ATA Funding Allocations for Fiscal Years 2012 through 2016

As shown in figure 1, in fiscal years 2012 through 2016, State allocated  approximately $715 million to the ATA program for training, mentoring,  equipment, and other services to help partner nations build or enhance  their counterterrorism capabilities. State Officials and Contractors Have Taken Various Steps to Ensure that Domestic Tactical Training Facilities Used by ATA Align with Security Requirements

		State Has Taken Steps to Oversee the Contract for ATA Training, Which Includes General Requirements for Facility Security

State’s steps to oversee the security of the tactical training facilities used  for domestic ATA training are predicated on the GATA contract. State officials said that it is the responsibility of the prime  contractors to ensure that the training facility subcontractors have the  necessary federal, state, and local permits for the storage of weapons,  ammunition, and explosives. Weaknesses Exist in ATA Data and Oversight of Participants, Some of Whom May Still Be in the United States

		ATA Course and Participant Data Are Incomplete and Sometimes Inaccurate

ATA program data on the courses that ATA delivered in fiscal years 2012  through 2016, and the participants of those courses, are incomplete and  inaccurate. Without management efforts to ensure the  implementation of ATA’s revised procedures, ATA will lack reasonable  assurance that its data collection efforts will improve data completeness  and accuracy, and officials may not be able to accurately report the  number of participants trained, in line with program performance  indicators. State and DHS Have Acted on Incidents of Participants’ Unauthorized Departures from Domestic ATA Training Activities

State and DHS have acted on 10 documented participant unauthorized  departures from ATA training activities in the United States since fiscal  year 2012. However, ATA officials noted that the  procedures were not always followed. ATA officials told us that they had asked the U.S. Without a process to confirm and document that ATA participants return  to their home countries, ATA may not be able to assess the extent to  which participants are making use of training to help detect, deter, and  prevent acts of terrorism, in line with program goals. In addition, without  some way to identify ATA participants who do not return home and,  therefore, may have remained in the United States following the  completion of ATA training, ATA may not be able to provide information to  DHS about participants whose failure to depart may warrant enforcement  action. Officials told  us that procedures for the collection of course and participant data have  been inconsistently implemented. (Recommendation 1)
The Assistant Secretary of State for Diplomatic Security should develop  and implement a process to confirm and document whether future ATA  participants return to their home countries following the completion of  ATA training and, for any participants trained in the United States who do  not, share relevant information with the Department of Homeland  Security. Having received evidence that State had provided  the relevant information to DHS, we removed this recommendation from  the final report. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

To determine what steps the Department of State (State) has taken to  ensure that facilities used for Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA) training in  the United States align with applicable facility and equipment security  requirements, we analyzed the security requirements in the Global  Antiterrorism Training (GATA) contract, which is used to secure third- party services to manage and deliver ATA training activities.
Why GAO Did This Study

State's ATA program aims to enhance foreign partners' capabilities to prevent acts of terrorism, address terrorism incidents when they do occur, and apprehend and prosecute those involved in such acts. In fiscal years 2012 through 2016, State allocated about $715 million to the ATA program, which it reports to have used to train about 56,000 security force officials from more than 34 partner nations. At least 2,700 of those participants were trained at facilities in the United States.
GAO was asked to review ATA program management. This report examines, among other objectives, (1) State's ability to oversee ATA participants trained in the United States and (2) the steps State has taken to ensure that facilities used for domestic ATA training align with applicable security requirements. GAO conducted fieldwork at two domestic training facilities selected because they provide tactical training; analyzed State and DHS data and documentation related to fiscal year 2012 through 2016 domestic training participants; and interviewed State and DHS officials, including those who oversee ATA training for three partner nations receiving significant ATA training. GAO also interviewed contractors who help implement the ATA program and analyzed related documents.

What GAO Found

Weaknesses exist in Department of State (State) Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA) program data and oversight of participants, including those trained in the United States. ATA course and participant data are incomplete and sometimes inaccurate, despite ATA's procedures for the collection of those data. ATA officials told GAO that procedures were not always followed. Without ensuring the implementation of procedures to collect complete and accurate program data, officials may not be able to accurately report the number of participants trained, in line with program performance indicators. Among participants trained in the United States since 2012, ATA has documented 10 participant unauthorized departures from ATA activities and provided related information to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) for follow-up. In addition to these 10, ATA recently identified 20 ATA participants trained in fiscal years 2012 through 2016 for whom departure from the United States following the completion of training is unconfirmed. ATA officials told GAO there is no formal process to confirm participants' return to their home countries following the completion of training (see fig.). Without such a process, ATA may not be able to assess the extent to which it is using training in line with program goals. Further, State may not be able to provide information to DHS about participants whose failure to depart may warrant enforcement action.
State and the contractors who implement ATA training have taken steps to ensure that facilities used for domestic training align with applicable security requirements. State's ATA training contract requires the secure storage of weapons and explosives and that the contractors have the relevant federal, state, and local permits. State reports overseeing the contractors through the receipt of copies of relevant licenses such as those required for possessing explosives; visits to the training facilities, including surveys examining storage security; and frequent meetings. Both of the domestic tactical training facilities that GAO visited had relevant licenses and, during site visits, GAO observed some suggested security measures, including fences, secured gates, and security patrols.

What GAO Recommends

State should ensure implementation of its data collection procedures and establish a process to confirm and document participants' return to their home countries. State agreed with both recommendations.