Milstar I Support to Some Critical Strategic Mission Areas Could Be Limited

The Milstar I system is expected to provide communication networks in support of designated strategic mission areas. However, a May 1998 draft operational test report, prepared by the Air Force Operational Test and Evaluation Center, concluded that although the Milstar system was found to be effective for communications during normal operations, numerous deficiencies would require corrective action before the full nuclear wartime strategic capabilities could be realized. In addition, more recent testing revealed that peripheral equipment and software to be used with Milstar has not been effectively controlled to ensure communications interoperability with other systems. Program officials stated that communication signal delays and poor voice quality are inherent characteristics in Milstar LDR technology and associated peripheral equipment. Transmitting accurate and timely messages from the North American Aerospace Defense Command to other strategic command centers is critical to ensuring a timely retaliatory response to an attack. However, operational testing of this network was not performed. The result was that operational test officials could not verify that ballistic missile alert messages could be reliably transmitted by the Milstar system. The Air Force Space Command subsequently tested the missile warning teletype network and identified that a required redundancy check could not be performed to ensure data accuracy. Continuous communication capabilities with deployed bomber forces are required if it became necessary to recall or redirect these forces. The year 2003 is also when the deployment of MDR terminals to tactical forces is to be completed and tactical forces will have become dependent on the Milstar II system. Although DOD is aware of this potential degradation in Milstar communications capabilities, it has not fully assessed the associated operational risks. Because the Milstar II satellite constellation’s communications capacity is predicted to degrade from fiscal years 2003 through 2006, when an advanced capability is to be available, the continuity of protected and mobile satellite communications capacity is a potentially significant issue. In addition, because the deployment of Milstar II terminals is expected to be completed by fiscal year 2003, such degradation in communications capacity could result in users not having the capabilities they require or expect to execute their missions. In assessing the operational risks associated with the predicted degradation of Milstar communications, as directed by the House Committee on Appropriations, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense specifically address (1) the minimally acceptable level of extremely high frequency satellite communications needed to support tactical forces and (2) the capability of the Milstar system to provide this minimum level of communications until an advanced extremely high frequency communications capability is deployed. The matters were (1) funding for voice conferencing network upgrades to improve timeliness and voice quality; (2) completing software upgrades, equipment installations, and certification of the missile warning teletype network; (3) performing operational testing of nuclear bomber force communications and endurance requirements; (4) implementing a new Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction, that addresses the management of satellite communications, to ensure interoperability certification of input-output communication devices, which are critical for user-to-user communications connectivity; and (5) completing ACMS development and performing tests to demonstrate the complex function of allocating and apportioning the fixed amount of Milstar communications capabilities. Scope and Methodology

Our review focused on Milstar system effectiveness and DOD’s plans to provide continuing comparable EHF communications capabilities after the existing system degrades.
Why GAO Did This Study

Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Department of Defense's (DOD) multiservice Milstar system, focusing on the: (1) Milstar system's capabilities to support strategic and tactical missions; and (2) extent to which DOD has provided assurance of continuing comparable satellite communications among the users after the Milstar satellites under development are launched.

What GAO Found

GAO noted that: (1) there are several limitations associated with the Milstar system's capabilities to support strategic missions; (2) although the Milstar I system has been deployed for over 2 years, a May 1998 draft operational test report revealed that system support could be limited in some critical strategic mission areas; (3) operational testing showed that military commanders could not communicate by voice in a timely and intelligible manner, when using the low data rate capabilities; (4) this limitation was attributable to inherent characteristics of Milstar's low data rate technology and associated peripheral equipment; (5) operational testing of the missile warning teletype network was planned, but not performed, to verify that accurate and timely ballistic missile alert messages could be transmitted from North American Aerospace Defense Command to other strategic command centers; (6) a subsequent Air Force test of this teletype network determined that a required redundancy check for data accuracy could not be performed without software modifications; (7) operational testing revealed a Milstar system endurance issue, associated with the nuclear bomber force, that must be resolved because of the requirement for continuous communication capabilities if the bomber force needed to be recalled or redirected; (8) testing showed that the configuration of peripheral equipment and its accompanying software has not been effectively controlled or fully certified to ensure communications interoperability with the Milstar system; (9) DOD has identified corrective actions for the limitations in these four areas; (10) final resolutions are dependent on approval of requirements, verification through testing, a certification process, or obtaining necessary funds; (11) DOD has not provided assurance that the continuity of protected medium data rate satellite communication capabilities will be maintained for tactical forces after the four Milstar II satellites are launched; (12) the satellite constellation's communication capabilities are predicted to degrade below a minimally acceptable level in fiscal year (FY) 2003, before the advanced satellite system is expected to be available in FY 2006; (13) the deployment of Milstar II tactical terminals is expected to be completed by 2003, and tactical forces will have become dependent on the Milstar II system; (14) this situation could result in users not having the communications capacity they require to execute their missions; and (15) DOD has not fully assessed the associated operational risks to tactical forces.