The two principal multilateral regimes that address exports of UAVs are  the MTCR and Wassenaar. Wassenaar, established in 1996, is a voluntary  association of 41 countries that share the goal of limiting the spread of  certain conventional weapons and sensitive dual-use items having both  civilian and military applications. There are also U.S. government agencies that gather and analyze  information on the proliferation of UAV systems and related technologies  and produce UAV-related threat assessments and other UAV-related  information. UAVs are also increasingly used in a number of civil and  commercial applications, such as law enforcement, but national and  international regulations place restrictions on most of these applications. UAV Proliferation Presents Risks for the United States, but Selected Transfers Support Its Interests

The United States likely faces increasing risks as additional countries of  concern and terrorist organizations acquire UAV technology. UAVs can  provide countries and terrorists organizations with increased abilities to  gather intelligence on and conduct attacks against U.S. interests. We were told that the significant  growth in the number of countries that have acquired UAVs, including key  countries of concern, has increased the threat to the United States. Transfers of U.S. UAV Technology Increase Allies’ Capabilities and Strengthen the Industrial Base for UAV Production

Although UAV proliferation poses risks, the U.S. government has  determined that selected transfers of UAV technology can further national  security objectives. Italy and  the United Kingdom also successfully deployed U.S. UAVs in Afghanistan  to collect intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance data on Taliban  activity. The United States Made Proposals to Address the Proliferation of UAVs through the MTCR but Members Did Not Agree to Most of the Changes

The United States proposed changes to address how the MTCR applies  to UAVs, but MTCR members only reached a consensus to accept one of  the changes. While Wassenaar applies to the export of some military and dual-use  systems used on UAVs, it does not apply to other dual-use enabling  technologies, according to available analysis. This fact raises concerns about the potential for  nonmembers to undermine the regimes’ ability to limit UAV proliferation. The United States Has Also Used Bilateral Demarches to Address UAV Proliferation Concerns

In addition to employing multilateral diplomacy to address UAV  proliferation concerns, the United States employed bilateral diplomacy,  chiefly in the form of demarches, to address specific concerns with  foreign governments. State provided to us approximately 70 cables  containing UAV-related demarches issued to 20 foreign governments and  a multilateral regime during the period from January 2005 to September  2011. Over 75 percent of the cables provided responded to efforts by a  small number of countries of concern to obtain controlled and  uncontrolled technologies for use in their UAV programs. Agencies Coordinate to Control the Spread of UAV Technology, but Could Strengthen Their Approval, Monitoring, and Enforcement Efforts

U.S. agencies coordinate in a variety of ways to control the spread of  UAV technology, but could strengthen their processes for approving,  monitoring, and enforcing export control requirements on UAVs. Second, DOD, State, and Commerce each conduct  end-use monitoring of some UAV technology, but differences in the  agencies’ programs may result in similar items being subject to different  levels of oversight. Additionally, many UAV-related license applications are reviewed by the  Missile Technology Export Control Group (MTEC). The U.S. government has authorized the export of a range of UAV  technology, but database limitations impair its ability to oversee the  release of such technology. Specifically, State’s licensing database was not  designed to produce complete data on the number, types, and value of  UAV technology that State has licensed for export. We recommend that all U.S. agencies with information relevant to the  export licensing process should seek to improve mechanisms for  information sharing. State and DOD also agreed with our recommendation to harmonize their  approaches to the end-use monitoring of UAVs. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are  listed in appendix V.

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

To assess the global trends in the development, acquisition, and  application of unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) technology worldwide since  2005, we obtained, analyzed, and corroborated private sector open  source and U.S. government reporting on U.S. and foreign UAV activities  from various sources and spoke to representatives of U.S. private sector  associations representing companies that manufacture UAVs. To assess the extent to which the U.S. government has coordinated its  export control efforts to limit the spread of UAV technology, we obtained  and analyzed fiscal years 2005 through 2010 export licensing and end- use monitoring data from Commerce and State. For this reason,  this appendix provides additional information about these changes.
Why GAO Did This Study

The global use of UAVs has increased significantly over time, raising concerns about their proliferation. MTCR and Wassenaar are the multilateral regimes that address UAV proliferation. MTCR seeks to limit the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction delivery systems, while Wassenaar seeks to limit the spread of certain conventional weapons and sensitive technologies with both civilian and military uses. This report is an unclassified version of a classified report issued in February 2012. GAO was asked to address (1) global trends in the use of UAV technology, (2) U.S. national security considerations concerning UAV proliferation, (3) multilateral and bilateral tools to control UAV proliferation, and (4) coordination of U.S. efforts to limit the spread of UAV technology. To conduct this review, GAO analyzed intelligence, licensing, and end-use monitoring data, and interviewed U.S. and foreign officials.

What GAO Found

Since 2005, the number of countries that acquired an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) system nearly doubled from about 40 to more than 75. In addition, countries of proliferation concern developed and fielded increasingly more sophisticated systems. Recent trends in new UAV capabilities, including armed and miniature UAVs, increased the number of military applications for this technology. A number of new civilian and commercial applications, such as law enforcement and environmental monitoring, are available for UAVs, but these applications are limited by regulatory restrictions on civilian airspace.
The United States likely faces increasing risks as countries of concern and terrorist organizations seek to acquire UAV technology. Foreign countries and terrorists acquisition of UAVs could provide them with increased abilities to gather intelligence on and conduct attacks against U.S. interests. For instance, some foreign countries likely have already used UAVs to gather information on U.S. military activities overseas. Alternatively, the U.S. government has determined that selected transfers of UAV technology support its national security interests by providing allies with key capabilities and by helping retain a strong industrial base for UAV production. For instance, the United Kingdom and Italy have used UAVs purchased from the United States to collect data on Taliban activity in Afghanistan.
The United States has engaged in multilateral and bilateral diplomacy to address UAV proliferation concerns. The United States principally engaged the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) to address multilateral UAV proliferation concerns. Since 2005, the United States proposed certain significant changes to address how MTCR controls UAVs, but members could not reach a consensus for these changes. Also, while the Wassenaar Arrangement (Wassenaar) controls the export of some key dual-use UAV components, it does not control other dual-use technologies that are commonly used in UAVs. The Department of State (State) has also used diplomatic cables to address the proliferation of UAV-related technologies bilaterally. State provided to GAO about 70 cables that it sent from January 2005 to September 2011 addressing UAV-related concerns to about 20 governments and the MTCR. Over 75 percent of these cables focused on efforts by a small number of countries of concern to obtain UAV technology.
U.S. agencies coordinate in several ways to control the spread of UAV technology, but could improve their UAV-related information sharing. For instance, an interagency group reviews many license applications to export UAV technology. However, there is not a formal mechanism to ensure that licensing agencies have relevant and timely intelligence information when making licensing decisions. Also, States licensing database cannot provide aggregate data on military UAV exports State has authorized, which may impair the U.S. governments ability to oversee the release of sensitive UAV technology. The Department of Defense (DOD) and State each conduct end-use monitoring of some UAV exports, but differences in the agencies programs may result in similar types of items being subject to different levels of oversight.

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that State improve its export licensing database to better identify authorized UAV exports, that relevant agencies improve mechanisms for sharing information relevant to the export licensing process, and that State and DOD harmonize their UAV end-use monitoring approaches. The agencies generally agreed with the recommendations.