The U.S. Government Has Not Met National Security Goals in Pakistan’s FATA

The United States has not met its national security goals to destroy the  terrorist threat and close the safe haven in the FATA, despite more than  $10.5 billion in U.S. support to Pakistan since 2002. Despite this effort, the 2007 NIE, State and  embassy documents, and Defense and State officials, including those  operating in Pakistan, have concluded that al Qaeda has regenerated its  ability to attack the United States and succeeded in establishing a safe  haven in Pakistan’s FATA. The United States Has Relied Primarily on the Pakistani Military to Accomplish Its Goals in Pakistan’s FATA, with Little Focus on Economic Development and Improving Governance

Since 2002, the United States has relied principally on the Pakistani  military to address U.S. national security goals in the FATA. Approximately $5.8  billion of this amount has been directed at efforts to combat terrorism in  Pakistan’s FATA and the border region. According to State, Pakistan has helped kill or capture hundreds of  suspected terrorists, including al Qaeda operatives and Taliban leaders. In  addition, Pakistani military operations have resulted in the deaths of  approximately 1,400 members of its security forces. No Comprehensive Plan for Guiding U.S. Efforts in the FATA Has Been Developed, as Called for by the Administration and Congress

Despite the recognition of U.S. government officials, including the U.S.  President and Congress, that a comprehensive plan employing all elements  of national power—diplomatic, military, intelligence, development  assistance, economic, and law enforcement support—was needed to  combat terrorism and close the terrorist safe haven in Pakistan’s FATA  region, a comprehensive plan to meet U.S. national security goals in the  region was never developed. Recognizing in 2006 that military efforts  alone would not succeed in the FATA, the embassy, with Defense, State,  and USAID support, and in conjunction with the Pakistani government in  power at that time, began an effort to focus more attention on the other  key elements of national power, such as development and public  diplomacy, to address U.S. national security goals in the FATA. Despite Executive, Congressional, and Independent Calls for Comprehensive Plans to Combat Terrorism and Close Terrorist Safe Havens, Such Plans Were Never Developed

As table 1 shows, the need for the development of comprehensive plans  employing all elements of national power—diplomatic, military,  intelligence, development assistance, economic, and law enforcement  support—to combat terrorism and close terrorist safe havens has been  recognized by the President’s national security strategies (2003), the  independent 9/11 Commission (2004), and by Congress in repeated  legislation (2004 and 2007). However, this  new approach does not yet constitute a comprehensive plan, and all of the  agencies’ individual efforts have not been fully approved in Washington.
Why GAO Did This Study

Since 2002, destroying the terrorist threat and closing the terrorist safe haven have been key national security goals. The United States has provided Pakistan, a key ally in the war on terror, more than $10.5 billion for military, economic, and development activities. Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), which border Afghanistan, are vast unpoliced regions attractive to extremists and terrorists seeking a safe haven. GAO was asked to assess (1) the progress in meeting these national security goals for Pakistan's FATA, and (2) the status of U.S. efforts to develop a comprehensive plan for the FATA. To address these objectives, GAO compared national security goals against assessments conducted by U.S. agencies and reviewed available plans.

What GAO Found

The United States has not met its national security goals to destroy terrorist threats and close the safe haven in Pakistan's FATA. Since 2002, the United States relied principally on the Pakistan military to address U.S. national security goals. Of the approximately $5.8 billion the United States provided for efforts in the FATA and border region from 2002 through 2007, about 96 percent reimbursed Pakistan for military operations there. According to the Department of State, Pakistan deployed 120,000 military and paramilitary forces in the FATA and helped kill and capture hundreds of suspected al Qaeda operatives; these efforts cost the lives of approximately 1,400 members of Pakistan's security forces. However, GAO found broad agreement, as documented in the National Intelligence Estimate, State, and embassy documents, as well as Defense officials in Pakistan, that al Qaeda had regenerated its ability to attack the United States and had succeeded in establishing a safe haven in Pakistan's FATA. No comprehensive plan for meeting U.S. national security goals in the FATA has been developed, as stipulated by the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (2003), called for by an independent commission (2004), and mandated by congressional legislation (2007). Furthermore, Congress created the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) in 2004 specifically to develop comprehensive plans to combat terrorism. However, neither the National Security Council (NSC), NCTC, nor other executive branch departments have developed a comprehensive plan that includes all elements of national power--diplomatic, military, intelligence, development assistance, economic, and law enforcement support--called for by the various national security strategies and Congress. As a result, since 2002, the U.S. embassy in Pakistan has had no Washington-supported, comprehensive plan to combat terrorism and close the terrorist safe haven in the FATA. In 2006, the embassy, in conjunction with Defense, State, and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and in cooperation with the government of Pakistan, began an effort to focus more attention on other key elements of national power, such as development assistance and public diplomacy, to address U.S. goals in the FATA. However, this does not yet constitute a comprehensive plan.