In accordance with  HSPD-6, TSC’s watch list is to contain information about individuals  “known or appropriately suspected to be or have been engaged in conduct  constituting, in preparation for, in aid of, or related to terrorism.” In  implementing this directive, NCTC and the FBI strive to ensure that  individuals who are reasonably suspected of having possible links to  terrorism—in addition to individuals with known links—are nominated for  inclusion on the watch list. 3). Agencies Have Had Approximately 53,000 Encounters with Individuals on the Watch List, and Outcomes Indicate the List Has Helped to Combat Terrorism

For the 42-month period of December 2003 (when TSC began operations)  through May 2007, screening and law enforcement agencies encountered  individuals who were positively matched to watch list records  53,218 times, according to our analysis of TSC data. Agencies took a range of actions, such as arresting  individuals, denying other individuals entry into the United States, and  most commonly, releasing the individuals following questioning and  information gathering. Our analysis of data on the outcomes of these  encounters and interviews with screening agency, law enforcement, and  intelligence community officials indicate that the watch list has enhanced  the U.S. government’s counterterrorism efforts by (1) helping frontline  screening agencies obtain information to determine the level of threat a  person poses and the appropriate action to take, if any, and (2) providing  the opportunity to collect and share information on known or  appropriately suspected terrorists with law enforcement agencies and the  intelligence community. The identifying information required  depends on the policies and needs of the screening agency and the  technical capacity of the respective agency’s computerized name-matching  program. As of May 2007, the FBI database contained the third highest  percentage of watch list records. Being on the Selectee list does not mean that the person will not be  allowed to board an aircraft or enter the United States. Regarding other ameliorative efforts,  TSC has ongoing initiatives that could help reduce false negatives, such as  improving the quality of watch list data. U.S. Customs and Border Protection Is Studying Cases Where Some Subjects of Watch List Records Were Not Detected by Screening at Ports of Entry

During our field visits in spring 2006 to selected ports of entry, CBP  officers informed us of several incidents involving individuals on the  watch list who were not detected until after they had been processed and  admitted into the United States. The U.S. Government Has Made Progress in Using the Watch List but a Strategy and Plan Supported by a Governance Structure with Clear Lines of Authority Would Enhance Use and Effectiveness

Although the U.S. government has made progress in using watch list  records to support terrorism-related screening, there are additional  opportunities for using the list. To date, appropriate opportunities  have not been systematically identified or evaluated, in part because the  federal government lacks an up-to-date strategy and a prioritized  investment and implementation plan for optimizing the use and  effectiveness of terrorist-related screening. However, many critical infrastructure components are not using watch list  records. These  plan elements, which were prescribed by HSPD-11, are crucial for  coordinated and comprehensive use of terrorist-related screening data, as  they provide a platform to establish governmentwide priorities for  screening, assess progress toward policy goals and intended outcomes,  ensure that any needed changes are implemented, and respond to issues  that hinder effectiveness, such as the potential vulnerabilities and  interagency coordination challenges discussed in this report. Further, we recommended the following three actions to enhance the use  of the consolidated terrorist watch list as a counterterrorism tool and to  help ensure its effectiveness:  that the Secretary of Homeland Security in consultation with the heads  of other appropriate federal departments and agencies and private  sector entities, develop guidelines to govern the use of watch list  records to support private sector screening processes that have a  substantial bearing on homeland security, as called for in HSPD-6;  that the Secretary of Homeland Security in consultation with the heads  of other appropriate federal departments, develop and submit to the  President through the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security  and Counterterrorism an updated strategy for a coordinated and  comprehensive approach to terrorist-related screening as called for in  HSPD-11, which among other things, (a) identifies all appropriate  screening opportunities to use watch list records to detect, identify,  track, and interdict individuals who pose a threat to homeland security  and (b) safeguards legal rights, including privacy and civil liberties; and  that the Secretary of Homeland Security in consultation with the heads  of other appropriate federal departments, develop and submit to the  President through the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security  and Counterterrorism an updated investment and implementation plan  that describes the scope, governance, principles, outcomes, milestones,  training objectives, metrics, costs, and schedule of activities necessary  for implementing a terrorist-related screening strategy, as called for in  HSPD-11. If the entire watch  list is not being checked, why not, what potential vulnerabilities exist,  and what actions are being planned to address these vulnerabilities?
Why GAO Did This Study

The Federal Bureau of Investigation's (FBI) Terrorist Screening Center (TSC) maintains a consolidated watch list of known or appropriately suspected terrorists and sends records from the list to agencies to support terrorism-related screening. Because the list is an important tool for combating terrorism, GAO examined (1) standards for including individuals on the list, (2) the outcomes of encounters with individuals on the list, (3) potential vulnerabilities and efforts to address them, and (4) actions taken to promote effective terrorism-related screening. To conduct this work, GAO reviewed documentation obtained from and interviewed officials at TSC, the FBI, the National Counterterrorism Center, the Department of Homeland Security, and other agencies that perform terrorism-related screening.

What GAO Found

The FBI and the intelligence community use standards of reasonableness to evaluate individuals for nomination to the consolidated watch list. In general, individuals who are reasonably suspected of having possible links to terrorism--in addition to individuals with known links--are to be nominated. As such, being on the list does not automatically prohibit, for example, the issuance of a visa or entry into the United States. Rather, when an individual on the list is encountered, agency officials are to assess the threat the person poses to determine what action to take, if any. As of May 2007, the consolidated watch list contained approximately 755,000 records. From December 2003 through May 2007, screening and law enforcement agencies encountered individuals who were positively matched to watch list records approximately 53,000 times. Many individuals were matched multiple times. The outcomes of these encounters reflect an array of actions, such as arrests; denials of entry into the United States; and, most often, questioning and release. Within the federal community, there is general agreement that the watch list has helped to combat terrorism by (1) providing screening and law enforcement agencies with information to help them respond appropriately during encounters and (2) helping law enforcement and intelligence agencies track individuals on the watch list and collect information about them for use in conducting investigations and in assessing threats. Regarding potential vulnerabilities, TSC sends records daily from the watch list to screening agencies. However, some records are not sent, partly because screening against them may not be needed to support the respective agency's mission or may not be possible due to the requirements of computer programs used to check individuals against watch list records. Also, some subjects of watch list records have passed undetected through agency screening processes and were not identified, for example, until after they had boarded and flew on an aircraft or were processed at a port of entry and admitted into the United States. TSC and other federal agencies have ongoing initiatives to help reduce these potential vulnerabilities, including efforts to improve computerized name-matching programs and the quality of watch list data. Although the federal government has made progress in promoting effective terrorism-related screening, additional screening opportunities remain untapped--within the federal sector, as well as within critical infrastructure components of the private sector. This situation exists partly because the government lacks an up-to-date strategy and implementation plan for optimizing use of the terrorist watch list. Also lacking are clear lines of authority and responsibility. An up-to-date strategy and implementation plan, supported by a clearly defined leadership or governance structure, would provide a platform to establish governmentwide screening priorities, assess progress toward policy goals and intended outcomes, consider factors related to privacy and civil liberties, ensure that any needed changes are implemented, and respond to issues that hinder effectiveness.