Moreover, federal agencies have conducted few  exercises to test recovery plans for these incidents. FEMA Has Not Developed a National Disaster Recovery Strategy to Help Guide RDD or IND Recovery Planning

FEMA has not developed a national disaster recovery strategy, as required  by law and directed by executive guidance, or issued specific guidance to  coordinate federal, state, and local government recovery planning for RDD  or IND incidents. Specifically, emergency management officials  from almost all 13 cities and most of their 10 states indicated in our survey  that they believe they would need to rely heavily on the federal  government to conduct and fund all or almost all analysis and  environmental cleanup activities associated with recovering from an RDD  or IND incidents of the magnitude described in the national planning  scenarios. Uncertainty about Federal Capability to Effectively Clean up Areas Contaminated with Radioactive Materials from RDD or IND Incidents

It is uncertain whether federal capability is sufficient to effectively clean  up from RDD or IND incidents because federal agencies have only carried  out environmental cleanup of localized areas of radioactive materials, and  some limitations exist in federal capabilities to help address the magnitude  of the cleanup that would follow these incidents. According to a  decontamination expert at DOE’s Idaho National Laboratory, experience  has shown that without guidance and discussion early in the response  phase, a contractor might use a decontamination technology during this  phase for no other reason than it was used before in an unrelated  situation. The expert told us that this situation might lead to selecting  environmental cleanup technologies that generate waste types that are  more difficult to remove than the original material and that create more  debris requiring disposal—leading to increased costs. Respondents  from nearly all the cities and states expressed the need for a national  disaster recovery strategy to address gaps and overlaps in current federal  guidance in the context of RDD and IND incidents. For example, respondents from some of the cities sought  better guidance on monitoring radioactivity levels, acceptable cleanup  standards, and management of radioactive waste. Most respondents from  cities expressed the need for greater planning interactions with the federal  government and more exercises to test recovery plans. Developed online national recovery guidance in 2007. Updated the recovery handbooks for radiation incidents in 2008 and 2009. Conducted a full-scale RDD recovery exercise in 2008. As the United States moves forward in recovery preparation, some insights  might be gained from the actions already taken by the United Kingdom to  increase its preparedness to recover from acts of nuclear and radiological  terrorism, many of which are similar to those suggested by the city, state,  and federal emergency management officials we surveyed for improving  federal preparedness to recover from RDD and IND incidents. Recommendations for Executive Action

To better prepare federal agencies to coordinate with state and local  governments on the analysis and environmental cleanup of areas  contaminated with radioactive materials following RDD or IND incidents,  we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct the Federal  Emergency Management Agency Administrator to prepare a national disaster recovery strategy that would clarify federal  responsibilities for assisting state and local governments with the  analysis and environmental cleanup of areas contaminated with  radioactive materials in the event of RDD or IND incidents;  issue guidance that describes how federal capabilities would be  integrated into and support state and local plans for recovery from  RDD and IND incidents; and schedule additional recovery exercises, in partnership with other  federal, state, and local governments that would, among other things,  specifically assess the preparedness of federal agencies and their  contractors to conduct effective and efficient analysis and  environmental cleanup activities associated with RDD and IND  incidents. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

In our review, we examined (1) the extent to which federal agencies are  planning to fulfill their responsibilities to help cities and states clean up  areas contaminated with radiation materials from radiological dispersal  device (RDD) and improvised nuclear device (IND) incidents, (2) what is  known about the federal government’s capability to effectively clean up  areas contaminated with radioactive materials from RDD and IND  incidents, and (3) suggestions from government emergency management  officials for improving federal preparedness to help cities and states  recover from RDD and IND incidents. To determine the extent to which federal agencies are planning to fulfill  their responsibilities to help cities and states clean up areas contaminated  with radioactive materials from RDD and IND incidents, we reviewed  pertinent federal law, presidential directives, and other executive  guidance; interviewed cognizant officials from the Department of  Homeland Security (DHS), Department of Energy (DOE), Environmental  Protection Agency (EPA), Federal Emergency Management  Administration (FEMA), and Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC);  conducted a survey of 13 cities considered to be at high or medium risk to  such attacks and their states, and all federal FEMA and EPA regional  offices; and reviewed information on the number and type of RDD and  IND response and recovery exercises that have been conducted from May  2003 through September 2009.
Why GAO Did This Study

A terrorist's use of a radiological dispersal device (RDD) or improvised nuclear device (IND) to release radioactive materials into the environment could have devastating consequences. GAO was asked to examine (1) the extent to which the federal government is planning to fulfill its responsibilities to help cities and their states clean up contaminated areas from RDD and IND incidents, (2) what is known about the federal government's capability to effectively clean up these contaminated areas, and (3) suggestions for improving federal preparedness to help cities and states recover from these incidents. The report also discusses recovery activities in the United Kingdom. GAO reviewed federal laws and guidance; interviewed officials from the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), Department of Energy (DOE), and Environmental Protection Agency (EPA); and surveyed emergency management officials from 13 cities at high risk of attack, their 10 states, and FEMA and EPA regional offices.

What GAO Found

FEMA, the DHS agency responsible for developing a comprehensive emergency management system, has not developed a national disaster recovery strategy, as required by law, or issued specific guidance to coordinate federal, state, and local government recovery planning for RDD and IND incidents, as directed by executive guidance. To date, most federal attention has been given to developing a response framework, with less attention to recovery. Responding to an attack would involve evacuations and providing treatment to those injured; recovering from an attack would include cleaning up the radioactive contamination to permit people to return to their homes and businesses. Existing federal guidance provides limited direction for federal, state, and local agencies to develop recovery plans and to conduct exercises to test recovery preparedness. Of the over 90 RDD and IND exercises to test response capabilities in the last 6 years, only 3 included a recovery component. GAO's survey found that almost all 13 cities and most states believe they would need to rely heavily on the federal government to conduct and fund analysis and environmental cleanup activities. However, city and state officials were inconsistent in views on which federal agencies to turn to for help, which could hamper the recovery effort. Although DOE and EPA have experience cleaning up localized radiation-contaminated areas, it is unclear whether this federal capability is sufficient to effectively direct the clean up after RDD or IND incidents, and to efficiently address the magnitude of cleanup that would follow these incidents. According to an expert at DOE's Idaho National Laboratory, experience has shown that not selecting the appropriate decontamination technology can generate waste types that are more difficult to remove than the original material and can create more debris requiring disposal--leading to increased costs. Limitations in laboratory capacity to rapidly test potentially millions of material samples during cleanup, and uncertainty regarding where to dispose of radioactive debris could also slow the recovery process. At least two-thirds of the city, state, and federal respondents expressed concern about federal capability to provide the necessary cleanup actions after these incidents. Nearly all survey respondents had suggestions to improve federal recovery preparedness for RDD and IND incidents. For example, almost all the cities and states identified the need for a national disaster recovery strategy to address gaps and overlaps in federal guidance. All but three cities wanted additional guidance, for example, on monitoring radioactivity levels, cleanup standards, and management of radioactive waste. Most cities wanted more interaction with federal agencies and joint exercising to test recovery preparedness. Finally, GAO's review of the United Kingdom's preparedness to recover from radiological terrorism showed that it has already taken actions similar to those suggested by GAO's survey respondents, such as issuing national recovery guidance, conducting a full-scale recovery exercise, and publishing national recovery handbooks for radiation incidents.