The first increment is an information network linking a new  generation of 18 manned and unmanned ground vehicles, air vehicles,  sensors, and munitions. At a fundamental  level, the FCS concept is replacing mass with superior information; that is,  to see and hit the enemy first, rather than to rely on heavy armor to  withstand attack. For example, it provides an architecture within which individual  systems will be designed—an improvement over designing systems  independently and making them interoperable after the fact. To be as survivable as the current heavy force,  the Unit of Action is primarily dependent upon the ability to kill the enemy  before being detected. For example, the FCS vehicles’ small size and lighter weight are factors  that improve agility, responsiveness, and deployability. This transformation of the Army, both in terms of operations and in  equipment, is underway with the full cooperation of the Army warfighter  community. FCS at Significant Risk of Not Delivering Required Capability Within Estimated Resources

The FCS program has yet to—and will not—demonstrate high levels of  knowledge at key decision points. The Army began system development and demonstration in  May 2003 and plans to make its initial FCS production decision in  November 2008—a schedule of about 5 ½ years. If the lessons learned from best practices and the experiences of past  programs have any bearing, the FCS strategy is susceptible to “late cycle  churn,” a phrase used by private industry to describe the discovery of  significant problems late in development and the attendant search for fixes  when costs are high and time is short. FCS Is an Unprecedented Technical Challenge

In the Army’s own words, FCS is “the greatest technology and integration  challenge the Army has ever undertaken.” It intends to develop a complex,  family of systems–an extensive information network and 14 major weapon  systems—in less time than is typically taken to develop, demonstrate, and  field a single system. At least 53 technologies that are considered critical to achieving critical  performance capabilities will need to be matured and integrated into the  system of systems. The  Army’s Acquisition Strategy Report states that at the Initial Production  Decision, all elements of the FCS may not be ready for initial production  and will require a continuation of system development and demonstration  efforts to complete integration and testing in accordance with the  program–tailoring plan. Alternatives to FCS Strategy Merit Consideration

We have reported on options that warrant consideration as alternatives for  developing FCS capabilities with less risk. It has to be as lethal and survivable as  the current force and its combat vehicles have to be a fraction of the  weight of current vehicles to be air transportable on the C-130 aircraft. The opportunity for increasing funds to cover cost increases poses a  challenge because FCS already dominates the Army’s investment budget. It might be difficult to find enough other programs to cut or defer to offset  FCS increases. Focus on the development and demonstration of its most critical  capabilities first, such as the network. This would take more time than if the current FCS schedule  were successfully carried out. Focus on maturing the most critical technologies first, then bundle them in  demonstrations of capabilities, such as Advanced Concept Technology  Demonstrations, then proceed with an acquisition program that would  attain sufficient knowledge at the right acquisition junctures. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

To develop the information on whether the FCS program was following a  knowledge-based acquisition strategy and the current status of that  strategy, we contacted, interviewed, and obtained documents from  officials of the Offices of the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition,  Technology, and Logistics); the Secretary of Defense Cost Analysis  Improvement Group; the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition,  Logistics, and Technology); the Program Executive Officer for Ground  Combat Systems; the Program Manager for Future Combat Systems; and  the Future Combat Systems Lead Systems Integrator.
Why GAO Did This Study

To become a more responsive and dominant combat force, the U.S. Army is changing its strategy from bigger and stronger weapons to faster and more agile ones. The Future Combat Systems (FCS)--which the Army calls the "greatest technology and integration challenge ever undertaken"--is expected to meet the Army's transformational objectives. Forming FCS' backbone is an information network that links 18 systems. Not only is FCS to play a pivotal role in the Army's military operations, FCS and its future iterations are expected to eventually replace all Army forces. For FCS' first developmental increment, the Army has set aside a 5 1/2-year timetable from program start (May 2003) until the initial production decision (November 2008). GAO was asked to testify about FCS' key features, whether the program carries any risks, and, if so, whether there are alternatives for developing FCS capabilities with fewer risks.

What GAO Found

The FCS concept is a new generation of manned and unmanned ground vehicles, air vehicles, and munitions, each of which taps into a secure network of superior combat information. These weapon systems are to be a fraction of the weight of current weapons yet as lethal and survivable. FCS' lightweight and small size are critical to meeting the Army's goals of deploying faster and being more transportable for big or small military operations. Rather than rely on heavy armor to withstand an enemy attack, FCS' systems will depend on superior communications to kill the enemy before being detected. One of FCS' key advantages is that it provides an architecture within which individual systems will be designed--an improvement over designing systems independently and making them interoperable after the fact. Another merit is that FCS is being acquired and developed with the full cooperation of the Army's program managers, contractors, and the warfighter community. FCS is at significant risk for not delivering required capability within budgeted resources. Three-fourths of FCS' needed technologies were still immature when the program started. The first prototypes of FCS will not be delivered until just before the production decision. Full demonstration of FCS' ability to work as an overarching system will not occur until after production has begun. This demonstration assumes complete success-- including delivery and integration of numerous complementary systems that are not inherently a part of FCS but are essential for FCS to work as a whole. When taking into account the lessons learned from commercial best practices and the experiences of past programs, the FCS strategy is likely to result in cost and schedule consequences if problems are discovered late in development. Because it is promising to deliver unprecedented performance capabilities to the warfighter community, the Army has little choice but to meet a very high standard and has limited flexibility in cutting FCS requirements. Because the cost already dominates its investment budget, the Army may find it difficult to find other programs to cut in order to further fund FCS. To avoid unanticipated cost and schedule problems late in development, several alternatives can be considered: (1) add time to FCS' acquisition schedule to reduce concurrent development; (2) take the time to develop and demonstrate the most critical capabilities first, such as the FCS network, then proceed with an acquisition program; and (3) focus on maturing the most critical technologies first, then bundle them in demonstrations of capabilities, and ensure that decision makers have attained the knowledge they need at critical junctures before moving forward.