	Background

U.S. Customs and Border Protection, a component of the Department of  Homeland Security, has the primary responsibility for securing the  nation’s borders. About 10 percent of the Border Patrol’s agents nationwide are  assigned to interior traffic checkpoints in the southwest border sectors,  according to the Border Patrol. Permanent and Tactical Checkpoints Have Different but Complementary Roles in the Border Patrol Strategy

The Border Patrol uses permanent and tactical checkpoints in 8 of its 9  southwest sectors as part of a multilayered enforcement strategy to deter  and defend against potential terrorists and their weapons, contraband  smugglers, and persons who have entered the country illegally. This is not the case in the Tucson sector, where legislative language has  prohibited the construction of checkpoints since fiscal year 1999. Moreover, starting in mid-2002, and through fiscal year 2004, the Border  Patrol relocated or closed checkpoints in the Tucson sector on a regular  basis, such as at least once every 7 days. According to the Border Patrol, permanent and tactical checkpoints are  part of an integrated, multilayered enforcement strategy intended to  achieve two key law enforcement objectives: (1) to increase the likelihood  of detection and apprehension of illegal entrants of all types, and thereby  to deter other potential illegal entrants from attempting to enter the  country, who might otherwise believe that successfully crossing the  border would mean that there were no further barriers to them, and (2) to  deter illegal entrants from transiting through permanent checkpoints on  major roadways, through fear of detection, and thereby to cause them to  use less traveled secondary roads on which the Border Patrol is able to  stop all or almost all vehicles (because of much lower traffic volume),  making illegal entrants more visible and easier to detect and apprehend. Permanent checkpoints’ physical infrastructure gives them different  capabilities than tactical checkpoints. In addition,  the 2005 Act changed the requirement to relocate checkpoints to “at least  an average of once every 14 days.”  According to the Border Patrol, the  phrase “an average” gave it more flexibility in determining checkpoint  operating schedules than the previous years’ requirement of “at least once  every 7 days.”  As a result, in fiscal year 2005, the Patrol operates the  checkpoint on I-19 for 14 days, closes it for 8 hours, and then reopens it for  14 days. It did  attempt to close and open for a few days at a time, they said, to try to  confuse illegal aliens and contraband smugglers. Studies or reports on checkpoint benefits and costs have  also not been performed by the Border Patrol. However, this support is not universal. Most Local Community Leaders We Contacted See Traffic Checkpoints as Benefiting their Communities

Local law enforcement, business, and community leaders near interior  traffic checkpoints in Temecula, California, in the San Diego sector, and  Nogales, Arizona, in the Tucson sector, that we interviewed told us that in  their view, the checkpoints and the presence of Border Patrol agents were  of considerable benefit to their communities. Our analysis of Border Patrol data suggest that, as measured in  apprehensions per agent work year, the restrictions in the Tucson sector  may have had a negative impact on the performance of its interior  checkpoints, starting at about the time the sector implemented direction  from congressional staff to relocate checkpoints every 7 days, in  comparison with the three other sectors we visited, where no comparable  decline in effectiveness occurred during the same time period. This  information could also be useful to the Congress as it considers ways to  improve the effectiveness of checkpoints and border security efforts. Recommendations for Executive Action

To better gauge the effects of border control efforts, we recommend that  the Commissioner of Customs and Border Protection    develop additional performance measures for the Border Patrol for the  productivity and effectiveness of interior checkpoints, such as  apprehensions per agent work year and cost per apprehension, and  include in CBP’s Performance and Annual Report data and analysis  provided by the additional performance measures on the performance  of interior checkpoints and what might be done to improve their  effectiveness. DHS stated that  CBP will consider our suggestions when developing these measures. According to Border Patrol  officials, Laredo is one of the busiest commercial ports of entry in the  United States.
Why GAO Did This Study

The U.S. Border Patrol, a component of the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) agency, a part of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), aims to apprehend persons who illegally enter the United States between official ports of entry, including potential terrorists, aliens, and contraband smugglers, thereby deterring or stopping illegal activity. The Patrol operates permanent and tactical (temporary) interior traffic checkpoints on major and secondary U.S. roads, mainly in the southwest border states where most illegal entries occur, as part of a multi-layer strategy to maximize detection and apprehension of illegal entrants. This report addresses (1) the role of interior checkpoints in the Patrol's strategy; (2) what is known about checkpoint costs and benefits; and (3) how checkpoints are evaluated and what performance measures indicate regarding their effectiveness.

What GAO Found

The Border Patrol operates 33 permanent traffic checkpoints in 8 of its 9 sectors in the southwest border states, supported by tactical checkpoints. While permanent checkpoints have the advantage of physical infrastructure, tactical ones have the mobility to block routes used to evade permanent ones and to respond to intelligence on illegal activity. A third type of checkpoint operates in the Tucson, Ariz., sector, where the Patrol has been legislatively prohibited from funding construction of checkpoints since fiscal year 1999. This restriction has prevented checkpoint construction. The Patrol also began closing or relocating checkpoints in the sector every 7 days at the instruction of congressional staff in June 2002, and was legislatively required to relocate checkpoints on the same schedule in FY 2003 and 2004, and an average of once every 14 days in FY 2005. Three of six checkpoints in the sector had to close for 7/14 days, as safety considerations made it too hazardous to relocate them. Local law enforcement and business and community leaders we interviewed from communities near interior traffic checkpoints said that benefits resulting from checkpoint operations included reductions in crime and vandalism. Although a few cited traffic delays, most were supportive of checkpoint operations. However, some others were concerned about the impact of the checkpoints on traffic congestion and quality of life in their communities. The Border Patrol does not routinely evaluate the effectiveness of checkpoint operations, or their costs. The Patrol includes limited traditional performance measures in its Performance and Annual Report, such as apprehensions and contraband seized. GAO developed an apprehension per agent work year measure to assess performance. The data suggest that the performance of the Tucson sector interior checkpoints dropped starting in FY 2002, and more in FY 2003, after the Border Patrol began relocating or closing them on a regular basis. Three other sectors we visited that did not have to relocate or close checkpoints experienced no comparable decrease in apprehensions per agent work year during the same time period. Other factors not measured or accounted for might also have contributed to these outcomes, but the Border Patrol's limited measures do not capture or assess them. A broader range of performance measures, when considered with other indicators, could be useful to CBP and the Congress as they consider ways to improve the effectiveness of interior traffic checkpoints and border security efforts.