Yuma Proving Ground tests aircraft armaments and sensor systems. While awaiting formal approval of the single-site consolidation at Yuma, in the spring 1995, the Army Secretary’s staff updated TECOM’s cost and savings analyses of two options: the single-site at Yuma and a dual-site at Fort Rucker and Yuma. While various Army officials and Army testing consolidation studies point to Yuma Proving Ground as providing the optimum testing environment for the Army, we found no indication that testing could not be conducted safely at the other locations. Likewise, Congress has urged DOD to downsize and consolidate testing activities. However, the services have been unable to agree on how best to achieve such consolidations. Of more immediate concern to DOD was the Army Secretary’s June 1995 tentative decision to consolidate Army aviation testing at Fort Rucker/Yuma. We believe that this is an appropriate approach to fully account for expected costs and savings. To broaden our perspective on aviation test and evaluation issues and future requirements, we held discussions with key testing officials in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Army’s Aviation and Troop Command, the Air Force Flight Test Center at Edwards Air Force Base, and the Naval Air Warfare Center at Patuxent River, Maryland. These changes produced significant increases in projected annual recurring and long-term savings to the Army.
Why GAO Did This Study

Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Secretary of the Army's tentative decision to move aviation testing activities now at Edwards Air Force Base, California, to Fort Rucker, Alabama, and retain Yuma Proving Ground.

What GAO Found

GAO found that: (1) the Army failed to fully account for savings from consolidating its aviation testing activities; (2) consolidation at Fort Rucker and Yuma Proving Ground will result in the greatest short-term and significant long-term savings; (3) single-site consolidation at Yuma will result in the greatest long-term savings and an optimum testing environment for future testing; (4) the Department of Defense (DOD) and the services have not reached consensus about how best to consolidate and downsize test activities; (5) excess aviation testing capacity within DOD signals that consolidation is necessary to reduce this excess; and (6) the Secretary of Defense will need stronger commitment and leadership to evaluate whether these options or other options will serve DOD best.