Introduction

On July 22, 2004, the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States(also known as the 9/11 Commission) issued its final report on the September 11, 2001, attacks onthe World Trade Center and the Pentagon. (2) The commission recommended two alternative proposals to changethe current intelligence committee structure: (1) replace the existing Senate and House SelectIntelligence Committees with a joint committee on intelligence; or (2) consolidate intelligenceappropriation and authorization functions in the existing intelligence authorizing committees, therebyenhancing the power of the authorizing committees. The report(1) describes the proposal; (2) compares it to the existing committee system; (3) describes a 19thcentury precedent for consolidation; (4) provides selected arguments in favor of consolidation as wellas against; (5) discusses two alternatives to consolidating authorization and appropriation functions:a Joint Committee on Intelligence and separate intelligence appropriations subcommittees in theSenate and House Committees on Appropriations; and (6) describes current legislation. For information on the proposed joint committee on intelligence, see CRS Report RL32525 , A Joint Committee on Intelligence: Proposals and Options From the 9/11 Commission and Others ,by [author name scrubbed]; and CRS Report RL32538(pdf) , 9/11 Commission Recommendations: JointCommittee on Atomic Energy -- A Model for Congressional Oversight? The commission would transfer jurisdiction overintelligence appropriations from the Senate and House Appropriations Committees to the intelligenceauthorization committees. Senate. Counter-Balance Proposed Centralization of Executive BranchIntelligence. (35) 
Provide Clear Congressional Accountability. Provide More Integrated Perspective on National Intelligence. Attract Members to Intelligence Committees. Opponents maintain thatconsolidation would significantly reduce oversight of program quality. May Weaken Intelligence Oversight. Concentrate Too Much Power in Intelligence Committees. , by [author name scrubbed].) It would retain program-quality andbudget analyses in separate appropriations and authorization committees, whichwould be lost under the 9/11 Commission's proposal. The disadvantages to establishing intelligence appropriations subcommittees, opponents argue, are that this approach too would be likely to (1) increase spending,unless the total intelligence amount is declassified or existing budget procedures aremodified; and (2) shortchange the intelligence needs of the military. On October 9, 2004, the Senate adopted, by a voteof 79-6, S.Res. On October 7, 2004, the House rejected, by a vote of 203-213, a proposal that, amongother provisions, would have required the Senate and House to establish in the 108thCongress either of the 9/11 Commission's recommendations to establish (1) a JointCommittee on Intelligence; or (2) a single committee in each chamber withjurisdiction over both intelligence authorizing and appropriating authorities.
On July 22, 2004, the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States(also known as the 9/11 Commission) issued its final report on the September 11, 2001, terroristattacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. Among other findings and recommendations,the commission stated that existing congressional oversight was "dysfunctional" and recommendedtwo alternative proposals to change the existing intelligence committee structure: (1) replace theexisting Senate and House Select Intelligence Committees with a joint committee on intelligence;or (2) consolidate intelligence appropriation and authorization functions in existing intelligenceauthorization committees. This report discusses the second of these two proposals. (For informationon the first proposal, see CRS Report RL32525 , A Joint Committee on Intelligence: Proposals andOptions From the 9/11 Commission and Others , by [author name scrubbed]; and CRS Report RL32538(pdf) , 9/11 Commission Recommendations: Joint Committee on Atomic Energy -- A Model forCongressional Oversight? , by [author name scrubbed].)
Under existing Senate and House rules, intelligence appropriations are under the jurisdictionof the Senate and House Appropriations Committees. Each committee distributes theseappropriations among five appropriations subcommittees, predominantly the Defense AppropriationsSubcommittees. The 9/11 Commission recommended transferring jurisdiction over intelligenceappropriations from the Senate and House Appropriations Committees to the intelligenceauthorization committees in each chamber.
Proponents of the commission's proposal have contended that its adoption would (1) improvecongressional oversight of intelligence, (2) counter-balance the commission's proposed consolidationof executive branch intelligence activities, (3) provide a more integrated perspective on nationalintelligence spending, (4) attract Members to the consolidated intelligence committees, and (5)provide clear congressional accountability on intelligence within Congress. Opponents argue thatconsolidation would (1) reduce oversight of program quality, (2) weaken intelligence oversight, (3)shortchange intelligence needs of the military, (4) concentrate too much power in intelligencecommittees, and (5) increase spending.
Opponents may accordingly argue that it would be preferable to adopt the alternativerecommendation of the 9/11 Commission to consolidate authorizing responsibility for intelligencein a joint committee. A third approach would be to consolidate responsibility for intelligenceappropriations in a new subcommittee of each the Senate and House Committees on Appropriations. On October 9, 2004, the Senate adopted S.Res. 445 , instituting this approach in theSenate. This action was based on a proposal by the Senate Majority and Minority Whips, the leadersof a bipartisan working group appointed by the Majority and Minority Leaders.
This report will be updated.