Thus, the  DMIA did not specifically require the collection of any new data on foreign  nationals departing at land POEs. These data are  checked against databases or watch lists of known criminals and  suspected terrorists. US-VISIT officials told us that it is their position that  once US-VISIT entry capability equipment was installed and operating,  CBP became responsible for identifying problems and notifying US-VISIT  when US-VISIT-related problems occurred so that US-VISIT can work with  CBP to resolve them. Nevertheless, CBP officials at 9 of the 12 sites we  visited where computer processing problems were identified said they did  not always use the help desk to report or resolve computer problems (and  thereby generating a record of the problems). For  example, the RFID solution does not meet the congressional requirement  for a biometric exit capability because the technology that has been tested  cannot meet a key goal of US-VISIT—ensuring that visitors who enter the  country are the same ones who leave. DHS was to have reported to Congress by June 2005 on how the agency  intended to fully implement a biometric entry/exit program. Until such a plan is finalized and issued, DHS is  not able to articulate how entry/exit concepts will fit together—including  any interim nonbiometric solutions—and neither DHS nor Congress is  positioned to prioritize and allocate resources for a US-VISIT exit  capability or plan for the program’s future. However, DHS has not defined a  strategic context that shows how US-VISIT fits with other land border  initiatives. Among other  things, we found that:    key decisions had yet to be made about what documents other than a  passport would be acceptable when U.S. citizens and citizens of  Canada enter or return to the United States—a decision critical to  making decisions about how DHS is to inspect individuals entering the  country, including what common facilities or infrastructure might be  needed to perform these inspections at land POEs;    a DHS and Department of State proposal to develop an alternative form  of passport, called a PASS card, would rely on RFID technology to help  DHS process U.S. citizens re-entering the country, but DHS had not  made decisions involving a broad set of considerations that include (1)  utilizing security features to protect personal information, (2) ensuring  that proper equipment and facilities are in place to facilitate crossings  at land borders, and (3) enhancing compatibility with other border  crossing technology already in use. Finally, DHS has not articulated how US-VISIT fits strategically and  operationally with other land-border security initiatives, such as the  Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative and Secure Border Initiative. Recommendations for Executive Action

To help DHS achieve benefits commensurate with its investment in US- VISIT at land POEs and security goals and objectives, we are  recommending that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct the US- VISIT Program Director, in collaboration with the Commissioner of CBP,  to take the following two actions:  improve existing management controls for identifying and reporting  computer processing and other operational problems as they arise at  land POEs and ensure that these controls are consistently  administered; and    develop performance measures for assessing the impact of US-VISIT  operations specifically at land POEs. We also recommend that as DHS finalizes the statutorily mandated report  describing a comprehensive biometric entry and exit system for US-VISIT,  the Secretary of Homeland Security take steps to ensure that the report  include, among other things,  information on the costs, benefits, and feasibility of deploying  biometric and nonbiometric exit capabilities at land POEs;    a discussion of how DHS intends to move from a nonbiometric exit  capability, such as the technology currently being tested, to a reliable  biometric exit capability that meets statutory requirements; and    a description of how DHS expects to align emerging land border  security initiatives with US-VISIT and what facility or facility  modifications would be needed at land POEs to ensure that technology  and processes work in harmony. Appendix V: Land Ports of Entry (POE) at Which US-VISIT Has Been Installed

According to the US-VISIT program office, US-VISIT entry capability was  installed at the following land POE by December 31, 2005.
Why GAO Did This Study

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) established the U.S. Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology (US-VISIT) program to collect, maintain, and share data on selected foreign nationals entering and exiting the United States at air, sea and land ports of entry (POEs). These data, including biometric identifiers like digital fingerprints, are to be used to screen persons against watch lists, verify visitors' identities, and record arrival and departure. GAO was asked to review implementation at land POE facilities and in doing so GAO analyzed: (1) efforts to implement US-VISIT entry capability; (2) efforts to implement US-VISIT exit capability; and (3) DHS's efforts to define how US-VISIT fits with other emerging border security initiatives. GAO reviewed DHS and US-VISIT program documents, interviewed program officials, and visited 21 land POEs with varied traffic levels on both borders.

What GAO Found

US-VISIT entry capability has been installed at 154 of the 170 land POEs. Officials at all 21 sites GAO visited reported that US-VISIT had improved their ability to process visitors and verify identities. DHS plans to further enhance US-VISIT's capabilities by, among other things, requiring new technology and equipment for scanning all 10 fingerprints. While this may aid border security, installation could increase processing times and adversely affect operations at land POEs where space constraints, traffic congestion, and processing delays already exist. GAO's work indicated that management controls in place to identify such problems and evaluate operations were insufficient and inconsistently administered. For example, GAO identified computer processing problems at 12 sites visited; at 9 of these, the problems were not always reported. US-VISIT has developed performance measures, but measures to gauge factors that uniquely affect land POE operations were not developed; these would put US-VISIT officials in a better position to identify areas for improvement. US-VISIT officials concluded that, for various reasons, a biometric US-VISIT exit capability cannot now be implemented without incurring a major impact on land POE facilities. An interim nonbiometric exit technology being tested does not meet the statutory requirement for a biometric exit capability and cannot ensure that visitors who enter the country are those who leave. DHS has not yet reported to Congress on a required plan describing how it intends to fully implement a biometric entry/exit program, or use nonbiometric solutions. Until this plan is finalized, neither DHS nor Congress is in a good position to prioritize and allocate program resources or plan for POE facilities modifications. DHS has not yet articulated how US-VISIT is to align with other emerging land border security initiatives and mandates, and thus cannot ensure that the program will meet strategic program goals and operate cost effectively at land POEs. Knowing how US-VISIT is to work with these initiatives, such as one requiring U.S. citizens, Canadians, and others to present passports or other documents at the border in 2009, is important for understanding the broader strategic context for US-VISIT and identifying resources, tools, and potential facility modifications needed to ensure success.