Intelligence is valuable only if it can be shared with consumers who need it, but, to the extent that it is more widely shared, risks of compromise are enhanced. The current Director of National Intelligence (DNI), James R. Clapper, has referred to the need to find the "sweet spot" between sharing and protecting information. Better information sharing throughout the Federal Government and especially among the agencies of the Intelligence Community has become a priority for both the Executive Branch and Congress. In the aftermath of 9/11, major legislation included significant provisions to encourage and, in some cases, mandate greater sharing of information and these provisions have been implemented by both the Bush and Obama Administrations. Changes Undertaken in Response to 9/11

Investigations of the September 11, 2001 attacks by the two congressional intelligence committees and the 9/11 Commission (the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States) concluded that a central obstacle to acquiring advance information on the plot was the inability to bring together all information that had been acquired about the plotters—there were many clues but they were retained in the files of different agencies. As the Bush Administration's 2007 National Strategy for Information Sharing stated: 
Information acquired for one purpose, or under one set of authorities, might provide unique insights when combined, in accordance with applicable law, with seemingly unrelated information from other sources, and therefore we must foster a culture of awareness in which people at all levels of government remain cognizant of the functions and needs of others and use knowledge and information from all sources to support counterterrorism efforts. Further, the DNI shall:
(A) establish uniform security standards and procedures; 
(B) establish common information technology standards; protocols, and interfaces;
(C) ensure development of information technology systems that include multi-level security and intelligence integration capabilities; 
(D) establish policies and procedures to resolve conflicts between the need to share intelligence information and the need to protect intelligence sources and methods;
(E) develop an enterprise architecture for the intelligence community and ensure that elements of the intelligence community comply with such architecture; and
(F) have procurement approval authority over all enterprise architecture-related information technology items funded in the National Intelligence Program. The Information Sharing Environment

The President was also directed by the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act to establish an Information Sharing Environment (ISE) to facilitate the sharing of information relating to terrorism among all Federal agencies and state, local and tribal entities. At the same time there are efforts to better protect the security of shared information. The FY2011 Intelligence Authorization bill, H.R. Most recently, the successful attack on Osama Bin Laden in May 2011 has been officially credited to cooperation among the CIA, NSA, and NGA in particular. An investigation by the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee concluded. One U.S. soldier in Iraq was reportedly able to download many thousands of State Department cables and transfer them to unauthorized recipients who published them on the Internet and in a number of newspapers. Most of the messages disseminated to the media were not from intelligence agencies and damage to U.S. intelligence efforts has not been publicly addressed. The WikiLeaks incident reflects a number of concerns that affect intelligence information sharing. Mass leaks of documents that reveal the names of U.S. contacts in foreign countries and foreign governments, including their intelligence services could result in severe repercussions and even death for individuals who have attempted to assist the U.S. Congress may choose to determine if these reports are accurate and if changes currently being planned by the Intelligence Community have been instituted. There is, in short, an active market for classified information held by U.S. intelligence agencies with thousands of officials having some access.
Unauthorized disclosures of classified intelligence are seen as doing significant damage to U.S. security. This is the case whether information is disclosed to a foreign government or published on the Internet. On the other hand, if intelligence is not made available to government officials who need it to do their jobs, enormous expenditures on collection, analysis, and dissemination are wasted. These conflicting concerns require careful and difficult balancing.
Investigations of the 9/11 attacks concluded that both technical and policy barriers had limited sharing of information collected by different agencies that, if viewed together, could have provided useful insight into the unfolding plot. A consensus emerged that U.S. intelligence agencies should share information more widely in order that analysts could integrate clues acquired by different agencies in order to "connect the dots."
Major statutory and regulatory changes were made to facilitate information sharing among agencies. An Information Sharing Environment was created within the new Office of the Director of National Intelligence in order to establish policies, procedures, and technologies to link people, systems, and information from government agencies. In law and in Federal regulations a culture of sharing has been established in the Intelligence Community.
Although government officials maintain that policies designed in recent years to increase sharing have helped prevent a number of serious terrorist attacks and contributed significantly to the May 2, 2011 operation against Osama bin Laden, the results have been uneven and, in some cases, unfortunate. Reviews of the Fort Hood shooting in 2009 and the attempted bombing of a commercial airliner the following Christmas revealed that serious obstacles to information sharing had not been completely overcome. At the same time, wide availability of State Department cables provided the opportunity for massive leaks of classified documents (including some intelligence materials) through the WikiLeaks website and cooperating media.
Despite these developments, support for information sharing among intelligence agencies remains strong within both the executive branch and Congress. Intelligence Community representatives have recently described new technologies and procedures to enhance information security including capabilities to determine who has had access to particular reports. Members of Congress included legislative initiatives to accomplish similar goals in FY2011 intelligence authorization legislation (H.R. 754) that has passed both the House and Senate. The challenge remains, how to manage inherent risks to find the "sweet spot" (the term used by Director of National Intelligence James Clapper) between information security and information sharing.
This report focuses on information acquired, analyzed, and disseminated by agencies of the U.S. Intelligence Community, but these concerns also affect classified information outside the Intelligence Community. Efforts to encourage and regulate sharing between Federal agencies and state, local, and tribal agencies are also important and they are directly addressed in CRS Report R40901, Terrorism Information Sharing and the Nationwide Suspicious Activity Report Initiative: Background and Issues for Congress, by [author name scrubbed] and CRS Report R40602, The Department of Homeland Security Intelligence Enterprise: Operational Overview and Oversight Challenges for Congress, by [author name scrubbed]. Further background can be found in CRS Report RL34177, A Summary of Fusion Centers: Core Issues and Options for Congress, by [author name scrubbed] and John Rollins.