Some in Congress have expressed concern that the U.S.nuclear stockpile and the Complex are becoming increasingly difficult and costly to maintain, thatsecurity costs are rising sharply, and that the Complex is not sufficiently responsive to the needs ofits "customer," the Department of Defense (DOD). The committee's report stated:
During the fiscal year 2005 budget hearings, theCommittee pressed the Secretary on the need for a systematic review of requirements for theweapons complex over the next twenty-five years, and the Secretary committed to conducting sucha review. (1)
In response, the Secretary of Energy in January 2005 had the Secretary of Energy AdvisoryBoard (SEAB) form the Nuclear Weapons Complex Infrastructure Task Force (hereinafter referredto as the "Task Force" or "TF"). (3) 

		The Task Force's View of, and Vision for, the Complex

The TF reported that there was no master plan guiding the Complex. Instead, it stated thatthere were redundant facilities within the Complex; excessive competition between the weaponslabs; an imbalance between the labs, with state-of-the-art experimental facilities, and the productionplants, with archaic equipment; and special nuclear material (SNM; see Appendix) at six of the eightComplex sites, increasing vulnerability to terrorist attack and raising security costs. These problems resulted in high costs. (ix) (Throughout this report, numbers inparentheses refer to pages in the Task Force's report.) Governance would be made more effective, in the TF's view, so as to "enablethe transformations needed for the Complex and the Stockpile." Discussion of Task Force Recommendations

In the Task Force scenario, construction of a modernized Complex would be simpler and lesscostly with several facilities built at a single site. Reliable Replacement Warhead programrecommendations. (a) RRWs are supposed to be easier to maintain than current warheads. Forgoing the value of sunk costs. (19)
Implications for the nuclear weapons laboratories. They point out that staffing assumptions based on the more limited range of skillsthat the TF seems to believe may be required by the RRW concept implicitly rest on otherassumptions: that the RRW concept will appear, after study, able to meet its goals; that theAdministration and Congress will choose to replace many current warheads with RRWs; and thatdesigning and engineering such new warheads will require a smaller skill set than is needed tomaintain existing designs. The labs conduct much non-weapons research. Pit production issues. Others would be rejected because of manufacturing defects. Security. Nonproliferation. Now, labs and plants exhibit much more concernabout ease of manufacture. (45)
Supporters of the current Complex maintain that there are many examples tocounter the TF statement that the Complex is unable to solve problems: the ability of the Complexto create scores of warhead designs, and to produce many thousands of units, during the Cold War;the ability of the Complex to increase its understanding of nuclear weapon behavior through the SSP;and the ability of the Complex to maintain the nuclear stockpile after the Cold War so that DOE andDOD could certify its safety and reliability annually for nine years so far. Task Force assumptions. The Task Force recommends that the United States should proceed immediately with RRW. Appendix: Nuclear Weapons and the Nuclear Weapons Complex

This Appendix describes key terms, concepts, sites, and facilities as an aid to readers notfamiliar with them.
Congress annually funds the nuclear weapons complex (the Complex), those sites thatdevelop, maintain, manufacture, and dismantle nuclear weapons. In hearings held in 2004, theHouse Appropriations Committee pressed the Secretary of Energy "for a systematic review ofrequirements for the weapons complex over the next twenty-five years." The committee expressedits concern that the Complex is not well suited to the post-Cold War situation, and should reflectpresidential decisions on the stockpile as well as issues of cost, security, and Complex size. Inresponse, the Nuclear Weapons Complex Infrastructure Task Force of the Secretary of EnergyAdvisory Board prepared a report, released in final form in October 2005.
The report indicated that the Complex had redundant facilities, security concerns, high cost,excessive competition between the weapons labs, and inadequate equipment for the productionplants. To redress these problems, the Task Force proposed restructuring the Complex. It wouldshift much production and some R&D to a new nuclear production center, probably close one ormore plants, contract out some nonnuclear work, shrink the labs, consolidate facilities, and take stepsto make governance more effective. It was concerned that current warheads, produced during theCold War, are inappropriate for the current situation because they have more yield and efficiencythan is needed, yet are more vulnerable to terrorist threats than is desirable, are hard to manufacture,are designed close to failure points, and will probably become harder to maintain. It recommendsrestructuring the nuclear arsenal by producing new-design Reliable Replacement Warheads (RRWs)with characteristics deemed more suitable to the current environment. The report links Complex andwarheads: in the Task Force's view, RRWs would be easier to produce and maintain, permitting asmaller, more efficient, and less costly Complex.
Observers familiar with the current Complex raise several concerns. From their perspective,closing Complex sites and facilities might meet fatal political opposition. They maintain that thereport seems to downplay the value of investments in Complex facilities over six decades, andprojects large cost savings through 2030 based on questionable assumptions. They fear that shiftingkey tasks that the nuclear weapons labs perform to other sites could disrupt the labs' ability to dotheir work. The recommendation to proceed immediately with RRW deals with restructuringweapons rather than the Complex and, in this view, may go beyond the Task Force's mandate. ADepartment of Defense official stated that a Department of Defense-Department of Energy agencydid not approve the Task Force's proposed 3-step transition to RRW, despite the report's strongimplication to the contrary. While any final decision on deploying RRWs must await completionof studies that might possibly reject RRW, the Task Force assumes RRW will proceed and does notexamine how its restructured Complex would support current warheads. Some express concern thatTask Force recommendations may be at odds with U.S. nuclear nonproliferation policy.
This report will not be updated.