and foreign service nationals— work at these locations. Since the 1970s, U.S. diplomatic personnel overseas have been  increasingly at risk from terrorist attacks and other acts of violence. In the 1998 bombings, terrorists attacked the U.S. embassies in Nairobi,  Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. In  addition, the bombings injured more than 4,000 Kenyans, Tanzanians, and  Americans. The fourth standard requires blast-resistant construction techniques and  materials. State’s fifth security standard is controlled access at the perimeter to the  compound. State Has Done Much to Improve Facility Security but Most Facilities Still Do Not Meet Security Standards

Over the last 4 years, State has accomplished much in improving posts’  security through various security upgrades. As a result, many buildings and their  occupants remain vulnerable to terrorist attacks. To assess the security of embassy and consulate facilities, we analyzed  State Department data to determine if the primary facilities meet State’s  five key standards that I discussed earlier. Figure 4 shows the portion of  posts where the primary office building meets or does not meet four of the  five security standards:  setback, perimeter wall or fence, anti-ram barrier,  and compound access control. We found that 120 primary facilities  lack an adequate perimeter wall/fence, while 147 lack adequate anti-ram  barriers. Ambassadors and security officers at three of the four posts we visited  emphasized that in addition to facilities not meeting standards, there were  security difficulties associated with the number of office facilities at their  post that were spread out around the city. At  133 posts, the primary office building has certain fire/life safety  deficiencies. For the primary office buildings alone, maintenance  needs exceed $316 million, with the primary building at more than one- third of all posts having more than $1 million in maintenance  requirements. OBO projects that maintenance costs will increase over  time because many of the facilities are so old and antiquated, some dating  back to the late 19th and early 20th century. In 1999, the Overseas Presence Advisory Panel  reported that many posts are equipped with obsolete systems that prevent  effective interagency information sharing. Replacing Buildings Is State’s Long-term Solution to Physical Security Problems

State continues to make security upgrades at some posts, but it is shifting  its resources toward replacing existing facilities with new, secure embassy  compounds or substantially retrofitting existing, newly acquired, or leased  buildings. As shown in figure 12, funding for State’s capital projects has  increased from $9.5 million in fiscal year 1998 to a requested $890 million  in fiscal year 2004. I will discuss this program  briefly and then make several preliminary observations regarding State’s  management of this program. OBO officials estimated that beginning in  fiscal year 2004, it will cost an additional $16 billion to replace facilities at  the remaining 160 posts. State is in the  early stages of its expanded construction program and, therefore, has not  yet established a clear track record that would provide complete answers  to these questions. Moreover, senior OBO management has  increased its oversight of ongoing capital and other projects. Exhibit 5, a video clip from the State Department showing the  performance of new windows and building materials, indicates that these  technologies show promise of providing an even greater level of physical  security for personnel operating in new buildings. Without adhering to a  systematic process for developing future staffing needs at U.S. embassies  and consulates, the U.S. government risks building the wrong-sized  facilities, which could lead to security concerns, additional costs, and  other work inefficiencies. As shown in  figure 15, at the proposed fiscal year 2004 rate of replacement, it would  take about 20 years to fund and 22 years to complete construction of the  estimated 160 remaining posts (assuming a 2-year design and construction  period).
Why GAO Did This Study

The 1998 terrorist bombings of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, which killed more than 220 people and injured 4,000, highlighted the compelling need for safe and secure overseas facilities. In November 1999, an independent advisory group, the Overseas Presence Advisory Panel, said that thousands of Americans representing our nation abroad faced an unacceptable level of risk from terrorist attacks and other threats. The panel called for accelerating the process of addressing security risks to provide overseas staff with the safest working environment, consistent with the nation's resources and the demands of their missions. Moreover, the panel concluded that many U.S. overseas facilities were insecure, decrepit, deteriorating, overcrowded, and "shockingly shabby," and it recommended major capital improvements to redress these problems. GAO was asked to (1) assess the current conditions of overseas diplomatic facilities, including security, maintenance, office space, and information technology; and (2) provide some preliminary observations regarding State's efforts to improve facility conditions by replacing existing buildings with new, secure embassy compounds.

What GAO Found

The State Department has done much over the last 4 years to improve physical security at overseas posts. For example, State has constructed perimeter walls, anti-ram barriers, and access controls at many facilities. However, even with these improvements, most office facilities do not meet security standards. As of December 2002, the primary office building at 232 posts lacked desired security because it did not meet one or more of State's five key current security standards of (1) 100-foot setback between office facilities and uncontrolled areas; (2) perimeter walls and/or fencing; (3) anti-ram barriers; (4) blast-resistant construction techniques and materials; and (5) controlled access at the perimeter of the compound. Only 12 posts have a primary building that meets all five standards. As a result, thousands of U.S. government and foreign national employees may be vulnerable to terrorist attacks. Moreover, many of the primary office buildings at embassies and consulates are in poor condition. In fact, the primary office building at more than half of the posts does not meet certain fire/life safety standards. State estimates that there is a backlog of about $730 million in maintenance at overseas facilities; officials stated that maintenance costs would increase over time because of the age of many buildings. At least 96 posts have reported serious overcrowding. While State continues to fund some security upgrades at embassies and consulates, State is shifting its resources from these upgrades toward constructing new buildings and substantially retrofitting existing, newly acquired, or leased buildings. Funding for these capital projects has increased from $9.5 million in fiscal year 1998 to a requested $890 million in fiscal year 2004. In addition to completing ongoing construction projects, State believes it needs to replace facilities at about 160 posts at an estimated cost of $16 billion. At the proposed fiscal year 2004 rate of funding, it will take more than 20 years to fully fund and build replacement facilities. While GAO has not fully analyzed State's performance in the early stages of this large-scale building program, GAO has observed that State has taken a number of positive steps to improve its program management. Because of the high costs and importance of this program, GAO believes the program merits extensive oversight.