In addition to annual training, forces that deploy conduct both individual  and collective predeployment training. Training requirements may have several associated tasks. For  example, in October 2010, Forces Command established a goal for active  component units to achieve company-level proficiency at home station. Based on our unit visits, 7 of 13 Army and Marine Corps  units conducting a culminating training event at a combat training center  were not able to complete all of the desired individual and collective  training (e.g., company-level, live-fire training) prior to their arrival at the  combat training centers. Further, officials from all of the Army and Marine Corps units we spoke  with stated that they planned to delay certain training until they were at  the combat training centers since resources—such as theater-specific  equipment like mine resistant ambush protected vehicles—were more  readily available there. Furthermore, we found that some units had to train to improve proficiency  levels at the combat training centers prior to beginning the culminating  training events, and therefore were not always able to take full advantage  of the training opportunities available to them at the combat training  centers to conduct complex, higher-level training. Army and Marine Corps officials, including trainers at the combat training  centers, reported that while units arrive at the combat training centers  with varying levels of proficiency, all units leave with at least the platoon  level proficiency required to execute counterinsurgency missions for the  current operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. As a result, junior leaders have focused more on training  execution and their higher headquarters have assumed much of the  responsibility for planning and preparing unit training. Army and Marine Corps Lack Results-Oriented Performance Metrics to Fully Evaluate the Impact of Their Training Management Initiatives

The Army’s and Marine Corps’ initiatives are a solid start to the  development of training management skills in their junior leaders, but  neither service has developed results-oriented performance metrics to  gauge the effectiveness of their efforts to restore training management  skills. However, the pace of operations over the past decade  has limited training time and reduced the services’ abilities to focus on  developing training management skills in their junior leaders. With the drawdown  of forces in Iraq and a commitment to resume training for a fuller range of  missions, both services have recognized the need and opportunity to  restore and develop leaders’ abilities to plan, prepare, execute, and  assess the wider range of needed training. However, without a means of measuring the effectiveness of  their efforts to restore and develop leaders’ training management skills,  the Army and Marine Corps lack the information they need to assess the  extent to which their leaders are prepared to plan, prepare, and assess  required training. Further, we reviewed unit training documents and interviewed officials  from 19 Army and 10 Marine Corps units to discuss training information  such as: (1) the training that units were completing, (2) any training that  units were unable to complete prior to the culminating training events, (3)  any factors that impacted units’ abilities to complete training prior to the  culminating training events, and (4) the impact that not completing  training prior to the final culminating training event might have on those  events. To assess the extent to which leaders are positioned to plan and manage  training as forces resume training for a fuller range of missions, we  reviewed service policy and guidance that provided information on the  return to training for a fuller range of missions, such as the U.S. Army  Forces Command Training and Leader Development Guidance for Fiscal  Year 2011-2012, Army Field Manual 7-0, Training Units and Developing  Leaders for Full Spectrum Operations, the Marine Corps’ Commandant  Planning Guidance, and the Marine Corps Posture Statement for 2011.
Why GAO Did This Study

Over the past decade, Army and Marine Corps forces have deployed repeatedly with limited time between deployments. At their home stations, combat training centers, and other locations, units have focused their limited training time on training for counterinsurgency operations. Prior to deploying, units also conduct a large-scale exercise referred to as a culminating training event. With the drawdown of forces in Iraq, the services have begun to resume training for a fuller range of offensive, defensive, and stability missions. The House report to the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011 directed GAO to report on the Army's and Marine Corps' abilities to complete training requirements. GAO assessed the extent to which the services' (1) active component forces are completing training prior to the culminating training event and (2) leaders are positioned to plan and manage training as forces resume training for a fuller range of missions. GAO analyzed training requirements and unit training documentation, and interviewed headquarters and unit personnel during site visits between July 2010 and July 2011.

What GAO Found

Deploying Army and Marine Corps units conduct extensive predeployment training--both individual and collective, to include a large-scale culminating training event--at their home stations, combat training centers, and other locations. However, several factors, such as limited training time between deployments, the large number of training requirements, and the current focus on counterinsurgency operation training have been preventing units from completing all desired training prior to the culminating training event. For example, based on GAO's site visits, 7 of 13 units were not able to complete all of the desired individual and collective training (e.g., company-level live fire training) prior to arriving at the combat training centers. Further, officials from all of the units GAO spoke with stated that they planned to delay certain training until they were at the combat training centers since resources--such as theater-specific equipment like mine resistant ambush protected vehicles--were more readily available there. GAO found that some units had to train to improve proficiency levels at the combat training centers prior to beginning the culminating training events, and therefore were not always able to take full advantage of the training opportunities available to them at the combat training centers to conduct complex, higher-level training. Still, according to trainers at the combat training centers, while units arrive with varying levels of proficiency, all forces leave with at least the platoon level proficiency required to execute the counterinsurgency missions required for ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Over the past decade, continuous overseas deployments have reduced training timeframes and resulted in senior leaders assuming training management responsibilities from junior leaders. Specifically, leaders at higher headquarters have taken responsibility for much of the training management function--planning, preparing, and assessing training--while junior leaders have focused primarily on training execution. However, changing conditions, such as increased competition for resources in a constrained fiscal environment, increased time at home station, and a return to training for a fuller range of missions, make it imperative that all leaders possess a strong foundation in training management. The services are developing various initiatives to restore and develop training management skills in their leaders, but neither service has developed results-oriented performance metrics to gauge the effectiveness of their efforts to restore these skills. As GAO has previously reported, establishing metrics can help federal agencies target training investments and assess the contributions that training programs make to improving results. Without a means of measuring the effectiveness of their efforts, the Army and Marine Corps will not have the information they need to assess the extent to which their leaders have the training management skills needed to plan, prepare, and assess required training.

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that the services develop results-oriented performance metrics that can be used to evaluate the effectiveness of their training management initiatives and support any adjustments that the services may need to make to these initiatives. DOD concurred with this recommendation.