In addition, for one unit,  these pay problems resulted in largely erroneous debts totaling $1.6  million. Procedural requirements,  particularly in light of the numerous organizations issuing guidance  applicable to this area, and potentially hundreds of organizations and  thousands of personnel involved in implementing this guidance, were not  well understood or consistently applied with respect to determining (1) the  actions required to make timely, accurate active duty pays to mobilized  Army Guard soldiers and (2) the component responsible, among Army  Guard, active Army, and DFAS, for taking the required actions. A. E.

			Guidance Outdated

We found several instances in which existing DOD and Army regulations  and guidance in the pay and allowance area were outdated and conflict  with more current legislation and DOD regulations. Human Capital Issues

With respect to human capital, we found weaknesses including (1)  insufficient resources allocated to pay processing, (2) inadequate training  related to existing policies and procedures, and (3) poor customer service. Systems Problems

Several systems issues were significant factors impeding accurate and  timely payroll payments to mobilized Army Guard soldiers, including    the lack of an integrated or effectively interfaced pay system with both  the personnel and order-writing systems;  limitations in DJMS-RC processing capabilities; and  ineffective system edits for large payments and debts. Concluding Comments

The extensive problems we identified at the case study units vividly  demonstrate that the controls currently relied on to pay mobilized Army  Guard personnel are not working and cannot provide reasonable assurance  that such pays are accurate or timely. However, pays to mobilized Army Reserve soldiers rely on many of the  same processes and automated systems used to pay mobilized Army Guard  soldiers. For example, in addition to our ongoing review of  the pay experiences of mobilized Army Reserve soldiers, we now have  related engagements ongoing that you requested concerning  controls over pays and related medical benefits for mobilized Army  Guard soldiers who elect to have their active duty tours extended to  address injuries or illnesses incurred while on active duty,  controls over travel reimbursements to mobilized Army Guard soldiers,  utilization of Army Guard forces since September 11, 2001, and  the impact of deployments on DOD’s ability to carry out homeland  security missions.
Why GAO Did This Study

In light of the recent mobilizations associated with the war on terrorism, GAO was asked to determine if controls used to pay mobilized Army Guard personnel provided assurance that such pays were accurate and timely. This testimony focuses on the pay experiences of Army Guard soldiers at selected case study units and deficiencies with respect to controls over processes, human capital, and automated systems.

What GAO Found

The existing processes and controls used to provide pay and allowances to mobilized Army Guard personnel are so cumbersome and complex that neither DOD nor, more importantly, the mobilized Army Guard soldiers could be reasonably assured of timely and accurate payroll payments. Weaknesses in these processes and controls resulted in over- and underpayments and late active duty payments and, in some cases, large erroneously assessed debts, to mobilized Army Guard personnel. The end result of these weaknesses is to severely constrain DOD's ability to provide active duty pay to these personnel, many of whom were risking their lives in combat in Iraq and Afghanistan. In addition, these pay problems have had a profound impact on individual soldiers and their families and may adversely impact on decisions to stay in the Army Guard. For example, many soldiers and their families were required to spend considerable time, sometimes while the soldiers were deployed in remote, hostile environments overseas, seeking corrections to active duty pays and allowances. The pay process, involving potentially hundreds of DOD, Army, and Army Guard organizations and thousands of personnel, was not well understood or consistently applied with respect to determining (1) the actions required to make timely, accurate pays to mobilized soldiers, and (2) the organization responsible for taking the required actions. With respect to human capital, we found weaknesses including (1) insufficient resources allocated to pay processing, (2) inadequate training related to existing policies and procedures, and (3) poor customer service. Several systems issues were also significant factors impeding accurate and timely payroll payments to mobilized Army Guard soldiers, including (1) nonintegrated systems, (2) limitations in system processing capabilities, and (3) ineffective system edits.