Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

The Chairman of the House Budget Committee requested that we evaluate the basis for DOD’s bomber force structure requirements, assess Air Force’s progress to implement its new conventional concept of operations for using bombers, and determine the cost to keep the bombers in the force and enhance their conventional capabilities. 3.1). The Air Force has not yet demonstrated that the B-2 can meet some of its most important operational requirements. The total cost to modernize DOD’s heavy bomber force is likely to exceed $7 billion by 2008. Option 1: Retire DOD’s B-1B Force

As discussed in chapter 2, DOD’s principal studies of bomber requirements have significant limitations in their methodology and in some cases include questionable assumptions that may overstate DOD’s need for bombers in conventional conflicts. The decision to assign B-1B bombers to the Air National Guard was supported by cost model comparisons and cost-benefit analyses. Conclusions

Considering the extensive and improving ground-attack capabilities of U.S. forces, the numerous other options that DOD has to attack most targets that the B-1B is likely to be assigned in future conflicts, and DOD’s awareness that it may need to reduce the number of systems currently planned to ensure a stable, modernized force for the future, we believe that retiring the B-1B force is an option that merits consideration in the context of DOD’s ongoing assessment of its future airpower needs.
Why GAO Did This Study

Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO assessed the: (1) basis for the Department of Defense's (DOD) bomber force requirements; (2) Air Force's progress in implementing the new conventional concept of operations for using bombers; and (3) costs to keep bombers in the force and enhance their conventional capabilities.

What GAO Found

GAO found that: (1) DOD based its decision to retain and upgrade 187 bombers on three studies that had significant limitations in their methodology, used questionable assumptions, and failed to examine less costly alternatives; (2) service commanders in chief, who expected to use fewer aircraft than recommended by the three studies, did not express concern that a smaller number of bombers would adversely affect their abilities in future conflicts; (3) the Air Force's bomber modernization program has experienced testing delays, has yet to demonstrate that bombers meet some of the most important mission requirements, and has not fully detailed bomber upgrades; (4) the total cost to modernize DOD's heavy bomber force is likely to exceed $7 billion by 2008; and (5) options that would help DOD to reduce bomber costs while maintaining extensive conventional ground-attack capability include retiring the B-1B force, retiring the 27 B-1B in the reconstitution reserve, placing additional B-1B in the Air National Guard, and consolidating basing for active B-1B.