CT Bureau’s Authorized Staffing Has Increased since Fiscal Year 2011, and Recent Efforts Have Been Made to Reduce Long- standing Staffing Gaps

The CT Bureau’s number of authorized full-time equivalent (FTE) staff  positions has grown annually since fiscal year 2011, and the bureau has  recently undertaken efforts to reduce a persistent staffing gap. The percentage of vacancies in the bureau has ranged from 17 percent to  23 percent in fiscal years 2011 to 2015. The Principal  Deputy Coordinator for Counterterrorism testified before Congress on  June 2, 2015 that the CT Bureau had reduced its FTE vacancies to 11  positions. However, we have been unable to verify that 4 of the  reportedly filled positions have been filled because State has not provided  sufficient documentation. Filling many of the  remaining positions was postponed until the current Coordinator for  Counterterrorism had time to assess the bureau’s needs and priorities,  according to the CT Bureau. Specifically, in fiscal years 2012 and 2013, the CT Bureau established  indicators and targets for its foreign assistance–related goals identified in  the bureau’s first multiyear strategic plan. The bureau also reported  results achieved toward each established indicator. CT Bureau Has Not Established Time Frames for Addressing Recommendations from Program Evaluations

Standard practices in program management include, among other things,  establishing specific time frames for addressing recommendations from  program evaluations. On the basis of our review of these action plans, the CT Bureau reported having implemented about half of the  recommendations (28 of 60) as of June 2015. CT Bureau’s Collaboration on Countering Violent Extremism and Counterterrorism Finance Programs Was Generally in Line with Key Collaboration Practices

We found that activities between the CT Bureau and other bureaus within  State as well as with other U.S. government agencies on counterterrorism  programs, specifically the CVE and CTF programs, were generally in line  with six of the seven key practices that GAO has identified for interagency  collaboration in the areas of (1) outcomes and accountability, (2) bridging  organizational cultures, (3) leadership, (4) clarity of roles and  responsibilities, (5) resources, and (6) written guidance and   We did not review one additional key collaboration  agreements.practice, which covers participants, because doing so would have  required taking a comprehensive look across all the State bureaus and  other U.S. government agencies to ensure that all the relevant  participants in counterterrorism efforts were included and would have  required an evaluation of their relevant resources, skills, and abilities to  contribute, which was outside the scope of this review. Conclusions

Given the critical importance of preventing terrorist attacks on the United  States and its interests around the world, State elevated the Office of the  Coordinator for Counterterrorism to the Bureau of Counterterrorism in  fiscal year 2012 to lead the department’s effort to counter terrorism  abroad and to secure the United States against terrorist threats and  violent extremism. Also, while the  CT Bureau has completed four program evaluations, resulting in 60  recommendations to improve its programs, it has implemented only about  half of those recommendations and has not established time frames for  addressing the remaining recommendations. Without specific time frames  for completing actions in response to evaluation recommendations, it will  be difficult for the bureau to ensure the timely implementation of  programmatic improvements that would benefit both the country-specific  efforts evaluated as well as the broader global program. Recommendations for Executive Action

Given that countering violent extremism is a priority for the U.S.  government in general and State’s CT Bureau, we recommend that the  Secretary of State take steps to ensure that CVE program efforts abroad  are evaluated. Specifically,  State indicated that it was currently assessing which programs would  most benefit from third-party evaluation during the upcoming fiscal year  and expected CVE to be included in its final determination. State  indicated that it will commit to setting a timetable for reviewing each  recommendation by a third-party evaluator and implementing those  actions that are deemed both implementable and worthwhile. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

In addition to presenting information on the evolution of the Department of  State’s (State) Bureau of Counterterrorism (CT Bureau) and changes in  funding, the objectives of this review were to examine (1) how the CT  Bureau’s staffing resources have changed since 2011, (2) the extent to  which the bureau has assessed its performance since 2011, and (3) the  extent to which the bureau’s coordination with U.S. government entities  on selected programs is in line with key collaboration practices.
Why GAO Did This Study

Terrorism and violent extremism continue to pose a global threat, and combating them remains a top priority for the U.S. government. State leads and coordinates U.S. efforts to counter terrorism abroad. State's Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism was elevated to bureau status in 2012 with the aim of enhancing State's ability to counter violent extremism, build partner counterterrorism capacity, and improve coordination. GAO was asked to review the effects of this change and the new bureau's efforts.
This report examines (1) how the bureau's staffing resources have changed since 2011, (2) the extent to which the bureau has assessed its performance since 2011, and (3) the extent to which the bureau's coordination with U.S. government entities on selected programs is in line with key collaboration practices. To address these objectives, GAO reviewed and analyzed State and other U.S. government agency information and interviewed U.S. government officials in Washington, D.C.

What GAO Found

The Department of State's (State) Bureau of Counterterrorism has had an annual increase in authorized full-time equivalent (FTE) positions since fiscal year 2011 and has recently undertaken efforts to reduce a persistent staffing gap. The bureau's authorized FTEs increased from 66 in fiscal year 2011 to 96 in fiscal year 2015, and over the same period, FTE vacancies ranged from 17 to 23 percent. The vacancies included both staff and management positions. Bureau officials said they postponed filling some positions until the Coordinator for Counterterrorism had sufficient time to assess the bureau's needs and priorities. A senior Bureau of Counterterrorism official testified before Congress in June 2015 that the bureau was making progress and that it had 11 vacancies. However, we have not been able to verify that 4 of the reportedly filled positions have been filled because State did not provide sufficient documentation.
While the bureau has undertaken efforts to assess its progress, it has not yet evaluated its priority Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) program and has not established time frames for addressing recommendations from program evaluations. Specifically, the bureau established indicators and targets for its foreign assistance–related goals and reported results achieved toward each indicator. The bureau has also completed four evaluations covering three of its six programs that resulted in 60 recommendations. The bureau reported having implemented about half of the recommendations (28 of 60) as of June 2015 but has not established time frames for addressing the remaining recommendations. Without specific time frames, it will be difficult for the bureau to ensure timely implementation of programmatic improvements. In addition, despite identifying its CVE program as a priority and acknowledging the benefit of evaluating it, the bureau has postponed evaluating it each fiscal year since 2012.
The bureau's coordination on two programs GAO reviewed, CVE and Counterterrorism Finance, generally reflects key practices for effective collaboration. For example, GAO identified efforts to define outcomes and accountability, bridge organizational cultures, and establish written guidance and agreements—all key practices of effective collaboration.

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that the Secretary of State take steps to (1) ensure that CVE program efforts abroad are evaluated and (2) establish time frames for addressing recommendations from program evaluations. State concurred with both of GAO's recommendations. State indicated that it was currently assessing which programs would benefit from a third-party evaluation and that it would commit to setting a timetable for reviewing each recommendation by a third-party evaluator.