Combat forces are exclusively military, whether active-duty or reserve. In response to this request we examined (1) DOD and service efforts to replace military personnel in peacetime support positions with DOD civilian employees and (2) the adequacy of planning for the future use of DOD civilian employees and contractor personnel to support military forces in theaters of contingency operations. To determine the number of DOD civilian employees and contractor personnel who deployed to the Gulf War, the functions they performed, and problems associated with their deployment, we reviewed DOD’s April 1992 final report to the Congress, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, with a particular focus on the “Civilian Support” appendix. Some of our reports and other DOD-sponsored studies show that civilian employees generally cost the government less than military personnel. In addition, a preference for using military personnel has often existed because the military personnel system provides a high degree of management control. Inadequate Integration Between Requirements and Budgeting Processes Hampers Military-to-Civilian Replacements

Many DOD and service personnel managers identified the inadequate integration between the process for determining civilian requirements and the budget process that funds these requirements as a barrier against replacing military personnel with civilians. Even when funds are allocated to replace military personnel in support positions with civilians, the services may not be required to use the funds for that purpose. Conclusions

Although DOD and the military services have general policies requiring them to use civilian personnel where possible, the services currently vary in the extent to which they use thousands of military personnel in support positions that, according to DOD and service officials, could be civilian. Eliminating military positions and replacing them with civilians can save significant personnel costs, since some cost analyses estimate that, during peacetime, each civilian costs about $15,000 per year less than a military person of comparable pay grade. Some Corrective Measures Are Being Taken

Each service has modified some of its regulations to respond to the problems identified during the Persian Gulf War. However, these changes have not yet been fully implemented. They have not fully identified civilian employees or contractor personnel who perform combat essential functions and who might be called to deploy.
Why GAO Did This Study

Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Department of Defense's (DOD) guidance and decisionmaking processes for determining when and whether to use civilian or military personnel in support positions, focusing on: (1) DOD and the military services' efforts to replace military personnel in support positions; (2) whether the services have adequately planned for the future use of civilian employees and contractor personnel to support military operations in combat areas; and (3) the actions taken to correct problems concerning civilian deployments to the Persian Gulf War.

What GAO Found

GAO found that: (1) although DOD and the services have attempted to convert military positions to civilian positions, the extent of these changes appears limited, since the ratio of military personnel to civilian personnel has not changed significantly; (2) replacing military personnel with civilian employees could reduce military personnel costs and release military members for use in combat-specific duties; (3) some DOD-sponsored studies have determined that civilian employees in peacetime support functions cost the government about $15,000 less per year than military employees in comparable pay grades; (4) service officials are reluctant to replace military personnel with civilian employees because the military is downsizing, they believe they can exert greater control over military personnel, they often do not receive sufficient funds or information to support civilian replacements, and budget allocation and civilian personnel requirement decisions are often made separately; and (5) the services have made efforts to correct some of the problems identified during the Persian Gulf deployment, but they have not identified their future potential wartime requirements for DOD civilian employees or contractor personnel or taken adequate steps to ensure that these personnel remain in the services for future crises.