NRC and the Agreement States Lack Complete Information on Numbers of Sealed Sources

The number of sealed sources in use today in the United States is unknown  primarily because no state or federal agency tracks individual sealed  sources. Over 1,300 Devices Containing Sealed Sources Have Been Reported Lost, Stolen, or Abandoned Since 1998

Since 1998, there have been more than 1,300 incidents where devices  containing sealed sources have been reported lost, stolen, or abandoned in  the United States, an average of about 250 per year. The majority of these  lost devices were subsequently recovered. Security for devices containing sealed sources varied among  facilities we visited in 10 states. In addition, NRC’s licensing process to  obtain sealed sources presents a potential security weakness, namely that  approved applicants may purchase sealed sources as soon as a new license  is issued by mail. Because the process assumes that the applicant is acting  in good faith, it is possible that sealed sources can be obtained for  malicious intent. NRC licensing procedures do not require inspection of licensee facilities  before the issuance of a license. NRC Efforts to Improve Security over Sealed Sources Have Been Limited and Disagreement Exists over the Appropriate Role of the States

Efforts undertaken by NRC and agreement states to strengthen the security  of sealed sources for medical, industrial, and research use have only, to  date, required large irradiator facilities to take specific actions. Additional  orders to licensees that possess high-risk sealed sources are expected to  follow. NRC intends to develop and  implement all additional security measures on licensees with sealed  sources, including those licensed by agreement states. However, 82 percent  of agreement states responding to our survey feel they should be  responsible for inspecting and enforcing security measures for sealed  sources in their states under their authority to ensure public health and  safety. Conclusions

The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, have changed the focus of  radioactive sealed sources regulation. Finally, to ensure that the federal and state governments’ efforts to provide  additional security to sealed sources are adequately integrated and  evaluated for their effectiveness, we recommend that the Chairman of  NRC:  determine how officials in agreement and non-agreement states can  participate in the development and implementation of additional  security measures and  include criteria and performance measures of the NRC’s and the  agreement states’ implementation of additional security measures in  NRC’s periodic evaluations of its and agreement states’ effectiveness. Furthermore, our report discusses that NRC’s security order to large  irradiators was issued on June 5, 2003. However, other sealed radioactive sources could also be  used as a terrorist weapon. 2. 4. To determine the number and types of sealed source licenses in the United  States and the number of sealed sources lost, stolen, or abandoned, we  relied upon information provided by state radiation control programs in  their responses to our survey. Why? September 11, 2001, to improve the  controls over radiological sources? 3. 12.
Why GAO Did This Study

Sealed radioactive sources, radioactive material encapsulated in stainless steel or other metal, are used worldwide in medicine, industry, and research. These sealed sources could be a threat to national security because terrorists could use them to make "dirty bombs." GAO was asked to determine (1) the number of sealed sources in the United States, (2) the number of sealed sources lost, stolen, or abandoned, (3) the effectiveness of federal and state controls over sealed sources, and (4) the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and state efforts since September 11, 2001, to strengthen security of sealed sources.

What GAO Found

The number of sealed sources in the United States is unknown because NRC and states track numbers of licensees instead of individual sealed sources. Users of certain devices containing sealed sources are not required to apply to NRC for a license. Accounting for these devices has been difficult. In addition, since 1998, more than 1,300 incidents have taken place in the United States where sealed sources have been lost, stolen, or abandoned. The majority of these lost devices were recovered. Security for sealed sources varied among the facilities GAO visited in 10 states. Also, a potential security weakness exists in NRC's licensing process to obtain sealed sources. Approved applicants may buy sealed sources as soon as a new license is issued by mail. Because the process assumes that the applicant is acting in good faith and it can take NRC as long as 12 months before conducting an inspection, it is possible that sealed sources can be obtained for malicious intent. In addition, NRC currently evaluates the effectiveness of state regulatory programs, but these evaluations do not assess the security of sealed sources. Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, NRC and states have notified licensees of the need for heightened awareness to security, but have not required any specific actions to improve security. NRC has been developing additional security measures since the attacks, and issued the first security order to large facilities that irradiate such items as medical supplies and food on June 5, 2003. Additional orders to licensees that possess high risk sealed sources are expected to follow. NRC and states disagree over the appropriate role of states in efforts to improve security. NRC intends to develop and implement all additional security measures on licensees with sealed sources, including those licensed by states. However, over 80 percent of states responding to our survey feel they should be given responsibility to inspect and enforce security measures.