	Introduction

Conference committees have long been known as "the third house of Congress." Current developments suggest, however, that the "third house" characterization might require modification. It is not that conference committees are unimportant, it is that another method for adjusting and reconciling bicameral differences on significant legislation has taken on greater prominence in the contemporary Congress. This method is the exchange of amendments—or "messages" —between the houses, the so-called "ping pong" procedure. If the conference committee is being somewhat eclipsed by the ping pong procedure as an important way to achieve bicameral reconciliation on consequential legislation, that would represent an important institutional change. This apparent development merits some attention and analysis. Accordingly, this report's purposes are fundamentally twofold: to examine the reasons for the heightened salience of the ping pong approach and to consider several reasons for and the implications that seem to flow from using this procedure rather than convening conferences to resolve inter-chamber disagreements on major legislation. To fulfill these two purposes, the report is organized into six sections as follows. First, it will provide an overview of the methods Congress employs to achieve inter-chamber agreement on legislation, including ping pong's place in the bicameral resolution process. Second, it will briefly discuss how each chamber gets to conference, underscoring how the convening of conference committees in the Senate can be effectively blocked, even if a majority of Senators would agree to send the measure to conference. Procedures usually are not isolated actions; they are employed in a policy, political, and legislative context. Hence, the fourth section of the report provides an overview of three case examples to illustrate in a concrete setting the factors that may trigger use of ping ponging over the convening of conference committees. Fifth, the report will discuss several reasons for, and implications of, ping ponging amendments back-and-forth between the chambers instead of forming conference committees to achieve bicameral agreement on legislation. Lastly, summary observations will be presented, including why the exchange of amendment pattern has seemingly evolved to become a more important feature of bicameral lawmaking activity. It was passed by the House and sent to the Senate.
Conference committees have long been known as the "third house of Congress." They are often the principal forum for resolving bicameral differences on major measures when the House and Senate pass dissimilar versions of the same bills. Current developments suggest, however, that the "third house" characterization might require modification. It is not that conference committees are unimportant, it is that another method for adjusting and reconciling bicameral differences on significant legislation has taken on greater prominence in the contemporary Congress. This method is the exchange of amendments between the houses—the so-called "ping pong" method.
If the conference committee is being somewhat eclipsed by the ping pong procedure as a way to achieve bicameral reconciliation on consequential measures, that would represent an important institutional development. This apparent development requires attention and analysis. Accordingly, this report's purposes are fundamentally twofold: to examine the reasons for the heightened salience of the ping pong approach and to consider several implications that seem to flow from using this procedure rather than convening conferences to resolve inter-chamber disagreements on major legislation.
To fulfill these two purposes, the report will examine six issues. First, it will provide an overview of the methods Congress employs to achieve bicameral agreement on legislation. Second, it will briefly discuss how each chamber gets to conference, underscoring how the convening of conferences in the Senate can be effectively blocked, even if a majority of Senators would agree to send the measure to conference. Third, it will examine several factors that have apparently contributed to the more conspicuous use of the ping pong method on significant measures.
Fourth, procedures are usually not isolated actions; they are employed in a policy, political, and legislative context. Hence, the report will use three case examples to illustrate in a concrete setting the factors that might trigger use of ping ponging over the convening of conference committees. Fifth, the report will discuss several reasons for, and implications of, ping ponging amendments back-and-forth between the chambers instead of forming conference committees to achieve bicameral agreement on legislation. Lastly, summary observations will be presented, including why the exchange of amendment pattern has seemingly evolved to become a more important feature of bicameral lawmaking activity.
This report will be updated if circumstances warrant such action.