DOD and DOE Strategic Plans for Threat Reduction and Nonproliferation Programs Are Not Integrated and Do Not Address U.S. Programs Worldwide

DOD and DOE prepare their own individual strategies to implement their  respective threat reduction and nonproliferation programs, but there is no  governmentwide strategy that integrates them with one another or with  those of other agencies that implement threat reduction and  nonproliferation programs. Furthermore, these programs are expanding beyond the FSU and may  potentially involve the response of multiple U.S. agencies. DOD and DOE Strategies for Threat Reduction and Nonproliferation Programs Generally Meet Criteria Established by the Government Performance and Results Act

DOD and DOE each have strategic plans governing their respective threat  reduction and nonproliferation programs. We found that this strategy generally  contains the elements of a strategic plan developed using GPRA criteria. Each project has a plan that details its broad mission,  specific objectives, external factors that could affect the achievement of  these objectives, metrics that are used to evaluate the performance of the  project, and cost estimates. In accordance with GPRA  criteria, DNN plans include cost estimates and cover a period of 5 years. To comply with the requirements  of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002, as  amended, the President submitted a plan and an annual report on the  implementation of the plan covering all agency efforts to secure nuclear  weapons, material, and expertise in the FSU. NSC Staff Guidance Delineating Agencies’ Roles, Information Sharing, and Dispute Resolution Results in Improved Program Coordination

On the basis of our review of NSC staff guidance and discussions with DOD  and DOE officials, we found that coordination among programs that share  similar missions, goals, and activities is improved when each agency’s roles  and responsibilities are delineated, information sharing is formalized, and  procedures for resolving interagency disputes are clear. While the majority  of programs in DOD and DOE are distinct, three program areas perform  similar functions in the FSU: (1) improving the security of sites where  Russian nuclear warheads are stored, (2) employing former biological  weapons scientists, and (3) enhancing the ability of countries to secure  their borders against the smuggling of WMD materials. By contrast, there is no governmentwide  guidance delineating the roles and responsibilities of agencies managing  border security programs. In  September 2002, NSC staff issued guidelines governing the coordination of  the biological weapons scientist employment programs, which addressed  these three elements. We also reviewed DOD, DOE, and State documents  regarding their border security programs. Weapons of Mass Destruction: Reducing the Threat From the Former  Soviet Union.
Why GAO Did This Study

Since 1992, the Congress has provided more than $7 billion for threat reduction and nonproliferation programs in the former Soviet Union (FSU). These programs have played a key role in addressing the threats of weapons of mass destruction and are currently expanding beyond the FSU. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004 mandated that GAO assess (1) Department of Defense (DOD) and Department of Energy (DOE) strategies guiding their threat reduction and nonproliferation programs and (2) efforts to coordinate DOD, DOE, and Department of State threat reduction and nonproliferation programs that share similar missions.

What GAO Found

GAO found that there is no overall strategy that integrates the threat reduction and nonproliferation programs of the DOD, DOE, and others. DOD and DOE have strategies governing their respective programs, which generally contain the elements of a strategy as established by the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993. These strategies include a mission statement and goals, identify external factors that could affect meeting these goals, establish metrics to evaluate the performance of the programs, provide cost estimates, and cover a period of at least 5 years. Given the involvement of multiple agencies, and the expansion of the threat reduction and nonproliferation programs beyond the FSU, integration of agencies' strategies is important. The agencies' implementation of very similar programs has not always been well coordinated. While the majority of programs in DOD and DOE are distinct, GAO found three program areas that perform similar functions in the FSU. GAO found that the coordination of programs enhancing security at Russian nuclear warhead sites improved after the National Security Council (NSC) staff issued guidance. Specifically, the guidance delineates agencies' roles, interactions, and ways to resolve disputes. The biological weapons scientist employment programs in DOD, DOE, and State are well coordinated and also have NSC staff guidance addressing roles, interactions, and disputes. By contrast, there is no governmentwide guidance delineating the roles and responsibilities of agencies managing border security programs. According to DOD and DOE officials managing these programs, agencies' roles are not well delineated and coordination could be improved.