	Background

DOD plays a support role in CBRNE consequence management, including  providing those capabilities needed to save lives, alleviate hardship or  suffering, and minimize property damage caused by the incident. DOD’s  stated requirement is to have three of these forces. DOD Has Its Own CBRNE Consequence Management Plans in Place but is Unable to Fully Integrate Them with Other Federal Plans, Which Are Incomplete

DOD has operational plans for CBRNE consequence management. However, DOD has not integrated its plans with other federal government  plans because the concept and strategic plans associated with the  Integrated Planning System mandated by Presidential directive in  December 2007 have not been completed. DOD’s plans and those of other federal and state entities cannot be fully  integrated until the supporting strategic and concept plans are completed. However, its ability to respond effectively may  be compromised because (1) its planned response times may not meet the  requirements of a particular incident, (2) it may lack sufficient capacity in  some key capabilities, and (3) it faces challenges in adhering to its strategy  for sourcing CCMRFs with available units. That risk can be  mitigated by plans that integrate the Active and Reserve Component  portions of the CCMRFs and agreements between DOD and the states on  the availability of National Guard units and the duty status under which  they would respond to a major incident requiring federal forces. DOD Has Taken Actions to Improve CCMRF Readiness, but Training Gaps and Conflicting Priorities May Degrade Performance

DOD has taken a number of actions in the past year to improve the  readiness of the first fielded CCMRF. We found that CCMRF may be limited in its ability to successfully conduct  consequence management operations because (1) it does not conduct  realistic full-force field training to confirm its readiness to assume the  mission or to deploy rapidly and (2) conflicting priorities between the  CBRNE mission and overseas deployments affect some units’ mission  preparation and unit cohesion. Therefore, for the first time, identified units have been conducting both  individual and collective training focused on the CBRNE mission. These training and force rotation issues have prevented DOD from  providing the kind of stability to the force that would allow units to build  cohesiveness. CCMRF Requirements Have Not Been Fully Developed, and Funding and Oversight Are Decentralized

DOD is making progress in identifying and providing funding and  equipment to meet CCMRF mission requirements; however, its efforts to  identify total program requirements have not been completed, and its  approach to providing program funding has been fragmented because  funding responsibilities for CCMRF-related costs are dispersed throughout  DOD and are not subject to central oversight. Extent of Dedicated Funds for Some CCMRF Training Affects Mission

In the spring of 2008, sourcing priority for the CCMRF mission increased  substantially within the department, and funding was provided for specific  aspects of the mission. Until all  CBRNE plans that are being developed under the Integrated Planning  System are complete, it will be difficult for DOD to know whether its  considerable body of operational plans will adequately address anticipated  gaps in the capabilities needed to respond to multiple, near-simultaneous,  CBRNE incidents. Without an overarching  approach to develop full and complete mission requirements, an approach  and mechanisms in place to fully support those requirements, and a  centralized focal point to ensure that all requirements have been identified  and fully funded, DOD’s ability to carry out this high-priority homeland  security mission efficiently and effectively could be in jeopardy. In order to ensure that DOD’s plans are consistent with stated program  goals, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Commander  of NORTHCOM and the military services to  align plans for all parts of CCMRF, including specialized and general- purpose units, with stated objectives for CCMRF, and include in their  planning efforts the extent to which existing CCMRF capabilities  contribute to identified response requirements and stated CCMRF  mission goals; and    work with the state governors through the states’ Adjutants General  and the National Guard Bureau to create a long-term plan for sourcing  CCMRF and ensure that the agreements being established between  DOD and state governors include specific terms on National Guard  force availability and duty and response status. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

To determine the extent to which the Department of Defense (DOD) has  planned for and structured its force to provide chemical, biological,  radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosive (CBRNE) consequence  management assistance, we met with DOD officials and reviewed DOD’s  plans to determine sourcing requirements for the CBRNE Consequence  Management Response Force (CCMRF).
Why GAO Did This Study

DOD plays a support role in managing Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosives (CBRNE) incidents, including providing capabilities to save lives, alleviate hardship or suffering, and minimize property damage. This report addresses the extent to which (1) DOD's CBRNE consequence management plans and capabilities are integrated with other federal plans; (2) DOD has planned for and structured its force to provide CBRNE consequence management assistance; (3) DOD's CBRNE Consequence Management Response Forces (CCMRF) are prepared for their mission; and (4) DOD has CCMRF funding plans that are linked to requirements for specialized CBRNE capabilities. GAO reviewed DOD's plans for CBRNE consequence management and documents from the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and FEMA. GAO also met with officials from the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense, U.S Northern Command, the military services, the National Guard Bureau, and some CCMRF units.

What GAO Found

DOD has its own CBRNE consequence management plans but has not integrated them with other federal plans because those federal entities have not completed all elements of the Integrated Planning System mandated by Presidential directive in December 2007. The system is to develop and link planning documents at the federal, state, and local levels. While the system's framework is established, the CBRNE concept and strategic plans that provide further guidance are incomplete. DOD has had operational plans in place and revises these plans regularly. However, until the Integrated Planning System and its associated plans are complete, DOD's plans and those of other federal and state entities will not be integrated, and it will remain unclear whether DOD's CCMRF will address potential gaps in capabilities. We previously recommended and DHS agreed that FEMA should develop a program management plan and schedule to complete the planning system. With a goal to respond to multiple, near-simultaneous, catastrophic CBRNE incidents, DOD has plans to provide needed capabilities, but its response times may not meet incident requirements, it may lack sufficient capacity in some capabilities, and it faces challenges to its strategy for sourcing all three CCMRFs with available units. Without assigned units and plans that integrate the active and reserve portions of CCMRF, and agreements between DOD and the states on availability of National Guard units and the duty status in which they would respond to an incident requiring federal forces, DOD's ability to train and deploy forces in a timely manner is at risk. DOD has taken a number of actions in the past year to improve the readiness of units assigned to the first CCMRF, increasing both individual and collective training focused on the mission and identifying the mission as high priority. However, the CCMRF has not conducted realistic full force field training to confirm units' readiness to assume the mission or to deploy rapidly. Competing demands of overseas missions may distract from a unit's focus on the domestic mission, and some CCMRF units rotate more frequently than stated goals. These training and force rotation problems have prevented DOD from providing the kind of stability to the force that would allow units to build cohesiveness. DOD is making progress in identifying and providing funding and equipment to meet CCMRF mission requirements; however, its efforts to identify all requirements have not been completed, and funding responsibilities are spread across the department and are not subject to central oversight. When the CCMRF mission priority increased in the spring of 2008, more funding was provided. However, units did not have dedicated funding and thus purchased equipment with funding also used for other missions. DOD lacks visibility over total funding requirements. Without an overarching approach to requirements and funding and a centralized focal point to ensure that all requirements have been identified and funded, DOD's ability to ensure that its forces are prepared to carry out this high-priority mission remains challenged.