To distinguish  between the two statutory authorities that may use O&M funding, for the  purposes of this review we refer to O&M-funded projects undertaken  using section 2805 of Title 10, U.S. Code (Unspecified Minor Military  Construction authority) in support of contingency operations as “O&M- funded unspecified minor military construction projects” and to O&M- funded projects using Contingency Construction Authority as  “Contingency Construction Authority projects.”

		Roles and Responsibilities Related to Contingency Construction

CENTCOM and its component commands have key roles and  responsibilities for contingency construction within CENTCOM’s  geographic area of responsibility. DOD Has Not Tracked the Universe and Cost of All Contingency Construction Projects in the CENTCOM Area of Responsibility That Support Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan

Since contingency operations began in Iraq and Afghanistan, DOD has  not tracked the universe and cost of all CENTCOM contingency  construction projects supporting operations there. According to  senior DOD officials, DOD is not required to track the universe and cost of  those projects. DOD has routinely used O&M funding for these projects to  more quickly meet requirements because the MILCON review process  can take up to 2 years. However, in some instances, DOD's use of O&M  funding has posed financial, operational, and duplication risks. Senior DOD officials stated that  they were unaware of the magnitude of their use of O&M funds for  unspecified minor military construction projects in the CENTCOM area of  responsibility because DOD did not track the O&M-funded contingency  construction projects using that authority. This use of  O&M funding appears significant when compared with the $3.9 billion  DOD reported as enacted for other construction projects in Afghanistan  over the same period using MILCON funding. CENTCOM officials noted that a construction project can use either  MILCON or O&M funding, and should be designed to address a single  construction requirement. Nonetheless, subsequent to the completion of the  concrete shelters the department reported in September 2015 that it  should have used MILCON funds to construct the shelters and  determined that the obligations incurred for the projects had exceeded  the statutory limit for O&M-funded unspecified minor military  construction projects, thus resulting in a violation of the Antideficiency  Act. DOD Has Guidance Used for Determining the Appropriate Level of Construction for MILCON-Funded Contingency Construction Projects in CENTCOM’s Area of Responsibility, but Has Not Documented the Rationale for All Such Determinations

		DOD Has Guidance Used for Determining the Appropriate Level of Construction for MILCON- Funded Contingency Construction Projects

DOD has guidance that is used for determining the appropriate level of  construction for MILCON-funded projects. Specifically, as of July  2015, the Army Corps of Engineers was unable to  provide us with documentation regarding the service components’  rationale for the respective level-of-construction determinations for 11 of  39 MILCON-funded construction projects in its database that cost over  $40 million each during fiscal years 2011 through 2015. Additionally, absent a requirement for  a formal process to reevaluate contingency construction projects when  missions change, DOD risks constructing facilities that may not be  essential to support existing missions or may not be sufficient for revised  missions in the CENTCOM area of responsibility and in future  contingencies worldwide. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

To determine the extent to which the Department of Defense (DOD) has  tracked the universe and cost of all contingency construction projects in  the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) area of responsibility that  support operations in Iraq and Afghanistan separately from all other  construction projects undertaken by DOD, we reviewed and analyzed  available DOD contingency construction project data from fiscal year  2001 through fiscal year 2016 maintained by the Office of Under  Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), the Army, the Air Force, and the  Army Corps of Engineers to determine the extent to which DOD identifies  and records construction projects undertaken in support of contingency  operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. To determine the extent to which DOD has developed a process for  reevaluating ongoing  contingency construction projects when missions  change, we collected and reviewed supporting documentation for reviews  that the U.S. Forces-Afghanistan conducted beginning in November 2011  of planned or ongoing contingency construction projects in Afghanistan— including CENTCOM data on construction project reevaluation reviews for  fiscal years 2011-15.
Why GAO Did This Study

For about 15 years, DOD has funded “contingency construction” projects to support operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. The range, complexity, and cost of construction vary (e.g., from concrete pads for tents to brick-and-mortar barracks). DOD funds the projects through MILCON or O&M appropriations. Base commanders can use O&M to fund lower cost projects.
Senate Report 113-174 includes a provision for GAO to review issues related to military construction in the CENTCOM area of responsibility in support of contingency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. GAO evaluated, among other things, the extent to which DOD has (1) tracked the universe and cost of all contingency construction projects in support of contingency operations there, (2) developed a process to determine the appropriate level of construction for MILCON-funded contingency construction projects, and (3) developed a process for reevaluating contingency construction projects when missions change. GAO reviewed relevant guidance and project data.

What GAO Found

Since contingency operations began in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Department of Defense (DOD) has not tracked the universe and cost of all U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) contingency construction projects supporting operations there. According to senior DOD officials DOD is not required to track all contingency construction projects separately from all other DOD projects, but DOD has been able to generate specific data on MILCON-funded contingency construction projects when requested. Senior DOD officials stated that they were unaware of the magnitude of their use of O&M funds because DOD has not tracked the universe and cost of O&M-funded unspecified minor military construction projects in support of contingency operations. GAO identified O&M-funded construction costs for fiscal years 2009-12 of at least $944 million for 2,202 of these projects in Afghanistan, costs that are significant compared with the $3.9 billion DOD reported as enacted for MILCON-funded projects there in the same period. DOD has routinely used O&M funding to more quickly meet requirements because the MILCON review process can take up to 2 years. However, DOD's use of O&M funding has posed risks. For example:
Financial risk: In 2010, DOD identified needed concrete shelters at Bagram Airfield, Afghanistan, staying below the O&M maximum by dividing a single requirement into separate projects. DOD reported in 2015 that it should have used MILCON funds for the shelters, determining that the obligations incurred had exceeded the statutory maximum for O&M-funded unspecified minor military construction projects, resulting in an Antideficiency Act violation.
Duplication risk : In 2015, officials at a base in the CENTCOM area of responsibility decided to use O&M funding for temporary facilities for a squadron while in the same year requesting MILCON funding for a permanent facility for the same squadron, which could result in providing the same service to the same beneficiaries.
For MILCON-funded contingency construction projects, DOD has guidance used for determining the appropriate level of construction, or building standard, based on the facility's life expectancy requirements, but as of July 2015 had not documented the rationale for such determinations for 11 of the 39 projects in fiscal years 2011-15 that cost over $40 million each. Further, for 8 of the 11 projects, senior DOD officials could not confirm what level of construction the projects represented based on DOD standards aimed at helping to match investments with requirements. Senior DOD officials acknowledged that an absence of such documentation could lead to DOD constructing facilities in excess of requirements because of the resulting lack of communication with those who design and construct the facilities.
DOD has not developed a formal process for reevaluating ongoing contingency construction projects when missions change. According to CENTCOM documentation, beginning in November 2011 DOD undertook five rounds of reviews of planned and ongoing projects in Afghanistan anticipating a change in the mission. However, without a requirement for such reviews, DOD risks constructing facilities that may be unneeded to support U.S. forces in the CENTCOM area of responsibility and in future contingencies worldwide.

What GAO Recommends

GAO made six recommendations including that DOD track the universe and cost of O&M-funded projects (DOD did not concur), review construction projects to ensure funds were properly used (DOD did not concur), examine approaches to shorten project approval times (DOD partially concurred), document level-of-construction determinations (DOD partially concurred), and require project reviews when missions change (DOD partially concurred). GAO maintains that its recommendations are valid.