	Background

Since its implementation in 2009, Secure Flight has changed from a  program that identifies passengers as high risk solely by matching them  against the No Fly and Selectee Lists to one that assigns passengers a  risk category: high risk, low risk, or unknown risk. TSA Lacks Key Information to Determine whether the Secure Flight Program Is Achieving Its Goals

In September 2014, we reported that Secure Flight has established  program goals that reflect new program functions since 2009 to identify  additional types of high-risk and also low-risk passengers; however,  current program performance measures do not allow Secure Flight to fully  assess its progress toward achieving all of its goals. We also found in September 2014 that TSA lacks timely and reliable  information on all known cases of Secure Flight system matching errors. We recommended that TSA develop a mechanism to  systematically document the number and causes of the Secure Flight  system’s matching errors, in accordance with federal internal control  standards. TSA Has Processes in Place to Implement Secure Flight Screening Determinations at Checkpoints, but Could Take Further Action to Address Screening Errors

In September 2014, we reported that TSA has processes in place to  implement Secure Flight screening determinations at airport checkpoints,  but could take steps to enhance these processes. TSA information from  May 2012 through February 2014 that we assessed indicates that  screening personnel have made errors in implementing Secure Flight  determinations at the checkpoint. However, we found that TSA does not have a systematic process for  evaluating the root causes of these screening errors at the checkpoint  across airports, which could allow TSA to identify trends across airports  and target nationwide efforts to address these issues. Therefore, we  recommended in September 2014 that TSA develop a process for  evaluating the root causes of screening errors at the checkpoint and then  implement corrective measures to address those causes. Uncovering and addressing the root  causes of screening errors could allow TSA to strengthen security  screening at airports by reducing the number of these errors at the  checkpoint. Passengers who are determined to have been  incorrectly matched to or listed on high-risk lists based on the TSDB are  added to a list of passengers known as the TSA Cleared List, which  allows them to be cleared (not identified as high risk) nearly 100 percent  of the time. In January 2014,  DHS TRIP also reduced its target for one of its key performance  indicators—average number of days for DHS TRIP redress cases to be  closed—from 93 to 78 days. In January 2014, DHS TRIP  also established intermediate and long-term performance goals for the  appeals process for the first time. TSA Has Implemented Oversight Mechanisms to Address Passenger Privacy Requirements, but Additional Actions Could Better Ensure Full Compliance

TSA has taken steps to implement privacy oversight mechanisms, but, as  we reported in September 2014, additional actions could allow TSA to  sustain and strengthen its efforts. TSA has also implemented  privacy training for new Secure Flight staff, and all DHS employees  receive annual privacy training. However, we found that existing Secure  Flight staff do not receive job-specific privacy refresher training consistent  with Office of Management and Budget (OMB) requirements. We recommended that  TSA provide at least annual job-specific privacy refresher training in order  to further strengthen Secure Flight’s protection of personally identifiable  information. DHS concurred with our recommendation and stated that  TSA’s OIA will develop and deliver job-specific privacy refresher training  for all Secure Flight staff. We also reported in September 2014 that TSA documents some aspects  of its Secure Flight privacy oversight mechanisms, such as scheduled  destructions of passenger data and reviews of planned changes to the  Secure Flight system. However, TSA does not have a mechanism to  comprehensively document and track key privacy-related issues and  decisions that arise through the development and use of Secure Flight—a  mechanism TSA planned to develop when Secure Flight implementation  began in 2009.
Why GAO Did This Study

As requested, this testimony summarizes the findings from two reports GAO issued in September 2014, about the Secure Flight program: Secure Flight: TSA Should Take Additional Steps to Determine Program Effectiveness ( GAO-14-531 ) and Secure Flight: TSA Could Take Additional Steps to Strengthen Privacy Oversight Mechanisms ( GAO-14-647 ). This testimony summarizes the findings of those reports. For those reports, GAO analyzed TSA documents and data related to performance measures, screener performance at airport checkpoints, the redress process, and privacy protections, and interviewed relevant officials.

What GAO Found

Since 2009, the Transportation Security Administration’s (TSA) Secure Flight program has changed from a program that identifies passengers as high risk solely by matching them against the No Fly List, composed of individuals who should be precluded from boarding an aircraft, and the Selectee List, composed of individuals who should receive enhanced screening at the airport security checkpoint, to one that assigns passengers a risk category: high risk, low risk, or unknown risk. Secure Flight has established program goals that reflect these new program functions; however, current program performance measures do not allow Secure Flight to fully assess its progress toward achieving all of its goals. Furthermore, TSA lacks timely and reliable information on all known cases of Secure Flight system matching errors.
TSA has processes in place to implement Secure Flight screening determinations at airport checkpoints, but could take steps to enhance these processes. TSA information from May 2012 through February 2014 indicates that screening personnel have made errors in implementing Secure Flight determinations at the checkpoint. However, TSA does not have a process for systematically evaluating the root causes of these screening errors. Evaluating the root causes of screening errors, and then implementing corrective measures, in accordance with federal internal control standards, to address those causes could allow TSA to strengthen security screening at airports.
The Department of Homeland Security Traveler Redress Inquiry Program (DHS TRIP) affords passengers who may have been incorrectly matched to or listed on high-risk lists based on the Terrorist Screening Database (TSDB)—the U.S. government’s consolidated list of known and suspected terrorists—an opportunity to seek redress. Passengers who, through the redress process, are determined to have been misidentified to a TSDB-based high-risk list are added to the TSA Cleared List, which allows them to be cleared (not identified as high risk) nearly 100 percent of time. In fiscal year 2013, DHS TRIP began working to reduce processing time for its redress and appeals cases. Specifically, DHS has reduced its target for average number of days for redress cases to be closed and has established a performance goal for the appeals process. DHS TRIP plans to periodically review its progress in achieving its appeals performance goal and determine by February 2015 whether further changes to the appeals process are warranted.
TSA has taken steps to implement several of the privacy oversight mechanisms it planned to establish when Secure Flight implementation began in 2009, but additional actions could allow TSA to sustain and strengthen its efforts. TSA has implemented privacy training for new Secure Flight staff, and all DHS employees receive annual privacy training. However, existing Secure Flight staff do not receive job-specific privacy refresher training consistent with Office of Management and Budget (OMB) requirements. Providing job-specific privacy refresher training could further strengthen Secure Flight’s protection of personally identifiable information. TSA also documents some aspects of its Secure Flight privacy oversight mechanisms, such as scheduled destructions of passenger data. However, TSA does not have a mechanism to comprehensively document and track key privacy-related issues and decisions that arise through the development and use of Secure Flight.

What GAO Recommends

In GAO’s September 2014 reports, GAO recommended that TSA develop measures to address all aspects of performance related to Secure Flight program goals, develop a mechanism to systematically document the number and causes of Secure Flight system matching errors, develop a process to regularly evaluate the root causes of screening errors at security checkpoints and implement measures to address these causes, provide job-specific privacy refresher training for Secure Flight staff, and develop a mechanism to document and track key Secure Flight privacy issues and decisions. DHS concurred with GAO’s recommendations.