Congress has been deeply involved in efforts to protect the United States and other nations against terrorist attacks, especially since 9/11. Preventing an RDD attack and preparing to respond to and recover from an attack are thus matters of homeland security. Terrorists, too, are interested in RDDs. The prospect of an RDD attack raises several issues for Congress, including:
the priority to be given to countering terrorism using RDDs vs. other types of unconventional weapons; the priority to be given to domestic vs. overseas expenditures to secure radioactive sources; whether to use federal funds to develop and deploy radiation detection networks in major cities and elsewhere; how best to prepare for decontamination following an RDD attack, such as the balance between R&D, stockpiling of equipment and supplies, training, rapid distribution of information, and analysis of the cost of decontamination vs. demolition and reconstruction; how to dispose of contaminated waste, including rubble from demolition and chemicals from decontamination, following an attack; whether to modify standards for permitting unescorted access to certain U.S. radioactive sources; whether to modify the pace of a program for implementing certain security enhancements for U.S. radioactive sources; and how to enhance U.S. capability for radiological forensics. As a guide to quantities of material that should be protected, in 2003 the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) revised its Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources. RDDs and Nuclear Weapons

The type of RDD most commonly referenced in the press and in public discussion is the "dirty bomb," in which conventional explosives like dynamite disperse radioactive material, but a dirty bomb is only one type of RDD. Estimates differ as to the area an RDD and a nuclear weapon would contaminate with radioactive material, depending on the height of burst of a nuclear weapon (and thus the quantity of material it lofted into the atmosphere that would become fallout), dispersibility of RDD material, wind patterns, radiation level at which an area is considered contaminated, and so on. A ground-burst nuclear weapon would contaminate a far larger area than an RDD. Panic. According to a State Department report, "Some terrorists seek to acquire radioactive materials for use in a radiological dispersal device." Terrorists would need to know something about radioactive materials. Many government agencies and other entities have taken steps to secure these sources; a few key examples follow. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

NRC is an independent agency. However, NRC has many programs for security of radioactive sources. National Nuclear Security Administration

NNSA is a semiautonomous agency within the Department of Energy. Other Agencies

Other agencies have responsibilities for security as well. Several CRS reports provide additional information. Global Efforts

			Securing Radioactive Sources

Because an RDD attack might occur outside the United States, or material obtained abroad might be used for an RDD attack on this nation, international organizations, the United States, nongovernmental organizations, and others have taken steps to secure sources worldwide. The directive further directs the Secretary to develop and administer a National Incident Management System (NIMS) to "provide a consistent nationwide approach for Federal, State, and local governments to work effectively and efficiently together to prepare for, respond to, and recover from domestic incidents, regardless of cause, size, or complexity" and to develop and administer a National Response Plan to "integrate Federal Government domestic prevention, preparedness, response, and recovery plans into one all-discipline, all-hazards plan." The Framework establishes a comprehensive, national, all-hazards approach to domestic incident response." A 2010 GAO report raised questions about the adequacy of preparations for recovery. Radiological forensics would probably not support retaliation. Issues for Congress

This report shows that the United States and others have done much to prevent, respond to, and recover from an RDD attack, but that more might be done. (5) Since costs resulting from an RDD attack could be tens of billions of dollars, some measures that are directly relevant to an RDD attack, such as decontamination R&D and programs to secure radioactive sources, may be cost-effective. This effort would be costly. Programs to secure sources in other nations could also promote a security culture, leveraging U.S. expenditures. Atoms that decay are "radioactive," radioactive atoms are called "radionuclides." Type of radiation. Sources of long-term exposure. (See " G8 Global Partnership: .")
Congress has long sought, through legislation and oversight, to protect the United States against terrorist threats, especially from chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) weapons. Radiological dispersal devices (RDDs) are one type of CBRN weapon. Explosive-driven "dirty bombs" are an often-discussed type of RDD, though radioactive material can also be dispersed in other ways. This report provides background for understanding the RDD threat and responses, and presents issues for Congress.
Radioactive material is the necessary ingredient for an RDD. This material is composed of atoms that decay, emitting radiation. Some types and amounts of radiation are harmful to human health.
Terrorists have shown some interest in RDDs. They could use them in an attempt to disperse radioactive material to cause panic, area denial, and economic dislocation. While RDDs would be far less harmful than nuclear weapons, they are much simpler to build and the needed materials are used worldwide. Accordingly, some believe terrorists would be more likely to use RDDs than nuclear weapons. Key points include:
RDDs could contaminate areas with radioactive material, increasing long-term cancer risks, but would probably kill few people promptly. Nuclear weapons could destroy much of a city, kill tens of thousands of people, and contaminate much larger areas with fallout. Cleanup cost after an RDD attack could range from less than a billion dollars to tens of billions of dollars, depending on area contaminated, decontamination technologies used, and level of cleanup required. Terrorists would face obstacles to using RDDs, such as obtaining materials, designing an effective weapon, and avoiding detection.
Governments and organizations have taken steps to prevent an RDD attack. Domestically, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission has issued regulations to secure radioactive sources. The Department of Homeland Security develops and operates equipment to detect radioactive material. The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) has recovered thousands of disused or abandoned sources. Some state and local governments have taken steps to prepare for an RDD attack. Internationally, the International Atomic Energy Agency has led efforts to secure radioactive sources. Its Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources offers guidance for protecting sources. The G8 Global Partnership has secured sources in Russia and elsewhere. A State Department program strengthens border security. Other nations and non-governmental organizations have acted to secure sources as well. Key points include:
Nuclear Regulatory Commission actions have done much to instill a security culture for U.S. licensees of radioactive sources post-9/11. Many programs have sought to improve the security of radioactive sources overseas, but some incidents raise questions about security.
Should prevention fail, federal, state, and local governments have taken many measures to respond to and recover from an RDD attack. The National Response Framework "establishes a comprehensive, national, all-hazards approach to domestic incident response." The federal government has resources for recovery. Key points include:
Government agencies have done much to prepare for and recover from an RDD attack. This work would help cope with other disasters. Conversely, planning for other disasters would help in the event of an RDD attack. Some experts have raised questions about the effectiveness of planning to respond to and recover from an RDD attack.
This report raises several issues for Congress, including:
the priority for countering RDDs vs. other CBRN; the priority given to securing domestic vs. overseas radioactive sources; whether to establish a radiation detection system in cities; how best to prepare for decontamination following an RDD attack; how to dispose of potentially large volumes of waste generated by decontamination; whether to modify certain personnel reliability standards; whether to modify the pace of a program for implementing certain security enhancements for U.S. radioactive sources; and how to improve radiological forensics capability.
CRS Report R41891, "Dirty Bombs": Background in Brief, by Jonathan Medalia, is an abridged version of this report.