Known Smuggling Events Persisted but Generally Declined from Fiscal Years 2011 through 2016, According to DHS Data

		Tunnel Discoveries Were Concentrated on the Southwest Border and Have Generally Declined since Fiscal Year 2011

Our analysis of Border Patrol tunnel data showed that there were 67  cross-border tunnels discovered along U.S. borders from fiscal years  2011 through 2016, all located on the southwest border, as shown in  figure 4. However, the  actual number of maritime smuggling events and the amount of drugs  smuggled by these methods is unknown. As discussed later, DHS S&T has projects underway to  enhance maritime domain awareness. Facilitating this type of comprehensive  assessment could help better inform management resource allocation  decisions. In addition, DHS has established coordination mechanisms that  specifically target the selected smuggling methods. Specifically, we found that not all officials addressing cross-border  tunnels were aware of—and thus not accessing—all relevant DHS  systems or offices with tunnel information. Documenting such  assessments, consistent with standards for internal control, prior to  making investment decisions would also enhance transparency by  providing stakeholders visibility into rationales for investment decisions  over time. Establishing and Monitoring Performance Measures Could Allow DHS to Better Assess Effectiveness of Efforts to Address the Selected Smuggling Methods

DHS has established or is in the process of establishing high-level  smuggling-related performance measures and DHS components collect  data regarding the prevalence of cross-border tunnel, ultralight aircraft  and selected maritime smuggling, but DHS has not assessed the  effectiveness of its efforts specific to addressing these smuggling  methods. Conclusions

As transnational criminal organizations have adapted their techniques to  smuggle drugs and humans through cross-border tunnels, ultralight  aircraft, panga boats, and recreational vessels to evade detection, it is  vital that DHS respond accordingly in its border security enforcement  efforts. DHS has also invested in technology to help detect and track  subterranean, aerial, and maritime smuggling, including various  technologies to help detect and track ultralight aircraft; however, CBP has  not assessed and documented how all of the alternative ultralight aircraft  technical solutions being considered will fully address operational  requirements or the costs and benefits associated with different  approaches. By establishing  performance measures and regularly monitoring performance against  targets, managers could obtain valuable information on successful  approaches and areas that could be improved to help ensure that both  technology investments and operational responses to address smuggling  through cross-border tunnels, ultralight aircraft, panga boats, and  recreational vessels are effective. Recommendations for Executive Action

To help ensure that efforts to address smuggling through cross-border  tunnels, ultralight aircraft, panga boats, and recreational vessels are  effective and that managers and stakeholders have the information  needed to make decisions, we recommend the Secretary of Homeland  Security take the following six actions:  1.  develop standardized, departmentwide definitions for maritime  vessels used for smuggling in the DHS Lexicon;  2.  direct the CBP-ICE tunnel committee to convene and establish  standard operating procedures for addressing cross-border tunnels,  including procedures for sharing information;  3.  direct the Commissioner of CBP to assess and document how the  alternative technological solutions being considered will fully meet  operational needs related to ultralight aircraft;  4.  direct the Commissioner of CBP and the Director of ICE to jointly  establish and monitor performance measures and targets related to  cross-border tunnels;  5.  direct the Commissioner of CBP to establish and monitor performance  targets related to ultralight aircraft; and  6.  direct the Commandant of the Coast Guard, Commissioner of CBP,  and the Director of ICE to establish and monitor RECOM performance  measures and targets related to panga boat and recreational vessel  smuggling. DHS concurred with four of the six recommendations in the  report and described actions underway or planned to address them. For example, as  noted in our report, the BEST Tunnel Task Forces do not currently have  documented standard operating procedures for addressing tunnels. How has DHS addressed smuggling by these methods? The  information gathered from our site visits is not generalizable to other  locations but provides insights into DHS’s responses to these incursions  and efforts to use risk and performance information to stop future  smuggling incidents using these methods.
Why GAO Did This Study

As DHS has increased the security of overland smuggling routes, transnational criminal organizations have adapted their techniques to smuggle drugs and humans through alternative methods. These methods include cross-border tunnels, ultralight aircraft, panga boats, and recreational maritime vessels. While these methods account for a small proportion of known smuggling, they can be used to transport significant quantities of drugs or for terrorist activity. GAO was asked to review DHS's efforts to address subterranean, aerial, and maritime smuggling. This report addresses, among other things, (1) the known prevalence of the aforementioned smuggling methods, (2) efforts to address them, and (3) efforts to assess the results of activities to counter them. GAO analyzed relevant procedures, reports, and data for fiscal years 2011 through 2016. GAO also interviewed DHS officials and conducted site visits to locations in California, Arizona, and Florida, chosen based upon past detection of smuggling by the selected methods, among other things. The information from the site visits is not generalizable, but provided valuable insights.

What GAO Found

GAO's analysis of Department of Homeland Security (DHS) data showed that there were 67 discovered cross-border tunnels, 534 detected ultralight aircraft incursions, and 309 detected drug smuggling incidents involving panga boats (a fishing vessel) and recreational vessels along U.S. mainland borders from fiscal years 2011 through 2016. The number of known smuggling events involving these methods generally declined over this period, but they remain threats.
DHS has established various coordination mechanisms and invested in technology to address select smuggling methods in the subterranean, aerial, and maritime domains. For example, DHS established interagency task forces to investigate cross-border tunnels. However, DHS has not established comprehensive standard operating procedures for addressing cross-border tunnels, and we found that relevant officials were not aware of all DHS systems or offices with tunnel information. By establishing procedures for addressing cross-border tunnels, DHS could provide strategic guidance and facilitate information sharing departmentwide, consistent with standards for internal control. DHS has also invested or plans to invest in at least five technology projects to help detect and track ultralight aircraft. However, DHS has not assessed and documented how all of the alternative ultralight aircraft technical solutions it is considering will fully address operational requirements or the costs and benefits associated with these different solutions. This type of analysis could help better position DHS to use its resources effectively and ensure that operational needs are met, consistent with risk management best practices.
DHS has established high-level smuggling performance measures and collects data on smuggling by tunnels, ultralight aircraft, panga boats, and recreational vessels; however, DHS has not assessed its efforts specific to addressing these smuggling methods to, for example, compare the percent of detected panga boat and recreational smuggling events that are interdicted against targeted performance levels. By establishing measures and regularly monitoring performance against targets, managers could obtain valuable information on successful approaches and areas that could be improved to help ensure that technology investments and operational responses to address these smuggling methods are effective, consistent with standards for internal control. This is a public version of a For Official Use Only—Law Enforcement Sensitive report that GAO issued in February 2017. Information DHS deemed For Official Use Only—Law Enforcement Sensitive has been redacted.

What GAO Recommends

GAO is making six recommendations, including that DHS establish procedures for addressing tunnels, assess ultralight aircraft technology, and establish performance measures and targets. DHS concurred with four recommendations and disagreed with those to establish tunnel procedures and maritime performance measures, citing other efforts. GAO believes the recommendations remain valid, as discussed in the report.