Although the augmented BCTs are specially resourced with advisor  personnel to advise, assist, and mentor the Iraqi and Afghan security  forces, the brigades still must balance the security force assistance  advising mission with other brigade missions. Army Is Deploying Augmented BCTs to Iraq and Afghanistan, but Some Challenges Exist

The Army has deployed augmented BCTs in response to theater  commanders’ requests; however, these units have faced challenges  because theater commanders’ guidance did not always clearly define how  these units were to perform key aspects of the augmented BCT concept  and theater commanders’ requests did not include some requirements  needed to support the advising mission, given the brigades’ resource  limitations. As a result, brigade commanders have faced challenges  determining how to prioritize their resources when supporting multiple  missions in addition to the advising mission and providing specialized  personnel, equipment, transportation, and security for the advisors. For example, some  advising teams told us that they were limited in their ability to advise in  certain specialty areas and that advisor personnel may be advising Iraqi  and Afghan leadership in functional areas where they have little or no  experience. Augmented BCTs and Advisors Have Sometimes Lacked Unity of Command

Augmented BCTs and their advisor personnel sometimes lacked the unity  of command envisioned under the Army’s augmented BCT concept  because theater commanders did not always provide clear guidance on  command and control structures for the advisors. As a result, in some  cases, advisors were reassigned to be under the control of a division or a  brigade other than the one that they trained and deployed with. According to Army officials, as a result of  field grade officer shortages, the Army has faced challenges meeting the  requirement to provide field grade advisors to the augmented BCTs at  least 45 days prior to the brigades’ mission rehearsal exercise. Specifically, the shift to augmented BCTs has:    Decreased the total number of advisors required for the advising  mission because, rather than relying completely on transition teams  comprised of individually sourced personnel to man the advisor  teams, the augmented BCT concept envisions advisor teams led by  advisor augments (who are individually sourced) and further manned  by pulling additional personnel from the brigade, as needed;    Alleviated the strain on the Army’s pool of company grade officers  (e.g., Captains) and non-commissioned officers (e.g., Sergeants 1st  class) because these ranks were required in greater numbers on the  transition teams than the augmented BCTs; and  Increased requirements for field grade officer advisors, since the  ranks of the advisors required for augmented BCTs are generally  higher than the ranks of transition team personnel—particularly in  Iraq, where all advisors are field grade officers. Some officials suggested that, given the challenge of providing all the  advisors to the augmented BCTs within specified time frames, it would be  helpful if at least two or three of the highest-ranking advisors arrived  significantly earlier than currently required to help integrate the advisors  into the BCT’s mission and structure. Conclusions

Developing capable Iraqi and Afghan security forces is a key component  of the U.S. military effort in Iraq and Afghanistan. DOD concurred with our recommendation that the Secretary of Defense,  in consultation with Secretary of the Army and U.S. Central Command,  direct that theater commanders in Iraq and Afghanistan assess their  needs for how advisor teams should be structured and supported and,  based on this assessment, ensure that any future requests for augmented  BCTs clearly define related requirements, including the number of  advisors, ranks of advisors, capabilities of advisors, and equipment for  advisors. To determine the extent to which the Army has provided augmented  BCTs for operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and what challenges, if any,  these units have faced in implementing the concept, we reviewed Army  unit deployment schedules, after action reviews and lessons learned from  redeployed augmented BCTs, and mission briefings from deployed  augmented BCTs and division commanders, dating back to 2009. To determine the extent to which requirements for augmented BCTs have  impacted overall Army personnel requirements, including the Army’s  ability to provide advisor personnel to BCTs in required time frames, we  examined data provided to us by HRC regarding Army shortfalls faced in  certain officer ranks currently and in coming years.
Why GAO Did This Study

Developing capable Iraqi and Afghan security forces is a key component of the U.S. military effort in Iraq and Afghanistan and, in 2009, the Army began augmenting brigade combat teams (BCT) with advisor personnel to advise the host nation security forces in these countries. House Armed Services Committee report 111-491 directed GAO to report on the Army's plans to augment BCTs to perform advising missions in Iraq and Afghanistan. This report (1) identifies the key characteristics of the augmented BCT concept; (2) assesses the extent to which the Army has provided augmented BCTs, and what challenges, if any, these units have faced; and (3) assesses the extent to which requirements for augmented BCTs have impacted overall Army personnel requirements, including the Army's ability to provide advisor personnel. GAO examined augmented BCT doctrine and guidance, analyzed advisor requirements, reviewed after- action reviews and lessons learned from augmented BCTs, and interviewed Army, theater command, and augmented BCT officials.

What GAO Found

Army guidance identifies key characteristics of the augmented BCT concept, such as how advisors are to be organized, commanded, and supported. For example, BCT commanders are to organize the advisors into teams, with other necessary resources being provided to the teams by the brigade. The theater commander determines the specific numbers and types of advisors based upon the operational environment and mission requirements. BCTs are envisioned to exercise command of advisor teams and provide support such as specialized personnel, equipment, and transportation and security. However, it is recognized that BCTs may have other priorities and must balance the demand for resources between the advising mission and other missions. The Army has deployed augmented BCTs in response to theater commanders' requests, but units have faced some challenges because commanders did not always set clear priorities between the advising mission and other missions or define specific requirements for how the BCTs should support the advising mission. For example, theater commanders did not require that advisor teams include specialized personnel, such as logisticians or intelligence officers. Because the BCTs already have high demand for these personnel, the brigades are challenged to meet the advisors' requirements for those same personnel. As a result, some advising teams told GAO that they were limited in their ability to advise in some specialty areas or that they may be advising Iraqi and Afghan security forces in functional areas where the advisors have little or no experience. Also, theater commanders' requests did not always specify command relationships. As a result, in some cases, advisors were reassigned to the control of a division or a brigade that they had not trained and deployed with, which disrupted the unity of command envisioned under the augmented BCT concept. The use of augmented BCTs has decreased the total number of advisor personnel required for the advising mission, but increased requirements for field grade officers, already in short supply. According to Army officials, as a result of these shortages, the Army has faced challenges meeting the requirement to provide field grade advisors at least 45 days prior to the brigades' mission rehearsal exercise. In many cases, advisors did not join the brigades until after the exercise, hindering their integration into the BCTs and complicating efforts to establish support and command structures. Some officials suggested that it would be helpful if at least two or three of the highest-ranking advisors arrived significantly earlier than currently required in order to facilitate integration. Moreover, GAO found that augmented BCTs are organizing their advisors into smaller numbers of larger teams than envisioned in the theater commander requirements. As a result, augmented BCTs may not need the number and rank of advisors currently required by those requests.

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that theater commands assess and refine, as appropriate, advisor requirements and define advisor support and command structures. GAO also recommends that the Army provide certain advisor personnel to brigades earlier in pre-deployment training. DOD concurred with the recommendations.