Among other things, the reports examine the extent  to which the ISE is being implemented by agencies that possess or use  terrorism-related information, operate systems within the ISE, or  otherwise participate in the ISE. RISS  centers and HIDTA Investigative Support Centers both have missions,  roles, and responsibilities that include supporting investigations. Overlap in these  activities can lead to benefits, such as validating information for  customers, or inefficiencies, such as burdening customers who use  resources to sort through redundant information. Specifically, out of the 91 instances of  overlap—in which more than one type of entity in the same urban area  conducted the same analytical activity or service for similar customers in  the same mission area—41 were in the mission area of all crimes, and 33  were in the mission area of counterterrorism compared with 17 that were  in the mission area of counternarcotics. Federal Agencies Do Not Hold Entities Accountable for Coordinating and Have Not Assessed Coordination Mechanisms to Help Reduce the Potential for Overlap

DOJ, DHS, and ONDCP acknowledge the importance of the entities  working together and sharing information; however, they do not hold the  entities accountable for coordinating with one another. A mechanism that  holds entities accountable for coordination and enables agencies to  monitor and evaluate the results of their efforts, such as performance  metrics related to coordination, could help provide the agencies with  information on the effectiveness of coordination among field-based  entities and help reduce any unnecessary overlap in entities’ efforts. Officials in the eight selected urban areas we reviewed cited the inclusion  of partners on governance boards and field-based entities’ physical or  virtual colocation as two practices that helped to enhance coordination,  information sharing, and efficiencies—in their view, reducing the potential  for unnecessary overlap and duplication in their analytical and  investigative support activities. DOJ, DHS, and ONDCP have not fully  assessed the extent to which such practices could be applied nationwide  to increase the benefits already being realized in some urban areas. Agencies Have Not Assessed Practices That Enhance Coordination to Help Identify Additional Opportunities to Coordinate and Reduce Overlap

DOJ, DHS, and ONDCP have not assessed the extent to which practices  that could enhance coordination and help reduce unnecessary overlap  and duplication in activities—such as participation on governance boards  and colocation—could be applied more comprehensively nationwide  across these field-based entities. Therefore,  agencies may have additional opportunities to apply these types of  practices. Further, as required by the Intelligence Reform Act, the Program Manager  is to submit annual reports to Congress. According to the Program Manager, past reports have  focused on broader issues such as strengthening the safeguarding of  terrorism-related information, but including information on specific  coordination efforts among the five types of field-based entities in future  reports would provide beneficial information to the information-sharing  environment. Agencies Collect Information on the Results Entities Achieve, but Vary in How They Consider Such Data when Making Decisions about Future Funding

FBI, BJA, DHS, and ONDCP collect information on the results that JTTFs,  FIGs, RISS centers, fusion centers and HIDTA Investigative Support  Centers achieve. Although some of these agencies consider the results  when they make decisions about future funding, others consider different  factors—such as risk and threats—rather than results, or do not directly  make decisions about future funding. Recommendations for Executive Action

Recognizing that agencies are taking steps to ensure that two of the three  systems officers use to deconflict their law enforcement actions are  interoperable, we recommend that the Director of ONDCP work with the  appropriate HIDTA officials to develop milestones and time frames for  actions needed to make the third system, SAFETNet, interoperable in  order to prevent unnecessary delays in reducing risks to officer safety and  lessening the burden on law enforcement agencies that are currently  using multiple systems. To help identify where agencies and the field-based entities they support  could apply coordination mechanisms to enhance information sharing and  reduce inefficiencies resulting from overlap, we recommend that the  Secretary of Homeland Security, the Attorney General, and the Director of  ONDCP work through the ISA IPC or otherwise collaborate to identify  characteristics of entities and assess specific geographic areas in which  practices that could enhance coordination and reduce unnecessary  overlap, such as cross-entity participation on governance boards and  colocation of entities, could be further applied. High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas (HIDTA) Program

Established in 1988, the HIDTA program is a federally funded program  administered by the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) that  brings together federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies into  task forces that conduct investigations of drug-trafficking organizations in  designated areas.
Why GAO Did This Study

Federal agencies and state and local governments have established field-based entities (e.g., centers and task forces) nationwide that share terrorism-related information, among other things. GAO was asked to assess these entities. This report addresses (1) the extent to which these entities are distinct, fragmented, overlapping, or duplicative; (2) the extent to which DOJ, DHS, and ONDCP hold entities accountable for coordinating and have assessed coordination opportunities; and (3) how, if at all, DOJ, DHS, and ONDCP incorporate information on the results entities achieve when making funding decisions. GAO analyzed entities' missions, activities, and coordination efforts in eight selected urban areas that range in geographic dispersion and risk. Although not generalizable, this analysis provided insights. This is a public version of a sensitive report GAO issued in March 2013. Information the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) deemed sensitive has been redacted.

What GAO Found

Five types of field-based information-sharing entities are supported, in part, by the federal government--Joint Terrorism Task Forces, Field Intelligence Groups, Regional Information Sharing Systems (RISS) centers, state and major urban area fusion centers, and High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area (HIDTA) Investigative Support Centers--and have distinct missions, roles, and responsibilities. However, GAO identified 91 instances of overlap in some analytical activities--such as producing intelligence reports--and 32 instances of overlap in investigative support activities, such as identifying links between criminal organizations. These entities conducted similar activities within the same mission area, such as counterterrorism, for similar customers, such as federal or state agencies. This can lead to benefits, such as the corroboration of information, but may also burden customers with redundant information. GAO also found that RISS centers and HIDTAs operate three different systems that duplicate the same function--identifying when different law enforcement entities may be conducting a similar enforcement action, such as a raid at the same location, to ensure officer safety--resulting in some inefficiencies. RISS and HIDTA have taken steps to connect two of the systems, but HIDTA does not have target time frames to connect the third system. A commitment to time frames would help reduce risks to officer safety and potentially lessen the burden on law enforcement agencies that are currently using multiple systems.
Agencies have neither held entities accountable for coordinating nor assessed opportunities for further enhancing coordination to help reduce the potential for overlap and achieve efficiencies. The Departments of Justice (DOJ) and Homeland Security (DHS), and the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP)--the federal agencies that oversee or provide support to the five types of field-based entities-- acknowledged that entities working together and sharing information is important, but they do not hold the entities accountable for such coordination. A mechanism that enables agencies to monitor the results of coordination efforts could encourage more coordination, help reduce any unnecessary overlap and leverage resources. Officials in the eight urban areas said that practices such as having representatives from other agencies on governance boards and colocating entities where possible enhanced coordination, information sharing, and efficiencies--in their view, reducing the potential of unnecessary overlap. Federal agencies have not assessed the extent to which such practices could be further implemented and, therefore, may be missing opportunities to maximize benefits. The Program Manager for the Information Sharing Environment (PM-ISE)--which manages efforts to enhance sharing governmentwide--has not reported on specific coordination efforts across the entities. Including agencies' assessment progress in the annual reports to the Congress would enhance accountability.
The agencies collect information on entities' results, but vary in the extent to which they consider the results when they make decisions about future funding. For example, agencies may consider other factors--such as risk and threats--rather than results, or funding decisions may be determined by state grant recipients or set in part by statutory or other requirements.

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that ONDCP work with HIDTA officials to establish time frames to connect systems; DHS, DOJ, and ONDCP develop measures to hold entities accountable for coordination and assess opportunities to enhance coordination; and the PM-ISE report on the results of the agencies efforts to assess coordination. DHS, ONDCP, and the PM-ISE concurred. DOJ generally agreed with the intent of the recommendations, but disagreed with their underlying premises that DOJ was not already taking such actions. GAO believes these actions do not fully address the recommendations as discussed further in this report.