1.) Personnel and Equipment Shortages Will Make It Increasingly Difficult for the Army Reserve to Continue to Support Overseas Operations

The Army Reserve has provided ready forces for ongoing military  operations since September 11, 2001, by transferring personnel and  equipment to deploying units; however, it is running out of personnel who  can be mobilized under current policies and equipment that meets  deployment standards for three key reasons. This has  left nondeploying units with shortages in personnel and equipment, which  hampers their ability to train for future missions. This hampers the  Army Reserve’s ability to maintain unit readiness. The Army Reserve Lacks Required Full-time Support Staff

Another significant challenge the Army Reserve faces in continuing to  provide support for near-term operations is that it has not been authorized  all of the full-time support staff it needs to perform critical readiness duties  at home. The Army and the Army Reserve Have Initiatives to Improve Readiness and Deployment Predictability, but Full Implementation Depends on Detailed Coordination and Funding Decisions

The Army and Army Reserve have taken several steps to plan and  implement a number of initiatives to address the readiness challenges  described above and improve deployment predictability for soldiers, but  they have not yet made decisions on the numbers and types of units the  Army Reserve will need in the future and several key decisions about the  Army Reserve’s structure and funding have not yet been finalized. While  the Army’s Campaign Plan defines overall goals to improve readiness of  Army units, including Army Reserve units, it does not describe the  personnel, units, and equipment the Army Reserve will need under the  Army’s modular structure and rotational force generating model. The Army has not completed planning  for how active and Army Reserve component combat support and combat  service support units will be organized to support the new modular brigade  combat teams. While the Army and Army Reserve have various initiatives under  way to improve Army Reserve readiness over time, not all of these  initiatives are being integrated and coordinated to ensure they most  efficiently achieve overall goals. We recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the  Army, in conjunction with the Chief of Staff of the Army; the Chief, Army  Reserve; and the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness,  to develop an implementation plan for a force rotation model for the Army  Reserve that describes  the types and numbers of units that should be available for deployment   the funding the Army Reserve will need to support its transition to a   the readiness levels for each phase of the rotation, including a  description of the associated levels of personnel and equipment and the  strategy for providing them, and how readiness will be evaluated.
Why GAO Did This Study

The Department of Defense (DOD) cannot meet its global commitments without continued reserve participation. The Army Reserve provides critical combat support and combat service support units, such as medical and transportation units, to the Army. While Army Reserve members historically could expect to train one weekend a month and 2 weeks a year with activations for limited deployments, since September 11 some have been called upon to support ongoing military operations for a year or more. GAO (1) identified the challenges the Army Reserve faces in continuing to support overseas operations and (2) assessed the extent to which the Army and Army Reserve have taken steps to improve the Army Reserve's readiness for future missions.

What GAO Found

While the Army Reserve has provided ready forces to support military operations since September 11, 2001, GAO found that it is becoming increasingly difficult for the Army Reserve to continue to provide these forces due to personnel and equipment shortages. The three primary causes of these shortages are (1) the practice of not maintaining Army Reserve units with all of the personnel and equipment they need to deploy, (2) current DOD and Army personnel policies that limit the number of reservists and length of time reservists may be deployed, and (3) a shortage of full-time support staff to develop and maintain unit readiness. These challenges are compounded by emerging recruiting shortfalls. The Army and Army Reserve have recently begun several initiatives to improve the Army Reserve's readiness and provide more deployment predictability for its soldiers; however, the Army lacks a comprehensive management strategy for integrating the initiatives to ensure that each initiative most efficiently contributes to the achievement of its overall readiness and predictability goals. One of the Army Reserve's major initiatives has been to develop a rotational force model. However, the model cannot be fully implemented until the Army determines the types and number of Army Reserve units it will need to carry out its plans to restructure into a more modular and flexible force. Because the Army has not defined what personnel, units, and equipment the Army Reserve will need under the new modular and rotational models, it cannot be assured that its initiatives are most efficiently working together to meet readiness goals and that funding is appropriately targeted to meet those goals. Until plans that integrate the initiatives are completed and approved and adequate resources are provided to implement them, the Secretary of Defense and the Congress will continue to lack assurance that DOD has an effective and efficient plan for resolving the Army Reserve's growing challenges.