At that time it was anticipated that the EA-6B  would remain in the inventory until at least 2015. The AoA report, published in 2002, concluded that an EA-6B replacement  would be needed in 2009 to meet the services needs. Changes in Operational Concept and Upgrades Extend Operational Viability of the EA-6B, but Quantities Are Insufficient to Meet Identified Requirements

The conclusion of the May 2002 AoA report that the EA-6B inventory  would be insufficient past 2009 was not based on the Navy’s requirement  for 90 aircraft, but on an inventory requirement of 108 aircraft that would  meet the needs of all services. The decision to move to a system of  systems using multiple aircraft types means the Navy will no longer be  required to support all of DOD’s electronic attack requirements. As a  result, EA-6B aircraft will be able to meet the Navy’s suppression of enemy  air defense needs through at least 2017 and the needs of the Marine Corps  through 2025 as long as sufficient numbers of the aircraft are outfitted  with ICAP III electronics suites. If the Navy is required to support all  services, given the recent Air Force proposal to terminate the EB-52  standoff jammer program, additional EA-6Bs may require the ICAP III  upgrade. According to program documents, the ICAP II tactical jamming system,  currently installed on most EA-6B aircraft, is limited in its ability to  conduct numerous critical functions. Currently 14 EA-6B aircraft have been funded to  receive the ICAP III upgrade, because of funding reductions, development  test results, and the decision in 2003 to replace the EA-6B with the EA- 18G. While the program is currently on cost and schedule  according to program officials, our analysis shows that the program is not  fully following the knowledge-based approach inherent in best practices  and DOD’s acquisition guidance, thus increasing the risk of cost growth  and schedule delays. In addition, the Navy plans to  procure a large percentage of the total EA-18G aircraft during low-rate  initial production based on limited knowledge of the aircraft’s ability to  perform the electronic attack mission. We have reported that at the start of  system development none of the program’s five critical technologies were  fully mature, and as recently as our March 2005 report this had not  changed. The design of the EA-18G appears stable because almost all of its design  drawings are complete. The EA-18G development schedule is  based on a premise--EA-6B inventory will not be sufficient beyond 2009-- that is no longer valid for assessing the Navy’s future needs. To determine whether the acquisition management approach to the Navy’s  airborne electronic attack core component, the EA-18G, is knowledge- based and can help forestall future risks, we reviewed pertinent DOD,  service, and contractor documents addressing the status of the EA-18G  development effort.
Why GAO Did This Study

The EA-6B has conducted airborne electronic attack for all services since 1996. In 2002, the Department of Defense (DOD) completed an analysis of alternatives for the EA-6B that concluded the inventory would be insufficient to meet the DOD's needs beyond 2009. Since then, the services have embarked on separate acquisition efforts to develop airborne electronic attack assets. In 2003, the Navy started development of the EA-18G aircraft to replace the EA-6B. This report was done under the Comptroller General's authority and assesses if (1) DOD's 2002 conclusion that the EA-6B inventory would be insufficient beyond 2009 remains valid for assessing the Navy's future needs, and (2) the acquisition approach used to develop the EA-18G is knowledge-based and might mitigate future risks.

What GAO Found

EA-6B aircraft will be able to meet the Navy's suppression of enemy air defense needs through at least 2017 and the needs of the Marine Corps through 2025--as long as sufficient numbers of the aircraft are outfitted with upgraded electronics suites. The conclusion that the EA-6B inventory would be insufficient past 2009 was not based on the Navy's requirement for 90 aircraft, but on an inventory requirement of 108 aircraft that would meet the needs of all services. The decision to move to a system of systems using multiple aircraft types means the Navy will no longer be required to support all of DOD's electronic attack requirements. However, insufficient quantities of upgraded jamming systems means that the majority of the EA-6B fleet is equipped with the older jamming system that is limited in its ability to conduct numerous critical functions. If the Navy is required to support all services, given the recent Air Force proposal to terminate its EB-52 standoff jammer program, additional EA-6Bs may require the Improved Capability (ICAP) III upgrade. The risk of cost growth and schedule delays in the EA-18G program is increasing because the program is not following a knowledge-based approach to acquisition. None of its five critical technologies were fully mature as the system development phase began, and that is still the case today. Of particular concern is the ALQ-218 receiver, placed in the harsh wingtip environment on the EA-18G and not the more benign setting of the EA-6B's tail, for which it was developed. While the EA-18G's design appears stable, and almost all its design drawings are complete, that may change once the aircraft is flight-tested. Production of the EA-18G is also risky: One-third of the total buy will be procured as low-rate initial production aircraft based on limited demonstrated functionality.