private resources. The rate on loan guarantees would have to be consistent with direct loans and is subject to the Federal Credit Reform Act of 1990 (FCRA). 402 ''National Infrastructure Development Bank Act of 2011''

On January 24, 2011, Representative DeLauro, along with many other cosponsors, introduced H.R. The board would have authority to (1) issue public benefit bonds and to provide financing to infrastructure projects from the proceeds; (2) make loan guarantees; (3) borrow on the global capital market and lend to regional, state, and local entities, and commercial banks for the purpose of funding infrastructure projects; (4) purchase in the open market any of the bank's outstanding obligations; and (5) monitor and oversee infrastructure projects financed, in whole or in part, by the bank. Whether this would lead to an increase in the total amount of capital devoted to infrastructure investment is unclear. If this shift were to occur, however, it could be to the detriment of existing investment, as the additional investment in infrastructure may be drawn from a relatively fixed amount of available investment funds. If it were to create a national infrastructure bank, Congress would need to consider the fate of these other programs. Although a national infrastructure bank might help accelerate projects over the long term, it is unlikely to be able to provide financial assistance immediately upon enactment. One attraction of the national infrastructure bank proposals is the potential to encourage significant nonfederal infrastructure investment over the long term for a relatively small amount of federal budget authority. Can a national infrastructure bank be financially self-sustaining? All pending infrastructure bank proposals have the objective of increasing investment in infrastructure while maintaining financial self-sustainability. Congress has established numerous banking entities taking a wide range of institutional forms. The extent of direct federal involvement varies. The three bills considered in this report, S. 652 , S. 936 , and H.R. How might an infrastructure bank be governed? It may apportion some resources to activities intended to satisfy overseers and stakeholders. Tax preferences were also significant. Federal Credit Assistance Programs
As noted above, the federal government also has a number of existing programs that provide loans, loan guarantees, and other credit assistance for a wide spectrum of infrastructure projects, including the following:
The Transportation Infrastructure Finance and Innovation Act (TIFIA) program (23 U.S.C.
Several bills to establish a national infrastructure bank have been introduced in the 112th Congress. This report examines three such bills, the Building and Upgrading Infrastructure for Long-Term Development Act (S. 652), the American Infrastructure Investment Fund Act of 2011 (S. 936), and the National Infrastructure Development Bank Act of 2011 (H.R. 402). These proposals share three main goals:
increasing total investment in infrastructure by encouraging new investment from nonfederal sources; improving project selection by insulating decisions from political influence; and encouraging new investment with relatively little effect on the federal budget through a mostly self-sustaining entity.
The federal government already uses a wide range of direct expenditures, grants, loans, loan guarantees, and tax preferences to expand infrastructure investment. A national infrastructure bank would be another way to provide federal credit assistance, such as direct loans and loan guarantees, to sponsors of infrastructure projects. To a certain extent, a new institution may be duplicative with existing federal programs in this area, and Congress may wish to consider the extent to which an infrastructure bank should supplant or complement existing federal infrastructure efforts.
It is unclear how much new nonfederal investment would be encouraged by a national infrastructure bank, beyond the additional budgetary resources Congress might choose to devote to it. The bank may be able to improve resource allocation through a rigorous project selection process, but this could have consequences that Congress might find undesirable, such as an emphasis on projects that have the potential to generate revenue through user fees and a corresponding de-emphasis on projects that generate broad public benefits that cannot easily be captured through fees or taxes.
As with other federal credit assistance programs, the loan capacity of an infrastructure bank would be large relative to the size of the appropriation. The bank is unlikely to be self-sustaining, however, if it is intended to provide financing at below-market interest rates. The extent to which the bank is placed under direct congressional and presidential oversight may also affect its ability to control project selection and achieve financial self-sufficiency.
More generally, Congress may wish to consider the extent to which greater infrastructure investment is economically beneficial. Advocates of increased investment in infrastructure typically assert that high-quality, well maintained infrastructure increases private-sector productivity and improves public health and welfare. Congress may want to weigh the benefit of the increased spending on physical infrastructure against the benefit generated by alternative types of spending.