Federal air marshals are subject to FAMS  procedures for checking-in for their flights, passing through security  screening checkpoints, and boarding aircraft. DHS Made Limited Progress in Achieving Its Stated Objectives in Transferring FAMS to ICE and Could Benefit from Key Transformation Practices in Returning FAMS to TSA

In the nearly 2 years that FAMS was part of ICE, DHS had made limited  progress in achieving its stated objectives to develop a surge capacity  through cross-training ICE agents and to enhance federal air marshals’  career opportunities. Specifically, DHS had developed some surge  capacity by cross-training a number of ICE agents, but suspended these  efforts in October 2004 in response to congressional concerns that the  cross-training was an ineffective use of resources and training. DHS  indicated that it would continue to support the surge effort, but had not  determined whether and when it would resume cross-training to support  this initiative. Further, although DHS recognized that federal air marshals’  career opportunities were limited, it had not developed plans to expand  them by providing additional opportunities through investigative or other  duties. Moreover, DHS had not determined how these stated transition  objectives would be met because it had not developed an overall strategy  to include implementation goals, measures, and a timeline to help target  performance shortfalls and suggest midcourse corrections, including any  needed adjustments to future goals and milestones—a key practice for a  successful merger and transformation effort. With its return of FAMS  to TSA, DHS has an opportunity to learn from its experience, including  how these key practices can facilitate FAMS’s transfer back to TSA. Further, DHS had not developed a communication strategy to create  shared expectations within the organization and report related progress on  FAMS’s transition into ICE to employees and other stakeholders—another  key practice of a successful merger or transformation. FAMS lacks adequate controls to help ensure that incidents federal air  marshals encounter that affect their ability to operate discreetly are  recorded. In addition, FAMS has not developed a written policy that establishes  criteria for when and how mission reports are to be completed and filed. Furthermore, FAMS lacks controls to help ensure that the results of  actions taken to address incidents identified in mission reports are  communicated to the federal air marshals who originally filed the reports. Not providing such information may serve to discourage federal air  marshals from submitting future reports. In addition, to facilitate the Federal Air Marshal Service’s management of  incidents that affect federal air marshals’ ability to operate discreetly  during their missions, we are recommending that the Secretary of the  Department of Homeland Security direct the Director of the Federal Air  Marshal Service to take the following four actions:    Develop a means for recording all incidents reported to the Mission  Operations Center that affect federal air marshals’ ability to operate  discreetly and criteria for determining which incidents require federal air  marshals to complete a mission report.
Why GAO Did This Study

The U.S. Federal Air Marshal Service (FAMS) has undergone a number of changes in recent years, including a 2003 transfer from the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) to the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement Bureau (ICE), and a 2005 transfer from ICE back to TSA. A key aspect of federal air marshals' operating procedures is the discreet movement through airports as they check in for their flight, transit screening checkpoints, and board the aircraft. This report discusses FAMS's (1) transfer to ICE and key practices that could facilitate its return to TSA, and (2) management of mission-related incidents that affect air marshals' ability to operate discreetly.

What GAO Found

DHS made limited progress in achieving the intended objectives of its transfer of FAMS to ICE, which included (1) developing a "surge" capacity through cross-training ICE agents, and (2) enhancing federal air marshals' career opportunities. Specifically, DHS had developed some surge capacity by cross-training a number of ICE agents but suspended these efforts in October 2004 in response to congressional concerns that the cross-training was an ineffective use of resources and training. DHS indicated that it would continue to support the surge effort, but had not determined whether and when it would resume cross-training to support this initiative. Further, although DHS recognized that federal air marshals' career opportunities were limited, it had not developed plans to expand them through investigative or other duties. Moreover, DHS had not determined how these transition objectives would be met because it had not developed an overall strategy to include implementation goals, measures, and a timeline to help target performance shortfalls and suggest midcourse corrections--a key practice for a successful transformation. DHS also had not developed a communication strategy to create shared expectations and report related progress on the transition to employees and other stakeholders--another key practice. With its return of FAMS to TSA, DHS's prior experience in transferring FAMS to ICE can provide useful information on key practices to consider in effecting a successful transition. FAMS lacks adequate management controls to help ensure that mission-related incidents that affect air marshals' ability to operate discreetly are recorded, tracked, and addressed. For example, FAMS has not developed a written policy that establishes criteria for when and how federal air marshals are to complete mission reports on incidents they encounter during their missions. In addition, FAMS lacks adequate controls to ensure that the outcome of actions taken to address these incidents was communicated to the federal air marshals who originally reported them. Not providing such information may serve to discourage federal air marshals from submitting future reports. FAMS officials have acknowledged that FAMS lacks written policies to govern the use and management of mission reports and stated that FAMS plans to develop such policies in the near future.