Services Generally Met Most Accession Needs for Newly Commissioned Officers Despite Some Challenges, but Army Faces Unique Problems with Future Accessions

The services generally met most their past needs for newly commissioned  officers; but the Army faces some unique problems accessing enough  officers to meet its needs and has not developed a strategic plan to  address these challenges. The Marine Corps, Navy, and the Air Force  generally met their needs for accessing newly commissioned officers in  FYs 2001, 2003, and 2005. The Army did not meet its overall accession needs for newly  commissioned officers in FYs 2001 and 2003, though it met its needs in  2005. The Navy also reported meeting its overall needs for commissioned  officers during FYs 2001, 2003, and 2005. For example, Navy ROTC met  its goal for naval flight officers in FY 2005 but not FY 2001 and FY 2003. While all the services are contributing forces to  operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Army is providing most of the  forces for these operations. The Army’s current approach is to first focus on its ROTC program and  academy to meet its officer accession needs, and then compensate for  accession shortfalls in these programs by increasing OCS accessions. Commissioning shortfalls at USMA and in the Army ROTC program, as  well as the Army’s need to expand its new officer corps, have required  OCS to rapidly increase the number of officers it commissions; however,  its ability to annually produce more officers is uncertain. While ROTC and OCS both report to the same  overall authority, they do not formally coordinate with one another or with  USMA. Without such an  alternative, given the decentralized management of the officer accession  programs, and without a strategic plan that identifies goals, risks, and  resources to mitigate officer shortfalls, the Army’s ability to meet future  mission requirements is uncertain. Moreover, the Army is experiencing a shortfall of mid-level  officers because it commissioned fewer officers 10 years ago due to a post- Cold War reduction in both force size and officer accessions. Without a plan to address both its accession  and retention challenges, the Army will not have the information and tools  it needs to effectively and efficiently improve its retention of officers in  both the near term and beyond. Other Services Generally Met Their Past Retention Needs but Will Face Certain Retention Challenges in the Future

The Marine Corps, Navy, and Air Force generally met their retention needs  and had higher continuation rates from their major accession programs  than did the Army. Retaining women may be particularly challenging in certain occupational  specialties. Steps Are Being Taken to Improve the Foreign Language Proficiency of Junior Officers, but Many Impediments Could Slow Progress

DOD and the services are taking steps to enhance the foreign language  proficiency of junior officers, but many impediments must be overcome to  achieve the language objectives that DOD has laid out for junior officers. Since at least 63 percent of  Army’s current ROTC officer candidates are not on a ROTC scholarship,  officials said that increasing the language requirement could make it more  difficult to reach recruiting and accession goals as well as the objective of  having 80 percent of junior officers with a minimal foreign language  proficiency. Service officials recognize the impediments to  foreign language training and are developing plans to implement DOD’s  initiatives. Conclusions

While all of the services are challenged to recruit, access, and retain  certain types of officers, the Army is facing the greatest challenge. DOD agreed that the  Army does not have a strategic plan dedicated to current and projected  officer accessions and retention. Also,  we examined data for fiscal years 2001, 2003, and 2005 as well as  projections for the current year (FY 2006 when we began our work) and  future years. To assess the extent to which the services are retaining the numbers and  types of officers they need, we reviewed laws and DOD-wide and service- specific policies and directives to gain a comprehensive understanding of  officer retention. Military Academy: Gender and Racial Disparities. Military Education: Information on Service Academies and Schools.
Why GAO Did This Study

Accessing and retaining high-quality officers in the current environment of increasing deployments and armed conflict may be two of the all volunteer force's greatest challenges. The military services use three programs to access officer candidates: (1) military academies, (2) the Reserve Officers' Training Corps (ROTC), and (3) Officer Candidate Schools (OCS). In addition to accessing new officers, the services must retain enough experienced officers to meet current operational needs and the services' transformation initiatives. GAO was asked to assess the extent to which the services are accessing and retaining the officers required to meet their needs. GAO also identified steps that the Department of Defense (DOD) and the services have taken and the impediments they face in increasing officers' foreign language proficiency. For this report, GAO examined actual accession and retention rates for officers in fiscal years (FYs) 2001, 2003, and 2005 as well as projections for later years. Also, GAO reviewed documents on foreign language training and plans.

What GAO Found

The services generally met most of their overall accession needs for newly commissioned officers, but the Army faces challenges accessing enough officers to meet its needs. The Marine Corps, Navy, and Air Force met their overall FYs 2001, 2003, and 2005 officer accession needs, but are experiencing challenges accessing specific groups, like flight officers and medical professionals. Moreover, the Army did not meet its needs for officers in FY 2001 and FY 2003 and expects to struggle with future accessions. To meet its officer accession needs, the Army's traditional approach has been to rely first on its ROTC and academy programs and then compensate for shortfalls in these programs by increasing its OCS accessions. Between FYs 2001 and 2005, the Army nearly doubled the number of OCS commissioned officers due to (1) academy and ROTC shortfalls, (2) decreased ROTC scholarships, and (3) a need to expand its officer corps. But OCS is expected to reach its capacity in FY 2007, and resource limitations such as housing and classroom space may prevent further expansion. In addition, the Army's three accession programs are decentralized and do not formally coordinate with one another, making it difficult for the Army, using its traditional approach, to effectively manage risks and allocate resources across programs in an integrated, strategic fashion. Without a strategic, integrated plan for determining overall annual accession goals, managing risks, and allocating resources, the Army's ability to meet its future mission requirements and to transform to more deployable, modular units is uncertain. All of the services except the Army generally met their past overall officer retention needs. The Army, which continues to be heavily involved in combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, faces many retention challenges. For example, the Army is experiencing a shortfall of mid-level officers, such as majors, because it commissioned fewer officers 10 years ago due to a post-Cold War force reduction. It projects a shortage of 3,000 or more officers annually through FY 2013. While the Army is implementing and considering initiatives to improve officer retention, the initiatives are not integrated and will not affect officer retention until at least 2009 or are unfunded. As with its accession shortfalls, the Army does not have an integrated strategic plan to address its retention shortfalls. While the Army is most challenged in retaining officers, the Marine Corps, Navy, and Air Force generally met their retention needs in FYs 2001, 2003, and 2005; but each experienced challenges in occupational specialties such as medical officers. DOD and the services are taking steps to enhance the foreign language proficiency of junior officers, but many impediments must be overcome to achieve the language objectives that DOD has laid out for junior officers. For example, academy and ROTC officer candidates already have demanding workloads and ROTC does not control curricula at host institutions. The services recognize these impediments and are drafting plans to implement DOD's foreign language objectives.