Software. Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS)/Warfighter Information Network- Tactical (WIN-T). Software will be used to control how JTRS radios will  work. Unclear If or When the Army Can Develop, Build, and Demonstrate the FCS Network

The Army is faced with significant management and technological  challenges that place development of the FCS network at risk. Among  others, network risks include:    Enterprise network performance and scalability. The development of waveforms remains a technically  challenging and lengthy effort, which involves complex software  development and integration work. Compounding this inherent difficulty on FCS were the program’s  poorly defined requirements, indicative of its immaturity. Since May 2003, projected SLOCs have increased by 61.4 million to an  estimated 95.1 million lines of computer software code, almost triple in  size compared to original estimates. Army officials maintain that these increases will not have a major  impact on the program. Taking the latest code estimate into consideration, the total size of FCS’s  software is about four times larger than the next largest software-intensive  defense programs. Seventy-five  percent of the FCS software is being developed by 14 software developers  (all certified at CMMI level 3 or above) who are developing 52 major  software packages. The continuing evolution of FCS system-level requirements, including that  caused by Army decisions on what it can afford to develop, and the  aggressive pace of the program, are causing disruptions at the software  developer level. The growth results in  requirements provided to software developers that are poorly defined,  late, or unstable. Uncertainty about Network Development and Demonstration Present Challenges for Decisionmakers at Key Program Events

It is unclear if network requirements, including software to be developed,  will be adequately defined and designs completed at the preliminary  design review scheduled for February 2009. At the time of the FCS milestone review in 2009, the extent of network  demonstration is expected to be very limited. Major Demonstration of FCS Network Scheduled in 2012 after Vehicle Designs Are Set

The first major demonstration of the FCS network is limited user test 3  scheduled for fiscal year 2012, which will be at least a year after critical  design review and about a year before the start of low-rate initial  production for the core FCS program scheduled to begin in 2013. One of the key objectives of that test will be to use FCS  prototypes to identify the contributions and limitations of the network on  the ability of the FCS brigade combat team to conduct missions across the  full spectrum of operations. This is a  significant risk as the software, which supports the information network,  is critical to the design and performance of the platforms and is expected  to control about 95 percent of FCS’s functionality. Conclusions

The advanced information network is the linchpin to the Army’s FCS  concept; yet, it is unclear whether, how, or when the Army will be able to  demonstrate that the network performs as needed. However, network and software requirements are not yet stable  at the system level and below, which has caused rework and deferred  functionality. We further recommend that the Secretary of Defense, in setting  expectations for the 2009 milestone review, include    a thorough analysis of network technical feasibility and risks,    synchronization of network development and demonstration with that  of other elements of FCS such as the manned ground vehicles, and    a reconciliation of the differences between independent and Army  estimates of network and software development scope and cost. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

To develop the information on the Future Combat System program’s  network and software challenges and technological risks, assess whether  disciplined software practices have been effectively implemented, and  determine whether the Army will have the necessary network and  software at key program events, we interviewed the Assistant Secretary of  the Army (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics); the Program Manager  for the Future Combat System (Brigade Combat Team); the Future  Combat System Lead Systems Integrator; officials from the Army’s  Software Engineering Directorate; and Lead Systems Integrator One Team  contractors.
Why GAO Did This Study

The Army's Future Combat System (FCS) requires a software-based advanced information network to meld people, sensors, and weapons into a cohesive fighting force. As software controls 95 percent of FCS's functionality, it determines the success or failure of the program. The Army contracted with the Boeing Company as a lead systems integrator (LSI) to define, develop and integrate FCS, including software development. GAO must by law report annually on FCS. This is one of two reports to meet this requirement. It addresses risks facing the development of network and software, the practices being used to manage software, and the timing of key network demonstrations. In conducting our work, GAO has contacted numerous DOD, Army, and contractor offices; reviewed technical documents on software and network development and plans; attended meetings; and spoken to Army and other officials on various aspects of FCS network and software development. GAO also performed detailed work at five FCS software developers.

What GAO Found

Almost 5 years into the program, it is not yet clear if or when the information network that is at the heart of the FCS concept can be developed, built, and demonstrated by the Army and LSI. Significant management and technical challenges have placed development of the network and software at risk. These risks include, among others, network performance and scalability, immature network architecture, and synchronization of FCS with Joint Tactical Radio System and Warfighter Information Network Tactical programs that have significant technical challenges of their own. Software being developed for the network and platforms is projected to total 95.1 million lines of computer code, almost triple the size since the program began in 2003. FCS's software is about four times larger than the next two largest software-intensive defense programs. Although several disciplined practices are being used to develop FCS's network and software, the program's immaturity and aggressive pace during development have delayed requirements development at the software developer level. For example, software developers for 5 major software packages that GAO reviewed report that high-level requirements provided to them were poorly defined, late, or omitted in the development process. This caused the software developers to do rework or defer functionality out to future builds. In turn, these poor or late requirements had a cascading effect that caused other software development efforts to be delayed. It is unclear when or how it can be demonstrated that the FCS network will work as needed, especially at key program junctures. For example, in 2009, network requirements, including software, may not be adequately defined nor designs completed at the preliminary design review; and at the FCS milestone review later that year, network demonstration is expected to be very limited. The first major FCS network demonstration--the limited user test in 2012--will take place at least a year after the critical design review and only a year before the start of FCS production. That test will seek to identify the impact of the contributions and limitations of the network on the ability to conduct missions. This test will be conducted after the designs have been set for the FCS ground vehicles, which poses risks because the designs depend on the network's performance. A full demonstration of the network with all of its software components will not be demonstrated until at least 2013 when the fully automated battle command system is expected to be ready.