DOE Has Overstated the IPP Program’s Progress and Achievements

DOE has not accurately portrayed the IPP program’s progress in the  number of WMD scientists receiving DOE support and the number of long- term, private sector jobs created. In addition, DOE has overstated the rate at which weapons  scientists have been employed in long-term, private sector jobs because it  does not independently verify the data it receives on the number of jobs  created, relies on estimates of job creation, and includes in its count a  large number of part-time jobs that were created. Many Scientists in Russia and Other Countries Who Did Not Claim Direct Experience with WMD Have Received Funds from DOE

A major goal of the IPP program is to engage former Soviet weapons  scientists, engineers, and technicians, and DOE claims to have  supplemented the incomes of over 16,770 of these individuals since the  program’s inception. Finally, many IPP project participants that DOE supports are too young to  have contributed to the Soviet Union’s WMD programs. While DOE guidance for the IPP program does not  prohibit participation of younger scientists in IPP projects, DOE has not  clearly stated the proliferation risk posed by younger scientists and the  extent to which they should be a focus of the IPP program. DOE reported that these 32 commercial successes had helped create or  support 2,790 new private sector jobs for former weapon scientists in  Russia and other countries. DOE Has Not Developed an Exit Strategy for the IPP Program but Instead Has Expanded Efforts to New Areas

DOE has yet to develop criteria for phasing-out the IPP program in Russia  and other countries of the former Soviet Union. Russian Government Officials, Russian and Ukrainian Scientists, and U.S. Industry Representatives Questioned the Continuing Need for the IPP Program

Officials from the Russian government, representatives of Russian and  Ukrainian institutes, and individuals at U.S. companies raised questions  about the continuing need for the IPP program. Specifically:    A senior Russian Atomic Energy Agency official told us in July 2007 that  the IPP program is no longer relevant because Russia’s economy is strong  and its scientists no longer pose a proliferation risk. Officials from 10 of the 22 Russian and Ukrainian institutes we interviewed  told us that they do not see scientists at their institutes as a proliferation  risk. DOE has not developed criteria to determine when scientists, institutes, or  countries should be “graduated” from the IPP program, and DOE officials  believe that there is a continued need to engage Russian scientists. In  contrast, State has assessed institutes and developed a strategy—using a  range of factors, such as the institute’s ability to pay salaries regularly and  to attract external funding—to graduate certain institutes from its Science  Centers program. We found that DOE is currently supporting 35 IPP  projects at 17 Russian and Ukrainian institutes that State considers to  already be graduated from its Science Center program and, therefore, no  longer in need of U.S. assistance. DOE Has Expanded Efforts to Iraq and Libya and Is Working to Support GNEP

DOE recently expanded its scientist assistance efforts on two fronts: DOE  began providing assistance to scientists in Iraq and Libya, and, through the  IPP program, is working to develop IPP projects that support GNEP. Specifically, in every fiscal year from 1998 through 2007,  DOE carried over unspent funds in excess of the amount that the Congress  provided for the program in those fiscal years. Two main factors have contributed to DOE’s large and persistent  carryover of unspent funds: the lengthy and multilayered review and  approval processes DOE uses to pay IPP project participants for their  work, and long delays in implementing some IPP projects.
Why GAO Did This Study

During the decades before its dissolution, the Soviet Union produced a cadre of scientists and engineers whose knowledge and expertise could be invaluable to countries or terrorist groups trying to develop weapons of mass destruction (WMD). After the Soviet Union's collapse in 1991, many of these scientists suffered significant cuts in pay or lost their government-supported work. To address concerns about unemployed or underemployed Soviet-era weapons scientists, the Department of Energy (DOE) established the Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention (IPP) program in 1994 to engage former Soviet weapons scientists in nonmilitary work in the short term and create private sector jobs for these scientists in the long term. GAO was asked to assess (1) DOE's reported accomplishments for the IPP program, (2) DOE's exit strategy for the program, and (3) the extent to which the program has experienced annual carryovers of unspent funds and the reasons for any such carryovers. In December 2007, GAO issued a report--Nuclear Nonproliferation: DOE's Program to Assist Weapons Scientists in Russia and Other Countries Needs to Be Reassessed, (GAO-08-189)--that addressed these matters. To carry out its work, GAO, among other things, analyzed DOE policies, plans, and budgets and interviewed key program officials and representatives from 22 Russian and Ukrainian institutes.

What GAO Found

DOE has overstated accomplishments on the number of scientists receiving DOE support and the number of long-term, private sector jobs created. First, although DOE claims to have engaged over 16,770 scientists in Russia and other countries, this total includes both scientists with and without weapons-related experience. GAO's analysis of 97 IPP projects involving about 6,450 scientists showed that more than half did not claim to possess any weapons-related experience. Furthermore, officials from 10 Russian and Ukrainian weapons institutes told GAO that the IPP program helps them attract, recruit, and retain younger scientists and contributes to the continued operation of their facilities. This is contrary to the original intent of the program, which was to reduce the proliferation risk posed by Soviet-era weapons scientists. Second, although DOE asserts that the IPP program helped create 2,790 long-term, private sector jobs for former weapons scientists, the credibility of this number is uncertain because DOE relies on "good-faith" reporting from U.S. industry partners and foreign institutes and does not independently verify the number of jobs reported to have been created. DOE has not developed an exit strategy for the IPP program. Officials from the Russian government, Russian and Ukrainian institutes, and U.S. companies raised questions about the continuing need for the program. Importantly, a senior Russian Atomic Energy Agency official told GAO that the IPP program is no longer relevant because Russia's economy is strong and its scientists no longer pose a proliferation risk. DOE has not developed criteria to determine when scientists, institutes, or countries should "graduate" from the program. In contrast, the Department of State, which supports a similar program to assist Soviet-era weapons scientists, has assessed participating institutes and developed a strategy to graduate certain institutes from its program. Even so, we found that DOE is currently supporting 35 IPP projects at 17 Russian and Ukrainian institutes where State no longer funds projects because it considers them to have graduated from its program. In addition, DOE has recently expanded the program to new areas. Specifically, DOE began providing assistance to scientists in Iraq and Libya and, through the IPP program, is working to develop projects that support a DOE-led international effort to expand the use of civilian nuclear power. In every fiscal year since 1998, DOE carried over unspent funds in excess of the amount that the Congress provided for the program. Two main factors have contributed to this recurring problem--lengthy review and approval processes for paying former Soviet weapons scientists and delays in implementing some IPP projects. In its recent report, GAO recommended, among other things, that DOE conduct a fundamental reassessment of the IPP program, including the development of a prioritization plan and exit strategy. DOE generally concurred with GAO's findings, but does not believe that the IPP program needs to be reassessed.