Navy’s Use of Human Systems Integration to Optimize Crew Size and Efforts to Establish Crew Size Goals Vary Considerably Across Ship Programs

Despite the potential of human systems integration to optimize crew size  and reduce total ownership costs, the Navy’s use of human systems  integration and goals to reduce crew size varied considerably across the  four new ship acquisition programs we examined. Only the DD(X)  destroyer program used human systems integration extensively to  optimize crewing during the concept and technology development phase  of the acquisition. In contrast, the JCC(X)  command ship and LHA(R) amphibious assault ship programs had not  emphasized human systems integration early in the acquisition process or  developed a comprehensive human systems integration approach. The  Navy’s crew size reduction goals for the four ships range from an  aggressive goal of about 60 to 70 percent on the DD(X) destroyer, to a lack  of any formal reduction goal on the JCC(X) command ship and the LHA(R)  amphibious assault ship. Requirements for using human systems integration and  crew size goals were included in the key acquisition documents to which  program managers are held accountable. T-AKE Cargo Ship Program Used Human Systems Integration in Some Aspects of Ship Design, Expects Crew Size Reductions, but Did Not Establish Specific Crew Size Goals

In developing the T-AKE cargo ship, which is in procurement and is  expected to become operational in 2005, elements of human systems  integration were used to streamline intraship cargo handling and to refine  the requirements for civilian mariners and active-duty personnel. The program also did not hold program  managers accountable for reducing crew size below that of the legacy  command ships. The mission need statement did not require the use of human systems  integration. These factors are (1) neither DOD nor Navy acquisition policies establish  specific requirements for using human systems integration, such as its  timing and whether the approach should be addressed in the key  acquisition documents; (2) funding challenges often result in decisions to  defer human systems integration activities and use legacy subsystems  when acquiring new ships to save near-term costs instead of investing in  research and development to reduce costs over the long term; (3) DOD  and Navy oversight of human systems integration activities is limited and  the Naval Sea Systems Command’s role in certifying that ships delivered to  the fleet have optimum crew sizes is unclear; and (4) the Navy lacks an  effective process to change its long-standing culture and the extensive  network of policies and procedures that have institutionalized current  manning practices. According to the Navy’s human systems integration experts,  labor-saving technology may add to the acquisition cost of a ship but may  also reduce the operating and support costs incurred over the ship’s  service life. Unless the Navy more consistently  applies human systems integration early in the acquisition process and  establishes meaningful goals for crew size reduction, the Navy may miss  opportunities to lower total ownership costs for new ships, which are  determined by decisions made early in the acquisition process. GAO’s Comment

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Why GAO Did This Study

The cost of a ship's crew is the single largest incurred over the ship's life cycle. One way to lower personnel costs, and thus the cost of ownership, is to use people only when it is cost-effective--a determination made with a systems engineering approach called human systems integration. GAO was asked to evaluate the Navy's progress in optimizing the crew size in four ships being developed and acquired: the DD(X) destroyer, T-AKE cargo ship, JCC(X) command ship, and LHA(R) amphibious assault ship. GAO assessed (1) the Navy's use of human systems integration principles and goals for reducing crew size, and (2) the factors that may impede the Navy's use of those principles.

What GAO Found

The Navy's use of human systems integration principles and crew size reduction goals varied significantly for the four ships GAO reviewed. Only the DD(X) destroyer program emphasized human systems integration early in the acquisition process and established an aggressive goal to reduce crew size. The Navy's goal is to cut personnel on the DD(X) by about 70 percent from that of the previous destroyer class--a reduction GAO estimated could eventually save about $18 billion over the life of a 32-ship class. The goal was included in key program documents to which program managers are held accountable. Although the Navy did not set specific crew reduction goals for the T-AKE cargo ship, it made some use of human systems integration principles and expects to require a somewhat smaller crew than similar legacy ships. The two other ships--the recently cancelled JCC(X) command ship and the LHA(R) amphibious assault ship--did not establish human systems integration plans early in the acquisition programs, and did not establish ambitious crew size reduction goals. Unless the Navy more consistently applies human systems integration early in the acquisition process and establishes meaningful goals for crew size reduction, the Navy may miss opportunities to lower total ownership costs for new ships, which are determined by decisions made early in the acquisition process. For example, the Navy has not clearly defined the human systems integration certification standards for new ships. Several factors may impede the Navy's consistent application of human systems integration principles and its use of innovations to optimize crew size: (1) DOD acquisition policies and discretionary Navy guidance that allow program managers latitude in optimizing crew size and using human systems integration, (2) funding challenges that encourage the use of legacy systems to save near-term costs and discourage research and investment in labor-saving technology that could reduce long-term costs, (3) unclear Navy organizational authority to require human systems integration's use in acquisition programs, and (4) the Navy's lack of cultural acceptance of new concepts to optimize crew size and its layers of personnel policies that require consensus from numerous stakeholders to revise.