	Many DOD Organizations Are Involved in Distributing Supplies and Equipment by Various Routes and Methods into and around Afghanistan

Distribution of materiel, such as supplies and equipment, into and around  Afghanistan is a complex process involving many DOD organizations and  utilizing both surface and air modes of transportation over various routes. DOD’s ability to provide timely logistics support to units deploying to  Afghanistan or already in theater depends on its ability to synchronize  these activities into one seamless process. Army Central Command’s 1st Theater Sustainment Command provides  command and control of logistics efforts within the U.S. Central  Command area of operations by monitoring strategic movements of  materiel and directly influencing movements into theater. The Central Command Deployment and Distribution Operations Center  bridges the gap between strategic and theater distribution by validating  and directing air movements and monitoring and directing surface  movements within theater. The main surface route  uses commercial ships to transport cargo to the seaport of Karachi,  Pakistan, from which it is trucked by contractors into Afghanistan. DOD Has Taken Some Steps to Improve the Distribution Process Based on Lessons Learned

DOD has taken some steps to improve its processes for distributing  materiel to deployed forces based on lessons learned from prior  operations, such as Operation Iraqi Freedom. To address these issues, in January 2004, U.S.  Transportation Command established the Central Command Deployment  and Distribution Operations Center, in part to help coordinate the  movement of materiel and forces into the theater of operations, including  both Iraq and Afghanistan, by confirming the combatant commander’s  deployment and distribution priorities and by synchronizing the forces,  equipment, and supplies arriving in theater with critical theater lift and  theater infrastructure limitations. DOD has also established policies and procedures to increase the use of  RFID tags to improve in-transit visibility over cargo. In December 2003,  we reported that DOD did not have adequate visibility over all supplies  and equipment transported to, within, and from the theater of operations  for Operation Iraqi Freedom, in part because RFID tags were not being  used in a uniform and consistent manner. Several Challenges Hinder DOD’s Ability to Distribute Supplies and Equipment to U.S. Forces in Afghanistan

Based on our preliminary observations, we note several challenges that  hinder DOD’s ability to distribute needed supplies and equipment to U.S.  forces operating in Afghanistan. These challenges include    difficulties with transporting cargo through neighboring countries and  around Afghanistan;  limited airfield infrastructure within Afghanistan;  lack of full visibility over supply and equipment movements into and  around Afghanistan;  limited storage capacity at logistics hubs in Afghanistan;    difficulties in synchronizing the arrival of units and equipment in  Afghanistan;  lack of coordination, as well as competing logistics priorities, in a  coalition environment; and    uncertain requirements and low transportation priority for contractors. DOD has ongoing or planned efforts to help mitigate some of these  challenges. In addition, DOD is working to address these challenges  through planning conferences to synchronize the flow of forces into  Afghanistan. While some of DOD’s efforts will promptly improve its ability  to efficiently distribute supplies and equipment to U.S. forces in  Afghanistan, other efforts involve long-term plans that will not be  completed in time to support the ongoing troop increase that is scheduled  to occur by August 2010. Limited Visibility over Surface Movements of Materiel May Hinder DOD’s Ability to Efficiently Manage the Flow of Materiel

DOD’s visibility over surface movements of supplies and equipment into  and around Afghanistan is limited, and this limitation may hinder its ability  to effectively manage the flow of supplies and equipment into the logistics  hubs and forward operating bases. Officials from key organizations across DOD,  including U.S. Transportation Command, U.S. Forces-Afghanistan, U.S.  Forces-Iraq, and Army Central Command, attended both  Throughout both conferences, DOD officials stressed the need to balance  and closely coordinate multiple requirements in order to sustain current  operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, draw down forces and equipment f Iraq, and increase forces and equipment in Afghanistan.
Why GAO Did This Study

In fiscal year 2009, the Department of Defense (DOD) reported that it spent $4 billion to move troops and materiel into Afghanistan, a mountainous, arid, land-locked country with few roads, no railway, and only four airports with paved runways over 3,000 meters. The terrain and weather in Afghanistan and surrounding countries pose further challenges to transporting supplies and equipment. In December 2009, the President announced that an additional 30,000 U.S. troops will be sent to Afghanistan by August 2010. Today's testimony discusses GAO's preliminary observations drawn from ongoing work reviewing DOD's logistics efforts supporting operations in Afghanistan, including (1) the organizations involved and routes and methods used to transport supplies and equipment into and around Afghanistan; (2) steps DOD has taken to improve its distribution process, based on lessons learned from prior operations; and (3) challenges affecting DOD's ability to distribute supplies and equipment within Afghanistan, and its efforts to mitigate them. In conducting its audit work, GAO examined DOD guidance and other documentation relating to the processes of transporting supplies and equipment to Afghanistan and met with various cognizant officials and commanders in the United States, Afghanistan, Kuwait, and Qatar.

What GAO Found

Movement of supplies and equipment into and around Afghanistan is a complex process involving many DOD organizations and using air, sea, and ground modes of transportation. DOD's ability to provide timely logistics support to units deploying to Afghanistan or already in theater depends on its ability to synchronize all of these activities into one seamless process. For example, U.S. Transportation Command manages air and surface transportation from the United States to and around the U.S. Central Command area of operations; U.S. Central Command's Deployment and Distribution Operations Center validates and directs air movements and monitors and directs surface movements within theater; the Air Force's Air Mobility Division assigns and directs aircraft to carry materiel within the theater; and the Army's 1st Theater Sustainment Command monitors strategic movements of materiel and directly influences movements into theater. Most cargo in theater is transported commercially by ship to Pakistan and then by contractor-operated trucks to Afghanistan, but high-priority and sensitive items are transported by U.S. military and commercial aircraft directly from the United States and other countries to logistics hubs in Afghanistan. DOD has taken some steps to improve its processes for distributing materiel to deployed forces based on lessons learned from prior operations. For example, in response to lessons learned from problems with keeping commanders informed about incoming materiel in Operation Iraqi Freedom, U.S. Transportation Command established the Central Command Deployment and Distribution Operations Center, which now helps coordinate the movement of materiel and forces into the theater of operations. Also, since GAO reported in 2003 that radio frequency identification tags were not being effectively used to track materiel in transit to, within, and from Iraq, DOD developed policies and procedures to increase tag use on cargo traveling through the U.S. Central Command theater of operations, including Afghanistan. Challenges hindering DOD's ability to distribute needed supplies and equipment to U.S. forces operating in Afghanistan include difficulties with transporting cargo through neighboring countries and around Afghanistan, limited airfield infrastructure, lack of full visibility over cargo movements, limited storage capacity at logistics hubs, difficulties in synchronizing the arrival of units and equipment, lack of coordination between U.S. and other coalition forces for delivery of supplies and equipment, and uncertain requirements and low transportation priority for contractors. DOD recognizes these challenges and has ongoing or planned efforts to mitigate some of them; however, some efforts involve long-term plans that will not be complete in time to support the ongoing troop increase. DOD is also working to address these challenges through planning conferences to synchronize the flow of forces into Afghanistan. At these conferences, DOD officials stressed the need to balance and coordinate multiple requirements in order to sustain current operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, draw down forces and equipment in Iraq, and increase forces and equipment in Afghanistan.