The number of these facilities has been reduced and the size of their workloads and staffs have declined significantly. It also looks for ways to consolidate and create more effective use of indirect and overhead personnel assigned to Army industrial activities. Accordingly, this report focuses on (1) whether the Army had a sound basis for personnel reductions planned at its depots during a 2-year period ending in fiscal year 1999; (2) progress the Army has made in developing an automated system for making depot staffing decisions based on workload estimates; (3) other factors that may adversely impact the Army’s ability to improve the cost-effectiveness of its depot maintenance programs and operations; and (4) workload trends, staffing, and productivity issues at the Army’s manufacturing arsenals. Of the 281 personnel separating with incentives from the Corpus Christi depot, 147 were classified as direct labor and 134 as overhead personnel. Automated System for Identifying Requirements Could Soon Be Certified Operational, but Some Development Work Remains

Army efforts to develop AWPS have proceeded to the point that required certification to the Congress of its operational capability is expected soon. Movement Toward Greater Reliance on the Private Sector

The Arsenal Act (10 U.S.C. In this context, recent experiences at the Army’s maintenance depots and arsenals indicate that the Army is facing multiple, difficult challenges and uncertainties in determining staffing requirements, and in improving the efficiency and effectiveness of its industrial activities. The Army has inadequate long-range plans to deal with issues such as those currently affecting the Army’s industrial facilities. Among the key actions that DOD identified are: a study to assess the Army’s overall maintenance support infrastructure to determine what functions need to be retained in-house to include its five depot-level repair activities and the recently expanded regional repair facilities; establishment of a board of directors to oversee and manage the Army’s total maintenance requirements process, including the allocation of work to in-house and contractor repair facilities; and development of a 5-year strategic plan for maximizing the efficient use of remaining maintenance depots and manufacturing arsenals.
Why GAO Did This Study

Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed: (1) the Army's basis for personnel reductions planned at its depots during fiscal years 1998-1999; (2) the Army's progress in developing an automated system for making maintenance depot staffing decisions based on workload estimates; (3) factors that may impact the Army's ability to improve the cost-effectiveness of its maintenance depot's programs and operations; and (4) workload trends, staffing, and productivity issues at the Army's manufacturing arsenals.

What GAO Found

GAO noted that: (1) the Army did not have a sound basis for identifying the number of positions to be eliminated from the Corpus Christi Depot; (2) this was particularly the case in determining the number of direct labor personnel needed to support depot workload requirements; (3) Army efforts to develop an automated workload and performance system for use in its depots have proceeded to the point that required certification to Congress of the system's operational capability is expected soon; (4) however, system improvements that are under way would enhance the system's capabilities for determining indirect and overhead personnel requirements in Army depots; (5) other issues and factors affecting the Army's basis for workload forecasting or the cost-effectiveness of its depot maintenance programs and activities are: (a) an increased reliance on the use of regional repair activities and contractors for work that otherwise might be done in maintenance depots; (b) declining productivity; (c) difficulties in effectively using depot personnel; and (d) nonavailability of repair parts; (6) use of the arsenals has declined significantly over the years as the private sector has assumed an increasingly larger share of their work; (7) according to Army officials, as of mid-1998, the Army's two weapons manufacturing arsenals used less than 24 percent of their industrial capacity, compared to more than 80 percent 10 years ago; and (8) the Army's depots and arsenals face multiple challenges and uncertainties, and the Army has inadequate long-range plans to guide its actions regarding its industrial infrastructure.