In November 2005, the National Security Council (NSC) issued the  National Strategy for Victory in Iraq (NSVI) to clarify the President’s  existing strategy for achieving U.S. political, security, and economic goals  in Iraq. According to this document, prevailing in Iraq is a vital U.S.  national interest because it will help win the war on terror and make  America safer, stronger, and more certain of its future. The six characteristics are (1) a  clear purpose, scope, methodology; (2) a detailed discussion of the  problems, risks, and threats the strategy intends to address; (3) the desired  goals and objectives, and outcome-related performance measures; (4) a  description of the U.S. resources needed to implement the strategy; (5) a  clear delineation of the U.S. government’s roles, responsibilities, and  mechanisms for coordination; and (6) a description of how the strategy is  integrated internally (that is, among U.S. agencies) and externally (in this  case, with the Iraqi government and international organizations). National Strategy for Victory in Iraq and Supporting Documents Do Not Fully Address All Key Characteristics of an Effective National Strategy

The NSVI aims to improve U.S. strategic planning for Iraq; however, the  NSVI and supporting documents do not fully address all of the six  desirable characteristics of effective national strategies that GAO has  identified through its prior work. Although the June 2006  Camp David fact sheet provides additional detail on recent U.S. and Iraqi  actions, it does not address the key shortfalls we identified in the three  areas. The NSVI and  supporting documents generally address this characteristic by identifying  U.S. government efforts to rebuild and stabilize Iraq in terms of these three  overarching objectives and address the assumptions that guided the  strategy’s development. Strategy Partially Addresses Agency Responsibilities, Integration, and Costs

The NSVI and supporting documents only partially (1) delineate the roles  and responsibilities of key U.S. government agencies; (2) describe how the  strategy will be integrated among U.S. entities, the Iraqi government,  international organizations and the mechanisms for coordination; and (3)  identify what the strategy will cost and the sources of financing. The strategy does not identify  other key related costs, including the costs of training, equipping, and  supporting Iraq’s security forces; the costs of rebuilding, maintaining, and  protecting critical oil and electricity infrastructure; or the costs of building  management capacity in Iraq’s central ministries and 18 provincial  governments. However, it does not redress  identified shortfalls in the U.S. strategy such as the lack of information on  costs. Other GAO-Related Work Shows that Security, Political, and Economic Factors Hamper U.S. Efforts to Achieve Strategic Goals

Other GAO work shows that security, political, and economic factors have  and will continue to hamper U.S. efforts to stabilize Iraq and achieve key  U.S. goals. First, increases in attacks against the coalition and its Iraqi  partners, growing sectarian violence, and the influence of militias have  adversely affected U.S. and Iraqi efforts to secure Baghdad and other  strategic cities. Iraq Faces Challenges in Delivering Government Services

The U.S. government faces significant challenges in improving the  capability of national and provincial governments to provide security and  deliver services to the Iraqi people. Efforts to Restore Oil and Electricity Sectors Are Hindered by Security, Corruption, Fiscal, and Management Challenges

The U.S. and Iraqi governments are trying to revitalize Iraq’s economy and  restore essential services in the oil and electricity sectors. However, these  efforts have been hindered by security, corruption, fiscal, and  management challenges. In addition,  it is unclear whether the current capacity can be sustained. The formation of the  new Iraqi government provides an opportunity for the United States  government to re-examine its strategy and more closely align its efforts  and objectives with those of the Iraqi people and other donors. Improving national and provincial governance.
Why GAO Did This Study

In November 2005, the National Security Council (NSC) issued the National Strategy for Victory in Iraq (NSVI) to clarify the President's strategy for achieving U.S. political, security, and economic goals in Iraq. The U.S. goal is to establish a peaceful, stable, and secure Iraq. In addition, in June 2006, the administration issued a fact sheet at Camp David discussing current progress and goals in Iraq. This testimony (1) discusses the extent to which the NSVI and its supporting documents address the six characteristics of an effective national strategy, and (2) assesses how security, political, and economic factors will affect achieving the U.S. strategy for Iraq. In this testimony, the NSVI and supporting documents are collectively referred to as the U.S. strategy for Iraq.

What GAO Found

The NSVI is an improvement over previous U.S. planning efforts for stabilizing and rebuilding Iraq. However, the NSVI and supporting documents are incomplete as they do not fully address all the characteristics of an effective national strategy. Among its positive attributes, the strategy's purpose and scope is clear; it identifies U.S. involvement in Iraq as a "vital national interest and the central front in the war on terror." Also, the strategy generally addresses the threats and risks facing the coalition forces and provides a comprehensive description of U.S. political, security, and economic objectives in Iraq. However, the discussion of outcome-related performance measures to assess progress in achieving these goals and objectives is limited. Moreover, the strategy falls short in at least three areas. First, it only partially identifies the agencies responsible for implementing key aspects of the strategy. Second, it does not fully address how the U.S. will integrate its goals with those of the Iraqis and the international community, and it does not detail Iraq's anticipated contribution to its future needs. Third, it only partially identifies the current and future costs of U.S. involvement in Iraq, including maintaining U.S. military operations, building Iraqi government capacity, and rebuilding critical infrastructure. Furthermore, the June 2006 Camp David fact sheet provides additional detail but does not address these key shortfalls. Security, political, and economic factors will hamper U.S. efforts to stabilize Iraq and achieve key U.S. goals. First, the U.S. and Iraq are trying to stabilize Iraq by training and equipping additional Iraqi security forces and securing Baghdad and other strategic cities. However, increases in attacks against the coalition and its Iraqi partners and the growing influence of militias will adversely affect U.S. and Iraqi efforts. Second, the U.S. and Iraq are trying to improve Iraq's capacity to govern by reconciling sectarian groups and building the capacity of national and provincial governments to provide security and services. However, sectarian conflicts, the lack of capacity in the ministries, and corruption serve to hinder these efforts. Third, the U.S. and Iraqi governments are trying to revitalize Iraq's economy and restore the oil, electricity, and other key sectors. However, these efforts have been impeded by security, corruption, fiscal, and other challenges. The formation of a permanent Iraqi government gives the U.S. an opportunity to re-examine its strategy for Iraq and align its efforts with Iraq and the international community. As a first step, NSC should complete the strategy by defining and disseminating performance metrics, articulating clear roles and responsibilities, specifying future contributions, and identifying current costs and future resources. In addition, the United States, Iraq, and the international community should (1) enhance support capabilities of the Iraqi security forces, (2) improve the capabilities of the national and provincial governments, and (3) develop a comprehensive anti-corruption strategy.