	Background

Five ESE sites collectively contain substantial quantities of Category I  special nuclear material. The Office of Independent Oversight and Performance  Assurance in DOE’s Office of Security and Safety Performance Assurance  supports the department by, among other things, independently evaluating  the effectiveness of contractors’ performance in safeguards and security. The key component  of DOE’s well-established, risk-based security practices is the DBT, a  classified document that identifies the characteristics of the potential  threats to DOE assets. A Number of Issues May Affect the Ability of ESE Sites to Fully Meet the Threat Contained in the New DBT in a Timely Fashion

When we testified before this Subcommittee in April 2004, we stated that  while DOE had issued the final DBT in May 2003, it had only recently  begun to resolve a number of significant issues that could affect the ability  of its sites to fully meet the threat in the new DBT in a timely fashion. Consequently, we stated, full DBT implementation could occur  anywhere from fiscal year 2005 to fiscal year 2008, well beyond the  department’s goal of the end of fiscal year 2006. Specifically, while ESE sites that contain  Category I special nuclear material have developed plans for implementing  the May 2003 DBT, as directed by the Deputy Secretary of Energy, we  believe there are four issues that will make it difficult to implement these  plans in a timely fashion. First, ESE sites approved their implementation plans in February 2004  before the Deputy Secretary of Energy issued his guidance on which sites  had improvised nuclear device vulnerabilities. As a result,  some sites may be required under the 2003 DBT to shift to enhanced  protection strategies, which could be very costly. Consequently, because ESE sites developed their plans well  before this guidance was issued, the assumptions in their plans may no  longer be valid and the plans may need to be revised. Second, the ESE site implementation plans are based on the May 2003  DBT; however, DOE is now reexamining the May 2003 DBT and may revise  it. Consequently, if the DBT is  changed in a way that increases security requirements, some ESE offices  may have to revise their implementation plans to reflect the need to  provide for a more stringent defense. NE security officials  told us that for one site no DBT implementation funding had been  requested for fiscal year 2005, even though the site recognized that it  needed to substantially increase its protective forces to meet the new  DBT. Because of the importance of successfully integrating multiple program  activities with security requirements, we continue to believe, as we  recommended in April 2004, that DOE needs to develop and implement a  departmentwide, multiyear, fully resourced implementation plan for  meeting the May 2003 DBT requirements that includes important  programmatic activities such as the closure of facilities and the  transportation of special nuclear materials.
Why GAO Did This Study

A successful terrorist attack on Department of Energy (DOE) sites containing the material used in nuclear weapons, called special nuclear material, could have devastating consequences for the site and its surrounding communities. Because of these risks, DOE needs an effective safeguards and security program. A key component of an effective program is the design basis threat (DBT), a classified document that identifies, among other things, the potential size and capabilities of terrorist forces. The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, rendered the then-current DBT obsolete resulting in DOE issuing a new version in May 2003. GAO examined the issues that could impede the ability of DOE's Office of Energy, Science and Environment to fully meet the threat contained in the May 2003 DBT by the department's fiscal year 2006 deadline.

What GAO Found

Five Office of Energy, Science and Environment sites contain substantial quantities of Category I special nuclear material, which consists of specified quantities of plutonium and highly enriched uranium. These sites have all developed plans for implementing the May 2003 DBT. However, there are several issues that could make it difficult to implement these plans by DOE's deadline of the end of fiscal year 2006. The Office of Energy, Science and Environment sites approved their DBT implementations plans in February 2004 before the Deputy Secretary of Energy issued his April 2004 guidance on which sites had improvised nuclear device vulnerabilities. As a result, some sites may be required to shift to enhanced protection strategies, which could be very costly. Consequently, the assumptions in the Office of Energy, Science and Environment DBT implementation plans may no longer be valid, and the plans may need to be revised. The Office of Energy, Science and Environment site plans are based on the May 2003 DBT; however, DOE is now reexamining the May 2003 DBT and may revise it. Consequently, if the DBT is changed in a way that increases security requirements, some Office of Energy, Science and Environment sites may have to revise their implementation plans to reflect the need to provide for a more stringent defense. The plan for one Office of Energy, Science and Environment site was under funded. Specifically, officials in the Office of Nuclear Energy, Science and Technology, which is part of the Office of Energy, Science and Environment, told GAO that, for one site, no DBT implementation funding had been requested for fiscal year 2005. Finally, full implementation of these plans will require the successful resolution of complex organizational arrangements between various program and security offices. Consequently, GAO continues to believe, as it recommended in April 2004, that DOE needs to develop and implement a departmentwide, multiyear, fully resourced implementation plan for meeting the new DBT requirements that includes important programmatic activities such as the closure of facilities and the transportation of special nuclear materials.