Air Support Differences Were Greater among Locations Than among Customers or Missions

OAM met 73 percent of the 38,662 total air support requests that it  received in fiscal year 2010, according to our analysis of AMOR data.OAM tracks its ability to meet air support requests by location, customer,  and mission in its AMOR system. As a result, Border Patrol may have more unmet requests  than other agencies. For example, Border  Patrol and ICE officials in one northern border location said they were  generally satisfied with OAM’s air support. Lastly, OAM  has taken actions to increase its ability to meet marine requests, including  purchasing “all-weather” vessels and cold-weather marine gear. OAM Could Benefit from Reassessing Its Mix and Placement of Resources to Better Address Mission Needs and Threats

OAM has not documented its analyses to support its resource mix and  placement decisions across locations, and challenges in providing higher  rates of support to high priority sectors indicate that a reassessment of its  asset mix and placement may provide benefits. Furthermore,  while OAM’s Fiscal Year 2010 Aircraft Deployment Plan stated that OAM  deployed aircraft and maritime vessels to ensure its forces were   While these  positioned to best meet the needs of CBP field commanders and respond  to the latest intelligence on emerging threats, OAM did not have  documentation that clearly linked the deployment decisions in the plan to  mission needs or threats. However, such  documentation of significant events could help OAM improve the  transparency of its resource allocation decisions to help demonstrate the  effectiveness of these resource decisions in fulfilling its mission needs  and addressing threats. For example, in fiscal year 2010, 50 percent of  OAM’s assets and 59 percent of OAM’s flight hours were in the southwest  border, Border Patrol’s highest-priority region. OAM’s fiscal year 2010 aircraft deployment plan stated that OAM  deployed aircraft and maritime vessels to ensure its forces were  positioned to best meet the needs of CBP Field Commanders and  respond to emerging threats; however, our analysis indicates that OAM  did not provide higher rates of air support in response to customer need  in locations designated as high priority based on threats. As such, to the extent that the benefits  outweigh the costs, reassessing the mix and placement of its assets and  personnel, and using performance results to inform these decisions could  help provide OAM with reasonable assurance that it is most effectively  allocating its scarce resources and aligning them to fulfill its mission  needs and related threats. In fiscal year 2010, for  example, OAM reported that it exceeded its performance goal and met  Border Patrol support requests greater than 98 percent of the time, but  the actual rate of support based on our subsequent analysis was 82  percent. Across mission-related activities, 54 percent of responding units reported  sharing intelligence on a frequent basis and 43 percent reported sharing  schedules, on a frequent basis. However, our survey and interviews also highlighted activities  where additional coordination could help leverage existing resources,  eliminate unnecessary duplication and enhance operational efficiencies,  including an assessment of whether proximate OAM and USCG units  should be colocated. Thus, DHS could benefit from assessing actions it  could take to improve coordination across a range of air and marine  activities, including reconstituting the DHS Aviation Management Council  and Marine Vessel Management Council. Recommendations for Executive Action

To help ensure that OAM assets and personnel are best positioned to  effectively meet mission needs and address threats, and improve  transparency in allocating scarce resources, we recommend that the  Commissioner of U.S. Customs and Border Protection take the following  three actions: document analyses, including mission requirements and threats, that  support decisions on the mix and placement of OAM’s air and marine  resources;  to the extent that benefits outweigh the costs, reassess the mix and  placement of OAM’s air and marine resources to include mission  requirements, performance results, and anticipated CBP strategic and  technological changes; and disclose data limitations relating to the accuracy of OAM’s reported  performance results for support provided. Specifically, we reviewed the extent that the  Office of Air and Marine (OAM):  (1) met air and marine support requests across locations, customers, and  missions,  (2) has taken steps to ensure that its mix and placement of resources met  its mission needs and addressed threats, and  (3) coordinated the operational use of its air and marine assets and  personnel with the USCG. As part of this  effort, GAO is reviewing the coordination between OAM and the U.S.  Coast Guard (USCG). USCG guidance - Used?
Why GAO Did This Study

Within DHS, the U.S. Customs and Border Protections (CBP) OAM deploys the largest law enforcement air force in the world. In support of homeland security missions, OAM provides aircraft, vessels, and crew at the request of the its customers, primarily Border Patrol, which is responsible for enforcing border security, and tracks its ability to meet requests. GAO was asked to determine the extent to which OAM (1) met its customers requests; (2) has taken steps to ensure its mix and placement of resources effectively met mission needs and addressed threats; and (3) coordinated the use of its assets with the USCG, which is to execute its maritime security mission using its assets. GAO reviewed DHS policies, interviewed OAM, Border Patrol, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, and USCG officials in headquarters and in 4 field locations selected on factors, such as threats and operating environments. Results from these field visits are not generalizable. GAO analyzed OAM support request data for fiscal year 2010, and surveyed OAM and USCG officials at 86 proximately located units to determine the extent of cooperation between the two agencies. This report is a public version of a law enforcement sensitive report GAO issued in February 2012. Information deemed sensitive has been redacted.

What GAO Found

GAOs analysis of the Office of Air and Marine (OAM) data found that OAM met 73 percent of the 38,662 air support requests and 88 percent of the 9,913 marine support requests received in fiscal year 2010. The level of support differed by location, customers, and type of mission. For example, in its northern region OAM met air support requests 77 percent of the time and in its southeast region, it met these requests 60 percent of the time. The main reasons for unmet air and marine support requests were maintenance and adverse weather, respectively. OAM has taken actions, such as developing an aircraft modernization plan and purchasing all-weather vessels, to address these issues.
OAM could benefit from taking additional steps to better ensure that its mix and placement of resources meets mission needs and addresses threats. GAOs analysis of OAMs fiscal year 2010 performance results indicate that OAM did not meet its national performance goal to fulfill greater than 95 percent of Border Patrol air support requests and did not provide higher rates of support in locations designated as high priority based on threats. For example, one high-priority Border Patrol sector had the fifth highest support rate across all nine sectors on the southwest border. OAM could benefit from reassessing the mix and placement of its assets and personnel, using performance results to inform these decisions. Such a reassessment could help provide OAM with reasonable assurance that it is most effectively allocating scarce resources and aligning them to fulfill mission needs and related threats. Additionally, OAM has not documented its analyses to support its asset mix and placement across locations. For example, OAMs fiscal year 2010 deployment plan stated that OAM deployed aircraft and maritime vessels to ensure that its forces were positioned to best meet field commanders needs and respond to emerging threats, but OAM did not have documentation that clearly linked the deployment decisions in the plan to these goals. Such documentation could improve transparency to help demonstrate the effectiveness of its decisions in meeting mission needs and addressing threats.
GAOs analysis of OAM and U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) air and marine survey responses indicated that they coordinated with their proximately located counterparts more frequently for activities directly related to carrying out their respective agencies missions (mission-related activities) than for mission support activities. For example, within mission-related activities, 54 percent of the 86 respondents reported sharing intelligence on a frequent basis and, within mission-support activities, about 15 percent reported that they frequently coordinated for maintenance requests. Survey respondents, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) analyses, and GAO site visits confirm that opportunities exist to improve certain types of coordination, such as colocating proximate OAM and USCG units, which currently share some marine and no aviation facilities. In addition, DHS does not have an active program office dedicated to the coordination of aviation or maritime issues. DHS could benefit from assessing actions it could take to improve coordination across a range of air and marine activities, including reconstituting departmental oversight councils, to better leverage existing resources, eliminate unnecessary duplication, and enhance efficiencies.

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends, among other things, that CBP reassess decisions and document its analyses for its asset mix and placement, and that DHS enhance oversight to ensure effective coordination of OAM and USCG resources, and DHS concurred.