	A Mandate for Change

Today we are at a key crossroad. In the past 5 years, DOD has doubled its planned investments  in weapons systems, but this huge increase has not been accompanied by  more stability, better outcomes, or more buying power for the acquisition  dollar. Rather than showing appreciable improvement, programs are  experiencing recurring problems with cost overruns, missed deadlines,  and performance shortfalls. It is within this context that we must engage in a comprehensive and  fundamental reexamination of new and ongoing investments in our  nation’s weapons systems. Moreover, it is counting on these efforts to enable  transformation of military operations. It is not unusual to see development cost  increases between 30 percent and 40 percent and schedule delays of  approximately 1, 2 or more years. This is not to say that the nation does not get  superior weapons in the end, but that at currently projected twice the level  of investment, DOD has an obligation to get better results. There are several reasons for this, but the primary ones include the fact  that DOD has never clearly specified who is accountable for what,  invested responsibility for execution in any single individual, or even  required program leaders to stay until the job is done. Likewise, contractors are not always held accountable when they fail to  achieve desired acquisition outcomes. DOD is also reviewing changes to requirements  setting. We believe DOD’s recently issued QDR did not lay out  a long term, resource constrained, investment strategy. Solutions

Our work shows that acquisition problems will likely persist until DOD  provides a better foundation for buying the right things, the right way. This  involves making tough tradeoff decisions as to which programs should be  pursued, and more importantly, not pursued, making sure programs are  executable, locking in requirements before programs are ever started, and  making it clear who is responsible for what and holding people  accountable when these responsibilities are not fulfilled. These changes  will not be easy to make. They require DOD to reexamine the entirety of  its acquisition process—what we think of as the “Big A”. This includes  making deep-seated changes to program requirements setting, funding,  and execution. It also involves changing how DOD views success, and  what is necessary to achieve success. In a recent study on program  management best practices, we recommended that DOD determine the  priority order of needed capabilities based on assessments of the  resources—that is dollars, technologies, time, and people needed to  achieve these capabilities. Our work over the past 10 years has  consistently shown when these basic steps are taken, programs are better  positioned to be executed within cost and schedule. It’s time to challenge such solutions.
Why GAO Did This Study

In the past 5 years, DOD has doubled its planned investments in weapons systems, but this huge increase has not been accompanied by more stability, better outcomes, or more buying power for the acquisition dollar. Rather than showing appreciable improvement, programs are experiencing recurring problems with cost overruns, missed deadlines, and performance shortfalls. GAO was asked to testify on ways to obtain a better return on DOD's weapons systems investments. This testimony identifies the following steps as needed to provide a better foundation for executing weapon programs: (1) developing a DOD-wide investment strategy that prioritizes programs based on realistic and credible threat-based customer needs for today and tomorrow, (2) enforcing existing policies on individual acquisitions and adhering to practices that assure new programs are executable, and (3) making it clear who is responsible for what and holding people accountable when these responsibilities are not fulfilled. Past GAO reports have made similar recommendations.

What GAO Found

DOD has a mandate to deliver high-quality products to warfighters, when they need them and at a price the country can afford. Quality and timeliness are especially critical to maintain DOD's superiority over others, to counter quickly changing threats, and to better protect and enable the warfighter. Cost is critical given DOD's stewardship responsibility for taxpayer money, combined with long-term budget forecasts which indicate that the nation will not be able to sustain its currently planned level of investment in weapons systems, and DOD's plans to increase investments in weapons systems that enable transformation of various military operations. At this time, however, DOD is simply not positioned to deliver high quality products in a timely and cost-efficient fashion. It is not unusual to see cost increases that add up to tens or hundreds of millions of dollars, schedule delays that add up to years, and large and expensive programs frequently rebaselined or even scrapped after years of failing to achieve promised capability. Recognizing this dilemma, DOD has tried to embrace best practices in its policies, and instill more discipline in requirements setting, among numerous other actions. Yet it still has trouble distinguishing wants from needs, and many programs are still running over cost and behind schedule. Our work shows that acquisition problems will likely persist until DOD provides a better foundation for buying the right things, the right way. This involves making tough tradeoff decisions as to which programs should be pursued, and more importantly, not pursued, making sure programs are executable, locking in requirements before programs are ever started, and making it clear who is responsible for what and holding people accountable when these responsibilities are not fulfilled. These changes will not be easy to make. They require DOD to re-examine the entirety of its acquisition process--what we think of as the "Big A"--including requirements setting, funding, and execution. Moreover, DOD will need to alter perceptions of what success means, and what is necessary to achieve success.