	Background

Table 1 lists the 37 research reactors operating in the United States. For  example, most U.S. research reactors are located on university campuses;  while these research reactors have security systems in place, none are  protected with the kind of security or armed security forces that protect  nuclear power reactors. DOE Used Its DBT to Develop Security and Emergency Response Requirements for Its Reactors, Which Also Benefit from National Laboratories’ Enhanced Security

To protect its four research reactors, DOE uses the security and  emergency requirements developed from its DBT and counts on the  security afforded by the reactors’ locations at certain national laboratories  that require heightened security. DOE Research Reactors Are Protected by Requirements of the DBT and Their Location at National Laboratories

DOE’s research reactors benefit from the greater security required for the  national laboratories where the research reactors are located. DOE Has Established Extensive Plans and Procedures for Safety and Security Incidents

DOE has concluded that the consequences of an attack at some of its  research reactors could be severe, possibly causing radiation to be  dispersed over many square miles and requiring the evacuation of nearby  areas. As a result, all facilities where DOE reactors are located have  established extensive plans and procedures for responding to reactor  emergencies, as DOE policies require. NRC’s Security Assessment May Not Adequately Reflect the Potential Consequences of a Terrorist Attack on Its Licensed Research Reactors

Between 2003 and 2006, NRC conducted a security assessment of NRC- licensed research reactors to determine whether existing security and  emergency response requirements were sufficient to protect against an  attack. In conducting this assessment, NRC established a minimum radiological  dosage as the criterion to determine if a full security assessment was  necessary. However, NRC’s security assessment may contain important  shortcomings. Specifically, NRC made the following assumptions that we have reason to  question:    NRC assumed that terrorists would use certain weapons and tactics in  attacking a reactor but did not fully consider alternative attack scenarios  which could be more damaging if carried out successfully. NRC assumed that only a small portion of a research reactor could be  damaged in a terrorist attack, resulting in the release of only a small  amount of radioactivity into the atmosphere. However, according to  experts at INL and DHS, it is possible that a larger portion of a research  reactor could be damaged in a terrorist attack. If this occurred, these  experts also noted that an attack could result in a release of a larger  amount of radioactivity into the atmosphere over neighboring  communities. NRC’s  reasons for its disagreement, and our analysis of these reasons, are  discussed in detail in the classified version of this report. NNSA Has Made Progress in Converting U.S. Research Reactors from HEU to LEU Fuel, but It Faces Challenges in Converting Some Remaining Research Reactors

NNSA has converted 8 currently operating U.S. research reactors from  HEU to LEU fuel and has plans to convert 10 remaining reactors by 2014. NNSA  is now developing a new fuel that will allow the remaining five reactors to  convert; according to an NNSA official, this new fuel must be developed  by 2011 if NNSA is to meet its 2014 conversion schedule goal. Argonne National Laboratory  officials working on the fuel development effort at that time characterized  the failures during testing as the worst they had ever experienced. If NRC finds that the consequences of an attack on a research reactor are  more severe than previously estimated, we recommended that the  Chairman of NRC take the following three actions:    ensure that the security requirements for research reactors are  commensurate with the consequences of attacks,  reexamine emergency response requirements to address whether  evacuation plans should be included, and  require that first responders to alarms at research reactors be armed. Furthermore, a  key finding of our report is that NRC disagreed with the SNL finding that  some NRC-licensed research reactors may not be prepared for certain  types of terrorist attacks. 2.
Why GAO Did This Study

There are 37 research reactors in the United States, mostly located on college campuses. Of these, 33 reactors are licensed and regulated by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). Four are operated by the Department of Energy (DOE) and are located at three national laboratories. Although less powerful than commercial nuclear power reactors, research reactors may still be attractive targets for terrorists. As requested, GAO examined the (1) basis on which DOE and NRC established the security and emergency response requirements for DOE and NRC-licensed research reactors and (2) progress that the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) has made in converting U.S. research reactors that use highly enriched uranium (HEU) to low enriched uranium (LEU) fuel. This report summarizes the findings of GAO's classified report on the security of research reactors (GAO-08-156C).

What GAO Found

DOE developed the security and emergency response requirements for its research reactors using its Design Basis Threat--a process that establishes a baseline threat for which minimum security measures should be developed. These research reactors benefit from the greater security required for the national laboratories where they are located, which store weapons-usable nuclear materials. DOE also has concluded that the consequences of an attack at some of its research reactors could be severe, causing radioactivity to be dispersed over many square miles and requiring the evacuation of nearby areas. As a result, all facilities where DOE reactors are located have extensive plans and procedures for responding to security incidents. NRC based its security and emergency response requirements largely on the regulations it had in place before September 2001. NRC decided that the security assessment it conducted between 2003 and 2006 showed that these requirements were sufficient. While it was conducting this assessment, NRC worked with licensees to improve security when weaknesses were detected. However, GAO found that NRC's assessment contains questionable assumptions that create uncertainty about whether the assessment reflects the full range of security risks and potential consequences of attacks on research reactors. For example, Sandia National Laboratories (SNL)--a contractor NRC used to assist in performing its assessment-- found that some NRC-licensed research reactors may not be prepared for certain types of attacks. However, NRC disagreed with SNL's finding. In 2006, NRC concluded that the consequences of attacks would result in minimal radiological exposure to the public. In addition, NRC assumed that terrorists would use certain tactics in attacking a reactor but did not fully consider alternative attack scenarios that could be more damaging. Finally, NRC assumed that a small part of a reactor could be damaged in an attack, resulting in the release of only a small amount of radioactivity. However, according to experts at Idaho National Laboratories and the Department of Homeland Security, it is possible that a larger part of a reactor could be damaged, which could result in the release of larger amounts of radioactivity. NNSA has made progress in changing from HEU to LEU fuel in U.S. research reactors but may face difficulty in converting some of the remaining research reactors. Since 1978, NNSA has converted eight currently operating U.S. research reactors, including two in 2006. In addition, NNSA plans to convert 10 more U.S. research reactors by September 2014--five of which are scheduled for conversion by 2009. However, NNSA faces difficulties in converting the remaining five reactors because these reactors cannot operate with the currently available LEU fuel. NNSA is now developing a new LEU fuel that will allow the remaining five reactors to operate. However, according to NNSA, developing this fuel has been problematic, as early efforts experienced failures during testing. NNSA officials acknowledged that further setbacks are likely to delay plans to convert these research reactors.