TSA Has Revised Explosives Detection Requirements for Checked-Baggage- Screening Systems, but Faces Challenges in Deploying Equipment to Meet the Requirements

In 2005, TSA revised explosives detection requirements for the EDS;  however, some number of the EDSs are currently operating at the levels  to detect explosives as set forth only in the 2005 requirements. In January 2010, TSA again revised the EDS explosives  detection requirements and plans to deploy EDSs meeting these  requirements in a tiered and phased approach over a number of years. However, as of January 2011, some number of the EDSs  in TSA’s fleet are configured to detect explosives at the levels established  only in the 2005 requirements. At all airports that use EDSs to screen checked baggage, ETD machines  are used in conjunction with EDSs to screen checked baggage for  explosives. First, TSA has experienced challenges in collecting  explosives data on the physical and chemical properties of certain  explosives needed by vendors to develop EDS detection software and  needed by TSA before procuring and deploying EDSs to meet the 2010  requirements. However, officials stated that  they subsequently decided to collect explosives data at the same time as  implementing the current EDS acquisition because TSA and other  stakeholders believed that the data collection effort would be  straightforward and that the new requirements could be easily applied to  machines procured in the current EDS acquisition. For example, by completing data collection for  each of the phases of the 2010 EDS requirements prior to pursuing  procurements for EDSs that meet those requirements, TSA could avoid  additional delays to the acquisition schedule due to any data collection  challenges. Documenting a plan to separate data collection efforts and  certification from future procurements could help TSA ensure it avoids the  challenges it has encountered during the current procurement. However, TSA has not yet developed a  plan or cost estimate for the planned upgrades. While there is no IMS for the EBSP, TSA has established a schedule for  the current EDS acquisition. TSA Has No Plan in Place Outlining How It Will Upgrade Deployed EDSs to Fully Meet the 2010 Requirements

TSA officials stated that they expect to upgrade an unknown number of  the current fleet of 2,297 EDSs and 260 of the EDSs to be purchased  under the current acquisition after they are deployed to airports to fully  meet all phases of the 2010 requirements. However, until TSA  develops a plan identifying how it will approach the upgrades for currently  deployed EDSs—and the plan includes such items as estimated costs,  the number of machines that can be upgraded, time frames for upgrading  them, and the number of times a given machine must be upgraded to  meet the 2010 EDS requirements—it will be difficult for TSA to provide  reasonable assurance that its upgrade approach is feasible or cost- effective. DHS also  stated that, per the recommendations of GAO and DHS, TSA is developing  a master schedule to document timelines associated with various projects. DHS concurred with our sixth recommendation to develop a plan to  deploy EDSs that meet the most recent EDS explosives detection  requirements and ensure that new machines, as well as machines  deployed in airports, will be operated at the levels established in those  requirements. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report  are listed in appendix V.

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

This report discusses: (1) the extent to which TSA has revised explosives  detection requirements and deployed EDSs and ETDs to meet these revised  requirements; (2) any challenges that TSA and the Department of Homeland  Security’s (DHS) Science and Technology Directorate (S&T) have  experienced in implementing the EDS acquisition; and (3) the extent to which  TSA’s approach to its EDS acquisition meets best practices for schedule and  cost estimates, and includes plans for potential upgrades to deployed EDSs. Appendix III: GAO’s Assessment of the Extent to Which the Electronic Baggage- Screening-Program Schedule Meets Established Best Practices

In determining the extent to which the Transportation Security  Administration’s (TSA’s) Electronic Baggage Screening Program (EBSP)  schedule meets established best practices, we identified that TSA did not  have an integrated master schedule (IMS) for the program.
Why GAO Did This Study

Explosives represent a continuing threat to aviation security. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA), within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), seeks to ensure through the Electronic Baggage Screening Program (EBSP) that checked-baggage-screening technology is capable of detecting explosives. Generally, the explosives detection system (EDS) is used in conjunction with explosives trace detection (ETD) machines to identify and resolve threats in checked baggage. As requested, GAO assessed the extent to which: (1) TSA revised explosives detection requirements and deployed technology to meet those requirements, and (2) TSA's approach to the current EDS acquisition meets best practices for schedules and cost estimates and includes plans for potential upgrades of deployed EDSs. GAO analyzed EDS requirements, compared the EDS acquisition schedule against GAO best practices, and interviewed DHS officials. This is a public version of a sensitive report that GAO issued in May 2011.

What GAO Found

TSA revised EDS explosives detection requirements in January 2010 to better address current threats and plans to implement these requirements in a phased approach. The first phase, which includes implementation of the previous 2005 requirements, is to take years to fully implement. However, deploying EDSs that meet 2010 requirements could prove difficult given that TSA did not begin deployment of EDSs meeting 2005 requirements until 4 years later in 2009. As of January 2011, some number of the EDSs in TSA's fleet are detecting explosives at the level established in 2005. The remaining EDSs in the fleet are configured to meet the 1998 requirements because TSA either has not activated the included software or has not installed the needed hardware and software to allow these EDSs to meet the 2005 requirements. Developing a plan to deploy and operate EDSs to meet the most recent requirements could help ensure EDSs are operating most effectively and should improve checked-baggage screening. However, TSA has faced challenges in procuring the first 260 EDSs to meet 2010 requirements. For example, due to the danger associated with some explosives, TSA and DHS encountered challenges in developing simulants and collecting data on the explosives' physical and chemical properties needed by vendors and agencies to develop detection software and test EDSs prior to the current acquisition. Also, TSA's decision to pursue EDS procurement during data collection complicated both efforts and resulted in a delay of over 7 months for the current acquisition. Completing data collection for each phase of the 2010 requirements prior to pursuing EDS procurements that meet those requirements could help TSA avoid additional schedule delays. TSA has established a schedule for the current EDS acquisition, but it does not fully comply with best practices, and TSA has not developed a plan to upgrade its EDS fleet. For example, the schedule is not reliable because it does not reflect all planned program activities and does not include a timeline to deploy EDSs or plans to procure EDSs to meet subsequent phases of the 2010 requirements. Developing a reliable schedule would help TSA better monitor and oversee the progress of the EDS acquisition. TSA officials stated that to meet the 2010 requirements, TSA will likely upgrade many of the current fleet of EDSs as well as the first 260 EDS machines to be purchased under the current acquisition. However, TSA has no plan in place outlining how it will approach these upgrades. Because TSA is implementing the 2010 requirements in a phased approach, the same EDS machines may need to be upgraded multiple times. TSA officials stated that they were confident the upgrades could be completed on deployed machines. However, without a plan, it will be difficult for TSA to provide reasonable assurance that the upgrades will be feasible or cost-effective.

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that TSA, among other things, develop a plan to ensure that new machines, as well as those machines currently deployed in airports, will be operated at the levels in established requirements, collect explosives data before initiating new procurements, and develop a reliable schedule for the EBSP. DHS concurred with all of GAO's recommendations and has initiated actions to implement them.