The program’s system-level critical design  review will be held late in fiscal year 2005 after the lead ship authorization  and will assess design maturity. The Conference Report also states that the Navy should complete land-based  testing of the advanced gun system and integrated power system prior to the completion of the critical design review. This improves the ability to establish  realistic cost, schedule, and performance objectives as well as the ability to  meet them. In using engineering development models, the  Navy seeks to achieve high levels of technology maturity by first defining  the requirements and risks of a developmental technology and then  executing a series of tests to reduce these risks and prove the utility of a  technology in its intended environment. The program’s schedule, however, does not allow most engineering  development models to generate sufficient knowledge before key decisions  are made. None of the DD(X) technologies included in the 10 engineering  development models were mature at the start of system design and none  are expected to be mature at the March 2005 decision to authorize detailed  design and construction of the lead ship. By the end of the critical design review, only three subsystems are  expected to have completed testing: the autonomic fire suppression  system, the hull form, and the infrared mockups. One example of the consequences of technology and design immaturity  already apparent in the DD(X) program is the development of the dual band  radar and its impact on the integrated deckhouse. If the weight of the radar increases or if other  technical factors cause it to be relocated, a redesign effort may be needed  to assure that requirements are met. Four of the 10 engineering development models—the total ship computing  environment, the peripheral vertical launch system, the hull form, and the  infrared mockups—are progressing as planned toward demonstrating  complete subsystems. Only two of  the engineering development models, the hullform and the integrated  power system, have fallback technologies that could be used if current  technologies do not meet requirements. Other  challenges are highlighted below. Plans for the integrated power  system do include the use of a fallback technology. As noted in the draft report, we believe the approach the Navy has taken  to demonstrate DD(X) technologies through the engineering development  models is both structured and disciplined. Our past work on best practices has shown that  technological unknowns discovered later in product development lead to  cost increases and schedule delays. While DOD policy allows for technologies to mature up to the  point of ship installation, it does not necessarily follow that this is a best  practice. DD(X) Engineering Development Models

DD(X)
DD(X)
DD(X)
DD(X)

	Integrated Deckhouse and Apertures

DD(X)

		DD(X)

	Integrated Undersea Warfare

DD(X)

	Peripheral Vertical Launch System

		• Tests for system will not be completed by lead ship authorization:

	Total Ship Computing Environment

DD(X)

Comments from the Department of Defense

	GAO Comments

The following are GAO’s comments on the Department of Defense’s letter  dated August 20, 2004. Our discussion of the technology and design maturity of the dual band  radar and the integrated deckhouse deals with the impact of the Navy’s  decision to change radar frequency, not the reason for the decision.
Why GAO Did This Study

The DD(X) destroyer--a surface ship intended to expand the Navy's littoral warfare capabilities--depends on the development of a number of new technologies to meet its requirements. The Navy intends to authorize detailed design and construction of the first ship in March 2005. GAO's past work has shown that developing advanced systems that rely heavily on new technologies requires a disciplined, knowledge-based approach to ensure cost, schedule, and performance targets are met. Best practices show, for example, that a program should not be launched before critical technologies are sufficiently matured--that is, the technology has been demonstrated in its intended environment--and that a design should be stabilized by the critical design review. Given the complexity of the DD(X) system and the number of new technologies involved, GAO was asked to describe the Navy's acquisition strategy for DD(X) and how it relates to best practices, and how efforts to mature critical technologies are proceeding.

What GAO Found

To reduce program risk, the Navy plans to build and test 10 developmental subsystems, or engineering development models, that comprise DD(X)'s critical technologies. While using these models represents a structured and disciplined approach, the program's schedule does not provide for the engineering development models to generate sufficient knowledge before key decisions are made. None of the technologies in the 10 engineering development models was proven to be mature when system design began, as best practices advocates. Moreover, the Navy does not plan to demonstrate DD(X) technology maturity and design stability until after the decision to authorize construction of the lead ship, creating risk that cost, schedule, and performance objectives will not be met. With many of the tests to demonstrate technology maturity occurring around the time of critical design review in late fiscal year 2005, there is the risk that additional time and money will be needed to address issues discovered in testing. Some of the technologies are progressing according to the Navy's plans, while others have experienced challenges. Four of the 10 engineering development models--the total ship computing environment, the peripheral vertical launch system, the hull form, and the infrared mockups--are progressing as planned toward demonstrating complete subsystems. However, four other models--the integrated power system, the autonomic fire suppression system, the dual band radar, and the integrated deckhouse--have encountered some problems. At this point, the most serious appear to be the schedule delay in the dual band radar resulting from the Navy's decision to change one radar type and the additional weight of the integrated power system. The two remaining engineering development models--the integrated undersea warfare system and the advanced gun system--are progressing as planned, but will not culminate in the demonstration of complete subsystems before being installed on the first ship. While the Navy has fallback technologies for the hull form and the integrated power system, it does not have such plans for the other eight engineering development models.