	Background

Task Force Hawk deployed to Albania in April 1999 as part of Operation  Allied Force. However, the government of Macedonia  would not allow combat operations to be conducted from its territory. 1.) The task force was a unique Army organization. Typically, attack helicopters  are used in conjunction with Army ground forces to engage massed  formations of enemy armor. See  appendix V.
We determined the status of each of the 107 lessons learned as of January  2001. In progress: We placed 60 lessons in this category. One was the  need for the Army and the Air Force to work together better jointly. A third area that the Army and the Air Force had difficulty with was  targeting. Improvements Are Needed in Interoperability

The second major theme that emerged from the lessons learned was the  interoperability of the command, control, communications, computers, and  intelligence equipment. Matter for Congressional Consideration

To ensure that the Army maintains the momentum to take actions to  resolve Task Force Hawk lessons learned, the Congress may want to  consider requiring the Army to report on remedial actions taken to  implement Task Force Hawk lessons. Scope and Methodology

To determine how Task Force Hawk’s concept of operation compared to  existing Army and joint doctrine, we reviewed Army and Joint Staff  doctrine publications and were briefed on existing deep attack doctrine at  the Army’s Training and Doctrine Command and the Army’s Aviation  School.
What GAO Found

The Army deployed its team, called Task Force Hawk, to participate in a Kosovo combat operation known as Operation Allied Force. This report (1) examines how Task Force Hawk's concept of operation compared to Army and joint doctrine, (2) reviews the lessons learned identified from the operation and determines the status of actions to address those lessons, and (3) examines the extent to which the Army and the Air Force were able to operate together as a joint force. GAO concludes that Task Force Hawk's deep attacks against Serbian forces in Kosovo was consistent with doctrine, but was not typical in that the task force was supporting an air campaign rather than its more traditional role of being used in conjunction with Army ground forces to engage massed formations of enemy armor. The Army identified 107 items that require remedial action. As of January 2001, 47 of the 107 items had been recommended for closure. Action is in process for the remaining 60 lessons. Finally, the Army and the Air Force experienced significant problems in their ability to work together jointly and the interoperability of the command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence equipment used during the operation. The Army is working on both issues aggressively. However, it will take time for results to be seen.