Since Fiscal Year 1993, DOE Has Spent About $1.3 Billion to Provide Security Upgrades at Nuclear Material Sites in Russia and Other Countries, but DOE’s Reporting of the Number of Buildings Secured May Be Misleading

DOE spent about $1.3 billion between fiscal year 1993 and fiscal year 2006  to provide security upgrades and other related assistance to facilities that  house weapons-usable nuclear material in Russia and other countries and  reports to have “secured” 175 buildings containing about 300 metric tons of  weapons-usable nuclear material in Russia and the former Soviet Union. The number of buildings that DOE reports as secured, however, does not  recognize that additional upgrades remain to be completed at some  buildings because DOE considers a building to be “secure” after it has  received only limited MPC&A upgrades (rapid upgrades), even when  additional comprehensive upgrades have yet to be completed. Finally, DOE and Rosatom have developed a Joint Action Plan that  includes 20 civilian and nuclear weapons complex sites housing buildings  with weapons-usable nuclear material. The  agencies plan to help Russia secure a total of 97 nuclear warhead sites by  the end of 2008. Coordination between DOE and DOD has improved since  2003, when we reported that the agencies had inconsistent policies toward  providing security assistance to Russian nuclear warhead sites. DOE has not used EVM on its fixed- price contracts to install security upgrades at Russian nuclear warhead  sites, but, during the course of our review, the department augmented its  contract performance management system to include additional reporting  mechanisms to identify and address schedule variances, which DOE  officials believe constitute a comparable alternative to an EVM system. DOE and DOD Helped Russia Improve Security at 62 Nuclear Warhead Storage Sites and Provided Assistance to Improve Security of Warheads in Transit

Through the end of fiscal year 2006, DOE had spent about $374 million to  improve security at 50 Russian nuclear warhead sites and plans to install  security upgrades at 23 additional sites by the end of 2008. Coordination between DOE and DOD’s Nuclear Warhead Security Efforts in Russia Has Improved

DOE and DOD have mechanisms for sharing information and avoiding  duplication of effort. DOE and DOD Use Similar Systems to Manage Large Contracts to Improve Security at Russian Nuclear Warhead Sites

In their efforts to provide security upgrades at Russian nuclear warhead  sites, DOE and DOD are taking similar approaches to managing large  contracts. DOE’s Ability to Ensure That U.S.-Funded Security Upgrades at Nuclear Material Sites Are Being Sustained May Be Hampered by Access Difficulties, Funding Concerns, and Other Issues

Several challenges could impact DOE’s ability to prepare Russia to sustain  security upgrades on its own at sites that house weapons-usable nuclear  material, including: (1) access difficulties at some sites, (2) the limited  financial ability of some Russian sites to maintain DOE-funded MPC&A  equipment, (3) the lack of certification of some DOE-funded MPC&A  equipment, and (4) delays in installing the MPC&A Operations Monitoring  (MOM) system at Rosatom facilities. If DOE and DOD cannot reach an agreement with the Russian  MOD on access procedures for sustainability activities at these 44 sites, or  develop acceptable alternatives to physical access, the agencies will be  unable to determine if U.S.-funded security upgrades are being properly  sustained and may not be able to spend funds allotted for these efforts. Recommendations for Executive Action

To increase the effectiveness of U.S. efforts to secure nuclear material and  warheads in Russia and other countries, we recommend that the Secretary  of Energy, working with the Administrator of NNSA, take the following two  actions:  revise the metrics used to measure progress in the MPC&A program to  better reflect the level of completion of security upgrades at buildings  reported as “secure;” and   develop a sustainability management system or modify the Metrics  Information Management System to more clearly track DOE’s progress  in developing a sustainable MPC&A system across all sites where it has  installed MPC&A upgrades, including evaluations of progress for each of  the seven key elements of sustainability outlined in DOE’s Sustainability  Guidelines. We visited Russia to discuss the implementation of U.S. nuclear  material and warhead security assistance programs with Russian officials.
Why GAO Did This Study

Safeguarding nuclear warheads and materials that can be used to make nuclear weapons is a primary national security concern of the United States. Since 1993, the Departments of Energy (DOE) and Defense (DOD) have worked to improve security at sites housing weapons-usable nuclear material and warheads in Russia and other countries. In 1995, DOE established the Materials Protection, Control, and Accounting (MPC&A) program to implement these efforts. GAO examined the (1) progress DOE has made in improving security at nuclear material sites in Russia and other countries, (2) progress DOE and DOD have made in improving security at Russian nuclear warhead sites, and (3) efforts DOE and DOD have undertaken to ensure the continued effective use of U.S.-funded security upgrades. To address these objectives, among other things, GAO analyzed agency documents, conducted interviews with key program officials, and visited four Russian nuclear sites.

What GAO Found

Through fiscal year 2006, DOE and DOD spent over $2.2 billion to provide security upgrades and other assistance at sites in Russia and other countries that house weapons-usable nuclear materials and warheads. With regard to securing nuclear material, DOE reports to have "secured" 175 buildings and plans to improve security at 35 additional buildings by the end of 2008. However, DOE's reported total of buildings "secured" does not recognize that additional upgrades remain to be completed at some buildings because DOE considers a building "secured" after it has received only limited MPC&A upgrades, even when additional comprehensive upgrades are planned. Further, DOE and Russia have developed a Joint Action Plan that includes 20 sites and details the remaining work to be accomplished by 2008. However, the plan does not include two sites containing many buildings with vast amounts of nuclear material where Russia has denied DOE access. DOE and DOD report to have improved security at 62 Russian warhead sites and plan to help secure 35 additional sites by the end of 2008. The departments have improved their coordination mechanisms since our 2003 report, in which GAO reported that the agencies had inconsistent policies for installing site security upgrades at Russian warhead sites. Additionally, DOE and DOD are using similar approaches to manage large security upgrade contracts at warhead sites. DOD has used earned value management (EVM), which at early stages can identify cost and schedule shortfalls. DOE has not used EVM on its fixed-price contracts, but, during the course of GAO's review, augmented its contract oversight to increase reporting frequency, which DOE officials consider a comparable alternative to EVM. DOE has developed broad guidelines to direct its efforts to help ensure that Russia will be able to sustain (operate and maintain) U.S.-funded security systems at its nuclear material and warhead sites after U.S. assistance ends and is working with Russia to develop a joint sustainability plan. However, DOE lacks a management information system to track the progress made toward its goal of providing Russia with a sustainable MPC&A system by 2013. DOE and DOD's abilities to ensure the sustainability of U.S.-funded security upgrades may be hampered by access difficulties, funding concerns, and other issues. Finally, DOE and DOD plan to provide Russia with assistance to sustain security upgrades at nuclear warhead sites but have not reached agreement with Russia on access procedures for sustainability visits to 44 sites. As a result, the agencies may be unable to determine if U.S.-funded security upgrades are being properly sustained.