	NORAD Had Assessed ASA Operational Requirements but Not on a Routine Basis as Part of a Risk-Based Management Approach

Although NORAD had performed some risk assessments in response to  individual DOD leadership inquiries about ASA operations, it had not done  routine risk assessments as part of a risk-based management approach to  determine ASA operational requirements. Moreover, NORAD has not  conducted similar assessments since 2006. The Air Force Had Not Implemented ASA Operations as a Steady-State Mission in Accordance with NORAD, DOD, and Air Force Directives and Guidance

Although its units are conducting ASA operations, the Air Force had not  implemented these operations as a steady-state mission in accordance  with NORAD, DOD, and Air Force directives and guidance. For example,  in response to a December 2002 NORAD declaration of a steady-state air  defense mission, the Air Force issued a directive assigning specific  functions and responsibilities to support the mission. According to the  directive, the Air Force was to take 140 actions to implement ASA as a  steady-state mission. Readiness of ASA Units Was Not Fully Assessed by the Air Force

NORAD partially assessed readiness through inspections; however, the Air  Force, which as the force provider is responsible for measuring readiness  for its missions by evaluating personnel, training, and the quantity and  quality of equipment needed, has not done so for ASA operations. Air  Force officials said they do not perform such assessments because the  service has not formally assigned the mission to the units. Specifically,  the Air Force issues mission Designed Operational Capability statements  that identify the unit’s mission(s) and related requirements (e.g., type a  However, the Air Force has not identified ASA  number of personnel). Temporary Status of ASA Operations Creates Difficulties for Units and Hampers Cost Visibility

Because the Air Force did not implement ASA operations as a steady-state  mission in accordance with NORAD, DOD, and Air Force guidance, at the  time of our review ASA units were experiencing a number of difficulties  that challenged their ability to perform both their expeditionary missions  and ASA operations. The unit commanders we interviewed identified  funding, personnel, and dual tasking of responsibilities as the top three  factors affecting ASA operations. The Air Force Had Not Developed a Plan to Address Fighter Aircraft Challenges for Units Conducting Both ASA Operations and Expeditionary Missions

Of the 18 ASA sites, 13 sites are currently equipped with F-16s, which,  according to ANG estimates, will reach the end of their useful service lives  between fiscal years 2015 and 2020. Extend the service life of the F-15 and F-16 aircraft. In  summary, we recommended that the Secretary of Defense direct    The Commander of the U.S. command element of NORAD to routinely  conduct risk assessments to determine ASA requirements, including the  appropriate numbers of ASA sites, personnel, and aircraft to support ASA  operations.
Why GAO Did This Study

This testimony discusses GAO's recently issued report on the North American Aerospace Defense Command's (NORAD) and the Department of Defense's (DOD) air sovereignty alert (ASA) operations. According to the National Strategy for Aviation Security, issued in March 2007, and officials from U.S. intelligence agencies with whom we met, air attacks are still a threat to the United States and its people. To address this threat, NORAD and DOD have fully fueled, fully armed aircraft and trained personnel on alert 24 hours a day, 365 days a year, at 18 ASA sites across the United States. Of the 18 sites, 16 are maintained by Air National Guard (ANG) units and 2 are maintained by active duty Air Force units. If warranted, NORAD can increase personnel, aircraft, and the number of ASA sites based on changes in threat conditions. The Air Force provides NORAD with personnel and equipment, including F-15 and F-16 aircraft, for these operations. ASA units are tasked to conduct and train for both expeditionary missions (e.g., military operations in Iraq) and ASA operations. This testimony will discuss whether (1) NORAD routinely conducts risk assessments to determine the appropriate operational requirements; (2) the Air Force has implemented ASA operations as a steady-state mission, which would require programming funding and measuring readiness, in accordance with NORAD, DOD, and Air Force guidance; and (3) the Air Force has developed a plan to address the recapitalization challenges to sustaining ASA operations for the future.

What GAO Found

Although NORAD had performed some risk assessments in response to individual DOD leadership inquiries about ASA operations, it had not done routine risk assessments as part of a risk-based management approach to determine ASA operational requirements. Moreover, NORAD has not conducted similar assessments since 2006. Although its units are conducting ASA operations, the Air Force had not implemented these operations as a steady-state mission in accordance with NORAD, DOD, and Air Force directives and guidance. For example, in response to a December 2002 NORAD declaration of a steady-state air defense mission, the Air Force issued a directive assigning specific functions and responsibilities to support the mission. According to the directive, the Air Force was to take 140 actions to implement ASA as a steady-state mission. NORAD partially assessed readiness through inspections; however, the Air Force, which as the force provider is responsible for measuring readiness for its missions by evaluating personnel, training, and the quantity and quality of equipment needed, has not done so for ASA operations. Air Force officials said they do not perform such assessments because the service has not formally assigned the mission to the units. Specifically, the Air Force issues mission Designed Operational Capability statements that identify the unit's mission(s) and related requirements (e.g., type anumber of personnel). Because the Air Force did not implement ASA operations as a steady-state mission in accordance with NORAD, DOD, and Air Force guidance, at the time of our review ASA units were experiencing a number of difficulties that challenged their ability to perform both their expeditionary missions and ASA operations. The unit commanders we interviewed identified funding, personnel, and dual tasking of responsibilities as the top three factors affecting ASA operations.