Objective, Scope, and Methodology

We examined DOD’s bottom-up review assumptions about key aspects of the two-conflict strategy to determine whether they reasonably supported DOD’s conclusion that the projected force, with enhancements, can execute the strategy. However, in doing the review, DOD did not fully analyze its assumptions regarding key aspects of the strategy, such as the ability of forces to redeploy from other operations to regional conflicts or between conflicts, availability of strategic lift and support forces, and deployability of Army National Guard combat brigades. Since the bottom-up review, DOD has begun additional analyses. War-fighting command officials stated that prepositioning this equipment is critical to executing the two-conflict strategy. Conclusions

The strategy of fighting and winning two nearly simultaneous conflicts will require a significant change in military planning for the deployment and use of U.S. forces. DOD did not begin to analyze these changes until after the bottom-up review. Their estimates of key characteristics of a situation involving two nearly simultaneous conflicts and the deployment of forces differ significantly from DOD’s estimates, including the amount of warning time for both conflicts and time between the onset of each conflict, mix of combat forces needed to respond to each conflict, and timing of force deployments. As a result, the commands are examining options they believe may maximize the use of U.S. capabilities. 2). Key war-fighting commands believe that the scenario may not reflect the most effective deployment and use of U.S. capabilities and are analyzing alternatives.
Why GAO Did This Study

GAO reviewed the key assumptions the Department of Defense (DOD) has made during its bottom-up review to determine whether they reasonably support the execution of a two-conflict strategy.

What GAO Found

GAO found that: (1) the strategy of fighting and winning two nearly simultaneous conflicts will require a significant change in military planning; (2) DOD has not fully analyzed key bottom-up review assumptions about the ability of forces to redeploy from other operations to regional conflicts or between conflicts, availability of strategic lift and support forces, or the deployability of Army National Guard combat brigades; (3) war-fighting command officials believe that the DOD plan for responding to two simultaneous major regional conflicts is questionable; (4) official estimates of the amount of warning time between the onset of each conflict, mix of combat forces needed to respond to each conflict, and timing of force deployments differ significantly from DOD estimates; (5) the military commands believe that the DOD scenario may not reflect the most effective deployment of U.S. forces and they are examining options they believe may maximize the use of U.S. capabilities; and (6) until DOD fully analyzes its bottom-up review assumptions and considers the war fighting commands' options, it will not be able to determine force size and mix, the supporting capabilities and funding needed for the two-conflict strategy, or if the strategy should be changed.