To assist in examining that question, this report provides an analysis of the role that home state Senators, historically and in the contemporary era, have played in the lower court selection process. In separate sections this report discusses
the historical origins of the role of Senators recommending persons for nomination to lower court judgeships—particularly, the custom of "senatorial courtesy" and the Senate Judiciary Committee's long-standing "blue slip" procedure; the effect of Senators' political party affiliation on their role as recommenders of judicial candidates from their state; the lesser role that Senators play generally when recommending circuit court, as opposed to district court, candidates; the processes by which Senators evaluate and select judicial candidates; Senators' contacts with a President's Administration after they make their recommendations but before the President selects a nominee; the options available to home state Senators when the President selects a judicial nominee against their advice, or without consulting them; and issues that have arisen in recent years over the proper role, and degree of influence, of home state Senators in the selection of nominees for U.S. district and circuit court judgeships. For Senators who are not of the President's party, a consultative role, with the opportunity to convey to the President their views about candidates under consideration for judgeships in their states, also has been a long-standing practice. As a general rule, a Senator who belongs to the President's party has the primary role in recommending candidates for federal district court judgeships in the home state, and an influential, if not the primary, role in recommending candidates for federal circuit court judgeships associated with the home state. Whereas home state Senators of the President's party often, if not always, dictate whom the President nominates to district judgeships, their recommendations for circuit court nominees, by contrast, typically compete with names suggested to the Administration by other sources or generated by the Administration on its own. As discussed above, the extent to which the two Senators will share the judicial selection role depends, to a great extent, on their respective prerogatives and interests in this area. Procedures Used to Identify and Evaluate Candidates

Senators have great discretion as to the procedures they will follow in identifying and evaluating candidates for appointment to federal judgeships. Clarifying the Senator's Role

Initial contacts between an administration and a Senator's office regarding judicial appointments can be expected to clarify the nature of the Senator's recommending role. In either situation, the Senator will then face the question of whether to oppose the nomination, either first in the Senate Judiciary Committee or later on the Senate floor. Option of Opposing the Nomination in Committee or on the Senate Floor

From the standpoint of a Senator, opposition to a lower court nomination in his or her state may serve a number of purposes, including one or more of the following:
Preventing confirmation. Causing the Administration to take consultation more seriously. For instance, the policy sometimes has been applied to allow consideration of a judicial nomination when one or even (in very rare instances) both home state Senators have declined to return positive blue slips, or to allow a negative or unreturned blue slip to block committee consideration only if the Administration, in the view of the committee chair, did not consult in good faith with a home state Senator prior to selecting the nominee. Various considerations might influence the Senator to take this position. Specific issues concerning the Senators' recommending role have included the following:

			What Constitutes "Good Faith" or "Serious" Consultation? Should Home State Senators Always Have the Opportunity to Provide Their Opinion of a Judicial Candidate Before He or She Is Nominated? How Differently Should the Administration Treat the Input of Senators, Depending on Their Party Affiliation? What Prerogatives Should Home State Senators Have in the Selection of Circuit Court Nominees? As already discussed, home state Senators of the President's party by custom exert less influence over the selection of circuit court nominees than of district court nominees. Should the Judiciary Committee and the Senate, as a Matter of Courtesy to Colleagues, Approve Judicial Nominees Supported by Home State Senators? Should Home State Senators Use Commissions to Aid Them in Selecting Judicial Candidates to Recommend to the President?
This report examines the role that home state Senators, historically and in the contemporary era, have played in the selection of nominees to U.S. district court and circuit court of appeals judgeships. It also identifies issues that have arisen in recent years over the role of home state Senators in the selection process for federal judges. Report findings include the following:
Supported by the custom of "senatorial courtesy," Senators of the President's party have long played, as a general rule, the primary role in selecting candidates for the President to nominate to district court judgeships in their states. They also have played an influential, if not primary, role in recommending candidates for circuit court judgeships associated with their states. For Senators who are not of the President's party, a consultative role, with the opportunity to convey to the President their views about candidates under consideration for judgeships in their states, also has been a long-standing practice—and one supported by the "blue slip" procedure of the Senate Judiciary Committee. In recent and many past Congresses, the Judiciary Committee's blue slip procedure has reinforced Senators' influence over judicial nominations in their state by permitting nominations to receive committee action only when both home state Senators have returned "positive" blue slips. Senators, in general, exert less influence over the selection of circuit court nominees than they do over district court nominee selection. Whereas home state Senators of the President's party often dictate whom the President nominates to district judgeships, their recommendations for circuit nominees, by contrast, typically compete with names suggested to the Administration by other sources or generated by the Administration on its own. Whether and how a state's two Senators share in the judicial selection role may depend, to a great extent, on their respective prerogatives, party affiliations, and interests. Senators have great discretion as to the procedures they will use to identify and evaluate judicial candidates, ranging from informally conducting candidate searches on their own to relying on nominating commissions to evaluate candidates. Contact between a Senator's office and the Administration can be expected to clarify the nature of the Senator's recommending role, including the degree to which the Administration, in its judicial candidate search, will rely on the Senator's recommendations. If a President selects a district or circuit court nominee against the advice of, or without consulting, a home state Senator, the latter must decide whether to oppose the nomination (either first in the Senate Judiciary Committee or later on the Senate floor). From the Senator's standpoint, opposition to the nomination might serve a number of purposes, including helping to prevent confirmation or influencing the Administration to take consultation more seriously in the future. On the other hand, various considerations might influence the Senator not to oppose the nomination, including the desirability of filling the vacant judgeship as promptly as possible, the qualifications of the nominee, and the possibility of better opportunities in the future to exert influence over judicial appointments.
In recent years, the role of home state Senators in recommending judicial candidates has given rise to various issues, including the following:
What constitutes "good faith" or "serious" consultation by the Administration? Should home state Senators always have the opportunity to provide their opinion of a judicial candidate before he or she is nominated? How differently should the Administration treat the input of Senators, depending on their party affiliation? What prerogatives should home state Senators have in the selection of circuit court nominees? Should the policy of the Judiciary Committee allow a home state Senator to block committee consideration of a judicial nominee? Conversely, should the Judiciary Committee and the Senate, as matter of courtesy, approve judicial nominees supported by home state Senators? Should home state Senators use commissions to aid them in selecting judicial candidates to recommend to the President?