DTS Faced Numerous Challenges

Our reports and testimonies related to DTS have highlighted various  management challenges that have confronted DOD in attempting to make  DTS the standard end-to-end travel system for the department. The issues  we have reported on include underutilization of DTS, weaknesses in DTS’s  requirements management and system testing practices, and the adequacy  of the economic analysis. More specifically, as discussed in our  September 2006 report, we found that the department did not have  reasonable quantitative metrics to measure the extent to which DTS  was actually being used. The reported DTS utilization was based on a  DTS Voucher Analysis Model that was developed in calendar year  2003 using estimated data, but over the years had not been completely  updated with actual data. At the time, we  found that the Air Force was the only military service that submitted  monthly metrics to the PMO-DTS officials for use in updating the DTS  Voucher Analysis Model. The lack of accurate and pertinent  utilization data hindered management’s ability to monitor its progress  toward the DOD vision of DTS as the standard travel system as well as  to provide consistent and accurate data to Congress. The underutilization of DTS also adversely affected the estimated  savings. As discussed in our September 2005 testimony there were at  least 31 legacy travel systems operating within the department at that  time. Requirements management and system testing. As noted in our September 2006  report, our analysis of the September 2003 economic analysis found  that two key assumptions used to estimate cost savings were not based  on reliable information. Two primary areas—personnel savings  of $24.2 million and reduced commercial travel office fees of               $31 million—represented the majority of the over $56 million of  estimated annual net savings DTS was expected to realize. Air Force and Navy DTS program officials stated  that they did not anticipate a reduction in the number of personnel with  the full implementation of DTS, but rather shifting staff to other  functions. Also, as  part of the Navy’s overall evaluation of the economic analysis, program  officials stated that “the Navy has not identified, and conceivably will  not recommend, any personnel billets for reduction.” Finally, the Naval  Cost Analysis Division’s October 2003 report on the economic analysis  noted that it could not validate approximately 40 percent of the Navy’s  total costs, including personnel costs, in the DTS life-cycle cost  estimates because credible supporting documentation was lacking. We also reported in 2006 that according to DOD’s September 2003  economic analysis, it expected to realize annual net savings of            $31 million through reduced fees paid to the commercial travel offices  because the successful implementation of DTS would enable the  majority of airline tickets to be acquired with either no or minimal  intervention by the commercial travel offices. However, we found that the 70 percent  assumption was not well supported. Rather, the sole support provided by the PMO-DTS was an article in a  travel industry trade publication. The article was not based on  information related to DTS, but rather on the experience of one   private-sector company. Using commercial databases to identify unused airline tickets. Concluding Remarks

In our two reports we made 14 recommendations to help improve the  department’s management and oversight of DTS and streamline DOD’s  administrative travel processes. The implementation of our recommendations will  be an important factor in DTS’s achieving its intended goals.
Why GAO Did This Study

In 1995, the Department of Defense (DOD) began an effort to implement a standard departmentwide travel system, the Defense Travel System (DTS). This testimony is based on previously issued GAO reports and testimonies that highlighted challenges confronted by DOD in the implementation of DTS. More specifically, today's testimony focuses on prior GAO reporting concerning (1) the lack of quantitative metrics to measure the extent to which DTS is actually being used, (2) weaknesses with DTS's requirements management and system testing, and (3) two key assumptions related to the estimated cost savings in the September 2003 DTS economic analysis were not reasonable. Today's testimony also highlights some actions that DOD could explore to help streamline its administrative travel processes such as using a commercial database to identify unused airline tickets.

What GAO Found

Overhauling the department's antiquated travel management practices and systems has been a daunting challenge for DOD. In several prior reports and testimonies, GAO identified several key implementation issues regarding DOD's ability to make DTS the standard travel system for the department. Specifically, GAO reported that DTS was not being used to the fullest extent possible, and DOD lacked comprehensive data to effectively monitor its utilization. At the time of GAO's 2006 review, DOD's utilization data were based on a model that was developed in calendar year 2003. However, the model had not been completely updated to reflect actual DTS usage at that time. The lack of up-to-date utilization data hindered management's ability to monitor progress toward the DOD vision of DTS as the standard travel system. Additionally, the continued use of the department's legacy travel systems resulted in the underutilization of DTS and adversely affected the expected savings that DTS could achieve. Furthermore, GAO previously reported weaknesses in DTS's requirements management and system testing practices. GAO found that DTS's requirements were still inadequate. GAO noted that until DOD improves DTS's requirements management practices, the department will not have reasonable assurance that DTS can provide the intended functionality. Additionally, GAO's 2006 report of the September 2003 DTS economic analysis found that the two key assumptions used to estimate annual net savings were not based on reliable information. Two cost components represented the majority of the over $56 million in estimated net savings--personnel savings and reduced commercial travel office fees. GAO's analysis found that $24.2 million in personnel savings related to the Air Force and the Navy were not supported. Air Force and Navy DTS program officials stated that they did not anticipate a reduction in the number of personnel, but rather the shifting of staff from the travel function to other functions. The Naval Cost Analysis Division stated that the Navy will not realize any tangible personnel cost savings from the implementation of DTS. In regard to the commercial travel office fees, GAO's 2006 reporting disclosed that the economic analysis assumed that 70 percent of all DTS airline tickets would either require no intervention or minimal intervention from the commercial travel offices resulting in an estimated annual net savings of $31 million. However, the support provided by the DTS program office was an article in a trade industry publication. The article was not based on information related to DTS, but rather on the experience of one private-sector company. In addition, GAO identified concepts that the department can adopt to streamline its travel management practices.