In fiscal year 2003, a total of $15 million was earmarked  for soft target protection, particularly to address security vulnerabilities at  overseas schools. State Has Not Developed a Strategy to Cover Soft Target Areas; Key Issues Need to Be Resolved

State has a number of programs and activities designed to protect U.S.  officials and their families outside of the embassy, including security  briefings, protection at schools and residences, and surveillance detection  (these programs are discussed in more detail later in this report). Despite  these efforts, State has not developed a comprehensive strategy that clearly  identifies safety and security requirements and resources needed to protect  U.S. officials and their families from terrorist threats outside the embassy. State officials raised a number of challenges related to developing and  implementing such a strategy. They indicated they have recently initiated  an effort to develop a soft target strategy. As part of this effort, State  officials said they will need to address and resolve a number of legal and  financial issues. State Has Not Fully Implemented ARB Training and Accountability Recommendations to Improve Security for Embassy Personnel

Investigations into terrorist attacks against U.S. officials found that, among  other things, the officials lacked the necessary hands-on training to help  counter the attacks. The ARBs recommended that State provide hands-on  counterterrorism training to help post officials identify terrorist  surveillance and quickly respond to an impending attack. After each investigation,  State told Congress it would implement these recommendations, yet we  found that State’s hands-on training course is still not mandatory for all  personnel going to posts, and procedures to monitor compliance with  security requirements have not been fully implemented. State Develops Soft Targets Program for Schools but Scope Is Not Yet Fully Defined

In response to congressional direction and funding, State, in 2003, began  developing a multiphase Soft Targets program that provides basic security  hardware to protect U.S. officials and their families at schools and some  off-compound employee association facilities. 8). Issues Related to the Protection of U.S. Officials and Their Families at Residences against Terrorist Threats

State’s primary program in place to protect U.S. officials and their families  at their residences, the Residential Security program, is principally  designed to deter crime, not terrorism. State  officials said that while the Residential Security program, augmented by  the local guard program, provides effective deterrence against crime, it  could provide limited or no deterrence against a terrorist attack. To provide  greater protection against terrorist attacks, some posts we visited used  surveillance detection teams in residential areas, despite guidance that  limits their use primarily to the embassy. Some posts we  visited limited the number of U.S. officials living in specific apartments or  neighborhoods to minimize the risk and consequences of a residential  terrorist attack. Recommendations for Executive Action

We recommend that the Secretary of State, working with the Overseas  Security Policy Board, take the following 11 actions:   Include in the current development of a comprehensive soft target  strategy information that (1) determines the extent of State’s  responsibilities for providing security to U.S. officials and their families  outside the embassy; (2) addresses the legal and financial ramifications  of funding security improvements to schools, places of worship, and the  private sector; (3) develops programs and activities with FAM standards  and guidelines to provide protection for those areas for which State is  deemed responsible for; and (4) integrates into the embassy emergency  action plan elements of the soft targets program. Our report focuses on State Department efforts to protect  U.S. officials and their families from terrorist threats, at their homes,  recreation centers, schools, commuting, and living outside the embassy  compounds. We have clarified the sentence by indicating that RSOs were unclear  about which schools could qualify for security assistance under phase  three of the Soft Targets Program.
Why GAO Did This Study

U.S. government officials working overseas are at risk from terrorist threats. Since 1968, 32 embassy officials have been attacked--23 fatally--by terrorists outside the embassy. As the State Department continues to improve security at U.S. embassies, terrorist groups are likely to focus on "soft" targets--such as homes, schools, and places of worship. GAO was asked to determine whether State has a strategy for soft target protection; assess State's efforts to protect U.S. officials and their families while traveling to and from work; assess State's efforts overseas to improve security at schools attended by the children of U.S. officials; and describe issues related to protection at their residences.

What GAO Found

State has a number of programs and activities designed to protect U.S. officials and their families outside the embassy, including security briefings, protection at schools and residences, and surveillance detection. However, State has not developed a comprehensive strategy that clearly identifies safety and security requirements and resources needed to protect U.S. officials and their families abroad from terrorist threats outside the embassy. State officials raised a number of challenges related to developing and implementing such a strategy. They also indicated that they have recently initiated an effort to develop a soft targets strategy. As part of this effort, State officials said they will need to address and resolve a number of legal and financial issues. Three State initiated investigations into terrorist attacks against U.S. officials outside of embassies found that the officials lacked the necessary hands-on training to help counter the attack. The investigations recommended that State provide hands-on counterterrorism training and implement accountability measures to ensure compliance with personal security procedures. After each of these investigations, State reported to Congress that it planned to implement the recommendations, yet we found that State's hands-on training course is not required, the accountability procedures have not been effectively implemented, and key embassy officials are not trained to implement State's counterterrorism procedures. State instituted a program in 2003 to improve security at schools, but its scope has not yet been fully determined. In fiscal years 2003 and 2004, Congress earmarked $29.8 million for State to address security vulnerabilities against soft targets, particularly at overseas schools. The multiphase program provides basic security hardware to protect U.S. officials and their families at schools and some off-compound employee association facilities from terrorist threats. However, during our visits to posts, regional security officers were unclear about which schools could qualify for security assistance under phase three of the program. State's program to protect U.S. officials and their families at their residences is primarily designed to deter crime, not terrorism. The Residential Security program includes basic security hardware and local guards, which State officials said provide effective deterrence against crime, though only limited deterrence against a terrorist attack. To minimize the risk and consequences of a residential terrorist attack, some posts we visited limited the number of U.S. officials living in specific apartment buildings. To provide greater protection against terrorist attacks, some posts we visited used surveillance detection teams in residential areas.