Physical inspections are one of the main tools NRC uses to oversee  licensee performance. NRC assesses its reviews of performance indicators and all findings that  result from its physical inspections to determine what actions, if any, to  take in response to signs of declining performance, including violations of  NRC requirements. NRC Relies on Staff’s Professional Judgment in Implementing Its Processes for Overseeing the Safety of Commercial Nuclear Reactors

NRC relies on its staff’s professional judgment in implementing its  processes, which are largely prescribed in guidance, for overseeing the  safety of commercial nuclear power reactors. NRC Allocates Specific Oversight Roles and Responsibilities among Regional Officials, Resident Inspectors, Headquarters Officials, and the Nuclear Power Industry

To implement its oversight, NRC allocates specific roles and  responsibilities to regional officials, resident inspectors, headquarters  officials, and the nuclear power industry. NRC assigns resident inspectors to each nuclear power plant to conduct  baseline inspections. NRC also builds into its processes incentives for licensees to identify  concerns about reactor safety, discuss those concerns with NRC, and  identify actions to correct them. NRC Oversight Relies on Its Staff’s Professional Judgment in Applying Regulations and Guidance

NRC’s oversight processes are based in regulation, and its specific  processes for identifying and assessing findings and violations are largely  prescribed in guidance, but rely on several key points where NRC staff  must exercise their professional judgment, such as determining (1)  whether an issue of concern constitutes a finding or violation, (2) a  finding’s risk significance or a violation’s severity, and (3) whether findings  or violations have cross-cutting aspects, among other things. Differences Exist across NRC Regions in Identifying and Resolving Findings, and NRC Has Taken Some Steps to Address Them

NRC is aware of differences across regions in identifying and resolving  the findings that result from its oversight processes and has taken some  steps to address them. During the same  period, Region II—the region with the greatest number of reactors and  plants—recorded the fewest number of nonescalated findings. Differences in inspection hours. NRC Officials and Industry Representatives Have Raised Concerns about Differences in the Number of Findings Identified across NRC Regions

NRC officials and industry representatives have raised concerns that  differences in the number of findings NRC regions identify may be due, in  part, to differences in how NRC staff identify and resolve findings. Number of Escalated Findings Had Fewer Differences across NRC Regions

The number of escalated findings had fewer differences across regional  offices. According to NRC officials, the initiative was  intended to explore how the different regional offices identify and assess  inspection findings. Thus even with taking these steps to examine  the consistency of its oversight processes, agency officials told us that  NRC has not conducted a comprehensive analysis of the causes of the  differences in the number of nonescalated findings identified across  regions. Under federal standards for internal control, managers at the  functional or activity level are to compare actual performance to planned  or expected results throughout the organization and analyze significant  differences. Without conducting such an analysis, NRC (1) does not  know whether its regional offices or individual inspectors are applying  regulations and guidance consistently in handling findings; or (2) cannot  identify other factors that may have led to the differences. NRC Uses Numerous Methods to Develop Lessons Learned for Improving Oversight, but Challenges Remain in Accessing This Information

NRC has both formal and informal methods for developing lessons  learned to improve its oversight. Formal methods include agencywide  programs and annual assessments. Informal methods include reaching  out to peer groups and technical experts throughout the agency and  accessing various agency databases. Although NRC guidance directs  inspectors to use information in agency databases on past experiences to  plan and conduct future inspection activities, inspectors face challenges  accessing this information, which may limit their ability to use it. NRC has also undertaken special initiatives, such as the Fukushima  Near-Term Task Force, to develop lessons learned from the accident at  the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant in Japan that it could apply in  its oversight of U.S. commercial nuclear power reactors. Without better search tools, inspectors could overly rely on  information available through informal channels. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

Our objectives were to (1) describe how the Nuclear Regulatory  Commission (NRC) implements its processes for overseeing the safety of  commercial nuclear power reactors; (2) evaluate the extent to which NRC  consistently identifies and resolves findings through these processes; and  (3) describe NRC’s methods for developing lessons learned to improve its  oversight and challenges, if any, NRC faces in doing so.
Why GAO Did This Study

The 2011 disaster at Japan's Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant demonstrated that unexpected nuclear accidents with extreme consequences can occur and, thus, heightened concerns about NRC's ability to oversee the safety of U.S. commercial nuclear power reactors. NRC oversees safety through multiple processes, such as physically inspecting reactors and also responding to signs of declining performance (i.e., findings) or violations of its requirements.
GAO was asked to review NRC's oversight of the U.S. nuclear power industry. This report examines (1) how NRC implements its processes for overseeing the safety of commercial nuclear power reactors; (2) the extent to which NRC consistently identifies and resolves findings through these processes; and (3) NRC's methods for developing lessons learned to improve its oversight and challenges, if any, NRC faces in doing so. GAO reviewed NRC policies and guidance; visited five nuclear power plants located in multiple NRC regions; analyzed NRC data on findings, violations, licensee performance, and inspection hours; interviewed NRC officials and industry representatives; and observed demonstrations of NRC's database search tools.

What GAO Found

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) relies on its staff's professional judgment in implementing its processes for overseeing the safety of U.S. commercial nuclear power reactors. In implementing this oversight, NRC allocates specific roles and responsibilities to resident inspectors assigned to each plant, regional officials at one of four regional offices responsible for most oversight activities, headquarters officials, and the nuclear power industry. NRC also builds into its processes incentives for plant managers to identify concerns about reactor safety, report those concerns to NRC, and take prompt actions to correct them. NRC's processes for identifying and assessing findings and violations are based on prescribed agency procedures and include several points where NRC staff must exercise their professional judgment, such as determining whether issues of concern identified during physical inspections constitute findings or violations and the risk significance of any findings or the severity of any violations, among other things.
NRC is aware of differences across regional offices in identifying and resolving findings that result from physical inspections. GAO's analysis of NRC's data indicated that the number of escalated findings had fewer differences across regions than nonescalated findings, which are lower-risk findings and less severe violations. According to NRC officials, several factors, such as the hours spent on inspections, may explain the differences in nonescalated findings. However, GAO found that the regional office with the fewest reactors and the fewest inspection hours had the most nonescalated findings. NRC officials and industry representatives have raised concerns that the differences may also be due to differences in how NRC staff identify and resolve findings. NRC has taken some steps to examine the consistency of its oversight. For example, in 2009, the four regional offices implemented an initiative to explore how the regional offices identify and assess inspection findings. However, NRC has not conducted a comprehensive analysis of the causes of the differences in the number of nonescalated findings across regions. Under federal standards for internal control, managers are to compare actual performance with planned or expected results throughout the organization and analyze significant differences. Without such an analysis, NRC does not know whether its regional offices are applying regulations and guidance consistently.
NRC has both formal and informal methods for developing lessons learned to improve its oversight. Formal methods include agencywide programs, annual and biennial assessments, and special initiatives. Informal methods include reaching out to peers and technical experts across the agency and accessing various agency databases. Although NRC guidance directs inspectors to use information in agency databases on past experiences to plan and conduct inspection activities, inspectors face challenges accessing this information, which may limit their ability to use it. For example, several NRC inspectors reported contacting other inspectors informally because NRC's database search tools contain limited instructions and do not ensure thorough results. Without better search tools, inspectors may overly rely on information available through informal channels.

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends, among other things, that NRC analyze the causes of differences in identifying and resolving findings across regional offices and address these differences, and that it improve its database search tools. NRC agreed with GAO's recommendations.