The AACB’s major test facilities study team concluded that, in most areas, the present number of major test facilities “very nearly represents the minimum required to conduct the aeronautical- and space-related research and development programs identified for this country.” The study team further stated that (1) closing facilities without eliminating programs does not generate big savings, (2) NASA and DOD are not on a common track to developing comparable facility-cost accounting, (3) there is inadequate coordination of investments, upgrades, and operations between NASA and DOD, and (4) NASA and DOD’s rocket propulsion test facilities have excess capacity for current and future workload. Notwithstanding a history of NASA/DOD cooperation on aerospace test facility-related issues prior to 1996, these goals collectively represent an effort to develop a broader national perspective on such issues. In September 1996, Congress added to this effort by requiring NASA and DOD to prepare a joint plan on rocket propulsion test facilities. Twenty months later, NASA and DOD signed agreements formally establishing these alliances. NASA and DOD Compete to Test Rocket Engines

Despite the formation of the rocket propulsion alliance, NASA’s and DOD’s relationship over this type of testing has been recently marked by competition. Testing engines in the next phase of the EELV program was the focus of NASA and Air Force competition. The plan shall provide, to the extent practical, for the development of commonly funded and commonly operated facilities.”
In a January 1997 response to congressional committees, DOD acknowledged that although NASA and the Air Force “do not yet have a formal plan,” a range of efforts was underway that would “form the basis for such a plan.” The efforts cited were Vision 21, the Quadrennial Defense Review, and the rocket propulsion alliance. The first two efforts cited are unlikely to form the basis of a joint plan because NASA is not a formal part of the Vision 21 review, and DOD does not intend that its 5-year plan to consolidate and restructure its laboratories and test and evaluation centers be a joint plan with other federal agencies. NASA also was not a formal part of the Quadrennial Defense Review of defense strategy. NASA and DOD Move Toward Joint Strategic Management of Aeronautical Test Facilities

NASA and DOD took a step toward creating a national perspective on testing in the area of aeronautics by agreeing in May 1997 to consider joint strategic management of their test facilities. And in October 1997, NASA and Air Force officials reached a verbal understanding on the scope and approach for joint strategic management, but have yet to agree on key aspects of a management organization. The DOD assessment team proposed a new organization—National Aeronautical Facility Base—with members from the three military departments and NASA. However, basic questions remain about strategic joint management, including the new organization’s structure and authority to make binding decisions and recommendations. Charter of National Rocket Propulsion Test Alliance

Comments From the Department of Defense

The following are GAO’s comments on DOD’s letter dated December 23, 1997. 2. 3. As we stated in the report, ultimately, if joint strategic management of aeronautics test facilities is successfully established, its adaption to other types of test facilities could be considered.
Why GAO Did This Study

GAO reviewed the National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA) and Department of Defense's (DOD) cooperation in developing a national perspective on aerospace test facilities, focusing on: (1) the extent to which NASA/DOD working groups on major test facilities have been operating on a regular basis; (2) NASA's and DOD's actions in response to a future need to test an engine for new Air Force rockets; (3) whether NASA and DOD prepared a congressionally required joint plan on rocket propulsion test facilities; and (4) whether NASA and DOD are implementing a DOD assessment team's recommendation in March 1997 to jointly manage with NASA certain aeronautical test facilities.

What GAO Found

GAO noted that: (1) the promise of closer NASA/DOD cooperation and the development of a national perspective on aerospace test facilities remains largely unfulfilled because NASA and DOD: (a) have not yet convened most test facility alliances; (b) compete with each other to test engines for new rockets; and (c) did not prepare a congressionally required joint plan on rocket propulsion test facilities; (2) although NASA and DOD have agreed to go beyond cooperative alliances in aeronautics and jointly manage their aeronautical test facilities, they have not yet reached agreement on key aspects of management organization; (3) NASA and DOD took 20 months (May 1996 through December 1997) to negotiate and sign agreements formally establishing the six test facility-related cooperative alliances; (4) despite the formation of the rocket propulsion alliance, NASA and DOD compete against each other to test engines for new rocket programs; (5) a principal arena of competition is the next phase of the Air Force's Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle program; (6) DOD did not prepare a legislatively mandated joint plan with NASA to coordinate rocket propulsion test facilities; (7) in a letter to congressional committee chairs and other members, DOD said that the bases of such a plan are: (a) ongoing activities such as Vision 21; (b) the May 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review of defense strategy; and (c) activities of the rocket propulsion alliance; (8) however, these efforts are unlikely to form the basis of a joint plan because NASA is not participating in either Vision 21 or the Defense Review; (9) in October 1997, NASA and Air Force officials took a step toward creating a national perspective on test facilities in the aeronautics area; (10) specifically, they reached an understanding on the scope and approach for joint strategic management of their aeronautical test facilities, including a new management organization; (11) however, they have not yet resolved basic issues, such as the organization's structure and authority; and (12) ultimately, if joint strategic management of aeronautics test facilities is successfully established, its adaption to other types of test facilities could be considered.