Launches to higher inclinations such as those needed for the space station lose some of this advantage, with a resulting loss in lift capability. The current plan includes about 30 individual actions that involve hardware redesign, improved navigational or flight design techniques, and new operational procedures. The super lightweight tank program has experienced some early development problems that could affect its performance. In its report, the team (1) concluded that the new tank had the potential for problems during development and manufacturing and (2) questioned using the improved engines for increased thrust capability. To support the first shuttle space station launch, all of the enhancement programs must be integrated and recertified into the shuttle system within a demanding schedule. Shuttle’s Ability to Support Station’s Assembly Schedule Is Questionable

Based on its launch history and projected budget, the shuttle may not be able to meet the demanding launch requirements of the space station’s assembly schedule. To meet the station’s “assembly complete” milestone, shuttle officials have designed a very compressed launch schedule. NASA currently plans to assess the impact of the new environments on these components based on the design rather than the actual hardware. Recommendation

We recommend that the Administrator of NASA establish an independent review team to (1) assess NASA’s systems integration plan for the lift-increasing enhancements, (2) identify the associated technical and programmatic risks, and (3) weigh the costs and benefits of NASA’s tight scheduling of shuttle flights to assemble the space station. In addition, we interviewed officials from NASA Headquarters, the shuttle program, and the space station program regarding issues related to NASA’s plan to support space station assembly. The first copy of each GAO report and testimony is free.
Why GAO Did This Study

Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO examined the extent to which the space shuttle program can support the space station's assembly requirements, focusing on the: (1) impacts of the declining shuttle budget; and (2) demanding schedule to support the space station.

What GAO Found

GAO found that: (1) the National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA) plans for increasing the shuttle's lift capability are complex and involve about 30 individual actions such as hardware redesigns, improved flight design techniques, and new operational procedures; (2) some of the hardware redesign programs have experienced early development problems, and the potential exists for additional problems; (3) the NASA schedule for meeting the space station's launch requirements appears questionable in the declining budget environment; (4) NASA must successfully complete numerous shuttle-related development programs on a tight schedule to support the first space station launch; (5) the remaining launch schedule is compressed and will be difficult to achieve without additional funding or more efficient processing methods; (6) delays in the launch schedule could substantially increase the station's cost; (7) NASA plans to forgo some of the shuttle's recertification activities and full integration testing of the propulsion system until the first launch of station components; (8) NASA plans to assess the implications of the design changes through a combination of tanking and component tests and systems analyses; and (9) NASA must ensure that the implications of integrating numerous individual design changes are fully understood and safety is not compromised.