1.2.) The MHC ship program, which is in the production phase, will cost about $1.5 billion. 1.3.) Specifically, we evaluated the (1) status of the Navy’s research and development programs, (2) readiness of the Navy’s on-hand mine countermeasures assets, and (3) match between the Navy’s mine countermeasures assets and its mine countermeasures requirements. A long-range plan addressing the gaps and limitations in the Navy’s mine warfare capabilities, especially its shallow water capabilities, could help the Navy maximize its limited financial resources and ensure sustained funding of its priority systems. The mine warfare program is experiencing budget constraints, and the Navy has not fully funded its shallow water mine countermeasures projects, even though it identified this area as a priority. Reliability and Supportability Problems Affect Mission Capability of Mine Warfare Ships

Reliability problems and parts shortages continue to affect the readiness and performance capabilities of the Navy’s MCM ships. The Command has had some success with its efforts. In addition, the Navy has plans to acquire a new MCS ship early in the next century. In the interim, the Navy is spending more than $118 million to modify an existing amphibious warfare ship to provide mine warfare assets with command, control, and support. Further, Navy officials estimate that it will cost the Navy $4.5 million annually to operate and maintain the MCS ship. Many of the shallow water mine countermeasures projects are underfunded. The Navy estimates that it will cost $3.6 million per year to operate and maintain each of these ships. Recommendations

To improve the Navy’s readiness to conduct mine countermeasures, we recommend that the Secretary of the Navy develop a long-range plan to identify the gaps and limitations in the Navy’s mine countermeasures capabilities; establish priorities among the competing projects and programs, including those in research and development; and sustain the development and procurement of the most critical systems.
Why GAO Did This Study

Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Navy's efforts to improve its ability to conduct effective sea mine countermeasures (MCM) in two simultaneous major regional conflicts, focusing on the: (1) status of the Navy's research and development projects; (2) readiness of the Navy's present MCM equipment; and (3) match between the Navy's planned and on-hand MCM equipment and its MCM requirements.

What GAO Found

GAO found that: (1) the Navy must develop different systems to cover deep- and shallow-water mine clearing operations, and its shallow-water MCM capability is limited; (2) the Navy has about 18 different projects to address its MCM weaknesses, but has not set clear priorities among its mine warfare programs; (3) a long-range plan could help the Navy maximize its limited financial resources and ensure ongoing funding of its priority systems; (4) the Navy has experienced delays in new systems' deployment and has identified shortfalls of at least $99.5 million in its shallow-water projects' development; (5) the Navy's 14 oceangoing MCM ships have long-standing equipment reliability problems and parts shortages, which hinders mission performance; (6) the Navy is resolving the ships' problems, but that will take several more years; (7) the Navy is spending about $1.5 billion for 12 coastal, non-oceangoing mine hunting ships that are no longer needed, and will spend an average of $3.6 million annually to operate and maintain each of them; (8) the Navy plans to acquire a new MCM command, control, and support ship early in the next century and, in the interim, convert an older helicopter carrier at a cost of $118 million, but other existing ships and onshore locations could fulfill mission requirements at a lower cost; and (9) the Navy could save millions of dollars by deactivating some of the coastal ships and the command support ship.