Air Force Faces Significant Challenges in Acquiring GPS Satellites

The Air Force’s GPS IIF acquisition initially was not well executed, and  currently poses technical problems. A slip  in the launch of the GPS IIIA satellites could increase the likelihood that  the GPS constellation will fall below the number of satellites required to  provide the level of GPS service the U.S. government has committed to  provide. The launch of the first IIF satellite has been delayed  until November 2009—almost 3 years late. According to the program  office, the cost to complete GPS IIF will be about $1.6 billion—about $870  million over the original cost estimate of $729 million. Several other studies have  raised similar issues. While recent studies have made  recommendations for strengthening leadership for space acquisitions, no  major changes to the leadership structure have been made in recent years. This  includes  reevaluating the contractor incentive/award fee approach;    providing a commitment from the Air Force to fully fund GPS IIIA in  Program Objectives Memorandum 2010;  funding and executing recommended mitigation measures to address the  next generation operational control segment and the GPS IIIA satellites;    combining the existing and new ground control segment levels of effort  into a single level of effort, giving the Air Force greater flexibility to  manage these efforts;    not allowing the program manager to adjust the GPS IIIA program scope to  meet increased or accelerated technical specifications, system  requirements, or system performance; and    conducting an independent technology readiness assessment of the  contractor design once the preliminary design review is complete. This schedule is 3 years shorter than the  schedule the Air Force has so far achieved under its IIF program. 3). Nonetheless, no major satellite program undertaken in the past decade has  met its scheduled goals. New Satellite Capabilities Will Not Be Leveraged Because of Delayed Delivery of Ground and User Equipment Capabilities

To maximize the benefit of GPS, the deployment of its space, ground  control, and user equipment capabilities must be synchronized so that the  full spectrum of military assets—weapons, aircraft, and ships, for  example—and individual users can take advantage of new capabilities  such as added protection from jamming. However, because of funding  shifts and diffuse leadership, the Air Force has not been successful in  synchronizing space, ground control, and user equipment segments. As such,  there is no single authority responsible for synchronizing all the  procurements and fielding related to GPS. A 2008 U.S. Strategic Command  Functional Solutions Analysis, conducted to provide recommendations for  solutions to positioning, navigation, and timing gaps, noted that the Air  Force is responsible for developing and integrating military GPS user  equipment for select platforms, and that integration and testing of these  platforms is required to be complete so that the user equipment is  available for procurement when the military signal becomes operational. While there is a consensus that DOD and other federal  organizations involved with GPS have taken prudent steps to manage  requirements and optimize GPS use, we also identified challenges in the  areas of ensuring civilian requirements can be met and ensuring that GPS  is compatible with other new, potentially competing global space-based  positioning, navigation, and timing systems. Conclusions

GPS has enabled transformations in military, civil, other government, and  commercial operations and has become part of the critical infrastructure  serving national and international communities. While  the Air Force is making a concerted effort to address acquisition problems,  there is still considerable risk that satellites will not be delivered on time,  leading to gaps in capability. The major contributors are listed in  appendix V.

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

To assess the Global Positioning System (GPS) satellite, ground control,  and user equipment acquisition programs and determine whether GPS  capabilities are being synchronized, we reviewed and analyzed program  plans and documentation related to cost, schedule, requirements, program  direction, and satellite constellation sustainment, and compared  programmatic data to GAO’s criteria compiled over the last 12 years for  best practices in system development. To  assess the risks that a delay in the acquisition and fielding of GPS III  satellites could result in the GPS constellation falling below the 24  satellites required by the standard positioning service and precise  positioning service performance standards, we obtained information from  the Air Force predicting the reliability for 77 GPS satellites—each of the 31  current (on-orbit) and 46 future GPS satellites—as a function of time. China also  is in the process of developing its own GNSS, Compass (also called  Beidou).
Why GAO Did This Study

The Global Positioning System (GPS), which provides positioning, navigation, and timing data to users worldwide, has become essential to U.S. national security and a key tool in an expanding array of public service and commercial applications at home and abroad. The United States provides GPS data free of charge. The Air Force, which is responsible for GPS acquisition, is in the process of modernizing GPS. In light of the importance of GPS, the modernization effort, and international efforts to develop new systems, GAO was asked to undertake a broad review of GPS. Specifically, GAO assessed progress in (1) acquiring GPS satellites, (2) acquiring the ground control and user equipment necessary to leverage GPS satellite capabilities, and evaluated (3) coordination among federal agencies and other organizations to ensure GPS missions can be accomplished. To carry out this assessment, GAO's efforts included reviewing and analyzing program documentation, conducting its own analysis of Air Force satellite data, and interviewing key military and civilian officials.

What GAO Found

It is uncertain whether the Air Force will be able to acquire new satellites in time to maintain current GPS service without interruption. If not, some military operations and some civilian users could be adversely affected. In recent years, the Air Force has struggled to successfully build GPS satellites within cost and schedule goals; it encountered significant technical problems that still threaten its delivery schedule; and it struggled with a different contractor. As a result, the current IIF satellite program has overrun its original cost estimate by about $870 million and the launch of its first satellite has been delayed to November 2009--almost 3 years late. Further, while the Air Force is structuring the new GPS IIIA program to prevent repeating mistakes made on the IIF program, the Air Force is aiming to deploy the next generation of GPS sa this schedule is optimistic, given the program's late start, past trends in space acquisitions, and challenges facing the new contracto tellites 3 years faster than the IIF satellites. GAO's analysis found that r. Of particular concern is leadership for GPS acquisition, as GAO and other studies have found the lack of a single point of authority for space programs and frequent turnover in program managers have hampered requirements setting, funding stability, and resource allocation. If the Air Force does not meet its schedule goals for development of GPS IIIA satellites, there will be an increased likelihood that in 2010, as old satellites begin to fail, the overall GPS constellation will fall below the number of satellites required to provide the level of GPS service that the U.S. government commits to. Such a gap in capability could have wide-ranging impacts on all GPS users, though there are measures the Air Force and others can take to plan for and minimize these impacts. In addition to risks facing the acquisition of new GPS satellites, the Air Force has not been fully successful in synchronizing the acquisition and development of the next generation of GPS satellites with the ground control and user equipment, thereby delaying the ability of military users to fully utilize new GPS satellite capabilities. Diffuse leadership has been a contributing factor, given that there is no single authority responsible for synchronizing all procurements and fielding related to GPS, and funding has been diverted from ground programs to pay for problems in the space segment. DOD and others involved in ensuring GPS can serve communities beyond the military have taken prudent steps to manage requirements and coordinate among the many organizations involved with GPS. However, GAO identified challenges to ensuring civilian requirements and ensuring GPS compatibility with other new, potentially competing global space-based positioning, navigation, and timing systems.