108-458 was designed to address the findings of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, known as the 9/11 Commission, that there has been inadequate coordination of the national intelligence effort and that the intelligence community, as then organized, could not serve as an agile information gathering network in the struggle against international terrorists. A key issue was the extent of the authorities of the DNI, especially with regard to management and budgeting for technical collection systems managed by Defense Department agencies. 401a(4)) consists of the following:
The Office of the Director of National Intelligence
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State (INR)
Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)
National Security Agency (NSA)
National Reconnaissance Office (NRO)
National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA)
The National Security Branch, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
Army Intelligence
Navy Intelligence
Air Force Intelligence
Marine Corps Intelligence
Coast Guard Intelligence 
The Office of Intelligence and Analysis, Department of the Treasury
The Office of Intelligence, Department of Energy
The Office of National Security Intelligence, Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA)
The Office of Intelligence and Analysis, Department of Homeland Security
Except for the CIA, intelligence offices or agencies are components of Cabinet departments with other roles and missions. The Treasury Department collects and processes information that may affect U.S. fiscal and monetary policies. Enduring Oversight Issues

		Duplication of Effort

The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 tasks the DNI with ensuring the elimination of waste and unnecessary duplication within the intelligence community. Some observers believe the DNI has focused more on other statutory requirements—specifically its mandate to facilitate information sharing—while neglecting this responsibility to eliminate waste, resulting in the proliferation of intelligence organizations, particularly in the areas of counterterrorism and analysis, that fulfill many of the same functions. A White House review of the 2009 Christmas day bombing attempt, for example, found that "Information sharing does not appear to have contributed to this intelligence failure," and that information about a pending attack had been shared with those in a position to disrupt the plot. A classified report prepared by the President's Intelligence Advisory Board (PIAB) in 2012 allegedly found that, after a decade of counterterrorism and intelligence support to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the CIA specifically and the intelligence community more generally has now become too focused on tactical operation and military. The ability to locate fixed installations and moving targets has become an integral component of U.S. military capabilities. These programs have substantial budgetary implications. Unauthorized disclosures of classified information will likely continue to be a concern, despite recent executive branch efforts to address this problem. Intelligence officials have maintained in congressional testimony that there is no unnecessary duplication of effort and that careful coordination is undertaken during the planning and implementing of such operations. That confirmation was held up while Members demanded to see Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel opinions about the Administration's targeted killing program. It remains to be seen whether these actions will be effective or whether stronger action will be needed. Some of the initiatives relating to acquisition did not, however, meet their objectives. (Members of Congress have access to these annexes, but must make special arrangements to read them.) Other oversight committees are responsible for intelligence agencies that are part of departments over which they have jurisdiction. The President signed the legislation on December 17, 2004, and it became P.L.
To address the challenges facing the U.S. intelligence community in the 21st century, congressional and executive branch initiatives have sought to improve coordination among the different agencies and to encourage better analysis. In December 2004, the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (P.L. 108-458) was signed, providing for a Director of National Intelligence (DNI) with authorities to manage the national intelligence effort. The legislation also established a Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).
Making cooperation effective presents substantial leadership and managerial challenges. The needs of diverse intelligence "consumers" must all be met, using many of the same systems and personnel. The DNI has substantial statutory authorities to address these issues, but the organizational relationships remain complex, especially for intelligence agencies that are part of the Defense Department. Members of Congress in their oversight role may seek to observe the extent to which effective coordination is accomplished.
The intelligence community, which comprises 17 agencies, has experienced a decade of budgetary growth. That era was typified by (1) institution building with embryonic organization such as the Office of the DNI and other new or evolving intelligence components, (2) information sharing and collaboration across those institutions, and (3) a focus on counterterrorism.
While those issues will remain areas of congressional interest, Members will likely confronted by a new set of intelligence challenges resulting from budgetary realities and from second-order effects stemming from post-9/11 changes. These include:
Consolidation and redundancy. Intelligence collection systems are expensive and some critics suggest there have been elements of waste and unneeded duplication of effort. The Administration is considering long-term reductions with an emphasis on potentially redundant information technology systems. There is great concern, however, that any reductions be carefully made to avoid curtailing capabilities that have become integral to military operations and to policymaking in many areas. Information security and management. The WikiLeaks disclosures that began in 2010 and other recent incidents of unauthorized disclosure of classified information have drawn considerable attention to the risks that widespread information sharing entails. Investigations into the 2009 Christmas day bombing attempt and the Fort Hood shooting also suggest analysts are now challenged to synthesize the large volumes of information being shared. Intelligence support to counterterrorism and operations. The Administration's targeting killing program raises legal, jurisdictional, and efficacy issues. Broader questions have also been raised about whether intelligence agencies have become too focused on counterterrorism to the detriment of other national security priorities and whether some of those functions should be transitioned to U.S. military control, allowing intelligence agencies to focus on traditional collection and analysis.