All three programs—SLS, Orion, and  EGS—must be ready on or before this launch readiness date to support  this integrated test flight. Ongoing Delays Foreshadow a Likely Schedule Slip as NASA Reassesses the Launch Readiness Date

With less than two years until the committed November 2018 launch  readiness date for EM-1, the three human exploration programs—Orion,  SLS, and EGS—are making progress, but schedule pressure is  escalating as technical challenges continue to cause schedule delays. All  three programs face development challenges in completing work, and  each has little to no schedule reserve remaining to the EM-1 date— meaning they will have to complete all remaining work with minimal delay  during the most challenging stage of development. Orion program officials told us that following delivery from ESA, they will  need the service module for 12 months for integration with the crew  module and testing prior to providing the completed Orion spacecraft to  the ground systems at Kennedy Space Center. Development of the  core stage—which functions as the SLS’s fuel tank and structural  backbone—is the program’s critical path, meaning any delay in its  development reduces schedule reserves for the whole program. While officials  indicate that they now have a corrective action plan in place, and welding  resumed in April 2017, they did not provide detail on the impact to  program schedule reserve. NASA concurred with our recommendation and as of January 2017,  senior NASA officials told us that they have reordered integration activities to try to meet the EM-1 launch schedule, but further analysis  indicates that they will have to delay the launch readiness date. These  officials stated that no decision has been made and NASA has not  committed to a timeline in which to report its findings. Given that these three human space exploration programs  represent more than half of NASA’s current portfolio development cost  baseline, a cost increase or delay could have substantial repercussions  for not only these programs but NASA’s entire portfolio. If NASA’s ongoing assessment of the November  2018 EM-1 launch readiness date reveals that a new, more realistic, date  is warranted, prolonging any decisions regarding the extent of delays and  cost overruns—no matter the magnitude—until after deliberations on  NASA’s fiscal year 2018 budget request would increase the risk that both  NASA and the Congress continue making decisions potentially involving  hundreds of millions of taxpayer dollars based on schedules that may no  longer be feasible. While the Orion, SLS, and EGS programs are working toward a target  EM-1 launch readiness date of November 2018, the threats to each  program’s schedule continue to mount, and the schedule reserve of each  program is either very limited or nonexistent. However, beyond that, the programs have  little to no cost reserves remaining to deal with challenges that may arise. Recommendations for Executive Action

In order to ensure that the Congress is able to make informed resource  decisions regarding a viable EM-1 launch readiness date, we recommend  that the NASA Administrator or Acting Administrator direct the Human  Exploration and Operations Mission Directorate to take the following two  actions:
Confirm whether the EM-1 launch readiness date of November 2018  is achievable, as soon as practicable but no later than as part of its  fiscal year 2018 budget submission process; and
Propose a new, more realistic EM-1 date if warranted and report to  Congress on the results of its EM-1 schedule analysis. Appendix I: Objective, Scope, and Methodology

To assess the extent to which the National Aeronautics and Space  Administration’s (NASA) Orion Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle (Orion),  Space Launch System (SLS), and Exploration Ground Systems (EGS)  programs have risks that affect their progress towards meeting their  Exploration Mission 1 (EM-1) cost and schedule commitments, we  compared current program status information against program cost and  schedule baselines. To determine the programs’ cost and schedule posture and to  assess the availability of the programs’ cost and schedule reserves  approaching EM-1, we analyzed its budget documentation, interviewed  program officials from all three programs with insight into the programs’  budget and schedule and discussed how reserves were being used to  mitigate known risks.
Why GAO Did This Study

NASA is undertaking a trio of closely related programs to continue human space exploration beyond low-Earth orbit: the SLS vehicle; the Orion capsule, which will launch atop the SLS and carry astronauts; and EGS, the supporting ground systems. NASA's current exploration efforts are estimated to cost almost $24 billion—to include two Orion flights and one each for SLS and EGS—and constitute more than half of NASA's current portfolio development cost baseline. All three programs are necessary for EM-1 and are working toward a launch readiness date of November 2018. In a large body of work on this issue, including two separate July 2016 reports, GAO has found that these programs have a history of working to aggressive schedules.
The House Committee on Appropriations report accompanying H.R. 2578 included a provision for GAO to assess the acquisition progress of the Orion, SLS, and EGS, programs. This report assesses the extent to which these programs have risks that affect their progress toward meeting their commitments for EM-1. To do this work, GAO assessed documentation on schedule and program risks and interviewed program and NASA officials.

What GAO Found

With less than 2 years until the planned November 2018 launch date for its first exploration mission (EM-1), the National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA) three human exploration programs—Orion Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle (Orion), Space Launch System (SLS), and Exploration Ground Systems (EGS)—are making progress on their respective systems, but the EM-1 launch date is likely unachievable as technical challenges continue to cause schedule delays. All three programs face unique challenges in completing development, and each has little to no schedule reserve remaining between now and the EM-1 date, meaning they will have to complete all remaining work with little margin for error for unexpected challenges that may arise. The table below lists the remaining schedule reserve for each of the programs.
The programs all face challenges that may impact their remaining schedule reserve. For instance
the Orion program's European Service Module is late and is currently driving the program schedule;
the SLS program had to stop welding on the core stage—which functions as the SLS's fuel tank and structural backbone—for months after identifying low weld strengths. Program officials stated that welding resumed in April 2017 following the establishment of a corrective action plan;
the EGS program is considering performing concurrent hardware installation and testing, which officials acknowledge would increase complexity; and
each program must integrate its own hardware and software individually, after which EGS is responsible for integrating all three programs' components into one effort at Kennedy Space Center.
Low cost reserves further intensify the schedule pressure. Senior NASA officials said they are analyzing the launch schedule and expect that the EM-1 date will have to slip, but they have yet to make a decision on the feasibility of the current date or report on their findings. With budget discussions currently ongoing for fiscal year 2018, the last year prior to launch, Congress does not yet have insight into the feasibility of the EM-1 launch date, or the repercussions that any cost increase or delays could have in terms of cost and schedule impacts for NASA's entire portfolio. Unless NASA provides Congress with up-to-date information on whether the current EM-1 date is still achievable, as of the time the agency submits its 2018 budget request, both NASA and Congress will continue to be at risk of making decisions based on less than the entire picture and on likely unachievable schedules.

What GAO Recommends

NASA should confirm whether the current EM-1 date is still achievable no later than as part of its fiscal year 2018 budget submission, and propose a new, realistic EM-1 launch readiness date, if warranted, and report its findings to Congress. NASA concurred with both recommendations and agreed that EM-1 will be delayed.