Most Afghan National Police Units Are Rated as Not Capable of Performing Their Mission

After an investment of more than $6 billion, Defense reporting indicates  that, as of April 2008, no police unit (0 of 433) was assessed as fully  capable of performing its mission and more than three-fourths of units  rated (334 of 433) were assessed as not capable (see table 3). Nonetheless, the  results of Defense’s census raise questions about the reliability of the  nearly 80,000 number of police reportedly assigned. Several Challenges Impede Development of Capable Police Forces

Several challenges impede U.S. efforts to build a capable police force. Although this effort is too new to fully assess, the continuing  shortfall in police mentors may put the initiative at risk. Shortage of Police Mentors Hinders Training, Evaluation, and Verification of Police on Duty

According to Defense officials, the shortage of available police mentors  has been a key impediment to U.S. efforts to conduct training and  evaluation and to verify that police are on duty. 1). Police Face Problems with Weak Judicial Sector, Pay, Corruption, and Attacks

Establishing a working judiciary in Afghanistan based on the rule of law is a  prerequisite for effective policing. New Initiative to Reconstitute Police Has Begun, but Limited Mentor Coverage Is a Risk Factor

Defense has recognized challenges to ANP development and began a new  initiative called Focused District Development in November 2007 to  address them. Defense and State Have Not Developed a Coordinated, Detailed Plan for Completing and Sustaining the ANSF

In our June 2005 report, we recommended that the Secretaries of Defense  and State develop detailed plans for completing and sustaining the ANSF  that contain several elements, including milestones for achieving stated  objectives and a sustainability strategy. Recurrent Coordination Difficulties Have Arisen in the Absence of a Coordinated Plan

In February 2007, Defense provided us a 5-page document that, according  to Defense officials, is intended to meet GAO’s 2005 recommendation for  detailed plans to complete and sustain the ANSF. Although Defense and  State are partners in training the ANP, the Defense document does not  identify or discuss the roles and responsibilities of State. State also did not  contribute to the development of this document and has not developed a  plan of its own. Limited Milestones Hinder Assessment of Progress

Defense’s 5-page document developed in response to our 2005  recommendation contains few milestones, including no interim milestones  that would help assess progress made in developing the ANP. Without interim milestones  against which to assess the ANP, it is difficult to know if this status  represents what the United States intended to achieve after 3 years of  increased efforts and an investment of more than $6 billion in the program. For instance, the  completion dates for development of the ANP stated in monthly status  reports dated June 2007, November 2007, and May 2008 fluctuated from  December 2008 to March 2009 to December 2012, with a 3-month period  when the completion date was reported as “to be determined.”
Similarly, although Defense’s newly adopted Focused District  Development initiative to reconstitute the uniformed police involves  considerable resources and is expected to last 4 to 5 years at a minimum,  no interim milestones or consistent end date for the effort are identified in  Defense’s 5-page document, monthly status reports, or briefings that  outline the effort. Furthermore,  without an end date and milestones for the U.S. effort to complete and  sustain the entire ANP, it is difficult to determine how long the United  States may need to continue providing funding and other resources for this  important mission—one that U.S. military officials stated may extend  beyond a decade. State also  expressed concerns about conditioning future appropriations on the  completion of a detailed plan. We continue to believe that a coordinated,  detailed plan that outlines agency roles and responsibilities and includes  clear milestones is essential to ensuring accountability of U.S. efforts and  facilitating assessment of progress. 2).
Why GAO Did This Study

Since 2005, the Department of Defense (Defense), with support from the Department of State (State), has directed U.S. efforts to develop the Afghan National Police (ANP) into a force capable of enforcing the rule of law and supporting actions to defeat insurgency, among other activities. This testimony discusses (1) U.S. efforts to develop a capable ANP; (2) challenges that affect the development of a capable ANP; and (3) GAO analysis of U.S. efforts to develop a coordinated, detailed plan for completing and sustaining the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), which comprise the ANP and the Afghan National Army (ANA). This statement is based on a concurrently issued GAO report titled Afghanistan Security: Further Congressional Action May Be Needed to Ensure Completion of a Detailed Plan to Develop and Sustain Capable Afghan National Security Forces, GAO-08-661 (Washington, D.C.: June 18, 2008).

What GAO Found

Although the ANP has reportedly grown in number since 2005, after an investment of more than $6 billion, no Afghan police unit (0 of 433) is assessed by Defense as fully capable of performing its mission and over three-fourths of units (334 of 433) are assessed at the lowest capability rating. In addition, while the ANP has reportedly grown in number to nearly 80,000 personnel, concerns exist about the reliability of this number. Several challenges impede U.S. efforts to develop capable ANP forces. First, the shortage of police mentors has been a key impediment to U.S. efforts to conduct training and evaluation and verify that police are on duty. Second, the ANP continues to encounter difficulties with equipment shortages and quality. Third, the ANP faces a difficult working environment, including a weak Afghan judicial sector and consistent problems with police pay, corruption, and attacks by insurgents. Defense has recognized challenges to ANP development and, in November 2007, began a new initiative called Focused District Development--an effort to train the police as units--to address them. This effort is too new to fully assess, but the continuing shortfall in police mentors may put the effort at risk. Despite a 2005 GAO recommendation calling for a detailed plan and a 2008 congressional mandate requiring similar information, Defense and State have not developed a coordinated, detailed plan with clearly defined roles and responsibilities, milestones for completing and sustaining the ANSF, and a sustainment strategy. In 2007, Defense produced a 5-page document intended to address GAO's 2005 recommendation. However, the document does not identify the role or involve the participation of State--Defense's partner in training the ANP. Further, State has not completed a plan of its own. In the absence of a coordinated, detailed plan that clearly defines agency roles and responsibilities, a dual chain of command exists between Defense and State that has complicated the efforts of mentors training the police. Defense's 5-page document also contains few milestones, including no interim milestones that would help assess progress made in developing the ANP. Without interim milestones, it is difficult to know if current ANP status represents what the United States intended to achieve by 2008. In addition, Defense's 5-page document lacks a sustainment strategy. Without a detailed strategy for sustaining the ANSF, it is difficult to determine how long the United States may need to continue providing funding and other resources for this important mission.