U.S.-India engagement on shared security interests is a topic of interest to the U.S. Congress, where there is considerable support for a deepened U.S. partnership with the world's largest democracy. This report includes a brief outline of American security interests in relation to India, followed by an in-depth discussion of India's strategic interests and defense posture. These sections provide context for a review of the variously convergent and divergent strategic interests of both countries. It concludes with a brief discussion of the outlook for future security bilateral cooperation. A companion piece to this report—CRS Report R42823, India-U.S. Security Relations: Current Engagement , by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed]—discusses the details of current U.S.-India security engagement. Review of US-India Security Relations, 1947-2005

In the early decades following Indian independence, the potential for positive security relations between Washington and New Delhi was hindered by three largely intertwined disagreements: The first was rooted in the all-consuming Cold War calculus and ostensibly nonaligned India's Soviet tilt (the latter being a function of India's strongly-held anti-colonialist sentiments following nearly a century under London's direct rule as the "crown jewel" of the British Empire). As the largest, most populous and most economically successful country in the region, India is an avid champion of counterterrorism efforts in the region. The Defense Department's 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review stated that as India's "military capabilities grow, [the country] will contribute to Asia as a net provider of security in the Indian Ocean and beyond." In June 2012, the two countries upgraded their ties to a strategic and cooperative partnership. Areas of Divergent Perspectives and Other Obstacles

Differing geopolitical, historic and economic experiences of the United States and India constitute the basis for considerable friction on a number of foreign policies and perspectives. India is also reported to be wary of intelligence and military contacts between the United States and its South Asian neighbors, particularly Pakistan. This success speaks to the broad consensus in both political establishments on the importance of the bilateral strategic partnership. The changes also served to open doors to both broader and smoother engagements in bilateral security cooperation and defense trade. Confusion arises from short-term versus long-term analyses of U.S.-India security relations. The Obama Administration—along with numerous pro-India analysts in Washington—has tended to emphasize the anticipated benefits of long-term engagement as opposed to a short-term approach that seeks gains derived through more narrow transactions. This latter tack can have the effect of raising and then thwarting expectations in Washington, as was the case with the ultimate failure of U.S. defense firms to secure the multi-billion-dollar contracts to supply new jets fighters to India. At the same time, growing U.S. frustrations have arisen from the sense that India's enthusiasm for further deepening bilateral security cooperation is limited, and that New Delhi has been insufficiently reciprocating in its approach. Looking ahead, there is widespread concurrence among many officials and analysts, alike, that the security relationship would benefit by undergirding ambitious rhetoric with more concrete action in areas of mutual agreement. In their view, defining which such actions would provide meaningful gains, even on a modest scale, appears to be the central task facing U.S. and Indian policy makers in coming years. Congress can guide the course and pace of this process with legislative consideration and through its oversight of U.S. foreign relations in Asia.
In today's fluid geopolitical environment, the relationship between the United States, the world's oldest democracy and an established global power, and India, its most populous democracy and an aspiring global power, is seen as a key variable in the unfolding international dynamics of the 21st century. As U.S. foreign policy attention shifts toward the Asia-Pacific (or Indo-Pacific) region, and as India's economic and military capabilities grow, Washington's pursuit of a strategic partnership with New Delhi demonstrates that the mutual wariness of the Cold War era has rapidly faded. A vital and in some ways leading aspect of this partnership has been security relations, and today the two countries are engaging in unprecedented levels of military-to-military ties, defense trade, and counterterrorism and intelligence cooperation. Still, although considerable enthusiasm for deepened security engagement is found in both capitals—and not least in the U.S. Congress—there is also a persistent sense that this aspect of the bilateral relationship lacks purpose and focus. Some observers argue that the potential of the relationship has been oversold, and that the benefits either hoped for or expected may not materialize in the near future. While Obama Administration officials variously contend that India is now or will be a net provider of security in its region, many independent analysts are skeptical that this aspiration can be realized, at least in the near-term.
Nongovernmental analyses of the course and pace of U.S.-India security relations are oftentimes incompatible or even conflicting in their assumptions and recommendations. Such incompatibility is frequently the result of the differing conclusions rooted in short-term versus long-term perspectives. The Obama Administration—along with numerous pro-India analysts in Washington—has tended to emphasize the anticipated benefits of long-term engagement as opposed to a short-term approach that seeks gains derived through more narrow transactions. This latter tack can have the effect of raising and then thwarting expectations in Washington, as was the case with the ultimate failure of U.S. defense firms to secure the multi-billion-dollar contracts to supply new combat aircraft to India. At the same time, frustrations among many in the United States have arisen from the sense that India's enthusiasm for further deepening bilateral security cooperation is limited, and that New Delhi's reciprocity has been insufficient.
Looking ahead, there is widespread concurrence among many officials and analysts that the security relationship would benefit from undergirding ambitious rhetoric with more concrete action in areas of mutual agreement. In their view, defining which actions will provide meaningful gains, even on a modest scale, appears to be the central task facing U.S. and Indian policy makers in coming years.
To assist Members of Congress and their staffs in clarifying the status of and outlook for bilateral security cooperation, this report—a companion to CRS Report R42823, India-U.S. Security Relations: Current Engagement, by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed]—takes a systematic approach to the major strategic perspectives held by policy makers in both countries and the ways in which these perspectives are variously harmonious, discordant, or, in some cases, both. The report opens with a brief review of the pre-2005 history of U.S.-India security relations. This is followed by discussion of key U.S. security interests related to India. Next is a focus on India's defense posture writ large. With this context set, the report reviews key areas of convergent and divergent security interests and perspectives. A brief discussion of the outlook for future security cooperation closes. For information on U.S.-India relations more broadly, see CRS Report RL33529, India: Domestic Issues, Strategic Dynamics, and U.S. Relations, coordinated by [author name scrubbed].