The Air Force is  responsible for GPS acquisition and is in the process of modernizing GPS  to enhance its performance, accuracy, and integrity. Air Force Faces Significant Challenges in Acquiring GPS Satellites

In recent years under the IIF program, the Air Force has struggled to  successfully build GPS satellites within cost and schedule goals. It  encountered significant technical problems that still threaten its delivery  schedule and it struggled with a different contractor for the IIF program. As a result  of these problems, the cost to complete GPS IIF will be about $1.6  billion—about $870 million over the original cost estimate of $729 million. The launch of the first IIF satellite has been delayed until November  2009—almost 3 years late. First, it is aiming to deploy the GPS IIIA satellites 3  years faster than the IIF satellites. If the Air Force does not meet its schedule goals for development of  GPS IIIA satellites, there will be an increased likelihood that in 2010, as old  satellites begin to fail, the overall GPS constellation will fall below the  number of satellites required to provide the level of GPS service that the  U.S. government is committing to providing. Such a gap in capability could have wide-ranging impacts on GPS users,  though the exact impact is hard to precisely define, as it would depend on  which satellites stop operating. There are measures the  Air Force and others can take to plan for and minimize these impacts,  which are detailed in our report. New Satellite Capabilities Will Not Be Leveraged Because of Delayed Delivery of Ground and User Equipment Capabilities

To maximize the benefit of GPS, the delivery of its ground control and  user equipment capabilities must be synchronized with the delivery of the  satellites so that the full spectrum of military assets and individual users  can take advantage of new capabilities. Our review found that  because of funding shifts and diffuse leadership, the Air Force has not  been successful in synchronizing satellite, ground control, and user  equipment segments. The Air Force used funding set aside for the ground control and user  equipment segment to resolve GPS satellite development problems,  causing a delay in the delivery of new GPS capabilities. Because leadership for acquisitions across the space community is  fragmented, there is no single authority responsible for synchronizing all  segments related to GPS. On the other hand, there are clearly other  enhancements that could be made to GPS satellites that could serve a  variety of vital missions—particularly because of the coverage GPS  satellites provide—and there is an expressed desire for GPS to serve as the  world’s preeminent positioning, navigation, and timing system. While there is a consensus that DOD and other federal  organizations involved with GPS have taken prudent steps to manage  requirements and optimize GPS use, we also identified challenges in the  areas of ensuring civilian requirements can be met and ensuring that GPS  is compatible with other new, potentially competing global space-based  positioning, navigation, and timing systems. We also reviewed and analyzed  program plans and documentation related to cost, schedule, requirements,  program direction, and satellite constellation sustainment, and compared  programmatic data to GAO’s criteria compiled over the last 12 years for  best practices in system development. To assess coordination among federal agencies  and the broader GPS community, we interviewed OSD and DOD officials  from offices that manage and oversee the GPS program, officials from the  military services, officials from civil departments and agencies, and  officials at the U.S. Department of State and at various European space  organizations.
Why GAO Did This Study

The Global Positioning System (GPS), which provides position, navigation, and timing data to users worldwide, has become essential to U.S. national security and a key tool in an expanding array of public service and commercial applications at home and abroad. The United States provides GPS data free of charge. The Air Force, which is responsible for GPS acquisition, is in the process of modernizing GPS. In light of the importance of GPS, the modernization effort, and international efforts to develop new systems, GAO was asked to undertake a broad review of GPS. Specifically, GAO assessed progress in (1) acquiring GPS satellites, (2) acquiring the ground control and user equipment necessary to leverage GPS satellite capabilities, and evaluated (3) coordination among federal agencies and other organizations to ensure GPS missions can be accomplished. To carry out this assessment, GAO's efforts included reviewing and analyzing program documentation, conducting its own analysis of Air Force satellite data, and interviewing key officials.

What GAO Found

It is uncertain whether the Air Force will be able to acquire new satellites in time to maintain current GPS service without interruption. If not, some military operations and some civilian users could be adversely affected. (1) In recent years, the Air Force has struggled to successfully build GPS satellites within cost and schedule goals; it encountered significant technical problems that still threaten its delivery schedule; and it struggled with a different contractor. As a result, the current IIF satellite program has overrun its original cost estimate by about $870 million and the launch of its first satellite has been delayed to November 2009--almost 3 years late. (2) Further, while the Air Force is structuring the new GPS IIIA program to prevent mistakes made on the IIF program, the Air Force is aiming to deploy the next generation of GPS satellites 3 years faster than the IIF satellites. GAO's analysis found that this schedule is optimistic, given the program's late start, past trends in space acquisitions, and challenges facing the new contractor. Of particular concern is leadership for GPS acquisition, as GAO and other studies have found the lack of a single point of authority for space programs and frequent turnover in program managers have hampered requirements setting, funding stability, and resource allocation. (3) If the Air Force does not meet its schedule goals for development of GPS IIIA satellites, there will be an increased likelihood that in 2010, as old satellites begin to fail, the overall GPS constellation will fall below the number of satellites required to provide the level of GPS service that the U.S. government commits to. Such a gap in capability could have wide-ranging impacts on all GPS users, though there are measures the Air Force and others can take to plan for and minimize these impacts. In addition to risks facing the acquisition of new GPS satellites, the Air Force has not been fully successful in synchronizing the acquisition and development of the next generation of GPS satellites with the ground control and user equipment, thereby delaying the ability of military users to fully utilize new GPS satellite capabilities. Diffuse leadership has been a contributing factor, given that there is no single authority responsible for synchronizing all procurements and fielding related to GPS, and funding has been diverted from ground programs to pay for problems in the space segment. DOD and others involved in ensuring GPS can serve communities beyond the military have taken prudent steps to manage requirements and coordinate among the many organizations involved with GPS. However, GAO identified challenges in the areas of ensuring civilian requirements can be met and ensuring GPS compatibility with other new, potentially competing global space-based positioning, navigation, and timing systems.