Some observers note the importance of statutory authorities and regular congressional oversight of the law enforcement-intelligence relationship. (11)
Activities abroad threatening U.S. security interests may also be violations of international law. (23)
In some cases, efforts of intelligence agencies in support of law enforcement efforts proved to be ill-advised. It is now making much greater use of open sources, i.e. , coordinating offices, in the Justice Department to interface with theCIA; 
new procedures to govern requests for intelligence-file searches that might result in the production of materials to be used in court cases;
requirements for law enforcement agencies to provide notice to prosecutors when there is an intelligence interest;
measures concerning the treatment of the identity of intelligence officers whose identities are classified;
new procedures to protect classified information in situations not envisioned by earlier statutes, such as the Classified Information Procedures Act;
a Memorandum of Understanding between the Attorney General and intelligence agencies that outlines the circumstances under which the agencies must report suspected criminal activity; and,
an intercommunity training plan to facilitate coordination. Coordinative and consultative mechanisms--an Intelligence-Law Enforcement Policy Board and a Joint Intelligence-LawEnforcement Working Group (JICLE)--have been established at several levels in response to the 1994 assessmentof theJoint Task Force on Intelligence and Law Enforcement reached to ensure that exchanges of information are soundlyestablished and preserve the integrity of the judicial process, as well as the legitimate functions of the IntelligenceCommunity. Section 804 of the FY1997 Intelligence Authorization Act( P.L.104-293 ) established within the NSC a Committee on Transnational Threats to develop strategies to deal with suchthreatsand to assist in the resolution of operational and policy differences among Federal departments and agencies inrespondingto the threats, to ensure the effective sharing of information about transnational threats among Federal departmentsandagencies, "including law enforcement agencies and the elements of the intelligence community," and "to developguidelines to enhance and improve the coordination of activities of Federal law enforcement agencies and elementsof theintelligence community outside the United States with respect to transnational threats." The only official with authority over both intelligence and law enforcement efforts is the President, even though in someadministrations the National Security Adviser or the White House Chief of Staff may have significant, ifnonstatutory,responsibilities. (58)
Although the absence of this information may not have complicated U.S. diplomacy in this instance, some observerssuggest that information regarding other countries' efforts to influence U.S. policies must be available to thoseresponsiblefor the formulation and execution of U.S. national security policy. Thestructure hasbeen maintained by the Bush Administration. These, they argue, also have significant drawbacks. The attacks of September 11, 2001 have been treated as military strikes against the United States rather than a felony. They further argue that it may be easier toaddresscomplex jurisdictional issues and oversight responsibilities at a time when relationships are malleable, rather thanto waituntil bureaucratic rigidities set in or undesirable precedents are set during grave crises that require immediatedecisions. Efforts to enforce international law and the extraterritorial provisions of domestic laws are increasingly important in theresponse of the U.S. Government to the transnational threats of the post-Cold War world. Very few observers believe that the two efforts can be simply conflated. Important constitutional distinctions will remain. Careful analysis of the campaign against Al Qaeda willundoubtedlyinform congressional oversight of the relationship between the two communities.
In the post-Cold War world, terrorism, narcotics trafficking, and related money laundering are perceived both as criminalmatters and as threats to the nation's security. Often collectively termed transnational threats, these issues havebecome theconcerns of law enforcement agencies as well as the U.S. Intelligence Community. Two foreign banking scandalsin thelate 1980s led to efforts to ensure that information in the possession of intelligence agencies would, in the future,be madeavailable to law enforcement officials. In the mid-1990s, the Federal Bureau of Investigation began assigningadditionalagents to newly created offices worldwide. The tragic events of September 11, 2001 provide a clear demonstrationof howlarge a threat international terrorism can become to national security. The Bush Administration and Congress havemovedrapidly to promote intelligence/enforcement cooperation among U.S. agencies in the campaign against Al Qaeda.
This report looks at the separate roles and missions and distinct identities of intelligence and law enforcement agencies. Coordinating their efforts has raised significant legal and administrative difficulties that have been only partiallyovercomedespite the creation of elaborate coordinative mechanisms under the oversight of the National Security Council. Someobservers also have expressed concerns about the greater use of information derived from intelligence sources injudicialproceedings, fearing that it may lead to over-reliance on surreptitious means of information collection and, thus,underminecivil liberties. Other observers have cautioned that redirecting intelligence assets to collect information for legalcases mayreduce support available to military commanders and policymakers. Some others believe that there may also beanoveremphasis on law enforcement in dealing with problems arising abroad. The report notes the employment ofcovertactions by intelligence agencies in certain law enforcement efforts.
This report also addresses congressional oversight of the law enforcement-intelligence relationship that is spread among anumber of House and Senate committees, each of which has only partial jurisdiction. Some observers believe thatthereshould be further efforts to base the evolving relationship in statutory law. They have argued that closer attentionshould begiven to coordinating the emerging relationship between intelligence and law enforcement efforts while practicesaremalleable rather than to wait until bureaucratic rigidities set in or unfortunate precedents are established duringcrises.
Even with conscientious efforts at coordination, others have noted that fundamental differences remain between matters oflaw and of national interest in a world of sovereign nation states. Enforcement of international law and theextraterritorialapplication of U.S. law can be vigorously and, at times, effectively resisted by other countries. The necessity toadapt U.S.responses to transnational threats to specific situations can also undermine respect for law by making enforcementappearinequitable.