TSA Has Taken Steps to Strengthen the Management and Performance of an Aviation Security Workforce, but Continues to Face Challenges

In recent years, TSA has taken numerous actions related to the  deployment, training, and performance of their aviation security  workforce. However, while the guidance  clearly defined FSD roles and responsibilities, TSA’s primary document  outlining FSDs’ authority was outdated and lacked clarity regarding FSD  authority relative to that of other airport stakeholders with whom FSDs  must coordinate closely to help ensure the effectiveness of aviation  security efforts. The use of TSOs in  these support functions could adversely affect the ability of FSDs to  adequately staff their screening checkpoints. TSA Has Strengthened TSO Training, but Faces Challenges in Delivering the Training

Since we reported on TSO training in September 2003, TSA has taken a  number of actions designed to strengthen training available to the TSO  workforce as part of its efforts to enhance the performance of TSOs. As previously discussed, TSA is taking steps to address the TSO  staffing challenges. OI officials stated that they  will continue testing. Officials did not specify when such a  program might begin. Since then, TSA has finalized targets  for the indexes, including targets for passenger and checked baggage  covert testing. TSA Has Made Progress in Providing Regulatory Oversight of Airport and Air Carrier Security Activities, but it Could Better Target Workforce Resources

TSA has taken steps to strengthen oversight for key areas of aviation  security, including domestic air cargo security operations conducted by air  carriers, and airport perimeter security operations and access controls  carried out by airport operators. As of  October 2005, however, TSA had not developed performance measures to  determine to what extent air carriers and indirect air carriers are  complying with air cargo security requirements, limiting TSA’s ability to  effectively target its workforce for future inspections and fulfill its  oversight responsibilities. Additional Action Needed to Strengthen TSA Inspections and Oversight of Domestic Air Cargo Security

We reported in October 2005 that TSA had significantly increased the  number of domestic air cargo inspections conducted of air carrier and  indirect air carrier compliance with security requirements. TSA officials stated that the agency planned to conduct additional  tests. These recommendations included (1) developing a methodology  and schedule for completing assessments of air cargo vulnerabilities and  critical assets; (2) reexamining the rationale for existing air cargo  inspection exemptions; (3) developing measures to gauge air carrier and  indirect air carrier compliance with air cargo security requirements;   (4) developing a plan for systematically analyzing and using the results of  air cargo compliance inspections to target future inspections and identify  system wide corrective actions; (5) assessing the effectiveness of  enforcement actions in ensuring air carrier and indirect air carrier  compliance with air cargo security requirements; (6) and ensuring that the  data to be used in the Freight Assessment System are complete, accurate,  and current. At the time of our review, we found TSA had begun  evaluating commercial airport security but needed a better approach for  assessing results. However, given the challenges TSA faces in  determining appropriate staffing levels at airports, it is critical that TSA  carefully consider how it strategically hires, deploys and manages its TSO  workforce to help strengthen its passenger and checked baggage  screening programs. Transportation Security Administration: More Clarity on the Authority  of Federal Security Directors Is Needed. Airport Passenger Screening: Preliminary Observations on Progress  Made and Challenges Remaining.
Why GAO Did This Study

It has been over 3 years since the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) assumed responsibility for passenger and baggage screening at commercial airports. This testimony focuses on the progress TSA is making in strengthening aspects of aviation security and the challenges that remain. Particularly, this testimony highlights (1) progress TSA has made, and challenges it faces, in managing a federalized security workforce--including federal security directors (FSD) and transportation security officers (TSO)--with operational responsibility for ensuring security of passengers and their baggage; and (2) actions TSA has taken, and the challenges it faces, to ensure appropriate regulatory oversight of other airport security activities.

What GAO Found

TSA has made progress in managing, deploying, and training a federalized aviation security workforce, including FSDs (the lead authority at U.S. airports) and TSOs (formerly known as screeners). FSDs have, for example, formed partnerships with key federal and private-sector stakeholders at airports engaged in security and operations. We reported, however, that the guidance on FSD authority is outdated and lacks clarity, particularly regarding security incidents when FSDs must coordinate with other stakeholders. Regarding TSOs, TSA has taken and has planned actions to strengthen the management and deployment of the TSO workforce. TSA has, for instance, developed a screening allocation model to determine TSO staffing levels at airports. However, FSDs have reported concerns that despite such a model, attracting, hiring, and retaining an adequate part-time TSO workforce remains a challenge. We have reported that, while TSA has expanded training opportunities for TSOs, insufficient TSO staffing and other problems hinder the ability of TSOs to take training. To evaluate TSO performance, TSA has collected performance data by conducting covert (undercover, unannounced) tests at passenger screening checkpoints. TSA has taken steps to strengthen key areas of aviation security for which it has regulatory and oversight responsibility, including domestic air cargo security, but faces challenges related to oversight and performance measurement. We reported in October 2005, for example, that while TSA had significantly increased the number of domestic air cargo inspections conducted, performance measures to determine to what extent air carriers and others are complying with air cargo security requirements had not been developed. Without such performance measures, and a systematic analysis of these results of air cargo security inspections, TSA's ability to target its workforce for future inspections, and fulfill oversight responsibilities, will be limited. Further, while TSA has incorporated elements of risk-based decision making into securing air cargo, its efforts are not yet complete. To address these and other issues, TSA officials stated that they plan to compile additional information on air cargo inspections to enhance their ability to conduct compliance inspections of air carriers using covert testing, and to require random inspection of air cargo.