SIV-Related Resignations in Afghanistan Are Likely to Fall from 2014 Levels, and Have Had Varied Effects on State’s and USAID’s Institutional Knowledge

From 2010 to 2015, a total of 378 Afghan local staff resigned from their  positions at State and USAID in Afghanistan after receiving SIVs (see fig. State and USAID had a high of 243 SIV-related resignations in 2014,  but the number of resignations will likely be lower in 2015 than in 2014,  based on both the number of such resignations as of August 2015 and  the number of Afghan staff who have currently completed an initial step in  the SIV application process. In addition,  embassy officials said that local staff attrition has affected some program  coordination with the Afghan government. Additionally, agency officials have noted that SIV processing was  relatively slow during the early years of the program. Afghan Staff Attrition, Including SIV-Related Resignations, Has Had Varied Effects on Agencies’ Institutional Knowledge

According to our assessment of changes to average tenure and grade  level of Afghan staff, Afghan staff attrition, including SIV-related  resignations, has had varied effects on State’s and USAID’s institutional  knowledge. From 2010 to June 2015, average tenure  among both agencies’ Afghan workforces decreased slightly (see table  1). Agencies Reported That They Have Successfully Identified Qualified Afghan Staff to Fill Vacancies

State and USAID reported they were successful in identifying qualified  replacements to fill vacancies for local staff positions. Agencies Have Taken Steps to Mitigate Attrition among Afghan Local Staff, Including SIV-Related Resignations

State and USAID have taken a number of actions to help mitigate the  effects of attrition among Afghan local staff, including local staff who  resigned their positions after receiving an SIV. Both agencies’  headquarters have provided additional administrative support to their  missions in Afghanistan beyond what is generally provided to other  overseas missions. State and USAID officials said they sometimes fill  one position with two employees in anticipation of an SIV-related  resignation. Temporary Assignments of Other Personnel to Kabul

State and USAID officials said they send U.S. direct hire employees to  Afghanistan on a temporary basis to fill staffing gaps caused by Afghan  staff attrition or to provide additional support to American personnel. Officials Said Agencies Have Not Evaluated Efforts to Mitigate Effects of Afghan Staff Attrition

While State and USAID have made a number of efforts to mitigate the  effects of Afghan staff attrition, according to officials, agencies have not  formally evaluated the extent to which these actions have addressed  effects on the workforce or programs. Key principles of human capital  management call for agencies to evaluate the success of human capital  strategies, such as actions taken to mitigate attrition among staff, by  using performance measures to assess the extent to which these  activities contribute to achieving programmatic goals. Furthermore, without evaluation of mitigating actions that agencies have  previously undertaken, agencies may be unable to weigh the costs and  benefits of actions being implemented, and may be unable to identify the  strategies that are most effective for handling future workforce-related  needs in challenging environments. In its written comments, USAID agreed with the recommendation. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

In this report, we evaluated (1) special immigrant visa (SIV)-related  resignations, including how, if at all, the Department of State’s (State) and  U.S. Agency for International Development’s (USAID) workforces in  Afghanistan have been affected in recent years; (2) the actions, if any,  State and USAID have taken to mitigate any effects related to the attrition  of Afghan staff, including SIV recipients; and (3) the extent to which State  and USAID have evaluated mitigating actions related to the attrition of  Afghan staff, including SIV recipients.
Why GAO Did This Study

Congress established an SIV program in 2009 for Afghan nationals with at least 1 year of U.S. government service, given the risk these employees face. Local staff at the U.S. diplomatic mission in Afghanistan are key to implementing U.S. policies and programs because of their institutional knowledge, language skills, and local relationships. A high rate of Afghan staff resigning after receiving an SIV could diminish the U.S. government's capacity to carry out its mission. GAO was asked to review State's and USAID's efforts to mitigate the loss of Afghan staff.
GAO evaluated (1) SIV-related resignations, including how, if at all, State's and USAID's workforces in Afghanistan have been affected in recent years; (2) the actions, if any, State and USAID have taken to mitigate any effects related to attrition of Afghan staff, including SIV recipients; and (3) the extent to which State and USAID have evaluated mitigating actions related to the attrition of Afghan local staff, including SIV recipients. GAO analyzed data from 2010 to 2015, reviewed documents regarding the Afghan workforce, and interviewed State and USAID officials.

What GAO Found

Resignations of Afghan local staff at the Department of State (State) and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) after receiving a special immigrant visa (SIV) reached their highest level in 2014, and have had varied effects on the agencies' institutional knowledge (fig.). Resignations increased as more Afghan staff began the SIV application process than in the initial years of the program, and as State addressed delays that had previously slowed visa issuances. Afghan staff resignations are likely to be lower in 2015 than in previous years based on the number of current staff that have initiated the SIV process. Based on GAO's assessment of changes to average tenure and grade level of Afghan staff from 2010 until June 2015, and insights from agency officials, the effects of SIV-related resignations on State's and USAID's institutional knowledge is varied. For example, average tenure among both agencies' Afghan workforces decreased slightly. In addition, embassy officials said that local staff attrition may affect some program coordination with the Afghan government. Nonetheless, despite this attrition, agency officials reported that they were successful in identifying qualified replacements to fill positions.
Agencies have taken a number of actions to mitigate the effects of Afghan staff attrition, including SIV-related resignations. For example, State and USAID temporarily transfer experienced local staff from other diplomatic missions to Afghanistan, and the agencies sometimes fill one position with two employees in anticipation of an SIV-related resignation. In addition, the agencies provide additional administrative support from Washington, D.C., beyond what is generally provided to other U.S. missions, and send U.S. personnel to Afghanistan on a temporary basis to fill staffing gaps caused by attrition.
State and USAID officials said that these agencies have not evaluated actions taken to mitigate the effects of Afghan staff attrition. Officials said agencies have not conducted such assessments because of resource constraints and the reactive nature of operations in such an unpredictable environment. Key principles of human capital management that GAO identified call for agencies to evaluate the contribution that such activities make toward achieving programmatic goals, including those related to the workforce. Without these assessments, it will be difficult for agencies to have information to determine the costs and benefits of actions taken and handle workforce-related needs in challenging environments in the future.

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that State and USAID evaluate actions intended to mitigate the effects of Afghan local staff resignations. State and USAID agreed with the recommendations.