After the events  surrounding the November 2000 general election, the Help America Vote  Act of 2002 (HAVA) was enacted and major election reforms are now being  implemented. Specifically, primarily with respect to  federal elections, our objectives were to examine each major stage of the  election process to (1) identify changes to election systems since the 2000  election, including steps taken to implement HAVA, and (2) describe the  issues and challenges encountered by election officials in the November  2004 election. The Election Assistance Commission is to be  involved with, among other things, providing voluntary guidance to  states implementing certain HAVA provisions, serving as a national  clearinghouse and resource for information with respect to the  administration of federal elections, conducting studies, administering  programs that provide federal funds for states to make improvements  to some aspects of election administration, and helping to develop  testing for voting systems, and standards for election equipment. States receiving funds to replace punch card voting  systems or lever voting systems could also request a waiver until January 1,  2006; otherwise such systems were to be replaced in time for the November  2004 general elections. Scope and Methodology

For this report, we conducted a Web-based survey of election officials in all  50 states and the District of Columbia, surveyed by mail a nationally  representative stratified random probability sample of 788 local election  jurisdictions, and conducted on-site interviews with election officials in   28 local jurisdictions in 14 states. Under HAVA, this has changed. Under NVRA, in the administration of voter  registration for federal elections, states may not remove the names of  people who are registered to vote for nonvoting and names may be  removed only for certain specified reasons: at the request of the registrant;  by reason of criminal conviction, as provided by state law; by reason of  mental incapacity, as provided by state law; or pursuant to a general  program that makes a reasonable effort to remove the names of ineligible  voters from the official lists by reason of the death of the voter or on the  ground that the voter has changed address to a location outside the  election jurisdiction on the basis of change of address information from the  U.S. This distinction has  importance on Election Day for first-time voters who registered through  registration drives. Some election officials said that the  increased early voter turnout during this election resulted in long lines. Since the November 2000 general election, some states  have also reported making changes to their identification requirements for  all voters. We use paper ballots. However, large and medium  jurisdictions encountered difficulties to a greater extent than small  jurisdictions. Some of the challenges  reported by these officials included keeping poll workers informed about  new or changing requirements, conveying a vast amount of information  about election processes to a large number of people in a limited time, and  ensuring that poll workers understand their tasks and responsibilities. On the basis of reports from state election officials and in local election  jurisdictions we surveyed and visited, states and local jurisdictions varied  in a number of ways regarding how they implemented HAVA’s provisional  voting requirements in the November 2004 election. As a result, states establish,  under their own election codes, the applicable jurisdiction where voters  must cast their provisional ballot from in order for such ballot to be eligible  to be counted. Specifically, we estimate   66 percent (plus or minus 7 percent) of jurisdictions had a problem with  voters not meeting residency eligibility requirements for the precinct or  jurisdiction, 61 percent (plus or minus 7 percent) received insufficient evidence that  individuals had submitted voter registration applications at motor  vehicle agency offices,  61 percent (plus or minus 7 percent) had instances of insufficient  evidence that individuals had registered or tried to register directly with  the election office,   34 percent (plus or minus 7 percent) had registration applications  received by the registrar very close to or after the registration deadline,  32 percent (plus or minus 7 percent) had voters not providing  identification as specified by HAVA for registrants who registered by  mail and were voting for the first time in the precinct or jurisdiction,  29 percent (plus or minus 6 percent) received insufficient evidence that  individuals had submitted voter registration applications at National  Voter Registration Act agencies other than motor vehicle agency offices,  28 percent (plus or minus 6 percent) had provisional ballot envelopes or  ballots that were incomplete or illegible, and  20 percent of jurisdictions had problems with voters who did not sign a  sworn statement that they met the qualifications to be eligible to vote in  the precinct or jurisdiction. Not all equipment failures resulted in lost votes, but some did create  technical challenges. It requires many steps, an unerring attention to detail,  and the seamless integration of people, processes, and technology. It is unclear if and  when this migration to more technology-based voting methods will  produce more integrated election system environments. It also includes election operations that affect voting equipment,  such as voter processing at the polling place and handling of absentee  ballots.
Why GAO Did This Study

The 2004 general election was the first presidential election that tested substantial changes states made to their election systems since the 2000 election, including some changes required by the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA). HAVA required some major changes in the nation's elections processes, not all which had to be implemented by the November 2004 election. HAVA addressed issues of people, processes, and technology, all of which must be effectively integrated to ensure effective election operations. GAO initiated a review under the authority of the Comptroller General to examine an array of election issues of broad interest to Congress. For each major stage of the election process, this report discusses (1) changes to election systems since the 2000 election, including steps taken to implement HAVA, and (2) challenges encountered in the 2004 election. For this report, GAO sent a survey to the 50 states and the District of Columbia (all responded) and mailed a questionnaire to a nationwide sample of 788 local election jurisdictions about election administration activities (80 percent responded). To obtain more detailed information about experiences for the 2004 election, GAO also visited 28 local jurisdictions in 14 states, chosen to represent a range of election system characteristics.

What GAO Found

In passing HAVA, Congress provided a means for states and local jurisdictions to improve upon several aspects of the election system, but it is too soon to determine the full effect of those changes. For example, 41 states obtained waivers permitted under HAVA until January 1, 2006, to implement a requirement for statewide voter registration lists. States also had discretion in how they implemented HAVA requirements, such as the identification requirements for first-time mail registrants. Some local election jurisdictions described different identification procedures for first-time mail registrants who registered through voter registration drives. Although states differed regarding where voters who cast provisional ballots for federal office must cast those ballots in order for their votes to be counted, provisional voting has helped to facilitate voter participation. HAVA also created the Election Assistance Commission, which has issued best practice guides and voluntary voting systems standards and distributed federal funds to states for improving election administration, including purchasing new voting equipment. The results of our survey of local election jurisdictions indicate that larger jurisdictions may be replacing older equipment with technology-based voting methods to a greater extent than small jurisdictions, which continue to use paper ballots extensively and are the majority of jurisdictions. As the elections technology environment evolves, voting system performance management, security, and testing will continue to be important to ensuring the integrity of the overall elections process. GAO found that states made changes--either as a result of HAVA or on their own--to address some of the challenges identified in the November 2000 election. GAO also found that some challenges continued--such as problems receiving voter registration applications from motor vehicle agencies, addressing voter error issues with absentee voting, recruiting and training a sufficient number of poll workers, and continuing to ensure accurate vote counting. At the same time, new challenges arose in the November 2004 election, such as fraudulent, incomplete, or inaccurate applications received through voter registration drives; larger than expected early voter turnout, resulting in long lines; and counting large numbers of absentee ballots and determining the eligibility of provisional voters in time to meet final vote certification deadlines.