Concern for Iraq’s minority groups led Congress to issue a series of  directives beginning in June 2007 to provide assistance to these groups. These directives are as follows:
2008 directive: In December 2007, for fiscal year 2008, the House  Committee on Appropriations directed that not less than $10 million of  unobligated Economic Support Fund (ESF) account funds provided in  prior fiscal years for Iraq should be used to assist religious minorities  in the Ninewa plain region of Iraq. As of November 2011, USAID and State reported to Congress that they  had provided about $40 million in assistance for minority groups in Iraq in  response to these directives. First, USAID documents—specifically, the list of  projects the agency submitted to Congress—linked only 26 percent of the  $14.8 million in assistance directly to the Ninewa plain region. Second,  USAID documents generally did not show whether the projects included  minority groups among the beneficiaries of the assistance and,  specifically, whether $8 million of assistance was provided for internally  displaced families. Third, USAID officials and documents did not  demonstrate that the agency used unobligated prior year ESF funds to  initiate projects in response to the 2008 directive. USAID Could Not Demonstrate How It Met the Provisions of the 2008 Directive

Our analysis of USAID documents found that USAID could not  demonstrate that it met the provisions of the 2008 directive because of  three weaknesses. USAID and State Generally Could Demonstrate How They Met the 2008 Supplemental and 2010 Directives

		USAID and State Approved $26.9 Million in Assistance for Minority Groups

According to USAID and State documents, the agencies approved $26.9  million in assistance for minority groups, primarily through the QRF  program.million in response to the 2008 supplemental directive and State  approved $16.5 million of assistance in response to the 2010 directive. State Designated Staff at the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad to Meet a Provision in the 2008 Supplemental Directive

State met the provision of the 2008 supplemental directive to designate  staff at the U.S. embassy in Baghdad to oversee and coordinate  assistance to minority groups. USAID and State Took Five Steps That Generally Demonstrated How They Met the 2008 Supplemental and 2010 Directives

USAID and State could generally demonstrate how they met the 2008  supplemental and 2010 directives through their use of the QRF program,  which served as the primary mechanism for the agencies to categorize,  track, monitor, and report on minority directive projects, among others. As directed by the U.S. embassy in Baghdad, the Office of Provincial  Affairs made support of minority groups one of the thematic goals of  the QRF program in 2008. USAID and State officials categorized projects  in the agencies’ respective QRF program databases by thematic goal. Conducted outreach to identify potential beneficiaries. According  to USAID and State officials, PRTs or the QRF program implementing  partner conducted final site visits and prepared project close-out  reports. Both USAID and State  conducted third-party assessments at the close of their respective  components of the QRF program. USAID and State Continue to Provide and Track Assistance to Iraq’s Minority Groups

According to USAID and State officials, the two agencies have continued  to assist Iraq’s minority groups through the obligation of an additional $28  million in reprogrammed ESF funds from prior fiscal years. Both agencies  submitted technical comments on the draft that were incorporated, as  appropriate. State did not submit an agency comment letter in response  to the draft. In its agency comment letter, USAID remarked that despite  GAO’s findings, USAID met the needs of internally displaced persons and  religious minorities to a greater extent than is presented in this report (see  app. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

Our objectives were to examine the extent to which (1) the U.S. Agency  for International Development (USAID) demonstrated that the assistance  it reported to Congress met the 2008 directive and (2) USAID and the  Department of State (State) demonstrated that the assistance they  reported to Congress met the 2008 supplemental and 2010 directives. This report is a publicly releasable version of a prior GAO report, issued  in May 2012, that State and USAID had designated Sensitive But  Unclassified.
Why GAO Did This Study

Since 2003, minority groups in Iraq have experienced religiously and ethnically motivated attacks, killings, and forced displacements. Concern for Iraqi religious and ethnic minorities led various congressional committees and Congress as a whole to issue a series of directives to provide assistance to these groups.
The 2008 directive directed that $10 million of unobligated ESF funds from prior years be provided to assist religious minorities in the Ninewa plain region of Iraq. The 2008 supplemental and 2010 directives directed that up to $10 million be provided to assist religious and ethnic minority groups in Iraq for each directive. USAID and State reported to Congress that they met the provisions of these three directives by providing $40 million in assistance to Iraqi minority groups.
Congressional requesters asked GAO to examine the extent to which (1) USAID demonstrated that the assistance it reported to Congress met the 2008 directive and (2) USAID and State demonstrated that the assistance they reported to Congress met the 2008 supplemental and 2010 directives. To address these objectives, GAO analyzed documents and interviewed officials from State and USAID in Washington, D.C., and Iraq. This report is a public version of a Sensitive But Unclassified report issued in May 2012.
GAO is not making recommendations. Both agencies provided technical comments on the draft that were incorporated, as appropriate. State did not submit an agency comment letter in response to the draft. In its agency comment letter, USAID stated that it met minority groups needs to a greater extent than is presented in the report. GAO continues to believe that USAID could not demonstrate how its reported assistance met the provisions of the 2008 directive.

What GAO Found

GAO found that the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) could not demonstrate how the projects that it reported to Congress met the provisions of the 2008 directive because of three weaknesses. First, USAID documentsspecifically, the list of projects the agency submitted to Congress linked only $3.8 million of the $14.8 million in assistance (26 percent) directly to the Ninewa plain region. Second, USAID documents generally did not show whether the projects included minority groups among the beneficiaries of the assistance and specifically whether $8 million of assistance was provided for internally displaced families. Third, USAID officials and documents did not demonstrate that the agency used unobligated prior year Economic Support Fund (ESF) funds to initiate projects in response to the 2008 directive.
USAID and the Department of State (State) generally could demonstrate how they met the 2008 supplemental and 2010 directives. According to USAID and State documents, the agencies approved $26.9 million in assistanceprimarily in essential services and humanitarian assistanceto meet the 2008 supplemental and 2010 directives provisions to spend up to $10 million for each directive to assist religious and ethnic minority groups in Iraq (see figure below). In addition, as directed by Congress, the U.S. embassy in Baghdad designated staff at the embassy to oversee and coordinate assistance to minority groups in 2008.
Using the Quick Response Fund (QRF) program, USAID and State took five steps that generally demonstrated how they met the 2008 supplemental and 2010 directives. First, the U.S. embassy in Baghdad directed that support of minority groups be made one of the thematic goals of the QRF program in 2008. Second, USAID and State categorized projects in their respective QRF databases by thematic goal. Third, the U.S. embassy in Baghdad and its Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) conducted outreach to inform potential beneficiaries of the availability of assistance through the QRF program. Fourth, PRTs or the QRF implementing partner conducted final site visits and prepared project close-out reports. Fifth, both USAID and State conducted third-party assessments at the close of their respective components of the QRF program. The QRF program closed and the PRTs ceased their operations by the end of 2011, as planned. According to USAID and State officials, the two agencies continue to assist minority groups through the obligation of an additional $28 million in reprogrammed ESF funds from previous years.