DOD has acted. During 1994 and 1995, it established the Joint Service Integration Group to prioritize chemical and biological defense research efforts and develop a modernization plan and the Joint Service Materiel Group to develop research, development, acquisition, and logistics support plans. However, DOD has not succeeded in fielding other needed equipment and systems designed to address critical battlefield deficiencies identified during the Persian Gulf Conflict and earlier. For example, in 1986, DOD studies found that its forces were inadequately trained to conduct critical tasks. Army studies conducted from 1991 to 1995 showed serious weaknesses at all levels in chemical and biological defense skills. There are two fundamental reasons for this. We found that these units often lacked needed equipment and training. Lack of Equipment

Medical units supporting early-deploying Army divisions we visited often lacked critical equipment needed to treat casualties in a chemically or biologically contaminated environment. Vaccine Stocks and Immunization Plans

DOD has inadequate stocks of vaccines for known threat agents, and an immunization policy established in 1993 that DOD so far has chosen not to implement. Problems Stem From Lack of Emphasis on Preparation for Chemical/Biological Warfare

The primary cause for the deficiencies in chemical and biological defense preparedness is a lack of emphasis up and down the line of command in DOD.
Why GAO Did This Study

GAO discussed its assessment of U.S. forces' capability to fight and survive chemical and biological warfare.

What GAO Found

GAO noted that: (1) none of the Army's crisis-response or early-deployment units have complied with requirements for stocking equipment critical for fighting under chemical or biological warfare; (2) the Department of Defense (DOD) has established two joint service groups to prioritize chemical and biological defense research efforts, develop a modernization plan, and develop support plans; (3) although DOD has begun to field a biological agent detection system, it has not successfully fielded other needed equipment and systems to address critical battlefield deficiencies; (4) ground forces are inadequately trained to conduct critical tasks related to biological and chemical warfare, and there are serious weaknesses at all levels in chemical and biological defense skills; (5) medical units often lack the equipment and training needed to treat casualties resulting from chemical or biological contamination; (6) DOD has inadequate stocks of vaccines for known threat agents and has not implemented an immunization policy established in 1993; and (7) the primary cause for these deficiencies is a lack of emphasis along the DOD command chain, with DOD focusing its efforts and resources on other priorities.