TC-AIMS II Has Not Been Managed in Accordance with Certain DOD System Acquisition Policies and Related Guidance

The Army, as DOD’s acquisition agent for TC-AIMS II, has not managed this  program in accordance with certain department acquisition policies, and  related guidance, that are intended to reasonably ensure that a proposed  system is the right solution to meet mission needs. In particular, the Army  has not economically justified the program on the basis of reliable  estimates of life-cycle costs and benefits, and it has not ensured that this  program, which is intended to produce a departmentwide military  deployment management system, is aligned with a departmentwide  business enterprise architecture or an integrated blueprint for business  systems modernization. As a result, the Army does not know that  investment in TC-AIMS II as planned is warranted, represents a prudent use  of limited DOD resources, and will be interoperable with and not be  duplicative of related systems. Even if TC-AIMS II happens to be the right system, both economically and  architecturally, the Army has not fully implemented risk management and  has not fully employed performance-based contracting practices. However,  it has largely managed system requirements, commercial components, and  contractor tracking and oversight in accordance with DOD policies and  related guidance. Investment in TC-AIMS II Has Not Been Adequately Justified on the Basis of Costs and Benefits

DOD’s acquisition management policy and related guidance recognize the  importance of developing reliable economic analyses to support  investment decision making. As a result, the Army currently lacks an adequate basis to justify its planned  investment in TC-AIMS II. This means that TC-AIMS II as a DOD-wide program is based  on a service-specific architecture and not a DOD-wide architecture, thus  increasing the risk that TC-AIMS II, as defined, will not properly fit within  the context of future DOD enterprisewide business operations and IT  environments. DOD has long operated without a well-defined enterprise architecture for  its business environment. To its credit, the Army has performed key activities related to  tracking and oversight. Conclusions

It is unclear whether the Army’s planned investment in TC-AIMS II is  warranted. This is due in large part to the evident change in the  scope of the program, which was initiated on the basis of the four military  services using TC-AIMS II but has not been revised to reflect that two  services have stated their intentions not to use the system. To  accomplish this, the Secretary of the Army should take the following three  actions:  collaborate with the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for  Networks and Information Integration/Chief Information Officer, the  Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation, and the Army Cost Analysis  Division to prepare a reliable economic analysis;  ensure that development of this economic analysis (1) complies with  cost-estimating best practices and relevant Office of Management and  Budget cost benefit guidance, (2) incorporates available data on  whether deployed TC-AIMS II capabilities are actually producing  benefits, and (3) addresses that the Air Force and Marines are not  planning to use the system; and  collaborate with the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition,  Technology, and Logistics and the Under Secretary of Defense  (Comptroller) to ensure that TC-AIMS II is adequately aligned with the  evolving DOD business enterprise architecture. In addition, the department stated that even  though its economic analysis showed a slight negative return on  investment, the system’s intangible benefits bolster the program’s  overall value. Objective, Scope, and Methodology

Our objective was to determine whether the Transportation Coordinators’  Automated Information for Movements System II (TC-AIMS II) was being  managed according to important aspects of the Department of Defense’s  (DOD) acquisition policies and guidance, as well as other relevant  acquisition management best practices.
Why GAO Did This Study

Because of the importance of the Department of Defense's (DOD) adherence to disciplined information technology (IT) acquisition processes in successfully modernizing its business systems, GAO was asked to determine whether the Transportation Coordinators' Automated Information for Movements System II (TC-AIMS II) program is being managed according to important aspects of DOD's acquisition policies and guidance, as well as other relevant acquisition management best practices. TC-AIMS II was initiated in 1995 as a joint services system to help manage force and equipment movements within the United States and abroad. The U.S. Department of the Army has the lead responsibility for managing the system's acquisition and estimates its life-cycle cost to be $1.7 billion over 25 years.

What GAO Found

The Army has managed the TC-AIMS II program in accordance with some, but not all, key aspects of DOD's system acquisition management policies and related guidance. These policies and guidance are intended to reasonably ensure that investment in a given IT system represents the right solution to fill a mission need--and, if it does, that acquisition and deployment of the system are handled in a manner that maximizes the chances of delivering defined system capabilities on time and within budget. The Army has not managed the program in accordance with those DOD policies and related guidance, including related federal and other best practice guidance, that are intended to reasonably ensure that a proposed system is the right solution to meet mission needs. Specifically, the Army has not economically justified its investment in TC-AIMS II on the basis of reliable estimates of costs and benefits. For example, the most recent economic justification included cost and benefit estimates predicated on all four military services using the system. However, two services (U.S. Department of the Air Force and U.S. Marine Corps) have stated that they do not intend to use it. The Army has not invested in TC-AIMS II within the context of a well-defined enterprise architecture, which is an institutional blueprint to control program investment decisions in a way that promotes interoperability and reduces redundancy among systems. The Army has instead focused on aligning TC-AIMS II with its logistics architecture; this means that even though TC-AIMS II is intended to be a DOD-wide program, it has been based on a service-specific architecture rather than a DOD-wide architecture. As a result, it may not properly fit within departmentwide plans. To its credit, the Army has largely managed the program in accordance with key policies and related guidance that are intended to reasonably ensure that the acquisition and deployment of a given system are handled in a manner that maximizes the chances of delivering defined capabilities on time and within budget. However, some aspects of this policy and guidance have not been followed. For example, the Army has not fully implemented risk management and has not adhered to a key feature of performance-based contracting. Reasons the Army cited for not following policies and guidance ranged from management inattention to lack of training. As a result, the Army, among other things, does not know whether the system is the right solution. Until this uncertainty and the previously discussed problems are addressed, it will remain unclear whether further planned investment in TC-AIMS II is warranted, and certain aspects of the program's management will be limited.