Trends in Security Conditions

Since June 2003, overall security conditions in Iraq have deteriorated and  grown more complex, as evidenced by increased numbers of attacks and  more recent Sunni/Shi’a sectarian strife after the February 2006 bombing of  the Golden Mosque in Samarra. The deteriorating conditions threaten  continued progress in U.S. and other international efforts to assist Iraq in  the political and economic areas. Moreover, the Sunni insurgency and Shi’a  militias have contributed to an increase in sectarian strife and large  numbers of Iraqi civilian deaths and displaced individuals. 2). The State Department reported in July 2006 that the recent upturn in  violence has hindered the U.S. government’s efforts to engage fully with its  Iraqi partners and to move forward on political and economic fronts. According to the U.S. DOD and State Progress Reports Provide Limited Information on the Development of Iraqi Security Forces

DOD and State report progress in developing capable Iraqi security forces  and transferring security responsibilities to them and the Iraqi government  in three key areas: (1) the number of trained and equipped forces, (2) the  number of Iraqi army units and provincial governments that have assumed  responsibility for security of specific geographic areas, and (3) the  assessed capabilities of operational units, as reported in aggregate  Transition Readiness Assessment (TRA) reports. Unit-level TRA reports provide that information. We  are currently working with DOD to obtain these reports because they  would more fully inform both GAO and the Congress on the capabilities  and needs of Iraq’s security forces. As  shown in table 1, the State Department reports that the number of trained  army and police forces has increased from about 174,000 in July 2005 to  about 294,000 as of August 2006. In spring 2005, MNF-I recognized that the number of trained and equipped  forces did not reflect their capability to assume responsibility for security. Embassy Campaign  Plan calls for the Iraqi army to assume the lead for counterinsurgency  operations in specific geographic areas and Iraqi civil authorities to assume  security responsibility for their provinces. We are  currently working with DOD to obtain the unit-level TRA reports. Questions for Congressional Oversight

1. What are the key political, economic, and security conditions that must  be achieved before U.S. forces can draw down and ultimately withdraw  from Iraq? The continued deterioration of security conditions in Iraq has hindered  U.S. political and economic efforts in Iraq. Why have security conditions continued to deteriorate in Iraq even as  the country has met political milestones, increased the number of  trained and equipped security forces, and increasingly assumed the lead  for security? If existing U.S. political, economic, and security measures are not  reducing violence in Iraq, what additional measures, if any, will the  administration propose for stemming the violence? 3.
Why GAO Did This Study

From fiscal years 2003 through 2006, U.S. government agencies have reported significant costs for U.S. stabilization and reconstruction efforts in Iraq. In addition, the United States currently has committed about 138,000 military personnel to the U.S.-led Multinational Force in Iraq (MNF-I). Over the past 3 years, worsening security conditions have made it difficult for the United States to achieve its goals in Iraq. In this statement, we discuss (1) the trends in the security environment in Iraq, and (2) progress in developing Iraqi security forces, as reported by the Departments of Defense (DOD) and State. We also present key questions for congressional oversight, including what political, economic, and security conditions must be achieved before the United States can draw down and withdraw? Why have security conditions continued to deteriorate even as Iraq has met political milestones, increased the number of trained and equipped forces, and increasingly assumed the lead for security? If existing U.S. political, economic, and security measures are not reducing violence in Iraq, what additional measures, if any, will the administration propose for stemming the violence?

What GAO Found

Since June 2003, the overall security conditions in Iraq have deteriorated and grown more complex, as evidenced by increased numbers of attacks and Sunni/Shi'a sectarian strife, which has grown since the February 2006 bombing in Samarra. As shown in the figure below, attacks against the coalition and its Iraqi partners reached an all time high during July 2006. The deteriorating conditions threaten the progress of U.S. and international efforts to assist Iraq in the political and economic areas. In July 2006, the State Department reported that the recent upturn in violence has hindered efforts to engage with Iraqi partners and noted that a certain level of security was a prerequisite to accomplishing the political and economic conditions necessary for U.S. withdrawal. Moreover, the Sunni insurgency and Shi'a militias have contributed to growing sectarian strife that has resulted in increased numbers of Iraqi civilian deaths and displaced individuals. DOD uses three factors to measure progress in developing capable Iraqi security forces and transferring security responsibilities to the Iraqi government: (1) the number of trained and equipped forces, (2) the number of Iraqi army units and provincial governments that have assumed responsibility for security in specific geographic areas, and (3) the capabilities of operational units, as reported in unit-level and aggregate Transition Readiness Assessments (TRA). Although the State Department reported that the number of trained and equipped Iraqi security forces has increased, these numbers do not address their capabilities. As of August 2006, 115 Iraqi army units had assumed the lead for counterinsurgency operations in specific areas, and one province had assumed control for security. Unit-level TRA reports provide insight into the Iraqi army units' training, equipment, and logistical capabilities. GAO is working with DOD to obtain the unit-level TRA reports. Such information would inform the Congress on the capabilities and needs of Iraq's security forces.