RS21606 -- NASA's Space Shuttle Columbia: Synopsis of the Report of the Columbia Accident InvestigationBoard
September 2, 2003

	CAIB's Conclusions

The following synopsis focuses on what appear to be the major questions being asked about the CAIB's findings about the tragedy and recommendations on thefuture of the shuttle program. What Caused the Columbia Accident? The Board concluded that "the present Shuttle is not inherently unsafe"but the "observations and recommendations in this report are needed to make the vehicle safe enough to operate inthe coming years." The CAIB report contains 29 recommendations (listed below) -- 23 technical and six organizational -- of which 15 must be implemented before the shuttlereturns to flight status. Adm. Gehman stated at the Board's August 26 press conference that there is no hierarchyin the recommendations -- all have equal weight.
NASA's space shuttle Columbia broke apart on February 1, 2003 as itreturned to Earth from a 16-day sciencemission. All seven astronauts aboard were killed. NASA created the Columbia Accident InvestigationBoard (CAIB), chaired by Adm. (Ret.) Harold Gehman,to investigate the accident. The Board released its report (available at http://www.caib.us) on August 26, 2003,concluding that the tragedy was caused bytechnical and organizational failures. The CAIB report included 29 recommendations, 15 of which the Boardspecified must be completed before the shuttlereturns to flight status. This report provides a brief synopsis of the Board's conclusions, recommendations, andobservations. Further information on Columbiaand issues for Congress are available in CRS Report RS21408. This report will not be updated.