Airborne electronic attack—a subset of the electronic attack mission— involves use of aircraft to neutralize, destroy, or temporarily degrade  (suppress) enemy air defense and communications systems, either  through destructive or disruptive means. DOD Strategy to Lower Costs Also Reduced Synergy among Systems

DOD’s strategy for meeting airborne electronic attack requirements— including both near-peer and irregular warfare needs—centers on  acquiring a family of systems, including traditional fixed wing aircraft, low  observable aircraft, unmanned aerial systems, and related mission  systems and weapons. Department analyses dating back a decade have  identified capability gaps and provided a basis for service investments in  airborne electronic attack capabilities. However, budget realities and  lessons learned from operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have driven  changes in strategic direction and program content. Most notably, the  department canceled some acquisitions, after which services revised their  operating concepts for airborne electronic attack. These decisions saved  money, allowing the department to fund other priorities, but reduced the  planned level of synergy among airborne electronic attack systems during  operations. As acquisition plans for these systems have evolved,  operational stresses upon the existing inventory of weapon systems have  grown. These stresses have materialized in the form of capability  limitations and sustainment challenges for existing systems, prompting  the department to invest in improvements to these systems to mitigate  shortfalls. Acquisitions May Not Produce Sufficient Results

DOD is investing in new airborne electronic attack systems to address its  growing mission demands and to counter anticipated future threats. However, progress acquiring these new capabilities has been impeded by  developmental and production challenges that have slowed fielding of  several planned systems. Some programs, including the Navy’s EA-18G  Growler and the Air Force’s EC-130H Compass Call modernization, are in  stable production and have completed significant amounts of testing. In addition, certain  airborne electronic attack systems in development may offer capabilities  that overlap with one another—a situation brought on in part by the  department’s fragmented urgent operational needs processes. As military  operations in Iraq and Afghanistan decrease, opportunities exist to  consolidate current acquisition programs across services; however, this  consolidation may be hampered by leadership deficiencies affecting the  department’s electronic warfare enterprise. Furthermore, current and  planned acquisition programs, even if executed according to plan, will not  fully address the materiel-related capability gaps identified by the  department—including some that date back 10 years. Improvements to Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures and Investments in Science and Technology Are Helping to Bridge Gaps

To supplement its acquisition of new systems, DOD is undertaking other  efforts to bridge existing airborne electronic attack capability gaps. In the  near term, services are evolving their tactics, techniques, and procedures  for operating existing systems to enable them to take on additional  mission tasks. These activities maximize the utility of existing systems  and better position operators to complete missions with equipment  currently available. Longer-term solutions, however, depend on the  department successfully capitalizing on its investments in science and  technology. DOD has recently taken actions that begin to address long- standing coordination shortfalls in this area including designating  electronic warfare as a priority area for investment and creating a steering  council to link capability gaps to research initiatives. However, these  steps do not preclude services from funding their own research priorities  ahead of departmentwide priorities. DOD’s planned  implementation roadmap for electronic warfare offers opportunities to  assess how closely component research investments are aligned to the  departmentwide electronic warfare priority and to coordinate component  investments in electronic warfare. Determine the extent to which the most pressing airborne  electronic attack capability gaps can best be met—using the  assets that are likely to be available—and take steps to fill any  potential gaps. Specifically, we  assessed (1) the department’s strategy for acquiring airborne electronic  attack capabilities, (2) progress made developing and fielding systems to  meet airborne electronic attack mission requirements, and (3) additional  compensating actions taken by the department to address capability  gaps, including improvements to tactics, techniques, and procedures and  investments in science and technology. To further  corroborate documentary evidence and obtain additional information in  support of our review, we conducted interviews with relevant DOD  officials responsible for managing airborne electronic attack requirements  and overseeing the related family of systems, including officials in the  Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and  Logistics; Office of the Director, Cost Assessment and Program  Evaluation; Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research,  Development and Acquisition; Office of the Chief of Naval Operations— Information Dominance and Air Warfare directorates; Office of the  Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition; Air Force Office of the  Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Plans, and Requirements— Electronic Warfare division; Air Force Air Combat Command; Army Office  of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Plans, and Training— Electronic Warfare division; Marine Air-Ground Task Force Electronic  Warfare; U.S. Strategic Command; and Joint Staff.
Why GAO Did This Study

Airborne electronic attack involves the use of aircraft to neutralize, destroy, or suppress enemy air defense and communications systems. Proliferation of sophisticated air defenses and advanced commercial electronic devices has contributed to the accelerated appearance of new weapons designed to counter U.S. airborne electronic attack capabilities. GAO was asked to assess (1) the Department of Defenses (DOD) strategy for acquiring airborne electronic attack capabilities, (2) progress made in developing and fielding systems to meet airborne electronic attack mission requirements, and (3) additional actions taken to address capability gaps. To do this, GAO analyzed documents related to mission requirements, acquisition and budget needs, development plans, and performance, and interviewed DOD officials.

What GAO Found

The Department of Defenses (DOD) evolving strategy for meeting airborne electronic attack requirements centers on acquiring a family of systems, including traditional fixed wing aircraft, low observable aircraft, unmanned aerial systems, and related mission systems and weapons. DOD analyses dating back a decade have identified capability gaps and provided a basis for service investments, but budget realities and lessons learned from operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have driven changes in strategic direction and program content. Most notably, DOD canceled some acquisitions, after which the services revised their operating concepts for airborne electronic attack. These decisions saved money, allowing DOD to fund other priorities, but reduced the planned level of synergy among systems during operations. As acquisition plans have evolved, capability limitations and sustainment challenges facing existing systems have grown, prompting the department to invest in system improvements to mitigate shortfalls.
DOD is investing in new airborne electronic attack systems to address its growing mission demands and to counter anticipated future threats. However, progress acquiring these new capabilities has been impeded by developmental and production challenges that have slowed fielding of planned systems. Some programs, such as the Navys EA-18G Growler and the Air Forces modernized EC-130H Compass Call, are in stable production and have completed significant amounts of testing. Other key programs, like the Navys Advanced Anti-Radiation Guided Missile, have required additional time and funding to address technical challenges, yet continue to face execution risks. In addition, certain systems in development may offer capabilities that overlap with one anothera situation brought on in part by DODs fragmented urgent operational needs processes. Although services have shared technical data among these programs, they continue to pursue unique systems intended to counter similar threats. As military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan decrease, opportunities exist to consolidate current acquisition programs across services. However, this consolidation may be hampered by DODs acknowledged leadership deficiencies within its electronic warfare enterprise, including the lack of a designated, joint entity to coordinate activities. Furthermore, current and planned acquisitions will not fully address materiel-related capability gaps identified by DODincluding some that date back 10 years. Acquisition program shortfalls will exacerbate these gaps.
To supplement its acquisition of new systems, DOD is undertaking other efforts to bridge existing airborne electronic attack capability gaps. In the near term, services are evolving tactics, techniques, and procedures for existing systems to enable them to take on additional mission tasks. These activities maximize the utility of existing systems and better position operators to complete missions with equipment currently available. Longer-term solutions, however, depend on DOD successfully capitalizing on its investments in science and technology. DOD has recently taken actions that begin to address long-standing coordination shortfalls in this area, including designating electronic warfare as a priority investment area and creating a steering council to link capability gaps to research initiatives. These steps do not preclude services from funding their own research priorities ahead of departmentwide priorities. DODs planned implementation roadmap for electronic warfare offers an opportunity to assess how closely component research investments are aligned with the departmentwide priority.

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that DOD conduct program reviews for certain new, key systems to assess cost, schedule, and performance; determine the extent to which the most pressing capability gaps can be met and take steps to fill them; align service investments in science and technology with the departmentwide electronic warfare priority; and review capabilities provided by certain planned and existing systems to ensure investments do not overlap. DOD agreed with three recommendations and partially agreed with the two aimed at reducing potential overlap among systems. DOD plans to assess coordination among systems, whereas GAO sees opportunities for consolidation, as discussed in the report.