U.S. These efforts were intended to help ensure that  the MOI and ANP are directed by professional staff that can successfully  manage and sustain a national police force in Afghanistan. The officer  corps reform program reduced the oversized MOI-ANP officer corps from  about 17,800 to about 9,000 personnel, reformed the ANP’s top-heavy rank  structure, and increased police pay. Expansion of New Approach to Training Afghan Police Constrained by Shortage of Military Personnel

CSTC-A has begun retraining ANP through its Focused District  Development (FDD) program, which is intended to build professional and  fully capable police units. FDD is achieving promising results in most  participating districts, according to Defense status reports. However, a  shortage of military personnel is constraining CSTC-A’s plans to expand  FDD and similar programs into the rest of Afghanistan by the end of 2010. Defense has identified a shortage of about 1,500 military personnel to  expand FDD and similar police development programs. In February 2009, Defense assessed 19 percent of the units retrained  through the FDD program as capable of conducting primary operational  missions, 25 percent as capable of conducting primary operational  missions with international support, 31 percent as capable of partially  conducting primary operational missions with international support, an 25 percent as not yet capable of conducting primary operational missions. However, the demand for personnel for use in Afghan  army training programs is likely to increase because Afghanistan, the  United States, and other international partners have agreed to increase the  Afghan army from 80,000 to 134,000 personnel. U.S. Agencies Screened MOI and ANP Officers but Did Not Systematically Compile Records of Background Checks

MOI and ANP officers were screened by Defense and State as part of a  rank reform program intended to promote institutional and organizational  reform, but State did not systematically compile records of background  checks conducted as part of the screening effort. At least 55 percent of the almost 17,800 officers tested passed,  according to data provided by CSTC-A. At least 9,797 (55 percent) of  these officers passed. Efforts to Enhance MOI and ANP Pay Systems Face Challenges of Limited Cooperation and Lack of a Nationwide Bank System

U.S.-supported pay system efforts are intended to (1) validate the status of  reported MOI and ANP personnel rosters and (2) help ensure that MOI and  ANP wages are distributed reliably and fairly. Despite some progress,  these efforts face challenges that include limited ANP cooperation and a  shortage of commercial banks. Although U.S. contractor personnel have  validated the status of almost 47,400 current MOI and ANP personnel, they  have been unable to validate the status of almost 29,400 additional  personnel—paid in part by U.S. contributions to LOTFA—because of a  lack of cooperation from certain ANP commanders. As of January 2009,  about 97 percent of reported MOI and ANP personnel had enrolled in a  new U.S.-supported electronic payroll system, and 58 percent had enrolled  in a new electronic funds transfer system to have salaries deposited  directly into their bank accounts. Appendix I: Objective, Scope, and Methodology

This report assesses U.S. government efforts to help the government of  Afghanistan (1) restructure the Ministry of Interior (MOI) and the Afghan  National Police (ANP), (2) retrain selected ANP units, (3) screen MOI and  ANP personnel, and (4) enhance MOI and ANP identification and pay  systems. To assess the status of U.S. efforts to restructure the MOI and ANP, we  reviewed the Department of Defense’s (Defense) Afghan National  Campaign Plan, a draft joint mentor coordination plan prepared by  Defense’s Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A)  and the European Union Police Mission to Afghanistan, and CSTC-A’s MOI  Development Plan. In Washington, D.C., we  met with officials from Defense, State, and DEA.
Why GAO Did This Study

The United States has invested more than $6.2 billion in the Afghan Ministry of Interior (MOI) and Afghan National Police (ANP). The Department of Defense's (Defense) Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A), with the Department of State (State), leads U.S. efforts to enhance MOI and ANP organizational structures, leadership abilities, and pay systems. This report assesses the status of U.S. efforts to help Afghanistan (1) restructure MOI and ANP, (2) retrain ANP units, (3) screen MOI and ANP personnel, and (4) enhance MOI and ANP pay systems. GAO reviewed Defense, State, and United Nations (UN) data and met with officials in the United States and Afghanistan.

What GAO Found

U.S. agencies and Afghanistan have achieved their goals of restructuring and reducing a top-heavy and oversized MOI and ANP officer corps, modifying police wages, and planning a reorganization of MOI headquarters. These efforts are intended to help ensure that the MOI and ANP are directed by professional staff that can manage a national police force. U.S. agencies and MOI cut the officer corps from about 17,800 to about 9,000, reduced the percentage of high-ranking officers, and increased pay for all ranks. MOI is scheduled to implement a U.S.-supported headquarters reorganization. CSTC-A has begun retraining ANP units through its Focused District Development (FDD) program, which is intended to address district-level corruption that impeded previous efforts to retrain individual police. FDD is achieving promising results, according to Defense status reports. In February 2009, Defense assessed 19 percent of FDD-retrained units as capable of conducting missions, 25 percent as capable of doing so with outside support, 31 percent as capable of partially doing so with outside support, and 25 percent as not capable. However, a lack of military personnel is constraining CSTC-A's plans to expand FDD and similar programs into the rest of Afghanistan by the end of 2010. Defense has identified a shortage of about 1,500 military personnel needed to expand FDD and similar police development programs. CSTC-A has previously obtained military personnel for ANP training by redirecting personnel from its Afghan army training program. However, the army program's demand for personnel is likely to increase as the Afghan army grows from 80,000 to 134,000 personnel. MOI and ANP officers were screened by Defense and State, but the full extent of the screening is unclear because State did not systematically compile records of its efforts. The screening effort was intended to improve the professionalism and integrity of the officer corps through testing by CSTC-A and background checks by State. At least 9,797 (55 percent) of the nearly 17,800 officers who took the tests passed, according to CSTC-A. State was unable to provide us with statistics concerning the results of background checks because it did not systematically compile its records. U.S.-supported pay system efforts are intended to validate MOI and ANP personnel rosters and ensure that wages are distributed reliably. Despite progress, these efforts face challenges that include limited ANP cooperation and a shortage of banks. U.S. contractors have validated almost 47,400 MOI and ANP personnel but have been unable to validate almost 29,400 personnel--who were paid in part by $230 million in U.S. contributions to a UN trust fund--because of a lack of cooperation from some ANP commanders. As of January 2009, 97 percent of all reported MOI and ANP personnel had enrolled in an electronic payroll system and 58 percent had enrolled to have their salaries deposited directly into their bank accounts. However, growth of the direct deposit system may be constrained because almost 40 percent of ANP personnel lack ready access to banks.