Administration officials argued that U.S. participation with ground forces wasnecessary for two main reasons: 1) the Bosnian, Croatian, and Serb negotiators all made U.S. groundforce participation a condition of their accepting any peace settlement; and 2) U.S. participation wasnecessary for the United States to maintain a leadership position in NATO. On December 14, 1995, the Presidents of Croatia, Bosnia, and Serbia signed a peace agreement in Paris. Though the SFOR operations have U.N. Security Council authorization,there is no "dual-key" command relationship with the United Nations. Toaccomplish this mission, NATO has identified key military and supporting tasks, as follows. Monitor and enforce compliance with the military aspects of the DaytonAccords. These concerns ledNATO's political leaders to authorize the Stabilization Force (SFOR) in December, 1996, to lastuntil June 1998. Among these provisions are:
1)U.S. ground forces should not remain in Bosnia indefinitely, and that the President should work with SFOR nations to allow the U.S. to withdraw its ground forces; 2) aNATO-led force, without U.S. ground troops, might be suitable for continued operations, and theUnited States might supply intelligence and logistical support, and a "ready reserve force in theregion". The fullStabilization Force numbers about 12,000 troops. The Bush Administration has indicated that,although there will be no unilateral U.S. withdrawal from the Balkans, consultations regardingcontinued U.S. participation will be on-going with the NATO allies. Discussions among NATOdefense ministers in February have indicated that the number of SFOR troops will be reduced byabout one-third during 2004, and that it is now expected that the European Union (EU) will assumeresponsibility for Bosnian peacekeeping operations in 2005. NATO Offensive Military Operations

During March 1999, Yugoslav Army and paramilitary Ministry of Interior troops moved out of garrison in Kosovo in violation of the October agreement, and about 20,000 additional Serb troopsmassed at the northern Kosovo border. With violence against ethnic Albanian civilians escalating,on March 24, NATO began airstrikes against targets in Serbia and Kosovo. On June 4,1999, the Yugoslav government accepted the provisions of the G-8 peace plan, and on June 9 NATO and Yugoslav military officials signed a Military-Technical Agreement (MTA)which provided for the phased withdrawal of all Yugoslav forces form Kosovo by June 20, 1999,and detailed the authority of the KFOR commander to enforce the peace agreement with all meansnecessary. The United Nations Security Council passed a resolution(S/RES/1244) endorsing the peace plan and an "international security presence" in Kosovo for itsenforcement. Refrain from hostile or provocative acts, including reprisals ordetentions. Of the almost 22,000 troops stationed with KFOR, the United States is providing about 2,100 or 11%. Within NATO, each nation participating in Operation Allied Force assumed the cost of its ownoperations. 1401 ) prohibiting the use of any funds authorized by the legislationfor military operations in Yugoslavia. From FY2002-FY2004,Congress has appropriated approximately $2.8 billion for Kosovo operations.
With the on-going requirements of U.S. military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the continuing peacekeeping deployments in the Balkans have come under congressional scrutiny todetermine whether or not they could be safely reduced or terminated. This report examines thehistory and current status of U.S. military operations in the Balkans, and will be updated as eventswarrant.
In Paris on December 14, 1995, the presidents of Bosnia, Croatia, and Serbia signed the peace settlement negotiated in Dayton, OH (Dayton Accords). The United Nations Security Council'sResolution 1031 authorized the NATO-led implementation force (IFOR) for one year. On December12, 1996, the Security Council authorized a follow-on force, dubbed the Stabilization Force (SFOR). This authorization has been renewed annually. In March 1998, the NATO allies agreed that SFORwill remain in Bosnia until significant progress has been made in the implementation of the DaytonAccords.
SFOR is now a force of about 12,000 troops. The U.S. contingent has been about 1,800. It will be reduced to 800 by summer 2004, and probably withdrawn by 2005 when the European Union isexpected to take over peacekeeping duties from NATO. U.S. forces have suffered no fatal casualtiesfrom hostile action in Bosnia. SFOR continues the mission of monitoring and enforcingdemilitarized zones and weapon cantonment. These efforts have been credited a success. NATOcommanders have lent assistance to civilian authorities in their efforts to create a stable politicalenvironment (e.g., detaining war crimes suspects, and providing support for elections and limitedassistance for refugees).
In Kosovo, with the failure of peace talks on March 24, 1999 NATO began Operation Allied Force airstrikes against targets in Serbia and Kosovo. In June Yugoslavia accepted a peace proposaland signed a military-technical agreement with NATO providing for the withdrawal of all Yugoslavforces from Kosovo and turning military control of the province over to NATO's peacekeepingforces (KFOR). U.N. Security Council Resolution 1244 endorsed the peace settlement and "aninternational security presence with substantial NATO participation." It is expected that NATOforces will remain in Kosovo until its political status is resolved.
KFOR totals about 20,000 troops in Kosovo, with the United States contributing about 2,100 troops. The U.S. has suffered no casualties from hostile action.
Congress has appropriated approximately $23.5 billion for Bosnia and Kosovo operations fromFY1992 through FY2004.
Congressional concerns have focused on the impact of Balkan operations on 1) military readiness and the ability to maintain military operations in Iraq, 2) whether there has been anequitable distribution of responsibilities among the NATO allies and 3) if the United States needsto participate in Balkan peacekeeping operations at all.