	Background

The Air Force began the F/A-22 development program in 1986 and  expected to complete development in 9 years for an estimated cost of  $12.6 billion. We have reported in the past that the F/A-22 acquisition approach was a  major contributor to the cost increases and delays in schedule that led to  reduced buying power. Integrated avionics has been a source of major schedule delays and cost  increases in the F/A-22 program. To accomplish this expanded mission, the Air Force will  need additional investments to develop and expand air-to-ground attack  capabilities for the F/A-22. In March 2003, the  Office of Secretary of Defense’s Cost Analysis Improvement Group  (CAIG) estimated that the Air Force would need $11.7 billion for the  planned modernization program. Additional risks are likely because the new processor and architecture are  being developed by other major aircraft programs and will require  extensive integration and operational testing to ensure that the F/A-22  program does not encounter similar problems that have delayed  integration and testing of the F/A-22’s current avionics suite. However, the Air  Force redesigned the tail to reduce producibility costs. Last year, in light of the changes in the program and investments that  remained, the Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and  International Relations of the House Committee on Government Reform  asked DOD to provide a new business case justifying the Air Force’s  planned number of F/A-22s (276 at that time) as well as how many F/A-22s  are affordable. JSF Joint Strike Fighter Program Is Approaching a Decision Point

The JSF acquisition program is approaching a key investment decision  point in its development as it prepares to stabilize the design for its critical  design reviews. It is the most expensive acquisition program  in DOD’s history with plans to buy almost 2,500 aircraft for an estimated  acquisition cost of about $200 billion. We have also seen the reverse, where  programs have gathered appropriate knowledge before their critical  design review. These programs had much more predictable cost and  schedule outcomes. Conclusions

DOD is not immune to efforts to address the fiscal imbalance confronting  the nation and will continue to face challenges based on competing  priorities, both within and external to its budget. In light of this substantial investment and the many changes that  have occurred in the F/A-22 program, we believe decision makers would  benefit from a new business case that justifies the need for the full air-to- air and air-to-ground capabilities and the quantities needed and affordable. The JSF program has a greater opportunity to make critical investment  decisions using a knowledge-based approach. While the program started  off with a high-risk approach by not maturing technologies before starting  system development, it has the opportunity to manage the system  development phase and stabilize the design before committing to large  investments in manufacturing capability—tooling, labor, and facilities—to  build test aircraft. The JSF program is considering a delay in its critical  design review to attain greater design stability in its airframe.
Why GAO Did This Study

The Department of Defense's (DOD) two major tactical aircraft fighter programs, the F/A-22 and the Joint Strike Fighter, represent an investment of about $280 billion. Problems in the F/A-22 development program have led to a 10-year delay in delivering the initial capability and development cost increases of $16 billion. The Joint Strike Fighter, which experienced problems early in the program, is now at a critical crossroad in development. Any discussion of DOD's sizeable investment that remains in these programs must also be viewed within the context of the fiscal imbalance facing the nation within the next 10 years. GAO was asked to testify on the status of the F/A-22 and draw comparisons between both F/A-22 and Joint Strike Fighter programs' acquisition approaches.

What GAO Found

The F/A-22 program has experienced several significant challenges since it began development in 1986. First, the Air Force had originally planned to buy 750 aircraft, but it now estimates it can only afford about 218 aircraft. Second, in order to develop an expanded air-to-ground attack capability, DOD estimates that the Air Force will need $11.7 billion in modernization funding. Third, the Air Force has determined that new avionics computer processors and architecture are needed to support most planned enhancements, which will further increase program costs and risk. Lastly, the development test program continues to experience problems and risks further delays primarily due to avionics failures and problems meeting reliability requirements. Because of the risks of future cost increases and schedule delays, a congressional subcommittee requested that DOD provide business case information on the F/A-22. However, the information DOD provided did not address how many aircraft the Air Force needs to accomplish its missions, how many the Air Force can afford considering the full life-cycle costs, whether investments in new air-to-ground capabilities are needed, and what are the opportunity costs associated with purchasing any proposed quantities of this aircraft. The Joint Strike Fighter program started system development and demonstration in 2001 and has already encountered some cost and schedule problems. It is now working toward maturing the aircraft design and is considering delays in its critical design reviews to attain greater knowledge before making a decision to increase its investment significantly. In contrast, the F/A-22 program encountered poor cost and schedule outcomes because it had not gathered the appropriate knowledge at critical junctures in the program. The Joint Strike Fighter program is still early in its development program, with a greater opportunity to efficiently apply knowledge to its critical investment decisions.