Congress, when authorizing and appropriating funds and in its oversight role, reviewsDepartment of Defense's (DOD's) plans to sustain and modernize the NCCS. (4) Increased momentum to implement the 2001 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) findings, as well as thepublication of DOD's 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), could provide an opportunity forCongress to revisit the structure and future relevance of the NCCS. This report will describe NCCSplatforms and functions, discuss the current role of the NCCS in light of the 2001 NPR and 2006QDR, examine current issues related to the role of the NCCS from both process and technologyperspectives, and review proposed modernization initiatives. National Military Command Center (NMCC) . (8) 
National Airborne Operations Center (NAOC). (11) 
USSTRATCOM Global Operations Center(GOC). (12) 
USSTRATCOM Airborne Command Post(ABNCP). (13) 
USSTRATCOM Mobile Consolidated Command Center(MCCC). Tactical Warning and Attack Assessment(TW/AA). Force Management. Force Direction. (19) 
The NCCS must also be reliable. The NPR embodied this approach in the architecture of a "new triad" of capabilities. (44) Some might even arguethat highlighting a "China threat" represents the latest effort in the search for a great power peercompetitor--one that the defense establishment has not found since the end of the Cold War era,similar to the warnings about a "coming war with Japan" prevalent in the 1990s. North Korea has been actively seeking a nuclear weapons capability sincethe 1960s. (52) 
Nations that have small nuclear arsenals could threaten disproportionate effects on U.S.infrastructure, including command and control systems, through an electromagnetic pulse(EMP). critical infrastructure might be one way that China could use its nuclear capability against theUS, rather than launching a massive strike. Command and Control Issues from the 2001 NPR

Some of the new missions addressed in the 2001 Nuclear Posture Review, specifically theinclusion of non-nuclear responses and of active defenses, will add to the challenges for the nuclearcommand and control system. It may need to expand itsreach to include additional participants, such as those responsible for the non-nuclear forces ordefensive forces, in the decision making process or at least as recipients of orders. In addition to support during crises and conflicts,the NMCC aids management of peacetime contingencies, such as natural disasters. Minimum Essential Emergency Communications Network(MEECN). The DefenseDepartment is also requesting funds to enhance both of its airborne nuclear command and controlplatforms, the E-4B NAOC and the E-6B ABNCP (Airborne Command Post). (109) 
Satellite Communications. However, the key functionsperformed by the NCCS will likely remain requirements as long as the United States maintains anuclear deterrent. Through the FY2007 budget request, the Defense Department has continuedto focus on evolutionary upgrades of the Cold War NCCS architecture. Are they still needed?
The Nuclear Command and Control System (NCCS) infrastructure supports the Presidentand his combatant commanders when they direct nuclear forces. This report discusses the currentrole of the NCCS in light of the 2001 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) and the 2006 QuadrennialDefense Review (QDR), examines current issues surrounding the NCCS, reviews modernizationinitiatives, summarizes NCCS functions and characteristics, and reviews NCCS platforms.
Key NCCS platforms include fixed locations such as the National Military Command Center(NMCC), the U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) Global Operations Center (GOC), andSite-R, and mobile platforms such as the E-4B National Airborne Operations Center (NAOC), theE-6B Airborne Command Post (ABNCP), and the Mobile Consolidated Command Center (MCCC).The NCCS must support situation monitoring, tactical warning and attack assessment of missilelaunches, senior leader decision making, dissemination of Presidential force-direction orders, andmanagement of geographically dispersed forces.
The Department of Defense's (DOD's) 2001 NPR proposed a "new triad" of offensive nuclearand conventional forces, passive and active defenses, and a robust infrastructure, tied together by thecommand, control, computers, communication, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, andplanning architecture to confront the new, allegedly unpredictable post-Cold War environment. Adapting to non-nuclear responses and active defenses poses additional challenges for the currentNCCS.
Some might question the continued relevancy of the legacy Cold War NCCS architecture. It wasdesigned against a "decapitation" threat from the Soviet Union. This threat might not still exist. However, some believe China is investing in a nuclear capability to compete with the United States. Iranand North Korea might be developing nuclear capabilities that, if not used to strike directly at the UnitedStates or U.S. forces, might be used to generate an electromagnetic pulse (EMP) that could wreck U.S.infrastructure. In addition to confronting these potential catastrophic threats, the NCCS could directconventional military operations, aid continuity of government in crises, and support civil authoritiesduring natural disasters or emergencies.
The Defense Department has proposed several modernization and procurement initiativesin its 2007 budget. The DOD budget requests upgrades for the Minimum Essential EmergencyCommunications Network (MEECN) links to the intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs),bombers, and tanker forces. It incorporates a redesign and consolidation of the NMCC, as part ofongoing Pentagon renovation efforts. It proposes several communications and aircraft upgrades tothe E-4B NAOC and the E-6B ABNCP. It seeks funding for a sweeping upgrade to its satellitecommunications capability through the Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) program andits follow-on, the Transformational Communications Satellite (TSAT) program.
This report will be updated as needed.