USAID’s total obligations for A&A instruments more than doubled from  about $5 billion in fiscal year 2002 to about $11 billion in fiscal year 2008. USAID Lacks Sufficiently Reliable Human Capital Data Needed for a Strategic A&A Workforce Plan

		USAID Lacks Sufficiently Reliable and Up-to-Date Data on A&A Staff Levels

In September 2008, we reported that USAID lacked the capacity to develop  and implement an A&A strategic workforce plan because the agency  lacked sufficiently reliable and up-to-date overseas A&A staff level data  and comprehensive information on the competencies of its A&A staff, who  play a critical role in assisting COs and CTOs in overseas missions. We also noted that OAA does not systematically track the number of  overseas A&A specialists, and its data on overseas A&A staff levels are out  of date. USAID Has Not Matched A&A Staff to Workload at Missions We Visited

A possible effect of USAID’s lack of reliable and up-to-date data on the  level of A&A staffing at its overseas locations is that the numbers and  competencies of A&A staff do not match A&A workload. At some missions  we visited last year, the numbers of A&A staff with the necessary  competencies were considerably less than adequate, while at other  missions they were more than adequate, according to mission officials. The mission director and A&A staff in Kazakhstan—a regional mission  responsible for A&A activities at missions in Kazakhstan and four other  Central Asian countries that do not have on-site A&A specialists—told us  that they could not adequately support A&A activities at those four  missions because of a heavy workload and competing demands from other  missions in the region. For example, they said they had delayed time-sensitive seasonal  agricultural projects because the CO was not available when needed to  approve contracts. USAID’s Recent Planning Efforts Do Not Comprehensively Address Its Strategic A&A Workforce Planning Needs

USAID has launched some ad hoc attempts to address its A&A workforce  issues. Taken together, these efforts do not constitute a strategic A&A  workforce plan that takes into account the entire A&A workforce. USAID Has Not Implemented the Evaluation Mechanism of Its A&A Function

USAID has not implemented an evaluation mechanism to provide adequate  oversight of its A&A function. OAA’s Evaluation Division is responsible for  providing this oversight to ensure that A&A operations follow USAID  policies, primarily by assessing the agency’s A&A operations worldwide. In fiscal year 2007, the Evaluation Division developed  an annual scorecard evaluation, intended to be completed by all COs as a  self-assessment of their A&A operations. The division has finished piloting the  scorecard evaluations at four missions and identified weaknesses in A&A  operations. For example, the division found that one mission lacked  resources to adequately monitor contractor performance. The division has  set a goal of implementing the scorecard evaluation and on-site visits to at  least 5 missions within a 2-year period. However, agency officials informed  us that the Evaluation Division did not have the staff needed to fully  implement the evaluation mechanism. Without implementing the  evaluation mechanism it has developed, USAID cannot certify the overall  adequacy and effectiveness of management controls for the A&A function. Without sufficiently  reliable and up-to-date data on its overseas A&A staff levels and  comprehensive information on the competencies of the A&A staff, which  are key elements of federal workforce planning models, USAID cannot  identify its critical staffing needs and adjust its staffing patterns to meet  those needs. Finally, the Evaluation  Division has increased its staff levels from 4 staff in fiscal year 2008 to 9  staff as of April 2009.
Why GAO Did This Study

The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) has shifted from conducting its own activities to managing acquisition and assistance (A&A) instruments--contracts, grants, and cooperative agreements--it awards to implementing organizations. From fiscal years 2002 through 2008, USAID's A&A obligations increased from about $5 billion to about $11 billion. A&A staff--contracting officers (COs) and A&A specialists--are primarily responsible for managing A&A instruments. This testimony is based on a September 2008 GAO report that examined USAID's capacity to develop and implement a strategic A&A workforce plan and the extent to which USAID has implemented a mechanism to evaluate its A&A function.

What GAO Found

USAID lacks the capacity to develop and implement a strategic A&A workforce plan because it is missing two elements: (1) sufficiently reliable and up-to-date data on its overseas A&A staff levels and (2) comprehensive information on the competencies of its overseas A&A staff. Data on the numbers of overseas A&A specialists collected by two USAID offices were unreliable or out of date. GAO found significant discrepancies between these offices' data sets and officials acknowledged that their A&A staff level data are neither reliable nor up-to-date. Also, USAID has not collected comprehensive competency information on its overseas A&A specialists. GAO's model of strategic workforce planning notes the importance of these data in developing a plan that could enable the agency to better match staff levels to changing workloads. During fieldwork at 7 USAID missions, GAO found that the numbers and competencies of A&A staff did not match A&A workloads at some missions. The numbers of A&A staff with the needed competencies were less than adequate at some missions, while at others they were more than adequate. For example, officials at the mission in Mali said they had delayed time-sensitive projects because key A&A staff were not available when needed to approve contracts, while officials at the mission in Peru said the current number of A&A staff may be more than adequate. In GAO's survey administered to USAID A&A staff in headquarters and overseas, most of the survey respondents overseas reported difficulty in altering staffing patterns to meet A&A workloads. USAID's efforts to address its A&A workforce issues do not constitute a strategic A&A workforce plan that takes into account the entire A&A workforce. Without accurate and reliable A&A staff data, USAID does not have adequate information to address current workload imbalances. USAID has not implemented an evaluation mechanism to provide oversight of its A&A function. The Evaluation Division in the Office of Acquisition and Assistance is responsible for providing this oversight to ensure that A&A operations follow USAID policies, primarily by assessing A&A operations worldwide. In fiscal year 2007, the division developed an evaluation mechanism that combines scorecard evaluations, in which COs self-assess their A&A operations, and onsite visits by division staff to selected locations based on the scorecard results and other factors. The division has completed scorecard evaluations at 4 missions and identified weaknesses in A&A operations. For example, the division found that one mission lacked resources to adequately monitor contractor performance. The division has set a goal of implementing this evaluation mechanism, including on-site visits to 5 missions within a 2-year period. However, according to agency officials, the division did not have the staff level needed to fully implement this evaluation mechanism. The division has increased its staff levels from 4 staff in fiscal year 2008 to 9 staff as of April 2009 and completed two more evaluations. However, USAID officials told us that OAA has not implemented the evaluation mechanism due to other priorities. As a result, USAID cannot certify the adequacy and effectiveness of management controls for the A&A function.