	Background

The US-VISIT program is a governmentwide endeavor intended to enhance  national security, facilitate legitimate trade and travel, contribute to the  integrity of the U.S. immigration system, and adhere to U.S. privacy laws  and policies by    collecting, maintaining, and sharing information on certain foreign  nationals who enter and exit the United States; identifying foreign nationals who (1) have overstayed or violated the terms  of their visit; (2) can receive, extend, or adjust their immigration status; or  (3) should be apprehended or detained by law enforcement officials;   detecting fraudulent travel documents, verifying traveler identity, and  determining traveler admissibility through the use of biometrics; and  facilitating information sharing and coordination within the border  management community. It is to be implemented by December 31, 2005. Increment 4 is the yet-to-be-defined end vision of US-VISIT, which will  likely consist of a series of capability releases. US-VISIT Is Inherently Risky

By definition, US-VISIT is a risky undertaking because it is to perform a  critical mission, its scope is large and complex, it must meet a demanding  implementation schedule, and its potential cost is enormous. In these  circumstances, preventing the entry of persons who pose a threat to the  United States cannot be guaranteed, and the missed entry of just one can  have severe consequences. Scope Is Large and Complex

US-VISIT is to provide for the interfacing of a number of existing systems. This process  involves the pre-entry, entry, status, and exit of hundreds of millions of  foreign national travelers to and from the United States at over 300 air,  sea, and land POEs. Status management process. Moreover, achievement of interim solutions is based on assumptions that,  if changed, could significantly affect facility and staffing plans. Potential Cost Is Significant

Despite DHS’s estimate in February 2003, that the total overall cost of the  US-VISIT program would be about $7.2 billion through fiscal year 2014, the  potential governmentwide cost of US-VISIT over just a 10-year period  could be about twice as much. However, the estimate did not include the costs to design and construct  interim facilities at land POEs. In this regard,  some of the existing systems have had availability and reliability problems  that could limit US-VISIT performance. Also, DHS did not identify the estimated cost of Increment 1. To the credit of the hard-working and dedicated staff working on the  program, an initial US-VISIT operating capability was deployed to major  air and selected sea POEs at the beginning of this year. To address  these risk factors, our published reports presented several  recommendations regarding the US-VISIT program, including    ensure that future expenditure plans fully disclose US-VISIT system  capabilities, schedule, cost, and benefits to be delivered;   determine whether proposed US-VISIT increments will produce mission  value commensurate with costs and risks;   define performance standards for each increment that are measurable and  reflect the limitations imposed by relying on existing systems;   develop a risk management plan and regularly report all high risks;    develop and implement a plan for satisfying key acquisition management  controls and implement these in accordance with Software Engineering  Institute guidance;   ensure that human capital and financial resources are provided to  establish a fully functional and effective US-VISIT program office;   define program office positions, roles, and responsibilities; and    develop and implement a human capital strategy for the program office  that provides for staffing positions with individuals who have the  appropriate knowledge, skills, and abilities. Unless DHS addresses the risk factors described in this testimony,  successful deployment of US-VISIT increments is doubtful, because  achieving success will depend too much on heroic efforts by the people  involved, rather than being the predictable outcome of sound investment  and acquisition management capabilities.
Why GAO Did This Study

US-VISIT (United States Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology) is a governmentwide program to enhance national security, facilitate legitimate trade and travel, contribute to the integrity of the U.S. immigration system, and adhere to U.S. privacy laws and policies by (1) collecting, maintaining, and sharing information on certain foreign nationals who enter and exit the United States; (2) identifying foreign nationals who (1) have overstayed or violated the terms of their visit; (2) can receive, extend, or adjust their immigration status; or (3) should be apprehended or detained by law enforcement officials; (3) detecting fraudulent travel documents, verifying traveler identity, and determining traveler admissibility through the use of biometrics; and (4) facilitating information sharing and coordination within the border management community. GAO was asked to testify on its completed work on the nature, status, and management of the USVISIT program.

What GAO Found

The US-VISIT program is inherently risky, both because of the type of program it is and because of the way it is being managed. First, US-VISIT is inherently risky because it is to perform a critical, multifaceted mission, its scope is large and complex, it must meet a demanding implementation schedule, and its potential cost is enormous. That is, one critical aspect of the program's mission is to prevent the entry of persons who pose a threat to the United States; failing in this mission could have serious consequences. To carry out this mission, the program aims to control the pre-entry, entry, status, and exit of millions of travelers--a large and complex process. In addition, through legislative mandate, it has challenging milestones (such as the system being implemented at all U.S. ports of entry by December 31, 2005). Finally, DHS estimated that the program would cost $7.2 billion through fiscal year 2014, but this estimate did not include all costs and underestimated some others. All these factors add risk. Second, several factors related to the program's management increase the risk of not delivering mission valued commensurate with costs or not delivering defined program capabilities on time and within budget. For example, the program is to rely initially on integrating existing systems with reported problems that could limit US-VISIT performance. In addition, the requirements for interim facilities at high-volume land ports of entry are not only demanding, they are based on assumptions that, if altered, could significantly affect facility plans. Further, DHS did not define the benefits versus costs of near-term program increments (that is, the interim versions of the program that are being pursued while the final version is being defined). Addressing these issues is the responsibility of the program office, which however was not adequately staffed, had not clearly defined roles and responsibilities for its staff, and had not established key processes for managing the acquisition and deployment of US-VISIT. Despite the program management challenges confronting US-VISIT, the first increment was deployed at the beginning of this year. However, the program still faces a number of risks, including the ones described above. To address these, GAO has made a series of recommendations regarding the planned scope of US-VISIT and its management. Addressing the identified risks increases the likelihood that the deployment of US-VISIT will be successful--the predictable outcome of sound management of a welljustified and designed program.