The CGS acquisition strategy provides for 2 years of LRIP, during which the Army anticipated buying 22 CGS systems at an estimated cost of about $138 million, though it received approval from DOD to procure up to an additional 16 CGS systems to accommodate other service and allied requirements. The Army now plans to evaluate the Medium and Light GSMs during that deployment and follow-on tests, if needed. While there is an operational need for Joint STARS, and despite the desire of operational commanders to have more capable systems as soon as possible, the fact remains that the Army has not adequately justified the urgency or benefits to be derived from accelerated fielding of the CGS in 1998 versus the originally planned fielding in fiscal year 2002. Furthermore, a program official stated and our review of the contract indicates that the Army needs to commit to only one CGS system in the second LRIP year to maintain the contract. Recommendation

The Army lacks an analysis justifying a need to accelerate the fielding of the CGS system and can save millions of dollars by minimizing production in its second year of CGS production. They receive data from the Mohawk Side Looking Airborne Radar and do not receive/process data from Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (Joint STARS) E8 aircraft. Interim Ground Station Module (GSM). The Army plans to acquire a total of 10 Light GSMs. Common Ground Station (CGS). GAO Comments

1. 3.
Why GAO Did This Study

GAO reviewed the Department of the Army's test and acquisition plans for the Common Ground Station (CGS), the fifth version of the Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (Joint STARS) ground station modules (GSM).

What GAO Found

GAO found that: (1) the Army planned to purchase 22 CGS in two years of low-rate initial production (LRIP) at a cost of $138 million, but it now plans to procure 34 CGS systems; (2) the Army has neither demonstrated an urgent need for CGS nor proved that the expected benefits from accelerated procurement outweigh its risks; (3) by 1998, the Army will need at least four CGS to complete operational test and evaluation; (4) since earlier versions of CGS have not tested well or completed an operational test and evaluation, the Army's acceleration of CGS LRIP increases the risk of procuring a costly and ineffective system; and (5) because the Army is only required to purchase one CGS in the second year of LRIP, it could significantly reduce system costs by procuring fewer systems in the early stages of the contract.