	Background

Multiple executive-branch agencies are responsible for different phases in  the federal government’s personnel security clearance process. Last year we found,  however, that the Director of National Intelligence, as Security Executive  Agent, has not provided agencies clearly defined policies and procedures  to consistently determine if a civilian position requires a security  clearance.for, among other things, developing uniform and consistent policies and  procedures to ensure the effective, efficient, and timely completion of  background investigations and adjudications relating to determinations of  eligibility for access to classified information or eligibility to hold a  sensitive position, and gives the Director authority to issue guidance to  agency heads to ensure uniformity in processes relating to those  determinations. says that, subject to  In our July 2012 report, we found that Department of Homeland Security  and DOD components’ officials were aware of the need to keep the  number of security clearances to a minimum, but were not always  required to conduct periodic reviews and validations of the security  clearance needs of existing positions. Conversely,  underdesignating positions could lead to security risks. In July 2012, we recommended, among other things, that the Director of  National Intelligence, in coordination with the Director of OPM and other  executive branch agencies as appropriate, issue clearly defined policy  and procedures for federal agencies to follow when determining if federal  civilian positions require a security clearance. We also recommended that  the Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with the Director of  OPM and other executive branch agencies as appropriate, issue  guidance to require executive branch agencies to periodically review and  revise or validate the designation of all federal civilian positions. The  Director of National Intelligence concurred with our recommendation and  has taken steps to implement them. For example, in May 2009 we reported that, with  respect to initial top secret clearances adjudicated in July 2008,  documentation was incomplete for most OPM investigative reports. We  independently estimated that 87 percent of about 3,500 investigative  reports that DOD adjudicators used to make clearance decision were  missing required documentation. We recommended that the Director of  OPM direct the Associate Director of OPM’s Federal Investigative  Services Division to measure the frequency with which its investigative  reports meet federal investigative standards in order to improve the  completeness—that is, quality—of future investigation documentation. As of March 2013, however, OPM had not implemented our  recommendation to measure how frequently investigative reports meet  federal investigative standards. Government-wide suitability and personnel security  clearance reform efforts have not yet focused on identifying potential cost  savings, even though the stated mission of these efforts includes  improving cost savings. For example, OPM’s investigation process—which represents just a  portion of the security clearance process and had significant costs—has  not been studied for process efficiencies or cost savings. In February  2012, we reported that OPM received over $1 billion to conduct more  than 2 million background investigations (suitability determinations and  personnel security clearances) for government employees in fiscal year  2011. As a result, OPM may be  simultaneously investing in process streamlining technology while  maintaining a less efficient and duplicative paper-based process. In 2012,  we recommended that, to improve transparency of costs and the  efficiency of suitability and personnel security clearance background  investigation processes that could lead to cost savings, the Director of  OPM direct the Associate Director of Federal Investigative Services to  take actions to identify process efficiencies that could lead to cost savings  within its background investigation process. OPM agreed with this  recommendation and we are working with OPM to assess any progress it  has made in this area. In conclusion, while the executive branch has made strides in improving  the timeliness of the personnel security clearance process, now is the  time to focus on making the improvements GAO has recommended. Personnel Security Clearances: Preliminary Observations on Joint  Reform Efforts to Improve the Governmentwide Clearance Eligibility  Process. DOD Personnel Clearances: New Concerns Slow Processing of  Clearances for Industry Personnel.
Why GAO Did This Study

Personnel security clearances allow government and industry personnel to gain access to classified information that, through unauthorized disclosure, can in some cases cause exceptionally grave damage to U.S. national security. In 2012, the Director of National Intelligence reported that more than 4.9 million federal government and contractor employees held a security clearance.
Multiple executive-branch agencies are responsible for different phases in the government-wide personnel security clearance process. The Director of National Intelligence, as Security Executive Agent, is to develop uniform and consistent policies and procedures. Executive branch agencies are to determine which positions require access to classified information. OPMs investigators from the Federal Investigative Service conduct the majority of security investigations on personnel holding those positions, and adjudicators from requesting agencies, such as DOD, make the final clearance eligibility determination. Reform efforts and reporting requirements since 2005 have focused on expediting the processing of clearances.
This testimony is based on GAO reports and testimonies issued between 2008 and 2013 on DODs personnel security clearance programs and security clearance reform efforts. This testimony addresses three areas for improvement to the government-wide personnel security clearance process: (1) a sound requirements determination process, (2) performance metrics to measure quality, and (3) guidance to enhance efficiencies.

What GAO Found

In July 2012, GAO reported that the Director of National Intelligence, as Security Executive Agent, had not provided agencies clearly defined policy and procedures to consistently determine whether a civilian position required a security clearance. Underdesignating positions can lead to security risks; overdesignating positions can result in significant cost implications. Also, GAO reported that the Department of Homeland Security and Department of Defense (DOD) components' officials were aware of the need to keep the number of security clearances to a minimum but were not always required to conduct periodic reviews and validations of the security clearance needs of existing positions. GAO recommended that, among other things, the Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with the Director of Office of Personnel Management (OPM) and other executive branch agencies as appropriate, issue clearly defined policies and procedures to follow when determining if federal civilian positions require a security clearance, and also guidance to require executive branch agencies to periodically review and revise or validate the designation of all federal civilian positions. The Director of National Intelligence concurred with GAO's recommendations and identified actions to implement them.
Executive branch agency efforts to improve the personnel security process have emphasized timeliness but not quality. In May 2009, GAO reported that with respect to initial top secret clearances adjudicated in July 2008, documentation was incomplete for most of OPM investigative reports. GAO independently estimated that 87 percent of about 3,500 investigative reports that DOD adjudicators used to make clearance decisions were missing required documentation. In May 2009, GAO recommended that the Director of OPM direct the Associate Director of OPM's Federal Investigative Services to measure the frequency with which its investigative reports met federal investigative standards in order to improve the completeness--that is, quality--of future investigation documentation. As of March 2013, however, OPM had not implemented this recommendation.
Government-wide personnel security reform efforts have not yet focused on potential cost savings, even though the stated mission of these efforts includes improving cost savings. For example, OPM's investigation process--which represents a portion of the security clearance process and has significant costs--has not been studied for process efficiencies or cost savings. In February 2012, GAO reported that OPM received over $1 billion to conduct more than 2 million background investigations in fiscal year 2011. GAO raised concerns that OPM may be simultaneously investing in process streamlining technology while maintaining a less efficient and duplicative paper-based process. In 2012, GAO recommended that, to improve the efficiency of suitability and personnel security clearance background investigation processes that could lead to cost savings, the Director of OPM direct the Associate Director of Federal Investigative Services to take actions to identify process efficiencies that could lead to cost savings within its background investigation process. OPM agreed with this recommendation and GAO is working with OPM to assess any progress it has made in this area.