With this overview, let me talk about the security environment for U.S. forces overseas. First, DOD has a large presence in many countries around the world, offering a plethora of potential targets. Second, predictive intelligence on terrorist attacks is difficult to obtain. Commanders, therefore, may not be in a position to prevent an attack from occurring; they can only prepare to minimize the consequences from an attack. Third, DOD installations are often located on host nation installations and as a result there are limitations on the security measures DOD can undertake. DOD designates the terrorist threat level faced by personnel in each country. Forces Has Improved, but Vulnerabilities Remain

During our review, we found the U.S. Central Command and its service component commands had taken a number of steps to improve the protection of U.S. forces from terrorist attacks. Among the actions taken, the command had determined the range of specific terrorist threats it needed to counteract in its area of responsibility, including a 20,000-pound truck bomb—the estimated approximate size of the bomb that struck Khobar Towers; devised threat-based standards, such as stand-off, to guide the design and construction of new facilities and modifications to existing structures; established an office that coordinates antiterrorist activities in the region and reports directly to the Deputy Commander in Chief, U.S. Central Command; and identified a need for and filled hundreds of additional security positions. DOD Has Taken Steps to Improve the Antiterrorism Program

At the time of our review, DOD had initiated a number of changes in its overall antiterrorism program in response to the Khobar Towers bombing. The Secretary of Defense directed that the five geographic combatant commanders take on increased antiterrorism responsibilities. Under the direction of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Defense Special Weapons Agency began to conduct vulnerability assessments at installations. DOD mandated more robust antiterrorism training for personnel deploying to medium- and high-threat countries. The Secretary of Defense established a centrally controlled fund to support emergency high-priority antiterrorism requirements not funded by the services. The services also had planned or instituted changes in their approach to antiterrorism. Nevertheless, Mr. Chairman, our work raised concerns that DOD’s initiatives were falling short of establishing a comprehensive and consistent approach to antiterrorism.
Why GAO Did This Study

GAO discussed the Department of Defense's (DOD) efforts to protect overseas forces from terrorist attack, focusing on Turkey and the Middle East and on: (1) the environment U.S. forces overseas are facing , including the terrorist threat and the relationship with the host nation governments; (2) the measures DOD has taken to enhance the security of personnel in the countries GAO visited; and (3) DOD initiatives to improve its overall force protection program.

What GAO Found

GAO noted that: (1) DOD has a large presence in many countries around the world, offering a plethora of potential targets; (2) predictive intelligence on terrorist attacks is difficult to obtain, and commanders may not be in a position to prevent an attack from occurring and can only prepare to minimize the consequences from an attack; (3) DOD installations are often located on host nation installations and, as a result, there are limitations on the security measures DOD can undertake; (4) the U.S. Central Command and its service component commands had taken a number of steps to improve the protection of U.S. forces from terrorist attacks, including: (a) determining the range of specific terrorist threats it needed to counteract in its area of responsibility, including a 20,000-pound truck bomb, the estimated approximate size of the bomb that struck Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia; (b) devising threat-based standards, such as stand-off, to guide the design and construction of new facilities and modifications to existing structures; (c) establishing an office that coordinates antiterrorist activities in the region and reports directly to the Deputy Commander in Chief, U.S. Central Command; and (d) identifying a need for and filling hundreds of additional security positions; (5) DOD had initiated a number of changes in its overall antiterrorism program in response to the Khobar Towers bombing, including: (a) the assignment of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to be the Secretary of Defense's principal advisor on antiterrorism; (b) the direction of the five geographic combatant commanders to take on increased antiterrorism responsibilities; (c) vulnerability assessments at installations by the Defense Special Weapons Agency; (d) mandated, more robust antiterrorism training for personnel deployed to medium- and high-threat countries; (e) the establishment of a centrally controlled fund to support emergency high-priority antiterrorism requirements not funded by the services; and (f) changes in the services' approach to antiterrorism; and (6) despite these changes, GAO's work raised concerns that DOD's initiatives were falling short of establishing a comprehensive and consistent approach to antiterrorism.