	Background

Currently, DOD has five major unmanned aircraft systems in use: the Air  Force’s Predator A and Global Hawk, the Marine Corps’ Pioneer, and the  Army’s Hunter and Shadow. The Army’s classifies Warrior as a medium-altitude system, in  the same category as its Hunter system, its Warrior prototype known as I- GNAT, and the Air Force’s Predator A. Warrior Capability Is Targeted to Support Army Commanders’ Needs

The Army has an operational requirement, approved by the Joint  Requirements Oversight Council, for an unmanned aircraft system  dedicated to direct operational control by Army field commanders. The technical features include:    multi-role tactical common data link,    ethernet,    heavy fuel engine,    automatic take-off and landing system,    more weapons,   interoperability with Army One System Ground Control Station, and    dual-redundant avionics. The Army’s cost estimates for the  Warrior are, of course, predicated on Army plans for successful  development and testing. Warrior Acquisition Strategy Not Consistent with Best Practices

In terms of technology maturity, design stability, and a realistic schedule,  the Army has not yet established a sound, knowledge-based acquisition  strategy for Warrior that is consistent with best practices for successful  acquisition. Two of  the four critical technologies—ethernet and data link—were not mature at  the time the Army awarded the Warrior system development and  demonstration contract in August 2005, and in early 2006 remain immature  at TRLs of 4. Nevertheless, some program risk is associated with these technologies  as well. Concurrency—the overlapping of technology and  product development, testing, and production schedules—is risky because  it can lead to design changes that can be costly and delay delivery of a  useable capability to the warfighter if testing shows design changes are  necessary to achieve expected system performance. Two of these  technologies are not yet mature (as of early 2006); none of the specific  technologies as planned to be used on Warrior have previously been  fully integrated onto an unmanned aircraft. The Warrior program office acknowledges that the schedule is high-risk. Conclusions

In concept, the Army has determined that the Warrior will meet its  operational requirements better than available alternatives such as the  Predator. DOD did not concur with the rest of our recommendation that, prior to  approval of long-lead items for Warrior's low-rate initial production, the  Secretary of the Army needed to ensure (a) critical Warrior technologies  are fully mature and demonstrated and (b) fully-integrated Warrior  developmental aircraft are fabricated and involved in development testing. Appendix: Comments from the Department of Defense
Why GAO Did This Study

Through 2011, the Department of Defense (DOD) plans to spend $20 billion on unmanned aircraft systems, including the Army's "Warrior." Because of congressional concerns that some systems have been more costly and taken more time to produce than predicted, GAO reviewed the Warrior program. This report (1) describes the Army's requirements underlying its decision to acquire Warrior instead of existing systems such as the Air Force's Predator, and (2) assesses whether the Army has established a sound acquisition strategy for the Warrior program.

What GAO Found

The Army determined the Warrior is its best option for an unmanned aircraft system directly controlled by field commanders, compared with existing systems such as the Air Force's Predator A. The Army believes that using the Warrior will improve force capability through teaming with other Army assets; using common ground control equipment; and allowing soldiers in the field to operate it. Warrior's key technical features include a heavy fuel engine; automatic take-off and landing system; faster tactical common data link; ethernet; greater carrying capacity for weapons; and avionics with enhanced reliability. The Army projects that Warrior will offer some cost savings over Predator A. In terms of technology maturity, design stability, and a realistic schedule, the Army has not yet established a sound, knowledge-based acquisition strategy for Warrior. Two of four of the Warrior's critical technologies were immature at the contract award for system development and demonstration and remain so in early 2006, and the mature technologies still have some risk associated with them because neither has previously been fully integrated onto an unmanned aircraft. The Warrior schedule allows 32 months from award of the development and demonstration contract to the initial production decision. Achieving this schedule will require concurrency of technology and product development, testing, and production. Once developmental aircraft are available for testing, the Army plans to fund procurement of long-lead items in August 2007. Experience shows that these concurrencies can result in design changes during production that can prevent delivery of a system within projected cost and schedule. The Warrior program faces these same risks.