	Introduction

Presidential claims of a right to preserve the confidentiality of information and documents in the face of legislative demands have figured prominently, though intermittently, in executive-congressional relations since at least 1792, when President Washington discussed with his Cabinet how to respond to a congressional inquiry into the military debacle that befell General St. Clair's expedition. Few such interbranch disputes over access to information have reached the courts for substantive resolution; the vast majority achieve resolution through political negotiation and accommodation. In fact, it was not until the Watergate-related lawsuits in the 1970s seeking access to President Nixon's tapes that the existence of a presidential confidentiality privilege was judicially established as a necessary derivative of the President's status in the U.S. constitutional scheme of separated powers. In total, there have been only four cases dealing with executive privilege in the context of information access disputes between Congress and the executive, and only two of those resulted in decisions on the merits. The Nixon era cases initially established the broad contours of the presidential communications privilege. Under those precedents, the privilege, which is constitutionally rooted, could be invoked by the President when asked to produce documents or other materials or information that reflect presidential decision making and deliberations that he believes should remain confidential. If the President does so, the materials become presumptively privileged. The privilege, however, is qualified, not absolute, and can be overcome by an adequate showing of need. Finally, while reviewing courts have expressed reluctance in balancing executive privilege claims against a congressional demand for information, they have acknowledged they will do so if the political branches have tried in good faith but failed to reach an accommodation. The unanimous panel in In re Sealed Case ( Espy ), and the subsequent reaffirmation of the Espy principles in Judicial Watch v. Department of Justice , addressed many of these unresolved questions, albeit in a noncongressional context, in a manner that may alter the future legal playing field in resolving such disputes. Two recent disputes between Congress and the executive branch relate directly to the application of executive privilege in the congressional oversight context. Many significant issues remained unresolved, including whether the President has to have actually seen or been familiar with the disputed matter; whether the presidential privilege encompasses documents and information developed by, or in the possession of, officers and employees in the departments and agencies of the executive branch outside the Executive Office of the President; whether the privilege encompasses all communications in which the President may be interested or if it is confined to a particular type of presidential decision making; and precisely what kind of demonstration of need can overcome the privilege and justify the release of privileged materials.
Presidential claims of a right to preserve the confidentiality of information and documents in the face of legislative demands have figured prominently, though intermittently, in executive-congressional relations since at least 1792. Few such interbranch disputes over access to information have reached the courts for substantive resolution. The vast majority of these disputes are resolved through political negotiation and accommodation. In fact, it was not until the Watergate-related lawsuits in the 1970s seeking access to President Nixon's tapes that the existence of a presidential confidentiality privilege was judicially established as a necessary derivative of the President's status in our constitutional scheme of separated powers. There have been only four cases involving information access disputes between Congress and the executive, and two of these resulted in decisions on the merits. The Nixon and post-Watergate cases established the broad contours of the presidential communications privilege. Under those precedents, the privilege, which is constitutionally rooted, could be invoked by the President when asked to produce documents or other materials or information that reflect presidential decision making and deliberations that he believes should remain confidential. If the President asserts the privilege, the materials become presumptively privileged. The privilege, however, is qualified, not absolute, and can be overcome by an adequate showing of need. Finally, while reviewing courts have expressed reluctance in balancing executive privilege claims against a congressional demand for information, they have acknowledged they will do so if the political branches have tried, in good faith, but failed to reach an accommodation.
Supreme Court decisions have left considerable gaps in the law of presidential privilege. Among the more significant issues left open include whether the President must have actually seen or been familiar with the disputed matter; whether the presidential privilege encompasses documents and information developed by, or in the possession of, officers and employees in the departments and agencies of the executive branch, outside of the Executive Office of the President; whether the privilege encompasses all communications with respect to which the President may be interested or is confined to presidential decision making and, if so, whether it is limited to a particular type of presidential decision making; and precisely what kind of demonstration of need must be shown to overcome the privilege and compel disclosure of the materials. The District of Columbia Circuit's 1997 ruling in In re Sealed Case (Espy), and its 2004 decision in Judicial Watch v. Department of Justice, addressed many of these questions in a manner that may alter the future legal playing field in resolving such disputes. Moreover, two recent disputes between the executive branch and Congress over the removal of U.S. Attorneys during the George W. Bush Administration and the Department of Justice's response to a congressional investigation into Operation Fast and Furious may provide further insight into the scope of executive privilege in the congressional oversight context.