Although these bills contain numerous wide-ranging changes, most provisions can be grouped into five broad categories:
Fed g overnance. Some proposals would change the Fed's institutional structure—how officials are selected, how policy decisions are reached, and so on. Some proposals aim to make the Fed more accountable to Congress by increasing congressional oversight or requiring the Fed to disclose more information to Congress and the public. P olicy rules ( e. g. , the Taylor Rule ) . Some proposals would require the Fed to compare its monetary policy decisions to those prescribed by a policy rule such as the Taylor Rule and report those findings to Congress. T he Fed's emergency lending powers. Some proposals would reduce the Fed's discretion to provide emergency assistance under Section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act. The Fed's balance sheet. This report analyzes these provisions and the policy debate surrounding them. 4753 ) and the FOMC Policy Responsibility Act ( H.R. 4755 , H.R. 6741 ). Monetary policy decisions, however, are made by the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC), which is composed of the seven governors, the president of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, and four other regional bank presidents. P.L. H.R. 4759 and H.R. 4757 and H.R. 10 , H.R. Congressional Commission. H.R. Other bills that would reduce the Fed's surplus include H.R. Policy Proposals

GAO Audit. 10 , H.R. 10 would increase the frequency of the Fed's required monetary policy reports to Congress from semiannually to quarterly and would require the chair to testify on monetary policy before the committees of jurisdiction quarterly instead of semiannually. H.R. H.R. 10 , H.R. 10 would require FOMC transcripts to be made publicly available. 10 , H.R. 4755 , and H.R. 6741 would subject the nonmonetary policy functions of the Fed's Board of Governors and 12 privately owned regional banks to the congressional appropriations process. 3354 ), as passed by the House. H.R. Cost-Benefit Analysis Requirements . H.R. 4791 , and H.R. GAO would report to Congress if the Fed was in compliance with the act's requirements, and if it was not, it would trigger a GAO audit that was not subject to the normal statutory restrictions (described " Oversight and Disclosure Proposals " section above) and the Fed chair's testimony before the committees of jurisdiction. 4270 and H.R. The Fed would be required to issue a report to the committees of jurisdiction semiannually on how the Fed's strategy or monetary policy decisions differ from the policy rules. The worsening of the financial crisis in 2008 led the Fed to revive this obscure provision to extend credit to nonbank financial firms for the first time since the 1930s. H.R. 10 , H.R. H.R. 10 , H.R. 10 , H.R. 4302 , and H.R. 10 , H.R. 4302 , and H.R. 4278 and H.R. 6741 would limit the types of securities that the Fed may acquire through open market operations to gold, Treasury currency (e.g., coins), or the direct obligations of the federal government, foreign central banks (e.g., foreign currency), or the International Monetary Fund (e.g., special drawing rights). The bills would require the Fed to swap any other assets (that it already holds or subsequently acquires) for federal debt of equal market value with the Department of the Treasury. The bills would also repeal the Fed's authority to make emergency loans to groups of banks, a power that has not been used because the Fed also has the authority to lend to individual banks. Concluding Thoughts

The proposals in this report are wide ranging and diverse but are united by the goals of increasing the Fed's accountability to Congress and decreasing Fed discretion. Whereas some provisions make minor changes, taken together the proposals would arguably reduce the Fed's independence from Congress somewhat. To some extent, a trade-off between independence and accountability is unavoidable.
The Federal Reserve (Fed) is the subject of legislation being considered in the 115th Congress. This report analyzes Fed bills that have seen committee or floor action and the policy debate surrounding them. The bills contain wide-ranging changes that can be grouped into five broad categories:
Fed governance. Some proposals, such as H.R. 4753, would change the Fed's institutional structure. H.R. 10, H.R. 4759, and H.R. 6741 would increase the voting weight of regional Fed presidents on the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) at the expense of the Fed's Board of Governors and the New York Fed. H.R. 4757 and H.R. 6741 would allow private banks to vote on the selection of Fed regional bank presidents. H.R. 10 would also create a congressional commission to recommend reforms to the Fed. P.L. 115-123 and P.L. 115-174 reduced the Fed's surplus account as a budgetary offset, as would multiple bills that passed the House.
Oversight and disclosure. Some proposals aim to make the Fed more accountable to Congress by increasing congressional oversight or requiring the Fed to disclose more information to Congress or the public. H.R. 24 and H.R. 10 would require Government Accountability Office (GAO) audits of the Fed that are not subject to current statutory restrictions that prevent GAO from performing policy evaluations of the Fed's monetary policy. H.R. 10 would subject the Fed's rulemakings to cost-benefit analysis requirements, require the FOMC to publicly release meeting transcripts, and increase requirements to periodically report to and testify before Congress. H.R. 10, H.R. 4791, and H.R. 6741 would require the Fed to publicly disclose the salaries and personal finances of certain officials and employees. H.R. 10, H.R. 4755, H.R. 3280, H.R. 6741, and H.R. 3354 would subject the Fed's nonmonetary policy functions to the congressional appropriations process and require the Fed to levy assessments to offset them.
Monetary policy rules (the Taylor Rule). H.R. 10, H.R. 4270 as reported, and H.R. 6741 would require the Fed to compare its monetary policy decisions to those prescribed by a policy rule (e.g., the Taylor Rule) and report those findings to Congress. Under H.R. 10, policy deviations from the rule would trigger GAO audits and congressional testimony.
The Fed's emergency lending powers. H.R. 10, H.R. 4302, and H.R. 6741 would reduce the Fed's discretion to make emergency loans under Section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act. The Fed used this authority to extend credit to nonbank financial firms during the financial crisis.
The Fed's balance sheet. H.R. 4278 and H.R. 6741 would limit the types of securities that the Fed may acquire through open market operations to gold, coins, or the direct obligations of the federal government, foreign central banks, or the International Monetary Fund. It would require the Fed to swap any other assets (including its large holdings of mortgage-backed securities) for federal debt with the Department of the Treasury.
The proposals reviewed in this report are wide ranging and diverse; many are united by the goals of increasing the Fed's accountability to Congress and decreasing Fed discretion. Although some provisions make minor changes, taken together the proposals would arguably somewhat reduce the Fed's independence from Congress. The Fed is more independent than most other agencies, which has traditionally been justified by its monetary policy responsibilities. Most research has found a positive relationship between monetary policy independence and economic outcomes. (Research is more divided on whether there is a positive relationship between Fed discretion and economic outcomes.) To some extent, a trade-off between independence and accountability is unavoidable. For example, Congress can require the Fed to follow a policy rule to reduce discretion, but Congress can ensure compliance with the rule only if there are negative consequences for noncompliance that would reduce independence.