In addition, the Comanche continues to experience scheduling delays and performance risks. Cost Estimate Increases

The Comanche program’s latest cost estimate, in April 2000, shows estimated costs have increased by almost $4.8 billion—from $43.3 billion to $48.1 billion—since our last report. The program office plans to use the additional development funding to at least partially address what had been unfunded requirements in three areas considered to be high risk: (1) developing and integrating the mission equipment package; (2) developing the technology to detect and isolate equipment problems (automatic fault isolation); and (3) developing and integrating satellite communication capabilities. Further, the Army’s schedule for developing and testing software for the Comanche may not be completed prior to the full-rate production decision. The Comanche continues to have several areas of high technical risk that jeopardize the achievement of several critical performance requirements. First, the Army does not yet know and it will not know until well after its low-rate initial production decision whether certain technologies being developed will fit on the helicopter and function as expected. However, at that time, the program office and the contractor will have limited experience and data relative to producing the fully developed Comanche helicopter. Until more experience and data is available, there is not a high level of confidence in the Army’s production cost estimate. Nevertheless, DOD stated that it is currently examining whether any of Comanche's requirements should be deferred, in order to reduce the risk of not meeting cost and schedule objectives. Scope and Methodology

To evaluate changes in the Comanche’s status with regard to cost, schedule, and performance and assess whether the Army has the certainty it needs to proceed with beginning production, we examined and compared program schedules, pertinent cost documents, and acquisition strategies, and discussed potential changes and causative factors with cognizant Comanche program officials.
Why GAO Did This Study

As of August 1, 1999, the Army's Comanche helicopter program faced significant risks related to cost overruns, scheduling delays, and degraded performance. GAO concluded that proceeding to the next development phase with high levels of uncertainty was not in accordance with best practices followed by successful commercial firms. This report evaluates changes since 1999 in the Comanche's cost, schedule, and performance, and assesses whether the Army will have the knowledge it needs to proceed with its current production plans.

What GAO Found

GAO found that the Comanche program's total development and production cost estimate has increased by almost $4.8 billion. However, areas of high technical risks and unfunded requirements could further increase the program's costs. The program office does not plan to update its April 2000 current estimate to reflect these increases until January 2003. The Comanche's December 2006 full rate production decision date has not changed even though the risks of not meeting this date have increased. The Army continues to face the risk that critical performance requirements may not be met--at least for the helicopters it will initially produce. The Department of Defense (DOD) recently provided $84 million in additional development funding to help reduce some of these high-risk areas. Additionally, the Army is not likely to have the knowledge it needs to begin production when scheduled. It is also not likely to know whether some technologies being developed, such as those used for the mission equipment package, will work on the helicopter and function as expected. DOD is also unlikely to know whether the helicopter can be produced within current cost estimates.