1). NORTHCOM’s mission consists of (1) homeland defense and (2) civil  support. 2). 3). NORTHCOM Has Ongoing Efforts to Improve Coordination with the States and NGB in Planning for Its Missions

In analyzing the survey results as well as during meetings with  NORTHCOM and NGB officials, we found that NORTHCOM has ongoing  efforts to improve coordination with the states and NGB in planning for its  missions and responding to requests for civil support missions. The  command conducts two large-scale exercises—Ardent Sentry and Vigilant  Shield—and participates in over 30 smaller regional, state, and local  exercises annually to help potential responders prepare for man-made and  natural disasters. Gaps Remain in NORTHCOM’s Coordination with the States and NGB

We identified three areas in which there are gaps in coordination with the  states and NGB. Third, a 2005 memorandum of agreement,  which is intended to provide the procedures by which NORTHCOM and  NGB interact, does not clearly define each agency’s roles and  responsibilities for planning for homeland defense and civil support. In the case of civil support and as outlined in the National Response  Framework, because NORTHCOM plays a supporting role to other federal  agencies and subsequently to state and local governments, NORTHCOM  officials told us that they are starting to reach out directly to states to  obtain their perspectives and incorporate these into future revisions of  NORTHCOM’s defense support of civil authorities plan. In either homeland defense or  civil support, increasing the current level of state involvement in the  development of NORTHCOM’s plans could help integrate  intergovernmental planning for catastrophic incidents, enhance overall  coordination, and help ensure that NORTHCOM’s plans for its missions  and responses to incidents are as effective as possible. According to our survey, 54 percent of the TAGs believe that NORTHCOM  is not at all or only slightly familiar with their states’ plan (see table 4). In part, NORTHCOM is not more familiar with these plans  because it has no established and thorough process regarding  coordination with the states or for gaining access to emergency response  plans, and it is not specifically required by DOD to obtain information on  state emergency response plans or determine state and local capabilities  and potential resource gaps. By  minimally involving the states in its homeland defense and civil support  plans and not becoming familiar with information on states’ emergency  response plans and capabilities, NORTHCOM increases the risk that it may  not be prepared with the needed resources to respond to an incident. These gaps may be attributable in part to the fact that NORTHCOM does  not have an established and thorough process for cooperating and  interacting with the states. Coordination with NGB is particularly important, because NGB has  experience working with state and local authorities during incidents and it  functions as NORTHCOM’s formal link to the states. As a result of the lack of clearly defined roles and responsibilities between  NORTHCOM and NGB, we found several instances in which there was  confusion and duplicate or potentially wasted efforts. In addition, NORTHCOM’s homeland  defense plan required NGB to collect state homeland defense plans and  make them available to NORTHCOM. However, NORTHCOM officials  told us that rather than use the database, they prefer to rely on NGB staff  to provide them National Guard readiness and capabilities data. Without effective interagency  coordination and planning and clearly defined roles and responsibilities,  there is a risk that NORTHCOM’s, NGB’s, and other nationwide efforts to  respond to an incident may be fragmented and uncoordinated, such as in  the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina. We achieved a 100 percent response rate.
Why GAO Did This Study

In 2002, the Department of Defense (DOD) established U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) to conduct homeland defense and civil support missions on U.S. soil. It is particularly important that NORTHCOM coordinate with the National Guard Bureau (NGB), because NGB has experience dealing with state and local authorities during incidents and functions as NORTHCOM's formal link to the states. GAO was asked to (1) determine the extent to which NORTHCOM has ongoing efforts to coordinate with the states and NGB in planning, exercises and other preparedness activities and (2) identify the extent to which there are any gaps in this coordination. To do this, GAO surveyed the state adjutants general, the highest ranking guardsman in each state, and received a 100 percent response rate, and reviewed interagency coordination plans and guidance.

What GAO Found

NORTHCOM has several ongoing efforts to improve coordination with the states and NGB in planning for its missions and responding to requests for civil support. For example, during hurricane season NORTHCOM facilitates weekly conferences with the relevant local, state, and federal emergency management officials, through which it has begun to build more productive relationships. NORTHCOM also conducted two large-scale exercises and participated in over 25 smaller regional, state, and local exercises annually to help responders prepare for man-made and natural disasters. In addition, NORTHCOM has been informally including NGB in reviewing its plans. We identified gaps in coordination between NORTHCOM, the states, and NGB in three areas: (1) NORTHCOM officials minimally involved the states in the development of its homeland defense and civil support plans. Less than 25 percent of the state adjutants general reported that they were involved in developing and reviewing these plans. For civil support, NORTHCOM officials told us that they are reaching out directly to states to better understand states' plans and capabilities, but for homeland defense, they rely on NGB to provide states perspectives. (2) NORTHCOM was not familiar with state emergency response plans and has no process for obtaining this information. Fifty-four percent of the state adjutants general reported that they believed that NORTHCOM was not at all or only slightly familiar with their states' emergency response plans. This may be attributable, in part, to the fact that NORTHCOM does not have an established and thorough process for cooperating and interacting with the states. By not obtaining and using information on states' plans and capabilities, NORTHCOM increases the risk that it will not be prepared to respond to an incident with the needed resources to support civil authorities. (3) A 2005 agreement, which is intended to provide the procedures by which NORTHCOM and NGB interact, does not fully or clearly define each agency's roles and responsibilities for planning for homeland defense and civil support. The lack of clearly defined roles and responsibilities has resulted in confusion and duplicative or wasted efforts. For example, as required in NORTHCOM's homeland defense plan, NGB compiled the states' homeland defense plans and made them available to NORTHCOM; however, NORTHCOM planners told us that they neither requested nor needed access to this information. Without clearly defined roles and responsibilities, there is a risk that NORTHCOM's and NGB's responses to an event could be fragmented and uncoordinated. Addressing these gaps could help integrate intergovernmental planning for catastrophic incidents, enhance overall coordination, and help ensure that NORTHCOM's plans for its missions and responses to incidents are as effective as possible.