Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

In response to requests from the Chairman and Ranking Minority Member of the Senate Armed Services Committee and the Chairman of the House Budget Committee, we assessed whether (1) the QDR’s force structure and modernization assessments examined alternatives to the planned force and (2) opportunities exist to improve the structure and methodology of future QDRs. Force Structure Assessments Tested Limited Alternatives

The QDR’s major theater war assessment, smaller-scale contingency war game series, and future regional great power assessment used some analytical tools different from those used in the Bottom-Up Review to analyze a broader range of military operations and conduct greater analysis of some key assumptions. Furthermore, none of the assessments fully examined the impact of evolving technologies and operational concepts on future force size and structure. As part of the QDR force assessment analysis, DOD modeled the sufficiency of U.S. forces to fulfill this requirement. OSD and Joint Staff officials stated that they did not analyze the effects of new technologies or concepts because the TACWAR model is not sensitive enough to do so. While this assessment provided several insights into how forces were allocated to a wide range of operations, it did not evaluate alternative force structures to identify the force best suited to meet the demands of the defense strategy. 2.1.) Modernization Review Did Not Reflect a Mission-Oriented Approach

DOD’s modernization review examined some variations of the services’ planned modernization programs but did not reflect a thorough, mission-oriented approach to assessing the mix of capabilities the United States will need to counter future threats. As a result, the QDR did not sufficiently examine linkages and trade-offs between force structure and modernization decisions. Planning for the Next QDR Can Help Provide for a More Thorough Review of Defense Needs

DOD can enhance the value of the next QDR by providing formal oversight of QDR preparation efforts, improving models and other analytical tools, and considering changes to the QDR’s structure and design. Changing the timing of the panels’ work, building greater collaboration among some panels, and delaying the QDR until later in the new administration’s term may also provide a more thorough review. DOD has some initiatives underway that could help it prepare for its next review. Moreover, DOD’s force structure and modernization panels completed their analyses separately and did not model trade-offs between modernization and force structure.
Why GAO Did This Study

Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed whether: (1) the Quadrennial Defense Review's (QDR) force structure and modernization assessments examined alternatives to the planned force; and (2) opportunities exist to improve the structure and methodology of future QDRs. GAO did not evaluate the rationale for the Department of Defense's (DOD) proposed defense strategy.

What GAO Found

GAO noted that: (1) QDR did not examine alternatives that would provide greater assurance that it identified the force structure that is best suited to implement the defense strategy; (2) the QDR's force assessments built on DOD's Bottom-Up Review analysis by examining requirements for a broader range of military operations beyond major theater wars, and by analyzing the potential impact of some key assumptions; (3) only one of the three major force assessments modeled any force structure alternatives; (4) the assessment did not examine alternatives that involved targeted changes because DOD officials foresaw problems in obtaining service consensus and DOD's models are not sensitive enough to assess the effects of some types of force structure changes; (5) although some technologies consistent with Joint Vision 2010 were modeled, none of the assessments fully examined the potential effects of new technologies and war-fighting concepts on DOD's planned force structure; (6) DOD's modernization review examined some variations of the services' procurement plans but did not include a thorough, mission-oriented review of the mix of capabilities the United States will need to counter future threats; (7) DOD divided responsibility for analyzing major procurement programs and investment issues among 17 task forces; (8) this approach did not always provide a mission focus that examined trade-offs or facilitated a fundamental reassessment of modernization needs in light of emerging threats and technological advances; (9) the modernization and force assessment panels conducted most of their work independently and concurrently, which hampered their ability to explore linkages and trade-offs between force structure and modernization alternatives; (10) DOD can provide a more thorough review of U.S. defense needs in the next QDR by preparing early, improving its analytical tools, and considering changes to the structure and design of the QDR process; (11) DOD has not yet developed a formal process to prepare for and coordinate activities related to the next QDR; and (12) delaying the start of the next QDR until later in the next Presidential administration may also facilitate a more thorough review.