NBC Training at Army and Marine Corps CTCs Varies, and Units Often Do Not Perform to Acceptable Proficiency Standards

Although the Army and the Marine Corps stress in their doctrine,  regulations, or orders the need to fully integrate NBC training into training  exercises and both have defined what they consider to be essential NBC  skills, neither has established minimum NBC tasks for units to perform  while they are training at the CTCs. Consequently, during fiscal years 2002 and 2003, Army  and Marine Corps units and personnel attending the CTCs received widely  varying amounts of NBC training, with some receiving little or none. Many Army Subunits Receive Little NBC Training at the CTCs

During our review of Army CTC training that occurred during fiscal years  2002 and 2003, we found that, while most units were exposed to some  NBC training at the CTCs, the overall percentage of Army battalion- or  brigade-sized units that received extensive NBC training during a rotation  was small. NTC training officials  estimated that, on average since fiscal year 2002, a typical 20- to 25-day  brigade rotation—which may include up to 4,000 soldiers—includes NBC  events that cause the entire unit to don the full chemical protective suit for  a total of 2 to 3 hours and about 150 to 200 soldiers to train in full  protective gear for a total of 18 to 24 hours. In other words, only about 5  percent of the brigade is affected by NBC training that requires wearing  full protective gear for more than 2 to 3 hours. We have also reported for more than a decade on problems with Army  units’ inadequate home-station training. In 1991, we reported that Army  home-station training lacked realism and often did not include NBC  training. NBC Training Was Not Conducted at the Marine Corps’ Combined Arms Exercises at Twentynine Palms

No NBC training was conducted during combined arms exercises at the  Marine Corps’ training center at Twentynine Palms for at least 5 years  prior to our review. Establishing minimal NBC tasks for  units attending CTCs could provide an opportunity for units’ NBC defense  capabilities to be objectively assessed and for CTC observers/controllers  to identify units’ NBC equipment shortfalls. Army and Marine Corps After-Action Reporting at the CTCs Does Not Fully Facilitate the Identification of NBC Training Trends

The Army and the Marine Corps do not always report lessons learned on  NBC training at the CTCs in a way that can be used to identify trends over  time and allow for cross-unit and cross-center comparisons. As a result, different  types of after-action reports and lessons learned are prepared for CTC  training, and these documents might or might not mention NBC training. The NTC does include,  in many cases, an assessment of a brigade’s NBC skills in its first week of  training. Conclusions

The CTCs represent a rare opportunity for Army and Marine Corps units to  perform advanced training under conditions that are designed to  approximate actual combat as closely as possible, thereby enabling units  to assess and build upon skills learned at home stations. The services  stress the importance of including NBC defense training in their exercises. NBC lessons learned during training rotations at the combat training  centers would be very useful for the services in their attempts to anticipate  and train for NBC problems that may occur later during operations. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

To determine the extent to which Army and Marine Corps units participate  in nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) training at the combat training  centers (CTC) and the extent to which these units and personnel perform  NBC tasks at the centers to service standards, we interviewed appropriate  officials and reviewed pertinent documents and after-action reports at the  following locations:    Office of the Department of the Army, Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3,    Center for Army Lessons Learned, Battle Command Training Program,  Combined Arms Center-Training, Combined Arms Research Library,  Fort Leavenworth, Kansas;    U.S. Army Chemical School, Maneuver Support Center, and the Army  Maneuver Support Center Academic Library, Fort Leonard Wood,  Missouri;    Training Division, Headquarters, U.S. To determine whether the Army and the Marine Corps report NBC training  at the CTCs in a standardized format that allows the services to identify  trends and lessons learned and to do cross-unit and cross-center  comparisons, we collected all available after-action reports from the  above-listed locations. The unit must be able to conduct unmasking procedures. Observation. doctrinal improvement.
Why GAO Did This Study

The Department of Defense (DOD) believes that it is increasingly likely that an adversary will use nuclear, biological, or chemical (NBC) weapons against U.S. forces. Consequently, DOD doctrine calls for U.S. forces to be sufficiently trained to continue their missions in an NBC-contaminated environment. Given longstanding concerns about the preparedness of DOD's servicemembers in this critical area, GAO has undertaken a body of work covering NBC protective equipment and training. For this review, GAO was asked to determine the following: (1) To what extent do Army and Marine Corps units and personnel attending combat training centers participate in NBC training, and to what extent do these units and personnel perform NBC tasks at the centers to service standards? (2) Do the Army and the Marine Corps report NBC training at the centers in a standardized format that allows the services to identify lessons learned and to do cross-unit and cross-center comparisons?

What GAO Found

Army and Marine Corps combat training centers provide a unique opportunity for units to perform advanced training under conditions that approximate actual combat, thereby enabling units to assess and build upon skills learned at home stations. Although DOD and both services have stressed the importance of including NBC defense in all types of training, they have not established minimum NBC-related tasks for units attending the centers. Commanders sometimes reduce NBC training to focus on other priority areas. As a result, the extent of NBC training actually conducted at these centers varies widely, and some units receive little or none at all. For example, officials at two Army training centers estimated that during fiscal years 2002 and 2003, a typical unit training rotation for a brigade-sized unit--which may include up to 4,000 soldiers--experienced NBC events that required only about 5 percent of these troops to train in full NBC protective clothing for a total of 18 hours or more. For the Marine Corps, no NBC training was conducted during combined arms exercises at its training center for at least 5 years prior to January 2004. The Marine Corps began to introduce NBC training into its combined arms exercises in two rotations that occurred in January and February 2004 but suspended it because of other priorities related to preparing units for ongoing operations. Without minimum NBC tasks, the services often miss the opportunity to use the centers' unique environment to improve units' proficiency in NBC defense. When Army units did undergo NBC training, observers noted that many units did not perform basic NBC tasks to Army standards. For example, during fiscal years 2002 and 2003, most brigades attending one center did not meet standards for basic NBC tasks such as donning protective gear, seeking overhead shelter, and conducting unmasking procedures. Observers at the Army centers often cited inadequate home-station training as the reason units were not performing basic NBC tasks to standards. Skills in these basic tasks are normally acquired during training at home stations and lay the foundation for acquiring more complex skills associated with large-unit NBC training. When units arrive at the centers with inadequate basic NBC skills, they may not be able to take full advantage of the unique and more complex large-unit NBC training opportunities offered at these centers. The Army and the Marine Corps do not always report lessons learned on NBC training at the centers in a way that can be used to identify trends over time and allow for cross-unit and cross-center comparisons. Army and Marine Corps doctrine stresses the importance of identifying lessons learned during training to enable tailored training at home stations and elsewhere to reduce the likelihood that similar problems will occur during operations. Because service guidance does not require standardized reporting formats, the training centers submit different types of after-action reports that might or might not mention NBC training. This lack of standardized reporting represents opportunities lost to the services to collect comparable data to identify NBC training trends and lessons learned.