Biennial budgeting proposals may focus on enacting budgetary legislation for either a two-year period or two succeeding one-year periods in a single measure. Types of Biennial Budgeting

Biennial budgeting as a concept has many permutations, and may include a requirement for two-year budget resolutions, two-year appropriations, and also affect the timing of consideration for other types of legislation related to revenue and spending. The stretch approach would extend the current budget process timetable to two full years. In contrast, the split sessions approach is based on the expectation that all budgetary legislation would be considered in a single year or session of Congress (typically the first), while consideration of non-budgetary matters would occur primarily in the other year or session. Biennial budgeting proposals have also varied with respect to the time frame for appropriations. Proposals to convert the budget process to a two-year cycle have typically involved a process centered on a two-year budget resolution. Arguments Made by Proponents of Biennial Budgeting

Supporters of biennial budgeting have generally advanced three arguments—that a two-year budget cycle would (1) reduce congressional workload by eliminating the need for annual consideration of routine or repetitious matters; (2) allow Congress to reserve time to promote improved oversight and program review; and (3) allow better long-term planning by the agencies that spend federal funds at the federal, state, or local level. Arguments Made by Opponents of Biennial Budgeting

Critics of biennial budgeting have countered with several arguments as to why some of the projected benefits might not be realized. Reducing the number of times that Congress considers budget matters, they have suggested, may only raise the stakes, and thereby heighten the possibility for conflict and increased delay. Projecting revenues and expenditures for a two-year cycle requires forecasting as much as 30 months in advance, rather than 18 under an annual budget cycle, and even 18-month projections have previously been inaccurate. With only a limited ability to anticipate future conditions, critics have argued that a two-year cycle could require Congress to choose either to allow the President greater latitude for making budgetary adjustments in the off-years or to engage in mid-cycle corrections to a degree that would nullify any anticipated time savings or planning advantages. Furthermore, they have argued that annual review of appropriations requests is an important part of oversight that would be lost under a biennial budget, with no guarantee that committees would take advantage of a separate oversight session, or that oversight separate from review of funding decisions would be as effective. Again the experience at the state level is inconclusive. Congressional action related to biennial budgeting first occurred in 1982 with hearings on S. 2008 , the Budget and Oversight Reform Act of 1981 (97 th Congress). None of these proposals were ultimately enacted. In the 112 th Congress, the House Rules Committee Subcommittee on the Legislative and Budget Process held a hearing on H.R. 114 , the Biennial Budgeting and Appropriations Act of 2011; no further action occurred during that Congress. In the 113 th Congress, the Senate adopted an amendment ( S.Amdt. 136 ) to the FY2014 budget resolution ( S.Con.Res. Additionally, the House Budget Committee reported H.R. 1869 , the Biennial Budgeting and Enhanced Oversight Act of 2014, with an amendment ( H.Rept. No further action was taken. 8 , the FY2014 budget resolution, an amendment was offered that created a deficit neutral reserve fund for the establishment of a biennial budget and appropriations process ( S.Amdt. 113-382 ).
Difficulties in the timely enactment of budgetary legislation have long fueled interest in ways to structure the congressional budget process to ease time constraints. One long-discussed reform proposal would attempt to remedy this by changing the budget cycle from one to two years.
Biennial budgeting is a concept that may involve several variations, including two-year budget resolutions, two-year appropriations, and other changes in the timing of legislation related to revenue or spending. Biennial budgeting proposals may focus on enacting budgetary legislation for either a two-year period or two succeeding one-year periods in a single measure. The overall time frame for a biennial budget cycle has previously taken either a "stretch" approach, where the current budget process timetable is extended to two full years, or a split sessions approach, where all budgetary activity is expected to occur in a single year or session of Congress (typically the first), while the other year or session is reserved primarily for oversight and the consideration of non-budgetary matters.
Proponents of biennial budgeting have generally advanced three arguments—that a two-year budget cycle would (1) reduce congressional workload by eliminating the need for annual review of routine matters; (2) reserve the second session of each Congress for improved congressional oversight and program review; and (3) allow better long-term planning by the agencies that spend federal funds at the federal, state, or local level.
Critics of biennial budgeting have countered by asserting that the projected benefits might not be realized. Projecting revenues and expenditures for a two-year cycle requires forecasting as much as 30 months in advance. This might result in less accurate forecasts and could require Congress to choose either allowing the President greater latitude to make budgetary adjustments in the off-years or engaging in mid-cycle corrections, which might effectively undercut any workload reduction or intended improvements in planning. Opponents have also pointed out that oversight through annual review of appropriations would be lost under a biennial budget, with no guarantee that a separate oversight session would be effective. Furthermore, they have argued that reducing the number of times that Congress considers budget matters may only raise the stakes, which heightens the possibility for conflict and increased delay.
Biennial budgeting has a long history at the state level. The trend since World War II has been for states to convert to an annual budget cycle; however, the most recent data available, from 2011, indicate that 19 states operate with a two-year cycle, and some states operate with mixed cycles that put significant portions of their budgets on a two-year cycle.
Congressional action related to biennial budgeting first occurred in 1982 with hearings on S. 2008, the Budget and Oversight Reform Act of 1981 (97th Congress). Additional action occurred with respect to biennial budgeting during the 100th, 101st, 102nd, 103rd, 104th, 105th, 106th, 107th, 108th, and 109th Congresses. None of these proposals were ultimately enacted. In the 112th Congress, the House Rules Committee Subcommittee on the Legislative and Budget Process held a hearing on H.R. 114, the Biennial Budgeting and Appropriations Act of 2011, but took no further action. In the 113th Congress, the Senate adopted an amendment (S.Amdt. 136) to the FY2014 budget resolution (S.Con.Res. 8), that created a deficit neutral reserve fund for the establishment of a biennial budget and appropriations process. Additionally, the House Budget Committee reported H.R. 1869, the Biennial Budgeting and Enhanced Oversight Act of 2014, with an amendment (H.Rept. 113-382). No further action was taken.