	Background: Policy Dilemmas

Over the last two years, the European Union (EU) has been considering lifting its armsembargo on the People's Republic of China (PRC), imposed after the June 1989 Tiananmen Squarecrackdown. The Bush Administration opposes an end to the EU's arms embargo on China, seeing it asa relaxation in the EU's human rights and arms export policies toward China, and out of step withU.S. Overall, there are two sets ofquestions for Congress in examining U.S. policy toward this question. If U.S. interests are adverselyaffected, what are some options for Congress to discourage the EU from lifting its arms embargo onChina and, if it is lifted, to protect U.S. national security interests? At the same time, the current disagreement presents an opportunity forcloser coordination of U.S.-European policies, including controls over military-related exports andstrategy towards China. Because some European companies have transferred defense-related systems to China underthe arms embargo that is not legally binding, the United States has called for the EU to maintain theembargo and strengthen export controls. (8) However, in response to theTiananmen Crackdown, the United States suspended military-to-military contacts and arms sales. In other words, all member states of the now-25 member EU must agree beforethe arms embargo can be lifted. The United Kingdom (U.K.) and the Netherlands have shared U.S.concerns about the strategic implications of an end to the embargo, while some of the Scandinaviancountries and other smaller states with strong human rights advocacy policies have also been lessenthusiastic. However, the EU did not move ahead with lifting the embargo in the spring of 2005. (24) 
As a result, ending the arms embargo on China does not appear to be high on the EU's agendafor the near to medium term. However, many analysts point out that the EU remains politically committed to lifting the embargo,and believe that its end may ultimately be only a matter of time. EU officials stress that if and when the embargois lifted, its end would be accompanied by the simultaneous introduction of a package of measures,including an enhanced EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports, to curtail more effectively Europeanarms sales to China (and elsewhere), and to address U.S. concerns. (42) 
Nonetheless, if the EU lifts its arms embargo on China, there are U.S. concerns that this stepcould:
increase China's leverage if there are more competingbidders
increase China's acquisitions of arms and militarytechnology
improve China's domestic defense industries
strengthen China's ability to threaten or use force against Taiwan, U.S. allies,or U.S. forces
increase China's weapons proliferation to unstable areas (in the Mideast, Asia,and Africa)
increase China's rising influence regionally as well asglobally. Its end, they assert, will pave the way for a strengthened EUarms export control regime -- including a revised and enhanced EU Code of Conduct on ArmsExports -- that will be more effective in controlling arms sales not only to China, but also globally. Political Motivations(68)

The EU is seeking to develop a "strategic partnership" with China. (74) 

		A Symbolic Embargo? These can be summarized as follows:
(1) Consistency of export with international commitments arising from U.N., EU, or theOrganization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) arms embargoes;
(2) Risk that export would be used for internal repression or where the recipient country has engagedin serious violations of human rights;
(3) Risk that export would provoke or prolong armed conflicts;
(4) Risk of recipient using export to undermine regional peace and security;
(5) Effect of export on defense and national security interests of friends, allies, and other EU memberstates;
(6) Commitment of purchaser to fight terrorism and uphold international law;
(7) Risk of diversion to third parties or to a terrorist organization;
(8) Risk that export would undermine the sustainable development of the recipient country. concerns about lifting the arms embargo on China. Implications for U.S. Resolutions Urging the EU to Keep the Embargo.
The European Union (EU) has been considering lifting its arms embargo on China, whichwas imposed in response to the June 1989 Tiananmen Crackdown. France, Germany, and other EUmembers claim that the embargo hinders the development of a "strategic partnership" with China. The Bush Administration and Members of Congress strongly oppose an end to the EU's armsembargo and urge stronger arms export controls. The United States contends that engagement withChina need not send the wrong signals on China's human rights record and military buildup thatthreatens a peaceful resolution of Taiwan and other Asian issues.
The EU argues that the arms embargo -- which is not legally binding -- is weak and largelysymbolic. Indeed, some EU members reportedly have allowed defense-related exports to Chinaunder the arms embargo. While such sales have raised questions about the effectiveness of the EU'sarms embargo on China, they also point to the potential for future sales of military equipment ortechnology to China, particularly without the political restraint of the embargo. EU governments,led by the United Kingdom, stress that if and when the embargo is overturned, its end would beaccompanied by a stronger EU arms export control regime -- including an enhanced EU Code ofConduct on Arms Exports -- that will improve accountability and better control arms sales to Chinaand elsewhere. U.S. critics, however, remain skeptical that even a tighter EU Code will containsufficient enforcement and transparency mechanisms to dissuade EU countries from exportingadvanced defense technologies that could enhance China's military buildup and ultimately threatencommon U.S., European, and Asian interests in peace and stability.
All 25 EU member states must agree before the embargo can be overturned. Although manyobservers had expected that the EU would lift the embargo in the spring of 2005, some membersgrew hesitant amid vocal and high-level U.S. opposition, especially since early 2005. Those arguingagainst lifting the embargo have cited persistent human rights problems in China, including a refusalto reexamine the Tiananmen Crackdown, and China's adoption in March 2005 of its "Anti-SecessionLaw" warning of a possible use of force against Taiwan. At present, ending the arms embargo onChina does not appear to be high on the EU's agenda. Still, the EU is politically committed tooverturning the embargo, and many observers believe that its end is ultimately only a matter of time. In the meantime, U.S. diplomacy could be effective, and the disagreement presents a chance forcloser coordination of U.S.-European policies, including those dealing with arms export controls anda rising China.
Overall, there are two sets of questions for Congress in examining U.S. policy toward the fateof the EU's arms embargo on China. What are the implications for U.S. interests in trans-Atlanticrelations and China? If U.S. interests are adversely affected, what are some options for Congressto discourage the EU from lifting its arms embargo on China and, if it is lifted, to protect U.S.national security interests in both Asia and Europe? Issues raised by these questions are the subjectof this CRS Report. This report will be updated as warranted.