DOD is continuing efforts to recapitalize its tactical air forces (replace  legacy with new) by acquiring and fielding the Air Force’s F-22A, the  Navy’s F/A-18E/F and EA-18G, and the joint service F-35 Joint Strike  Fighter (JSF) weapon systems. New Acquisition Programs Are Spending Significantly More Dollars and Delivering Fewer Tactical Aircraft Later Than Originally Planned

Midway through a 40-year effort to recapitalize and modernize its tactical  air forces, DOD’s efforts have been blunted by relatively poor outcomes in  its cornerstone new acquisition programs. Increased costs, extended  development times, requirement changes, and budget pressures have  reduced DOD’s buying power, and DOD now expects to replace legacy  aircraft with about 1,500 fewer new tactical aircraft than it had originally  planned—a reduction of one-third. Collectively, these  programs are expected to cost about $400 billion—with almost three- fourths still to be invested—to acquire about 3,200 aircraft (see table 2). Total quantities  have been reduced by one-third compared to original plans at each  program’s inception (see table 3). New Acquisition Costs and Delays Have Made Resourcing Decisions for Legacy Systems Reactive and Less Efficient

The problems and delays encountered by the new tactical aircraft  acquisition programs have direct and significant impacts on legacy  systems plans and costs. Uncertainty about new systems costs and deliveries makes it difficult to  effectively plan and efficiently implement modernization efforts and legacy  retirement schedules. Program managers are hard-pressed to allocate funds or set  sunset schedules for legacy fleets until the outcomes of new acquisitions  are known. DOD has become increasingly concerned that the high cost of  keeping aging weapon systems relevant and able to meet required  readiness levels is a growing challenge in the face of forecast threat  capabilities and is depleting modernization accounts, reducing the  department’s flexibility to invest in new weapons. Further delays in JSF could exacerbate problems. A Joint Enterprise- Level Investment Strategy for Tactical Aircraft Is Lacking As Services Plan Independently

DOD does not have a single, integrated investment plan for recapitalizing  and modernizing its tactical air forces. Moving forward, projected plans are  likely unaffordable given competing demands from future defense and  nondefense budgets. Legacy aircraft would be virtually replaced by the more capable  new systems. Options to erase these shortfalls include buying more new aircraft and  extending the life of legacy aircraft. The JSF  program represents 90 percent of the investments to go for new tactical  aircraft and projected plans are likely unaffordable given projected future  budget constraints and competing demands. With limited information contained in the QDR report, many questions are  still unanswered about the future of DOD’s tactical aircraft modernization  efforts. This capability—one of the few examples of a truly joint asset shared by  the military services—is now expected to diminish, to be replaced by  separate and unique aircraft for each of the services. The  Secretary should  take decisive actions to shorten cycle times in delivering needed  combat capabilities to the warfighter including    adopting a time-certain development cycle that can deliver an  increment of new capability within 5 to 6 years after the start of  system design and development; and  reassessing requirements for ongoing weapon system acquisition  programs to identify ways to reduce requirements and speed up  delivery of initial capabilities; and    develop an integrated enterprise-level investment strategy that  is based on a joint assessment of warfighting needs and a full set of  potential and viable alternative solutions, considering not only new  acquisitions but also modifications to legacy aircraft to achieve this  balance within realistic and affordable budget projections for DOD;    strikes a balance between maintaining near-term readiness and  addressing long-term needs; and    considers the contributions of bombers, long range strike aircraft,  unmanned aircraft, missiles, and other weapons currently in the  inventory and those planned that can be employed to attack the  same type targets as the tactical aircraft. It is also DOD’s largest cooperative  development program. Tactical Aircraft: Status of F/A-22 and JSF Acquisition Programs and  Implications for Tactical Aircraft Modernization.
Why GAO Did This Study

The Department of Defense (DOD) plans to invest $109 billion in its tactical air forces between 2007 and 2013. Long term, DOD plans to replace aging legacy aircraft with fewer, more expensive but more capable and stealthy aircraft. Recapitalizing and modernizing tactical air forces within today's constrained budget environment is a formidable challenge. DOD has already incurred substantial cost and schedule overruns in its acquisition of new systems, and further delays could require billions of dollars in additional investments to keep legacy aircraft capable and sustainable. Because of the large investments and risk, GAO was asked to review investment planning for tactical aircraft. This report describes the current status of DOD's new tactical aircraft acquisition programs; identifies current impacts on legacy aircraft modernization programs and retirement schedules; and assesses DOD's overall investment plan for tactical aircraft.

What GAO Found

DOD's efforts to recapitalize and modernize its tactical air forces have been blunted by cost and schedule overruns in its new tactical aircraft acquisition programs: the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF), the Air Force F-22A, and the Navy F/A-18E/F. Collectively, these programs are expected to cost about $400 billion--with about three-fourths still to be invested. The JSF program, which is expected to make up the largest percentage of the new fleet, has more than 90 percent of its investments still in the future. Increased costs and extended development times have reduced DOD's buying power, and DOD now expects to replace legacy aircraft with about one-third fewer new aircraft compared to original plans at each program's inception. The outcomes of these acquisition programs directly impact existing tactical aircraft systems. Until new systems are acquired in sufficient quantities to replace legacy fleets, legacy systems must be sustained and kept operationally relevant. Continual schedule slips and reduced buys of new aircraft--particularly in the F-22A and JSF programs--make it difficult for program managers to allocate funds for modifying legacy aircraft to meet new requirements or to set retirement dates for legacy aircraft. Lengthening the life of legacy systems also impacts DOD's new tactical aircraft acquisition programs. DOD has become increasingly concerned that the high cost of keeping aging weapon systems relevant and able to meet required readiness levels is a growing challenge in the face of forecast threats and reduces the department's flexibility to invest in new weapons. DOD's tactical aircraft investments are driven by the services' separate acquisition planning. Moving forward, these plans are likely unexecutable given competing demands from future defense and non defense budgets. The EA-6B--providing tactical radar jamming capabilities for all services and one of the few examples of a joint asset--is also expected to be replaced by separate and unique aircraft for each of the services. Without a joint, DOD-wide strategy for tactical aircraft investments, it is difficult to identify potential areas where efficiencies might be achieved or where capability gaps might occur in DOD's tactical aircraft acquisitions.