Security for Civilians and Contractors in Iraq Is Provided by a Mix of Military Forces, State Department Security Personnel, and Private Security Providers

U.S. civilian government agencies and reconstruction contractors have had  to contract with private security providers because it is not part of the U.S.  military’s stated mission to provide security to these organizations. More than  half of the contractors awarded contracts in 2003 replaced their security  providers. Contractors Rebuilding Iraq Obtained Their Own Security with Little Assistance from the Agencies

Contractors engaged in reconstruction efforts were generally required to  provide for their own security, and they have done so by awarding  subcontracts to private security providers. The contractors’ efforts  to obtain suitable security providers met with mixed results, as many  subsequently found that their security provider could not meet their needs. Contractor officials attributed this turnover to various factors, including  the urgent need to obtain security, the increasing threat level, their lack of  knowledge of potential sources and the security market, and the absence of  useful agency guidance. For example, one agency official noted that his agency’s  requests for proposals for security services are publicly available. Initially, coordination between the military  and private security providers was informal. First, private security providers continue to report incidents between  themselves and the military when approaching military convoys and  checkpoints. U.S. Additionally,  coordination was inconsistent. Some Coordination Problems Remain between Private Security Providers and the U.S. Military

While security providers, reconstruction contractors, and military  representatives of the PCO believe that the ROC has improved  coordination on the complex battle space in Iraq, both the private security  providers and the military believe that several coordination issues remain  to be resolved. Agencies Have Limited Capabilities to Assess the Cost Impact of Using Private Security Providers

Despite the significant role played by private security providers in enabling  reconstruction efforts to proceed, neither the Department of State, DOD,  nor USAID has complete data on the cost associated with using private  security providers. On 15 reconstruction contracts  we found that the cost to obtain private security providers and security- related equipment at the reconstruction contract level can be considerable,  as it accounted for 15 percent or more on 8 of the 15 contracts we  reviewed; on only 4 of those 8 contracts, however, did the agencies  formally track security costs under a separate task order or contract line  item. Agency and contractor officials acknowledged that security costs  had diverted planned reconstruction resources and led to canceling or  reducing the scope of certain reconstruction projects, though they also  noted that other factors have affected reconstruction projects. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are  included in appendix V.

Scope and Methodology

To determine the extent to which U.S. government agencies and  contractors working in Iraq at the behest of the U.S. government have  acquired security services from private security providers, we reviewed a  wide array of documents to determine who was responsible for providing  security to those types of organizations, including   warning orders and fragmentary orders issued by the U.S. Central  Command (CENTCOM), Combined Joint Task Force-7, Multi National  Forces–Iraq, and Multi National Corps-Iraq to determine if any orders  had been issued regarding providing security to U.S. government  employees or contractors rebuilding Iraq;  contracting documents such as statements of work, requests for  proposals and contracts and contact modifications;  Department of Defense (DOD) regulations and instructions that relate  to the management of contractors during contingency operations;   Departments of State and Defense memoranda of understanding  regarding security and support;  proposed guidance between the Department of State and the  Department of Defense regarding contractor support;  guidance to contractors prepared by the Coalition Provisional Authority  (CPA) regarding contractor operations in Iraq; and  Department of State rules and regulations, including the Foreign Affairs  Manual.
Why GAO Did This Study

The United States is spending billions of dollars to reconstruct Iraq while combating an insurgency that has targeted military and contractor personnel and the Iraqi people. This environment created a need for those rebuilding Iraq to obtain security services. GAO evaluated the extent to which (1) U.S. agencies and contractors acquired security services from private providers, (2) the U.S. military and private security providers developed a working relationship, and (3) U.S. agencies assessed the costs of using private security providers on reconstruction contracts.

What GAO Found

The civilian U.S. government agencies and reconstruction contractors in Iraq that GAO evaluated have obtained security services, such as personal and convoy security, from private security providers because providing security to them is not the U.S. military's stated mission. U.S. military forces provide security for those Department of Defense (DOD) civilians and contractors who directly support the combat mission. In Iraq, the Department of State and other federal agencies contract with several private security providers to protect their employees. Under their contracts, contractors rebuilding Iraq are responsible for providing their own security and have done so by awarding subcontracts to private security providers. As of December 2004, the agencies and contractors we reviewed had obligated more than $766 million for private security providers. The contractors' efforts to obtain suitable security providers met with mixed results, as they often found that their security provider could not meet their needs. Overall, GAO found that contractors replaced their initial security providers on more than half the 2003 contracts it reviewed. Contractor officials attributed this turnover to various factors, including the absence of useful agency guidance. While the U.S. military and private security providers have developed a cooperative working relationship, actions should be taken to improve its effectiveness. The relationship between the military and private security providers is one of coordination, not control. Prior to October 2004 coordination was informal, based on personal contacts, and was inconsistent. In October 2004 a Reconstruction Operations Center was opened to share intelligence and coordinate military-contractor interactions. While military and security providers agreed that coordination has improved, two problems remain. First, private security providers continue to report incidents between themselves and the military when approaching military convoys and checkpoints. Second, military units deploying to Iraq are not fully aware of the parties operating on the complex battle space in Iraq and what responsibility they have to those parties. Despite the significant role played by private security providers in enabling reconstruction efforts, neither the Department of State, nor DOD nor the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) have complete data on the costs of using private security providers. Even at the contract level, the agencies generally had only limited information readily available, even though agency and contractor officials acknowledged that these costs had diverted a considerable amount of reconstruction resources and led to canceling or reducing the scope of some projects. For example, in March 2005, two task orders for reconstruction worth nearly $15 million were cancelled to help pay for security at a power plant. GAO found that the cost to obtain private security providers and security-related equipment accounted for more than 15 percent of contract costs on 8 of the 15 reconstruction contracts it reviewed.