1). According to  State, it reviews all arms sales and exports through FMS and DCS for  human rights concerns, among other things. Implementation Gaps Limit the Effectiveness of U.S. Efforts to Safeguard Military Equipment in the Persian Gulf Countries

		DOD Monitors Military Equipment Based on Lists of Sensitive Items, while State Monitors it Case-by- Case Based on Sensitivity and Other Risk Factors

			DOD Conducts Two Levels of End-Use Monitoring and Periodic Compliance Visits

Under its Golden Sentry program, DOD conducts two levels of  monitoring—enhanced end-use monitoring and routine end-use  monitoring—based on a list of specific sensitive defense articles. To facilitate  these inventories, DOD tracks man-portable NVDs by serial number in  the SCIP. However, the required frequency for these  inventories was not documented in formal DOD guidance. Less Advanced NVDs Purchased through FMS Have Received More Rigorous End-Use Monitoring than Advanced NVDs Purchased through DCS

As a result of DOD’s and State’s different approaches to end-use  monitoring, some less advanced, second-generation NVDs purchased by  the Gulf countries through FMS have received more rigorous end-use  monitoring than more advanced third-generation NVDs purchased  through DCS. Meanwhile, State has approved at  least 13 licenses for the sale of more than 11,000 advanced, third- generation NVDs to Saudi Arabia’s Ministry of Defense and Aviation  through DCS since 2005. State Conducts Human Rights Vetting for Recipients of U.S.- Funded Training in Gulf Countries, but Does Not Conduct Comparable Vetting for Recipients of Equipment

		State Conducts Human Rights Vetting for Individuals and Units Nominated for U.S.- Funded Training in the Gulf Countries

Data from State’s new vetting database indicate that State has conducted  human rights vetting for about 770 individuals and 12 units in the Gulf  countries that were nominated for U.S.-funded training. State Does Not Conduct Individual- and Unit-Level Human Rights Vetting for Recipients of U.S.-Funded Equipment in the Persian Gulf

In contrast to its vetting process for recipients of training, State does not  conduct individual- or unit-level human rights vetting for recipients of U.S.- funded equipment in Gulf countries. State has conducted human  rights vetting for hundreds of individuals and units that received U.S.- funded training in the Gulf countries, but has not conducted comparable  vetting for the anticipated recipients of more than $188 million in U.S.- funded equipment for Bahrain and Oman. State does not currently have procedures in place to conduct vetting later  in the acquisition process when the exact recipient unit or individual is  known. Gaps in implementing State’s Blue Lantern  monitoring program have resulted in State not physically verifying receipt  of some items or confirming some end-users’ compliance with license  conditions—even though State has identified the need for a postshipment  check—thus reducing confidence in the security of arms exported to  these entities. Also, the absence of DOD documentation of its efforts both  to verify host country security and accountability procedures for sensitive  military equipment and to monitor less sensitive items limits assurance  that equipment sold through FMS is being used as intended. DOD and State both agreed with our recommendation to take steps to  harmonize their approaches to end-use monitoring for NVDs. DOD agreed with our recommendation to develop guidance requiring its  personnel to document efforts to verify host country security and  accountability procedures for sensitive equipment and activities to monitor  less sensitive equipment. Therefore, we continue to believe  that our recommendation on the need for policies and procedures on  using site visits remains valid. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

To assess the extent to which the Department of Defense (DOD) and the  Department of State (State) safeguard U.S. military technologies sold or  exported to Persian Gulf countries through their end-use monitoring  programs, we reviewed relevant laws and regulations, interviewed U.S. and  host country officials, and analyzed end-use monitoring and licensing data. To assess the extent to which DOD and State provide similar or differing  levels of protection for the same military technologies sold or exported to  the Gulf countries, we interviewed DOD and State officials in Washington,  D.C., and the Gulf countries, as well as host country officials in Saudi  Arabia and the UAE. 2. 3. We cited this Blue Lantern check as an example of an instance in  which delays in requesting and conducting a check prevented State  from conducting a serial number inventory of a shipment of NVDs or  verifying that these items were being stored in secure facilities. 10.
Why GAO Did This Study

The United States has authorized billions of dollars in arms sales and exports to six Persian Gulf countries--Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). However, regional tensions and civil conflicts have raised concerns about the security and use of arms sold or exported to these countries. The Departments of Defense (DOD) and State (State) established end-use monitoring programs to ensure that these arms are used as intended. This report assesses the extent to which DOD and State (1) safeguard U.S. military technologies sold or exported to the Gulf countries, (2) provide similar or differing levels of protection for the same military technologies, and (3) vet recipients of U.S.-funded military training and equipment for potential human rights violations. To address these objectives, GAO reviewed laws and regulations, analyzed data and documentation, and interviewed officials in Washington, D.C., and the Gulf countries.

What GAO Found

Gaps in implementation limit the effectiveness of U.S. efforts to safeguard military equipment sold or exported to the Persian Gulf. Under the Golden Sentry program, DOD did not document its efforts to verify host country security and accountability procedures for sensitive military equipment, and DOD personnel in five of six Gulf countries did not document their activities to monitor less sensitive items. Under its Blue Lantern program, State officials conducted postshipment checks without visiting end-users of U.S. military equipment in 10 of 13 cases GAO reviewed, and delays in requesting and conducting checks have prevented State from verifying receipt of some items. In addition, State closed post-shipment checks without receiving confirmation of receipt in 2 of 13 cases GAO reviewed. DOD and State both treat night vision devices (NVD) as a sensitive technology, but their end-use monitoring for these items varies markedly, leaving them prone to diversion. Man-portable NVDs sold through Foreign Military Sales (FMS) must be tracked by serial number, inventoried following delivery, and inventoried periodically thereafter. In contrast, State does not track NVDs by serial number or conduct regular inventories for NVDs exported through direct commercial sales (DCS). As a result, less advanced NVDs purchased through FMS have received more rigorous monitoring than more advanced NVDs purchased through DCS. In Saudi Arabia, DOD officials inventoried thousands of second-generation NVDs that were purchased through FMS in the early 1990s. Meanwhile, State approved licenses for the sale of thousands of advanced, third-generation NVDs to Saudi Arabia since 2005, which are subject to less rigorous end-use monitoring. State has conducted human rights vetting for hundreds of individuals and units that were nominated for U.S.-funded training in the Gulf countries, but has not conducted comparable vetting for anticipated recipients of about $188 million in U.S.-funded equipment for Bahrain and Oman. Such vetting is especially critical given Bahrain's use of its security forces to quell public demonstrations since Spring 2011. In November 2010, State established a new system for human rights vetting in the Gulf countries and has since vetted almost 800 individuals and units nominated for U.S.-funded training. However, recipients of equipment are not screened through this system. According to State, it does not vet recipients of equipment at the individual or unit level because the recipients are not generally known at the time that the assistance is approved, and State does not have procedures in place to conduct vetting later in the acquisition process. DOD and State should harmonize their end-use monitoring for NVDs and strengthen procedures to verify compliance with security and accountability requirements, among other things. Also, State should implement individual- and unit-level human rights vetting for recipients of equipment. DOD agreed with all of the recommendations. State agreed with two of the recommendations, but disagreed that it should develop guidance on the use and timing of site visits and closure of Blue Lantern cases. GAO believes the recommendations remain valid on the need for policies, procedures, and guidance.