2). Proliferation of Cruise Missiles and UAVs Poses a Growing Threat to U.S. National Security Interests

The proliferation of cruise missiles and UAVs poses a growing threat to  U.S. national security. Multilateral Export Control Regimes Increased Focus on Cruise Missiles and UAVs, but Are Limited in Their Effectiveness

The United States and other governments have used the MTCR, and, to  some extent, the Wassenaar Arrangement, as the key tools to address the  proliferation of cruise missiles and UAVs. License requirements for items not listed are based  on the exporter’s knowledge of the end user or end uses to which the item  would be applied. The case of a New Zealand citizen obtaining unlisted dual-use items to  develop a cruise missile illustrates this gap in U.S. export controls. Compliance with Conditions on Exports of Cruise Missiles, UAVs, and Related Dual-use Items Seldom Verified through End-use Monitoring

Post-shipment verification (PSV) is a key end-use monitoring tool used by  U.S. agencies to confirm that authorized recipients of U.S. technology both  received transferred items and used them in accordance with conditions  of the transfer. Based on State licensing data, we  identified 786 licenses for cruise missiles, UAVs, or related items from  fiscal years 1998 through 2002. Because  some key dual-use components can be acquired without an export license,  it is difficult for the export control system to limit or even track their use. Furthermore, the U.S. government seldom uses its end-use monitoring  programs to verify compliance with the conditions placed on items that  could be used to develop cruise missiles or UAVs. Thus, the U.S.  government does not have sufficient information to know whether  recipients of these exports are effectively safeguarding equipment and  technology in ways that protect U.S. national security and nonproliferation  interests. Recommendations for Executive Action

A gap in dual-use export control regulations could enable individuals in  most countries of the world to legally obtain without any U.S. government  review U.S. dual-use items not on the Commerce Control List to help make  a cruise missile or UAV. It said that  our report was misleading and inaccurate to suggest that State does not  monitor exports to verify compliance with export authorizations. GAO Comments

1. 2. GAO Comments

1.
Why GAO Did This Study

Cruise missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) pose a growing threat to U.S. national security interests as accurate, inexpensive delivery systems for conventional, chemical, and biological weapons. GAO assessed (1) the tools the U.S. and foreign governments use to address proliferation risks posed by the sale of these items and (2) efforts to verify the end use of exported cruise missiles, UAVs, and related technology.

What GAO Found

The growing threat to U.S. national security of cruise missile and UAV proliferation is challenging the tools the United States has traditionally used. Multilateral export control regimes have expanded their lists of controlled technologies, but key countries of concern are not members. U.S. export control authorities find it increasingly difficult to limit or track unlisted dual-use items that can be acquired without an export license. Moreover, a gap in U.S. export control authority enables American companies to export certain dual-use items to recipients that are not associated with missile projects or countries listed in the regulations, even if the exporter knows the items might be used to develop cruise missiles or UAVs. American companies have in fact legally exported dualuse items with no U.S. government review to a New Zealand resident who bought the items to build a cruise missile. The U.S. government seldom uses its end-use monitoring programs to verify compliance with conditions placed on the use of cruise missile, UAV, or related technology exports. For example, State officials do not monitor exports to verify compliance with license conditions on missiles or other items, despite legal and regulatory requirements to do so. Defense has not used its end-use monitoring program initiated in 2002 to check the compliance of users of more than 500 cruise missiles exported between fiscal years 1998 and 2002. Commerce conducted visits to assess the end use of items for about 1 percent of the 2,490 missile-related licenses we reviewed. Thus, the U.S. government cannot be confident that recipients are effectively safeguarding equipment in ways that protect U.S. national security and nonproliferation interests.