To address this problem, multiple  U.S. agencies have conducted capacity development efforts at individual  Iraqi ministries since 2003. U.S. Efforts to Build Capacity of the Iraqi Government Lack Unified Direction

The implementation of U.S. efforts to help build the capacity of the Iraqi  national government over the past 4 years has been characterized by (1)  multiple U.S. agencies leading individual efforts without overarching  direction from a lead entity or strategic approach that integrates their  efforts with Iraqi government priorities and (2) shifting timeframes and  priorities in response to deteriorating security and U.S. embassy  reorganization. State, USAID, and DOD Lead Individual Efforts without Overall Direction

No single agency is in charge of leading and providing overall direction for  U.S. ministry capacity development efforts. However, this effort was abandoned,  according to State and USAID officials, and State and DOD developed  their own metrics. Low Capacity of Iraq Ministries and Other Challenges Pose Risks to the U.S. Ministry Capacity Development Program

U.S. efforts to develop Iraqi ministerial capacity face four key challenges  that pose a risk to their success and long-term sustainability. Iraq Ministries’ Lack of Trained Personnel Hinders Capacity Development

Iraqi government institutions suffer from significant shortages of  competent personnel with the skills to perform the vital tasks necessary to  provide security and deliver essential services to the Iraqi people. The  exodus of employees from the ministries limits U.S. efforts to develop  ministry capacity. Nonetheless, the need for an  overarching capacity development strategy is clear given that the  President has identified ministry capacity development as a key to the  success in Iraq, has called for greater integration of U.S. civilian and  military efforts to develop Iraqi government capacity, and has requested at  least $255 million in additional funding in fiscal year 2008 for these  efforts. Moreover, a January 2007 report by the Iraqi National Security  Council took steps to identify the critical efforts and coordination needed  at key civilian ministries to support the Ministries of Defense and  Interior. Finally, it called for U.S. agencies to  plan these efforts in consultation with the Iraqi ministries and work with  the ministries to determine their needs and priorities. U.S. agencies have provided  $169 million to improve the capacity of Iraq’s ministries as of the end of  2006. Key components of an  overall capacity development strategy should include a clear purpose,  scope, and methodology; a clear delineation of U.S. roles, responsibilities,  and coordination, including the designation of a lead agency for capacity  development; desired goals, objectives, and activities, based on Iraqi- identified priorities; performance measures based on outcome metrics;  and a description of  how resources will be targeted to achieve the desired  end-state balancing benefits, costs, and both internal risks (such as  potential changes in cost, schedule, or objectives) and external risks (such  as an increase in violence or militia influence). 10. Appendix II: Scope and Methodology

In this report, we (1) assess the nature and extent of U.S. efforts to  develop the capacity of the Iraqi ministries, (2) assess the key challenges  to these efforts, and (3) assess the extent to which the U.S. government  has an overall strategy for these efforts that incorporates key elements. To describe these programs, we reviewed U.S. government documents  including the Department of State’s (State) quarterly section 2207 reports  to Congress from October 2004 to April 2007 on the use of Iraq Relief and  Reconstruction Funds; State’s quarterly section 1227 reports to Congress  from April 2006 to April 2007 on current military, diplomatic, political, and  economic measures undertaken to complete the mission in Iraq; the U.S.  Agency for International Development (USAID) contract awarded in July  2006 to Management Systems International, Inc., Building Recovery and  Reform through Democratic Governance National Capacity Development  Program; reports on USAID’s implementation of the Iraqi Financial  Management Information System under the Economic Governance Project  II; the U.S. Embassy-Baghdad Joint Task Force for Capacity  Development’s catalogue of U.S. capacity development efforts fromApril  2007; the Department of Defense’s (DOD) quarterly reports to Congress,  Measuring Security and Stability and Iraq, from July 2005 to June 2007;  and Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq’s 2007 Campaign  Action Plan. For example, a number of  subquestions were not answered for all ministries. Help Iraqi ministries execute budgets and  provide metrics for leadership.
Why GAO Did This Study

Iraq's ministries were decimated following years of neglect and centralized control under the former regime. Developing competent and loyal Iraqi ministries is critical to stabilizing and rebuilding Iraq. The President received $140 million in fiscal year 2007 funds and requested an additional $255 million in fiscal year 2008 to develop the capacity of the Iraq's ministries. This report assesses (1) the nature and extent of U.S. efforts to develop the capacity of the Iraqi ministries, (2) the key challenges to these efforts, and (3) the extent to which the U.S. government has an overall integrated strategy for these efforts. For this effort, GAO reviewed U.S. project contracts and reports and interviewed officials from the Departments of State (State), Defense (DOD), and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) in Baghdad and Washington, D.C.

What GAO Found

Over the past 4 years, U.S. efforts to help build the capacity of the Iraqi national government have been characterized by (1) multiple U.S. agencies leading individual efforts, without overarching direction from a lead entity that integrates their efforts; and (2) shifting timeframes and priorities in response to deteriorating security and the reorganization of the U.S. mission in Iraq. First, no single agency is in charge of leading the U.S. ministry capacity development efforts, although State took steps to improve coordination in early 2007. State, DOD and USAID have led separate efforts at Iraqi ministries. About $169 million in funds were allocated in 2005 and 2006 for these efforts. As of mid-2007, State and USAID were providing 169 capacity development advisors to 10 key civilian ministries and DOD was providing 215 to the Ministries of Defense and Interior. Second, the focus of U.S. capacity development efforts has shifted from long-term institution-building projects, such as helping the Iraqi government develop its own capacity development strategy, to an immediate effort to help Iraqi ministries overcome their inability to spend their capital budgets and deliver essential services to the Iraqi people. U.S. ministry capacity efforts face four key challenges that pose a risk to their success and long-term sustainability. First, Iraqi ministries lack personnel with key skills, such as budgeting and procurement. Second, sectarian influence over ministry leadership and staff complicates efforts to build a professional and non-aligned civil service. Third, pervasive corruption in the Iraqi ministries impedes the effectiveness of U.S. efforts. Fourth, poor security limits U.S. advisors' access to their Iraqi counterparts, preventing ministry staff from attending planned training sessions and contributing to the exodus of skilled professionals to other countries. The U.S. government is beginning to develop an integrated strategy for U.S. capacity development efforts in Iraq, although agencies have been implementing separate programs since 2003. GAO's previous analyses of U.S. multiagency national strategies demonstrate that such a strategy should integrate the efforts of the involved agencies with the priorities of the Iraqi government, and include a clear purpose and scope; a delineation of U.S. roles, responsibilities, and coordination with other donors, including the United Nations; desired goals and objectives; performance measures; and a description of benefits and costs. Moreover, it should attempt to address and mitigate the risks associated with the four challenges identified above. U.S. ministry capacity efforts to date have included some but not all of these components. For example, agencies are working to clarify roles and responsibilities. However, U.S. efforts lack clear ties to Iraqi-identified priorities at all ministries, clear performance measures to determine results at civilian ministries, and information on how resources will be targeted to achieve the desired end-state.