Figure 1 illustrates DOD’s technology management  process. Overall Transition Rates Not Determinable, but Selected Programs Illustrate Factors for Transition Success

Since 2010, DARPA has had success in transitioning new technologies  from the research environment to military users, including DOD  acquisition programs and warfighters. Our  analysis of the 10 selected programs did, however, identify four factors  that contributed to transition successes, the most important of which were  military or commercial demand for the planned technology and linkage to  a research area where DARPA has sustained interest. This approach shapes how the  agency defines, pursues, and tracks technology transition. Figure 2  illustrates in more detail DARPA’s process for assessing technology  transition outcomes in its programs. Figure 3 highlights these four  factors. DARPA Prioritizes Innovation and Deemphasizes Technology Transition in Key Processes

DARPA’s investment of program funds and staff are primarily focused on  the highest priority of its agency mission, which is creating radically  innovative technologies that support DOD’s warfighting mission. In addition, although DARPA  disseminates information on its past programs, it does not take full  advantage of available, government-sponsored resources for sharing  technical data. DARPA has also elected not to participate in most DOD  programs intended to facilitate technology transition, with the exception of  mandated small business programs, citing the challenges it perceives in  meeting the process and reporting requirements of these DOD programs  within DARPA’s typical timeframes for executing its research initiatives. However, these reviews do not assess a program’s strategy for achieving  technology transition. DARPA leadership delegates oversight and review  of technology transition strategies to the agency’s Adaptive Execution  Office, which coordinates with program managers to review and provide  input on technology transition strategies, particularly in the latter stages of  programs. DARPA’s limited training for program managers on technology  transition is inadequate to consistently position programs for transition  success. For  many years, DOD has maintained website-accessible databases that  disseminate information within the department, and to a lesser extent, to  the public and to private companies. Currently, DARPA  disseminates information on past programs through both internal and  external means, but does not share information with key data repositories  that the federal government sponsors, which may obscure visibility into its  programs and lead to missed transition opportunities. Consequently, DOD did not agree  that technology transition training requirements should be increased for  DARPA program managers and stated that DARPA’s current approach of  “tailored curricula focused on a program’s unique transition needs”  remained appropriate. Further, DOD did not agree that increased dissemination of technical data  on completed DARPA programs was warranted. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

This report covers the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency’s  (DARPA) (1) effectiveness at transitioning technologies since fiscal year  2010, including identifying the factors that contributed to successful  technology transitions, and (2) implementation of Department of Defense  (DOD) policies and programs intended to facilitate the transition of  technologies. To assess DARPA’s effectiveness at transitioning technologies since  fiscal year 2010, including identifying factors that contributed to  successful transitions, we requested and reviewed portfolio-level data  identifying the names, funding amounts, and technology transition of  those DARPA programs successfully completing technology development  during fiscal years 2010 through 2014.
Why GAO Did This Study

After the Soviet Union launched the first satellite into orbit in 1957, the U.S. government made a commitment to initiate, rather than react to, strategic technological surprises. DOD relies on DARPA's disruptive innovations to maintain this promise, backed by congressional appropriations of over $2.9 billion in fiscal year 2015 alone. In April 2015, DOD reported that U.S. technological superiority is again being challenged by potential adversaries and renewed efforts to improve its products. Meanwhile, GAO found deficiencies in DOD's technology transition processes that may hinder these efforts and DARPA's goals.
Senate Report 113-176 included a provision for GAO to review DOD's technology transition processes, practices, and results. This report focuses on DARPA and assesses its (1) effectiveness at transitioning technologies since fiscal year 2010, including identifying factors that contribute to successful transitions, and (2) implementation of DOD policies and programs intended to facilitate technology transition. GAO reviewed DARPA programs completed since 2010; identified transition factors by analyzing program documentation for a random sample of 10 cases; reviewed DOD policies; and interviewed DOD officials.

What GAO Found

Since 2010, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) has had success in technology transition—the process of migrating new technologies from the research environment to military users, including Department of Defense (DOD) acquisition programs and warfighters. However, inconsistencies in how the agency defines and assesses its transition outcomes preclude GAO from reliably reporting on transition performance across DARPA's portfolio of 150 programs that were successfully completed between fiscal years 2010 and 2014. These inconsistencies are due in part to shortfalls in agency processes for tracking technology transition. Nevertheless, GAO's analysis of 10 selected programs identified four factors that contributed to transition success, the most important being military or commercial demand for the planned technology and linkage to a research area where DARPA has sustained interest. Both of these factors were generally evident at the time a program started, while the other two factors were observed later, once the program was underway. The figure below highlights the four factors.
DARPA's implementation of DOD programs intended to foster technology transition has been limited and neither DOD nor DARPA have defined policies for managing transition activities. DARPA has also largely elected not to participate in DOD technology transition programs, with the exception of federally mandated small business programs, citing challenges in meeting program requirements within DARPA's typical three- to five-year timeframe for executing its research initiatives. Instead, DARPA primarily focuses its time and resources on creating radically innovative technologies that support DOD's warfighting mission and relegates technology transition to a secondary priority. DARPA leadership defers to its program managers to foster technology transition, but provides limited related training. Moreover, while its leadership conducts oversight of program managers' activities through periodic program reviews, these reviews do not regularly assess technology transition strategies. GAO has found that this approach does not consistently position programs for transition success. Further, while DARPA disseminates information on its past programs within DOD, to the public, and among private companies, it does not take full advantage of government-sponsored resources for sharing technical data, which may obscure visibility into its programs and lead to missed transition opportunities.

What GAO Recommends

DARPA should regularly assess technology transition strategies, refine training requirements, and increase dissemination of technical data for completed programs. DOD did not agree to take GAO's recommended actions, which remain warranted, as discussed in the report.