	Introduction

This report provides background information and potential issues for Congress regarding the growing strategic competition between China and India—the world's two most populous nations—in South Asia and the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). This economic dependence on energy and trade transiting the Indian Ocean has become a strategic vulnerability for these states at a time when the United States is becoming less dependent on imported energy. Goals and Objectives

Under several past administrations, U.S. policy toward the Indo-Pacific has included the following goals and objectives:
Shape the strategic dynamics in the IOR as needed to prevent Asia from being dominated by a single hegemon or coalition of powers that could threaten the United States; Support U.S. friends and allies in the region and develop strategic and defense relationships with regional partners to strengthen the U.S strategic standing in the region; Promote a rules-based order and norms that support regional stability; Protect U.S. access to energy supplies; Help maintain freedom of navigation on the high seas and through the strategic choke points of the Indo-Pacific to facilitate the flow of U.S. and global trade and energy resources and the transit of U.S. naval forces; Prevent the region from being used by terrorists as bases of operations; Prevent the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction from the region to state and non-state actors; Prevent large scale conflicts, such as between India and Pakistan, to preserve regional stability and trade; Keep the United States engaged in the dominant economic and strategic architectures of the region to promote U.S. economic interests; Continue to work with like-minded partners to support open societies and promote shared values including the rule of law, human rights, democracy and religious freedom; Conduct counterpiracy operations; and Work with China, India and regional states to address the threat of climate change in bilateral, multilateral, and global contexts. It identifies "a geopolitical competition between free and repressive visions of world order" in the Indo-Pacific. An understanding of strategic dynamics between India and China may help inform congressional decisionmakers as they make military procurement decisions related to the Administration's policies and U.S. interests. The Quad raises the role of values, as well as interests, in regional security groups. China-India strategic rivalry in the IOR is shaped by a number factors, including the following: 
China's further development of its strategic partnership with Indian rival Pakistan through the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), a key project in China's BRI; China's strategic, trade, investment and diplomatic advances in Bangladesh, Burma (Myanmar), Nepal, and Sri Lanka; China's expanding naval and military presence in the IOR including the new military base at Djibouti (and potentially another in Pakistan) as well as increased naval presence in the Indian Ocean; India's decision not to join China's BRI over sovereignty concerns related to CPEC projects in Kashmir; Border disputes including China's claim to the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh and China and India's border standoff at Doklam in Bhutan; China's opposition to India joining the Nuclear Suppliers Group and to it becoming a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council; India's hosting the Dalai Lama and nearly 100,000 exiled Tibetans; India's Act East Policy including developing relations with Vietnam; China's role in blocking the designation of certain anti-India terrorists at the United Nations; India's trade deficit with China; and the two nations' starkly different political systems (India is the world's largest democracy and China is presenting its authoritarian system as a model for the world). There are other conceptual frameworks, such as the security dilemma, which could also be applied. Land Border Tensions
While maritime security dynamics between China and India are evolving rapidly, the two nations continue their long-standing dispute over the contested Himalayan land border. China and India fought a month-long border war in late 1962. China may have been motivated to signal displeasure over developing ties between India and the United States. Much of China's energy must be imported by sea. China's dependence on imported energy, much of which must transit the Indiana Ocean and the Strait of Malacca, is a key strategic vulnerability for China and is a key driver for China's increasing engagement with the IOR. Some media reports view the AAGC as a counter to China's Belt and Road Initiative and "an attempt to create a free and open Indo-Pacific region by rediscovering ancient sea-routes and creating new sea corridors that will link the African continent with India and countries in South-Asia and South-East Asia." (See below.) Sri Lanka
Sri Lanka's strategically important location near sea lanes that link the energy-rich Persian Gulf with the economies of Asia apparently have led to China's growing interest in the nation. China has increased both security and economic assistance to Sri Lanka. India, along with the United States, has been an active voice for reconciliation. Dhaka's foreign policy seeks to develop ties with China while continuing positive relations with New Delhi, the United States, and the West. Such humanitarian concerns are largely absent in China's relations with Burma which are more focused on securing its trade and energy infrastructure investments.
The Indian Ocean Region (IOR), a key geostrategic space linking the energy-rich nations of the Middle East with economically vibrant Asia, is the site of intensifying rivalry between China and India. This rivalry has significant strategic implications for the United States. Successive U.S. administrations have enunciated the growing importance of the Indo-Pacific region to U.S. security and economic strategy. The Trump Administration's National Security Strategy of December 2017 states that "A geopolitical competition between free and repressive visions of world order is taking place in the Indo-Pacific region."
A discussion of strategic dynamics related to the rivalry between China and India, with a focus on U.S. interests in the region, and China's developing strategic presence and infrastructure projects in places such as Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Burma (Myanmar), and Djibouti, can inform congressional decision-makers as they help shape the United States' regional strategy and military capabilities. Potential issues for Congress include determining resource levels for the Navy, Marines, Air Force, and Army to meet the United States' national security interests in the region and providing oversight of the Administration's efforts to develop a regional strategy, provide foreign assistance, and maintain and develop the United States' strategic and diplomatic relationships with regional friends and allies to further American interests.
Competition between China and India is driven to a large extent by their economic rise and the rapid associated growth in, and dependence on, seaborne trade and imported energy, much of which transits the Indian Ocean. There seems to be a new strategic focus on the maritime and littoral regions that are adjacent to the sea lanes that link the energy rich Persian Gulf with the energy dependent economies of Asia. Any disruption of this supply would likely be detrimental to the United States' and the world's economy. China's dependence on seaborne trade and imported energy, and the strategic vulnerability that this represents, has been labeled China's "Malacca dilemma" after the Strait of Malacca, the key strategic choke point through which a large proportion of China's trade and energy flows.
Much of the activity associated with China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) can be viewed as an attempt by China to minimize its strategic vulnerabilities by diversifying its trade and energy routes while also enhancing its political influence through expanded trade and infrastructure investments. China's BRI in South and Central Asia and the IOR, when set in context with China's assertive behavior in the East China Sea and the South China Sea and border tensions with India, is contributing to a growing rivalry between India and China. This rivalry, which previously had been largely limited to the Himalayan region where the two nations fought a border war in 1962, is now increasingly maritime-focused. Some in India feel encircled by China's strategic moves in the region while China feels threatened by its limited ability to secure its sea lanes. Understanding and effectively managing this evolving security dynamic may be crucial to preserving regional stability and U.S. national interests.
Some IOR states appear to be hedging against China's rising power by building their defense capabilities and partnerships, while others utilize more accommodative strategies with China or employ a mix of both. Some also see an opportunity to balance India's influence in the region. Hedging strategies by Asian states include increasing intra-Asian strategic ties, as well as seeking to enhance ties with the United States. This may present an opportunity for enhanced security collaboration particularly with like-minded democracies such as the United States, India, Australia and Japan. While forces of nationalism and rivalry may increase tensions, shared trade interests and interdependencies between China and India, as well as forces of regional economic integration in Asia more broadly, have the potential to dampen their rivalry. The United States' presence as a balancing power can also contribute to regional stability.