	Introduction

The EELV (Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle) program stands at a crossroads today. Factors that prompted the initial EELV effort in 1994 are once again manifest—significant increases in launch costs, procurement concerns, and concerns about competition. In addition, a long-standing undercurrent of concern over U.S. reliance on a Russian rocket engine (RD-180) for critical national security space launches on one of the primary EELV rockets was exacerbated by the Russian backlash over U.S. sanctions against Russian actions in Ukraine. Moreover, significant overall EELV program cost increases and unresolved questions over individual launch costs, along with legal challenges to the Air Force EELV program by SpaceX, have contributed to Congress recently taking legislative action that has significantly affected the EELV program. Efforts by the Obama Administration and the Air Force to work with Congress on changing the EELV strategy have been deemed insufficient by those in Congress eager to proceed more quickly and definitively. The commission did not recommend co-producing the RD-180 in the United States, but instead recommended spending $141 million to begin development of a new U.S. liquid rocket engine to be available by 2022, to coincide with the end of Phase 2 in the current EELV acquisition strategy. The recurring theme since the start of the EELV program has been how best to pursue this requirement while driving down costs through competition and ensuring launch reliability and performance. Efforts to transition away from the RD-180 to a domestic U.S. alternative engine or launch vehicle are not without technical, program, or schedule risks. A combination of factors over the next several years, as a worst-case scenario, could leave the United States in a situation where some of its national security space payloads will not have a certified launcher available. Even with a smooth, on-schedule transition away from the RD-180 to an alternative engine or launch vehicle, the performance and reliability record achieved with the RD-180 to date would likely not be replicated until well beyond 2030 because the RD-180 has had 68 consecutive successful civil, commercial, and NSS launches since 2000.
The United States is in the midst of making significant changes in how best to pursue an acquisition strategy that would ensure continued access to space for national security missions. The current strategy for the EELV (Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle) program dates from the 1990s and has since been revised a few times. The program has been dogged by perennial concerns over cost and competition. Those same concerns are a major impetus for change today.
The EELV program stands at a crossroads today. Factors that prompted the initial EELV effort in 1994 are once again manifest—significant increases in launch costs, procurement concerns, and concerns about competition. In addition, a long-standing undercurrent of concern over U.S. reliance on a Russian rocket engine (RD-180) for critical national security space launches on one of the primary EELV rockets was exacerbated by the Russian backlash over U.S. sanctions against Russian actions in Ukraine. Moreover, significant overall EELV program cost increases and unresolved questions over individual launch costs, along with legal challenges to the Air Force EELV program by SpaceX, have contributed to Congress recently taking legislative action that has significantly affected the EELV program. Efforts by the Obama Administration and the Air Force to work with Congress on changing the EELV strategy have been deemed insufficient by those in Congress eager to proceed more quickly and definitively.
The Air Force and the Department of Defense (DOD) have argued for a slower, more measured transition to replace the RD-180. Although some in Congress have pressed for a more flexible transition to replace the RD-180 and possibly allow for development of a new launch vehicle, others in Congress have sought legislation that would move the transition process forward more quickly with a focus on developing an alternative U.S. rocket engine. This debate over how best to proceed with NSS launch has been a leading legislative priority in the defense bills over the past few years and is likely to continue to be so throughout the coming year.
Transitioning away from the RD-180 to a domestic U.S. alternative would likely involve technical, program, and schedule risk. A combination of factors over the next several years, as a worst-case scenario, could leave the United States in a situation where some of its national security space payloads would not have a certified launcher available. Even with a smooth, on-schedule transition away from the RD-180 to an alternative engine or launch vehicle, the performance and reliability record achieved with the RD-180 to date would not likely be replicated until well beyond 2030 because the RD-180 has had 68 consecutive successful civil, commercial, and NSS launches since 2000.