IAEA Has Strengthened Its Safeguards Program, but Weaknesses Need to Be Addressed

IAEA has taken steps to strengthen safeguards by more aggressively  seeking assurances that a country is not pursuing a clandestine nuclear  program. In a radical departure from past practices of only verifying the  peaceful use of a country’s declared nuclear material at declared facilities,  IAEA has begun to develop the capability to independently evaluate all  aspects of a country’s nuclear activities. Under the Additional Protocol, IAEA  has the right, among other things, to (1) receive more comprehensive  information about a country’s nuclear activities, such as research and  development activities, and (2) conduct “complementary access,” which  enables IAEA to expand its inspection rights for the purpose of ensuring  the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities. Despite these successes, a group of safeguards experts recently cautioned  that a determined country can still conceal a nuclear weapons program. A Number of Weaknesses Impede IAEA’s Ability to Effectively Implement Strengthened Safeguards

There are a number of weaknesses that hamper IAEA’s ability to  effectively implement strengthened safeguards. IAEA has only limited  information about the nuclear activities of 4 key countries that are not  members of the NPT—India, Israel, North Korea, and Pakistan. In  addition, these countries are only required to declare exports of nuclear  material previously declared to IAEA. Another major weakness is that more than half, or 111 out of 189, of the  NPT signatories have not yet brought the Additional Protocol into force, as  of August 2006. In addition, safeguards are significantly limited or not applied in about 60  percent, or 112 out of 189, of the NPT signatory countries—either because  they have an agreement (known as a small quantities protocol) with IAEA,  and are not subject to most safeguards measures, or because they have not  concluded a comprehensive safeguards agreement with IAEA. According to  IAEA and Department of State officials, this is a weakness in the agency’s  ability to detect clandestine nuclear activities or transshipments of nuclear  material and equipment through the country. Last, IAEA is facing a looming human capital crisis that may hamper the  agency’s ability to meet its safeguards mission. For example, as we reported in  2002, the Suppliers Group helped convince Argentina and Brazil to accept  IAEA safeguards on their nuclear programs in exchange for expanded  access to international cooperation for peaceful nuclear purposes. The Nuclear Suppliers Group has also helped IAEA verify compliance with  the NPT. Despite these benefits, there are a number of weaknesses that could limit  the Nuclear Suppliers Group’s ability to curb nuclear proliferation. Specifically, members do not always share information about  licenses they have approved or denied for the sale of controversial items  to nonmember states. Without this shared information, a member country  could inadvertently license a controversial item to a country that has  already been denied a license from another Suppliers Group member state. In addition, there are a number of obstacles to efforts aimed at  strengthening the Nuclear Suppliers Group and other multilateral export  control regimes. U.S. Since the fall of the Soviet Union, the United States, through a  variety of programs, managed by the Departments of Energy, Defense  (DOD), and State, has helped Russia and other former Soviet countries to  secure nuclear material and warheads, detect illicitly trafficked nuclear  material, eliminate excess stockpiles of weapons-usable nuclear material,  and halt the continued production of weapons-grade plutonium. However, U.S. assistance  programs have faced a number of challenges, such as a lack of access to  key sites and corruption of foreign officials, which could compromise the  effectiveness of U.S. assistance. GAO last reported on the MPC&A program in 2003. At that  time, a lack of access to many sites in Russia’s nuclear weapons complex  had significantly impeded DOE’s progress in helping Russia to secure its  nuclear material. However,  we also noted that U.S. radiation detection assistance efforts faced  challenges, including corruption of some foreign border security officials,  technical limitations of some radiation detection equipment, and  inadequate maintenance of some equipment. Surplus U.S. Nuclear Nonproliferation: IAEA Has Strengthened Its Safeguards and  Nuclear Security Programs, but Weaknesses Need to Be Addressed. GAO- 06-93. Washington, D.C.: October 7, 2005. Nuclear Nonproliferation: U.S. Efforts to Help Other Countries Combat  Nuclear Smuggling Need Strengthened Coordination and Planning.
Why GAO Did This Study

The International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) safeguards system has been a cornerstone of U.S. efforts to prevent nuclear weapons proliferation since the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) was adopted in 1970. Safeguards allow IAEA to verify countries' compliance with the NPT. Since the discovery in 1991 of a clandestine nuclear weapons program in Iraq, IAEA has strengthened its safeguards system. In addition to IAEA's strengthened safeguards program, there are other U.S. and international efforts that have helped stem the spread of nuclear materials and technology that could be used for nuclear weapons programs. This testimony is based on GAO's report on IAEA safeguards issued in October 2005 (Nuclear Nonproliferation: IAEA Has Strengthened Its Safeguards and Nuclear Security Programs, but Weaknesses Need to Be Addressed, GAO-06-93 [Washington, D.C.: Oct. 7, 2005]). This testimony is also based on previous GAO work related to the Nuclear Suppliers Group--a group of more than 40 countries that have pledged to limit trade in nuclear materials, equipment, and technology to only countries that are engaged in peaceful nuclear activities--and U.S. assistance to Russia and other countries of the former Soviet Union for the destruction, protection, and detection of nuclear material and weapons.

What GAO Found

IAEA has taken steps to strengthen safeguards, including conducting more intrusive inspections, to seek assurances that countries are not developing clandestine weapons programs. IAEA has begun to develop the capability to independently evaluate all aspects of a country's nuclear activities. This is a radical departure from the past practice of only verifying the peaceful use of a country's declared nuclear material. However, despite successes in uncovering some countries' undeclared nuclear activities, safeguards experts cautioned that a determined country can still conceal a nuclear weapons program. In addition, there are a number of weaknesses that limit IAEA's ability to implement strengthened safeguards. First, IAEA has a limited ability to assess the nuclear activities of 4 key countries that are not NPT members--India, Israel, North Korea, and Pakistan. Second, more than half of the NPT signatories have not yet brought the Additional Protocol, which is designed to give IAEA new authority to search for clandestine nuclear activities, into force. Third, safeguards are significantly limited or not applied to about 60 percent of NPT signatories because they possess small quantities of nuclear material, and are exempt from inspections, or they have not concluded a comprehensive safeguards agreement. Finally, IAEA faces a looming human capital crisis caused by the large number of inspectors and safeguards management personnel expected to retire in the next 5 years. In addition to IAEA's strengthened safeguards program, there are other U.S. and international efforts that have helped stem the spread of nuclear materials and technology. The Nuclear Suppliers Group has helped to constrain trade in nuclear material and technology that could be used to develop nuclear weapons. However, there are a number of weaknesses that could limit the Nuclear Suppliers Group's ability to curb proliferation. For example, members of the Suppliers Group do not always share information about licenses they have approved or denied for the sale of controversial items to nonmember states. Without this shared information, a member country could inadvertently license a controversial item to a country that has already been denied a license from another member state. Since the early 1990s, U.S. nonproliferation programs have helped Russia and other former Soviet countries to, among other things, secure nuclear material and warheads, detect illicitly trafficked nuclear material, and eliminate excess stockpiles of weapons-usable nuclear material. However, these programs face a number of challenges which could compromise their ongoing effectiveness. For example, a lack of access to many sites in Russia's nuclear weapons complex has significantly impeded the Department of Energy's progress in helping Russia secure its nuclear material. U.S. radiation detection assistance efforts also face challenges, including corruption of some foreign border security officials, technical limitations of some radiation detection equipment, and inadequate maintenance of some equipment.