If, however, the President determines that it is essential to limit access to a covert action finding in order to "meet extraordinary circumstances affecting vital interests of the United States," then rather than providing advanced notification to the full congressional intelligence committees, as is generally required, the President may limit such notification to the "Gang of Eight," and any other congressional leaders he may choose to inform. The statute defines the "Gang of Eight" as being comprised of the chairmen and ranking Members of the two congressional intelligence committees and the House and Senate majority and minority leadership. First, the President is required to provide a statement setting out the reasons for limiting notification to the Gang of Eight, rather than the full intelligence committees. In report language accompanying the 1980 enactment, Congress established its intent to preserve the secrecy necessary for very sensitive covert actions, while providing the President with a process for consulting in advance with congressional leaders, including the intelligence committee chairmen and ranking minority Members, "who have special expertise and responsibility in intelligence matters." In 1991, following the Iran-Contra Affair, Intelligence Conference Committee Conferees more specifically stated that Gang of Eight notifications should be used only when "the President is faced with a covert action of such extraordinary sensitivity or risk to life that knowledge of the covert action should be restricted to as few individuals as possible." Changes to Gang of Eight Provisions

Congress approved several changes to the Gang of Eight notification procedures as part of the FY2010 Intelligence Authorization Act ( P.L. 111-259 ). The unclassified version of the FY2011 Intelligence Authorization Act ( P.L. 112-72 ), enacted June 8, 2011, contained no further changes to the Gang of Eight notification procedure. Congress Signaled Its Intent That the Gang of Eight Would Decide When To Inform the Intelligence Committees

During the Senate's 1980 debate of the Gang of Eight provision, congressional sponsors said their intent was that the Gang of Eight would reserve the right to determine the appropriate time to inform the full intelligence committees of the covert action of which they had been notified. With regard to Section 501(c), Senate report language stated:
The authority for procedures established by the Select Committees is based on the current practices of the committees in establishing their own rules. Such sentiments appear to have contributed to the subsequent decision by Congress to permit the executive branch to notify the Gang of Eight in such cases. Impact on Congressional Intelligence Oversight

The impact of Gang of Eight notifications on the effectiveness of congressional intelligence oversight continues to be debated. Doing so in cases involving particularly sensitive covert actions presents a special challenge. Success turns on a number of factors, not the least of which is the degree of comity and trust that defines the relationship between the legislative and executive branches.
Legislation enacted in 1980 gave the executive branch authority to limit advance notification of especially sensitive covert actions to eight Members of Congress—the "Gang of Eight"—when the President determines that it is essential to limit prior notice in order to meet extraordinary circumstances affecting U.S. vital interests. In such cases, the executive branch is permitted by statute to limit notification to the chairmen and ranking minority Members of the two congressional intelligence committees, the Speaker and minority leader of the House, and Senate majority and minority leaders, rather than to notify the full intelligence committees, as is required in cases involving covert actions determined to be less sensitive.
Congress, in approving this new procedure in 1980, during the Iran hostage crisis, said it intended to preserve operational secrecy in those "rare" cases involving especially sensitive covert actions while providing the President with advance consultation with the leaders in Congress and the leadership of the intelligence committees who have special expertise and responsibility in intelligence matters. The intent appeared to some to be to provide the President, on a short-term basis, a greater degree of operational security as long as sensitive operations were underway. In 1991, in a further elaboration of congressional intent following the Iran-Contra Affair, congressional report language stated that limiting notification to the Gang of Eight should occur only in situations involving covert actions of such extraordinary sensitivity or risk to life that knowledge of such activity should be restricted to as few individuals as possible.
In its mark-up of H.R. 2701, the FY2010 Intelligence Authorization Act, the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) replaced the Gang of Eight statutory provision, adopting in its place a statutory requirement that each of the intelligence committees establish written procedures as may be necessary to govern such notifications. According to committee report language, the adopted provision vests the authority to limit such briefings with the committees, rather than the President.
On July 8, 2009, the executive branch issued a Statement of Administration Policy (SAP) in which it stated that it strongly objected to the House Committee's action to replace the Gang of Eight statutory provision, and that the President's senior advisors would recommend that the President veto the FY2010 Intelligence Authorization Act if the committee's language was retained in the final bill.
The Senate Intelligence Committee, in its version of the FY2010 Intelligence Authorization Act, left unchanged the Gang of Eight statutory structure, but approved several changes that would tighten certain aspects of current covert action reporting requirements.
Ultimately, the House accepted the Senate's proposals, which the President signed into law as part of the FY2010 Intelligence Authorization Act (P.L. 111-259).
Both the House and Senate Intelligence Committees did not make any further changes to the Gang of Eight notification procedure when both committees approved respective versions of the 2011 Intelligence Authorization Act (P.L. 112-72) enacted on June 8, 2011.
This report describes the statutory provision authorizing Gang of Eight notifications, reviews the legislative history of the provision, and examines the impact of such notifications on congressional oversight.
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