	Several Factors Affect the Delivery of Humanitarian Assistance to People inside Syria

We identified three key factors that affect delivery of humanitarian  assistance to people inside Syria. U.S. Agencies and Their Implementing Partners Have Assessed Some Risks to Their Programs, but Most Partners Have Not Assessed Fraud Risks

State, USAID, and their implementing partners have assessed some  types of risk to their programs inside Syria, but most partners have not  assessed the risk of fraud. In the  context of Syria, such risks could include theft and diversion; fraud;  safety; security; program governance; and implementing partner capacity  risks. Although most of the implementing partners in our sample did not conduct  assessments of the risk of fraud, there are elevated risks for fraud in U.S.  funded humanitarian assistance projects for people inside Syria. Further, in May 2016, USAID OIG reported the identification of bid- rigging and multiple bribery and kickback schemes related to contracts to  deliver humanitarian aid in Syria, investigations of which resulted in the  suspension of 14 entities and individuals involved with aid programs from  Turkey. Agencies Could Improve Oversight

We found that partners in our sample had implemented controls to  mitigate certain risks of delivering humanitarian assistance inside Syria. State and USAID have taken steps to oversee partner programs  delivering humanitarian assistance inside Syria; nevertheless,  opportunities to assess and mitigate the potential impact of fraud risks  remain. U.S. officials cited a variety of oversight activities. Further, in October 2015, USAID’s Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster  Assistance hired a third party monitoring organization to review its  projects in Syria. Given the opportunity for fraud that exists in humanitarian assistance  programs, as well as the ongoing USAID OIG investigations, without  instructions to specifically collect data on fraud and training to identify it,  USAID may be missing an opportunity to assist in its activities to mitigate  fraud risks and design appropriate controls. In addition, USAID should ensure its  field monitors (1) are trained to identify potential fraud risks and (2) collect  information on them.
Why GAO Did This Study

This testimony summarizes the information contained in GAO's July 2016 report, entitled Syria Humanitarian Assistance: Some Risks of Providing Aid inside Syria Assessed, but U.S. Agencies Could Improve Fraud Oversight ( GAO-16-629 ).

What GAO Found

Delivery of U.S. humanitarian assistance to people inside Syria is complicated by three factors including a dangerous operating environment, access constraints, and remote management of programs. Active conflict creates a dangerous environment characterized by attacks on aid facilities and workers, and humanitarian organizations face difficulties accessing those in need. Additionally, U.S. agency officials must manage programs in Syria remotely, increasing risks to the program, including opportunities for fraud. Despite these challenges, according to the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), U.S. humanitarian assistance has reached 4 million people inside Syria per month.
The Department of State (State), USAID, and their implementing partners have assessed some types of risk to their programs inside Syria, but most partners have not assessed the risk of fraud. Of the 9 implementing partners in GAO's sample of funding instruments, most assessed risks related to safety and security, but only 4 of 9 assessed fraud risks. Such an assessment is important as USAID's Office of Inspector General (OIG) has uncovered multiple instances of fraud affecting U.S. programs delivering humanitarian assistance to Syria. In May 2016, USAID OIG reported that 1 of its active fraud investigations resulted in the suspension of 14 entities and individuals. Given the challenging environment in Syria, fraud risk assessments could help U.S. agencies better identify and address risks to help ensure aid reaches those in need.
Partners have implemented controls to mitigate certain risks, but U.S. agencies could improve financial oversight. For example, almost all partners in our sample have controls to mitigate safety risks and some use technology to monitor the transport of goods. Additionally, U.S. agencies have taken steps to oversee activities in Syria, such as quarterly meetings with partners and spot checks of partner warehouses. Further, in October 2015, USAID hired a third party monitor to improve oversight of its activities and help verify progress of its programs. However, the monitors' training curriculum lacks modules on identifying fraud risks. Without such training, monitors may overlook potential fraud risks and miss opportunities to collect data that could help USAID improve its financial oversight.