The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act ( P.L. 93-288 , as amended) authorizes the President to provide temporary housing and other disaster response and recovery activities. In the case of Hurricane Katrina, the size and scope of this disaster was truly unprecedented in comparison to other large events; as such, the disaster strained the traditional shelter system. For example, at a House Financial Services hearing on Katrina housing, one Member of Congress noted that the large FEMA contingent of workers in the area actually used a significant part of the remaining resources (both hotels and other housing) and suggested that FEMA staff were, in fact, in competition with local disaster victims wishing to return to the area. Mobile homes are larger and are generally used to house applicants who are unable to obtain rental housing in the area. The travel trailers "have been used principally for shorter-term housing needs" following disaster events. But a catastrophic disaster such as Katrina removes many options. Issues for Congress

		National Disaster Housing Strategy

In Public Law 109-295, the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006, known as the post-Katrina Act, Congress directed FEMA to develop, in concert with other federal departments and agencies, as well as the non-profit sector and other interested parties, an overall strategy for disaster housing. This report was due 270 days after enactment, which would have placed its due date in July of 2007. On July 24, 2008 FEMA began a 60-day public comment period on the strategy. Since it was a catastrophic event that was the basis for the request for this strategy, as well as its overall context, it should more directly address how the strategy would address a catastrophic event. Two of these actions are the establishment of the Disaster Housing Assistance Program (DHAP), which transferred management of long-term rental housing to HUD, and FEMA's recent announced reversal, in the housing strategy, of its previous decision to no longer use travel trailers, due to safety concerns, as a disaster housing option . Further, all of the aforementioned considerations do not include the assistance some families and individuals received from charitable groups as well. 109-295 ). The changes in P.L. The work of the JHSG may be a part of the Disaster Housing Strategy that has been promised by FEMA to be provided to Congress in April of 2008. The aftermath of Hurricane Katrina illustrated the challenge of implementing Stafford Act programs on a large, national scale. The time-span of such a sheltering/housing program could be shifted to nine or 12 months, depending on the federal and state governments' ability to make contact with victims and provide them resources for alternative forms of housing. But the same concerns with costs exist regarding current FEMA temporary housing practices. Administrative Responsibility

Another policy question is which federal agency should be primarily responsible for catastrophic disaster housing. At present, the amount of funding spent on housing (both rental assistance and manufactured housing) for the Gulf Coast hurricane season of 2005 stands at over $10 billion. Congress could opt to consider the lessons of this disaster in terms not only of program adjustments and corrections, but also the appropriate governmental role throughout the recovery process for any possible future events of this magnitude. FEMA has been tasked by P.L.
Some have criticized the Federal Emergency Management Agency's (FEMA's) emergency housing policies, particularly its approach to health and safety standards (as exemplified by the evidence of formaldehyde in both trailers and mobile homes), as well as its overall strategy to perform its housing mission. To address disaster housing issues, Congress could opt to consider questions such as the following: how have disaster housing needs traditionally been addressed under the Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (P.L. 93-288, as amended)? How did FEMA's approach during Hurricane Katrina differ from previous disasters and why? Should FEMA have pursued expanded authorities at the start of the disaster? Should housing vouchers have been used earlier and tailored to the disaster event? With a substantial amount of available funding provided by Congress, but without requesting expanded authority, FEMA found its sole option was to use traditional disaster housing practices. Those practices, successful for disasters of a historically familiar size, were hard-pressed to meet the unprecedented demands of the Katrina catastrophic disaster.
There are potential events (New Madrid earthquake or other large natural or terrorist events) that could conceivably produce many of the same challenges presented by the Gulf Coast hurricane season of 2005. Those challenges include large, displaced populations spread across the nation and separated families unable to return because of the loss of not only their homes but also their places of employment. Federal disaster housing policy may remain an issue in the 110th Congress, because, as Hurricane Katrina illustrated, the continued existence of communities after a catastrophic event involves extensive federal assistance issues.
In the past, FEMA's approaches have turned on practical and theoretical considerations. Practical considerations include the agency's ability to house families and individuals within a short time frame and in proximity to the original disaster, and in the case of Hurricane Katrina, to make contact with the hundreds of thousands of applicants who registered for assistance. Some of the theoretical policy considerations include questions of equity, self-reliance, federalism, and the duration of federal assistance. Those considerations have led to process questions concerning program stewardship and the potential for waste, fraud, and abuse of federal resources.
The Post-Katrina Act, enacted in October of 2006 (P.L. 109-295), includes changes in FEMA housing policy that provide the President with greater flexibility for meeting the challenges of disasters on a large scale. Also, Public Law 110-28 has eased the cost-share burden for some housing costs and other disaster relief programs. Future debate on the housing issue will also be informed by the report on the National Disaster Housing Strategy (as directed in P.L. 109-295). This Strategy was due to Congress in 2007, but a draft was not provided until late July of 2008. Following a 60-day comment period, a final National Disaster Housing Strategy is scheduled to be presented to Congress.
This report will be updated as warranted by events.