DOD Continues to Have Problems That Hinder Progress in Implementing Its Corrosion Prevention and Mitigation Strategy

DOD has had long-standing problems in funding, identification of impacts,  and development of metrics, and these are continuing. Third, the Corrosion Office has  not developed results-oriented metrics, even though we have previously  recommended that it do so. Without comprehensive reviews of the  services’ corrosion-related programs and proposed funding requests, the  Corrosion Office cannot fulfill its oversight and coordination role for the  department. None of the four services has a designated official or office to oversee and  coordinate corrosion activities, despite a recommendation by the Defense  Science Board that they do so. To date, it has  made some progress in identifying corrosion cost impacts. Without an action plan, DOD could miss opportunities for achieving long- term corrosion cost savings. Most Major Defense Acquisition Programs We Reviewed Have Not Incorporated Key Elements of Corrosion Prevention Planning

The Corrosion Prevention and Control Planning Guidebook encourages  the establishment of corrosion prevention and control plans and corrosion  prevention advisory teams as early as possible in the acquisition process. However, only 14 of the 51 programs we reviewed actually had both plans  and advisory teams. We found that one reason  why most programs did not have corrosion prevention plans or corrosion  prevention advisory teams is that while they are strongly suggested, these  elements are not mandatory. In  addition to this DOD guidance, the individual services have issued  guidance that also calls for incorporating corrosion prevention planning  during acquisition of weapon system programs. Moreover, these programs may be missing  opportunities to prevent future corrosion and thereby mitigate the impacts  of corrosion on the costs, readiness, and safety of military equipment. Without top DOD and service leadership commitment to addressing these  issues, corrosion prevention and mitigation will remain an elusive goal and  opportunities to reduce costs, enhance readiness, and avoid safety  problems will be lost. To ensure that DOD’s Corrosion Office provides oversight and  coordination of the services’ proposed funding requests for corrosion  prevention and mitigation programs, we recommend that the Secretary of  Defense:    Direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and  Logistics to require the military services to provide comprehensive data  about their annual funding requirements for corrosion prevention and  mitigation efforts to the DOD Corrosion Office, before annual funding  requests are sent to Congress. To ensure that DOD does not miss opportunities for achieving long-term  corrosion cost savings, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense:    Direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and  Logistics to develop an action plan for using the information contained in  the Army ground vehicle and Navy ship segments of DOD’s cost impact  study. Appendix II: Scope and Methodology

To assess the Department of Defense’s (DOD) efforts to implement its  corrosion prevention and mitigation strategy, including the oversight of  funding; identification of cost, readiness, and safety impacts; and the  development of results-oriented metrics, we reviewed DOD’s funding and  progress for corrosion-related projects that it initiated during fiscal years  2005 and 2006.
Why GAO Did This Study

Corrosion can have a deleterious effect on military equipment and infrastructure in terms of cost, readiness, and safety. Recognizing this concern, the Bob Stump National Defense Authorization Act of Fiscal Year 2003 required the Department of Defense (DOD) to designate an official or organization to oversee and coordinate efforts to prevent and mitigate corrosion. Recently, the National Defense Authorization Act of Fiscal Year 2006 directed GAO to examine the effectiveness of DOD's corrosion prevention and mitigation programs. In addition, GAO evaluated the extent to which DOD has incorporated corrosion prevention planning in acquiring weapon systems. GAO reviewed strategy documents, reviewed corrosion prevention planning for 51 recent major weapon system acquisitions, and interviewed DOD and military service officials.

What GAO Found

DOD continues to have problems that hinder progress in implementing its corrosion prevention and mitigation strategy. While it has created a Corrosion Policy and Oversight Office, that office lacks the ability to oversee and coordinate its efforts throughout DOD, as envisioned by Congress. For example, DOD's office does not review all of the services' proposed funding requests for corrosion programs, even though it is required to do so, because DOD has not directed the services to provide such information and none of the services has a designated official or office to oversee and coordinate servicewide corrosion activities. Without comprehensive reviews of the services' corrosion-related programs and proposed funding requests, the office cannot fulfill its oversight and coordination role. DOD has made some progress in identifying corrosion cost impacts, but it has not identified readiness and safety impacts. It recently completed corrosion cost impact studies for Army ground vehicles and Navy ships, identifying an estimated $4.5 billion in annual corrosion costs. Although the studies provided potentially useful data for reducing these costs, DOD has not developed an action plan to apply these data to developing corrosion prevention and mitigation strategies. Without an action plan, it could miss opportunities to achieve long-term cost savings. DOD has not yet developed results-oriented metrics, although GAO has previously recommended that it do so. Without top DOD and service leadership commitment to address these issues, corrosion prevention and mitigation will remain elusive goals and opportunities to reduce costs, enhance readiness, and avoid safety problems will be lost. Most of the weapon system acquisition programs GAO reviewed had not incorporated key elements of DOD corrosion prevention guidance. GAO found that only 14 of the 51 programs reviewed had both corrosion prevention plans and advisory teams, as encouraged in the DOD guidance. The primary reason most programs did not have these two elements is that they are not mandatory. As a result, these programs may be missing opportunities to prevent and mitigate corrosion.