As shown in figure 2, as of September 2002, DOD and DOE had obligated a  total of $1.8 billion to upgrade security at sites where Russia has WMD  material. To address these issues, we assessed U.S.  efforts to enhance security at sites in Russia that store (1) weapons-usable  nuclear material, (2) nuclear warheads, (3) dangerous biological  pathogens, and (4) chemical weapons. For each area, we assessed U.S.  plans to address these security threats at WMD sites in Russia; U.S.  progress in implementing these plans, and the primary challenges and  unresolved issues facing DOD and DOE in their efforts to secure Russian  sites. Our review of DOD’s biosecurity program focused on assistance provided  since 1998 to improve the security of biological sites in Russia. The majority of DOE’s expenditures during fiscal years 2001 and 2002  were for activities other than securing buildings such as securing material  during transport and maintaining previously installed equipment. While  these efforts are important, they do not directly advance DOE’s goal of  securing all buildings in Russia with weapons-usable nuclear material by  2008. Access to Sensitive Sites Remains a Barrier to Completing Security Improvements by 2008

DOE’s lack of access to many buildings that store weapons-usable nuclear  material, in particular to buildings in the nuclear weapons complex, is the  greatest challenge to providing assistance to improve nuclear material  security in Russia. DOD has made limited progress in securing storage sites. However, because DOD and DOE have different approaches to achieving a  common objective critical to U.S. national interests, coordination is  essential. Recommendation

The Secretaries of Defense and Energy should develop an integrated plan  to ensure that their related programs to help secure Russia’s nuclear  warheads work together to address implementation issues, such as  determining which department will provide assistance to certain sites and  resolving equipment standardization concerns. After more than 4 years of effort, DOD has made little  progress in addressing security concerns at these sites. Thus far, DOD has focused its  security program on sites where it has identified dangerous pathogen  collections and where it has access. Second, the United States does not have access  to former biological weapons sites. As a result, a large quantity of chemical weapons in  Russia will remain vulnerable to theft or diversion. Recommendations

Given the lengthy time frame for the destruction of Russia’s chemical  weapons stockpile, the Secretary of Defense should consider:  reassessing the need to provide improved security at the three sites in  Russia that store nerve agent but have not received U.S. security  assistance; and  working with Russian officials to develop practical plans for securing  chemical weapons while in transit to the planned destruction facility at  Shchuch’ye.
Why GAO Did This Study

Terrorists and countries of concern may be able to gain access to poorly secured weapons of mass destruction at sites throughout Russia. To address this threat to U.S. national security, the Departments of Defense (DOD) and Energy (DOE) have obligated more than $1.8 billion since 1992. GAO was asked to report on U.S. programs to help improve security at sites where Russia stores (1) weapons-usable nuclear material, (2) nuclear warheads, (3) dangerous biological pathogens, and (4) chemical weapons. For each area, GAO assessed U.S. plans to address security threats at sites in Russia, U.S. progress in implementing those plans, and the primary challenges facing DOD and DOE.

What GAO Found

The Departments of Defense and Energy have made slow progress in helping improve the security of sites in Russia with weapons of mass destruction against the threat of theft or diversion because Russia is not providing needed access to many sites. Unfortunately, there is little reason to believe this situation will change in the near future. DOE plans to help secure Russia's weapons-usable nuclear material by 2008; however, the department lacks access to many sites. As a result, most of DOE's expenditures in the past 2 years went to functions other than securing buildings, such as maintaining previously installed equipment and developing nuclear security regulations. While important, these efforts do not advance DOE's objective of protecting all buildings with weapons-usable nuclear material. DOD and DOE have pursued different approaches to securing nuclear warhead sites. DOE recently scaled back its plans, and the two agencies will face coordination issues, such as deciding which agency will secure sites in both of their plans. DOD has made little progress in securing dangerous pathogens at the 49 sites where Russia and the United States have collaborative programs. Russia has consistently refused DOD access to sites and has closed some sites to U.S. security programs. Negotiations on a bilateral agreement to implement this assistance have also stalled. DOD's efforts to secure chemical weapons have focused on a destruction facility that will not be complete until 2006. It may be 40 years before Russia's nerve agent stockpile can be destroyed. DOD has improved security at two sites, but two thirds of Russia's stockpile remains vulnerable to theft.