In December 2005, President Bush issued NSPD-44 to promote the security  of the United States through improved coordination, planning, and  implementation of stabilization and reconstruction assistance. State’s Planning Framework Lacks Full NSC Approval, Clearly Defined Roles and Responsibilities, and Interagency Support

S/CRS has led an interagency effort to develop a framework for planning  and coordinating stabilization and reconstruction operations. As of October 2007, the framework  has not been fully applied to any operation. In addition, NSPD-44, the  Foreign Affairs Manual, and the framework provide unclear and  inconsistent guidance on roles and responsibilities for S/CRS and other  State bureaus and offices; the lack of a common definition for stability and  reconstruction operations may pose an obstacle to interagency  collaboration; and some partners have shown limited support for the  framework and S/CRS. The Country  Reconstruction and Stabilization Group would be responsible for  developing U.S. government policies that integrate civilian and military  plans and for mobilizing civilian responses to stabilization and  reconstruction operations. Further, some interagency  partners believe the planning process, as outlined in the draft planning  guide, is too cumbersome and time consuming for the results it produces. DOD Is Developing a New Approach to Stability Operations, But Faces Significant Challenges to Improve Capabilities and Planning

DOD has taken several positive steps toward developing a new approach  to stability operations but has encountered challenges in several areas. Similarly, the combatant commanders are establishing  working groups and other outreach efforts to include non-DOD  organizations in the development of a wide range of military plans that  combatant commanders routinely develop, but these efforts have had a  limited effect because of inadequate guidance, practices that inhibit  sharing of planning information, and differences in the planning  capabilities and capacities of all organizations involved. Specific Challenges Hinder DOD’s Ability to Develop Capabilities and Encourage Interagency Participation in Combatant Command Planning Efforts

We have identified four specific challenges that if not addressed, may  hinder DOD’s ability to develop the full range of capabilities needed for  stability operations, or to facilitate interagency participation in the routine  planning activities at the combatant commands. The department recognizes the importance of successfully  completing these capability assessments, and in the August 2006 report on  stability operations to the Secretary of Defense, the Under Secretary  stated that the department has not yet defined the magnitude of DOD’s  stability operations capability deficiencies, and that clarifying the scope of  these capability gaps continues to be a priority within the department. DOD has made limited progress in developing measures of effectiveness. First, DOD has not provided  specific guidance to the commands on how to integrate planning with non- DOD organizations. DOD collects lessons learned from past operations, but planners are not  consistently using this information as they develop future contingency  plans. State Is Establishing Three Civilian Corps but Must Address Staffing Issues and Seek Additional Congressional Approvals

Since 2005, State has been developing three civilian corps to deploy  rapidly to international crises. Agencies Have Partially Staffed Active and Standby Response Corps; Civilian Reserve Corps Still a Concept

To meet NSPD-44 requirements for establishing a strong civilian response  capability, State and other U.S. agencies are developing three corps of  civilians to support stabilization and reconstruction operations. Conclusions

State and DOD have begun to take steps to enhance and better coordinate  stability and reconstruction activities, but several significant challenges  may hinder their ability to successfully integrate planning for potential  future operations and strengthen military and civilian capabilities to  conduct them.
Why GAO Did This Study

The United States has become increasingly involved in stabilization and reconstruction operations as evidenced in the Balkans, Haiti, Somalia, Iraq, and Afghanistan. In December 2005, the President issued National Security Presidential Directive 44, establishing governmentwide policy for coordinating, planning, and implementing U.S. stabilization and reconstruction assistance to affected foreign entities. This testimony addresses stabilization and reconstruction issues related to (1) State Department (State) efforts to improve interagency planning and coordination, (2) Department of Defense (DOD) efforts to enhance its capabilities and planning, and (3) State efforts to develop civilian capabilities. GAO's statement is based on its May 2007 report on DOD stability operations and preliminary observations related to State's interagency planning framework and civilian response capabilities.

What GAO Found

State and DOD have begun to take steps to better coordinate stabilization and reconstruction activities, but several significant challenges may hinder their ability to integrate planning for potential operations and strengthen military and civilian capabilities to conduct them. State's Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization is developing a framework for U.S. agencies to use when planning stabilization and reconstruction operations, but the framework has yet to be fully applied to any operation. The National Security Council has not approved the entire framework, guidance related to the framework is unclear, and some interagency partners have not accepted it. For example, some interagency partners stated that the framework's planning process is cumbersome and too time consuming for the results it produces. While steps have been taken to address concerns and strengthen the framework's effectiveness, differences in planning capacities and procedures among U.S. government agencies may pose obstacles to effective coordination. DOD has taken several positive steps to improve its ability to conduct stability operations but faces challenges in developing capabilities and measures of effectiveness, integrating the contributions of non-DOD agencies into military contingency plans, and incorporating lessons learned from past operations into future plans. These challenges, if not addressed, may hinder DOD's ability to fully coordinate and integrate stabilization and reconstruction activities with other agencies or to develop the full range of capabilities those operations may require. Among its many efforts, DOD has developed a new policy, planning construct and joint operating concept with a greater focus on stability operations, and each service is pursuing efforts to improve capabilities. However, inadequate guidance, practices that inhibit sharing of planning information with non-DOD organizations, and differences in the planning capabilities and capacities of DOD and non-DOD organizations hinder the effectiveness of these improvement efforts. Since 2005, State has been developing three civilian corps to deploy rapidly to international crises, but significant challenges must be addressed before they will be fully capable. State and other agencies face challenges in establishing two of these units--the Active Response Corps and Standby Response Corps--because of staffing and resource constraints and concerns that stabilization and reconstruction operations are not core missions for each parent organization. Congress has not yet enacted legislation necessary for State to obligate funds for the third unit, the Civilian Reserve Corps, staffed solely with non-federal volunteers. Further, State has not fully defined the types of missions these personnel would be deployed to support.