DOD Has Conducted Robust Planning for the Current Drawdown Phase and Execution Is Under Way, but Visibility and Tracking of Some Equipment Remain a Challenge

DOD has robust plans and processes for determining the sequence of  actions and associated resources necessary to achieve its objectives for  the drawdown from Iraq. The current phase of the drawdown is well under  way with a significant amount of equipment removed from Iraq and bases  transitioned, among other things. However, several factors,  including limited operational flexibility and the need to move a greater  amount of equipment and close the largest bases with fewer available  resources create a set of challenges and risks greater than what DOD  faced during the prior drawdown phase. DOD’s existing plans and  processes create flexibility and mitigate risk, but DOD continues to face  challenges maintaining real-time visibility over some equipment and  tracking unaccounted for equipment remaining after bases undergo the  transition process. DOD Has Taken Steps to Improve Contract Management and Oversight in Iraq, but Challenges Remain

DOD has taken action to improve its management of contracts in Iraq,  such as enhancing contract oversight through command emphasis and  assigning COR responsibilities as a primary duty in certain instances. However, other concerns, such as lack of experience among contract  oversight personnel, remain. As the drawdown progresses, DOD may  face further challenges in ensuring that major contracts transition without  gaps in key services, and in effectively implementing its guidance for  descoping contracts and demobilizing contractor personnel and  infrastructure. DOD has also improved contractor demobilization planning based on  lessons learned from the prior drawdown phase. Units are taking further steps to ensure the continuity of key services  while continuing to descope contracts. According to senior military  officials, since local contractors do not require extensive base life support,  such as housing, and will not have to be repatriated to their country of  origin at the end of the contract, they can be employed to provide certain  services that would otherwise have to be discontinued. Some units also intend to replace contractor  personnel with servicemembers to ensure continuity of certain services,  such as guard security, airfield vegetation removal, and generator  maintenance and are conducting “troop-to-task” analysis to determine  which servicemembers will perform these tasks and how many will be  needed. However, without taking additional steps to  address the challenges discussed below, DOD may be unable to  effectively implement its guidance and ensure the effective reduction of  contract services to appropriate levels and ultimate demobilization of all  its contractors. DOD and State Are Coordinating to Establish and Support the Post-2011 U.S. Government Presence in Iraq, but Key Elements of This Presence May Not Be Well Understood throughout DOD

DOD and State interagency coordination for the transition began late, but  both agencies have now coordinated extensively to plan for the transfer  or loan to State of a wide range of DOD equipment, and DOD has taken  steps to minimize any impact on unit readiness of such transfers. To help ensure that DOD will be able to complete the orderly and efficient  retrograde and transfer of its equipment and transition of its bases in Iraq  by minimizing unanticipated requirements,   direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology,  and Logistics, in conjunction with the Secretary of the Army and  the Commander, U.S. Central Command, to approve and  implement, as appropriate, a process, to include associated policy  and training, for acquiring and maintaining real-time visibility of  CMGO equipment before it is delivered to the U.S. government  that meets the needs of operational forces while retaining  oversight features inherent to DOD’s current accountability  processes; and    direct the Commander, U.S. Forces-Iraq take steps to collect  accurate data on equipment that is found during the large base  closure process but not recorded in any property book, and, as  appropriate, refine the projection for equipment needing to be  retrograded and transferred based on these data. To maximize its ability to achieve an orderly and efficient drawdown of  contracted services in Iraq, direct the Commander, U.S. Forces-Iraq, to  (1) assess the risk of providing all contractors, including their  subcontractors, with the information—such as base transition dates— required to descope services and demobilize their workforces, against the  risk of contractors’ inability to meet milestones without it and take the  appropriate actions based on this assessment; (2) take appropriate  measures, such as enforcement of guidance laid out in the template to be  developed by the office of the Senior Contracting Official-Iraq, to ensure  robust contractor planning associated with demobilization; and (3) engage  contractors to ensure that total personnel headcounts accurately reflect  all personnel, including those working under subcontracts. To determine the extent to which DOD has planned for, begun to execute,  and identified and mitigated risks associated with curtailing unneeded  contract services, transitioning expiring contracts, and providing adequate  contract oversight, we reviewed contracting-specific planning documents,  memoranda, and other sources of guidance issued by DOD and  subordinate organizations. To determine the extent to which DOD has planned for, begun to execute,  and mitigated risk associated with facilitating and supporting the transition  to a civilian-led presence in Iraq, we reviewed transition-specific planning  documents, briefings, and memoranda.
Why GAO Did This Study

The drawdown of U.S. forces in Iraq and the transition from a U.S. military to a civilian-led presence after December 2011 continue amid an uncertain security and political environment. This report is one in a series of reviews regarding the planning and execution of the drawdown. Specifically, this report assesses the extent to which DOD has planned for, begun to execute, and mitigated risk associated with (1) transferring and removing personnel and equipment from remaining bases in Iraq; (2) curtailing unneeded contract services, transitioning expiring contracts, and providing adequate contract oversight; and (3) facilitating and supporting the transition to a civilian-led presence in Iraq. GAO examined relevant DOD planning documents, attended drawdown-related conferences, interviewed State officials and DOD officials throughout the chain of command in the United States, Kuwait, and Iraq, and visited several locations in Kuwait and Iraq to observe drawdown operations.

What GAO Found

DOD has robust plans and processes for determining the sequence of actions and associated resources necessary to achieve the drawdown from Iraq, which is well underway with a significant amount of equipment removed from Iraq and bases transitioned, among other things. However, several factors contribute to making this phase more challenging than the previous drawdown phase. First, DOD will have less operational flexibility in this phase of the drawdown, yet will need to move a greater amount of equipment than in prior drawdown phases. Second, DOD is closing the largest bases with fewer available resources left on site, which creates a set of challenges and risks greater than what DOD faced during the prior drawdown phase. Although DOD's plans and processes create flexibility and mitigate risk, it has limited visibility over some equipment remaining in Iraq and does not track equipment found on transitioning bases that is not listed on any property accountability record. Without addressing these issues, DOD may miss opportunities to make the drawdown more efficient. DOD has taken action to improve its management of contracts in Iraq, such as enhancing contract oversight and assigning Contracting Officer's Representative responsibilities as a primary duty, although concerns, such as lack of experience among contract oversight personnel, remain. As the drawdown progresses, DOD may face further challenges in ensuring that major contracts transition without gaps in key services. To ensure the continuity of key services while continuing to reduce these services, some units are exploring the option of using local contractors to provide certain services since local contractors do not require extensive support, such as housing, and will not have to be repatriated to their country of origin at the end of the contract, although GAO has previously reported on challenges associated with hiring such firms resulting in the need for greater oversight. Some units also intend to replace contractor personnel with servicemembers to ensure continuity of certain services, such as guard security and generator maintenance. Despite various steps to ease contractor demobilization, DOD faces challenges in demobilizing its contractors, including operational security-driven limits on exchanging information such as base closure dates and ensuring accurate contractor planning. Without taking additional steps to address these challenges, DOD may be unable to effectively implement its demobilization guidance and ensure the effective reduction of contract services to appropriate levels and ultimate demobilization of all its contractors. As the U.S. presence in Iraq transitions to a civilian-led presence, although DOD and State interagency coordination for the transition began late, both agencies have now coordinated extensively and begun to execute the transfer or loan to State of a wide range of DOD equipment, while DOD has taken steps to minimize any impact on unit readiness of such transfers. DOD also has agreed to potentially provide State with extensive contracted services, including base and life support, food and fuel, and maintenance, but State may not have the capacity to fund and oversee these services.

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that DOD take further action to (1) acquire and maintain real-time visibility over contractor-managed government- owned equipment; (2) collect data on unaccounted-for equipment found during base transitions; (3) work with contractors to gather and distribute information needed to demobilize their workforces; and (4) officially clarify the scope of DOD's role in post-2011 Iraq, to include the privileges and immunities to be afforded all DOD government personnel. DOD concurred with all of GAO's recommendations.