	Introduction: Issues for Congress

The United States enjoys a strong legacy of defense cooperation with Turkey, both bilaterally and in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), dating from the onset of the Cold War. A more independent Turkish foreign policy course—reflected in recent international events involving Iran, Israel, and other countries—has raised concerns among some Members of Congress. As Turkey's regional influence expands through economic, political, and cultural means, its importance has arguably increased for the United States on issues of global significance that include Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan, and Israeli-Palestinian issues. In early 2011, Turkey's regional role has arguably become even more prominent—exemplified by its significant involvement politically and militarily on the question of NATO's intervention in Libya—as political change and unrest generates international debate about links between internal governance, humanitarian and civil society issues, and regional security. This affects both U.S. and Turkish calculations of the mutual benefits and leverage of defense cooperation. Major Areas of Defense Cooperation

U.S.-Turkey defense cooperation continues apace with respect to promoting stability and countering terrorism in Iraq and Afghanistan. For additional information on Turkey's possible acquisition of missile defense systems, see " Missile Defense Systems " below. Status Quo Approach : Would not focus significantly on recent developments, but rather emphasize and express confidence that existing NATO and bilateral relationships—with their long legacies—can address mutual security challenges, even in an evolving regional and global context. Accommodative Approach: Accord high priority to the U.S.-Turkey alliance and revise expectations for it by accommodating Turkey's expressions of its national interests—and U.S. perceptions of these interests—given recent developments within Turkey, the region, and globally. Linkage Approach: Link cooperation to some extent to Turkey 's relations with certain third-party countries or non-state actors—including Iran , Israel , Hamas , Armenia , and China —or to Turkish actions on issues of U.S. national security interest . Case-by-Case Approach: Use or combine any of the other three approaches on a case-by-case basis. Approach(es) to U.S.-Turkey defense cooperation matters could hinge on a number of factors, including the following:
U.S.-Turkish agreement on how to address regional security challenges; Turkey's relations with key third-party countries and non-state actors, including Iran, Israel, Hamas, Armenia, China, Cyprus, and Greece; Turkey's perceived importance to U.S. interests given regional and global developments and trends, as well as possible alternate locations for military basing and transport corridors; the level of U.S. trust in Turkish leaders (civilian and military) and in internal Turkish stability; and the likelihood of influencing Turkey to act in U.S. interests and of strengthening the overall bilateral and NATO relationships. Specific Issues and Possible Options for Congress

		Access to Turkish Bases and Transport Corridors

The prospect of temporary or permanent denial of U.S. military access to Turkish bases and transport corridors concerns Congress and other policymakers. The souring of Turkey-Israel relations has the potential to affect U.S.-Turkey defense cooperation given that the United States maintains close alliances with both Turkey and Israel (which is not a member of NATO), and has counted on previously close Turkey-Israel military relations to cultivate U.S.-Turkey-Israel military cooperation. Arms Sales and Industrial Cooperation

Turkey no longer receives annual Foreign Military Financing aid for purchasing U.S.-produced equipment. A final purchasing decision could be made in 2011. Some officials and analysts believe that in at least some respects the United States needs Turkey more than Turkey needs the United States, given (1) increased Turkish economic and military self-sufficiency, and (2) what they view as a relative decline of U.S. influence in the region and globally as other actors emerge—particularly those that have greater intimate knowledge of the region and more of an existential stake in its security. Others counter that claims of Turkish leverage over the United States are exaggerated because
Turkey's influence with the United States ultimately depends on its ability to help deliver regional outcomes that serve U.S. interests; the United States arguably can depend on other allies to deliver outcomes it desires; and it is unclear whether any potential non-NATO alliance could provide Turkey with superior, equal, or comparable (1) security guarantees, (2) regional influence and geopolitical prestige, or (3) collaborative benefits on military matters such as procurement, interoperability, or training. However, Turkey may not have yet decided whether it perceives hosting a proposed U.S. BMD radar under NATO auspices as, on balance, more likely to cultivate stability, or as unduly provocative to neighboring countries. The availability of Turkish bases and territory for U.S./NATO deployments, operations, and supply lines is valuable and remains a possible point of contention and leverage, but the extent of its importance and of alternatives may be subject to further analysis.
Congress and the Obama Administration are seeking to manage longstanding bilateral and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)-based defense cooperation with Turkey at a time when a more independent Turkish foreign policy course and changes in regional security conditions are creating new challenges for both countries. Defense cooperation rooted in shared threat perceptions from the Cold War era and built on close U.S. ties with the Turkish military leadership now must be reconciled with a decline of the military's political influence in Turkish society and some negative turns in Turkish popular sentiment toward the United States over the past decade. At the same time, Turkey's importance as a U.S. ally has arguably increased on issues of global significance in its surrounding region that include Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan, and the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. In early 2011, Turkey's regional role has arguably become even more prominent—exemplified by its significant involvement politically and militarily on the question of NATO's intervention in Libya.
How Congress and the Administration manage defense cooperation with Turkey in this evolving context is likely to have a significant bearing on U.S. national security interests, as well as on both U.S. and Turkish calculations of the mutual benefits and leverage involved in the cooperative relationship. Some officials and analysts believe that, in at least some respects, the United States needs Turkey more than Turkey needs the United States. Others counter that claims of Turkish leverage over the United States are exaggerated.
Possible general congressional and Administration approaches to U.S.-Turkey defense cooperation ("Possible U.S. Policy Approaches") include
avoiding major recharacterizations of the alliance, while emphasizing and expressing confidence that existing NATO and bilateral relationships—with their long legacies—can address mutual security challenges; according high priority to the alliance and revising expectations for it by accommodating new developments within and outside of Turkey; linking cooperation in some way to Turkey's relations with certain third-party countries or non-state actors—including Iran, Israel, Hamas, Armenia, and China—or to Turkish actions on issues of U.S. national security interest; and using or combining any of these approaches on a case-by-case basis.
Specific issues that remain of significant importance for Congress (see "Specific Issues and Possible Options for Congress"), given its authority to appropriate funds, review major arms sales, consider non-binding resolutions, and provide general oversight include the following:
Continued military access to Turkish bases and transport corridors: The ongoing availability to the United States and NATO of Turkish bases and transport corridors—which have been used heavily for military operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Libya—is valuable and remains a possible point of contention and leverage. The extent of its importance and of alternatives may be subject to further analysis. Future of Turkey-Israel relations: U.S. efforts to maintain alliances with both Turkey and Israel could be made more complicated if relations between them do not improve—potentially influencing the regional security environment. Missile defense radar: Whether Turkey agrees in 2011 to host a U.S. forward-deployed radar for missile defense as part of the NATO system may depend on its perceptions of whether doing so would be more likely to cultivate stability or to be unduly provocative to neighboring countries. Arms sales and industrial cooperation: Turkey continues to seek advanced military equipment from U.S. sources, particularly with respect to fighter and drone aircraft, helicopters, and missile defense systems (see "Arms Sales and Industrial Cooperation"). At the same time, Turkey is increasingly diversifying its defense contacts and procurement relationships with non-NATO countries. Military and security assistance: Although the United States no longer provides major annual grant aid to Turkey's military, assistance continues to foster cooperation on counterterrorism, law enforcement, and military training and education.
For more information on related issues, please see CRS Report R41368, Turkey: Politics of Identity and Power, and CRS Report RL34642, Turkey: Selected Foreign Policy Issues and U.S. Views, both by [author name scrubbed].