The Navy requested $1.4 billion for three LCS seaframes in its fiscal year  2016 budget request. The Navy has 10 mission packages in its inventory and  currently plans to buy 64 mission packages. Both variants have now completed rough water trials; the  Freedom variant completed total ship survivability testing in 2014, but  the Independence variant has not yet conducted this testing. The Navy provided Congress with a report in May 2014 assessing the  expected survivability attributes and the concept of operations for the  ships, but in terms of comparing the two variants the Navy essentially  suggested that since the two variants are built to the same requirements  they perform the same way. Survivability and Lethality Requirements Less Than Other Combatants, and Have Been Reduced over Time

The Navy designed LCS with survivability and lethality capabilities that  are not aligned with the projected operational environment in which the  ship will operate, and over time it has lessened or removed some  survivability and lethality requirements. Since 2004, the Navy has also reduced some LCS lethality requirements. This is due to the following  considerations:
LCS did not demonstrate it could meet all its requirements in these
Testing only demonstrated that LCS could meet its requirements in  one operational test event and is inadequate to provide statistical  confidence in the ship’s performance; the test environment was not  operationally stressing and the crew got extensive training and  practice;
Only one of the two variants were tested; and
Meeting threshold capability will require missile integration. According to current plans, the Navy will not have completed its test plan  to demonstrate the survivability of LCS until approximately 2018, at which  point it plans to have more than 24 ships either in the fleet or under  construction. This test—where both variants will be subject to an  underwater explosion and assessed for damage—is planned for 2016. For the Independence variant, the Navy conducted a seakeeping and  structural loads trial event on LCS 2 in January-February 2014. The Navy has not yet provided us  with the analysis reports, stating that the report is still undergoing  revisions. In December 2014, the former Secretary of Defense announced that he  approved the Navy’s recommendation. The former Secretary of Defense  further directed the Navy to provide his office by May 1, 2015: (1) an  acquisition strategy to support the design and procurement of the new  small surface combatant no later than fiscal year 2019 and sooner if  possible; and (2) an assessment of the cost and feasibility of back-fitting  the existing LCS with enhanced survivability and lethality systems. However,  according to Navy documentation, the Navy is notionally planning on 20  modified LCS—the costs of which have not been fully determined. The House report on the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal  Year 2015 includes a provision that we analyze the Small Surface  Combatant Study and the Navy’s plans moving forward; we just began  this work after receiving the Navy’s study, and we plan on issuing a  separate report on these issues. Conclusions

The actual lethality and survivability performance of LCS is still largely  unproven through realistic testing, 6 years after delivery of the lead ships,  with 2 additional ships delivered and 20 more ships under construction  and/or under contract. The Navy is quickly embarking on an effort to redesign the LCS to  address lethality and survivability concerns. Direction from the former Secretary of Defense to  develop an acquisition strategy for the new small surface combatant— and to assess back-fitting some systems on the current LCS—by May  2015 with the first ship procured in 2019 leaves little time to develop  important knowledge about current limitations of the ships in these areas. Further, given the uncertainties over the long term about the ship’s  survivability and lethality and proposed changes to future ships,  consider not fully funding the Navy’s request for future LCS ships  beyond fiscal year 2016, pending the completion and analysis of  the final survivability assessments for both variants due in 2018. In the classified version of this report, we make a separate  recommendation to the Secretary of the Navy related to defining a  currently vague SUW requirement that we redacted because it contained  classified information. DOD did not concur with our recommendation to solicit an independent  technical assessment of the survivability of the Independence variant  from an organization such as a ship classification society, stating that  such an organization could not provide an independent look and would  not have the technical competence to perform a threat weapon-based  assessment of the survivability of any Navy ship. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

Although this report is dated December 2015, our findings are current as  of July 2015 to be consistent with a classified report issued in July 2015. To assess the extent to which LCS meets its current survivability  requirements, we analyzed Navy and DOT&E test reports for both  developmental and operational test events on LCS and reviewed the LCS  test and evaluation master plan and the Navy’s Capstone Enterprise Air  Warfare Ship Self-Defense test and evaluation master plan. To assess the recent decisions pertaining to upcoming changes to the  program in response to the Secretary of Defense’s concerns with LCS  lethality and survivability, we analyzed available Navy documentation on  the proposed modified LCS.
Why GAO Did This Study

GAO has reported extensively on LCS—an over $34 billion Navy program (in 2010 dollars) consisting of two different ships and interchangeable mission packages. In February 2014, the Secretary of Defense, citing survivability concerns, directed the Navy to assess design alternatives for a possible LCS replacement.
House and Senate reports for the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014 included a provision for GAO to analyze LCS survivability. Based on congressional interest, GAO also examined lethality. This report examines (1) the extent to which LCS survivability and lethality requirements are aligned with the ship's threat environments and if they have changed, (2 and 3) and if LCS meets its current requirements. GAO also (4) assessed recent decisions pertaining to the Navy's plans to address the Secretary of Defense's concerns. GAO analyzed relevant documents and interviewed Navy officials.

What GAO Found

The lethality and survivability of the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) is still largely unproven, 6 years after delivery of the lead ships. LCS was designed with reduced requirements as compared to other surface combatants, and the Navy has since lowered several survivability and lethality requirements and removed several design features—making the ship both less survivable in its expected threat environments and less lethal than initially planned. The Navy is compensating for this by redefining how it plans to operate the ships.
In 2014, the Navy conducted its first operational test of an early increment of the surface warfare mission package on a Freedom variant LCS, demonstrating that LCS could meet an interim lethality requirement. The Navy declared LCS operationally effective. However, the Navy's test report stated that the ship did not meet some key requirements. Further, the Department of Defense's Director of Operational Test and Evaluation has stated that there is insufficient data to provide statistical confidence that LCS can meet its lethality requirements in future testing or operations, and further testing is needed to demonstrate both variants can meet requirements in varied threat environments.
The Navy also has not yet demonstrated that LCS will achieve its survivability requirements, and does not plan to complete survivability assessments until 2018—after more than 24 ships are either in the fleet or under construction. The Navy has identified unknowns related to the use of aluminum and the hull of the Independence variant, and plans to conduct testing in these areas in 2015 and 2016. However, the Navy does not plan to fully determine how the Independence variant will react to an underwater explosion. This variant also sustained some damage in a trial in rough sea conditions, but the Navy is still assessing the cause and severity of the damage and GAO has not been provided with a copy of the test results. Results from air defense and cybersecurity testing also indicate concerns, but specific details are classified.
In February 2014 the former Secretary of Defense directed the Navy to assess options for a small surface combatant with more survivability and combat capability than LCS. The Navy conducted a study and recommended modifying the LCS to add additional survivability and lethality features. After approving the Navy's recommendation, the former Secretary of Defense directed the Navy to submit a new acquisition strategy for a modified LCS for his approval. He also directed the Navy to assess the cost and feasibility of backfitting lethality and survivability enhancements on current LCS. Nevertheless, the Navy has established a new frigate program office to manage this program, and the Navy has requested $1.4 billion for three LCS in the fiscal year 2016 President's budget, even though it is clear that the current ships fall short of identified survivability and lethality needs. GAO has an ongoing review of the Navy's small surface combatant study and future plans for the LCS program.
This report is a public version of a classified report issued in July 2015. Throughout this report, GAO has indicated where information has been omitted or redacted due to security considerations. All information in this report reflects information current as of July 2015 to be consistent with the timeframe of the classified report.

What GAO Recommends

GAO suggests Congress delay funding for fiscal year 2016 LCS until the Navy submits a completed rough water trials report, acquisition strategy, and backfit plan; and consider not fully funding some or all LCS procurement pending analysis of these documents and the final survivability assessments. GAO also recommends several actions for DOD. The department concurred with two recommendations and partially concurred with two others, but did not concur with soliciting an independent technical assessment of the Independence variant. GAO continues to believe that such an independent assessment is warranted.