The Departments of Defense and State Have Not Developed a Coordinated, Detailed Plan for Completing and Sustaining the ANSF

Defense and State have not developed a coordinated, detailed plan for  completing and sustaining the Afghan army and police forces, despite our  recommendation in 2005 and a mandate from Congress in 2008 that such a  plan be developed. For example, although the  document provides some broad objectives and performance measures for  training and equipping the ANSF, it identifies few milestones. However, while this military plan  provides needed field guidance, it is not a coordinated Defense and State  plan with near- and long-term resource requirements. Few Afghan Army Units Are Capable of Leading Operations and Efforts to Develop Their Capability Face Several Challenges

The United States has invested over $10 billion to develop the ANA since  2002, but less than 2 percent (2 of 105 ANA units rated) are assessed at  CM1—full operational capability. Finally,  ANA combat units report significant shortages in approximately 40  percent of items defined as critical by Defense, including machine guns  and vehicles. Some of these challenges, such as shortages of mentors and  equipment, are due in part to competing global priorities, according to  senior Defense officials. Without resolving these challenges, the ability of  the ANA to reach full capability may be delayed. Development of a Capable Army Faces Challenges in Manning, Training, and Equipping the Force

U.S. efforts to build the ANA have faced challenges in manning the army,  such as recruiting for leadership positions and retaining personnel;  shortfalls in the number of U.S. trainers and coalition mentors deployed  with ANA units in the field to assist in developing capable ANA forces; and  shortages of critical equipment items. Second, although basic recruiting is strong, the ANA is experiencing  difficulties finding qualified candidates for leadership and specialist  positions. Several Challenges Impede Efforts to Improve Capability of Afghan National Police Forces

Although the ANP has reportedly grown in number since 2005, after an  investment of nearly $6 billion, no police unit is assessed as fully capable  of performing its mission. First, less than one- quarter of the ANP has police mentors present to provide training in the  field and verify that police are on duty. Second, the Afghan police have not  received about one-third of the equipment items Defense considers  critical, and continue to face shortages in several categories of equipment,  including trucks, radios, and body armor. In addition, Afghanistan’s weak  judicial system hinders effective policing, and our analysis of status  reports from the field indicates that the ANP consistently experiences  problems with police pay, corruption, and attacks, including by insurgents. Defense, State, and DynCorp officials all identified the continuing shortfall  in police mentors as a challenge to U.S. efforts to develop the Afghan  police. In 2007, Defense provided a 5-page document in response to our  recommendation. However, this document included few long-term  milestones, no intermediate milestones for judging progress, and no  sustainability strategy. In 2008, Congress mandated that Defense, in  coordination with State, submit reports on a comprehensive and long-term  strategy and budget for strengthening the ANSF and a long-term detailed  plan for sustaining the ANSF. Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix V.

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

To analyze U.S. plans for developing and sustaining the Afghan National  Security Forces (ANSF) and identify the extent to which these plans  contain detailed objectives, milestones, future funding requirements, and  sustainability strategies, we reviewed planning documents from Combined  Security Transition Command—Afghanistan (CSTC-A) and the Office of  the Secretary of Defense, including draft and CSTC-A-approved versions of  the Campaign Plan for the Development of Afghan National Military and  Police Forces (Campaign Plan); a planning document provided by the  Office of the Secretary of Defense; and a Defense briefing on ANSF  sustainment. However, although Defense  and State are partners in training the ANP, the fact remains State did  not participate in the development of the 5-page document Defense  provided to GAO, nor has State developed a plan of its own. We maintain that, without a detailed plan, assessing progress in  developing the ANSF is difficult. Goals.
Why GAO Did This Study

Since 2002, the United States has worked to develop the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). The Department of Defense (Defense), through its Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A), directs U.S. efforts to develop the Afghan National Army (ANA) and, in conjunction with the Department of State (State), the Afghan National Police (ANP). To follow up on recommendations from GAO's 2005 report on the ANSF, GAO analyzed the extent to which U.S. plans for the ANSF contain criteria we recommended. GAO also examined progress made and challenges faced in developing the ANA and ANP. To address these objectives, GAO reviewed Defense, State, and contractor documents and met with cognizant officials. GAO has prepared this report under the Comptroller General's authority to conduct evaluations on his own initiative.

What GAO Found

In 2005, GAO recommended that Defense and State develop detailed plans for completing and sustaining the ANSF. In 2007, Defense provided a document in response to this recommendation. This 5-page document lacks sufficient detail for effective interagency planning and oversight. For example, while the document includes some broad objectives and performance measures, it identifies few long-term milestones and no intermediate milestones for assessing progress, and it lacks a sustainability strategy. Although Defense and State are partners in police training, the document does not include State's input or describe State's role. Further, State has not completed a plan of its own. In January 2008, CSTC-A completed a field-level plan to develop the ANSF that includes force goals, objectives, and performance measures. While this is an improvement over prior field-level planning, it is not a substitute for a coordinated, detailed Defense and State plan with near- and long-term resource requirements. In 2008, Congress mandated that the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Secretary of State, provide a long-term strategy and budget for strengthening the ANSF, and a long-term detailed plan for sustaining the ANSF. These have not been provided. Without a detailed plan, it is difficult to assess progress and conduct oversight of the cost of developing the ANSF. This is particularly important given the limited capacity of the Afghan government to fund the estimated $2 billion per year ANSF sustainment costs for years into the future. The United States has invested over $10 billion to develop the ANA since 2002. However, only 2 of 105 army units are assessed as being fully capable of conducting their primary mission and efforts to develop the army continue to face challenges. First, while the army has grown to approximately 58,000 of an authorized force structure of 80,000, it has experienced difficulties finding qualified candidates for leadership positions and retaining personnel. Second, while trainers or mentors are present in every ANA combat unit, shortfalls exist in the number deployed to the field. Finally, ANA combat units report significant shortages in about 40 percent of equipment items Defense defines as critical, including vehicles, weapons, and radios. Some of these challenges are due in part to competing U.S. global priorities. Without resolving these challenges, the ability of the ANA to reach full capability may be delayed. Although the ANP has reportedly grown in number since 2005, after an investment of over $6 billion, no police unit is fully capable and several challenges impede U.S. efforts to develop the police. First, less than one-quarter of the police have mentors present to provide training in the field and verify that police are on duty. Second, police units continue to face shortages in equipment items that Defense considers critical, such as vehicles, radios, and body armor. In addition, Afghanistan's weak judicial system hinders effective policing and rule of law, and the ANP consistently experiences problems with pay, corruption, and attacks from insurgents. Defense began a new effort in November 2007 to address these challenges, but the continuing shortfall in police mentors may put this effort at risk.