In its rebaselining effort, this and other  aspects of Secure Flight are currently being reviewed, and policy decisions  regarding the operations of the program have not been finalized. TSA officials acknowledged that they had not  followed a disciplined life cycle approach in developing Secure Flight, but  stated that in moving forward, they would follow TSA’s standard  development process. Further, TSA had proceeded with Secure Flight development without an  effective program management plan that contained up-to-date program  schedules and cost estimates. Prior to TSA’s rebaselining effort of Secure Flight, several oversight  reviews of the program had been conducted that raised questions about  program management, including the lack of fully defined requirements. TSA has taken actions that recognize the need to instill more rigor and  discipline into the development and management of Secure Flight, and  suspended its development efforts while it rebaselines the program. Although TSA officials  stated that they will use a disciplined life cycle approach when moving  forward with the rebaselined program, officials have not identified when  their rebaselining effort will be completed. TSA Had Made Progress in Coordinating with Critical Stakeholders, but More Work Remains

As we testified in February 2006, TSA had taken steps to collaborate with  Secure Flight stakeholders—CBP, TSC, and domestic air carriers—whose  participation is essential to ensuring that passenger and terrorist watch list  data are collected and transmitted for Secure Flight operations, but  additional information and testing are needed to enable stakeholders to  provide the necessary support for the program. All key program stakeholders we interviewed stated that additional  information was needed before they could finalize their plans to support  Secure Flight operations. Key Factors That Could Influence the Effectiveness of Secure Flight Remain to Be Finalized or Resolved

As of February 2006, several activities were under way, or were about to  be decided, that would affect Secure Flight’s effectiveness. For example,  TSA had tested name-matching technologies to determine what type of  passenger data would be needed to match against terrorist watch list data. Prior to its rebaselining effort, we further reported that TSA had not made  key policy decisions for determining the passenger information that air  carriers would be required to collect, the name-matching technologies that  would be used to vet passenger names against terrorist watch list data,  and thresholds that would be set to determine the relative volume of  passengers who are to be identified as potential matches against the  database. Because  Secure Flight’s system development documentation did not fully address  how passenger privacy protections were to be met, it was not possible to  assess potential system impacts on individual privacy protections, as of  February 2006. Prior to the rebaselining effort, TSA was  in the process of developing but had not issued the systems-of-records  notice required by the Privacy Act, or the privacy impact assessment  required by the E-Government Act, that would describe how TSA will  protect passenger data once Secure Flight becomes operational. When we reported on Secure Flight in March 2005, TSA had committed to  take action on our recommendations to manage the risks associated with  developing and implementing Secure Flight, including finalizing the  concept of operations, system requirements, and test plans; completing  formal agreements with CBP and air carriers to obtain passenger data;  developing life cycle cost estimates and a comprehensive set of critical  performance measures; issuing new privacy notices; and putting a redress  process in place. We support these  efforts and believe that proceeding with operational testing and  completing other key program activities should not be pursued until TSA  demonstrates that it has put in place a more disciplined life cycle process  as part of its rebaselining effort. Appendix I: Related GAO Products

Aviation Security: Significant Management Challenges May Adversely  Affect Implementation of the Transportation Security Administration’s  Secure Flight Program. TSA’s Modifications to Rules for Prescreening Passengers. Measures for Testing the Impact of Using Commercial Data for the  Secure Flight Program. We also interviewed  representatives from the U.S. Customs and Border Protection and  Terrorist Screening Center to obtain information about stakeholder  coordination.
Why GAO Did This Study

After the events of September 11, 2001, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) assumed the function of passenger prescreening--or the matching of passenger information against terrorist watch lists to identify persons who should undergo additional security scrutiny--for domestic flights, which is currently performed by the air carriers. To do so, TSA has been developing Secure Flight. This testimony covers TSA's progress and challenges in (1) developing, managing, and overseeing Secure Flight; (2) coordinating with key stakeholders critical to program operations; (3) addressing key factors that will impact system effectiveness; and (4) minimizing impacts on passenger privacy and protecting passenger rights.

What GAO Found

For over 3 years, TSA has faced challenges in developing and implementing the Secure Flight program, and in early 2006, it suspended Secure Flight's development to reassess, or rebaseline, the program. TSA's rebaselining effort is currently under way, and final decisions regarding the future direction of the program have not been made. In our most recent report and testimony, we noted that TSA had made some progress in developing and testing the Secure Flight program, but had not followed a disciplined life cycle approach to manage systems development or fully defined system requirements. We also reported that TSA was proceeding to develop Secure Flight without a program management plan containing program schedule and cost estimates. Oversight reviews of the program had also raised questions about program management. Secure Flight officials stated that as they move forward with the rebaselined program, they will be following a more rigorous and disciplined life cycle process for Secure Flight. We support TSA's rebaselining effort, and believe that the agency should not move forward with the program until it has demonstrated that a disciplined life cycle process is being followed. We also reported that TSA had taken steps to collaborate with Secure Flight stakeholders whose participation is essential to ensuring that passenger and terrorist watch list data are collected and transmitted to support Secure Flight. However, key program stakeholders--including the U.S. Customs and Border Protection, the Terrorist Screening Center, and air carriers--stated that they needed more definitive information about system requirements from TSA to plan for their support of the program. In addition, we reported that several activities that will affect Secure Flight's effectiveness were under way or had not yet been decided. For example, TSA conducted name-matching tests that compared passenger and terrorist screening database information to determine what type of passenger data would be needed for Secure Flight's purposes. However, TSA had not yet made key policy decisions that could significantly impact program operations, including what passenger data it would require air carriers to provide and the name-matching technologies it would use. Further, Secure Flight's system development documentation did not fully identify how passenger privacy protections were to be met, and TSA had not issued the privacy notices that described how it would protect passenger data once Secure Flight became operational. As a result, it was not possible to assess how TSA is addressing privacy concerns. Secure Flight officials stated that they plan to address privacy issues and finalize its redress polices in conjunction with rebaselining the program.