According to CBP,  it is one of the largest, most important law enforcement systems currently  in use, and is the primary system available to CBP officers and agents  from other departments for use in determining the admissibility of persons  wishing to enter the country. The system is managed by CBP’s Office of Passenger  Systems Program Office and is currently hosted at CBP’s datacenter. TECS’s obsolescence also makes it difficult and expensive to  maintain and support. It is to be fully  operational by March 2015. Schedule and Cost of Both TECS Modernization Programs Are Unclear

CBP has begun delivering functionality to its users; however, its schedule  and cost commitments continue to change and are still being revised. Specifically, CBP intends to modernize the functionality, data, and aging  infrastructure of legacy TECS and move it to DHS’s data centers. To date, CBP has  completed one of these five projects, having completed its deployment of  functionality to improve its secondary inspection processes to air, sea,  and land ports of entry in 2013. CBP is in the process of revising its  schedule baseline for the second time in under a year, making it unclear  when the program ultimately intends to deliver needed functionality. Exacerbating this situation is the fact that CBP has not developed its  master schedule sufficiently to effectively manage work activities or  monitor the program’s progress. However, as previously  stated, the program is in the process of revising its estimate, and thus, it  is unclear how much it will cost to complete the program. Meanwhile, ICE is replanning its $818 million TECS Mod program, having  determined in June 2013 that the system under development was not  technically viable and could not support ICE’s needs—this coming after  having already reduced the scope of its initial program installment by  about 70 percent due to protracted technical difficulties and schedule  delays. In January 2014, ICE reported that it had rebaselined its  program requirements and that it anticipates having its revised cost and  schedule estimates finalized this coming spring. TECS Modernization’s Risk Management Is Generally Consistent with Leading Practices, but Requirements Management Has Had Mixed Results

Both CBP and ICE implemented risk management practices that are  generally—though not fully—consistent with leading practices, and both  had mixed results in managing program requirements. Specifically,  neither program identified all known risks, nor escalated them for timely  review by senior management. ICE issued new  requirements guidance for the program in March 2013 that is consistent  with leading practices, but has yet to demonstrate that these have been  fully implemented. DHS’s Governance Bodies Have Taken Actions Aligned with Leading Practices, but Incomplete and Inaccurate Data Have Limited Their Effectiveness

DHS’s governance bodies have taken actions to oversee the two TECS  Mod programs that are generally aligned with leading practices. Specifically, they have monitored TECS Mod performance and progress  and have ensured that corrective actions have been identified and  tracked. However, a lack of complete, timely, and accurate data have  affected the ability of these governance bodies to make informed and  timely decisions, thus limiting their effectiveness. Until these governance bodies base their reviews of performance on  timely, complete, and accurate data, they will be limited in their ability to  effectively provide oversight and to make timely decisions. Implementation of Recommendations Could Improve DHS’s Efforts to Develop and Implement Its TECS Mod Programs

In our report, we made several recommendations to improve DHS’s  efforts to develop and implement its TECS Mod programs. Specifically,  we recommended that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct the CBP  Commissioner to: (1) develop an integrated master schedule that  accurately reflects all of the program’s work activities, as well as the  timing, sequencing, and dependencies between them; (2) ensure that all  significant risks associated with the TECS Mod acquisition are  documented in the program’s risk and issue inventory—including  acquisition risks mentioned in our report—and are briefed to senior  management, as appropriate; (3) revise and implement the TECS Mod  program’s risk management strategy and guidance to include clear  thresholds for when to escalate risks to senior management, and  implement as appropriate; and (4) revise and implement the TECS Mod  program’s requirements management guidance to include the validation  of requirements to ensure that each is unique, unambiguous, and  testable. DHS concurred with all but one of our recommendations, disagreeing with  the recommendation regarding the weaknesses in CBP’s schedule. However, given the weaknesses in CBP’s master schedule, we  continue to believe that management will be unable to determine how a  slip in the completion date of a particular task may affect the overall  project or program schedule, and thus, absent any changes, continuing to  use it as a tool to track progress will remain ineffective. This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the  United States.
Why GAO Did This Study

DHS's border enforcement system, known as TECS, is the primary system for determining admissibility of persons to the United States. It is used to prevent terrorism, and provide border security and law enforcement, case management, and intelligence functions for multiple federal, state, and local agencies. It has become increasingly difficult and expensive to maintain and is unable to support new mission requirements. In 2008, DHS began an effort to modernize the system. It is being managed as two separate programs by CBP and ICE.
In December 2013, GAO reported that DHS needed to strengthen its efforts to modernize these key enforcement systems. This statement summarizes that report. Specifically, it covers (1) the scope and status of the two TECS Mod programs, (2) selected program management practices for TECS Mod, (3) the extent to which DHS is executing effective oversight and governance of the two TECS Mod programs, and (4) the importance of addressing our recommendations for improving DHS's development efforts.

What GAO Found

The schedule and cost for the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) border enforcement system modernization program known as TECS Mod that is managed by Customs and Border Protection's (CBP) continue to change; while the part managed in parallel by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) is undergoing major revisions to its scope, schedule, and cost after discovering that its initial solution is not technically viable. CBP's $724 million program intends to modernize the functionality, data, and aging infrastructure of legacy TECS and move it to DHS's data centers by 2016. To date, CBP has deployed functionality to improve its secondary inspection processes to air and sea ports of entry and, more recently, to land ports of entry in 2013. However, CBP is in the process of revising its schedule baseline for the second time in under a year. Further, CBP has not developed its master schedule sufficiently to reliably manage work activities or monitor program progress. These factors raise questions about the certainty of CBP's remaining schedule commitments. Regarding ICE's $818 million TECS Mod program, it is redesigning and replanning its program, having determined in June 2013 that its initial solution was not viable and could not support ICE's needs. As a result, ICE largely halted development and is now assessing design alternatives and is revising its schedule and cost estimates. Program officials stated the revisions will be complete in spring 2014. Until ICE completes the replanning effort, it is unclear what functionality it will deliver, when it will deliver it, or what it will cost to do so, thus putting it in jeopardy of not completing the modernization by its 2015 deadline.
CBP and ICE have managed many risks in accordance with some leading practices, but they have had mixed results in managing requirements for their programs. In particular, neither program identified all known risks, nor escalated them for timely management review. Further, CBP's guidance reflects most leading practices for effectively managing requirements, but important requirements development activities were underway before such guidance was established. ICE, meanwhile, operated without requirements management guidance for years, and its requirements activities were mismanaged, resulting in testing failures and delays. ICE issued requirements guidance in March 2013 that is consistent with leading practices, but it has not yet been implemented.
DHS's governance bodies have taken actions to oversee the two TECS Mod programs that are generally aligned with leading practices. Specifically, they have monitored TECS Mod performance and progress and have ensured that corrective actions have been identified and tracked. However, a lack of complete, timely, and accurate data have affected the ability of these governance bodies to make informed and timely decisions, thus limiting their effectiveness. Until these governance bodies base their performance reviews on timely, complete, and accurate data, they will be constrained in their ability to effectively provide oversight.

What GAO Recommends

GAO is making no new recommendations in this statement. In its December 2013 report, GAO recommended that DHS improve its efforts to manage requirements and risk, as well as its governance of the TECS Mod programs. DHS agreed with all but one of GAO's eight recommendations, disagreeing with the recommendation about improving CBP's master schedule. GAO continues to believe improvements are necessary to validate schedule commitments and monitor progress.