	Background

Current domestic uses of UAS are limited and include law enforcement,  monitoring or fighting forest fires, border security, weather research, and  scientific data collection. Obstacles to Safe and Routine Integration of UAS

In 2008, we reported that UAS could not meet the aviation safety  requirements developed for manned aircraft and posed several obstacles  to operating safely and routinely in the national airspace system. Sense and avoid technologies. Consequently, the UAS must possess the capability to sense and  avoid an object using on-board equipment, or with the assistance of a  human on the ground or in a chase aircraft, or by other means, such  as radar. Command and control communications. Similar to what we previously  reported, ensuring uninterrupted command and control for UAS  remains a key obstacle for safe and routine integration into the  national airspace. do not contain provisions to address issues relating to unmanned  aircraft. The lack of  final regulations could hinder the acceleration of safe and routine  integration of UAS into the national airspace. Given the remaining obstacles to UAS integration, we stated in 2008 that  Congress should consider creating an overarching body within FAA to  coordinate federal, academic, and private-sector efforts in meeting the  safety challenges of allowing routine access to the national airspace  system. While it has not created this overarching body, FAA’s Joint  Planning and Development Office has taken on a similar role. Additionally, we made two  recommendations to FAA related to its planning and data analysis efforts  to facilitate the process of allowing UAS routine access to the national  airspace, which FAA has implemented. Role of the Department of Homeland Security in Domestic UAS Use

DHS is one of several partner agencies of FAA’s Joint Planning and  Development Office (JPDO) working to safely integrate UAS into the  national airspace. TSA has the authority to regulate the security of all  transportation modes, including non-military UAS, and according to TSA  officials, its aviation security efforts include monitoring reports on potential  security threats regarding the use of UAS. Security is a significant issue that could be exacerbated with an increase  in the number of UAS, and could impede UAS use even after all other  obstacles have been addressed. In our 2008 report, we recommended that the Secretary of Homeland  Security direct the Administrator of TSA to examine the security  implications of future, non-military UAS operations in the national  airspace and take any actions deemed appropriate. FAA granted DHS authority to operate UAS  to support its national security mission along the United States northern  and southern land borders, among other areas. Preliminary Observations on Emerging UAS Issues

Our ongoing work has identified several UAS issues that, although not  new, are emerging as areas of further consideration in light of the efforts  towards safe and routine access to the national airspace. These include  concerns about 1) privacy as it relates to the collection and use of  surveillance data, 2) the use of model aircraft, which are aircraft flown for  hobby or recreation, and 3) the jamming and spoofing of the Global  Positioning System (GPS). Currently, no federal agency has specific statutory responsibility to  regulate privacy matters relating to UAS. The Federal Bureau of Investigation report of the arrest and criminal  prosecution of a man plotting to use a large remote-controlled model  aircraft filled with plastic explosives to attack the Pentagon and U.S.  Capitol in September 2011 has highlighted the potential for model  aircraft to be used for non-approved or unintended purposes. However, apart from FAA’s voluntary  safety standards for model aircraft operators, FAA has no regulations  relating to model aircraft. We plan to report  more fully this fall on these same issues, including the status of efforts to  address obstacles to the safe and routine integration of UAS into the  national airspace. This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the  United States.
Why GAO Did This Study

UAS aircraft do not carry a human operator on board, but instead operate on pre-programmed routes or by following commands from pilot-operated ground stations. An aircraft is considered to be a small UAS if it is 55 pounds or less, while a large UAS is anything greater. Current domestic uses of UAS are limited and include law enforcement, monitoring or fighting forest fires, border security, weather research, and scientific data collection by the federal government. FAA authorizes military and non-military UAS operations on a limited basis after conducting a case-by-case safety review. Several other federal agencies also have a role or interest in UAS, including DHS. In 2008, GAO reported that safe and routine access to the national airspace system poses several obstacles.
This testimony discusses 1) obstacles identified in GAOs previous report on the safe and routine integration of UAS into the national airspace, 2) DHSs role in the domestic use of these systems, and 3) preliminary observations on emerging issues from GAOs ongoing work.
This testimony is based on a 2008 GAO report and ongoing work, and is focused on issues related to non-military UAS. In ongoing work, GAO analyzed FAAs efforts to integrate UAS into the national airspace, the role of other federal agencies in achieving safe and routine integration, and other emerging issues; reviewed FAA and other federal agency efforts and documents; and conducted selected interviews with officials from FAA and other federal, industry, and academic stakeholders.

What GAO Found

GAO earlier reported that unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) could not meet the aviation safety requirements developed for manned aircraft and posed several obstacles to operating safely and routinely in the national airspace system. These include 1) the inability for UAS to detect, sense, and avoid other aircraft and airborne objects in a manner similar to see and avoid by a pilot in a manned aircraft; 2) vulnerabilities in the command and control of UAS operations; 3) the lack of technological and operational standards needed to guide the safe and consistent performance of UAS; and 4) the lack of final regulations to accelerate the safe integration of UAS into the national airspace. GAO stated in 2008 that Congress should consider creating an overarching body within the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to address obstacles for routine access. FAAs Joint Planning and Development Office (JPDO) has taken on a similar role. FAA has implemented GAOs two recommendations related to its planning and data analysis efforts to facilitate integration.
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is one of several partner agencies of JPDO working to safely integrate UAS into the national airspace. Since 2005, FAA has granted DHS authority to operate UAS to support its national security mission in areas such as the U.S. northern and southern land borders. DHSs Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has the authority to regulate security of all modes of transportation, including non-military UAS, and according to TSA officials, its aviation security efforts include monitoring reports on potential security threats regarding the use of UAS. Security considerations could be exacerbated with routine UAS access. TSA has not taken any actions to implement GAOs 2008 recommendation that it examine the security implications of future, non-military UAS.
GAOs ongoing work has identified several UAS issues that, although not new, are emerging as areas of further consideration in light of greater access to the national airspace. These include concerns about privacy relating to the collection and use of surveillance data. Currently, no federal agency has specific statutory responsibility to regulate privacy matters relating to UAS. Another emerging issue is the use of model aircraft (aircraft flown for hobby or recreation) in the national airspace. FAA is generally prohibited from developing any rule or regulation for model aircraft. The Federal Bureau of Investigation report of a plot to use a model aircraft filled with plastic explosives to attack the Pentagon and U.S. Capitol in September 2011 has highlighted the potential for model aircraft to be used for unintended purposes. An additional emerging issue is interruption of the command and control of UAS operations through the jamming and spoofing of the Global Positioning System between the UAS and ground control station. GAO plans to report more fully this fall on these issues, including the status of efforts to address obstacles to the safe and routine integration of UAS into the national airspace.