The current generation of UAVs has been under development for defense  applications since the 1980s. UAVs won considerable acceptance during  military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq in 2002 and 2003, respectively. They were used in these operations to observe, track, target, and in some  cases strike enemy forces. These and similar successes have heightened  interest in UAVs within DOD and the services. The majority of the funds—$1.8 billion (67 percent)—have been for UAV  research, development, test, and evaluation. Progress Made, but Challenges Remain in UAV Planning

DOD has taken certain positive steps to improve the management of the  UAV program by establishing a program focal point in the joint UAV  Planning Task Force and trying to communicate a common vision for UAV  development, the UAV Roadmap. The development of the 2002 Roadmap has been the Task Force’s primary  product to communicate its vision and promote interoperability. The Task Force convinced the Air Force to continue with the  Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicle program last year when the Air  Force wanted to terminate it, and the Task Force ultimately helped the  then-separate Air Force and Navy programs merge into a joint program. However, the Task Force cannot compel the services to adopt any of its  suggestions and consequently has not always succeeding in influencing  service actions. DOD Has No Comprehensive Strategic Plan

Neither the Roadmap nor other DOD guidance documents represent a  comprehensive strategy to guide the development and fielding of UAVs  that complement each other, perform the range of missions needed, and  avoid duplication. The approach then ties these requirements to forecasted trends in  developing technologies as a means to try to develop a realistic  assessment of the state of the technology in the future and the  extent to which this technology will be sufficient to meet identified  requirements. Others are to establish joint  standards and control costs. These officials  further stated that the Office of the Secretary of Defense’s 2002 UAV  Roadmap provided some useful guidance, but was not used to guide the  development of the service’s UAV roadmaps. Moreover, they did not view  the Office of the Secretary of Defense’s Roadmap as either a DOD-wide  strategic plan or an overarching architecture for integrating UAVs into the  force structure. Success has been achieved as a result of intervention by leadership and  the use of innovative processes. In 1988 we reported on a variety of management challenges related to UAV  development. That success on the battlefield is leading to  more and more demand for UAVs and innovative ways of using them,  creating pressures such as a greater need for interoperability of systems  and competition for limited resources like money, electromagnetic  frequency spectrum, and airspace. The UAVs that are successful today  survived an environment characterized by a number of canceled programs,  risky strategies, uncoordinated efforts, and uncertain funding. Taking these steps will give Congress confidence that  its investments’ in the technology will produce optimum capabilities  desired of UAVs. Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: DOD’s Acquisition Efforts.
Why GAO Did This Study

The current generation of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) has been under development since the 1980s. UAVs were used in Afghanistan and Iraq in 2002 and 2003 to observe, track, target, and strike enemy forces. These successes have heightened interest in UAVs within the Department of Defense (DOD). Congress has been particularly interested in DOD's approach to managing the growing number of UAV programs. GAO was asked to summarize (1) the results of its most current report on DOD's approach to developing and fielding UAVs1 and the extent to which the approach provides reasonable assurance that its investment will lead to effective integration of UAVs into the force structure, and (2) the major management issues GAO has identified in prior reports on UAV research and development.

What GAO Found

GAO's most recent report points out that while DOD has taken some positive steps, its approach to UAV planning still does not provide reasonable assurance that the significant Congressional investment in UAVs will result in their effective integration into the force structure. In 2001, DOD established the joint UAV Planning Task Force in the Office of the Secretary of Defense to promote a common vision for UAV-related efforts and to establish interoperability standards. To communicate its vision and promote UAV interoperability, the task force issued the 2002 UAV Roadmap. While the Roadmap provides some strategic guidance for the development of UAV technology, neither the Roadmap nor other documents represent a comprehensive strategic plan to ensure that the services and other DOD agencies focus development efforts on systems that complement each other, will perform the range of priority missions needed, and avoid duplication. Moreover, the Task Force has only advisory authority and, as such, cannot compel the services to adopt its suggestions. GAO's prior work supports the need for effective oversight of individual UAV programs at the departmental level. UAVs have suffered from requirements growth, risky acquisition strategies, and uncertain funding support within the services. Some programs have been terminated. Success has been achieved as a result of top-level intervention and innovative acquisition approaches. For example, in 2003, the Office of the Secretary of Defense had to intervene to keep the Unmanned Combat Air Vehicle program viable. As UAV programs grow in the future, they will face challenges in the form of increased funding competition, greater demand for capabilities, and spectrum and airspace limitations. Moreover, UAVs are no longer an additional "nice-to-have" capability; they are becoming essential to the services' ability to conduct modern warfare. Meeting these challenges will require continued strong leadership, building on the UAV Roadmap and Planning Task Force as GAO has recommended.