Each mission package consists of  systems made up of manned and unmanned vehicles and the subsystems  these vehicles use in their missions. Additional crew will be needed to  operate these systems. The Navy eventually conducted a requirements  development process and analyzed a number of alternative solutions to a  new ship but concluded that the LCS remained the best option. However, the  requirements the Navy arrived at for LCS’s surface warfare capabilities  were focused on small boats, and this did not include an analysis of the  impact of larger surface threats in the littorals. When  operating independently, such as during routine deployments to littoral  waters, LCS may not be able to call upon assistance from larger U.S.  forces. A Detailed Concept of Operations Has Been Developed for LCS but Faces a Number of Challenges in Implementation

Although there are no formal criteria for developing a concept of  operations, the Navy has developed both a broad concept and more  detailed plans as to how the LCS and its mission systems will be used to  meet requirements. The concept of operations also includes several  challenges that, if not met, may increase the risk in actual LCS operations. However, the Navy has not yet fully considered the LCS concept of  operations in the force structure and procurement plans for the MH-60  helicopter, which is critical to all LCS missions. Since the helicopter is critical for LCS’s concept of  operations, the ship’s operations will be significantly limited if the  helicopters are not bought and made available. The Navy plans for a period of about 12 months between the time  of delivery of the first Flight 0 ship and the start of construction for the  first Flight 1 ship, provided the first Flight 0 ship is available on time. Immaturity in Mission Package Technologies Could Decrease the Experimental and Operational Utility of Flight 0 Ships

A number of the technologies chosen for the LCS mission packages are  not mature, increasing the risk that the first ships will be of limited utility  and not allow sufficient time for experimentation to influence design for  follow-on ships. These factors could also impair the  Navy’s ability to experiment with the Flight 0 ships and adequately gather  and incorporate lessons learned into the designs for the Flight 1 ships. The basis of the procurement  costs for the LCS seaframe appears to be more defined because the Navy  has conducted a series of cost analyses to investigate the challenges in  detailed design and construction. The Navy seeks to stabilize seaframe  costs by establishing a $220 million cost target and working to meet this  target by trading between capability and cost while assuring that seaframe  performance meets threshold requirements. Other mission package costs are not covered  by LCS program cost analyses. The developmental nature of the mission package technologies may affect  more than the procurement, or recurring, costs of LCS. Recommendations for Executive Action

To help the Navy assess and mitigate operational, force structure, and  technology risks associated with LCS, we are making the following three  recommendations:
To determine whether surface threats larger than small boats do  pose risks to the LCS when operating independently and to  mitigate any risks the Navy subsequently identifies, we recommend  that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Navy to  conduct an analysis of the effect of a surface threat larger than  small boats on LCS operations and the impact on other naval  forces in support of those operations. To allow the Navy to take full advantage of the technical and  operational maturation of the Flight 0 ships before committing to  the much larger purchases of follow-on ships, we recommend that  the Secretary of Defense direct the Navy to revise its acquisition  strategy to ensure that it has sufficiently experimented with both  Flight 0 ship designs, captured lessons learned from Flight 0  operations with more than one of the mission packages, and  mitigated operational and technology risks before selection of the  design for an award of a detailed design and construction contract  for Flight 1 is authorized. To assess the progress of technology development in LCS mission  packages, we reviewed the basis of the Navy’s estimation of technology  readiness and plans to bring these technologies to full maturity.
Why GAO Did This Study

To conduct operations in littorals--shallow coastal waters--the Navy plans to build a new class of surface warship: the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS). LCS is being designed to accomplish its missions through systems operating at a distance from the ship, such as helicopters and unmanned vehicles, and that will be contained in interchangeable mission packages. The Navy is using an accelerated approach to buy the LCS, building the ships in "flights." Flight 0, consisting of four ships, will provide limited capability and test the LCS concept. The schedule allows 12 months between the delivery of the first Flight 0 ship and the start of detailed design and construction for Flight 1 ships. Estimated procurement cost of the Flight 0 ships is $1.5 billion. The Congress directed GAO to review the LCS program. This report assesses the analytical basis of LCS requirements; the Navy's progress in defining the concept of operations; the technical maturity of the mission packages; and the basis of recurring costs for LCS.

What GAO Found

The formal analysis of requirements for U.S. littoral combat operations--conducted after the Navy established the LCS program--examined a number of options, such as the extent to which existing fleet assets or joint capabilities could be used. While the Navy concluded that the LCS remained the best option, it focused on LCS requirements for combating small boats. The Navy did not conduct an analysis of the impact of larger surface threats LCS may face. Such threats may increase the risk to LCS operations when no other nearby U.S. forces are available to help. The Navy has developed both a broad concept and more detailed plans on how the LCS will be employed. It has also identified a number of challenges that could put the LCS concept at risk, such as manning, logistics, and communications. For example, reduced manning--a key goal of the LCS program--may not be achievable because maintaining and operating the ship's mission packages, such as the MH-60 helicopter, may require more sailors than the current design allows. Further, the Navy has not yet incorporated the numbers of helicopters that will be needed to fulfill LCS's concept of operation into its force structure and procurement plans. If the Navy's efforts to meet these challenges are not successful, the Navy may not have sufficient time to experiment with the Flight 0 ships and integrate lessons learned into planning and designing for follow-on ships. While the Navy designed the first LCS to rely on proven technologies and systems, a number of technologies to be used in LCS's mission packages have yet to be sufficiently matured--that is, they have not been demonstrated in an operational environment--increasing the risk of cost and schedule increases if the technologies do not work as intended. Technologies must also be demonstrated for systems on the LCS seaframe. Other factors may affect the availability of mature technologies and subsystems, such as making the modifications necessary for adaptation to the LCS and transitioning projects from the laboratory to production. Collectively, these technology issues pose an additional challenge to the Navy's ability to sufficiently experiment with Flight 0 ships in time to inform the design efforts for follow-on ships. Procurement costs for the Flight 0 ships remain uncertain. The basis for the seaframe cost target--$220 million--appears to be more defined than for the mission packages, as the Navy has performed various cost analyses that consider the challenges in detailed design and construction. The Navy seeks to meet the cost target by trading between capability and cost. Cost data for the Flight 0 mission packages are not as firm in part because of the uncertainties associated with immature technologies.