Key Domestic Ports Handle Vast Majority of Energy Imports

The United States imports about 65 percent of its crude oil and petroleum  products as well as about 3 percent of its natural gas needs. Overseas, terrorists  have demonstrated the ability to carry out at least three types of threats. Second is a standoff  missile attack using a rocket or some other weapon launched from a  distance. For instance, LNG and LPG are highly combustible and pose a risk to  public safety of fire or—in a more unlikely scenario in which they are in a  confined space—explosion. In addition to maritime suicide attacks, terrorists have also targeted  energy facilities on land. In some locations, however, the Coast  Guard has had difficulty meeting its own self-imposed requirements for  security activity. In U.S. Waterways and Ports, the Primary Challenge Involves Coping with Limited Resources and a Growing Security Workload

Domestically, many agencies and other stakeholders have taken steps to  develop and implement plans for helping ensure the security of maritime  energy commodity shipments. While port security grants and resource sharing agreements are expected  to address at least part of the resource needs of the Coast Guard’s law  enforcement partners, the Coast Guard is likely to require additional  resources to fulfill its own new security responsibilities. Stakeholders Have Developed Spill and Terrorism Response Plans but Face Several Challenges in Integrating Them

To mitigate the consequences of a terrorist attack on a tanker carrying  energy commodities, the United States has multiple plans that address  actions to be taken at the national, port, facility, and vessel levels. To  translate these plans into effective response actions, stakeholders could  face at least three main challenges. Second, port-level plans to mitigate  the potentially substantial economic consequences of an attack, such as  plans that set priorities for the movement of vessels after a port reopens,  could be useful. To date, federal grants for port security have been directed  mostly to prevention rather than response, but now DHS is moving toward  a more comprehensive risk-based decision-making process for allocating  grant funds. Conclusions

The ship-based supply chain for energy commodities remains threatened  and vulnerable, and appropriate security throughout the chain is essential  to ensure safe and efficient delivery. Appendix I: Objective, Scope, and Methodology

The objectives of this report were to (1) determine the types of terrorist  threats to tankers carrying energy commodities and the potential  consequences of a successful attack; (2) describe what measures are being  taken both internationally and domestically to protect these tankers, and  what challenges, if any, federal agencies face in making these actions  effective; and (3) if a terrorist attack succeeds despite these protective  measures, describe what plans are in place to respond and discuss the  potential challenges federal agencies may face in responding to a future  attack. To describe what plans are in place for responding to a terrorist attack,  should one occur despite protective measures, and discuss the challenges  federal agencies may face in responding, we conducted interviews with  officials from the Departments of Homeland Security and Justice; the  Environmental Protection Agency; as well as officials representing port  authorities, state and local offices of public safety and emergency  management, oil and gas facilities, and first responders, including police  and fire departments. Maritime Security: Public Safety Consequences of a Ter a Tanker Carrying Liquefied Natural Gas Need Clarification.
Why GAO Did This Study

U. S. energy needs rest heavily on ship-based imports. Tankers bring 55 percent of the nation's crude oil supply, as well as liquefied gases and refined products like jet fuel. This supply chain is potentially vulnerable in many places here and abroad, as borne out by several successful overseas attacks on ships and facilities. GAO's review addressed (1) the types of threats to tankers and the potential consequences of a successful attack, (2) measures taken to protect tankers and challenges federal agencies face in making these actions effective, and (3) plans in place for responding to a successful attack and potential challenges stakeholders face in responding. GAO's review spanned several foreign and domestic ports, and multiple steps to analyze data and gather opinions from agencies and stakeholders.

What GAO Found

The supply chain faces three main types of threats--suicide attacks such as explosive-laden boats, "standoff" attacks with weapons launched from a distance, and armed assaults. Highly combustible commodities such as liquefied gases have the potential to catch fire or, in a more unlikely scenario, explode, posing a threat to public safety. Attacks could also have environmental consequences, and attacks that disrupt the supply chain could have a severe economic impact. Much is occurring, internationally and domestically, to protect tankers and facilities, but significant challenges remain. Overseas, despite international agreements calling for certain protective steps, substantial disparities exist in implementation. The United States faces limitations in helping to increase compliance, as well as limitations in ensuring safe passage on vulnerable transport routes. Domestically, units of the Coast Guard, the lead federal agency for maritime security, report insufficient resources to meet its own self imposed security standards, such as escorting ships carrying liquefied natural gas. Some units' workloads are likely to grow as new liquefied natural gas facilities are added. Coast Guard headquarters has not developed plans for shifting resources among units. Multiple attack response plans are in place to address an attack, but stakeholders face three main challenges in making them work. First, plans for responding to a spill and to a terrorist threat are generally separate from each other, and ports have rarely exercised these plans simultaneously to see if they work effectively together. Second, ports generally lack plans for dealing with economic issues, such as prioritizing the movement of vessels after a port reopens. The President's maritime security strategy calls for such plans. Third, some ports report difficulty in securing response resources to carry out planned actions. Federal port security grants have generally been directed at preventing attacks, not responding to them, but a more comprehensive risk-based approach is being developed. Decisions about the need for more response capabilities are hindered, however, by a lack of performance measures tying resource needs to effectiveness in response.