And, according to current DOD  estimates, costs for two programs— Advanced Extremely High Frequency  (AEHF) and Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS) High—are expected to  significantly increase in fiscal years 2017 and 2018. As figure 4 shows, in several cases, DOD has increased the  number of satellites. Some Acquisition Programs Appear to Have Overcome Problems, but Other Programs Still Susceptible to Cost and Schedule Overruns

DOD had long-standing difficulties on nearly every space acquisition  program, struggling for years with cost and schedule growth, technical or  design problems, as well as oversight and management weaknesses. However, to its credit, it continues to make progress on several of its high- risk space programs, and is expecting to deliver significant advances in  capability as a result. While DOD is having success in readying some satellites for launch, other  space acquisition programs face challenges that could further increase  cost and delay delivery targets. Delays in the MUOS program have resulted in critical potential capability  gaps for military and other government users. Results of GAO Space-Related Reviews over the Past Year

Over the past year, we have completed reviews of sustaining and  upgrading GPS capabilities and commercializing space technologies under  the Small Business Innovation Research program (SBIR), and we have  ongoing reviews of (1) DOD space situational awareness (SSA) acquisition  efforts, (2) parts quality for DOD, MDA, and the National Aeronautics and  Space Administration (NASA), and (3) a new acquisition strategy being  developed for the EELV program. These reviews, discussed further below,  underscore the varied challenges that still face the DOD space community  as it seeks to complete problematic legacy efforts and deliver modernized  capabilities. Our reviews of GPS and space situational awareness, for  instance, have highlighted the need for more focused coordination and  leadership for space activities that touch a wide range of government,  international, and industry stakeholders; while our review of the SBIR  program highlighted the substantial barriers and challenges small business  must overcome to gain entry into the government space arena. DOD Has Taken and Is Taking Actions to Address Space and Weapon Acquisition Problems

DOD continues to work to ensure that its space programs are more  executable and produce a better return on investment. Many of the actions  it has been taking address root causes of problems, though it will take time  to determine whether these actions are successful and they need to be  complemented by decisions on how best to lead, organize, and support  space activities. For space in particular, DOD is working to ensure that critical  technologies are matured before large-scale acquisition programs begin,  requirements are defined early in the process and are stable throughout,  and system design remains stable. Additionally, DOD and the Air Force are working to streamline  management and oversight of the national security space enterprise. However, more changes to processes, policies, and support  may be needed—along with sustained leadership and attention—to help  ensure that these reforms can take hold, including addressing the diffuse  leadership for space programs. This has hampered DOD’s ability to synchronize  delivery of space, ground, and user assets for space programs. While some changes to the leadership structure have recently been  made—including revalidating the role of the Secretary of the Air Force as  the DOD Executive Agent for Space, disestablishing the Office of the  Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and Information Integration  and the National Security Space Office, and aligning Air Force space  system acquisition responsibility into a single Air Force acquisition  office—and others are being studied, it is too early to tell how effective  these changes will be in streamlining management and oversight of space  system acquisitions. Finally, adequate workforce capacity is essential for the front-end  planning activities now required by acquisition reform initiatives for new  weapon programs to be successful.
Why GAO Did This Study

Despite decades of significant investment, most of the Department of Defense's (DOD) large space acquisition programs have collectively experienced billions of dollars in cost increases, stretched schedules, and increased technical risks. Significant schedule delays of as much as 9 years have resulted in potential capability gaps in missile warning, military communications, and weather monitoring. These problems persist, with other space acquisition programs still facing challenges in meeting their targets and aligning the delivery of assets with appropriate ground and user systems. To address cost increases, DOD reduced the number of satellites it would buy, reduced satellite capabilities, or terminated major space system acquisitions. Broad actions have also been taken to prevent their occurrence in new programs, including better management of the acquisition process and oversight of its contractors and resolution of technical and other obstacles to DOD's ability to deliver capability. This testimony will focus on the (1) status of space system acquisitions, (2) results of GAO's space-related reviews over the past year and the challenges they signify, (3) efforts DOD has taken to address causes of problems and increase credibility and success in its space system acquisitions as well as efforts currently underway, and (4) what remains to be done.

What GAO Found

Over the past two decades, DOD has had difficulties with nearly every space acquisition program, with years of cost and schedule growth, technical and design problems, and oversight and management weaknesses. However, to its credit, DOD continues to make progress on several of its programs--such as the Space Based Infrared System High and Advanced Extremely High Frequency programs--and is expecting to deliver significant advances in capability as a result. But other programs continue to be susceptible to cost and schedule challenges. For example, the Global Positioning System (GPS) IIIA program's total cost has increased by about 10 percent over its original estimate, and delays in the Mobile User Objective System continue the risk of a capability gap in ultra high frequency satellite communications. In 2010, GAO assessed DOD's efforts to (1) upgrade and sustain GPS capabilities and (2) commercialize or incorporate into its space acquisition program the space technologies developed by small businesses. These reviews underscore the varied challenges that still face the DOD space community as it seeks to complete problematic legacy efforts and deliver modernized capabilities--for instance, the need for more focused coordination and leadership for space activities--and highlight the substantial barriers and challenges that small businesses must overcome to gain entry into the government space arena. DOD continues to work to ensure that its space programs are more executable and produce a better return on investment. Many of the actions it has been taking address root causes of problems, though it will take time to determine whether these actions are successful. For example, DOD is working to ensure that critical technologies are matured before large-scale acquisition programs begin and requirements are defined early in the process and are stable throughout. Additionally, DOD and the Air Force are working to streamline management and oversight of the national security space enterprise. While DOD actions to date have been good, more changes to processes, policies, and support may be needed--along with sustained leadership and attention--to help ensure that these reforms can take hold, including addressing the diffuse leadership for space programs. While some changes to the leadership structure have recently been made and others are being studied, it is too early to tell how effective they will be in streamlining management and oversight of space system acquisitions. Finally, while space system acquisition workforce capacity is essential if new weapon programs are to be successful, DOD continues to face gaps in technical and programmatic expertise for space.