How Is the United States Assisting the Newly Independent States to Improve Their Nuclear Material Controls? Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

Our objectives were to (1) review the nature and extent of problems with controlling nuclear materials in the NIS; (2) determine the status and future prospects of U.S. efforts to help strengthen controls over direct-use nuclear material in Russia, Ukraine, Kazakstan, and Belarus; and (3) assess plans for consolidating these efforts in DOE. To meet our objectives, we reviewed U.S. assessments of the nature and extent of nuclear material control problems in the NIS; pertinent program documents, including agreements between DOD and the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy (MINATOM), the Ukrainian State Committee on Nuclear and Radiation Safety, the Ministry of Defense of Kazakstan, the Ministry of Defense of Belarus, and between DOE and Gosatomnadzor (GAN); program plans; trip reports; quarterly progress reviews and State Department cables; and program budget, obligation, and expenditure data for the CTR-sponsored government-to-government program and for DOE’s lab-to-lab program. U.S. officials are concerned that social and economic changes in the NIS have increased the threat of theft and diversion of nuclear material, and with the breakdown of Soviet-era MPC&A systems, the NIS may not be as able to counter the increased threat. Nature and Extent of the Problem

The Soviet Union produced up to 1,200 metric tons of HEU and 200 metric tons of plutonium. Much of this material is outside of nuclear weapons, and the stockpile of material outside of weapons is expected to grow rapidly as Russia proceeds to dismantle its weapons. Nuclear facilities rely on antiquated accounting systems and practices that cannot quickly detect and localize nuclear material losses. The NIS May Not Have Accurate and Complete Inventories

The NIS may not have accurate and complete inventories of the direct-use material they inherited from the former Soviet Union. DOE also signed an agreement with GAN, the Russian nuclear regulatory agency, in June 1995 to cooperate on the establishment of a national nuclear materials control and accounting system in Russia. The government-to- government program has provided working group meetings, site surveys, physical protection equipment, computers, and training for projects in Russia, Ukraine, Kazakstan, and Belarus. At Obninsk, the program has upgraded MPC&A systems for a research reactor facility that houses several thousand kilograms of direct-use material. Prospects for MPC&A Upgrades Are Improving

While the CTR-sponsored government-to-government program has gotten off to a slow start controlling direct-use material, the U.S. government is making progress in expanding participation in the program to more facilities with direct-use material in the NIS. DOE Faces Uncertainties in Managing an Expanded U.S. Assistance Program

In fiscal year 1996, the United States substantially increase its MPC&A assistance program to include all facilities in the NIS known to contain direct-use nuclear material. DOE plans to request from Congress $400 million for the program over  7 years. DOE’s priorities are to (1) improve controls at facilities in the NIS handling direct-use material, (2) help the Russians develop and deploy current MPC&A equipment and technology to these facilities, and (3) assist the NIS in developing a national MPC&A regulatory system.
Why GAO Did This Study

Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed U.S. efforts to strengthen controls over nuclear materials in the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union, focusing on the: (1) nature and extent of problems with controlling direct-use nuclear materials in the newly independent states; (2) status and future prospects of U.S. efforts in Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus; and (3) executive branch's consolidation of U.S. efforts in the Department of Energy (DOE).

What GAO Found

GAO found that: (1) the Soviet Union produced about 1,200 metric tons of highly enriched uranium and 200 metric tons of plutonium; (2) much of this material is outside of nuclear weapons and is highly attractive to theft, and the newly independent states may not have accurate and complete inventories of the material they inherited; (3) with the breakdown of Soviet-era material protection, control, and accounting (MPC&A) systems, the newly independent states may not be as able to counter the increased threat of theft; (4) nuclear facilities cannot quickly detect and localize nuclear material losses or detect unauthorized attempts to remove nuclear material; (5) while there is not yet direct evidence of a black market for nuclear material in the newly independent states, the seizures of direct-use material in Russia and Europe have increased concerns about theft and diversion; (6) U.S. efforts to help the newly independent states improve their MPC&A systems for direct-use material started slowly; (7) the Department of Defense's (DOD) government-to-government Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program obligated $59 million and spent about $4 million from fiscal years (FY) 1991 to 1995 for MPC&A improvements in Russia, Ukraine, Kazakstan, and Belarus, and provided working group meetings, site surveys, physical protection equipment, computers, and training; (8) the program began to gain momentum in January 1995 when CTR program and Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy (MINATOM) officials agreed to upgrade nuclear material controls at five high-priority facilities handling direct-use material; (9) DOE and Russia's nuclear regulatory agency have also agreed to cooperate on the development of a national MPC&A regulatory infrastructure; (10) DOE's lab-to-lab program, which obligated $17 million and spent $14 million in FY 1994 and 1995, has improved controls at two zero-power research reactors, and begun providing nuclear material monitors to several MINATOM defense facilities to help them detect unauthorized attempts to remove direct-use material; (11) in FY 1996, the program is implementing additional projects in MINATOM's nuclear defense complex; (12) the United States expanded the MPC&A assistance program in FY 1996 to include all known facilities with direct-use material outside of weapons; (13) management and funding for the expanded program were consolidated within DOE, which plans to request $400 million over 7 years for the program; and (14) DOE is responding to uncertainties involving the program's overall costs and U.S. ability to verify that assistance is used as intended by developing a long-term plan and a centralized cost reporting system and implementing a flexible audit and examination program.