Key Differences Between DOD’s Military and Nonmilitary Missions

Military and nonmilitary missions differ in terms of roles, duration,  acceptance, and capabilities normally employed. The Threat of Terrorism Altered Some Military Operations

Since September 11, 2001, the threat of another catastrophic terrorist  event has altered some military operations. However, as of September 11, 2001, NORAD also orders  combat air patrols over U.S. cities to prevent terrorist attacks. Moreover, DOD continues to support U.S. civil  authorities for nonmilitary missions as it did prior to September 11, 2001. The Posse Comitatus Act Restricts DOD’s Role in Civilian Law Enforcement

The 1878 Posse Comitatus Act prohibits the use of the Army and  Air Force “to execute the laws” of the United States except where  authorized by the Constitution or acts of Congress. §831);    assist with some terrorist incidents involving weapons of mass destruction  (10 U.S.C. DOD Created Organizations and a Plan for Domestic Military Missions, but Force Structure Adjustments Have Not Been Made

In response to adjustments in its strategic focus, DOD has created new  organizations and is implementing a campaign plan for domestic military  missions, but it has not evaluated or adjusted its force structure. We could not assess the  adequacy of the organizational changes and the plan at the time of our  review because the organizations were not yet fully operational, and the  campaign plan was only recently completed. Domestic military missions provide less opportunity to  practice varied skills required for combat and consequently offer limited  training value; thus, some forces have not been tailored to perform their  domestic military missions. These factors indicate that the current mission  approach may not be sustainable and risks eroding readiness. However, some forces are not well tailored to perform domestic  military missions. When performing domestic military missions, combat  units are unable to maintain proficiency in combat skills through practice  in normal training. Moreover,  from September 2001 through December 2002, the number of personnel  exceeding the established personnel tempo thresholds increased  substantially, an indicator that the present force structure may not be  sufficient to address the increase in domestic and overseas military  missions. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

To determine how the Department of Defense’s (DOD) military  and nonmilitary missions differ and how they have changed since  September 11, 2001, we conducted in-depth interviews with officials from  the Office of the Secretary of Defense, including but not limited to the  Office of the Executive Secretary, Office of the Special Assistant for  Homeland Security, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for  Homeland Defense, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for  Reserve Affairs, and the General Counsel; the Joint Staff’s J-3 Directorate  for Operations and J-5 Directorate for Strategic Plans and Policy;  U.S. Joint Forces Command’s Joint Force Headquarters for Homeland  Security; the Director of Military Support; the U.S. Army Reserve  Command; the National Guard Bureau Homeland Defense Office; and the  Army and Air National Guard. GAO Comments

1. Finally, DOD stated that it has adjusted its  strategic and operational focus to encompass traditional military  threats from hostile states, asymmetric threats posed by terrorists, and  asymmetric threats posed by hostile states. 2. 4.
Why GAO Did This Study

The way in which the federal government views the defense of the United States has dramatically changed since September 11, 2001. Consequently, the Department of Defense (DOD) has adjusted its strategic and operational focus to encompass not only traditional military concerns posed by hostile states overseas but also the asymmetric threats directed at our homeland by both terrorists and hostile states. GAO was asked to review DOD's domestic missions, including (1) how DOD's military and nonmilitary missions differ; (2) how DOD's military and nonmilitary missions have changed since September 11, 2001; (3) how the 1878 Posse Comitatus Act affects DOD's nonmilitary missions; and (4) the extent to which DOD's organizations, plans, and forces are adequate for domestic military missions and the consequent sustainability of the current mission approach.

What GAO Found

DOD's military and nonmilitary missions differ in terms of roles, duration, acceptance, and capabilities normally employed. The threat of terrorism has altered some military operations. For example, as of September 11, 2001, the North American Aerospace Defense Command orders combat air patrols over U.S. cities to prevent terrorist attacks. The 1878 Posse Comitatus Act prohibits the direct use of federal military troops in domestic civilian law enforcement, except where authorized by the Constitution or acts of Congress. Congress has expressly authorized the use of the military in certain situations such as to assist with terrorist incidents involving weapons of mass destruction. DOD has established new organizations (such as U.S. Northern Command) and implemented a campaign plan for domestic military missions, but it has not evaluated or adjusted its force structure. GAO did not assess the adequacy of the new organizations or the campaign plan because the organizations were not yet fully operational, and the campaign plan was only recently completed. DOD's force structure is not well tailored to perform domestic military missions and may not be able to sustain the high pace of operations that preceded and followed the attacks on September 11, 2001. While on domestic military missions, combat units are unable to maintain proficiency because these missions provide less opportunity to practice the varied skills required for combat and consequently offer little training value. In addition, from September 2001 through December 2002, the number of servicemembers exceeding the established personnel tempo thresholds increased substantially, indicating that the present force structure may not be sufficient to address the increase in domestic and overseas military missions. As a result, U.S. forces could experience an unsustainable pace that could significantly erode their readiness to perform combat missions and impact future personnel retention.