	TSA Did Not Validate the Science Underlying the SPOT Program before Deploying SPOT

As discussed in our May 2010 report, TSA deployed SPOT nationwide  before first determining whether there was a scientifically valid basis for  using behavior and appearance indicators as a means for reliably  identifying passengers who may pose a risk to the U.S. aviation system. Specifically,  DHS’s plan to assess SPOT is not designed to fully validate whether  behavior detection can be used to reliably identify individuals in an airport  environment who pose a security risk. According to TSA, SPOT was deployed before a scientific validation of the  program was completed, but TSA stated that this deployment was made in  response to the need to address potential threats to the aviation system,  such as suicide bombers. However, a 2008 report issued by the National Research Council of the  National Academy of Sciences stated that the scientific evidence for  behavioral monitoring is preliminary in nature. Thus, we  recommended that the Secretary of Homeland Security convene an  independent panel of experts to review the methodology of the validation  study on the SPOT program being conducted to determine whether the  study’s methodology is sufficiently comprehensive to validate the SPOT  program. According to DH S’s  Science and Technology Directorate, this independent review is expected  to be completed in early April 2011. As we noted in our report, research on other issues, such as determining  the number of individuals needed to observe a given number of passengers  moving at a given rate per day in an airport environment or the duration  that such observation can be conducted by BDOs before observation  fatigue affects effectiveness, could provide additional information on the  extent to which SPOT can be effectively implemented in airports. As we reported in March 2011, Congress may wish to consider limiting  program funding pending receipt of an independent assessment of TSA’s  SPOT program. TSA Is Taking Steps to Address Operational Challenges in Implementing the SPOT Program

In May 2010, we reported that TSA is not fully utilizing the resources it has  available to systematically collect the information obtained by BDOs on  passengers whose behaviors and appearances resulted in either a referral  to a BDO or to a LEO, and who thus may pose a risk to the aviation  system. Official guidance on what data should be entered into the  system on passengers could better position TSA personnel to be able to  consistently collect information to facilitate synthesis and analysis in  “connecting the dots” with regard to persons who may pose a threat to the  aviation system. In March 2011, TSA stated that it  has taken steps to implement our recommendation by revising SPOT  standard operating procedures to provide guidance directing the input of  BDO data into the Transportation Information Sharing System. TSA plans  to implement these revised procedures in April 2011. In addition, all SPOT  airports have access to the Transportation Information Sharing System as  of March 2011 according to TSA. In addition, as we previously reported, studying airport video recordings  of the behaviors exhibited by persons transiting airport checkpoints who  were later charged with or pleaded guilty to terrorism-related offenses  could provide important insights about behaviors that may be common  among terrorists or could demonstrate that terrorists do not generally  display any identifying behaviors. Using CBP and Department of Justice information, we examined the travel  of key individuals allegedly involved in six terrorist plots that have been  uncovered by law enforcement agencies. As a result, in our May 2010 report, we recommended that  if the current validation effort determines that the SPOT program has a  scientifically validated basis for using behavior detection for  counterterrorism purposes in the airport environment, then TSA should  study the feasibility of using airport checkpoint surveillance video  recordings to enhance its understanding of terrorist behaviors. DHS  agreed with our recommendation and noted that TSA agrees this could be  a useful tool and is working with DHS’s Science and Technology  Directorate to utilize video case studies of terrorists, if possible. In March 2011,  TSA stated that it is exploring ways to better utilize video recordings to  identify these behavioral indicators.
Why GAO Did This Study

The attempted passenger aircraft bombing of Northwest flight 253 on December 25, 2009, provided a vivid reminder that the civil aviation system remains an attractive terrorist target. To enhance aviation security, in October 2003 the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Transportation Security Administration (TSA) began testing of its Screening of Passengers by Observation Techniques (SPOT) program to identify persons who may pose a risk to aviation security. The SPOT program utilizes behavior observation and analysis techniques to identify potentially high-risk passengers. This testimony provides information on (1) the extent to which TSA has validated the scientific basis for SPOT and (2) other operational challenges. This statement is based on a prior report GAO issued in May 2010 on SPOT, including selected updates made in March 2011. For the updates, GAO reviewed documentation on TSA's progress in implementing the report's recommendations.

What GAO Found

As GAO reported in May 2010, TSA deployed its behavior detection program nationwide before first determining whether there was a scientifically valid basis for the program. According to TSA, the program was deployed before a scientific validation of the program was completed in response to the need to address potential security threats. However, a scientific consensus does not exist on whether behavior detection principles can be reliably used for counterterrorism purposes, according to a 2008 report of the National Research Council of the National Academy of Sciences. DHS is conducting a study on the scientific basis of SPOT. Thus, in May 2010, GAO recommended that DHS convene an independent panel of experts to review the methodology of its study. DHS concurred and stated that it is convening an independent panel to review its current efforts to help validate the scientific basis for the program, which is expected to complete its work by early April 2011. Nonetheless, DHS's study to assess SPOT is not designed to fully validate whether behavior detection can be used to reliably identify individuals in an airport environment who pose a security risk. For example, factors such as the length of time behavior detection officers (BDO) can observe passengers without becoming fatigued are not part of the plan and could provide additional information on the extent to which SPOT can be effectively implemented. The results of a panel to review DHS's methodology could help ensure a rigorous, scientific validation of SPOT. As GAO previously reported, TSA experienced SPOT operational challenges, including not systematically collecting and analyzing information obtained by BDOs on passengers who may pose a threat to the aviation system. Better utilizing existing resources would enhance TSA's ability to quickly verify passenger identity and could help TSA to more reliably "connect the dots" with regard to persons who pose a threat. Thus, GAO recommended that TSA clarify BDO guidance for inputting information into the database used to track suspicious activities, and develop a schedule to expand access to this database across all SPOT airports. TSA agreed and in March 2011 stated that it has revised the SPOT standard operating procedures on how BDOs are to input data into the database used to report suspicious activities. TSA plans to implement these revised procedures in April 2011. TSA also reported that all SPOT airports have access to this database as of March 2011. In addition, GAO reported that individuals allegedly involved in six terrorist plots transited SPOT airports. GAO recommended in May 2010 that TSA study the feasibility of using airport video recordings of the behaviors exhibited by persons transiting airport checkpoints who were later charged with or pleaded guilty to terrorism-related offenses. GAO reported that such recordings could provide insights about behaviors that may be common among terrorists or could demonstrate that terrorists do not generally display any identifying behaviors. TSA agreed that studying airport videos could be a useful tool in understanding terrorist behaviors in the airport environment and in March 2011 reported that it is exploring ways to better utilize such recordings.

What GAO Recommends

GAO has made recommendations in prior work to strengthen TSA's SPOT program. TSA generally concurred with the recommendations and has actions under way to address them. GAO provided the updated information to TSA. TSA had no comment.