	Background

The 2010 Nuclear Security Summit highlighted the global threat posed by  nuclear terrorism and the need for countries to work in a comprehensive  and concerted fashion to ensure that nuclear materials are not stolen or  diverted for weapons use. The 2010 Summit produced results. Governmentwide Strategy to Implement the President’s 4-Year Global Nuclear Material Security Initiative Lacked Important Details

In December 2010, we reported on aspects of U.S. planning and  strategies to secure all vulnerable nuclear materials worldwide within a 4- year period. NSC officials approved a  U.S. governmentwide strategy entitled “Interagency Efforts to Improve the  Security of Nuclear Weapons and Fissile Materials,” which, among other  things, described the scope and objectives of the interagency effort and  identified the main activities by agencies and programs in support of the  President’s initiative. Despite individual agency efforts to implement the 4-year initiative, we  found that the overarching interagency strategy coordinated by NSC  lacked specific details concerning how the initiative would be  implemented, including the identity of, and details regarding, vulnerable  foreign nuclear material sites and facilities to be addressed, agencies and  programs responsible for addressing each site, planned activities at each  site, potential challenges and strategies for overcoming these challenges,  anticipated timelines, and cost estimates. However, we found that, absent such  an implementation plan, essential details associated with the 4-year  initiative were unclear, including the initiative’s overall estimated costs,  time frames, and scope of work. They  described the value of the President’s proposal as a “forcing function” to  (1) accelerate ongoing U.S. nuclear nonproliferation programs, (2) drive  closer integration of nuclear nonproliferation programs across the federal  government, and (3) mobilize greater international responsibility for and  commitment to nuclear material security. We recommended that NSC lead and coordinate the development of a  comprehensive plan for implementing this initiative. NSC did not comment on our  recommendation. Agencies Have Limited Ability to Account for, Monitor, and Evaluate the Security of U.S. Nuclear Material Overseas

Improving the U.S. government’s management of nuclear cooperation  agreements could contribute to the administration achieving its goal of  securing all vulnerable nuclear material worldwide in 4 years. Nuclear cooperation agreements do not contain specific access rights  that enable U.S. agencies to monitor and evaluate the physical security of  U.S. nuclear material overseas, and the United States relies on its  partners to maintain adequate security. In our September 2011 report, we found that DOE has taken steps to  improve security at a number of facilities overseas that hold U.S. nuclear  material but faces constraints. For example, we suggested that  Congress consider directing DOE and NRC to compile an inventory of  U.S. weapon-usable nuclear materials overseas. As a separate matter,  we also suggested that Congress consider amending the Atomic Energy  Act if State, working with other U.S. agencies, does not include enhanced  measures regarding physical protection access rights in future and  renewed agreements, so that U.S. interagency physical protection teams  may obtain access when necessary to verify that U.S. nuclear materials  have adequate physical protection. We also identified potential fragmentation and overlapping functions  among some programs. Furthermore, we found that no single federal agency has lead  responsibility to direct federal efforts to prevent and detect nuclear  smuggling overseas. We made two recommendations to NSC to streamline and eliminate the  potential for fragmentation and overlap among U.S. government  programs involved in preventing and detecting the smuggling of nuclear  materials overseas. Based on the findings in this  report, the Subcommittee subsequently asked us to review the security of  hospitals and medical facilities in the United States that use radiological  sources. NRC’s Security Requirements Do Not Prescribe Specific Measures for Protecting Radiological Sources at Hospitals and Medical Facilities

NRC, which is responsible for regulating the security of radiological  sources in U.S. hospitals and medical facilities, issued a security order in  2005 that directed licensees possessing radiological sources of concern  to implement increased controls for access, detection and assessment,  material shipments, physical barriers, information protection, and  sensitive information. These approaches have created a mix of security  controls and procedures that could leave some facilities’ radiological  sources more vulnerable than others to possible tampering, sabotage, or  outright theft. NNSA Has Secured Radiological Sources at U.S. According to NNSA officials, as of December 2011, the program spent an  estimated $96 million to secure radiological sources at 302 U.S. hospitals  and medical facilities. We found  that some hospitals have declined the upgrades, including hospitals  located in high-risk urban areas. We are continuing to conduct our audit and plan to visit some additional  medical facilities in the United States.
Why GAO Did This Study

In 2009, President Obama announced an international initiative to secure all vulnerable nuclear material worldwide within 4 years. Leaders of 47 nations endorsed this effort at the 2010 Nuclear Security Summit and will meet again in March 2012 to evaluate their work and set new goals for nuclear security. The United States has been a leader in promoting nuclear nonproliferation efforts worldwide. GAO has issued numerous reports on U.S. nonproliferation programs administered by several agencies, including the departments of Energy (DOE), State, and Defense (DOD); and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). This testimony, which is based primarily on previously issued reports, discusses (1) the U.S. strategy to secure all vulnerable nuclear material within 4 years, (2) U.S. agencies ability to track and evaluate the security of U.S. nuclear materials transferred to foreign countries, (3) challenges coordinating federal nuclear nonproliferation efforts, and (4) preliminary observations regarding GAOs ongoing work on federal efforts to secure radiological sources in U.S. hospitals and medical facilities. To conduct its ongoing work, GAO visited 25 hospitals and medical facilities in 7 states and the District of Columbia.
GAO is making no new recommendations, but continues to believe that implementation of the recommendations made in its recent reports complements and supports the administrations goal of securing vulnerable nuclear material in a timely fashion.

What GAO Found

The Presidents 4-year initiative is a worthwhile effort designed to accelerate U.S. and international efforts to secure nuclear material worldwide. However, as GAO reported in December 2010, the governmentwide strategy approved by the National Security Council (NSC) for the initiative lacked specific details regarding how the initiative will be implemented. As a result, key details associated with the initiative are unclear, including its overall estimated cost, time frame for completion of work, and scope of planned work. In its 2010 report, GAO recommended, among other things, that NSC lead the interagency development of a more detailed implementation plan for the Presidents 4-year initiative. NSC did not comment on GAOs recommendations.
The United States also faces challenges accounting for and evaluating the security of U.S. nuclear material overseas. As GAO reported in September 2011, federal agencies are not able to fully account for U.S. nuclear material overseas that is subject to nuclear cooperation agreements. GAO also found that the agreements do not contain specific access rights that enable agencies to monitor and evaluate the physical security of U.S. nuclear material overseas. GAO found that the agencies responsible for reviewing foreign partners security are not doing so systematically. GAO suggested that Congress consider directing DOE and NRC to fully account for U.S. weapon-usable nuclear materials overseas and consider amending the Atomic Energy Act to require access rights allowing the United States to verify adequate protection of U.S. nuclear materials if future agreements cannot be negotiated to include such rights.
GAO also reported in December 2011 on the challenges in coordinating U.S. governmentwide nonproliferation efforts. Specifically, GAO identified potential fragmentation and overlap among some U.S. programs that played a role in preventing and detecting the smuggling of nuclear materials overseas. GAO also found that no single federal agency had the lead responsibility to direct these efforts. GAO recommended, among other things, that NSC review U.S. programs working to prevent nuclear smuggling overseas to reduce fragmentation and potential overlap. NSC declined to comment on the recommendations.
In addition to nuclear materials, the Summit plans to address the security of radiological sourcesmaterial that could be used to make a dirty bomb. Based on preliminary results from ongoing work on federal efforts to secure radiological sources in U.S. hospitals and medical facilities, GAO found that NRCs security controls for hospitals and medical facilities do not prescribe the specific steps that must be taken to protect their radiological sources. GAO also found that medical facilities have implemented the controls in various ways. This has created a mix of security measures at the locations GAO visited that could leave some facilities more vulnerable than others. DOEs National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) has established a voluntary program to upgrade the security of domestic facilities that have radiological sources. NNSA has made progress in securing domestic radiological sources, but some facilities have declined NNSAs assistance, including hospitals located in high-risk urban areas.