	CBP Has Various Tools for Targeting U.S.-Bound Cargo Containers for Inspections

As part of its efforts to target high-risk cargo containers for inspection,  CBP uses various sources of information to screen containers in advance  of their arrival in the United States. To further  enhance CBP’s ability to target high-risk shipments, in 2006 the SAFE  Port Act required CBP to collect additional data related to the movement  of cargo to identify high-risk cargo for inspection, and in 2009 CBP  implemented the Importer Security Filing and Additional Carrier  Requirements, collectively known as the 10+2 rule. The cargo  information required by the 10+2 rule comprises 10 data elements from  importers, such as country of origin, and 2 data elements from vessel  carriers, such as the position of each container transported on a vessel,  all of which are to be provided to CBP in advance of arrival at a U.S. port. In  response to this recommendation, CBP took steps in January 2011 to  improve targeting efforts by updating its targeting criteria in to include risk  factors present in the 10+2 data. DHS Has Made Some Progress in Implementing Technologies to Improve Container Security

		Container Security Technologies Are Intended to Detect Intrusion and Track Movement

As we reported in September 2010, DHS’s Science and Technology  Directorate (S&T) initiated four container security technology projects, in  part, in response to general MTSA requirements, as well as CBP’s need  for technologies to detect intrusion and track the movement of containers  through the supply chain. Radiation Detection and Nonintrusive Imaging Technology Can Help Identify Container Contents

To prevent the smuggling of nuclear and radiological materials, as of  September 2010, CBP in coordination with DHS’s Domestic Nuclear  Detection Office (DNDO), has deployed over 1,400 radiation portal  monitors (RPM) at U.S. ports of entry. Since 2006, we have been reporting on long-standing problems with  DNDO’s efforts to deploy advanced spectroscopic portal (ASP) radiation  detection monitors, a more-advanced and significantly more-expensive  type of RPM designed to replace the RPMs CBP currently uses. DNDO officials stated that  they planned to update the cost-benefit analysis; however, after spending  more than $200 million on the program, in February 2010, DHS  announced that it was scaling back its plans for development and use of  the ASP, and subsequently announced in July 2011 that it was ending the  ASP program, which means DHS continues to face limitations in radiation  detection. CBP has since implemented these  recommendations. As The Deadline for 100 Percent Scanning Approaches, Uncertainty Persists over the Future of 100 Percent Scanning

		The Scope of the Secure Freight Initiative Has Decreased after Facing Numerous Challenges

In response to the SAFE Port Act requirement to implement a pilot  program to determine the feasibility of scanning 100 percent of U.S.- bound containers with both radiation detection and nonintrusive  equipment, CBP, the Department of State, and the Department of Energy  jointly announced the formation of the Secure Freight Initiative (SFI) pilot  program in December 2006. In October 2009, we reported that while CBP and the Department of  Energy had made progress in integrating new technologies as part of the  SFI program, progress in implementing and expanding the scanning of  U.S.-bound cargo containers at participating ports was limited. Logistical, technological, and other problems at participating ports have  prevented any of the participating ports from achieving 100 percent  scanning, as ultimately required by the 9/11 Act, leaving the feasibility  and efficacy of 100 percent scanning largely unproven. In addition to the challenges CBP faced in implementing 100 percent  scanning at the select SFI pilot ports, CBP also faces a number of  potential challenges in integrating the 100 percent scanning requirement  with the existing container security programs that make up CBP’s layered  security strategy. We recommended that CBP perform analyses to determine whether 100  percent scanning is feasible, and if so, the best way to achieve it; or,  alternatively, if it is not feasible, present acceptable alternatives. To date,  however, CBP has not conducted such a feasibility assessment. Further, CBP has not provided any details about any alternatives to 100  percent scanning that DHS or CBP may be considering. As we previously reported, in the short term,  DHS acknowledged it will not be able to meet this deadline for full-scale  implementation of the 9/11 Act’s scanning requirement and will need to  grant extensions to those foreign ports unable to meet the scanning  deadline in order to maintain the flow of trade and comply with the 9/11  Act. Therefore, DHS expects to grant a blanket extension to all foreign ports  pursuant to the statue, thus extending the target date for compliance with  this requirement by 2 years, to July 2014. As a result, DHS will need to notify Congress by May 2,  2012, of any extensions it plans to grant. Supply Chain Security: DHS Should Test and Evaluate Container  Security Technologies Consistent with All Identified Operational  Scenarios to Ensure the Technologies Will Function as Intended. Cargo Container Inspections: Preliminary Observations on the Status of  Efforts to Improve the Automated Targeting System.
Why GAO Did This Study

Cargo containers that are part of the global supply chainthe flow of goods from manufacturers to retailersare vulnerable to threats from terrorists. The Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA) of 2002 and the Security and Accountability For Every (SAFE) Port Act of 2006 required the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to take actions to improve maritime transportation security. Also, the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (9/11 Act) required, among other things, that by July 2012, 100 percent of all U.S.-bound cargo containers be scanned. Within DHS, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) is responsible for container security programs to address these requirements. This testimony addresses, among other things, (1) efforts to gather advance information about container shipments to assess risks, (2) technologies used to protect the integrity of containers and scan them, and (3) the status of efforts to scan 100 percent of U.S.-bound containers. GAOs statement is based on products issued from April 2005 through July 2011, along with selected updates conducted from January to February 2012. Updates involved collecting information from CBP on the status of efforts to address GAOs prior recommendations on these issues and its plans to implement 100 percent scanning.

What GAO Found

As part of its efforts to identify high-risk cargo for inspection, CBP uses various sources of information to screen containers in advance of their arrival in the United States. For example, in 2009, CBP implemented the Importer Security Filing and Additional Carrier Requirements to collect additional information for targeting. The additional cargo information required, such as country of origin, is to be provided to CBP in advance of arrival of the cargo containers at U.S. ports. In September 2010, GAO recommended that CBP establish milestones and time frames for updating its targeting criteria to include additional information. In response, CBP updated its targeting criteria in January 2011.
DHS has made some progress in developing and implementing container security technologies to protect the integrity of containers and to scan them. GAO reported in September 2010 that DHSs Science and Technology Directorate initiated four container security technology projects to detect and report intrusions into cargo containers. However, operational testing had not occurred to ensure the prototypes would function as intended. Therefore, GAO recommended that testing and evaluation occur in all environments in which DHS planned to implement the technologies. DHS concurred and has made progress implementing this recommendation. To prevent the smuggling of nuclear and radiological materials, CBP, in coordination with the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO), has deployed over 1,400 radiation portal monitors (RPM) at U.S. ports of entry to detect the presence of radiation in cargo containers. Since 2006, GAO reported on problems with DNDOs efforts to deploy a more-advanced and significantly more-expensive type of RPM. Among other things, GAO reported that an updated cost-benefit analysis might show that DNDOs program to replace existing equipment with the advanced technology was not justified. After spending more than $200 million, DHS ended the program in July 2011.
Uncertainty persists over how DHS and CBP will fulfill the mandate for 100 percent scanning given that the feasibility remains unproven in light of the challenges CBP has faced implementing a pilot program for 100 percent scanning. In response to the SAFE Port Act requirement to implement a pilot program to determine the feasibility of 100 percent scanning, CBP, the Department of State, and the Department of Energy announced the formation of the Secure Freight Initiative (SFI) pilot program in December 2006. However, logistical, technological, and other challenges prevented the participating ports from achieving 100 percent scanning and CBP has since reduced the scope of the SFI program from six ports to one. In October 2009, GAO recommended that CBP perform an assessment to determine if 100 percent scanning is feasible, and if it is, the best way to achieve it, or if it is not feasible, present acceptable alternatives. However, to date, CBP has not conducted such an assessment or identified alternatives to 100 percent scanning. Further, as GAO previously reported, DHS acknowledged it will not be able to meet the 9/11 Acts July 2012 deadline for implementing the 100 percent scanning requirement, and therefore, it expects to grant a blanket extension to all foreign ports pursuant to the statute, thus extending the target date to July 2014. To do so, DHS is required to report to Congress by May 2, 2012, of any extensions it plans to grant.

What GAO Recommends

GAO has made recommendations in past reports to DHS to strengthen its container security efforts. DHS concurred with GAOs recommendations and has either addressed them or is undertaking efforts to address them.