With regard to OPT, in particular, USCIS is responsible for  adjudicating employment authorization requests from the foreign students  who have obtained DSOs’ recommendations to participate in OPT. ICE Has Not Identified or Assessed Risks in OPT

SEVP has not identified or assessed risks associated with OPT, such as  potential fraud or noncompliance with ICE regulations. Senior SEVP  officials told us they consider OPT to be a low-risk employment benefit for  foreign students because, in part, they believe foreign students under  OPT do not have an incentive to jeopardize their foreign student visa  status and future legal status to stay and work in the United States. However, SEVP has not developed a process to determine the extent to  which schools that recommend and foreign students approved for OPT  may pose risks. For example, CTCEU officials identified that a certain  threshold, or percentage, of a school’s foreign student population  approved for OPT may be a potential indicator of fraud involving OPT.According to our analysis of SEVIS data, as of August 2013, of the  approximately 2,650 SEVP-certified schools with at least 1 foreign  student approved for OPT, the percentage of each school’s registered  foreign students approved for OPT met or exceeded the threshold  identified by CTCEU at 193 schools. As part of these efforts, SEVP  officials have not identified and assessed potential risks specific to OPT  posed by schools and foreign students or determined the extent to which  the office will include potential OPT risks as part of their efforts to assess  risks SEVP-wide. Further, obtaining  and assessing risk information from CTCEU and ICE field offices from  prior noncompliance and fraud cases involving OPT throughout the  development of its process to identify and assess risks in SEVP, to  include OPT, could better position SEVP to manage any risks associated  with OPT. ICE Cannot Fully Ensure Foreign Students Working under Optional Practical Training Are Maintaining Their Legal Status in the United States

		ICE Does Not Consistently Collect Information Needed to Oversee OPT Requirements

ICE does not consistently collect information needed to oversee OPT  requirements related to the type and timing of foreign students’  employment, as ICE regulations do not specifically require the collection  of information on foreign students’ places and dates of employment in  SEVIS. As indicated in table 3, SEVIS data on foreign students approved for the  three types of OPT show that 38 percent of student records (48,642 of  126,796) do not contain an employer name, as of August 2013. Conclusions

OPT, which is an employment benefit, provides certain eligible foreign  students with the opportunity to seek temporary work to gain practical  experience in their major areas of study during and after completing an  academic program. ICE has taken initial actions to identify risks  across SEVP-certified schools; however, ICE has not analyzed available  information to identify and assess potential risks specific to OPT posed by  schools and foreign students. By collecting the appropriate information in SEVIS  and monitoring such information for compliance, ICE may better position  itself to determine whether foreign students approved for OPT are  maintaining their legal student visa status while supplementing their  education with employment directly related to their areas of study in the  United States. To better ensure DSOs’ and students’ compliance with OPT  requirements, and strengthen efforts to identify and assess potential risks  in OPT, we recommend that the Director of ICE direct SEVP to take the  following five actions:  require that pre-completion and 12-month post-completion OPT  students report to DSOs, and DSOs record in SEVIS, students’  employer information, including the employer’s name and address; develop and distribute guidance to DSOs on how to determine  whether a job is related to a student’s area of study and require DSOs  to provide information in SEVIS to show that they took steps, based  on this guidance, to help ensure that the student’s work is related to  the area of study; require that students report to DSOs, and DSOs record in SEVIS,  students’ initial date of employment and any periods of  unemployment; develop and provide guidance to DSOs and USCIS on how much time  constitutes 1 full academic year for the purposes of recommending  and authorizing OPT; and develop and implement a mechanism to monitor available information  in SEVIS to determine if foreign students are accruing more OPT than  allowed by ICE regulations. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

This report examines the extent to which the Department of Homeland  Security (DHS) has (1) identified and assessed risks associated with  optional practical training (OPT), and (2) collected information and  developed monitoring mechanisms to help ensure students comply with  OPT requirements and maintain their legal status in the United States. To determine the extent to which DHS’s Immigration and Customs  Enforcement (ICE) has identified and assessed risks in ICE’s Student and  Exchange Visitor Program (SEVP) specifically related to OPT, we  analyzed program documentation, analyzed data, and interviewed  officials from DHS and its relevant components, including U.S. As we  did not select a probability sample of ICE field offices to interview, the  results of these interviews cannot be projected to all of ICE’s 26 field  offices.
Why GAO Did This Study

As of November 2013, about 100,000 of the approximately 1 million foreign students in the United States were approved to participate in OPT—an employment benefit that allows foreign students to obtain temporary work in their areas of study during and after completing an academic program. ICE is responsible for certifying schools; monitoring foreign students and schools, including their compliance with OPT requirements; and enforcing immigration laws for those that fail to comply.
GAO was asked to review the management of OPT. This report examines the extent to which DHS has (1) identified and assessed risks associated with OPT, and (2) collected information and developed monitoring mechanisms to help ensure students comply with OPT requirements and maintain their legal status. GAO analyzed ICE regulations and policies and data on schools that recommend and foreign students approved for OPT, as of August 2013. GAO interviewed ICE and USCIS officials, including those from 7 of 26 ICE field offices selected based on factors such as OPT-related fraud investigations. Interview results cannot be generalized, but they provided insights about OPT risks.

What GAO Found

U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), a component of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), has not identified or assessed fraud or noncompliance risks posed by schools that recommend and foreign students approved for optional practical training (OPT), in accordance with DHS risk management guidance. ICE's Student and Exchange Visitor Program (SEVP) officials consider OPT to be a low-risk employment benefit for foreign students because, in part, they believe foreign students approved for OPT do not have an incentive to jeopardize their legal status in the United States. However, SEVP has not determined potential risks in OPT. Further, officials from the Counterterrorism and Criminal Exploitation Unit (CTCEU), ICE's investigative unit, and ICE field agents GAO interviewed have identified potential risks involving OPT based on prior and ongoing investigations. For example, ICE field agents identified cases where school officials recommended OPT for foreign students to work outside of their major areas of study, which is not allowed under ICE regulations. In response to a June 2012 GAO recommendation, ICE has taken initial actions to identify risks across SEVP-certified schools but has not identified and assessed OPT risks or determined the extent to which potential OPT risks will be part of its efforts to assess risks SEVP-wide. Further, SEVP has not coordinated with CTCEU, including obtaining and assessing information from CTCEU and ICE field offices regarding OPT risks, as part of its efforts. Identifying and assessing OPT risks, in coordination with CTCEU, could better position SEVP to manage risks in OPT.
ICE has not consistently collected the information and developed the monitoring mechanisms needed to help ensure foreign students comply with OPT requirements, thereby maintaining their legal status in the United States. Foreign students can participate in OPT while attending classes and after graduation for up to 12 months; students studying in science, technology, engineering, or mathematics fields may be eligible for an additional 17 months (29 months total). However, ICE does not have complete information on which foreign students approved for OPT are actively working and whether employment is related to their studies, per ICE regulations. For example, GAO's analysis of ICE data on students engaged in all types of OPT indicates that 38 percent (48,642 of 126,796) of student records do not contain an employer's name. Furthermore, the data do not include the date on which students granted authorization began working. ICE does not require that students and school officials report this information. Without these data, ICE cannot determine whether students with employment authorization are working in jobs related to their studies and not exceeding regulatory limits on unemployment. Collecting and monitoring complete information on foreign students approved for OPT would better position ICE to determine whether these students are maintaining legal status in the United States.
This is a public version of a For Official Use Only/Law Enforcement Sensitive report that GAO issued in January 2014. Information DHS deemed sensitive has been redacted.

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that ICE, among other things, identify and assess OPT-related risks and require additional employment information from students and schools. DHS concurred with the recommendations.