These operations have required large numbers of forces with support  skills, such as military police and civil affairs. Army Combat Support and Combat Service Support Skills Are in Increasingly Short Supply, and Data on Skilled Individuals Available for Future Deployments Are Not Integrated into the Sourcing Process

Ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have created continuing high  demand for certain combat support and combat service support skills,  including military police, engineering, and civil affairs, and officials  charged with sourcing future rotations have a limited view of what  personnel remain available for future rotations. The supply of personnel already trained in high- demand skills and eligible to deploy has decreased as operations have  continued because many personnel with these skills are reservists whose  deployments and duration of involuntary active duty service under the  partial mobilization authority are limited by DOD and Army policy. However, DOD officials charged with  identifying forces for future rotations have not had a source of readily  available, comprehensive personnel data on deployment histories and  skills across the services. Further, without complete, reliable, and accessible  data that provide greater visibility over its available forces, DOD will lack  analytical bases for requesting changes in or exceptions to current  deployment policies when needed. However, DOD officials charged with  identifying the personnel who could be reassigned or retrained to meet  requirements were challenged because they did not have information that  linked data on personnel who remained eligible to deploy and their skills  across the services. Moreover, it  does not provide an ability to make future projections about whether DOD  will be able to meet future requirements or will need to consider other  alternatives. Until DOD systematically  integrates such data into its process for identifying forces, it will continue  to use an inefficient process and make important decisions about how to  meet the combatant commander’s requirements based on limited  information. DOD Has Not Conducted a Comprehensive, Data- Driven Analysis of Options to Enhance the Availability of Personnel with High- Demand Skills for Future Rotations

Although DOD found ways to meet the combatant commander’s  requirements for high-demand skills through the 06-08 rotation, it has not  undertaken a comprehensive analysis of options to support future  rotations in Iraq and Afghanistan should they continue for a number of  years. Identifying forces for future rotations is likely to become more difficult for  DOD without comprehensive analyses of options for meeting potential  future requirements. Additionally,  without linking data to options, the services may have difficultly deploying  all reservists at least once before other reservists are required to deploy  for a second time, which is a key goal of officials in OSD. If DOD had data- driven analyses of options to increase available skilled personnel, DOD  leaders would have a better basis for considering policy changes and  congressional decision makers would have more complete information  with which to carry out their oversight responsibilities with regard to the  size and composition of the force, mobilization policies, and other issues. Recommendations for Executive Action

To facilitate DOD’s decision making to meet the demands associated with  the Global War on Terrorism and to increase the availability of skilled  personnel, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense take the following  two actions:  Integrate comprehensive data that identify active and reserve personnel  according to deployment history and skill set, including personnel who are  available to deploy, with DOD’s sourcing process before identifying  combat support and combat service support personnel for the next  rotation to Iraq and Afghanistan. Such  analyses should include an assessment of options, such as using more  personnel with support skills from the Army and other services;  transferring more positions to high-demand areas; changing deployment  lengths; and increasing Army end strength, which would increase the  availability of personnel in high-demand skills. To assess the extent to which DOD has conducted a comprehensive, data- driven analysis of its alternatives to continue meeting requirements for  high-demand forces, we met with officials in the Office of the Under  Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness (Readiness,  Programming and Assessment), the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the U.S. Army’s  Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, and the U.S.  Joint Forces Command Joint Deployment Operations Division to  determine whether the department had plans to conduct assessments. GAO Comments

1. 2.
Why GAO Did This Study

Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the war on terrorism has dominated the global security environment. Ongoing overseas operations and heavy reliance on reservists have raised concerns about how the Department of Defense (DOD) will continue to meet its requirements using an all-volunteer force. The Army, in particular, has faced continuing demand for large numbers of forces, especially for forces with support skills. GAO was mandated to examine the extent of DOD's reliance on personnel with high-demand skills and its efforts to reduce or eliminate reliance on these personnel. Accordingly, GAO assessed (1) the combat support and combat service support skills that are in high demand and the extent to which DOD officials have visibility over personnel who are available for future deployment and (2) the extent to which DOD has conducted a comprehensive, data-driven analysis of alternatives for providing needed skills.

What GAO Found

Ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have required large numbers of ground forces, creating particularly high demand for certain combat support and combat service support skills, such as military police and civil affairs. After determining which requirements can be met with contractor personnel, DOD then determines how to meet requirements for military personnel. DOD officials charged with identifying forces have not had full visibility over the pool of skilled personnel available for future deployments. For some skills, the combatant commander's operational requirements have exceeded the initial supply of readily available trained military forces. DOD has met demands for these skills through strategies such as reassigning or retraining personnel. However, many of the skilled personnel in high demand are reservists whose involuntary active duty is limited under the current partial mobilization authority and DOD and Army policy. To meet requirements, officials charged with identifying personnel for future rotations developed an inefficient, labor-intensive process to gather information needed for decision making because integrated, comprehensive personnel data were not readily available. DOD is taking steps to develop comprehensive data that identify personnel according to deployment histories and skills; however, until DOD systematically integrates such data into its process for identifying forces, it will continue to make important decisions about personnel for future rotations based upon limited information and lack the analytical bases for requesting changes in or exceptions to deployment policies. Although DOD has developed several strategies to meet the combatant commander's requirements for previous rotations, it has not undertaken comprehensive, data-driven analysis of options that would make more personnel available for future rotations in Iraq and Afghanistan. A key reason why DOD has not conducted comprehensive analyses of options is that its process for identifying forces focuses on one rotation at a time and does not take a long-term view of potential requirements. Prior GAO work has shown that reliable data about current and future workforce requirements are essential for effective strategic planning, as is the data-driven analysis of the number of personnel and the skill mix needed to support key competencies. With data that link deployment dates and skills, DOD could assess options, including using more personnel with support skills from the Army and other services, transferring more positions to high-demand areas, and changing deployment lengths. Each of these options has both advantages and disadvantages. However, without a comprehensive analysis of the options and their related advantages and disadvantages, DOD will be challenged to plan effectively for future requirements and to meet recruiting goals. Additionally, without linking data and options, the services may have difficulty deploying all reservists once before other reservists are required to deploy for a second time, which is a key DOD goal. Moreover, the Secretary of Defense and Congress will not have complete information with which to make decisions about the size and composition of the force, mobilization policies, and other issues.