	Introduction

The United States witnessed an increase in sex offender management policy at the federal, state, and local levels beginning in the 1990s. As a result, laws have been enacted which impose a variety of post-incarceration controls on sex offenders. In two cases decided in the spring of 2010, United States v. Comstock and United States v. Carr , the U.S. Supreme Court addressed questions raised by federal civil commitment and registration requirements. Proponents of strong post-incarceration controls argue that the restrictions are necessary to reduce a demonstrably high recidivism rate, safeguard potential victims, and assist law enforcement in tracking offenders. Opponents question the restrictions' efficacy and argue that they are disproportionate to the crimes committed. These and other policy issues may be informed by judicial determinations. This report examines background and case law related to registration requirements and residency restrictions. Most recently, Congress enacted the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA) as part of the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006 (Adam Walsh Act). They organize persons convicted of sex offenses into three tiers, calling for progressively more scrutiny and longer registration requirements for each tier. With a few notable exceptions, the U.S. courts of appeals have upheld the federal registration provisions and § 2250. Federal courts have distinguished Lambert in cases challenging SORNA. Legislators and others are debating the efficacy of these restrictions as courts are determining the constitutional limits of enacting such laws. On the federal level, defendants have been unsuccessful with their challenges. In determining whether the statute's punitive effects were sufficient to negate or override the legislature's intent to create a civil, non-punitive regulatory scheme, the court relied on the five factors the Court used in Smith v. Doe : (1) whether the law has been regarded in U.S. history and traditions as punishment; (2) whether it promotes the traditional aims of punishment (deterrence and/or retribution); (3) whether it imposes an affirmative disability or restraint; (4) whether it has a rational connection to a non-punitive purpose; and (5) whether it is excessive with respect to that purpose. Conversely, in Lee v. State , the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals upheld Alabama's sex offender residency restriction statute against an ex post facto challenge. As restrictions have increased in both number and severity, questions arise. For example, is it possible that a statute's effect is so punitive as to negate a legislature's apparent non-punitive intent? Under what circumstances may these restrictions be applied?
The United States witnessed increased attention to sex offender management policy at the federal, state, and local levels beginning in the 1990s. As a result, laws have been enacted which impose a variety of post-incarceration controls on sex offenders, including but not limited to registration and community notification requirements, civil commitment, global positioning system (GPS) monitoring and tracking, and residency restrictions. Two recent U.S. Supreme Court cases—United States v. Carr and United States v. Comstock—involved challenges to such controls passed at the federal level. This report provides background information and examines relevant case law, with a particular focus on registration requirements and residency restrictions.
Legislation enacted to protect the community from sex offenders is not a novel concept. At the federal level, Congress has passed a series of laws adopting the use of sex offender registries and community notification for sexually violent offenders and those committing offenses against children. Most recently, as part of the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006 (P.L. 109-248), Congress passed the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA). The statute categorizes sex offenders into three tiers, with progressively longer and more scrutinizing registration requirements for each tier.
Proponents argue that post-incarceration restrictions are necessary to reduce a demonstrably high recidivism rate, safeguard potential victims, and assist law enforcement in tracking offenders. Opponents question the restrictions' practical impact on recidivism rates and argue that the controls may be disproportionate to the crimes committed.
As some commentators question the efficacy of these controls, courts are assessing their constitutionality. Defendants have invoked a myriad of constitutional grounds in challenges to post-conviction restrictions. With some exceptions, federal courts have generally upheld the restrictions. For example, in a 2003 case, Smith v. Doe, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld Alaska's sex offender registration requirements against an ex post facto challenge. Applying Smith, federal courts of appeals have also generally upheld the federal registration law against such challenges. However, as restrictions have increased in both number and severity, questions remain. Is it possible that a statute's purpose or effect is so punitive as to negate a legislature's apparent non-punitive intent? Under what circumstances may these restrictions be applied? Can states and localities apply these restrictions retroactively? These are some of the issues likely to emerge in pending and future federal court cases.