Today, TSA security activities at airports are overseen by FSDs. TSA has also implemented leadership  and technical training programs for Screening Supervisors. FSDs  reported that insufficient staffing and a lack of high-speed  Internet/intranet connectivity at some training facilities have made it  difficult to fully utilize these programs and to meet training requirements. TSA has acknowledged that challenges exist in recurrent screener training  delivery and is taking steps to address these challenges, including  factoring training requirements into workforce planning efforts and  distributing training through written materials and CD-ROMs until full  Internet/intranet connectivity is achieved. In December 2003, TSA issued a directive requiring screeners to receive  3 hours of recurrent training per week averaged over a quarter year. First, TSA  policy does not clearly define responsibility for ensuring that screeners  have completed all required training. However, TSA  headquarters officials stated that they have no formal policy for  monitoring screeners’ completion of basic training. Because of the unclear policies and procedures  for recording completion of remedial training, TSA does not have adequate  assurance that screeners are receiving legislatively mandated remedial  training. For  example, TSA has increased the amount of covert testing it performs at  airports. However, TSA is  taking steps to address the overall imbalance in passenger and checked  baggage screening performance data, including working toward  implementing TIP for checked baggage screening and developing an image  recognition module for checked baggage screener recertification. Although TSA has not yet established performance targets for each of the  component indicators, TSA plans to finalize performance targets for the  indicators by the end of fiscal year 2005. These  weaknesses and vulnerabilities were identified at airports of all sizes, at  airports with federal screeners, and airports with private-sector screeners. TSA Has Identified and Implemented Efforts to Enhance Screener Performance, but These Efforts Primarily Focused on Passenger Screeners

TSA has implemented a number of improvements designed to enhance  screener performance, based on concerns it identified in a July 2003  Passenger Screener Performance Improvement Study and  recommendations from OIAPR. TSA Has Established Screening Performance Measures and Indexes but Has Not Established Key Performance Targets

TSA has established performance measures, indexes, and targets for the  passenger and checked baggage screening systems, but has not  established targets for the various components of the screening indexes. Conclusions

It has been over 2 years since TSA assumed responsibility for passenger  and checked baggage screening operations at the nation’s commercial  airports. Additionally, history demonstrates that U.S. commercial aircraft have long  been a target for terrorist attacks through the use of explosives carried in  checked baggage, and covert testing conducted by TSA and DHS OIG have  identified that weaknesses and vulnerabilities continue to exist in the  passenger and checked baggage screening systems, including the ability of  screeners to detect threat objects. While covert test results provide an  indicator of screening performance, they cannot solely be used as a  comprehensive measure of any airport’s screening performance or any  individual screener’s performance, or in determining the overall  performance of federal versus private-sector screening. Recommendations for Executive Action

To help ensure that all screeners have timely and complete access to  screener training available in the Online Learning Center and to help  provide TSA management with reasonable assurance that all screeners are  receiving required passenger and checked baggage screener training, we  recommend that the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security  direct the Assistant Secretary, Transportation Security Administration, to  take the following two actions:    develop a plan that prioritizes and schedules the deployment of high-speed  Internet/intranet connectivity to all TSA’s airport training facilities to help  facilitate the delivery of screener training and the documentation of  training completion, and    develop internal controls, such as specific directives, clearly defining  responsibilities for monitoring and documenting the completion of  required training, and clearly communicate these responsibilities  throughout the agency. (3) What is the  status of TSA’s efforts to assess and enhance screener performance in  detecting threat objects?
Why GAO Did This Study

The screening of airport passengers and their checked baggage is a critical component in securing our nation's commercial aviation system. Since May 2003, GAO has issued six products related to screener training and performance. This report updates the information presented in the prior products and incorporates results from GAO's survey of 155 Federal Security Directors--the ranking Transportation Security Administration (TSA) authority responsible for the leadership and coordination of TSA security activities at the nation's commercial airports. Specifically, this report addresses (1) actions TSA has taken to enhance training for passenger and checked baggage screeners and screening supervisors, (2) how TSA ensures that screeners complete required training, and (3) actions TSA has taken to measure and enhance screener performance in detecting threat objects.

What GAO Found

TSA has initiated a number of actions designed to enhance screener training, such as updating the basic screener training course. TSA also established a recurrent training requirement and introduced the Online Learning Center, which makes self-guided training courses available over TSA's intranet and the Internet. Even with these efforts, Federal Security Directors reported that insufficient screener staffing and a lack of high-speed Internet/intranet connectivity at some training facilities have made it difficult to fully utilize training programs and to meet the recurrent training requirement of 3 hours per week, averaged over a quarter year, within regular duty hours. TSA acknowledged that challenges exist in recurrent training delivery and is taking steps to address these challenges, including factoring training into workforce planning efforts and distributing training through written materials and CD-ROMs. However, TSA has not established a plan prioritizing the deployment of high-speed Internet/intranet connectivity to all airport training facilities to facilitate screener access to training materials. TSA lacks adequate internal controls to provide reasonable assurance that screeners receive legislatively mandated basic and remedial training, and to monitor its recurrent training program. Specifically, TSA policy does not clearly specify the responsibility for ensuring that screeners have completed all required training. In addition, TSA officials have no formal policies or methods for monitoring the completion of required training and were unable to provide documentation identifying the completion of remedial training. TSA has implemented and strengthened efforts to measure and enhance screener performance. For example, TSA has increased the number of covert tests it conducts at airports, which test screeners' ability to detect threat objects on passengers, in their carry-on baggage, and in checked baggage. These tests identified that overall, weaknesses and vulnerabilities continue to exist in passenger and checked baggage screening systems at airports of all sizes, at airports with federal screeners, and at airports with private-sector screeners. While these test results are an indicator of performance, they cannot solely be used as a comprehensive measure of any airport's screening performance or any individual screener's performance. We also found that TSA's efforts to measure and enhance screener performance have primarily focused on passenger screening, not checked baggage screening. For example, TSA only uses threat image software on passenger screening X-ray machines, and the recertification testing program does not include an image recognition module for checked baggage screeners. TSA is taking steps to address the overall imbalance in passenger and checked baggage screening performance data. TSA also established performance indexes for the passenger and checked baggage screening systems, to identify an overall desired level of performance. However, TSA has not established performance targets for each of the component indicators that make up the performance indexes, including performance targets for covert testing. TSA plans to finalize these targets by the end of fiscal year 2005.