The Military Has Relied Heavily on Open Pit Burning at Installations in Afghanistan and Iraq, but Burn Pit Operators Have Not Always Followed Relevant Guidance

Since the beginning of hostilities in Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003), the  military has relied heavily on open burn pits to dispose of the large  quantities of solid waste generated at its installations, but CENTCOM did  not develop comprehensive guidance on operating or monitoring burn pits  until 2009, well after both conflicts were under way. Furthermore, our site  visits and review of contractor documentation found that burn pit  operators did not always comply with this guidance. In addition, DOD  health officials said that many items now prohibited from burn pits, such  as plastics, have been routinely burned at U.S. military bases from the start  of each conflict. DOD Has Relied Heavily on Burn Pits for Solid Waste Disposal in Afghanistan and Iraq

Prior to 2004, the military used burn pits exclusively to handle waste  disposal needs in Afghanistan and Iraq. For example,  according to DOD officials, between 2005 and 2010, there was a large  increase in the number of operational solid waste incinerators in both  countries. First, CENTCOM does not routinely  collect such data. By August 2010,  there were 251 active burn pits in Afghanistan and 22 in Iraq. Alternatives to Open Pit Burning Include Source Reduction, Recycling, Incinerators, and Landfills, but DOD Has Not Evaluated Their Benefits or Costs

Alternative waste management practices, such as source reduction,  recycling, incinerators, and land filling, are alternatives for managing  DOD’s wartime waste stream, decreasing its volume and potential toxicity,  and reducing the potential health impacts of burn pits at U.S. bases in  Afghanistan and Iraq. DOD guidance discourages long- term use of burn pits and encourages the use of incinerators and landfills  instead. DOD has also been slow in implementing waste  management alternatives because other logistical and operational  priorities took precedence over environmental programs, according to  CENTCOM officials. DOD’s recycling practices at its bases in Afghanistan and Iraq were also  limited and primarily involved large scrap metals. We discussed the costs of burn pits and solid waste incinerators with DOD  contract management officials, military officers in both countries, and  other DOD officials to determine the extent to which DOD has analyzed  these costs. However, in part because DOD  and VA lack information on burn pit emissions and individuals’ exposure  to burn pits, the potential health impacts of burn pit emissions on  individuals are not well understood. However, these surveillance efforts do not collect data on specific  individuals’ level of exposure to burn pit emissions. DOD and VA Have Sponsored Studies to Better Understand the Health Impact of Servicemembers’ Exposure to Burn Pit Emissions

The U.S. Army Center for Health Promotion and Preventive Medicine (now  the Army Public Health Command) and the Air Force Institute for  Operational Health (now the U.S. Air Force School of Aerospace  Medicine) jointly conducted the studies of Joint Base Balad, described  earlier, in response to concerns expressed by servicemembers about the  possible health impacts of their exposures to burn pit emissions and to  gain a better understanding of the situation at Balad. However, burn pits remain a significant waste  disposal method in each conflict and the overall incidence of exposure of  service personnel, contractors, and host country nationals to burn pits and  any related health outcomes is unclear. This is largely because of the  expedience of burn pits, a lack of awareness of current guidance, and the  fact that some contracts for burn pit operators do not reflect the most  recent guidance. Furthermore, the fact that DOD and its forces in  Afghanistan and Iraq have not implemented a more comprehensive air  sampling and monitoring plan leaves DOD and other affected stakeholders  without the benefit of potentially useful information on emissions that  could help in characterizing risks from burn pit emissions and possibly  determining whether pollutants detected in ambient monitoring stem from  burn pits or other sources. In its written response, included as  appendix II, DOD said that it concurred with five of the six  recommendations and partially concurred with the recommendation that  the Secretary of Defense direct U.S. forces in Afghanistan and Iraq to  monitor burn pits in accordance with current guidance. The Department of Veterans Affairs  said they appreciated the opportunity to comment on the draft and had no  comments. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

This report addresses the following objectives: (1) determine the extent to  which the U.S. military installations in Afghanistan and Iraq have used  open pit burning and adhered to guidance governing their use; (2) identify  alternatives to open pit burning and the extent to which the Department of  Defense (DOD) evaluated these alternatives; and (3) determine the extent  to which U.S. forces have monitored the air quality, exposures, and  potential health impacts of burn pit emissions in accordance with relevant  guidance. In addition, we  analyzed DOD air sampling, health risk characterization, and health  surveillance documents; as well as documents from the Department of  Veterans Affairs (VA), which provides healthcare and other benefits to  veterans and their families, on health surveillance efforts.
Why GAO Did This Study

From the start of military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, the U.S. military and its contractors have burned solid waste in open burn pits on or near military bases. According to the Department of Defense (DOD), burn pit emissions can potentially harm human health. U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) guidance directs the military's use of burn pits, and the Department of Veterans' Affairs (VA) provides healthcare and other benefits to veterans and their families. GAO was asked to report on the (1) extent of open pit burning in Afghanistan and Iraq, and whether the military has followed its guidance; (2) alternatives to burn pits, and whether the military has examined them; and (3) extent of efforts to monitor air quality and potential health impacts. GAO visited four burn pits in Iraq, reviewed DOD data on burn pits, and consulted DOD and VA officials and other experts. GAO was unable to visit burn pits in Afghanistan.

What GAO Found

The military has relied heavily on open pit burning in both conflicts, and operators of burn pits have not always followed relevant guidance to protect servicemembers from exposure to harmful emissions. According to DOD, U.S. military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq generate about 10 pounds of solid waste per soldier each day. The military has relied on open pit burning to dispose of this waste mainly because of its expedience. In August 2010, CENTCOM estimated there were 251 burn pits in Afghanistan and 22 in Iraq. CENTCOM officials said the number of burn pits is increasing in Afghanistan and decreasing in Iraq, which reflects U.S. troop reallocations and efforts to install waste incinerators. Despite its reliance on burn pits, CENTCOM did not issue comprehensive burn pit guidance until 2009. Furthermore, to varying degrees, operators of burn pits at four bases GAO visited in Iraq were not complying with key elements of this guidance, such as restrictions on the burning of items, including plastic, that produce harmful emissions. DOD officials also said that, from the start of each conflict, operators routinely burned items that are now prohibited. The continued burning of prohibited items has resulted from a number of factors, including the constraints of combat operations, resource limitations, and contracts with burn pit operators that do not reflect current guidance. Waste management alternatives could decrease the reliance on and exposure to burn pits, but DOD has been slow to implement alternatives or fully evaluate their benefits and costs, such as avoided future costs of potential health effects. Various DOD guidance documents discourage long-term use of burn pits, encourage the use of incinerators and landfills, or encourage waste minimization such as source reduction. DOD has installed 39 solid waste incinerators in Iraq and 20 in Afghanistan, and plans to install additional incinerators in Afghanistan. To date, source reduction practices have not been widely implemented in either country and recycling consists primarily of large scrap metals. DOD plans to increase recycling at its bases in Iraq, but recycling at bases in Afghanistan has been limited. Further, DOD has not fully analyzed its waste stream in either country and lacks the information to decrease the toxicity of its waste stream and enhance waste minimization. U.S. Forces in Afghanistan and Iraq do not sample or monitor burn pit emissions as provided by a key CENTCOM regulation, and the health impacts of burn pit exposure on individuals are not well understood, partly because the military does not collect required data on emissions or exposures from burn pits. Army public health officials have, however, sampled the ambient air at bases in each conflict and found high levels of particle pollution that causes health problems but is not unique to burn pits. These officials identified logistical and other challenges in monitoring burn pit emissions, and U.S. Forces have yet to establish pollutant monitoring systems. DOD and VA have commissioned studies to enhance their understanding of burn pit emissions, but the lack of data on emissions specific to burn pits and related exposures limit efforts to characterize potential health impacts on service personnel, contractors, and host-country nationals. Among other things, GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense improve DOD's adherence to relevant guidance on burn pit operations and waste management, and analyze alternatives to its current practices. In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD said that it concurred with five of the six recommendations and partially concurred with the sixth. GAO addressed a DOD suggestion to clarify the sixth recommendation. VA reviewed the draft report and had no comments.