United States Supported Several Multilateral Efforts to Address Nuclear Networks, but Some Proposals Have Not Been Adopted

The United States has initiated a range of multilateral efforts and  proposals to counter nuclear proliferation networks. Although multilateral  organizations have adopted some U.S. proposals that would help address  illicit nuclear proliferation networks, they have not adopted others. Third, with U.S.  support, IAEA has taken several actions to address proliferation networks,  such as establishing a unit intended to analyze covert nuclear trade  activities. The United States Negotiated Passage of UN Resolution 1540 to Combat WMD Proliferation

The United States negotiated the passage of a UN Security Council  resolution that obligated all member states to adopt laws and regulations  prohibiting the proliferation of WMD. NSG  periodically updates and strengthens its guidelines on how member states  should control and license sensitive technologies and maintain lists of the  technologies to be controlled. NSG has not adopted two U.S. proposals announced by the President in  2004. However, IAEA has not yet adopted a  recommendation that calls for member states to provide it with export  data that would allow the agency to better detect covert nuclear activities. Impact of U.S. However, the impact of this  assistance is difficult to determine because State did not evaluate either  the proliferation risk for all of the countries in which network activities  are alleged to have occurred or the results of its assistance efforts. From fiscal years 2003 through 2006, the U.S. government provided about  $9 million, or 4 percent of the overall total, to seven countries in which  A.Q. Agencies Do Not Consistently Assess Their Programs

Despite U.S. government efforts to provide bilateral assistance to  countries to help them improve their export control systems, it is difficult  to determine the impact of these programs because State did not  consistently conduct or document risk analyses as a basis for countries to  receive assistance and has not assessed the program performance. State’s Risk Analyses Are Undocumented and Incomplete

While both State’s and Energy’s assistance programs conduct risk analyses  on a country-by-country basis to prioritize assistance efforts, State did not  conduct one such analysis for each country in its program and did not  document the ones it conducted. EXBS program assessments characterize features of a country’s export  control system but do not evaluate the impact of U.S. training on the  country. Agencies Cannot Identify Information to Assess Whether Their Ability to Combat Nuclear Proliferation Networks Has Improved

U.S. agencies engaged in export control enforcement activities are  impaired from judging their progress in preventing nuclear proliferation  networks because they cannot readily identify basic information on the  number, nature, or details of all their enforcement activities involving  nuclear proliferation. State disagreed with our finding that it did not conduct program  assessments for about 60 percent of its participating countries, asserting  that it conducted program assessments for all six of the countries in the  scope of our review that received EXBS funding. To identify the status of U.S. efforts to strengthen multilateral controls to  counter nuclear proliferation networks, we reviewed program  documentation and interviewed knowledgeable officials from key U.S.  agencies: DOD, Energy, and State. To assess the impact of U.S. bilateral assistance to help other countries  improve their legal and regulatory controls against nuclear proliferation  networks, we reviewed program documentation and interviewed  knowledgeable officials from key U.S. agencies: DOD, Energy, and State. As we stated in our report, the  EXBS strategic plan did not identify a risk level for 11 of the 56  countries to which it provided assistance between fiscal years 2003  and 2006.
Why GAO Did This Study

For decades, the United States has tried to impede nuclear proliferation networks that provide equipment to nuclear weapons development programs in countries such as Pakistan and Iran. GAO was asked to examine U.S. efforts to counter nuclear proliferation networks, specifically the (1) status of U.S. efforts to strengthen multilateral controls, (2) impact of U.S. assistance to help other countries improve their legal and regulatory controls, and (3) impact of U.S. efforts to strengthen its enforcement activities. GAO's findings focused on seven countries where network activities reportedly occurred.

What GAO Found

The United States has advocated several multilateral actions to counter nuclear proliferation networks. Although multilateral bodies have adopted some U.S. proposals, they have not adopted others. For example, the United States negotiated passage of a United Nations Security Council resolution that obligated all member states to adopt laws and regulations prohibiting the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. It also led the development of watch lists of nuclear technologies that are not formally controlled by states and formation of a multilateral unit intended to analyze covert nuclear trade activities. However, one multilateral body has not adopted two key U.S. proposals made in 2004 to commit its members to add new restrictions on exporting sensitive nuclear technologies. Also, one multilateral organization has not adopted a recommendation for member states to provide it with more export data that would allow it to better detect covert nuclear activities. The impact of U.S. bilateral assistance to strengthen countries' abilities to counter nuclear networks is uncertain because U.S. agencies do not consistently assess the results of this assistance. The impact of this assistance is difficult to determine because the Department of State did not evaluate either (1) the proliferation risk for all of the countries in which network activities are alleged to have occurred or (2) the results of its assistance efforts. Between 2003 and 2006, State and the Department of Energy provided about $9 million to improve the export controls of seven countries in which nuclear proliferation network activities reportedly occurred. State did not evaluate either (1) the proliferation risk for all of the countries in which network activities are alleged to have occurred or (2) the results of its assistance efforts. State did not perform risk analyses for 11 of the 56 countries in its program for those years and did not document the basis for each country's proliferation threat level or explain how the risk analyses were done. Of the six countries in our study to which State provided assistance, State performed risk analyses for five. Also, State did not conduct program assessments for about 60 percent of its participating countries and for two of the six countries in our study that received assistance. Moreover, while State's program assessments characterize a country's export control system and its weaknesses, they do not assess how U.S. training efforts contributed to correcting weaknesses. Relevant U.S. agencies are impaired from judging their progress in preventing nuclear networks because they cannot readily identify basic information on the number, nature, or details of all their enforcement activities involving nuclear proliferation. The U.S. government identified the prevention of nuclear proliferation as a high priority. U.S. agencies collect information, maintain lists of companies and individuals that they sanction, and maintain case files on investigations of suspected violations of U.S. law. However, most of these agencies cannot readily identify which enforcement activities involve nuclear proliferation as they cannot ensure that searching their case file databases for words, such as nuclear, would reveal all relevant cases.