Joint cross-service teams would analyze  common business-oriented functions, and the military departments would  analyze service-unique functions. The scenario development and analysis phase focused on identifying  various realignment and closure scenarios for further analysis. DOD’s Recommendations Would Have Varying Degrees of Success in Achieving Goals for the 2005 BRAC Round

The recommendations proposed by the Secretary of Defense would have  varying degrees of success in achieving DOD’s BRAC 2005 goals of  reducing infrastructure and achieving savings, furthering transformation  objectives, and fostering joint activity among the military services. While  DOD proposed a record number of closure and realignment actions,  exceeding those in all prior BRAC rounds combined, many proposals focus  on the reserve component bases and relatively few on closing active bases. Some proposed actions represent  some progress in emphasizing transformation and jointness, but progress  in these efforts varied without clear agreement on transformational options  to be considered, and many recommendations tended to foster jointness by  consolidating functions within rather than across military services. DOD Projects Recommendations Would Produce Savings, but there are Limitations Associated with the Savings Estimates

DOD projects that its proposed recommendations will produce nearly  $50 billion in 20-year net present value savings, with net annual recurring  savings of about $5.5 billion. Military Personnel Savings

Much of the projected net annual recurring savings (47 percent) are  associated with eliminating positions currently held by military personnel;  but rather than reducing end-strength levels, DOD indicates the positions  are expected to be reassigned to other areas, limiting dollar savings  available for other uses. DOD also incorporated into its  analytical process several key considerations required by the BRAC  legislation, including the use of certified data, basing its analysis on its 20- year force structure plan and emphasizing its military value selection  criteria, which included homeland defense and surge capabilities. Several Aspects of DOD’s BRAC Recommendations and Rejected Proposals May Warrant Further Attention

We identified issues regarding DOD’s recommendations, and other actions  considered during the selection process that may warrant further attention  by the BRAC Commission. Issues with DOD’s BRAC Recommendations

We identified a number of issues, most of which apply to a broad range of  DOD’s recommendations, that may warrant further attention by the BRAC  Commission. In addition to the issue previously discussed regarding  military personnel eliminations being claimed as savings to the department,  other issues include (1) instances of lengthy payback periods (time  required to recoup up-front investment costs), (2) inconsistencies in how  DOD estimated costs for BRAC actions involving military construction  projects, (3) uncertainties in estimating the total costs to the government to  implement DOD’s recommended actions, and (4) potential impacts on  communities surrounding bases that are expected to gain large numbers of  personnel if DOD’s recommendations are implemented. Nevertheless, the savings could  prove difficult to track over time. Our  monitoring of the process from the start permitted us to assess the extent  to which the process followed was logical, sequential, reasoned, and well  documented. Because of  time limitations and complexities introduced by DOD in weaving together  the unprecedented 837 closures and realignment actions across the country  into 222 recommendations, we focused more on evaluating major issues  affecting more than one recommendation than on implementation issues of  individual recommendations. The majority of the candidate recommendations had various components  derived from using the optimization model; however, a few of the  recommendations did not. Surge requirements, where applicable, were  determined by military judgment. Likewise, they noted that it  was not used to select sites for the Joint Strike Fighter and Unmanned  Aerial Vehicle training because there were limited sites selected for this  training. Their objectives were to validate the data and the adequacy of  the supporting documentation. DOD Inspector General’s and Service Audit Agencies’ Role in the Process

The DOD Inspector General and service audit agencies reviewed the data  and processes used by the Intelligence Joint Cross-Service Group to  develop its recommendations. 2. 3. Arlington, Va.: June 8, 2005.
Why GAO Did This Study

On May 13, 2005, the Secretary of Defense submitted proposed base realignment and closure (BRAC) actions to an independent commission for its review. The Commission must submit its recommendations to the President by September 8, 2005, for his acceptance or rejection in their entirety. Congress has final action to accept or reject these recommendations in their entirety later this year. The law requires that GAO issue a report on the Department of Defense's (DOD) recommendations and selection process by July 1, 2005. GAO's objectives were to (1) determine the extent to which DOD's proposals achieved its stated BRAC goals, (2) analyze whether the process for developing recommendations was logical and reasoned, and (3) identify issues with the recommendations that may warrant further attention. Time constraints limited GAO's ability to examine implementation details of most of the individual recommended actions.

What GAO Found

DOD had varying success in achieving its 2005 BRAC goals of (1) reducing excess infrastructure and producing savings, (2) furthering transformation, and (3) fostering jointness. While DOD proposed a record number of closures and realignments, exceeding all prior BRAC rounds combined, many proposals focused on reserve bases and relatively few on closing active bases. Projected savings are almost equally large, but most savings are derived from 10 percent of the recommendations. While GAO believes savings would be achieved, overall up-front investment costs of an estimated $24 billion are required, and there are clear limitations associated with DOD's projection of nearly $50 billion in savings over a 20-year period. Much of the projected net annual recurring savings (47 percent) is associated with eliminating jobs currently held by military personnel. However, rather than reducing end-strength levels, DOD indicates the positions are expected to be reassigned to other areas, which may enhance capabilities but also limit dollar savings available for other uses. Sizeable savings were projected from efficiency measures and other actions, but underlying assumptions have not been validated and could be difficult to track over time. Some proposals represent efforts to foster jointness and transformation, such as initial joint training for the Joint Strike Fighter, but progress in each area varied, with many decisions reflecting consolidations within, and not across, the military services. In addition, transformation was often cited as support for proposals, but it was not well defined, and there was a lack of agreement on various transformation options. DOD's process for conducting its analysis was generally logical, reasoned, and well documented. DOD's process placed strong emphasis on data, tempered by military judgment, as appropriate. The military services and seven joint cross-service groups, which focused on common business-oriented functions, adapted their analytical approaches to the unique aspects of their respective areas. Yet, they were consistent in adhering to the use of military value criteria, including new considerations introduced for this round, such as surge and homeland defense needs. Data accuracy was enhanced by the required use of certified data and by efforts of the DOD Inspector General and service audit agencies in checking the data. Time limitations and complexities introduced by DOD in weaving together an unprecedented 837 closure and realignment actions across the country into 222 individual recommendations caused GAO to focus more on evaluating major cross-cutting issues than on implementation issues of individual recommendations. GAO identified various issues that may warrant further attention by the Commission. Some apply to a broad range of recommendations, such as assumptions and inconsistencies in developing certain cost and savings estimates, lengthy payback periods, or potential impacts on affected communities. GAO also identified certain candidate recommendations, including some that were changed by senior DOD leadership late in the process that may warrant attention.