	Weaknesses in Notification and Watch List Procedures

In our review of the 240 visa revocations, we found examples where  information on visa revocations did not flow between the State  Department and appropriate units overseas and within INS and the FBI. We found that  that these units did not consistently receive information on visa  revocations. Individuals with Revoked Visas May Be in the United States

Our analysis shows that thirty individuals with revoked visas have entered  the United States and may still remain in the country. Twenty-nine of these  individuals entered before State revoked their visas. INS and the FBI Did Not Routinely Take Action on Individuals with Revoked Visas Who Had Entered the United States

The INS and the FBI did not routinely attempt to investigate or locate any  of the individuals whose visas were revoked and who may be in the  country. Systemic Weaknesses Were the Result of Limited Guidance on Visa Revocation Process

The weaknesses I have outlined above resulted from the U.S. government’s  limited policy guidance on the visa revocation process. While State  and INS officials told us they use the visa revocation process to prevent  suspected terrorists from entering the United States, neither they nor FBI  officials had policies or procedures that covered investigating, locating,  and taking appropriate action in cases where the visa holder had already  entered the country. To remedy the systemic weaknesses in the visa revocation process, we are  recommending that the Secretary of Homeland Security, who is now  responsible for issuing regulations and administering and enforcing  provisions of U.S. immigration law relating to visa issuance, work in  conjunction with the Secretary of State and the Attorney General to:    develop specific policies and procedures for the interagency visa  revocation process to ensure that notification of visa revocations for  suspected terrorists and relevant supporting information are transmitted  from State to immigration and law enforcement agencies, and their  respective inspection and investigation units, in a timely manner;   develop a specific policy on actions that immigration and law enforcement  agencies should take to investigate and locate individuals whose visas  have been revoked for terrorism concerns and who remain in the United  States after revocation; and   determine if any persons with visas revoked on terrorism grounds are in  the United States and, if so, whether they pose a security threat. In commenting on our report, Homeland Security agreed that the visa  revocation process should be strengthened as an antiterrorism tool.
Why GAO Did This Study

The National Strategy for Homeland Security calls for preventing the entry of foreign terrorists into our country and using all legal means to identify; halt; and where appropriate, prosecute or bring immigration or other civil charges against terrorists in the United States. GAO reported in October 2002 that the Department of State had revoked visas of certain persons after it learned they might be suspected terrorists, raising concerns that some of these individuals may have entered the United States before or after State's action. Congressional requesters asked GAO to (1) assess the effectiveness of the visa revocation process and (2) identify the policies and procedures of State, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) that govern their respective actions in the process.

What GAO Found

Our analysis shows that the visa revocation process was not being fully utilized as an antiterrorism tool. The visa revocation process broke down when information on individuals with revoked visas was not shared between State and appropriate immigration and law enforcement offices. It broke down even further when individuals had already entered the United States prior to revocation. INS and the FBI were not routinely taking actions to investigate, locate, or resolve the cases of individuals who remained in the United States after their visas were revoked. In our review of 240 visa revocations, we found that (1) appropriate units within INS and the FBI did not always receive notifications of all the revocations; (2) names were not consistently posted to the agencies' watch lists of suspected terrorists; (3) 30 individuals whose visas were revoked on terrorism grounds had entered the United States and may still remain; and (4) INS and the FBI were not routinely taking actions to investigate, locate, or resolve the cases of individuals who remained in the United States after their visas were revoked. These weaknesses resulted from the U.S. government's limited policy guidance on the process. None of the agencies have specific, written policies on using the visa revocation process as an antiterrorism tool.