The Army Does Not Know the Extent It Used Borrowed Military Personnel or if Its Use Impacted Training and Readiness during Fiscal Years 2013 and 2014

The Army does not know the extent to which it used borrowed military  personnel during fiscal year 2013 and fiscal year 2014 because it is  unable to distinguish borrowed military personnel from the larger category  of special duty in its monthly special duty reports, and the Army did not  collect complete and accurate data on special duty use, including  borrowed military personnel use, through its reporting mechanisms at that  time. In addition, because of these shortcomings in its data on borrowed  military personnel, the Army does not know the extent to which the use of  borrowed military personnel impacted readiness and training. However, without a requirement and oversight to  help ensure that the use of borrowed military personnel is tracked and  reported and that the data collected are complete and accurate, the Army  will continue to have limited information and may be unable to identify any  potential problems with this use of personnel, including the full extent of  any effects on training and readiness. Terminating the exception means that  conventional DOD and Army policies on special duty, including Army  Regulation 570-4—which limits borrowed military personnel duration to 90  days in most circumstances—are in effect as of the beginning of fiscal  year 2015. In  addition, these officials stated that they used borrowed military personnel  in various capacities including as gate guards, lifeguards, grounds  maintenance, and gym attendants. 1.) Officials from Selected Installations Did Not Consider Full Costs in Fiscal Years 2013 and 2014 When Deciding to Use Borrowed Military Personnel, and Army Oversight of Cost Reporting Was Limited

Officials from Army installations we visited did not consider the full costs  of using borrowed military personnel during fiscal years 2013 and 2014. In addition, the Army did not provide the oversight that was necessary to  ensure that commanders documented and reported the full costs of using  borrowed military personnel in these years. The Army Did Not Provide Sufficient Oversight to Help Ensure Commanders Documented and Reported Comprehensive Data during Fiscal Years 2013 and 2014 on the Full Cost of Using Borrowed Military Personnel

The Army did not provide sufficient oversight to help ensure commanders  at installations documented or reported costs in monthly special duty  reports when making decisions to use borrowed military personnel. In  addition to the March 2012 memorandum directing commanders to  consider the full costs of personnel in accordance with DOD’s cost- estimation guidance, the Secretary of the Army issued a memorandum  in March 2013, directing installations to document the costs of borrowed  military personnel. However, we reviewed data reported in February  2014, and none of the 13 commands and installations whose data we  reviewed comprehensively reported the full cost of special duty personnel  data, including borrowed military personnel, to the Army. DOD  cost-estimating guidance provides installations with guidance for  estimating full personnel cost comparisons of military, civilian, and  contractor support. Furthermore, without oversight of the full costs for the  use of borrowed military personnel, collected in a uniform manner across  commands, the Army will not have a comprehensive picture of these  personnel costs, which may negatively affect its ability to make informed  strategic decisions about workforce requirements. Recommendations for Executive Action

To better position the Army to determine the extent to which it is  continuing to use borrowed military personnel and to enhance the Army’s  ability to utilize its total workforce efficiently and effectively as it moves  forward, we are making the following four recommendations to the  Secretary of the Army:
Establish a requirement for collecting, tracking, and reporting data on  the use of borrowed military personnel and provide guidance to  ensure that data collected are complete and accurate; if other special  duty data are included, ensure that the tool contains a method to  distinguish borrowed military personnel from other special duty data. Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

In commenting on a draft of this report, the Army concurred with three  recommendations and partially concurred with one recommendation. Specifically, the Army stated  that the OSD definition is the use of military personnel to replace or  convert functions that were previously performed by civilians or  contractors. However, the Army recognizes that soldiers performing work outside their  military occupational specialties for extended periods of time negatively  impacts a soldier’s career, readiness and morale. While not generalizable, the  information obtained from these site visits provided perspectives about  the factors that affect use of borrowed military personnel at the local level.
Why GAO Did This Study

To mitigate the effects of budget uncertainty, the Army uses borrowed military personnel to perform tasks previously performed by civilians or contractors. Under Army Regulation 570-4, this use is generally restricted to a limited time and to duties deemed military essential or filling critical requirements, and can be in or outside of a soldier's military occupation. Due to the sequestration of budgetary resources in fiscal year 2013, the Army expected an increased use of these personnel, suspended some requirements in the Army regulation, and required monthly usage reports.
House Report 113-102 included a provision for GAO to review the Army's use of borrowed military personnel. This report examines the extent to which the Army, during fiscal years 2013 and 2014, (1) used borrowed military personnel, and what is known about any readiness and training impacts and (2) considered costs when making decisions for this use. GAO reviewed relevant DOD and Army documents, analyzed cost data, and interviewed cognizant officials. GAO visited selected installations and while not generalizable, information obtained from these site visits provided insight into the use of borrowed military personnel.

What GAO Found

The Army does not know the extent to which it used borrowed military personnel during fiscal years 2013 and 2014 because (1) it is unable to distinguish borrowed military personnel from the larger category of special duty personnel in its monthly special duty reports and (2) the Army did not collect complete and accurate data on special duty use through its reporting mechanisms at that time. In addition, because of these shortcomings in its data on borrowed military personnel, the Army does not know the extent to which the use of borrowed military personnel affected readiness and training. An Army regulation requires borrowed military personnel assignments normally should be limited to 90 days, but temporary guidance provided during fiscal years 2013 and 2014 was unclear with respect to any limitation in length. The Army did not track the actual amount of time soldiers served in this temporary status, thereby limiting its ability to monitor this usage. Further, borrowed military personnel were used in various capacities outside of their Military Occupational Specialty including as lifeguards, grounds maintenance personnel, and gym attendants because the Army did not provide specific guidance on what functions it considered appropriate to fill with borrowed military personnel. The Army's monthly reporting requirement on use of borrowed personnel expired at the beginning of fiscal year 2015, so the Army does not now have a requirement to monitor this usage even though Army officials said this usage of borrowed military personnel would continue. Without a continued requirement and clear guidance for identifying and monitoring the extent to which borrowed military personnel are used, the Army risks allocating its resources inefficiently and ineffectively and may be unable to identify any potential problems with this use of personnel, including any impacts on training and readiness.
The Army did not consider full costs in fiscal years 2013 and 2014 when deciding to use borrowed military personnel and the Army did not provide the oversight that was necessary to ensure that commanders documented and reported the full costs of using borrowed military personnel in these years. This is important because the full costs of borrowed military personnel can be greater than civilian personnel performing the same function. GAO reviewed special duty data reported in February 2014, and found that none of the 13 commands and installations reviewed reported the full costs for all military, civilian, and contractor personnel. In March 2013, in addition to Department of Defense (DOD) guidance, the Secretary of the Army directed installations using borrowed military personnel to report the full costs of military personnel in accordance with DOD's cost-estimating policy. However, the Army did not provide sufficient oversight to help ensure commanders documented and reported the full costs of borrowed military personnel. Without Army oversight to help ensure the full costs for the use of borrowed military personnel are considered, documented, and reported, the Army will not have a comprehensive picture of these personnel costs, which may negatively affect its ability to make informed strategic decisions about workforce requirements.

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that the Army establish a requirement and guidance for monitoring the use of borrowed military personnel and improve oversight of cost reporting. DOD concurred with three recommendations and partially concurred with one. DOD also raised a definitional issue which GAO addresses in this report.