	Background

		Expedited Screening

In 2011, TSA began developing new expedited security procedures  intended to strengthen security and improve the passenger experience by  shortening lines and wait times, and in October 2011, implemented its  expedited screening program—known as TSA Pre®. TSA Is Taking Steps to Improve the Security Effectiveness of Expedited Screening

TSA has taken steps to improve the security effectiveness of expedited  screening since we issued our December 2014 report. Specifically, TSA  has begun planning for the testing of the security effectiveness of the  Managed Inclusion process as an overall system–ensuring that the  testing adheres to established design practices. In addition, TSA has  adjusted the TSA Pre ® Risk Assessment program algorithm used to  assign passengers scores and identify low risk passengers because the  DHS-OIG found that the algorithm allowed a high-risk individual access to  expedited screening. Our December 2014 report found that TSA has tested the effectiveness of  the individual Managed Inclusion security layers, but that TSA had not yet  tested the Managed Inclusion process as an overall system. As a result, we recommended  that TSA take steps to ensure and document that its planned testing of  the Managed Inclusion process as a system adheres to established  evaluation design practices. In addition, according to a TSA memorandum dated November 2015,  TSA made changes to the TSA Pre ® Risk Assessment program and  Managed Inclusion process to enhance aviation security as a result of the  findings and recommendations included in three prior DHS-OIG audit  reports. As a result of this evaluation and based on a recommendation  from another DHS-OIG audit, TSA documentation shows that TSA  discontinued the use of Explosives Trace Detection (ETD) devices as a  method used to conduct real time threat assessments and is now limiting  the use of Managed Inclusion to airports that employed canine team to  detect explosives. According to the TSA administrator, these changes  have resulted in a 20 percent decrease in the number of individuals who  receive expedited screening. While TSA Uses TSO Screening Performance Data, It Is Constrained by Incomplete and Unreliable Data and a Lack of Data Analysis and Assessment Follow-Up

TSA utilizes data on TSO performance obtained from its various testing  programs to help to ensure that individual TSOs are (1) qualified to  conduct passenger and checked baggage screening based on Annual  Proficiency Reviews and resulting recertifications, and (2) demonstrate  proficiency, during live screening operations, in their adherence to  screening standard operating procedures and other TSA guidance for  detecting prohibited items. However, incomplete and unreliable data and  limited analysis constrains TSA’s ability to determine the true level of TSO  performance in screening passengers and baggage for prohibited items. In addition, during live screening operations, TSA also monitors individual  TSO performance through (1) Threat Image Projection (TIP) testing by  local TSA officials which assesses the TSOs’ proficiency at identifying  prohibited items in X-ray images of passengers’ carry-on baggage, and  (2) Aviation Screening Assessment Program (ASAP) covert tests which  assess the TSOs’ ability to properly adhere to screening standard  operating procedures and prevent the passage of prohibited items  through passenger and baggage checkpoints. As shown in figure 2, some  airports in all five airport risk categories did not report any TIP results  nationally over the course of a year from fiscal year 2010 through fiscal  year 2013. Based on our observation of the incomplete TIP data, we recommended  in May 2016 that DHS ensure that TSA officials at individual airports  submit complete TIP results to the national database as required by TSA  policy. DHS concurred with our recommendation on ensuring the completeness  of TIP data and is taking steps to address it. TSA  headquarters officials stated that they had previously not systematically  analyzed TIP results data to determine any national trends for the  purposes of informing future training programs or changes to screening  processes or procedures. DHS concurred with this  recommendation and is taking steps to address it. ASAP Covert Test Results are Unreliable

As we also reported in May 2016, TSA determined that ASAP pass rate  results data were unreliable, which caused them to question the extent to  which ASAP tests accurately measure TSO performance. These  recommendations may include, among other things, additional training for  certain points in the screening process and further testing in certain  areas. Moreover, we reported that tracking the implementation of its  recommendations, including the extent to which identified corrective  actions are improving subsequent TSO performance and test results, will  help TSA better determine the extent to which its implemented  recommendations are leading to improvements in screening operations  and appropriately addressing identified root causes for previous test  failures.
Why GAO Did This Study

In 2015, TSA screened or oversaw the screening of more than 708 million passengers at more than 450 U.S airports. In carrying out the screening process, TSA is responsible for ensuring the security of civil aviation while also managing the efficient flow of passengers. TSA employs screening personnel, called TSOs, to carry out passenger and baggage screening operations. Each year, TSA tests TSO performance as part of its efforts to monitor the effectiveness of aviation security screening. In 2011, TSA began providing expedited screening procedures to selected passengers, intended to strengthen security and improve the passenger experience by shortening lines and wait times.
This testimony addresses the extent to which TSA (1) has taken steps to improve the security effectiveness of expedited screening and (2) uses TSO performance testing data to enhance TSO performance in screening for prohibited items. This statement is based on reports GAO issued in May 2016 and December 2014, and selected updates. Among other things, GAO analyzed TSA documentation on expedited screening and TSO testing data.

What GAO Found

The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has taken steps intended to improve the security effectiveness of expedited passenger screening since GAO reported on it in December 2014. These steps include
Adjusting the TSA Pre✓® Risk Assessment program algorithm used to assign passengers scores and identify low risk passengers;
Limiting the use of Managed Inclusion to airports that employ canine teams to detect explosives; and,
Developing plans to test the security effectiveness of the Managed Inclusion process as an overall system–ensuring that the testing adheres to established design practices.
According to a TSA memorandum dated November 2015, TSA made changes to TSA Pre✓® Risk Assessment program and Managed Inclusion process as a result of the findings and recommendations included in three prior Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General audit reports. According to TSA, these changes were necessary to ensure security and resulted in a 20 percent decrease in the number of individuals receiving expedited screening. Previously, in December 2014, GAO found that TSA had not tested the overall effectiveness of the Managed Inclusion process, and recommended that TSA ensure that its planned testing adhere to established evaluation design practices to yield reliable test results. DHS concurred with the recommendation and plans to begin testing the effectiveness of the Managed Inclusion process as a system during fiscal year 2016.
TSA uses data on Transportation Security Officer (TSO) performance obtained from its various testing programs to ensure that individual TSOs are (1) demonstrating through annual proficiency reviews and resulting recertification that they are qualified to continue conducting passenger and checked baggage screening, and (2) demonstrating proficiency during live screening operations in adhering to screening procedures. However, in a report containing sensitive security information completed in May 2016, GAO found that TSA's ability to fully evaluate TSO performance in screening passengers and baggage for prohibited items is constrained by incomplete and unreliable testing data and a lack of data analysis. For example, some airports did not report testing data on TSOs' ability to identify prohibited items over fiscal years 2009 through 2014 as required by TSA policy. TSA officials also stated they do not systematically analyze test results to determine any national trends for informing future TSO training. In addition, TSA determined that pass rate data for one of its covert testing programs that uses role players at airports to assess TSO performance was unreliable. Specifically, testing by an independent contractor indicated that TSA's covert testing data likely overstated TSO performance. TSA is taking action to determine the root cause of the variance in the testing results and is implementing corrective actions. Further, GAO found that TSA does not track the implementation, where appropriate, of recommendations made based on the covert testing results. DHS concurred with GAO's recommendations made in its May 2016 report and is planning actions to address them.

What GAO Recommends

In its May 2016 report, GAO recommended that TSA ensure that (1) airports submit complete TSO performance data, (2) the data are analyzed nationally, and (3) implementation of covert testing recommendations are tracked. DHS concurred and is taking actions to address the recommendations.