All of the project’s  elements and major subsystems were within weeks of becoming the  project’s critical path—the schedule with the least amount of reserve—for  the overall project. We further found that JWST continued to meet its cost  commitments, but that larger than planned workforce levels, particularly  with the observatory contractor, posed a threat to meeting cost  commitments. NASA has generally agreed and  taken steps to implement a number of our recommendations; however,  there are three recommendations that NASA has not fully implemented  that could still benefit the JWST project. JWST Is Maintaining Schedule Commitment with Significant Integration and Test Efforts Underway

The project has completed most of its major hardware deliveries including  the telescope, instrument module, and the majority of the spacecraft. Two of five planned integration efforts are complete and two  more are currently underway. As we have previously reported, integration and testing is the  phase where problems are most likely to be found and schedules tend to  slip. Project Has Consumed Schedule Reserve to Mitigate Technical Issues with Critical Integration Work Still Ahead

The project has consumed 8 of 14 total months of its overall schedule  reserve to address technical challenges across elements and major  subsystems. Almost 3 months of this reserve have been consumed within  the past year. The remaining 6 months of reserve is more than required  by Goddard Space Flight Center, as determined by project officials, and  on track with the project’s more conservative internal plan—which was set  above the Goddard standard at the replan in 2011. Complexity of JWST Underscores Integration and Test Risks

JWST is one of the most technologically complex science projects NASA  has undertaken. As integration and testing moves forward, the project will need to  be able to reduce a significant amount of risk and address technical  challenges in a timely manner to stay on schedule. The project maintains a list of risks—currently with 73 items—that need to  be tested and mitigated to an acceptable level in the remaining 2 years  before launch. Many of these risks relate to the project’s  numerous deployments or single point failures. Thus, going forward,  technical issues encountered during integration and test are more likely to  require critical path schedule reserves to address, as has recently been  observed in the OTIS integration and test effort. Though the project spent $42.8 million more than planned for fiscal year  2016, project officials managed JWST within its allocated budget for the  fifth consecutive year since the 2011 replan. For the past 32 months, Northrop Grumman’s  actual workforce has exceeded its projections and is not expected to fall  to under 300 full-time equivalents until the spring of 2017. However, in July 2016, Northrop Grumman  submitted its first cost overrun proposal to NASA since the replan in 2011. Jet Propulsion Laboratory: In fiscal year 2016, the laboratory overran  its cost for work related to JWST and the project used budget reserves to  cover additional costs. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

Our objectives were to assess the extent to which the James Webb  Space Telescope (JWST) project is (1) managing technological issues  and development challenges to maintain its committed schedule and (2)  meeting its committed cost levels and managing its workforce plans. To assess the extent to which the JWST project is managing  technological issues and development challenges to maintain its  committed schedule, we reviewed project and contractor schedule  documentation, and held interviews with program, project, and contractor  officials on the progress made and challenges faced building and  integrating the different components of the observatory.
Why GAO Did This Study

JWST is one of NASA's most complex and expensive projects, at an anticipated cost of $8.8 billion. Now in the midst of significant integration and testing that will last the 2 remaining years until the planned October 2018 launch date, the JWST project will need to continue to address many challenges and identify problems, some likely to be revealed during its rigorous testing. The continued success of JWST hinges on NASA's ability to anticipate, identify, and respond to these challenges in a timely and cost-effective manner to meet its commitments.
Conference Report No. 112-284, accompanying the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2012, included a provision for GAO to assess the project annually and report on its progress. This is the fifth such report. This report assesses the extent to which JWST is (1) managing technological and developmental challenges to meet its schedule commitments, and (2) meeting its committed cost levels and managing its workforce plans. To conduct this work, GAO reviewed monthly JWST reports, reviewed relevant policies, conducted independent analysis of NASA and contractor data, and interviewed NASA and contractor officials.

What GAO Found

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA) James Webb Space Telescope (JWST) project is still operating within its committed schedule while in its riskiest phase of development, integration and test. Most hardware deliveries and two of five major integration and test efforts have been completed. Two other integration and test efforts are underway, with the final effort to begin in fall 2017. JWST used about 3 months of schedule reserve since GAO's last report in December 2015. For example, the project used one month of schedule reserve to address delays in integrating the Optical Telescope Element and the Integrated Science Instrument module, due to the complexity of this effort. The project's remaining 6 months of reserve is more than required by Goddard Space Flight Center requirements, as determined by project officials. The figure below shows JWST's elements and major subsystems, the schedule reserve remaining for each, and the critical path—the schedule with the least amount of reserve.
JWST is one of NASA's most technologically complex science projects and has numerous risks and single points of failure, which need to be tested and understood before launch. The project also faces a number of risks related to the observatory software. Looking ahead, the project will likely need to consume more reserves for its complex integration and test efforts.
JWST is meeting its cost commitments despite technical and workforce challenges. Although the project used $42.8 million more than planned for fiscal year 2016, it is maintaining spending within the levels dictated by the 2011 replan. NASA continues to emphasize that maintaining schedule is the priority, which resulted in the use of the fiscal year 2016 cost reserves to meet technical challenges. Also, as GAO previously found in December 2015, the observatory contractor has continued to maintain a larger workforce for longer than planned in order to address technical issues. For example, in 2016, the observatory contractor averaged 165 full-time equivalents more than projected to address technical issues while minimizing the impact on schedule. The contractor submitted a proposal to NASA this summer to cover cost overruns, which was the first such proposal since the replan in 2011.

What GAO Recommends

GAO is not making recommendations in this report. GAO has made recommendations in previous reports, to which NASA has generally agreed and taken steps to implement. There are three recommendations that NASA has not fully implemented that could still benefit the JWST project.