Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

We reviewed the training results of the seven enhanced brigades that were former roundout/up brigades to determine whether (1) the Bold Shift training strategy has enabled combat brigades to meet peacetime training goals, (2) the advisers assigned to the brigades were working effectively to improve training readiness, and (3) prospects of having the brigades ready for war within 90 days are likely. Tank and Bradley Fighting Vehicle crews in less than one-third of the battalions were able to meet gunnery goals. Brigades Were Trained in Few Mission-Essential Tasks

Army doctrine states that peacetime training is to be focused on the requirements of a unit’s wartime mission. According to brigade officials, many of the personnel were excused to take individual training courses in their assigned jobs. Adviser Program Is Hampered by Numerous Problems

The new adviser program’s efforts to improve training readiness have been limited by factors such as an ambiguous definition of the advisers’ role; poor communication between the active Army, advisers, brigades, and Guard leadership, which caused confusion and disagreement over Bold Shift’s goals; and difficult working relationships. Conclusions

Any significant improvement in the proficiency levels of National Guard combat brigades are not likely to be attained without a marked improvement in the relationship between the active Army and the Guard. Prospects for Achieving the 90-Day Deployment Goal Are Uncertain

It is highly uncertain whether the National Guard combat brigades can be ready to deploy 90 days after mobilization. Initial postmobilization models estimated that the brigades would need between 68 and 110 days before being ready to deploy. Initial Models Estimate 68 to 154 Days

In February 1992, the Army Chief of Staff testified before the House Committee on Armed Services that the Army could not have the Guard brigades ready to deploy with less than 60 to 90 days of postmobilization preparation time. Another brigade estimated it would need only 37 days of training.
Why GAO Did This Study

Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Army National Guard's combat brigades' war-readiness, focusing on whether: (1) the Bold Shift training strategy has enabled combat brigades to meet peacetime training goals; (2) the brigades' advisers are working effectively to improve training readiness; and (3) prospects of having the brigades ready for war within 90 days are likely.

What GAO Found

GAO found that: (1) in general, none of the 7 enhanced brigades achieved the training proficiency required during the first 3 years of the Bold Shift training strategy; (2) in 1993, combat platoons mastered only 14 percent of their mission-essential tasks and less than one-third of the battalions met their gunnery goals; (3) the brigades could not meet staffing and personnel goals, since many personnel were not sufficiently trained in their individual job and leadership skills; (4) the brigades' training problems are long-standing and will be difficult to improve; (5) although training strategy revisions are under way, the improvements will take years to be effective; (6) the Army advisers' efforts to improve the Guard's training readiness have been limited by an ambiguous definition of the advisers' role, poor communications between the Army, advisers, brigades, and other Guard officials, particularly regarding training goals, and difficult working relationships between the Army and the state-run Guard; (7) it is highly uncertain whether the brigades could be ready to deploy 90 days after mobilization, since the Guard's peacetime training is inadequate; (8) the postmobilization model estimated that the brigades would need 68 to 154 days of postmobilization training before deployment, while another model estimated that the best trained brigades would need 102 days to deploy; and (9) brigade proficiency reports have generally overstated brigade readiness levels.