	Introduction

Nearly half a million miles of oil and gas transmission pipeline crisscross the United States. The report discusses several policy concerns relatedto federal pipeline security efforts: 1) federal threat information for pipelines, 2) criteria foridentifying "critical"assets, 3) TSA funding for pipeline security, and 4) federal agency cooperationin pipeline security. The report also focuses on TSA and the OPS as the lead pipelinesecurity and safety agencies. Despite substantial private and public efforts to promote security, it is widely recognized that pipelines are inherently vulnerable. (25) This title: 
Authorizes DOT to inspect pipelines and enforce its regulations with fines, injunctions, and criminal penalties
Requires operators to report incidents, safety-related conditions and annualsummary data
Prescribes minimum pipeline safety requirements, including operatorqualifications for regulated functions
Imposes oil spill response plan requirements to reduce environmental impactof accidental discharges
Provides grants-in-aid to state pipeline safety compliance agencies that adoptdamage prevention programs
Requires operators to establish drug and alcohol programs. DOT administers pipeline regulations through the Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS) within the Research and Special Programs Administration (RSPA). The actaccorded TSA with responsibility for security "in all modes of transportation, including "...modesof transportation that are exercised by the Department of Transportation." 107-296 ) creating the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). According to TSA, the agency expects pipelineoperators to maintain security plans based on the OPS/industry consensus security guidancecirculated in 2002 and subsequent revisions. (61) In 2003 the agency visited 24 of the largest 25-30pipeline operators to review their security plans and inspect their facilities. All but two of the 24 operators have provided TSAwith copies of their security plans and system maps, as well as critical infrastructure information. The OPS joined TSA on approximatelyone-third of its operator inspections in 2003. (65)
According to TSA, the agency intends to work with industry to help operators better identifytheir most critical assets. The President's 2003 infrastructure protection strategy, for example, noted that"pipeline facilities already incorporate a variety of stringent safety precautions" and that "as a whole,the response and recovery capabilities of the pipeline industry are well proven..." (71) Senior DHSofficials have also asserted that "pipelines are the best organized and have the best security practices"among maritime and land transportation sectors. TSA and the OPS currently cooperate on security inspections, but many inindustry are still concerned about the possibility of redundant, conflicting regulatory regimes. (76)

		Identifying Critical Facilities

Various industry representatives state that they need clear and stable definitions of pipeline asset criticality so they will know exactly what assets to protect, and how well to protect them. (80)

		Pipeline Security Resources at TSA

The President's FY2005 budget request for DHS does not include a separate line item forTSA's pipeline security activities. These staff willmaintain TSA's asset database, support TSA's multi-modal risk models, develop new securitystandards and issue regulations -- all with the consultation of industry and other federal agencies. While TSA believes it has an understanding with the OPS thatTSA will be the lead agency for pipeline security, a memorandum of agreement between the agencieshas not been signed. In addition to these specific issues, Congress may wish to assess how the various elements of U.S. pipeline security activity fit together in the nation's overall strategy to protect criticalinfrastructure.
Nearly half a million miles of oil and gas transmission pipeline crisscross the United States. The nation's pipeline industry has made substantial investments to protect these systems and respond tothe possibility of terror attacks. However, U.S. pipelines are inherently vulnerable because of theirnumber and dispersion. Due to the essential role pipelines play in our economy, Congress isexamining the adequacy of federal pipeline security efforts.
The Transportation Security Administration (TSA), within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), is the lead federal agency for security in all modes of transportation -- includingpipelines. The agency oversees industry's identification and protection of critical pipeline assetsthrough security reviews, risk assessment and inspections. The Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS),within the Department of Transportation (DOT), is the lead federal regulator of pipeline safety . While TSA and the OPS have distinct missions, pipeline security and safety are intertwined. Thereare questions about the appropriate division of responsibility between the agencies and about theresources they will have for mandated security activities.
As the lead agency for pipeline security, TSA expects pipeline operators to maintain security plans based on security guidance initially circulated in 2002. TSA also plans to issue pipelinesecurity regulations, although it is unclear if and when it will do so. This agency also intends to issuenew analytic models to help operators identify critical facilities and assess vulnerability to terroristattack. In 2003, TSA inspected 24 of the largest 25-30 pipeline operators to review their securitypractices and collect critical asset data. TSA found that nearly all of these operators had met orexceeded minimum security guidelines. All but two of the 24 operators also provided TSA with theirsecurity plans and critical infrastructure information. The OPS joined TSA on approximatelyone-third of these inspections and expects a continued security role. The agencies have no formalcooperative agreement defining responsibilities and at this point do not think they need one.
Industry and government agencies generally assert that efforts to promote U.S. pipeline security are on the right track. Nonetheless, TSA's current funding for pipeline security will provide onlylimited capability for inspections and enforcement of any future regulations. The President' sFY2005 budget request does not include a line item for TSA's pipeline activities; they will be fundedfrom the agency's general operational budget. In addition to appropriations issues, Congress isconsidering several policy concerns: Operators believe they need more specific federal threatinformation to improve security decisions. Many operators also believe they need clear and stabledefinitions of what constitutes a "critical" asset. Finally, operators are concerned about potentiallyredundant, conflicting regulatory regimes under TSA and the OPS. This report will be updated asevents warrant.