However, in recent years, U.S. participation in peace operations has grown. Peace operations were the major reason for the increases, with smaller increases for joint activities. Over the same period, the Marine Corps increased the average of its force deployed from about 12 percent to 13 percent. Units in Short Supply Heavily Tasked

Increased deployments have fallen most heavily to a few types of units with unique skills in high demand, such as special forces, electronic warfare squadrons, Patriot air defense units, and military police. DOD is examining the need to increase the number of some high-deploying units. Peace Operations and Joint Activities Drive Increase in Deployments

In the high-deploying units we studied, most of the increased deployments were for peace operations, particularly those of Air Force and Army units. Program officials told us that many joint training exercises involve small groups of servicemembers, and they are attempting to reduce them by combining or canceling some exercises. About one-third of the Army units experienced reductions. However, DOD policy on PERSTEMPO is unclear in many areas. The services continuously monitor retention levels of individuals and job specialties, and the Army and the Air Force already have or plan to offer bonuses and increase the number of personnel in some high-deploying units, such as air defense artillery or airborne warning and control system units. However, deployments to combat training centers, which generally last about 3 weeks, are not counted. Recommendations

To provide the oversight and guidance needed for long-term management of PERSTEMPO, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense identify key indicators that provide the best measures of deployments’ impact on personnel readiness and adjust existing databases to allow research comparing these indicators in high PERSTEMPO units, skill groups, or weapon systems to other such groups and issue DOD regulations that guide service management of PERSTEMPO by (1) establishing a DOD-wide definition of deployment; (2) stating whether each service should have a goal, policy, or regulation stipulating the maximum amount of time units and/or personnel may be deployed; and (3) defining the minimum data on PERSTEMPO each service must collect and maintain. We then compared ratings below expected levels with unit explanations of degradations in readiness, supplementing this analysis with discussions at the major command level. Additional copies are $2 each.
Why GAO Did This Study

Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO examined the United States' military readiness, focusing on the: (1) frequency of deployments in recent years; (2) effects of increased deployment on combat readiness; and (3) Department of Defense's (DOD) efforts to limit personnel temporary (PERSTEMPO) deployment.

What GAO Found

GAO found that: (1) Army and Air Force deployments have increased among special forces, electronic warfare squadrons, and Patriot air defense, and military police units; (2) the percentage of personnel deployed from 1987 to 1995 has increased from 2 to 6 percent for the Air Force and 5 to 9 percent for the Army; (3) the Navy and Marine Corps traditionally deploy units at twice the rate of the other services and remain active for at least half of the year; (4) peace operations, along with smaller increases in joint activity, are the driving force behind increased deployments; (5) DOD believes that deployments can be reduced by eliminating redundant military training and combining or cancelling some exercises; (6) the Status of Resources and Training System reports less than one-third of frequently deploying units dropping below planned readiness levels; (7) DOD is concerned about the nature of frequently deploying units' personnel problems; (8) DOD statistics on personnel readiness are not useful because they are inconsistent and are only compiled at the major command level; and (9) high PERSTEMPO is likely to continue unless DOD directs the services to set up goals and policies to manage PERSTEMPO.