DOE’s Reform Effort Streamlined Directives, but Views on the Revisions Were Not Sought from the Public or Federal Agencies Other than the Safety Board

Under its reform effort, DOE reduced the number of safety directives by  eliminating or combining, among other things, requirements it determined  were unclear, duplicative, or too prescriptive; allowing contractors  additional flexibility; and encouraging the use of industry standards. DOE Revised Its Safety Directives to Reduce Duplication, Allow Contractors Additional Flexibility, and Encourage the Use of Industry Standards

In total, under its reform effort, DOE reduced the number of its safety  directives from 80 to 42. In its quality assurance directive, for example, DOE deleted 61 of 245  requirements for a corrective action program because it determined that  the requirements were adequately addressed in revisions to other  directives on oversight practices. DOE Obtained Views on Proposed Changes from DOE and Contractor Staff and from the Safety Board, but Did Not Seek the Views of the Public or Other Federal Agencies

As part of its process to revise its directives, DOE obtained comments  from federal and contractor officials on proposed revisions. Benefits of DOE’s Reform Effort Are Unclear

Under its reform effort, DOE intended to enhance productivity and reduce  costs while maintaining safety, but it is unclear whether its effort will  achieve these benefits, or whether the benefits will outweigh the costs to  implement the reform. For example, DOE did not determine how the  original requirements contained in safety directives impaired productivity  or added costs before undertaking the reform effort. As a result, DOE is not well  positioned to know that its reform effort will achieve its intended benefits. DOE Sought to Enhance Productivity and Reduce Costs but Did Not First Analyze Burden or Costs of the Original Requirements

According to the Deputy Secretary’s March 2010 memorandum  announcing the reform effort and discussions with DOE officials, DOE  undertook the reform effort to realize productivity and cost benefits while  maintaining safety. Instead, DOE’s reform effort has focused on output-oriented  measures, such as the number of directives cancelled or revised, and  not on outcome measures, such as specific improvements in  productivity or cost savings. DOE’s Reform Effort Did Not Fully Address Safety Concerns We and Others Have Identified

DOE’s reform effort did not fully address safety concerns that we, DOE’s  Office of Inspector General, and the Safety Board have repeatedly  identified in three key areas—(1) quality assurance, (2) safety culture,  and (3) federal oversight. For example, DOE’s Office of Enforcement identified  quality assurance problems following a June 2010 incident during which a  worker was exposed to radiation after puncturing his hand with a sharp  object contaminated with plutonium at DOE’s Savannah River Site. According to Safety  Board officials, because the acquisition regulation does not contain  the specificity of the Integrated Safety Management directives,  contractors may not implement the requirements as vigorously as they  would if they had to follow the more specific practices in the original  directives. For example:
DOE has placed greater emphasis on having its Office of Independent  Oversight staff review safety design documents, which lay out the  safety systems for facilities at DOE’s sites, before their construction. In addition, changes to  DOE’s oversight directives raise concerns about the ability of DOE’s  Office of Independent Oversight staff to provide a critical review of safety  at DOE’s sites that is independent from DOE site office and contractor  staff, a concern we have raised in the past. Recommendations for Executive Action

To help ensure that DOE’s reform of its safety directives results in  improved productivity and safety at its sites, we recommend that the  Secretary of Energy take the following four actions prior to fully  implementing revisions to its directives across all of the department’s  sites:  systematically analyze the costs and benefits associated with  implementing the revised safety directives to ensure that the costs do  not exceed the benefits that the department expects to achieve; provide DOE’s sites and contractors with a plan that details (1) the  reform effort’s goals, (2) the effort’s long-term implementation  strategy, (3) results-oriented outcome measures, and (4) how DOE  will use results-oriented data to evaluate the reform’s effectiveness  and to determine whether additional changes are needed; ensure that the plan developed for DOE’s sites and contractors  identifies how the reform effort will help address past and recurring  safety concerns with quality assurance, safety culture, and federal  oversight of contractor activities; and  clearly define the oversight roles and responsibilities of DOE’s Office  of Independent Oversight staff to ensure that their work is sufficiently  independent from the activities of DOE site office and contractor staff. However, DOE  commented that it had significant concerns with the accuracy of the  report’s findings and the validity of its conclusions. DOE is correct that safety management and safety culture are  different, but related, concepts.
Why GAO Did This Study

DOE carries out many of the nations most critical missions, including stewardship of the nations nuclear weapons stockpile and the environmental remediation of radioactive and hazardous legacy waste left over from the Cold War. DOE uses a system of regulations and internal directives that lay out requirements and guidance for ensuring the safety of staff and contractors, the public, and the environment. Over the past 10 years, GAO and others have repeatedly made recommendations for DOE to improve safety performance. In March 2010, DOE announced a reform effort to revise safety-related directives to increase productivity and reduce costs while maintaining safety.
This report examines (1) how DOE revised safety directives under its reform effort, (2) the costs of the reform effort and the benefits DOE hoped to achieve, and (3) the extent to which its reform effort addresses safety concerns GAO and others have identified. GAO reviewed relevant DOE reform effort documents, visited selected DOE sites to interview site office and contractor officials, and analyzed past GAO and other reports on DOEs safety problems.

What GAO Found

Under its safety reform effort, the Department of Energy (DOE) reduced the number of safety directives by eliminating or combining requirements it determined were unclear, duplicative, or too prescriptive and by encouraging the use of industry standards. DOE reduced the number of its safety directives from 80 to 42, and for some of the directives DOE retained, it made extensive revisions. For example, DOE deleted requirements from its quality assurance directive addressing a corrective action program because another safety directive adequately covered these requirements. DOE obtained comments on its proposed revisions from DOE and contractor staff and from the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (Safety Board).
The benefits of DOEs reform effort are not clear. DOE intended to enhance productivity and reduce costs while maintaining safety, but DOE did not determine how the original requirements contained in safety directives impaired productivity or added costs before undertaking the reform effort. Moreover, DOE did not assess whether the cost to implement the revised directives would exceed the benefits, but officials said they had launched an initial study to determine, among other things, the costs associated with implementing selected safety requirements. DOE also did not develop performance measures in order to assess how the reform effort will lead to improved productivity or lower costs while maintaining safety. Instead, DOE is measuring success by using output-oriented measures, such as the number of directives eliminated, and not outcome measures, such as specific productivity improvements or cost savings. In the absence of clear measures linking the reform effort to productivity and safety improvements, DOE is not well positioned to know that its reform effort will achieve the intended benefits.
DOEs reform effort did not fully address safety concerns GAO and others have identified in three key areas: (1) quality assurance, (2) safety culture, and (3) federal oversight. Regarding quality assurance, DOE strengthened its quality assurance directive by clarifying that contractors must follow specific industry quality assurance standards, but quality assurance problems persist. For example, DOE proposed a nearly $250,000 fine against a contractor in July 2011 after identifying quality assurance problems in an incident where a worker punctured his hand with a sharp object contaminated with plutonium. With regard to safety culture, DOE revised its Integrated Safety Management directives to attempt to strengthen the safety culture at its sites, but DOE removed requirements for contractors to follow the directives because contractors already had to comply with safety management requirements in federal regulation. Safety Board officials raised concerns that the requirements in federal regulation are less detailed and, as a result, contractors may not implement safety practices as rigorously as if they were subject to the more specific requirements in DOEs directives. Finally, regarding federal oversight, DOE revised its approach to place greater emphasis on having its independent oversight staff review safety design documents before facilities are constructed, rather than after they are built. Other changes, however, such as requiring oversight staff to coordinate their assessment activities with DOE site office and contractor staff, raise concerns about the oversight staffs ability to provide a critical review of safety at DOEs sites that is independent from DOE site office and contractor staff.

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that DOE analyze the costs and benefits of its safety reform effort and identify how the effort will help address safety concerns. DOE agreed with the recommendations but commented that it had significant concerns about the accuracy of the reports findings and conclusions. GAO stands by its findings and conclusions for the reasons discussed in the report.