	Ongoing Operations Have Challenged DOD’s Ability to Sustain Readiness of Ground Forces, Particularly for Nondeployed Forces

To meet the challenges of ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan,  DOD has taken steps to increase the availability of personnel and  equipment for units deploying to Iraq and Afghanistan, particularly with  regard to the Army and Marine Corps. It has  also transferred equipment from nondeployed units and prepositioned  stocks to support deployed units. The Army and Marine Corps have  refocused training to prepare deploying units for counterinsurgency  missions. DOD has also relied more on Navy and Air Force personnel and  contractors to help perform tasks normally handled by Army or Marine  Corps personnel. DOD Has Adjusted Policies to Increase Availability of Personnel, but Long-Term Implications Are Unclear

For the past several years, DOD has continually rotated forces in and out  of Iraq and Afghanistan to maintain required force levels. Since September 11, 2001, DOD has made a number of adjustments to its  personnel policies, including those related to length of service obligations,  length of deployments, frequency of reserve component mobilizations, and  the use of volunteers. However, it is unclear  whether longer deployments or more frequent involuntary mobilizations  or other adjustments will affect recruiting and retention. We also have reported that  while the Army and Marine Corps continue to meet mission requirements  and report high readiness rates for deployed units, nondeployed units have  reported a decrease in reported readiness rates, in part due to equipment  shortages. As a result, units  are not necessarily developing and maintaining the skills for a fuller range  of missions. In October 2007, DOD  estimated the number of DOD contractors in Iraq to be about 129,000. Actions Based on Transparency, Sound Plans, and Measurable Outcomes Are Needed to Guide DOD’s Efforts to Rebuild Readiness of Ground Forces

Given the change in the security environment since September 11, 2001,  and related increases in demands on our military forces as well as the  ongoing high level of commitment to ongoing operations, rebuilding  readiness of U.S. ground forces is a long-term prospect. While  there are no quick fixes to these issues, we believe the department has  measures it can take that will advance progress in both the short and long  terms. Over the past several years, we have reported and testified on a  range of issues related to military readiness and made multiple  recommendations aimed at enhancing DOD’s ability to manage and  improve military readiness. Recommended Actions to Improve Strategic Decision Making and Address Specific Readiness Concerns

A common theme in our work has been the need for DOD to take a more  strategic approach to decision making that promotes transparency and  ensures that programs and investments are based on sound plans with  measurable goals, validated requirements, prioritized resource needs, and  performance measures to gauge progress against the established goals. Because significant resources will be  needed to provide the personnel, equipment, and training necessary to  restore and maintain readiness, and because DOD is competing for  resources in an increasingly fiscally constrained environment, we also  recommended that the plans contain specific investment priorities,  prioritized actions that the services believe are needed to achieve the  plans’ readiness goals and time frames, and measures to gauge progress in  improving force readiness. The Army needs to revise and adjust its training strategy to include a plan  to support full-spectrum training during extended operations, and clarify  the capacity needed to support the modular force. DOD must develop a strategy and plans for managing near-term risks and  management challenges related to its prepositioning programs. DOD agreed with some recommendations, but has yet to fully implement  them. For others, particularly when we recommended that DOD develop  more robust plans linked to resources, DOD believed its current efforts  were sufficient. We continue to believe such plans are needed.
Why GAO Did This Study

U.S. military forces, and ground forces in particular, have operated at a high pace since the attacks of September 11, 2001, including to support ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Between 2001 and July 2007, approximately 931,000 U.S. Army and Marine Corps servicemembers deployed for overseas military operations, including about 312,000 National Guard or Reserve members. To support ongoing military operations and related activities, Congress has appropriated billions of dollars since 2001, and through September 2007, the Department of Defense (DOD) has reported obligating about $492.2 billion to cover these expenses, of which a large portion are related to readiness. In addition, DOD's annual appropriation, now totaling about $480 billion for fiscal year 2008, includes funds to cover readiness needs. GAO was asked to testify on (1) the readiness implications of DOD's efforts to support ongoing operations; and (2) GAO's prior recommendations related to these issues, including specific actions that GAO believes would enhance DOD's ability to manage and improve readiness. This statement is based on reports and testimonies published from fiscal years 2003 through 2008. GAO's work was conducted in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

What GAO Found

While DOD has overcome difficult challenges in maintaining a high pace of operations over the past 6 years and U.S. forces have gained considerable combat experience, our work has shown that extended operations in Iraq and elsewhere have had significant consequences for military readiness, particularly with regard to the Army and Marine Corps. To meet mission requirements specific to Iraq and Afghanistan, the department has taken steps to increase the availability of personnel and equipment for deploying units, and to refocus their training on assigned missions. For example, to maintain force levels in theater, DOD has increased the length of deployments and frequency of mobilizations, but it is unclear whether these adjustments will affect recruiting and retention. The Army and Marine Corps have also transferred equipment from nondeploying units and prepositioned stocks to support deploying units, affecting the availability of items for nondeployed units to meet other demands. In addition, they have refocused training such that units train extensively for counterinsurgency missions, with little time available to train for a fuller range of missions. Finally, DOD has adopted strategies, such as relying more on Navy and Air Force personnel and contractors to perform some tasks formerly handled by Army or Marine Corps personnel. If current operations continue at the present level of intensity, DOD could face difficulty in balancing these commitments with the need to rebuild and maintain readiness. Over the past several years, GAO has reported on a range of issues related to military readiness and made numerous recommendations to enhance DOD's ability to manage and improve readiness. Given the change in the security environment since September 11, 2001, and demands on U.S. military forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, rebuilding readiness will be a long-term and complex effort. However, GAO believes DOD can take measures that will advance progress in both the short and long terms. A common theme is the need for DOD to take a more strategic decision-making approach to ensure programs and investments are based on plans with measurable goals, validated requirements, prioritized resource needs, and performance measures to gauge progress. Overall, GAO recommended that DOD develop a near-term plan for improving the readiness of ground forces that, among other things, establishes specific goals for improving unit readiness, prioritizes actions needed to achieve those goals, and outlines an investment strategy to clearly link resource needs and funding requests. GAO also made recommendations in several specific readiness-related areas, including that DOD develop equipping strategies to target shortages of items required to equip units preparing for deployment, and DOD adjust its training strategies to include a plan to support full-spectrum training. DOD agreed with some recommendations, but has yet to fully implement them. For others, particularly when GAO recommended that DOD develop more robust plans linked to resources, DOD believed its current efforts were sufficient. GAO continues to believe such plans are needed.