	Background

NASA’s Vision for Space Exploration calls for a return of humans to the  Moon and eventual human spaceflight to Mars. Among the first major  efforts of this program are the developments of new space flight  systems—including the Ares I Crew Launch Vehicle and the Orion Crew  Exploration Vehicle. Progress  has been made; however, technical and design challenges are still  significant and until they are resolved NASA will not be able to reliably  estimate the time and money needed to execute the program. In addition,  cost issues and a poorly phased funding plan continue to hamper the  program. Consequently, NASA is changing the acquisition strategy for the  Orion project as the agency attempts to increase confidence in its ability to  meet a March 2015 first crewed launch. The  Constellation program’s integrated risk management system also identified  this strategy as high risk and warned that funding shortfalls could occur in  fiscal years 2009 through 2012, resulting in planned work not being  completed to support schedules and milestones. According to project  officials, these shortfalls limited NASA’s ability to mitigate technical risks  early in development and precluded the orderly ramp-up of workforce and  developmental activities. Changing Acquisition Strategy

In response to technical challenges and cost and funding issues, NASA is  changing the Orion project acquisition strategy. Though these changes to overarching requirements are likely to increase  the confidence level associated with the March 2015 first crewed flight,  they do not guarantee that the program will conduct a successful first  crewed flight in March 2015. As NASA addresses the findings and recommendations of the  Review of U.S. Human Space Flight Plans Committee, we recommend  that the new NASA Administrator direct the Constellation program, or its  successor, to develop a sound business case—supported by firm  requirements, mature technologies, a preliminary design, a realistic cost  estimate, and sufficient funding and time—before proceeding into  implementation, and, if necessary, delay the preliminary design review  until a sound business case demonstrating the program’s readiness to  move forward into implementation is in hand. NASA acknowledged that, while  substantial work has been completed, the Constellation program faces  knowledge gaps concerning requirements, technologies, funding,  schedule, and other resources. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

To assess NASA’s progress toward establishing a sound business case for  the Ares I and Orion projects and identify key technical challenges NASA  faces in developing the Ares I Crew Launch and the Orion Crew  Exploration Vehicles, we obtained and analyzed Constellation plans and  schedules, risk mitigation information, and contract performance data  relative to the standards in our knowledge-based acquisition practices  including program and project plans, contracts, schedules, risk  assessments, funding profile, budget documentation, earned value reports,  and the results of NASA’s assessments of the program. NASA: Ares I and Orion Project Risks and Key Indicators to Measure  Progress.
Why GAO Did This Study

NASA's Constellation program is developing the Ares I Crew Launch Vehicle and the Orion Crew Exploration Vehicle as the agency's first major efforts in a plan to return to the moon and eventually send humans to Mars. GAO has issued a number of reports and testimonies on various aspects of this program, and made several recommendations. GAO was asked to assess NASA's progress in implementing GAO's recommendations for the Ares I and Orion projects, and identify risks the program faces. GAO analyzed NASA plans and schedules, risk mitigation information, and contract performance data relative to knowledge-based acquisition practices identified in prior GAO reports, and interviewed government officials and contractors.

What GAO Found

NASA is still struggling to develop a solid business case--including firm requirements, mature technologies, a knowledge-based acquisition strategy, a realistic cost estimate, and sufficient funding and time--needed to justify moving the Constellation program forward into the implementation phase. Gaps in the business case include significant technical and design challenges for the Orion and Ares I vehicles, such as limiting vibration during launch, eliminating the risk of hitting the launch tower during lift off, and reducing the mass of the Orion vehicle, represent considerable hurdles that must be overcome in order to meet safety and performance requirements; and a poorly phased funding plan that runs the risk of funding shortfalls in fiscal years 2009 through 2012, resulting in planned work not being completed to support schedules and milestones. This approach has limited NASA's ability to mitigate technical risks early in development and precludes the orderly ramp up of workforce and developmental activities. In response to these gaps, NASA delayed the date of its first crewed-flight and changed its acquisition strategy for the Orion project. NASA acknowledges that funding shortfalls reduce the agency's flexibility in resolving technical challenges. The program's risk management system warned of planned work not being completed to support schedules and milestones. Consequently, NASA is now focused on providing the capability to service the International Space Station and has deferred the capabilities needed for flights to the moon. Though these changes to the overarching requirements are likely to increase the confidence level associated with a March 2015 first crewed flight, these actions do not guarantee that the program will successfully meet that deadline. Nevertheless, NASA estimates that Ares I and Orion represent up to $49 billion of the over $97 billion estimated to be spent on the Constellation program through 2020. While the agency has already obligated more than $10 billion in contracts, at this point NASA does not know how much Ares I and Orion will ultimately cost, and will not know until technical and design challenges have been addressed.