	Background

TSA is the primary federal agency responsible for overseeing the security  of surface transportation systems, including developing a national strategy  and implementing security programs. TSA Has Taken Some Actions to Implement a Risk Management Approach but Could Do More to Inform the Allocation of Resources across the Surface Transportation Sector

In March 2009, we reported that TSA has taken some actions called for by  the NIPP’s risk management process, but has not conducted  comprehensive risk assessments across aviation and four major surface  transportation modes. Consequently, we recommended that TSA conduct  comprehensive risk assessments for the transportation sector to produce a  comparative analysis of risk across the entire transportation sector, which  the agency could use to guide current and future investment decisions. For example, we  reported in June 2009 that TSA had not conducted its own risk assessment  of mass transit and passenger rail systems that combined all three risk  elements, as called for by the NIPP. For example, in April 2009,  we reported that TSA’s efforts to assess security threats to freight rail  could be strengthened. We recommended that TSA  expand its efforts to include all security threats in its freight rail security  strategy. DHS concurred with this recommendation and has since reported  that TSA has developed a Critical Infrastructure Risk Tool to measure the  criticality and vulnerability of freight railroad bridges. We expect to issue this report by the end of this year. TSA Has Generally Improved Coordination with Key Stakeholders but Additional Actions Could Enhance Current Efforts to Improve Surface Transportation Security

TSA has developed several initiatives to improve coordination with its  federal, state, and private sector stakeholders. For example, we reported in April 2009 that federal and industry  stakeholders have taken a number of steps to coordinate their freight rail  security efforts, such as implementing agreements to clarify roles and  responsibilities and participating in various information-sharing  mechanisms. For example, we reported that TSA was not requesting data on  deficiencies in security plans and training activities collected by FRA,  which could be useful to TSA in developing regulations requiring high-risk  rail carriers to develop and implement security plans. To improve  coordination, we recommended that DHS work with federal partners such  as FRA to ensure that all relevant information, including threat  assessments, is shared. DHS concurred with the recommendation. Using Targeted, Outcome-Oriented Performance Measures Could Help TSA Better Monitor Strategy and Program Effectiveness

In accordance with Executive Order 13416 and requirements of the 9/11  Commission Act, DHS, through TSA, has developed national strategies for  each surface transportation mode. Similarly, in June 2009, we reported that  TSA’s Mass Transit Modal Annex identified sectorwide goals that apply to  all modes of transportation as well as subordinate objectives specific to  mass transit and passenger rail systems, but did not contain measures or  targets on the effectiveness of operations of the security programs  identified in the annex. DHS concurred with both of these recommendations. As part of our ongoing review of TSA’s efforts to help ensure pipeline  security, we are assessing the extent to which TSA has measured efforts to  strengthen pipeline security. Also, developing additional performance measures—particularly outcome- based measures—that assess the effects of TSA’s efforts in strengthening  pipeline security and are aligned with transportation-sector goals and  pipeline security objectives could better enable TSA to evaluate security  improvements in the pipeline industry. TSA Has More Than Doubled Its Surface Transportation Inspector Workforce but Faces Challenges in Balancing Priorities and Directing Current and Future Workforce Needs

Over the past two years, TSA has reported having more than doubled the  size of its Surface Transportation Security Inspection Program, expanding  the program from 93 inspectors in June 2008 to 201 inspectors in April  2010. Workforce Planning: At the time of our June 2009 report, TSA did not  have a human capital or other workforce plan for its Surface  Transportation Security Inspection Program, but the agency had plans  to conduct a staffing study to identify the optimal workforce size to  address its current and future program needs.
Why GAO Did This Study

Terrorist attacks on surface transportation facilities in Moscow, Mumbai, London, and Madrid caused casualties and highlighted the vulnerability of such systems. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA), within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), is the primary federal agency responsible for security of transportation systems. This testimony focuses on the extent to which (1) DHS has used risk management in strengthening surface transportation security, (2) TSA has coordinated its strategy and efforts for securing surface transportation with stakeholders, (3) TSA has measured the effectiveness of its surface transportation security-improvement actions, and (4) TSA has made progress in deploying surface transportation security inspectors and related challenges it faces in doing so. GAO's statement is based on public GAO products issued from January to June 2009, selected updates from September 2009 to April 2010, and ongoing work on pipeline security. For the updates and ongoing work, GAO analyzed TSA's pipeline risk assessment model, reviewed relevant laws and program management documents, and interviewed TSA officials.

What GAO Found

DHS has taken actions to implement a risk management approach but could do more to inform resource allocation based on risk across the surface transportation sector--including the mass transit and passenger rail, freight rail, highway, and pipeline modes. For example, in March 2009, GAO reported that TSA had not conducted comprehensive risk assessments to compare risk across the entire transportation sector, which the agency could use to guide investment decisions, and recommended that TSA do so. TSA concurred, and in April 2010 noted planned actions. GAO has also made recommendations to strengthen risk assessments within individual modes, such as expanding TSA's efforts to include all security threats in its freight rail security strategy, including potential sabotage to bridges, tunnels, and other critical infrastructure. DHS concurred and is addressing the recommendations. TSA has generally improved coordination with key surface transportation stakeholders, but additional actions could enhance its efforts. For example, GAO reported in April 2009 that although federal and industry stakeholders have taken steps to coordinate their freight rail security efforts, TSA was not requesting another federal agency's data that could be useful in developing regulations for high-risk rail carriers. GAO recommended that DHS work with its federal partners to ensure that all relevant information, such as threat assessments, is shared. DHS concurred with this recommendation and recently stated that TSA has met with key federal stakeholders regarding sharing relevant assessment information and avoiding duplication. TSA has developed national strategies for each surface transportation mode, but using targeted, outcome-oriented performance measures could enable TSA to better monitor the effectiveness of these strategies and programs that support them. For example, GAO reported in June 2009 that TSA's mass transit strategy identified sectorwide goals, but did not contain measures or targets for program effectiveness. Such measures could help TSA track progress in securing transit and passenger rail systems. GAO also reported in April 2009 that TSA's freight rail security strategy could be strengthened by including targets for three of its four performance measures and revising its approach for the other measure, such as including more reliable baseline data to improve consistency in quantifying results. GAO recommended in both instances that TSA strengthen its performance measures. DHS concurred and noted planned actions. Preliminary findings from GAO's ongoing review of pipeline security show that TSA has taken some actions to monitor progress, but could better measure pipeline security improvements. GAO expects to issue a report by the end of 2010. GAO reported in June 2009 that TSA had more than doubled its surface transportation inspector workforce and expanded the roles and responsibilities of surface inspectors, but faced challenges balancing aviation and surface transportation priorities and had not completed a workforce plan to direct current and future program needs. TSA has initiated but not yet finished a staffing study to identify the optimal size of its inspector workforce.