Authorized Special Operations Military Positions Have Increased since 2001

Our analysis of data provided by SOCOM and its service component  commands shows that the number of authorized special operations  positions for military personnel increased from approximately 42,800 in  fiscal year 2001 to approximately 62,800 in fiscal year 2014. Army Special Operations  Command, U.S. In fiscal  year 2001, special operations military positions constituted 1.9 percent of  the services’ total authorized force levels. Special Operations– Specific Funding Has Increased Markedly since Fiscal Year 2001, but DOD Does Not Have Information on the Total Funding to Support SOF

While the size of SOF has increased by about 47 percent since fiscal year  2001, our analysis shows that the special operations–specific funding to  support the force has more than tripled. We found that SOF–specific  funding increased from about $3.1 billion in fiscal year 2001 to about $9.8  billion in fiscal year 2014. DOD Has Little Visibility over Total Funding Devoted to SOF

Information on funding to support SOF exists, but funding data are  tracked and managed across various organizations in a decentralized  manner, and neither DOD nor the military services have systematically  collected, estimated, or reported total SOF funding needs. Until DOD has more complete information on the total funding necessary  to support SOF, decision makers will be unable to effectively identify and  assess justification materials for future funding needs, or weigh priorities  and assess budget trade-offs within anticipated declining resources. SOCOM Has Taken Steps to Manage the Effect of SOF Deployments, but Some Portions of SOF Are Still Heavily Deployed

In a May 2014 report to Congress, DOD noted that SOF personnel have  come under significant strain in the years since September 11, 2001. DOD Has Not Fully Assessed Opportunities to Reduce the Demand for SOF

Opportunities may exist to better balance the workload across the force  because the activities assigned to SOF can be similar to the types of  activities assigned to conventional forces. Our work identified two factors that inhibit the department’s ability to  share the burden of SOF deployments with conventional forces. Second, DOD’s current force-allocation process does not systematically  consider whether conventional forces could serve as an appropriate  alternative to meet requests for SOF. Unless the department has a requirement to more fully assess whether  opportunities exist to better balance operational demands across the joint  force, the demand for SOF—and the high pace of deployments that  results—is likely to continue. Direct the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in consultation with  SOCOM and the military services, to evaluate whether opportunities exist for certain types of activities  traditionally conducted by SOF to be transferred to or shared with  conventional forces and  revise the validation criteria outlined in Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of  Staff Manual 3130.06A to include a requirement that the Joint Staff  consider whether conventional forces could serve as an appropriate  alternative to meet requests for SOF before validating combatant  commander requests. Regarding  DOD’s point about potential benefits for decision making, we continue to  believe that having information on total funding to support SOF would  help officials determine whether needs are realistic and feasible within  identified budgetary constraints. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

We conducted this work in response to a provision in the National  Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014, section 1086, to review  organization, capabilities, structure, and oversight of special operations  forces (SOF). This report (1) examines trends since fiscal year 2001 in  authorized positions for special operations military personnel and how  special operations force levels have compared with the military services’  total force levels, (2) evaluates the extent to which the Department of  Defense (DOD) has determined the total costs to support SOF, and (3)  examines the extent to which DOD has taken steps to manage the pace  of SOF deployments. To evaluate the extent to which DOD has taken steps to manage the  pace of SOF deployments, we obtained and reviewed data from SOCOM  on average weekly SOF deployments.
Why GAO Did This Study

SOF are specially organized, trained, and equipped to conduct operations in hostile or politically sensitive environments. Since 2001, DOD has increased the size and funding of SOF and emphasized SOF's importance to meet national security needs. SOF deployments have focused on the Middle East and placed significant demand on the force during this period.
The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014 included a provision that GAO review SOF force structure. This report examines (1) trends since FY 2001 in authorized special operations military positions; (2) the extent to which DOD has determined total funding for SOF; and (3) the extent to which DOD has taken steps to manage the pace of SOF deployments, among other issues.
GAO analyzed data for FYs 2001 through 2014 on SOF authorized positions, funding, and deployment data. GAO reviewed data on service-provided SOF funding and policies and other documentation and interviewed officials regarding processes for managing SOF deployments.

What GAO Found

GAO analysis of the resources devoted to U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) found that the number of authorized special operations military positions increased from about 42,800 in fiscal year (FY) 2001 to about 62,800 in FY 2014, which includes combat and support personnel. Even with this growth, special operations military positions constituted less than 3 percent of the military services' FY14 total authorized force levels.
Special operations–specific funding has increased markedly, but the Department of Defense (DOD) has not determined the total funding used to support special operations forces (SOF). Funding provided to SOCOM for special operations–specific needs has more than tripled from about $3.1 billion in FY 2001 to about $9.8 billion in FY 2014 constant dollars, including supplemental funding for contingency operations. However, these totals do not include funding provided by the services, which SOCOM estimates is more than $8 billion annually. GAO found that DOD has little visibility over total funding to support SOF, primarily because it has not established a requirement or methodology to capture and report this information. Until DOD has more complete information on total funding to support SOF, decision makers will be unable to effectively identify and assess resource needs or weigh priorities and assess budget trade-offs.
DOD has taken some steps to manage the increased pace of special operations deployments, but opportunities may exist to better balance the workload across the joint force because activities assigned to SOF can be similar to activities assigned to conventional forces. Average weekly deployments of SOF personnel have increased from about 2,900 in FY 2001 to about 7,200 in FY 2014. SOCOM has taken steps to manage the effect of SOF deployments, but DOD reported that some portions of the force are still heavily deployed. GAO identified two factors that inhibit DOD's ability to potentially share the burden of SOF deployments with the conventional force. First, DOD has not evaluated since 2003 whether activities performed by SOF could be conducted by conventional forces. Second, DOD's current force-allocation process provides the Joint Staff with criteria to validate force requests, but does not systematically consider whether conventional forces could serve as an appropriate alternative to meet some requests for SOF. Unless the department more fully assesses whether opportunities exist to better balance demands across the joint force, the demand for SOF and the high pace of deployments that results is likely to continue.

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that DOD improve visibility in total funding to support SOF and determine whether opportunities exist to balance deployments across the joint force. DOD partially concurred, stating that existing processes that guide funding and force allocation decisions are appropriate, but that it would review these processes and consider opportunities for improvement. GAO continues to believe that actions are needed, as discussed in the report.