1.) DOD started the program by procuring two candidate systems for competitive testing. 2.) As of December 1994, the contractor had not delivered adequate logistic support information. The contracting officer identified logistic support information as the primary area of deficiency. Hunter’s Performance Problems Have Not Been Resolved

DOD policy requires that operational test and evaluation be structured to determine (1) the operational effectiveness and suitability of a system under realistic combat conditions and (2) whether the minimum acceptable operational performance requirements have been satisfied. Goal of Joint-Service System Is at Risk

DOD currently plans to begin full-rate production of the Hunter system for the Army and the Marine Corps before verifying that the system will meet the Navy’s needs. As a result, the congressional call for DOD to develop a joint-service system is at risk. Recommendation

We recommend that the Secretary of Defense prohibit award of a second low-rate production contract until the Hunter system satisfactorily demonstrates that it is operationally effective and operationally suitable and will satisfactorily meet the requirements of the Army, the Marine Corps, and the Navy.
Why GAO Did This Study

GAO reviewed the Department of Defense's (DOD) acquisition of the Hunter Short-Range Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV), focusing on whether: (1) the system is logistically supportable; (2) previously identified performance deficiencies have been corrected; and (3) the system represents a valid joint-service effort.

What GAO Found

GAO found that: (1) the Hunter UAV system is not logistically supportable and has serious unresolved performance deficiencies; (2) the contractor had not delivered required logistical support information as of December 1994; (3) the system may be unsuitable for theater operations and may require costly contractor maintenance and support; (4) the vehicle is grounded because of a number of crashes during testing; (5) DOD plans to go into full production before determining whether the land-based vehicle is suitable for naval operations, which jeopardizes the joint-service system; (6) although DOD recently restructured the Hunter program, the program faces further delays and curtailment of critical testing while allowing for the procurement of defective systems; and (7) the planned award of a second low-rate production contract will have a minimal effect on preserving the contractor's skilled labor pool.