Many Major Cities Assessed the Risk of RDD and IND Attacks as Lower Than Other Hazards They Face, and Few Had Developed Specific Response Plans

Many major city emergency managers, although not all, responded to our  questionnaire that their city had assessed the risks of RDD and IND  attacks and had ranked the risk of these attacks as lower than the risk of  other hazards their city faces. Most of the major cities that  reported having RDD and IND response plans also reported having  conducted exercises to validate those plans. Of the 27 major cities that responded to our  questionnaire, 11 (41 percent) of the emergency managers reported that  their city had completed RDD response plans, and 8 (30 percent) had  completed IND response plans. Some emergency managers for cities  that did not have specific RDD and IND response plans reported that they  would rely on other plans in the event of such an attack, including their  city’s emergency operations plan or hazard management plan. Major Cities Vary Widely in Perceptions of Their Ability to Respond within 24 Hours of RDD and IND Attacks, but Perceive More Ability to Respond to an RDD Attack

Our analysis of the questionnaire responses from major city emergency  managers showed a wide variation in their perceptions regarding their  cities’ abilities to respond within the first 24 hours to the RDD or IND  attack depicted in the National Planning Scenarios, but most perceived  that their city has more ability to conduct the early response for an RDD  attack than for an IND attack. We also asked them to consider  mutual aid from other jurisdictions in estimating their early response  abilities, but not to consider assistance from federal sources. For example, 7 of 27 cities  were perceived by their emergency managers as being able to conduct all  of the activities needed for early response to an RDD attack without  federal assistance—such as treating casualties—while 2 cities were  perceived as being able to conduct all of the activities needed for an IND  attack, without federal assistance. According to FEMA and NNSA officials,  additional federal guidance may not be necessary because they expect  major cities to have the abilities to respond to a more likely smaller scale  RDD attack than the large RDD attack, as they would a hazardous  materials spill. Without greater awareness of and  additional federal guidance on the capabilities needed by cities for early  response to both RDD and IND attacks, cities may not have the  information they need to adequately prepare for and respond to them. Any gaps in response capabilities could lead to complications that result  in greater loss of life and economic impacts. Major Cities Reported Need for Guidance on the Type and Timing of Federal Technical and Resource Assistance for Early Response to RDD and IND Attacks

Most emergency managers from major cities responding to our  questionnaire reported that they need federal technical and resource  assistance to support their early response to RDD and IND attacks, but  federal guidance on the type and timing of this assistance is not found in  a single document and may not be well understood by emergency  managers. Almost all emergency managers (24  of 27 cities for RDD and 23 of 27 cities for IND) indicated that their city  needs federal funding to maintain current early response capabilities. According to the 2008 National Response Framework, response  capabilities are developed within the national preparedness system  through effective planning, coordinating, training, equipping, and  exercising activities. These activities are essential elements of an  integrated, capability-based approach to preparedness. More federal planning  guidance applicable to major cities has been developed for IND response,  primarily based on the event depicted in the National Planning Scenarios,  but this guidance does not detail the early response capabilities needed  by major cities in relation to other sources of assistance. Lack of adequate response planning  could lead to complications that result in greater loss of life and economic  impacts. Recommendation for Executive Action

To provide assistance to major cities in planning for early response to  RDD and IND attacks, we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland  Security direct the Administrator for the Federal Emergency Management  Agency to promote greater awareness of existing federal guidance and  develop additional guidance where appropriate to clarify the capabilities  needed by cities for these attacks, including the planning assumptions for  an RDD attack and the type and timing of federal assistance for early  response. GAO staff who made contributions to this  report are listed in appendix V.

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

In our review, we examined major cities’ (1) assessment of the risks of  RDD and IND attacks and the extent to which they have developed plans  for responding to them, (2) perceptions of their abilities to respond to  RDD and IND attacks in the first 24 hours (early response), and (3)  perceptions of their need for federal support in the early response to RDD  and IND attacks. We also reviewed relevant federal guidance documents.
Why GAO Did This Study

A terrorist attack in a major city using an RDD or an IND could result not only in the loss of life but also have enormous psychological and economic impacts. Major cities are assumed to be preferred targets of such attacks, and local governments, along with their states, have primary responsibilities for early response (within the first 24 hours), with assistance from federal sources, as necessary, coming later. A disjointed or untimely response could increase the impact and undermine public confidence in federal, state and local governments' ability to respond to an attack.
GAO was asked to review issues related to response preparedness for RDD and IND attacks. This report examines major cities' (1) assessment of RDD and IND risks and development of response plans, (2) perceptions of their abilities to respond within the first 24 hours, and (3) perceptions of the need for federal support in early response to these attacks. GAO primarily relied on questionnaire responses from emergency managers of 27 of the 31 major cities that the Department of Homeland Security considers to be at high risk for terrorist attack, the review of pertinent federal guidance, and interviews with FEMA officials and others.

What GAO Found

Many emergency managers from the 27 major cities responding to GAO's questionnaire, although not all, reported that their city had assessed the risks of a terrorist attack using a radiological dispersal device (RDD) or improvised nuclear device (IND) and had ranked the risk of these attacks as lower than the risk of other hazards they face. Also, 11 of the 27 reported that they had completed RDD response plans, and 8 of the 27 reported that they had completed IND response plans. Some emergency managers for cities without specific RDD and IND response plans reported that they would rely on their city's all hazards emergency operations plan or hazard management plan if attacked. Most cities that had RDD and IND response plans reported conducting exercises to validate the plans based on federal guidance.
Major cities varied widely in perceptions of their abilities to respond within the first 24 hours of RDD and IND attacks (early response). For example, all 27 cities were perceived by their emergency managers as being able to conduct at least a few of the early response activities after an RDD attack, such as treating casualties, with assistance from other jurisdictions but not federal assistance. Ten of those cities were perceived as not being able to conduct any of the response activities for an IND attack without federal assistance. GAO analysis found that these perceptions were not necessarily related to a city having RDD and IND response plans but rather related to their understanding of nuclear and radiological incidents and the capabilities needed for response according to information obtained from Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) officials. GAO found limited federal planning guidance related to the early response capabilities needed by cities for the large RDD attack depicted in the national planning scenarios. Federal guidance may not be needed, according to FEMA officials, because they expect cities to address a more likely but smaller RDD attack--as they would a hazardous materials spill--with limited federal assistance. More federal planning guidance applicable to cities has been developed for IND response, but this guidance does not detail the early response capabilities needed by cities in relation to other sources of assistance. Without greater awareness of and additional federal guidance on the capabilities needed by cities for early response to these attacks, cities may not have the information they need to adequately prepare for and respond to them. This could lead to complications that result in greater loss of life and economic impacts.
Most emergency managers reported perceived needs for federal technical and resource assistance to support their cities' early response to RDD (19 of 27 cities) and IND (21 of 27 cities) attacks. However, GAO found that federal guidance on the type and timing of such assistance is not readily available or understood by all emergency managers. This condition could lead to a disjointed and untimely response that might increase the consequences of either kind of attack. Emergency managers also reported a need for improved procedures and more information that FEMA is addressing. In addition, most emergency managers reported their city needed federal funding to maintain current capabilities to respond to RDD and IND attacks. According to DHS guidance, response capabilities are developed through planning, training, equipping, and exercising, which are essential elements of an integrated, capability-based approach to preparedness.

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that FEMA develop guidance to clarify the early response capabilities needed by cities for RDD and IND attacks. FEMA did not concur with this recommendation. GAO believes that gaps in early response abilities warrant federal attention and has clarified its recommendation.