Still, in recent years, we and others have often demonstrated that significant weaknesses continue to plague the nation’s aviation security. Historically, the federal government has maintained that providing security is the responsibility of air carriers and airports as part of their cost of doing business. With the events of the last week, concerns have arisen again as to who should be responsible for security and screening passengers at our nation’s airports. In May 2000, we reported that our special agents, in an undercover capacity, obtained access to secure areas of two airports by using counterfeit law enforcement credentials and badges. Our agents could thus have carried weapons, explosives, chemical/biological agents, or other dangerous objects onto aircraft. Concerns have long existed about screeners’ ability to detect and prevent dangerous objects from entering secure areas. Many aviation stakeholders agreed that a stable, highly trained, and professional workforce is critical to improving screening performance. These criteria are to   establish accountability for screening performance;   ensure cooperation among stakeholders, such as airlines, airports, FAA,   efficiently move passengers to flights; and   minimize legal and liability issues.
What GAO Found

A safe and secure civil aviation system is critical to the nation's overall security, physical infrastructure, and economy. Billions of dollars and countless programs and policies have gone into developing such a system. Although many of the specific factors contributing to the terrible events of September 11 are still unclear, it is apparent that our aviation security system is plagued by serious weaknesses that can have devastating consequences. Last year, as part of an undercover investigation, GAO special agents used fake law enforcement badges and credentials to gain access to secure areas at two airports. They were also issued tickets and boarding passes, and could have carried weapons, explosives, or other dangerous items onto the aircraft. GAO tests of airport screeners also found major shortcomings in their ability to detect dangerous items hidden on passengers or in carry-on luggage. These weaknesses have raised questions about the need for alternative approaches. In assessing alternatives, five outcomes should be considered: improving screener performance, establishing accountability, ensuring cooperation among stakeholders, moving people efficiently, and minimizing legal and liability issues.