Training is fundamental, according to  a DOD assessment of the mission area, because technological  advancements are “meaningless if not supported by training.”

	Despite DOD’s Efforts, Joint Close Air Support Training Deficiencies Remain

DOD has had limited success in overcoming the barriers that prevent  troops from receiving the realistic, standardized training that is needed to  prepare them for joint operations. These lingering problems include few  opportunities for ground and air forces to train together in a joint  environment, a lack of realistic training opportunities at troops’ home  stations, differences in the training standards for aircraft controllers, and  the low priority placed on joint close air support training in the services’  school curriculum and exercises. Figure 2. As a result, close air support cannot be realistically practiced. However, the time devoted to each topic, as  well as the specific instructional material presented, varies among the  services. Some Services Give Low Priority to Joint Close Air Support Training

One of the primary reasons the services do not provide the training needed  to adequately prepare U.S. forces to plan and execute the joint close air  support missions is the low priority they give to this mission in  comparison with other training requirements. The services have not  been able to agree on several of them. Lack of Equipment Interoperability and Coordinated Purchases Hampers Effectiveness of Close Air Support Mission Programs

The military services have not yet achieved DOD’s goals for ensuring that  equipment acquired for close air support missions is interoperable and  cost-effective. In addition, digital transmission systems  can transmit more detailed information, thereby improving the “situational  awareness” of both ground and air forces. DOD’s Joint Close Air Support action plan has hit several  roadblocks—primarily because the services have been unable to agree on  joint solutions. Such training is certainly needed to prepare  U.S. troops to conduct close air support missions. Congress  needs this information to ensure that U.S. forces are adequately prepared  to perform the mission and that the department is making cost-effective  decisions in procuring equipment to enhance joint performance on the  battlefield. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

To determine what efforts the Department of Defense (DOD) and the  services have made in providing adequate training for the joint close air  support mission, we interviewed officials at all levels of DOD from the  Office of the Secretary of Defense, Personnel and Readiness, and unit-level  service representatives both within the United States and overseas. To determine what efforts DOD has made to enhance the capabilities of  the equipment used to support the joint close air support mission, we  obtained the services’ acquisition strategies for the specific equipment  they were procuring to enhance mission effectiveness.
Why GAO Did This Study

Recent operations in Afghanistan demonstrated the dangers of providing air support close to troops on the ground. Such close air support requires timely, well-practiced procedures and communication between ground and air elements. While most close air support operations in Afghanistan were successful, "friendly fire" incidents have resulted from mistakes made while conducting the mission. At the request of the Ranking Minority Members of the Subcommittees on Total Force and Readiness, House Committee on Armed Services, GAO reviewed Department of Defense (DOD) efforts to provide adequate close air support training, as well as efforts to enhance the equipment used to support this mission.

What GAO Found

The Department of Defense has had limited success in overcoming the barriers that prevent troops from receiving the realistic, standardized close air support training necessary to prepare them for joint operations. This is the result of four interrelated factors: (1) ground and air forces have limited opportunities to train together in a joint environment; (2) home station training is often restricted and thus does not always provide realistic training to prepare troops to perform the mission; (3) the services use different training standards and certification requirements for personnel responsible for coordinating close air support; and (4) within the individual services, joint close air support training is often a lower priority than other missions. While the department recognizes the need to improve the training for the mission, progress has been slow on many of the issues because the services have been unable to agree on joint solutions. In the interim, U.S. troops engaged in joint close air support missions are forced to conduct last-minute training or create ad hoc procedures on the battlefield. Efforts to enhance the capabilities of the equipment used to perform the joint close air support mission have not kept pace with precision weapons capabilities and as a result do not achieve DOD's goals for interoperability and cost-effectiveness. Advanced systems improve the accuracy of battlefield information and can speed the transmission of information from the troops on the ground to attacking aircraft. However, the services have acquired equipment that is not able to communicate across the services, a key requirement in joint operations. Moreover, the services are procuring equipment independently to meet individual service needs, thereby missing opportunities to achieve cost benefits from joint service purchases.