	DOD’s Military and Nonmilitary Missions Differ

Military missions differ from nonmilitary missions on a variety of factors,  as shown in table 1. DOD’s directive  specifies that requests for nonmilitary support be evaluated against the  following criteria:  legality (compliance with laws),  lethality (potential use of lethal force by or against DOD forces),  risk (safety of DOD forces),    cost (who pays, impact on the DOD budget),    appropriateness (whether the requested mission is in the interest of DOD  to conduct), and  readiness (impact on DOD’s ability to perform its primary mission). The Posse Comitatus Act Restricts DOD’s Role in Civilian Law Enforcement

The 1878 Posse Comitatus Act prohibits the use of the Army and Air Force  “to execute the laws” of the United States except where authorized by the  Constitution or Acts of Congress. Congress has expressly authorized the use of the military in certain  situations. For example, DOD can use its personnel and equipment to:    assist with drug interdiction and other law enforcement functions   (10 U.S.C. §831);    assist with terrorist incidents involving weapons of mass destruction   (10 U.S.C. The Adequacy of New Management Organizations, Plans, and Forces for Domestic Missions

It is too early to assess the adequacy of DOD’s new management  organizations or its plans, although forces may not be fully tailored to the  current domestic missions. At the same time, DOD  has used existing forces for these missions since September 11, 2001. The new Assistant Secretary is to provide overall  supervision for domestic missions. The Nature of the Threat Was Still Under Discussion When the Campaign Plan Was Written

DOD’s planning process requires the Department and the services to staff,  train, and equip forces for their military missions as outlined in campaign  plans and deliberate plans developed by the combatant commanders,  including the Commander of U.S. Northern Command. DOD’s Forces Are Not Tailored to Conduct Long- Term Military Missions Domestically

Based on our review, DOD’s forces are not tailored for some of the  missions that they have been performing since September 11, 2001, and  the result could be eventual erosion of military readiness. Increased Overseas and Domestic Missions Add to High Army and Air Force Personnel Tempo

Current overseas and domestic missions are stressing U.S. forces as  measured in personnel tempo data. The Air Force reported similar trends. Also, as  with the Army, Air Force servicemembers away 220 to 365 days had risen  from about 1,600 to over 22,100. In September 2002, 1,900 had spent more than 401 days away from  home over a 2-year period. Therefore, to prevent  servicemembers with key skills from leaving the services, DOD issued  orders to prevent degradation in combat capabilities, an action known as  stop loss authority.
Why GAO Did This Study

The way in which the federal government views the defense of the United States has dramatically changed since September 11, 2001. Consequently, the Department of Defense (DOD) is adjusting its Cold War strategic focus (of defending against massed combat forces) to better encompass defense against the asymmetric threats that small terrorist cells represent to U.S. territory. GAO was asked to review DOD's participation in domestic missions. This testimony represents our preliminary work in response to the request. It addresses (1) the primary differences in military and nonmilitary missions; (2) how DOD evaluates requests for nonmilitary missions; (3) how the 1878 Posse Comitatus Act impacts DOD's nonmilitary missions; (4) whether current management organizations, plans, and forces are adequate to support DOD's domestic missions; and (5) the impact of overseas and domestic missions on military personnel tempo. GAO is making no recommendations in this testimony.

What GAO Found

DOD's military and nonmilitary missions differ in terms of roles, duration, discretion to accept or reject, and capabilities normally employed. DOD evaluates nonmilitary mission requests on the basis of legality, lethality, risk to DOD forces, the cost, the appropriateness of the mission, and the impact on military readiness. The 1878 Posse Comitatus Act prohibits the direct use of federal military troops in domestic civilian law enforcement, except where authorized by the Constitution or Acts of Congress. Congress has expressly authorized the use of the military in certain situations such as to assist with drug interdiction or assist with terrorist incidents involving weapons of mass destruction. It is too early to assess the adequacy of DOD's new management organizations or plans but some forces may not be tailored for their domestic missions. DOD established an Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and U.S. Northern Command plan and execute domestic missions. U.S. Northern Command's plan for domestic military missions was developed before DOD officials had agreed on the nature of the threat. Forces are not adequately tailored for some domestic missions, and readiness could erode because of it. For example, Air Force fighter units deployed since September 11, 2001 to perform combat air patrols are unable to also perform required combat training. Overseas and domestic missions are stressing U.S. forces as measured in personnel tempo data. In September 2001, about 1,600 Air Force personnel had spent 220 to 365 days away from their homes over the previous year, but by December 2002 almost 22,100 Air Force personnel had been away that long. The Army reported similar increases. To prevent erosion in combat capabilities, DOD issued orders, known as stop loss, to involuntarily retain critical personnel.