This waste is the result of both  commercial and noncommercial activities. In addition to spent nuclear fuel generated from commercial purposes,  DOE manages an inventory of about 13,000 metric tons of spent nuclear  fuel and high-level nuclear waste at five DOE sites. DOE is also responsible for managing nuclear waste from a variety of  other sources. The Status of the Yucca Mountain Repository

Uncertainties exist about the direction of the nation’s policy for nuclear  waste disposal. Under NWPA, as amended, Yucca Mountain is the only site  that DOE is to investigate for suitability as a permanent nuclear waste  repository. DOE investigated Yucca Mountain; in 2002 recommended the  site to the President; and in 2008 submitted a license application to NRC. DOE did not cite  technical or safety issues as the reason for its decision to withdraw the  license application. In a May 2010 reply DOE filed before NRC’s Atomic  Safety and Licensing Board, the department explained that the Secretary’s  judgment is not that Yucca Mountain is unsafe or that there are flaws in  the license application, but rather that Yucca Mountain is not a workable  option and that alternatives will better serve the public interest. DOE  stated that a key aspect of the problem was the continuing lack of public  support for the repository among the people of the state of Nevada and  that public acceptance is a key component of a workable solution to  permanent disposal of nuclear waste. On June 29, 2010, the licensing board denied DOE’s motion, ruling that  DOE was obligated under NWPA, as amended, to continue with the  licensing effort. On June 30, 2010, the day after the Atomic Safety and  Licensing Board denied DOE’s motion to withdraw its license application  with prejudice, the NRC commissioners issued an order inviting parties— including the state of Nevada, local counties, and industry—to file briefs  addressing whether the commissioners should review the board’s decision  and, if so, whether they should uphold or reverse it. Amid uncertainties about the status of the repository license, DOE took  steps to shut down the Yucca Mountain program and the Office of Civilian  Radioactive Waste Management by September 30, 2010, when funding  would have ended under the President’s budget proposal. As of May 26, 2011, the board has  not ruled on the motion. DOE plans to wait for the Blue Ribbon Commission’s final  recommendations, before deciding on a direction for future nuclear waste  storage efforts. Each Storage Option Offers Benefits but Poses Challenges, Including High Costs

The three primary nuclear waste storage and disposal options we have  reported on—continued on-site storage, interim storage at a centralized  facility, and permanent disposal in a geologic repository—offer benefits  as well as challenges, including significant costs. Two of the options— which could be used in the interim before permanent disposal is  available—provide the nation with additional time to seek approaches to  nuclear waste management and disposal that might achieve broader  acceptance than the Yucca Mountain permanent repository. Interim storage in general comes with benefits and challenges. Continued on-site storage. It would also result in  costs to the federal government such as exposure to liabilities resulting from lawsuits against DOE, which  committed to take custody of commercial nuclear waste in 1998, as  required by NWPA, as amended. The federal government has paid $956  million through the Department of Treasury’s judgment fund, and DOE  estimates future liability to be about $15.4 billion through 2020, plus  $500 million every year after that. potential penalties of $75,000 per day, or about $27.4 million per year if  DOE and the Navy fail to meet commitments to remove their spent  nuclear fuel from DOE-sites in Idaho and Colorado by January 1, 2035. Interim storage at a centralized facility. Key challenges to a geologic repository are the cost and time required to  site and build it and the need to gain public acceptance for the project. Principal Lessons Learned That Could Facilitate Future Nuclear Waste Storage or Disposal Efforts

Our review of reports and interviews with DOE and NRC officials and  representatives of various national associations, local and state  governments, and community organizations, suggest two broad lessons for  future waste storage or disposal efforts. Education has also helped foster public acceptance. A second broad lesson is that, in developing storage or disposal options, it  is important to have consistent policy, funding, and leadership, since any  such effort will take decades. Because the nation has not resolved how to manage spent nuclear fuel and  high-level waste and because any future endeavor is likely to take decades  and cost billions of dollars more, in our April 2011 report we raised  matters Congress may wish to consider to improve the success of future  nuclear waste disposal efforts. Specifically, Congress may wish to  consider whether a more predictable funding mechanism and an  independent organization, outside of DOE, may be more effective in  developing a permanent solution to nuclear waste management.
Why GAO Did This Study

The United States has generated over 75,000 metric tons of spent nuclear fuel and high-level nuclear waste--extremely hazardous substances--at 80 sites in 35 states and is expected to more than double that amount by 2055. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 (NWPA) required the Department of Energy (DOE) to investigate a geologic repository for nuclear waste. In 1987, Congress amended NWPA to direct DOE to focus on a repository at Yucca Mountain, Nevada. In 2008, DOE submitted a license application for the repository but in March 2010 moved to withdraw it. However, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) or the courts--as a result of federal lawsuits--might compel DOE to resume the licensing process. GAO has reported on options for interim storage of this waste and the effects a Yucca Mountain termination could have on both commercial waste and DOE-managed waste. This testimony is based on that prior work and discusses (1) the status of the Yucca Mountain repository and national policy for nuclear waste disposal, (2) options for storing nuclear waste and their benefits and challenges, and (3) principal lessons that can be learned from past nuclear waste management efforts.

What GAO Found

Uncertainties exist about the direction of the nation's policy for nuclear waste disposal. Under NWPA, DOE investigated Yucca Mountain as a site for a repository. In 2002, DOE recommended the site to the President and in 2008 submitted a license application to NRC. DOE is now seeking to withdraw the application from NRC's Atomic Safety and Licensing Board. DOE did not cite technical or safety issues but stated that Yucca Mountain is not a workable option because of a lack of public acceptance by the people of Nevada. On June 29, 2010, the board denied DOE's motion, ruling that NWPA requires DOE to continue the licensing effort. The NRC commissioners announced they might consider reviewing the board's decision, but as of May 26, 2011, no review had been announced. Separately, state and local governments and a private party filed suit in federal court against DOE and NRC in an effort to stop the repository termination. The court has not yet ruled. Amid this uncertainty, DOE took steps to shut down Yucca Mountain by September 30, 2010. DOE also established a Blue Ribbon Commission to evaluate alternatives for nuclear waste disposal, which plans to report by January 2012. Three primary waste storage options offer benefits but also face challenges, including high costs. Two options are for interim storage--continued on-site or centralized storage--which could allow time for research into new approaches that might have wider public acceptance than the Yucca Mountain permanent repository. Continued on-site storage would require less effort to implement since it is the current method of waste storage. However, this option could trigger significant financial liabilities as a result of industry lawsuits stemming from DOE's failure to accept the waste in 1998, as required under NWPA. The federal government has already paid $956 million, and future liabilities are estimated to be at least $15.4 billion through 2020. DOE and the Navy also might not meet certain commitments to remove their waste from two states, which could bring penalties and a suspension of the Navy's shipments of spent fuel, raising concerns about the Navy's ability to refuel its nuclear-powered warships. The second interim option, centralized interim storage, may face challenges because DOE states that it currently has no authority to implement this option. The third option, a geologic repository, is widely considered the only currently feasible option for permanently disposing of nuclear waste. DOE has faced challenges in identifying an acceptable site for permanent geologic disposal. Restarting the search would likely take decades and cost billions of dollars. Published reports and interviews--with federal, state, and local government officials and representatives of various organizations--suggest two broad lessons that can be learned from past nuclear waste management efforts. First, transparency, economic incentives, and education are important tools for gaining public acceptance. Second, it is important for any waste management strategy to have consistent policy, funding, and leadership, particularly since the process will take decades. An independent organization with a more predictable funding mechanism may be better suited than DOE to oversee nuclear waste management.

What GAO Recommends

GAO is making no new recommendations at this time and continues to believe that implementing the recommendations in its March (GAO-11-230) and April 2011 (GAO-11-229) reports could improve DOE's efforts to manage and store nuclear waste.