The first block, known as Block 1, is to include a mix  of surveillance technologies (e.g., cameras, radars, and sensors) and C3I  technologies that are to produce a common operating picture—a uniform  presentation of activities within specific areas along the border. In January 2010, the DHS Secretary ordered a departmentwide  reassessment of the program to include a comprehensive assessment of  alternatives to SBInet to ensure that the department utilizes the most  efficient and effective technological and operational solutions to secure  the border. In September 2008, we reported that the  scope of SBInet was becoming more limited without becoming more  specific, thus making it unclear and uncertain what system capabilities  would be delivered when and to what locations. To its credit, the SPO subsequently defined the scope of the first  incremental block of SBInet capabilities that it intended to deploy and  make operational; however, these capabilities and the number of  geographic locations to which they are to be deployed have continued to  shrink. However,  DHS has not demonstrated the cost-effectiveness of Block 1. Without a meaningful understanding of SBInet  costs and benefits, DHS lacks an adequate basis for knowing whether the  initial system solution is cost-effective. In particular:    The SPO revised its Systems Engineering Plan, which documents its life  cycle management approach for SBInet definition, development, testing,  deployment, and sustainment, in November 2008, and this plan is largely  consistent with DHS and other relevant guidance. In summary, we recommended that DHS limit future investment in SBInet  to work that is either already under contract and supports the completion  of Block 1 activities for deployment to TUS-1 and AJO-1 and/or provides a  basis for a departmental decision on what, if any, expanded investment in  SBInet is justifiable as a prudent use of DHS’s resources for carrying out  its border security and immigration management mission. Further, we recommended that DHS decide whether proceeding with  expanded investment in SBInet represents a prudent use of the  department’s resources, and report the decision, and the basis for it, to the  department’s authorization and appropriations committees. To DHS’s credit, it has initiated actions to address our recommendations. To minimize the program’s exposure to risk, it is imperative for  DHS to follow through on its stated commitment to ensure that SBInet, as  proposed, is the right course of action for meeting its stated border  security and immigration management goals and outcomes, and once this  is established, for it to ensure that the program is executed in accordance  with proven acquisition management best practices. This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the  United States.
Why GAO Did This Study

The Secure Border Initiative (SBI) is intended to help secure the 6,000 miles of international borders that the contiguous United States shares with Canada and Mexico. The program, which began in November 2005, seeks to enhance border security and reduce illegal immigration by improving surveillance technologies, raising staffing levels, increasing domestic enforcement of immigration laws, and improving physical infrastructure along the nation's borders. Within SBI, the Secure Border Initiative Network (SBInet) is a multibillion dollar program that includes the acquisition, development, integration, deployment, and operation of surveillance technologies--such as unattended ground sensors and radar and cameras mounted on fixed and mobile towers--to create a "virtual border fence." In addition, command, control, communications, and intelligence (C3I) software and hardware are to use the information gathered by the surveillance technologies to create a real-time picture of what is transpiring within specific areas along the border and transmit the information to command centers and vehicles.

What GAO Found

The testimony summarizes our most recent report on SBInet, which provided a timely and compelling case for DHS to rethink the plans it had in place at the beginning of this year for investing in SBInet. In this regard, we showed that the scope of the initial system's capabilities and areas of deployment have continued to shrink, thus making it unclear what capabilities are to be delivered when. Moreover, DHS had yet to demonstrate the cost-effectiveness of the proposed SBInet solution, and thus whether the considerable time and money being invested represented a prudent use of limited resources. Further, DHS had not employed the kind of acquisition management rigor and discipline needed to reasonably ensure that the proposed system capabilities would be delivered on time and within budget. Collectively, we concluded that these limitations increased the risk that the proposed solution would not meet the department's stated border security and immigration management goals. To minimize the program's exposure to risk, we recommended that DHS determine whether its proposed SBInet solution satisfied the department's border security needs in the most cost-effective manner and that the department improve several key life cycle management areas. DHS largely agreed with our recommendations. More importantly, since receiving these recommendations in a draft of our report in March 2010, the Secretary of Homeland Security has taken action to limit the department's near-term investment in SBInet pending its completion of an analysis of alternative investment options. This and other planned actions are consistent with the intent of our recommendations.