	Overview

The year 2007 has seen Pakistan buffeted by numerous and serious political crises culminating in the December 27 assassination of former Prime Minster and leading opposition figure Benazir Bhutto, who had returned to Pakistan from self-imposed exile in October. Bhutto's killing in an apparent gun and bomb attack (the circumstances remain controversial) has been called a national tragedy for Pakistan and does immense damage to already troubled efforts to democratize the country. The assassination came just 12 days after Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf had lifted a 6-week-old emergency order. A Provisional Constitution Order (PCO) was issued by Musharraf (in his role as army chief) on the same day pursuant to the emergency proclamation. Top U.S. officials repeatedly have urged President Musharraf to make more energetic efforts to restore civilian government and rule of law in Islamabad by respecting the independence of the country's judiciary and by holding free and fair parliamentary elections in early 2008. Despite seemingly undemocratic developments in Islamabad, the United States has since 2001 provided billions of dollars in foreign assistance to Pakistan. Several bills condemning the emergency declaration were introduced in Congress ( S.Res. 372 , H.Res. 810 , and H.Res. 823 ), but none has moved out of committee to date. The U.S. government had supported a Musharraf-Bhutto accommodation as being in the best interests of both Pakistan and the United States. Bhutto's catastrophic removal from Pakistan's political equation thus dealt a serious blow to U.S. policies aimed at bringing greater stability to that country. U.S. and other Western officials, including Secretary Rice, urged Musharraf to refrain from any such move. President Musharraf announced his decision to declare a state of emergency in a late-night televised address to the Pakistani people on November 3. Moreover, several thousand opposition figures, human rights activists, and lawyers were rounded up and detained in the days following the emergency proclamation. The Pakistani media were largely unanimous in their criticism of what was widely seen to be a bald-faced attempt by Musharraf to maintain his own power in the face of increasing pressures. In late November, the newly reconstituted Supreme Court struck down challenges to the validity of Musharraf's October 2007 reelection, clearing the way for Musharraf to resign his military commission, which he did on November 28. Musharraf, for his part, called Bhutto "too confrontational" and ruled out further power-sharing negotiations with her. Especially worrisome for skeptics is Musharraf's demolition of the country's judiciary: deposed Chief Justice Chaudhry remains under house arrest, as does many of the approximately 100 high court judges who refused to take a new oath of office under the PCO. There have been numerous reports of government efforts to "pre-rig" the polls. Implications for Pakistan-U.S. Relations

		Policy Discussion

The ability of the United States to effectively exert diplomatic pressure on Pakistan is demonstrably low at present. Congress already has placed legal conditions on future U.S. military aid to Pakistan.
The year 2007 has seen Pakistan buffeted by numerous and serious political crises culminating in the December 27 assassination of former Prime Minster and leading opposition figure Benazir Bhutto, who had returned to Pakistan from self-imposed exile in October. Bhutto's killing in an apparent gun and bomb attack (the circumstances remain controversial) has been called a national tragedy for Pakistan and does immense damage to already troubled efforts to democratize the country. The assassination came just 12 days after Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf had lifted a 6-week-old emergency order. On November 3, some eight years after he overthrew the elected government in a bloodless 1999 military coup, Musharraf had suspended the country's constitution and assumed emergency powers in his role as both president and army chief. The move came as security circumstances deteriorated sharply across the country, but was widely viewed as being an effort by Musharraf to maintain his own power. His government placed numerous Supreme Court justices under house arrest, and jailed thousands of opposition figures and lawyers who opposed the abrogation of rule of law. It also cracked down on independent media outlets, many of which temporarily were shut down completely.
President Musharraf sought to justify his "second coup" as being necessary to save Pakistan from Islamist extremism and from a political paralysis he blamed largely on the country's Supreme Court. The United States, which had exerted diplomatic pressure on Musharraf to refrain from imposing a state of emergency, views Pakistan as a vital ally in global and regional counterterrorism efforts, and it has provided considerable foreign assistance to Pakistan since 2001, in part with the goal of facilitating a transition to democracy in Islamabad. Washington and other world capitals pressured Musharraf to return Pakistan to its pre-November 3 political circumstances, relinquish his status as army chief, and hold free and fair elections in January 2008. Musharraf vowed to hold such elections (which, following the Bhutto assassination, were rescheduled for February 18) and he finally resigned his military commission in late November. While thousands of previously detained political activists have been released, most of the approximately 100 high court judges who refused to take a new oath of office remain under house arrest.
In the months preceding the emergency declaration, Bhutto had engaged negotiations toward a power-sharing arrangement with Musharraf. The U.S. government supported such accommodation as being in the best interests of both Pakistan and the United States. Bhutto's catastrophic removal from Pakistan's political equation thus dealt a serious blow to U.S. interests. In light of this and other developments that constitute major setbacks for U.S. policy toward Pakistan, U.S. officials are reevaluating their approach, and many in Congress have called for cutting or halting certain types of U.S. assistance to Pakistan. Several bills condemning the emergency declaration were introduced in Congress (S.Res. 372, H.Res. 810, and H.Res. 823), but none has moved out of committee to date. Division J of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008 (H.R. 2764) places conditions on a portion of U.S. military assistance to Pakistan and includes a call for "implementing democratic reforms" there. See also CRS Report RL33498, Pakistan-U.S. Relations. This report will be updated.