In addition, confusion over the definition and scope of  the mission perpetuates confusion about the capabilities and  expenditures associated with the mission. In September 2011, NORAD stopped  using the term “air sovereignty alert” (ASA) and created a new term,  “aerospace control alert” (ACA) without clearly defining ACA or the  capabilities that are now included within it. DOD Has Not Fully Implemented a Risk- Based Management Approach That Balances Risk and Costs for ASA Operations

DOD has taken a series of actions for ASA operations that are consistent  with a risk-based management approach; however, several key actions  have yet to be taken to fully implement a risk-based management  approach that would enable the department to better balance risk and  costs. DOD Has Established and Linked Its Homeland Defense Strategic Goal to Its ASA Objectives, but Has Not Established Performance Measures

DOD’s overarching homeland defense goal is to secure the United States  from direct attack, but DOD is unable to measure the extent to which ASA  operations help to achieve that goal. NORAD Has Not Conducted Routine Risk Assessments, and Its ASA Model Has Limitations

Although we have previously recommended that NORAD should conduct  routine risk assessments of ASA operations—the second phase of a  risk-based management approach—we found that it has not implemented  this recommendation. While we are encouraged that DOD has examined some alternatives to  its current ASA operations, adopting a more-rigorous risk-based  management approach—including balancing risk and costs—would help  decision makers within DOD and elsewhere more-effectively allocate  finite DOD resources. Weak Internal Controls Limit the Ability of the Air Force and National Guard Bureau to Accurately Identify ASA Expenditures

Internal control weaknesses limit the Air Force’s ability to accurately  identify expenditures with regard to Air Force management of ASA  operations. Air Force and National Guard Bureau Officials Have Not Accurately Identified ASA Expenditures

We analyzed the fiscal year 2010 expenditure information the Air Force  and National Guard Bureau submitted to Congress and found that it did  not accurately identify all ASA expenditures.Force’s submission to Congress, more than $246 million was expended  on ASA operations in fiscal year 2010. First, we found that the Air Force overstated its ASA flying-hour  expenditures by at least $22 million. Third, the budget justification document the Air Force provided to  Congress did not include some expenditures that are related to ASA. Additionally, GAO’s Standards for Internal Control in the Federal  Government cite the importance of developing detailed internal-controls  policies, procedures, and practices to ensure basic accountability,  maintain funds control, and prevent fraud and abuse. Conclusions

Since the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, the U.S. government has  taken extensive efforts to protect the airspace over the United States,  aviation threat profiles have changed, and fiscal resources have become  more constrained. Matter for Congressional Consideration

In order to ensure that the Air Force is taking action that addresses the  long-term sustainability of ASA operations, Congress may wish to  consider requiring the Secretary of the Air Force to fully implement the  remaining actions identified in our 2009 report within a time period that  Congress believes most prudent. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

To determine the extent to which the Air Force has implemented the  recommendations from our 2009 report, we interviewed officials from the  Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas’  Security Affairs, the Air Force’s homeland-defense office, the Air Force’s  Air Combat Command, the National Guard Bureau, and three air  sovereignty alert (ASA) units. Appendix II: Air Force’s Implementation of Our 2009 Recommendations as of November 2011

Recommendation  We recommend that the Secretary of  Defense direct the military services with  units that consistently conduct Air  Sovereignty Alert (ASA) operations to  formally assign ASA duties to these units  and then ensure that the readiness of  these units is fully assessed, to include  personnel, training, equipment, and ability  to respond to an alert. We recommend that the Secretary of  Defense direct the Secretary of the Air  Force to implement ASA as a steady-state  mission according to NORAD, Department  of Defense (DOD), and Air Force guidance  by  (1) incorporating ASA operations within the  Air Force submissions for the 6-year  Future Years Defense Program;  (2) updating the Air Force homeland  defense policy, homeland operations  doctrine, and concept of operations to  incorporate and define the roles and  responsibilities for ASA operations; and  (3) updating and implementing the ASA  program action directive. However, the approach that DOD uses to backfill personnel and units for ASA  operations is still managed on an ad hoc basis.
Why GAO Did This Study

In the 11 years since September 11, 2001, the U.S. government has put forth extensive efforts to protect the nations aviation sector and airspace. These efforts include air sovereignty alert (ASA) operations, for which the Air Force provides personnel and fully fueled, fully armed aircraft sitting on constant alert at 18 sites across the United States. In 2009, GAO found shortcomings in the Department of Defenses (DOD) management of ASA operations, leading to a number of GAO recommendations. For this report, GAO examined the extent to which (1) the Air Force has implemented GAOs 2009 recommendations, (2) DOD has implemented a risk-based management approach for ASA operations, and (3) the Air Force has accurately identified expenditures for ASA operations. To do so, GAO analyzed relevant strategies, planning documents, guidance, and expenditure data; and interviewed North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), Air Force, National Guard Bureau, and other DOD officials.

What GAO Found

The Air Force has not fully implemented the recommendations from GAOs 2009 report. With regard to GAOs recommendation that the military services should formally assign ASA duties to the units that consistently conduct them and ensure that the readiness of those units is fully assessed, the Air Force did so. However, the National Guard Bureau is considering reversing that action because it believes that the recommendation can be better addressed through the Air Forces standard deployment process. The Air Force has also not established a timetable to implement ASA as a steady-state mission; has not developed and implemented a plan to recapitalize the aging fighter aircraft that conduct ASA operations before the end of their service lives; and, when ASA units are deployed to support other ongoing operations, the Air Force continues to identify replacement units to perform the ASA mission on an ad hoc basis. All of the above were related to recommendations GAO made to the Air Force in its 2009 report. Separately, GAO found considerable confusion about the capabilities associated with ASA operations in part because, in September 2011, NORAD stopped using the term air sovereignty alert and created a new term, aerospace control alert (ACA), without clearly defining ACA or the missions that are now included within it.
DOD has taken a series of actions for ASA operations that are consistent with a risk-based management approach. However, several key actions have yet to be taken that would enable the department to better balance risk and costs. Risk-based management includes conducting routine risk assessments that evaluate threats, vulnerabilities, and criticality of assets, as recommended in GAOs 2009 report, and selecting between alternative courses of action to mitigate risk and make decisions about allocating resources. Although threats to the nations air sovereignty continue to emerge and evolve, GAO found that DOD is unable to measure the extent to which ASA helps to achieve the departments homeland-defense goal of securing the United States from direct attack because DOD has not established performance measures. NORAD has not conducted routine risk assessments of ASA operations. DOD has also yet to conduct a cost-benefit analysis for two of the three alternatives to current ASA operations that GAO evaluated. Adopting a more-rigorous risk-based management approachincluding balancing risk and costswould help policymakers within DOD and elsewhere more effectively allocate finite DOD resources.
Weak internal controls limit the ability of the Air Force and National Guard Bureau to accurately identify ASA expenditures. GAO analyzed the fiscal year 2010 expenditure information that the Air Force and National Guard Bureau submitted to Congress along with DODs fiscal year 2012 budget justification and found the reported expenditures of more than $246 million to be inaccurate. For example, GAO found that the Air Force overstated ASA flying-hour expenditures by at least $22 million and included expenditures related to national special-security events, which are not part of ASA operations. GAO found that the Air Forces ability to identify ASA expenditures is limited by unclear roles and responsibilities for programming and budgeting and a lack of guidance on defining and tracking ASA expenditures. These types of internal controls are important to ensuring basic accountability, maintaining funds control, and preventing fraud and abuse.

What GAO Recommends

Congress may wish to consider requiring the Air Force to fully implement GAOs 2009 recommendations. In addition, GAO recommends that DOD improve its risk management of ASA operations and improve the Air Forces ability to accurately identify ASA expenditures. DOD fully or partially agreed with all of GAOs recommendations.