Specifically, we determined (1) the rate and timing of attrition, (2) the extent of DOD’s investment in recruiting and training first-term enlistees, (3) reasons for attrition after training, (4) servicemembers’ perceptions of quality-of-life factors that contribute to attrition, and (5) actions DOD and the services are taking to reduce enlistees’ attrition. High First-Term Attrition Results in a Reduced Return on the Services’ Recruiting and Training Investment

About one-third of all enlistees who entered the services between fiscal year 1982 and 1993 did not complete their first contract terms. DOD’s attrition rates throughout this period are somewhat higher than reported because they do not include some enlistees who were allowed to separate early for various reasons, such as to attend a civilian school or to allow the services to meet mandated end strengths. Using these earlier costs, we estimate that the services spent $1.3 billion on recruiting and training the enlistees who entered the services in fiscal year 1993 but did not complete their first terms. In fact, these rates were higher than they had been in over a decade. A Large Portion of Attrition Occurs Between Enlistees’ 7th and 48th Month of Service

An analysis of the 35.8-percent attrition rate for enlistees who entered the services in fiscal year 1993 indicates that 13.6 percent of all enlistees were separated before they had completed 6 months of service or less. For the 72,670 enlistees who did not complete their first terms, 27,624 were separated in this initial period. The services’ sometimes extreme variations in the percentages of their separations for a given official reason suggest that the services interpret separation codes differently, that their separation policies differ, that the services have very different attrition problems, or some combination of these explanations. 3.1 through 3.4 show each service’s major reasons for separation by gender.) Our recommendations were incorporated in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998 (P.L. All four services take drug use very seriously. The Air Force and the Army have set specific numeric targets for reducing attrition, and the Air Force, the Army, and the Marine Corps report that they have been successful in reducing attrition in some areas. As a result, any success these efforts experience in lowering attrition may be either coincidental or have the unintended effect of retaining enlistees who really should be separated. It has also set numerical targets for reducing attrition rates. In our 1997 report on attrition from basic training, we made recommendations to DOD and the services on ways to improve the use of separation codes to build a database for DOD to manage attrition. In concurring with our recommendations, DOD agreed to direct the services to (1) review their 90-day release policies and the exceptions granted to those policies, (2) prepare a report on quality-of-life issues that could be addressed to reduce attrition, (3) provide local commanders with guidance and formal policy changes related to specific types of attrition the services target for remedial action, (4) reassess the appropriateness of providing favorable types of discharges to enlistees whose behavior or performance led to their early separation to ensure that proper incentives exist to encourage enlistees to complete their first terms, and (5) prepare a report by October 1999 documenting service initiatives related to our recommendations.
Why GAO Did This Study

Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed historical attrition rates for enlisted personnel who serve at least 6 months but leave military service before completing their first contract terms, focusing on: (1) the rate and timing of attrition during enlistees' first terms; (2) the extent of the Department of Defense's (DOD) investment in recruiting and training first-term enlistees; (3) reasons for first-term attrition after training; (4) service members' perceptions of quality-of-life factors that contribute to attrition; and (5) actions DOD and the armed services are taking to reduce enlistees' attrition.

What GAO Found

GAO noted that: (1) first-term attrition has been a long-standing and complex problem for the services; (2) while all four services are concerned about attrition, they have made few formal policy changes aimed at reducing attrition in specific target populations; (3) although the services collect survey data to assess attitudes about military service and quality of life, they do not use this data to analyze why separations are occurring or to formulate policy changes or actions aimed at reducing early attrition; (4) between fiscal year (FY) 1982 through FY 1993, 31.7 percent of all enlistees did not complete their first terms of service; (5) for Army, Navy, and Air Force enlistees who entered the services in FY 1993, attrition rates were higher than they had been in over a decade; (6) DOD's data on attrition does not include all enlistees allowed to separate early from the military; (7) using the FY 1993 cost estimates, GAO calculates that the services spent $1.3 billion on the 72,670 enlistees who entered the services in FY 1993 and departed prematurely; (8) because these enlistees were separated early, the services did not get a full return on their investment; (9) official reasons for the separation of enlistees who entered the services in FY 1993 varied by gender and service; (10) variances in the types of separations among the services indicate that the services interpret separation codes differently, that their separation policies differ, that the services have very different attrition problems, or some combination of these explanations; (11) in its 1997 report on attrition from basic training, GAO recommended ways for DOD to improve the use of these separation codes to build a more complete database on reasons for servicewide attrition; (12) GAO's recommendations have been incorporated into the National Defense Authorization Act for FY 1998, and DOD has begun to comply with these legislative requirements; (13) all four services are concerned about attrition, and the Army and the Air Force have set numerical targets for reducing it; (14) GAO found that the services did not always have adequate data on the exact reasons for separation; (15) without such data and formal policy changes, numerical targets will be arbitrary, and success in reducing attrition may either be coincidental or result in the failure to discharge enlistees who really should be separated; and (16) allowing many enlistees to easily separate with honorable discharges may inadvertently serve as a disincentive for them to persevere.