Attack helicopter inventories have fallen only 4 percent—1,811 to 1,732. Similarly, DOD has enhanced the capabilities of specialized support aircraft and long-range missiles and plans further improvements to these systems. 3.3). Conclusions

Although potential adversaries possess capabilities that constitute a threat to the ability of U.S. air power to accomplish its objectives, the severity of these threats, particularly in relation to the formidable capability of U.S. forces to counter them, appears to be limited. These programs, which are likely to be a significant challenge to pay for, are proceeding even though DOD has not sufficiently assessed joint mission requirements. In other cases, there are viable and less costly alternatives to planned investments. Planned Investments Pose a Financial Challenge

Each military service has major acquisition programs to modernize its combat air power forces. Based on our past reviews of individual air power systems and available information we collected on our six mission reviews, we believe that DOD is proceeding with some major investments without clear evidence that the programs are justified. Despite this level of capability, the services are modifying current platforms and developing new weapon systems that will provide new and enhanced interdiction capabilities over the next 15 to 20 years at a total estimated cost of over $200 billion. This is being done despite the services’ unmatched capabilities in air-to-air combat. 5.2). Conclusions

DOD has not been adequately examining its combat air power force structure and its modernization plans and programs from a joint perspective. However, DOD’s decision support systems do not provide sufficient information from a joint perspective to enable the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and other decisionmakers to prioritize programs, objectively weigh the merits of new air power investments, and decide whether current programs should continue to receive funding.
Why GAO Did This Study

GAO reviewed the Department of Defense's (DOD) plans to modernize its combat air capabilities, focusing on whether DOD has sufficient information from a joint perspective to: (1) prioritize its air power programs; (2) objectively weigh the merits of new program investments; and (3) decide whether existing programs should receive continued funding.

What GAO Found

GAO found that: (1) although DOD believes that its modernization plans are affordable, it faces a major challenge in attempting to fund the services' air modernization programs; (2) DOD has not sufficiently assessed joint mission requirements or compared these requirements to the services' aggregate capabilities; (3) DOD is proceeding with some major air modernization programs without clear evidence that the programs are justified; (4) the services plan to acquire numerous advanced weapons systems over the next 15 to 20 years to enhance their interdiction capabilities despite the availability of viable, less costly alternatives; (5) reductions in combat aircraft inventories have been largely offset by improvements in night-fighting and targeting capabilities and increases in advanced long-range missile inventories; (6) although potential adversaries possess capabilities that could threaten U.S. air power, the severity of these threats appears to be limited; and (7) DOD has taken steps to enhance information on joint combat requirements, but these efforts have had little impact in identifying duplication in existing air combat capabilities.