FTA’s FWSO and region three office, which includes the Washington  metropolitan area, have jointly managed oversight of SafeTrack. WMATA Did Not Fully Follow Leading Practices When Planning SafeTrack Because It Wanted to Address Safety Issues Immediately, but Future Projects Could Benefit from Additional Planning

WMATA’s planning of SafeTrack did not fully align with leading project  management practices, including some that are focused on projects for  rehabilitating transit assets. Specifically, while WMATA’s efforts to  coordinate with local stakeholders after SafeTrack began have generally  been in line with such practices, WMATA did not (1) comprehensively  collect and assess data on its assets, (2) analyze alternatives, or (3)  develop a project management plan before starting work. WMATA did not  follow these practices because it believed it needed to start work  immediately to address critical safety issues. By not gathering and using detailed data on all  aspects of the track infrastructure when planning SafeTrack, WMATA  decision-makers may not have had sufficient information to develop  project objectives and properly prioritize SafeTrack work. According to WMATA officials, WMATA did not develop a comprehensive  project management plan before beginning SafeTrack because they  believed a project management plan was not appropriate for such a  project. Without a  policy and procedures that require the development of a plan for future  large-scale rehabilitation projects, WMATA lacks a key tool to ensure its  projects are completed on-time, on-budget, and according to quality  standards. WMATA Is Using Several Leading Practices to Implement SafeTrack and Improve the Quality of Completed Work

WMATA’s implementation of SafeTrack generally aligns with leading  project management practices. Specifically, during the course of each  SafeTrack surge, WMATA officials collect and document information  about the work performed and the condition of assets. Last,  WMATA developed a new organization-wide quality control and  assurance framework that it is implementing for the first time through  SafeTrack. However, although  WMATA is collecting information on the condition of assets repaired  through SafeTrack, WMATA does not have a policy or procedures  requiring it to use asset data when planning future large-scale  rehabilitation projects, as previously discussed. In accordance with leading project management practices, WMATA  officials have developed lessons learned during and after each surge  period, and have used those lessons during subsequent maintenance  and planning efforts. FTA Has Used Inspections and Other Tools to Direct WMATA to Make Safety Repairs and Oversee SafeTrack

		FTA Has Conducted Inspections and Directed WMATA to Make Safety Critical Repairs before and during SafeTrack

Prior to WMATA’s announcement of SafeTrack in May 2016, FTA  conducted many inspections of WMATA’s track infrastructure and internal  inspection program. As a result of its inspections, FTA directed WMATA to complete safety  critical work both prior to starting and during SafeTrack, specifically:  In response to WMATA’s initial SafeTrack plan provided to FTA on  May 6, 2016, FTA sent a letter on May 11, 2016, directing WMATA to  make urgent repairs to reduce the risk of smoke and fire events and  the occurrence of arcing insulators on certain sections of the rail  system. In the case of SafeTrack, due to WMATA’s desire to begin  SafeTrack work immediately, and FTA’s determination of SafeTrack as a  major capital project after work had already commenced, WMATA did not  submit its project management plan to FTA until 4 months into the project. Recommendations

To ensure future large-scale rehabilitation projects are in line with leading  project management practices, WMATA should develop a policy that  requires and includes relevant procedures specifying that the following  three actions be taken prior to starting large-scale projects: use detailed data on the conditions of assets to develop project evaluate and compare alternative ways of accomplishing the project  objectives, including estimates for the alternatives’ costs and impacts;  and develop a comprehensive project management plan for the selected  alternative—to include key elements such as detailed plans for  managing the project’s scope, schedule, and cost—for those projects  that may not be designated major capital projects. NTSB also said that FTA’s public  transportation safety oversight approach lacks the necessary standards,  expertise, and resources. In written comments, reproduced in appendix II, WMATA agreed with our  findings and conclusions, and said that it is working to address the  recommendations.
Why GAO Did This Study

Recent inquiries into WMATA's Metrorail system have revealed a range of serious safety issues. In response to some of these issues, as well as a backlog of track maintenance, WMATA announced in May 2016 that it was undertaking SafeTrack, a large-scale rehabilitation project. The SafeTrack project is overseen by FTA.
GAO was asked to review a range of safety and oversight issues regarding WMATA. This report examines the extent to which WMATA's (1) planning and (2) implementation of SafeTrack was consistent with leading project management practices as well as (3) the steps taken by FTA to oversee SafeTrack.
GAO reviewed documentation on WMATA's planning and project implementation, and FTA's oversight of SafeTrack. GAO also interviewed officials from WMATA, FTA, and local jurisdictions, and compared WMATA's planning and implementation of SafeTrack to leading project management practices developed by professional organizations.

What GAO Found

The Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority's (WMATA) planning of SafeTrack did not fully align with leading project management practices. While WMATA generally followed leading practices to coordinate with stakeholders, it did not comprehensively collect and use data on the condition of its assets, analyze project alternatives, and develop a project management plan before starting work. WMATA did not follow these practices because it believed it needed to start work immediately to address critical safety issues.
Although WMATA inspected its track assets when planning SafeTrack, those inspections were not comprehensive and did not collect detailed data on the condition of all track infrastructure, such as all “interlockings,” where trains cross from one track to another. As a result, WMATA's decision makers may not have used sufficient information to develop project objectives and to properly prioritize SafeTrack work.
Though WMATA developed three alternatives for SafeTrack, it did not determine the costs and impacts of each alternative, or assess them to determine which approach may have resulted in greater efficiencies, lower costs, or less disruption for riders and local jurisdictions.
Before WMATA began SafeTrack, it lacked a comprehensive project management plan, which is a key tool to ensure a project is completed on-time, within-budget, and according to quality standards.
WMATA does not have a policy that requires, and includes relevant procedures for how to carry out, these planning activities for large-scale rehabilitation projects. Without such a policy and procedures, WMATA lacks a framework to plan future rehabilitation projects so that they achieve their objectives.
WMATA's implementation of SafeTrack generally aligned with leading project management practices. Specifically, WMATA officials collected information on the work performed and the condition of assets repaired during SafeTrack. WMATA officials also collect lessons learned during and after each surge, and use those lessons during subsequent maintenance and planning efforts. Additionally, WMATA developed a new organization-wide quality control and assurance framework and is implementing it for the first time through SafeTrack.
The Federal Transit Administration (FTA) has used safety inspections and other tools to oversee SafeTrack and direct WMATA to undertake safety-critical work. FTA has relied on two different authorities to oversee SafeTrack: (1) FTA's public transportation safety oversight authority, and (2) its project management oversight authority. Prior to the start of SafeTrack and during the project, FTA conducted safety inspections and directed WMATA to make repairs to reduce the risk of smoke and fires on the rail system. After SafeTrack work began and estimated project costs exceeded $100 million, FTA determined SafeTrack to be a major capital project, triggering the statutory requirement that WMATA prepare a project management plan. WMATA did not submit its project management plan until 4 months into SafeTrack. FTA found the plan lacked sufficient detail, and WMATA told GAO it is working to improve the plan.

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that WMATA develop a policy that requires and includes procedures for it to, prior to starting future large-scale rehabilitation projects: (1) use asset data to develop project objectives; (2) analyze alternatives; and (3) develop a project management plan for those projects that may not be designated as major capital projects. WMATA agreed with GAO's findings and said that it is working to address the recommendations.