SBIRS is to replace the  existing infrared system, the Defense Support Program, which has  provided early missile warning information since the 1970s. These difficulties have led DOD to  restructure the program multiple times, including revising program goals  in 2002, 2004, and 2005. By  April 2007, in additional tests, the number of problems escalated well  beyond what was expected. DOD Is Taking Steps to Mitigate Software Problems, Including Initiatives to Improve Program Oversight

To mitigate the software problems, DOD has assessed various alternatives  and developed an approach for implementing the software redesign effort  and overseeing its development. DOD and the SBIRS contractor are taking  steps to address problems, among others, with the original software  architecture. DOD has redesigned the architecture, and is in the midst of  developing additional software, and testing elements critical to the  integration and test of systems. DOD has also undertaken several  initiatives to improve its program oversight and to help it better manage  the development, including addressing weaknesses in program  management responsibility, accountability, and other areas. DOD’s Plan for Resolving the Software Problem Is Optimistic

While DOD has estimated that the SBIRS program will be delayed by 15  months and cost $414 million to resolve the software problems, those  estimates appear too optimistic, given the cost and schedule risks  involved. For example, SBIRS contractors’ report low confidence that  software can be produced in time to meet the December 2009 satellite  launch goal. Finally, as of August 2008,  DOD reported that SBIRS was already behind schedule on some software  development efforts, and thousands of activities remain that must be  integrated and tested across various systems, with cost and schedule  implications, if problems or unintended consequences occur. Major Challenge and Risks to the Redesign and Development Effort Still Exist

Based on an April 2008 review of the revised software designs and  software development approach, the independent review teams— comprised of personnel from the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense  for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics; Aerospace Corporation;  Lockheed Martin Corporate; Air Force Space and Missiles Systems Center  Wing; and the Software Engineering Institute—concluded that the  program should proceed with formal software coding, but also expressed  concern about the ambitious schedule. Specifically, the review teams cited  the program’s aggressive schedule as a major challenge because it allows  “little margin for error” and concluded the program faces high risk of not  meeting the schedule. These deviations from the disciplined development  process allowed the program to shortcut important processes in order to  meet the ambitious schedule goal, rather than follow a disciplined process  to develop software. Recommendations for Executive Action

To better ensure that SBIRS can meet the cost and schedule goals for  resolving the flight software problems as well as launch the first satellite  on schedule, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense   revise the cost and schedule estimates based on more realistic  assumptions to increase the confidence of success, and  require that the contractor make adherence to disciplined software  practices a priority to reduce program risk. As indicated in our report, SBIRS has been restructured several times  because it underestimated the technical complexity and inherent  challenges associated with software, among other technical elements.
Why GAO Did This Study

In 1996, DOD initiated the Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS) to replace the nation's current missile detection system, and to provide expanded missile warning capability. Since then, SBIRS has been restructured several times to stem cost increases and schedule delays, including revising program goals in 2002, 2004, and 2005. These actions were partly due to the challenges of developing sophisticated technologies and software. In 2007, SBIRS had a major setback when flight software for the first satellite underwent testing and failed, a failure caused by design issues. DOD developed a plan for resolving these issues, and revised its cost and schedule goals. GAO has assessed (1) the approach used to mitigate the problems, and (2) the cost and schedule risks and challenges of that approach. To conduct our work, GAO has contacted, met with, and performed detailed work at numerous DOD and contractor offices; and reviewed technical documents on flight software.

What GAO Found

To mitigate the SBIRS flight software problems, DOD has assessed various alternatives and developed a way to implement the software redesign and oversee its development. In April 2008, DOD approved the redesign effort, which addressed problems with the original design that affected the timing of stored programs, distribution of control between processors, and failure at the hardware interface level. Six review teams comprised of 70 personnel in all evaluated the designs to ensure the technical solutions, development approach, and readiness of test facilities were adequate. DOD and its contractor are now implementing the simplified architecture, developing new software, and testing elements critical to the integration and test of systems. DOD is also improving its program oversight and better managing the SBIRS development, by acting on the recommendations of an Independent Program Assessment; addressing weaknesses in management responsibility, accountability and organizational structure; and establishing a central execution team. DOD has estimated that the SBIRS program will be delayed by 15 months and cost $414 million in funding to resolve the flight software problems, but these estimates appear optimistic. For example, confidence levels--based on the program's ability to develop, integrate, and test software in time to meet the schedule goal--have been assessed as low. Further, the review teams who approved the designs to start coding software report that the program's aggressive schedule is a major challenge because it allows "little margin for error." DOD has also introduced risk by granting waivers to streamline the software development processes to meet the aggressive schedule. These allow the program to deviate from disciplined processes in order to compress the schedule and meet the goal. In addition, some software elements are behind schedule, and thousands of software activities and deliverables remain to be integrated. Delay by these other programs could create unintended consequences for the SBIRS launch goal. If DOD should need additional time or encounter problems beyond what was planned for, more funds will be needed and launch of the first satellite in December 2009 could be jeopardized.