	Establishing a Comprehensive U.S. Strategy Is an Essential First Step in Planning for Future Military Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan

We have identified several key elements of an effective national strategy  that should be considered by the new administration in developing  national strategies for Iraq and Afghanistan to guide the way forward. First, our work shows that new strategies for both countries should  reflect a comprehensive governmentwide approach and clearly  delineate U.S. government roles, responsibilities, and coordination  mechanisms. Regarding Iraq, one major issue that will need to be addressed is to  determine to what extent a drawdown of U. S. forces will be  determined based on the achievement of goals or conditions in light of  the specific time frames for withdrawal included in the November 2008  SOFA between Iraq and the United States that took effect in January  2009. Furthermore, as the administration develops strategies for both  countries and plans to adjust force levels, it will need to closely  examine the availability of resources, given the heavy commitment of  U.S. forces to ongoing operations over the past several years. Third, in light of future demands on the federal budget, attention will  be needed to ensure that U.S. efforts are executed in a manner that  maximizes the use of available resources and includes mechanisms for  oversight. Clearly, strong oversight on the part of the Congress  and senior decision makers within DOD will also be a critical element  to protecting the taxpayers’ interest and resources. Operational Factors Should Be Considered in Developing Plans to Draw Down U.S. Based on discussions with DOD officials and an analysis of planning  efforts, we found that the effectiveness and efficiency of DOD’s  redeployment efforts from Iraq will depend on the extent to which it  develops plans that address several issues such as the following:    Although the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) has designated an  executive agent to coordinate the retrograde of materiel and equipment  from the Iraqi theater of operations, no unified structure exists to  coordinate the teams and units engaged in efforts to manage and  execute the return of materiel and equipment. The pace at which units can be redeployed and equipment and materiel  returned to the United States from Iraq will be governed by the  capacity of facilities in neighboring countries as well as restrictions on  the use of those facilities. Several Operational Concerns Need to Be Considered as DOD Refines Its Strategy and Plans for Afghanistan

Based on our work examining current and past military operations, there  are several operational issues that must be considered as the United States  refines its strategy and plans for using military forces in Afghanistan. We  have identified several issues in the following five key areas that warrant  consideration by DOD planners as they develop strategies and plans for  these operations: availability of forces, training of personnel, availability of  equipment, transportation of equipment and personnel, and management  and oversight of contractors. As of December 1, 2008,  more than 180,000 service members were deployed in the two countries. There are  also limited maintenance facilities in Afghanistan. In addition to ground equipment, DOD will need to assess its requirements  for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities to  support increased force levels in Afghanistan, given its current allocation  of assets to support ongoing operations in Iraq. Furthermore, DOD  is still in the process of developing metrics to measure the performance of  these assets. Given these challenges,  we have concerns that lessons learned from the experience of using  contractors to support forces deployed in Iraq may not be shared with  forces deploying to Afghanistan and many of the contractor-related  issues in Iraq may therefore recur in Afghanistan. Afghanistan presents its own  unique transportation and security concerns that will need to be  factored into how contractors will be able to support the increased  number of U.S. forces and, potentially, bases in Afghanistan. Drawdown will increase demands on contractors and contract  oversight personnel in Iraq: As noted above, the United States is  planning for the drawdown of its forces in Iraq. As the United States develops a strategy for Iraq and  Afghanistan, and related plans for adjusting force levels, we believe that  increased awareness of significant challenges may improve their ability to  successfully develop and execute a strategy.
Why GAO Did This Study

The United States is in the process of developing its strategy for operations in Afghanistan, as well as for the drawdown and continued operations of forces in Iraq. As of December 2008, approximately 32,500 U.S. troops were deployed in Afghanistan. Moreover, DOD may add an additional 30,000 troops in Afghanistan. Since 2001, the war in Afghanistan changed from a violent struggle against al Qaeda and its Taliban supporters to a multi-faceted counterinsurgency effort. As of December 2008, U.S. troops in Iraq numbered approximately 148,500. DOD also had about 162,400 contractors in Iraq as of mid-2008. Today's testimony addresses (1) key observations regarding the development of U.S. strategy in Iraq and Afghanistan; (2) factors that should be considered as the United States refines its strategy for Iraq and plans to draw down forces; and (3) factors that should be considered as the United States develops a strategy for Afghanistan and plans for increasing forces. This statement is based on GAO reports and testimonies on Iraq and Afghanistan.

What GAO Found

Lessons learned from GAO's past work indicate that U.S. strategy for Iraq and Afghanistan should reflect a governmentwide approach and contain a number of key elements, including clear roles, responsibilities, and coordination mechanisms among government agencies, as well as specific goals, performance measures, and time frames that take into account available resources. Given the heavy commitment of U.S. forces to ongoing operations over the past several years, the availability of forces, equipment, and infrastructure will need to be closely examined in developing plans to reposture military forces. Finally, in light of future demands on the federal budget, attention will be needed to ensure that U.S. plans are developed and executed in an efficient and cost-effective manner. Clearly, strong oversight by the Congress and senior decision makers will be needed to minimize past problems such as contract mismanagement and insufficient attention to overseeing contractors. In refining its strategy and plans for the drawdown of forces in Iraq, senior leaders will need to consider several operational factors. For example, DOD will need to develop plans to efficiently and effectively relocate thousands of personnel and billions of dollars worth of equipment out of Iraq; close hundreds of facilities; and determine the role of contractors. Furthermore, the capacity of facilities in Kuwait and other neighboring countries may limit the speed at which equipment and materiel can be moved out of Iraq. With regard to Afghanistan, DOD will likely face an array of potential challenges related to people, equipment and infrastructure. For example, the availability and training of personnel will be critical considerations as the force is already significantly stressed from ongoing operations and current training capacity has been primarily focused on operations in Iraq. Additionally, the availability of equipment may be limited because the Army and Marine Corps have already deployed much of their equipment to Iraq and much of the prepositioned assets also have been withdrawn to support ongoing operations. Similarly, DOD will need to assess its requirements for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities given its current allocation of these assets to support ongoing operations in Iraq. Further, the ability to transport personnel and equipment into Afghanistan will be challenged by the limited infrastructure and topography of Afghanistan. Moreover, the extent to which contractors will be used to support deployed U.S. forces must be considered as well as how oversight of these contractors will be ensured. Given all of these factors, sound planning based on a well-developed strategy is critical to ensure lessons learned over the years from Iraq are incorporated in Afghanistan and that competing resources are prioritized effectively between both operations.