MNF-I Plan for Transferring Security Responsibilities to Iraqi Forces

In October 2003, the multinational force outlined a four-phased plan for  transferring security missions to Iraqi security forces. The plan’s objective  was to allow a gradual drawdown of coalition forces first in conjunction  with the neutralization of Iraq’s insurgency and second with the  development of Iraqi forces capable of securing their country. Data on Iraqi Security Forces Has Limitations

U.S. government data does not provide reliable information on the status  of Iraqi military and police forces. Ministry of Defense reports  exclude the absent military personnel from its totals. The reported number of Iraqi police is unreliable. According to a  senior official from the U.S. embassy in Baghdad, MNF-I does not  know how many Iraqi police are on duty at any given point because the  Ministry of Interior does not receive consistent and accurate reporting  from police stations across Iraq. The Departments of Defense and State do not provide additional  information on the extent to which trained Iraqi security forces have  their necessary equipment. The Insurgency Has Intensified

According to senior military officials, the insurgency in Iraq—particularly  the Sunni insurgency—has grown in number, complexity, and intensity  over the past 18 months. These key challenges are  (1) training, equipping, and sustaining a changing force structure;   (2) determining progress in developing capable forces without a system  for measuring their readiness; (3) developing loyalty and leadership  throughout the Iraqi chain of command; and (4) developing police capable  of democratic law enforcement in a hostile environment. This makes it difficult to provide effective  support—the training, equipping, and sustaining of Iraqi forces. In February 2005 press briefings, the Secretary of Defense and the  commanding general of the Multi-National Security Transition Command- Iraq cited the leadership of Iraqi security forces as a critical element in  developing Iraqi forces capable of combating insurgents. To address this weakness, MNF-I  and the Iraqi government report taking steps to better prepare some police  to operate during an insurgency. Conclusion

The multinational force has been working to transfer full security  responsibilities for the country to the Iraqi military and police. However,  the multinational force and Iraq face the challenges of an intense  insurgency, a changing Iraqi force structure, the lack of a system to  measure military and police readiness, an Iraqi leadership and chain of  command in its infancy, and a police force that finds it difficult to uphold  the rule of law in a hostile environment. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

We provided preliminary observations on 1) the strategy for transferring  security responsibilities to Iraqi military and police forces, 2) the data on  the status of the forces, and 3) challenges the Multi. National Force in Iraq  (MNF-I) faces in transferring security missions to these forces. To determine the data on Iraqi security forces, we reviewed unclassified  Department of State status reports from June 2004 to March 2005 that  provided information about the number of troops by the Ministries of  Defense and Interior. We also  examined the Iraqi National Security Strategy, funding documents from  the Office of Management and Budget and State Department, and the fiscal  year 2005 Supplemental Request of the President.
Why GAO Did This Study

Since the fall of the former Iraq regime in April 2003, the multinational force has been working to develop Iraqi military and police forces capable of maintaining security. To support this effort, the United States provided about $5.8 billion in 2003-04 to develop Iraq's security capability. In February 2005, the president requested a supplemental appropriation with an additional $5.7 billion to accelerate the development of Iraqi military and police forces. GAO provides preliminary observations on (1) the strategy for transferring security responsibilities to Iraqi military and police forces; (2) the data on the status of forces, and (3) challenges that the Multi-National Force in Iraq faces in transferring security missions to these forces. To prepare this statement, GAO used unclassified reports, status updates, security plans, and other documents from the Departments of Defense and State. GAO also used testimonies and other statements for the record from officials such as the Secretary of Defense. In addition, GAO visited the Iraqi police training facility in Jordan.

What GAO Found

The Multinational Force in Iraq has developed and begun to implement a strategy to transfer security responsibilities to the Iraqi military and police forces. This strategy would allow a gradual drawdown of its forces based on the multinational force neutralizing the insurgency and developing Iraqi military and police services that can independently maintain security. U.S. government agencies do not report reliable data on the extent to which Iraqi security forces are trained and equipped. As of March 2005, the State Department reported that about 82,000 police forces under the Iraqi Ministry of Interior and about 62,000 military forces under the Iraqi Ministry of Defense have been trained and equipped. However, the reported number of Iraqi police is unreliable because the Ministry of Interior does not receive consistent and accurate reporting from the police forces around the country. The data does not exclude police absent from duty. Further, the departments of State and Defense no longer report on the extent to which Iraqi security forces are equipped with their required weapons, vehicles, communications equipment, and body armor. The insurgency in Iraq has intensified since June 2003, making it difficult to transfer security responsibilities to Iraqi forces. From that time through January 2005, insurgent attacks grew in number, complexity, and intensity. At the same time, the multinational force has faced four key challenges in increasing the capability of Iraqi forces: (1) training, equipping, and sustaining a changing force structure; (2) developing a system for measuring the readiness and capability of Iraqi forces; (3) building loyalty and leadership throughout the Iraqi chain of command; and (4) developing a police force that upholds the rule of law in a hostile environment. The multinational force is taking steps to address these challenges, such as developing a system to assess unit readiness and embedding US forces within Iraqi units. However, without reliable reporting data, a more capable Iraqi force, and stronger Iraqi leadership, the Department of Defense faces difficulties in implementing its strategy to draw down U.S. forces from Iraq.