For example, the Departments of Commerce and  State rely in part on DOD’s input on what is militarily critical to inform  export control decisions. At the same time, the  lists are significantly out of date. As a result, the lists are of questionable  value. Validation Process Provides Little Assurance That Lists Are Complete and Accurate

Working group chairs face two key challenges in identifying and selecting  experts to participate in the technology working groups that update the  MCTL and DSTL. To ensure the lists are complete and accurate,  DOD components review and validate the working groups’ updates—  a process DOD program officials consider a critical check of the working  groups’ efforts. Second, the reviewers may not have the technical knowledge to validate  the updates. However,  one-quarter of the reviewers did not review the lists. MCTL and DSTL Lack Currency

A Militarily Critical Technologies Program goal is to completely update the  MCTL and DSTL at least every 4 years by updating about 5 sections of  each list every year. The DSTL is also out of date. Over the  past 5 years, only half of the DSTL sections have been updated (see   table 2). Agencies Tend to Rely on Information Other than the MCTL and DSTL to Support Decisions about Critical Technologies

While the MCTL was created to help determine items that need to be  controlled, the list has generally not been used to inform export control  and DOD policy decisions. Several DOD components have developed their  own efforts to catalog critical technologies to meet their needs. While the MCTL is expected to inform  review of export license applications or export control decisions, the  Defense Technology Security Administration—which represents DOD on  export control decisions—does not use the MCTL for export licensing  decisions or to inform DOD’s input to U.S. government export control  proposals that are considered by the multilateral export control regime  known as the Wassenaar Arrangement. In 1996, the Air Force issued guidance instructing  personnel not to use the MCTL to inform export control and other  decisions. As with export control decisions, we found that the MCTL is seldom used  to inform various DOD policy decisions, including those related to  identifying and protecting critical technology on weapon systems,  counterintelligence efforts related to critical technologies, and programs  reporting on the protection of the defense industrial base. Officials from the  Army’s Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Research and  Technology/Chief Scientist, who were aware of the existence of the DSTL,  stated that the DSTL is not useful for informing science and technology  decisions because it is overly broad, its taxonomy does not align with  Army Research and Technology taxonomy, and its assessments are rarely  in consonance with Army Research and Technology subject matter  experts. To ensure that users’ requirements are met, we recommend that the  Secretary of Defense direct the Director for Defense Research and  Engineering, in conjunction with the Under Secretary of Defense for  Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, to    examine existing efforts within the department to catalog critical  technologies and determine best practices for identifying  technologies;    using these best practices, develop an approach that best meets  user requirements in a timely manner;    on the basis of the new approach, identify duplicative efforts, if any;  ensure the efficient use of resources; and determine what level of  funding is appropriate;    develop an implementation plan for the approach, including  timelines for execution and implementing guidance or directives;  and    establish an oversight mechanism to ensure that user needs are met. We also compared MCTL  and DSTL updates over the past 10 years with program-stated goals for  updating the lists.
Why GAO Did This Study

Major acquisitions in the Department of Defense's (DOD) force transformation rely on maintaining technological superiority to ensure U.S. military dominance. Failure to identify and protect critical technologies makes U.S. military assets vulnerable to cloning, neutralization, or other action that degrades current and anticipated capabilities. To help minimize these risks, DOD's Militarily Critical Technologies Program developed and periodically updates two lists of technologies--the Militarily Critical Technologies List (MCTL) and the Developing Science and Technologies List (DSTL). While the lists are primarily intended to inform U.S. export control decisions, they can also inform counterintelligence activities, research plans, and technology protection programs, making MCTL and DSTL fundamental resources for security decisions. To ensure these lists are informative, GAO assessed the Militarily Critical Technologies Program's process for updating the MCTL and DSTL and determined how the lists are used to inform export control and DOD policy decisions.

What GAO Found

The Militarily Critical Technologies Program's process for updating the MCTL and DSTL has generated lists that are of questionable value. To update the lists, working groups of experts from government, industry, and academia identify militarily critical technologies. However, participation in the working groups is voluntary, and some experts choose not to participate or do not participate fully. Validation of the updates--a critical check to ensure the lists are complete and accurate--also provides little assurance that the lists are of value. More than one-third of the reviewers acknowledged they do not have the technical expertise necessary to validate the updates, and one-quarter did not review the lists. The lists are also out of date. Although a stated program goal calls for all 20 sections of the lists to be completely updated at least every 4 years, about half of the sections on the MCTL--including technologies related to weapons, communications, and biological warfare--have not been updated for 10 years. The DSTL is also out of date; almost half of the sections have not been updated in the past 5 years. With the limited value of the MCTL and DSTL, agencies tend to rely on other information sources to inform export control and DOD policy decisions. According to DOD and Department of Commerce export control officials, the MCTL is too broad, difficult to use, and out of date to inform export control proposals or export licensing decisions. Concerned about the MCTL's accuracy and reliability, the Air Force instructed its personnel not to use the MCTL. The DSTL is also seldom used--in part because some DOD components were not aware of the list. For those components that were aware of the DSTL, some found it only marginally useful because it too is out of date. Several DOD components have developed their own efforts to track global technologies. For example, the Army established international technology centers dedicated to identifying international cooperative opportunities as well as to maintain knowledge of foreign research efforts to avoid technological surprises for the warfighter.