	Introduction

The November 2002 outbreak in China of a new form of atypical pneumonia, Severe AcuteRespiratory Syndrome (SARS) had widespread economic, political, and social effects on the PRCand presented a serious test for new PRC party leadership, named at the November 2002 PartyCongress, and for new central government officials named at the March 2003 meeting of theNational People's Congress. (1) Having firstminimized and tried to cover up the extent of the disease,PRC officials eventually were forced by circumstances to acknowledge the problem, apologize forfailure to be more forthcoming, and respond openly and aggressively to the outbreak. Thegovernment's handling of new SARS cases emerging in January 2004 differs markedly from itsearlier experience. By mid-April 2003,persistent rumors, international inquiries, and foreign press reports were bringingenormous pressure to bear on government officials, who were still reporting that SARS had beencontained in Guangdong and that only 15 more cases had been reported in Beijing, for a total of 37. WHO investigators publicly announced on April 16, 2003 that the international community did nottrust the Beijing city government's figures, and that the numbers Beijing was reporting did notinclude patients in military hospitals or those with suspected but unconfirmed cases. Officials offered a public apologyfor their "leadership failure" in addressing the SARS crisis. The Party made many early mis-steps in 2003 that damaged its credibility. According to newsaccounts, much of the information about the SARS outbreak was passed on almost instantaneouslythrough cellular phone text messages -- at times 40 million a day, according to one press report --a volume that was well beyond the government's ability to monitor or control. Chinese officials acknowledge that China's poor health care infrastructure poses a majorrisk to its future economic development. (58)

	SARS and Avian Flu in 2004

Some policy observers suggest that a number of PRC actions and decisions in the past yearillustrate that the government has made significant policy changes since the 2003 SARS outbreak. (61) The PRC government duly announced the emergence and confirmation of new SARS cases inJanuary 2004 -- the first in China since spring of 2003. In Guangdong, where the first new caseappeared, provincial officials immediately ordered the extermination of the province's 10,000captive civet cats -- a dinner table delicacy in southern China and suspected animal source of theSARS virus. On January 27, 2004, a WHO official stated that a "staggering" numberof birds, both migratory and domestic, were infected with the virus in at least 10 Asian countries. Some critics have seen the PRC's initial actions in the avian flu outbreak as a return to the secretive methods used in the early 2003 SARS outbreak in China. Given the nature and extent of the SARS crisis, however, Communist Party and centralgovernment officials were forced publicly to make fuller disclosure, and in doing so to embraceseveral radical concepts they had not addressed before: the right of the public to know aboutinformation that directly concerns their daily lives, and the need for government to hold officialsaccountable for their mistakes and failings. While issuing no travel restrictions, WHO said that the spread of SARS to Canada,Singapore, and Europe made it a "global health threat."
In November 2002, SARS, a new and deadly human illness suspected of having an animal origin, made its first appearance in China. Chinese leaders at first minimized the effects of the newvirus and covered up the extent of its spread. But the disease moved rapidly to other countries,prompting the World Health Organization in 2003 to label the virus a "global health threat." Underintense public scrutiny, Chinese leaders in April 2003 eventually acknowledged that people weresickening and dying, apologized for their leadership failures in addressing the problem, and launcheda series of initiatives to try to contain the disease, limit its economic damage, and protect publichealth. By July 2003, the initial SARS outbreak had ended. But global disease specialists expressedconcern that the virus could recur, like influenza, or that other similarly mutating viruses could leapfrom the animal to the human world. On January 5, 2004, China confirmed the first new case ofSARS in Guangdong Province, where the 2003 outbreak had occurred. On January 27, 2004, PRCofficials acknowledged that several flocks of birds in China were infected with the same deadlystrain of avian flu that in recent weeks had ravaged bird populations and killed humans in otherAsian countries.
The emergence of SARS and other new viruses has posed a steep learning curve for a new generation of Chinese officials who had assumed office in November 2002, only weeks before theoriginal SARS outbreak. In suppressing information early in the crisis, the government lostcredibility and public confidence. More reliable information was available from foreign mediasources, the Internet, and cell-phone text messages -- as many as 40 million a day during the 2003SARS crisis, according to one report. In the 2003 crisis, Chinese leaders were forced to adjust theirstrategy by publicly embracing two radical concepts: the public has a right to know aboutinformation directly concerning their daily lives, and government officials need to be accountableto the public for their performance. Officials began issuing regular briefings in 2003 about SARScases, and several top officials were fired for covering up the crisis. Since then, the government hasrevamped emergency procedures, issued rules requiring greater government transparency, andworked to reduce the deficiencies and prohibitive costs of public health care. Some observerssuggested that "lessons learned" from the 2003 SARS outbreak could permanently influence PRCgovernance.
Some change can be seen in the more open and aggressive way officials have handled SARS cases in 2004. Officials have publicly announced both confirmed and suspected cases, ordered theextermination of many civet cats -- a culinary delicacy in China but a suspected source of animal-to-human transferof the disease -- and begun human trials of a new SARS vaccine developed inChina. Still, PRC officials in early January 2004 detained and questioned journalists from a Chinesenewspaper that first reported on the new SARS cases, suggesting that the government still seeks tocontrol information flow. And global health officials have criticized official secretiveness inaddressing the new avian flu outbreak.