Senior U.S. officials, including President Bush, particularly in an October 2002 speech in Cincinnati, asserted the following about Iraq's WMD: (1) that Iraq had worked to rebuild its WMD programs in the nearly four years since U.N. weapons inspectors left Iraq and had failed to comply with 16 U.N. previous resolutions that demanded complete elimination of all of Iraq's WMD programs; (2) that Iraq had used chemical weapons against its own people (the Kurds) and against Iraq's neighbors (Iran), implying that Iraq would not necessarily be deterred from using WMD against the United States; and (3) that Iraq could transfer its WMD to terrorists, particularly Al Qaeda, for use in potentially catastrophic attacks in the United States. Post-Saddam Transition and Governance

U.S. goals are for a unified, democratic, and federal Iraq that can sustain, govern, and defend itself and is an ally in the global war on Islamic militancy. However, the main focus of U.S. officials during October 2009 was on prodding Iraqi factions to reach agreement on an election law needed to hold national elections in January 2010. New Coalitions and Elections Going Forward

The various Iraqi factions are maneuvering in advance of the next national elections, now set for March 7, 2010. 110-28 is in CRS Report RS21968, Iraq: Politics, Elections, and Benchmarks , by [author name scrubbed] . For more detailed breakdowns of U.S. aid to Iraq, see CRS Report RL31833, Iraq: Reconstruction Assistance , by [author name scrubbed]. In February 2009, President Obama announced a winding down of U.S. military involvement in Iraq by the end of 2011, although some senior U.S. military officers assert that the Iraqi government might require, and might request, a continued U.S. military training and advisory presence after that time. At its height, the Iraqi Sunni insurgency (both native Iraqi and AQ-I) did not derail the political transition, but it caused rates of U.S. casualties and Sunni-Shiite violence sufficient to stimulate debate in the United States over the U.S. commitment in Iraq. Some believe that overall sectarian violence has been reduced substantially because the civil war caused a segregation of Sunnis and Shiites, particularly in Baghdad, and this segregation could explain why major HPA's since April 2009 have not produced major new sectarian violence. Khata'ib is the only Shiite militia group named as an FTO to date. (For more information, see CRS Report RS22323, Iran ' s Activities and Influence in Iraq , by [author name scrubbed].) The Current Situation and U.S. Drawdown Plans

The Bush Administration and the Obama Administration have attributed much of the positive developments in Iraq since 2008 to the 2007 "troop surge." According to President Obama's withdrawal plan, all U.S. combat troops are to depart in 19 months—by August 31, 2010—leaving a "residual presence" of about 35,000 to 50,000 primarily to train and advise the ISF and to perform counter-terrorism missions against AQ-I. In line with planning, the force is at about 115,000 at the end of October 2009, and will drop to about 110,000 by the time of the Iraqi national elections on March 7, 2010. Some of these forces could be trainers or other mentors for the ISF. As discussed above, it also stipulates that U.S. combat forces will cease patrols in Iraqi cities as of June 30, 2009. The U.S. draw-down plans articulated by President Obama on February 27, 2009, appear to be within these timetables. (See CRS Report RL30588, Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy , by [author name scrubbed].) Reorganizing the Political Structure, and "Federalism"

Some experts say that Iraq's legislative achievements and security improvements have not produced lasting political reconciliation and that, at some point, Iraq will again see high levels of violence.
The Obama Administration is facing a security environment in Iraq vastly improved over that which prevailed during 2005-2007, although rifts in Iraqi society are still not reconciled, providing the potential for the security situation to deteriorate significantly. The overall frequency of violence is down to post-Saddam low levels, yet, since May 2009, insurgents have increased high profile attacks designed to shake public confidence in the Iraqi government and security forces. These attacks did not derail the June 30, 2009, U.S. withdrawal of combat troops from major cities and have not, to date, caused a modification of the February 27, 2009, announcement by President Obama that all U.S. combat brigades would be withdrawn by August 31, 2010. The drawdown—from current U.S. troop levels of about 115,000—is expected to begin in earnest after Iraq's March 2010 national elections and leave a residual presence of about 50,000 U.S. trainers, advisers, and mentors. These are to be withdrawn by the end of 2011. The drawdown is in line with a U.S.-Iraq "Security Agreement" that took effect January 1, 2009.
Some U.S. officials caution against a prevailing belief that "the war is over" and believe that further political progress is needed to produce a unified, democratic Iraq that can govern and defend itself and is an ally in the war on terror. Continuing ethnic and sectarian disputes—particularly signs of new disillusionments among Sunni Arabs—are manifesting not only as high profile attacks against government facilities in Baghdad, but also as bombings directed against local politicians as Iraq heads toward the next national elections. Iraq's Christian community says it has suffered intimidation by both Arabs and Kurds, particularly near Mosul and Kirkuk. The factional splits among the elites greatly delayed passage of the election law needed to hold the national elections, and caused a postponement of the election until March 7, 2010. The splits between Maliki and his erstwhile Shiite allies, and with other competitors, have produced several strong, new coalitions that will challenge Maliki in the upcoming elections.
The security progress in 2008 and 2009 came after several years of frustration that Operation Iraqi Freedom had overthrown Saddam Hussein's regime, only to see Iraq wracked by a violent Sunni Arab-led insurgency, resulting Sunni-Shiite sectarian violence, competition among Shiite groups, and the failure of Iraq's government to equitably administer justice or deliver services. Mounting U.S. casualties and financial costs—without clear movement toward national political reconciliation—stimulated debate within the 110th Congress over whether a stable Iraq could ever be achieved, and at what cost. With an apparent consensus within the Administration to wind down the U.S. combat in Iraq, U.S. economic and security aid to Iraq has been reduced since FY2008.
For further information, see CRS Report RS21968, Iraq: Politics, Elections, and Benchmarks, by [author name scrubbed], Iraq: Politics, Elections, and Benchmarks, by [author name scrubbed]; CRS Report RL34064, Iraq: Oil and Gas Legislation, Revenue Sharing, and U.S. Policy, by [author name scrubbed]; CRS Report RL32105, Iraq: Foreign Contributions to Stabilization and Reconstruction, by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed]; and CRS Report RL31833, Iraq: Reconstruction Assistance, by [author name scrubbed].