	Introduction

The National Security Act of 1947 (P.L. 80-253) established the statutory framework for themanagerial structure of the United States Intelligence Community, including the Central IntelligenceAgency (CIA) and the position of Director of Central Intelligence (DCI). A fundamental intent ofthis legislation was to coordinate, and to a certain extent centralize, the nascent intelligence effortsof the United States as an emergent superpower in the face of a hostile Soviet Union. Unlike the intelligence investigations of the1970s and 1980s, these early studies were primarily concerned with questions of efficiency andeffectiveness rather than with issues of legality and propriety. 104-293 ), but some observers havesubsequently concluded that this legislation did not go far enough and that, in the light of the eventsof September 11, 2001 and the Iraq War, intelligence organization questions need to be reevaluated. In the face of Soviet aggressiveness, the U.S. sought to enhance its nationaldefense capabilities to curb the international spread of communism and to provide security for thenation itself. In the context of the Cold War, a communist Cuba appeared to justify covert U.S. action tosecure a change in that nation's government. In part, the directive called for: 
An enhanced leadership role for the [DCI] in planning, reviewing, and evaluating all intelligence programs and activities, and in the production of nationalintelligence. (82)
In the same year, Ray Cline, a former Deputy Director of the CIA, made a number of recommendations. Both proposals called for the following:
Creating a Director of National Intelligence (DNI) with authority to program and reprogram intelligence funds throughout the Intelligence Community, including the DefenseDepartment, and to direct their expenditure; and to task intelligence agencies and transfer personneltemporarily from one agency to another to support new requirements;
Creating two Deputy Directors of National Intelligence (DDNIs); one of whom would be responsible for analysis and estimates, the other for Intelligence Community affairs;
Creating a separate Director of the CIA, subordinate to the new DNI, to manage the agency's collection and covert action capabilities on a day-to-day basis;
Consolidating analytical and estimative efforts of the Intelligence Community (including analysts from CIA, and some from DIA, the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR)at the State Department, and other agencies) into a separate office under one of the Deputy DNIs(this aspect of the proposal would effectively separate CIA's analytical elements from its collectionand covert action offices);
Creating a National Imagery Agency within the Department of Defense (DOD) to collect, exploit, and analyze imagery (these tasks had been spread among several entities; theHouse version would divide these efforts into two new separate agencies);and
Authorizing the Director of DIA to task defense intelligence agencies (DIA, NSA, the new Imagery Agency) with collection requirements; and to shift functions, funding, andpersonnel from one DOD intelligence agency to another. The recommendations of the Aspin/Brown Commission and the IC21 Study led to extensive congressional considerationof intelligence organization issues. The general trend has been towardsmore thorough oversight both by the executive branch and by congressional committees. Some have argued that, in the light of the Intelligence Community's inability toprovide warning of the September 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon andinaccurate intelligence estimates about Iraqi weapons of mass destruction, the need for reorganizingthe Intelligence Community has become self-evident. Specific legislation to reorganize the nation's intelligence effort, including S. 2845 , is currently under consideration and the 9/11 Commission's recommendationsare receiving widespread interest.
Proposals for the reorganization of the United States Intelligence Community have repeatedly emerged from commissions and committees created by either the executive or legislative branches. The heretofore limited authority of Directors of Central Intelligence and the great influence of theDepartments of State and Defense have inhibited the emergence of major reorganization plans fromwithin the Intelligence Community itself.
Proposals to reorganize the Intelligence Community emerged in the period immediately following passage of the National Security Act of 1947 (P.L. 80-253) that established the positionof Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Recommendations have ranged from adjustments in the DCI's budgetary responsibilities to theactual dissolution of the CIA and returning its functions to other departments. The goals underlyingsuch proposals have reflected trends in American foreign policy and the international environmentas well as domestic concerns about governmental accountability.
In the face of a hostile Soviet Union, early intelligence reorganization proposals were more concerned with questions of efficiency. In the Cold War context of the 1950s, a number ofrecommendations sought aggressively to enhance U.S. covert action and counterintelligencecapabilities. The chairman of one committee charged with investigating the nation's intelligencecapabilities, Army General James H. Doolittle, argued that sacrificing America's sense of "fair play"was wholly justified in the struggle to prevent Soviet world domination.
Following the failed invasion of Cuba at the Bay of Pigs, the unsuccessful results of intervention in Vietnam, and the Watergate scandal, investigations by congressional committeesfocused on the propriety of a wide range of heretofore accepted intelligence activities that includedassassinations and some domestic surveillance of U.S. citizens. Some forcefully questioned theviability of secret intelligence agencies within a democratic society. These investigations resultedin much closer congressional oversight and a more exacting legal framework for intelligenceactivities. At the same time, the growth in technical intelligence capabilities led to an enhanced --but by no means predominant -- leadership role for the DCI in determining community-widebudgets and priorities.
With the end of the Cold War, emerging security concerns, including transnational terrorism, narcotics trafficking, and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, faced the United States. Some statutory changes were made in the mid-1990s, but their results were not far-reaching. In theaftermath of the September 11, 2001 attacks and the Iraq War, some observers urge reconsideringthe intelligence organization. The 9/11 Commission has specifically recommended theestablishment of a National Intelligence Director to manage the national intelligence program. Current intelligence organization issues can be usefully addressed with an awareness of argumentspro and con that were raised by earlier investigators; this recommendation has been incorporated ina number of bills, including S. 2845 . This report will be updated as circumstanceswarrant.