While one bill ( S. 197 ) would provide for a nominal 1.7% salary adjustment, the other three— S. 2353 , H.R. This report
reviews the most common arguments that have been advanced in recent years for and against raising federal judicial salaries; examines a large body of data relevant to the question of whether fluctuations in judicial pay levels have affected the federal judiciary's ability to recruit and retain judges; considers various time periods (between 1955 and 2006) over which the rise and fall of judicial salaries may be examined, taking into account, as well, changes that have occurred at various points in time in non-salary compensation that federal judges receive; identifies and analyzes options available to Congress in addressing the judicial pay issue in addition to increasing judicial salaries by a specific amount or percentage on a one-time basis—including "de-linking" congressional and judicial salaries, providing judges with salaries based on their cost of living, revising retirement benefits, and altering outside income limits; and provides a side-by-side comparison of the three bills noted above that would provide for a substantial judicial pay increase, showing how the levels provided for would compare with those of the benchmark year of 1969 (the year of highest real salaries for federal judges since at least 1913). The Constitution prohibits Congress from diminishing the salaries of Article III federal judges. First, they note that the salaries of federal judges are high relative to all workers in the United States. Effect of Judicial Salary on Recruitment and Retention of Federal Judges: An Examination of the Relevant Data

The difference of opinion on the necessity of a raise in judicial salary stems, in part, from disagreement on some of the consequences of what might be considered a low judicial salary. In particular, those who advocate and oppose increasing judicial salary disagree over the extent to which declines in judicial salary:
make it more difficult to recruit federal judges from private practice, depriving the federal judiciary of talented candidates; lead more federal judges, before becoming eligible for retirement, to leave the bench to work in private practice, increasing turnover in the federal judiciary; and lead more judges, after becoming eligible for retirement to leave the judiciary (often for jobs in the private sector or elsewhere), rather than remaining in the judiciary in semi-retired "senior status," depriving the federal judiciary of important resources of manpower and expertise. Since 1933, the percentage of federal judges whose immediate prior position was another judgeship, either at the state or federal level, has increased. Congress may also choose to consider several changes to the structure of salary and benefits for federal judges, including "de-linking" congressional and judicial salaries, paying judges different salaries based on the location of their chambers, revising retirement benefits for federal judges, altering survivor benefits for the spouses and dependents of federal judges, reconsidering limits on the outside income judges are permitted to earn, convening the Citizens' Commission on Public Service and Compensation, and creating "automatic" adjustments for judicial salaries. "De-linking" Congressional and Judicial Salaries

Related to the issue of judicial salary is the relationship between the salaries of federal judges and Members of Congress. Current retirement provisions may be seen as generous from the perspective of judges who have qualified for them, but may be seen as difficult to attain for federal judges who face decisions about their financial futures before they are eligible for retirement or senior status. 3753 , as reported by the House Judiciary Committee, and S. 1638 , as reported by the Senate Judiciary Committee, would raise judicial salaries each year by the base rate increase given to General Schedule employees. S. 1638 also limits the acceptance of honorary memberships to those valued at no more than $50 per year and applies the regulations of the Judicial Conference on outside earned income to justices of the U.S. Supreme Court.
Several federal judges, including the Chief Justice of the United States, have expressed concern over the level of judicial salary. Chief Justice Roberts has called the current levels of judicial salary a "constitutional crisis" that threatens the independence of the federal courts. The most common arguments for raising judicial salary claim that low judicial salaries (1) limit the ability of the federal judiciary to draw on a diverse pool of candidates for positions on the federal bench; (2) force federal judges concerned about their financial futures to resign from the bench before they become eligible for retirement; and (3) drive other federal judges, upon becoming eligible for retirement, to retire completely (to earn extra income outside the judiciary), rather than remain to assist the courts as judges on "senior status." Opponents of raising judicial salary generally question whether variations in judicial salary affect recruitment and retention of federal judges.
Examination of the available evidence on the effect of judicial salary on judicial recruitment and retention suggests (1) trends away from appointing judges directly from private practice and toward appointing federal judges who are already in the judiciary (as state judges or federal bankruptcy or magistrate judges) date to before the most recent decline in judicial salaries, (2) federal judges are not resigning from the federal bench at rates much higher than historical averages, and (3) the percentage of federal judges who chose retirement in lieu of senior status has also not risen markedly in the last several years. From an examination of data on judicial departures, we are unable to identify a conclusive relationship between judicial salary and federal judges' decisions to resign or retire.
Should Congress wish to address the issue of judicial salary, it has several options. In addition to increasing the pay of federal judges on a one-time basis by a specific amount or percentage, Congress might consider "de-linking" congressional and judicial salaries, providing that judges receive salaries based on their cost of living, revising retirement benefits, adjusting survivor benefits for the spouses and dependents of federal judges, altering outside income limits, convening the Citizens' Commission on Public Service and Compensation, or enacting automatic adjustments for judicial salary.
Four bills concerning judicial salary have been introduced in the 110th Congress: S. 197 would adjust the salaries of federal judges upward by 1.7%; S. 2353 would increase the salaries of federal judges by 16.5%; and S. 1638, as reported by the Senate Judiciary Committee, and H.R. 3753, as ordered reported by the House Judiciary Committee, would increase the salaries of most federal judges by 28.7%, permit cost-of-living adjustments to judicial salaries to go into effect unless Congress passed legislation stopping them from doing so, change the eligibility for federal judges to retire, and change how the annuity they receive upon retirement is calculated. S. 1638 also imposes limits on reimbursable travel and honorary memberships for judges, as well as applying limits on outside earned income to U.S. Supreme Court justices. This report will be updated as events warrant.