Unit readiness also  affects time frames. Availability of Reserves Is Greatly Influenced by Mobilization Authorities and Personnel Policies

The availability of reserve component forces to meet future requirements  is greatly influenced by DOD’s implementation of the partial mobilization  authority and by the department’s personnel policies. In addition, DOD was considering a  change in its implementation of the partial mobilization authority. This approach was necessary because the department had  not developed a strategic framework that identified DOD’s human capital  goals necessary to meet organizational requirements. Requirements for  reserve component forces increased dramatically after September 11,  2001, and are expected to remain high for the foreseeable future. As noted earlier, during our review, DOD was considering changing its  implementation of the partial mobilization authority from its current  approach, which limits mobilizations to 24 cumulative months, to an  approach that would have limited mobilizations to 24 consecutive  months to expand its pool of available personnel. However, in  commenting on a draft of this report, DOD stated that it would retain  its current cumulative implementation approach. In June 2004, DOD noted that about 30,000 reserve members had  already been mobilized for 24 months. Under DOD’s cumulative  approach, these personnel will not be available to meet future  requirements. In its comments on a draft of  our report, DOD did not elaborate on how it expected to address its  increased personnel requirements. The Army Was Not Able to Efficiently Execute Its Mobilization and Demobilization Plans

The Army was not able to efficiently execute its mobilization and  demobilization plans, because mobilization and demobilization site  officials faced uncertainties concerning demands for facilities, turnover  among support personnel, and the arrival of reserve component forces. The Army’s mobilization  and demobilization plans assumed that active forces would be deployed  abroad, thus vacating installations when reserve component forces were  mobilizing and often demobilizing. Facility Construction and Renovation Projects Are Not Based on Updated Planning Assumptions

To address housing and other facilities shortages at mobilization and  demobilization sites, the Army has embarked on a number of facility  construction and renovation projects without updating its planning  assumptions regarding the availability of facilities and personnel. As a  result, the Army risks spending money inefficiently on projects that may  not be located where the need is greatest. Ability to Effectively Manage Health of Servicemembers Is Limited

DOD’s ability to effectively manage the health status of its reserve  component members is limited because (1) its centralized database has  missing and incomplete health records and (2) it has not maintained full  visibility over reserve component members with medical issues. Air Force

In the Air Force, a lack of central visibility of some reserve component  personnel with medical problems who are serving on active duty has  resulted in delayed resolution to their medical problems. We recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the  Army to take, within the context of establishing DOD’s strategic  framework for force availability, the following two actions:    update mobilization and demobilization planning assumptions to  reflect the new operating environment for the Global War on  Terrorism—long-term requirements for mobilization and  demobilization support facilities and personnel and the likelihood that  active forces will continue to rotate through U.S. bases while reserve  component forces are mobilizing and demobilizing and    develop a coordinated approach to evaluate all the support costs  associated with mobilization and demobilization at alternative sites— including both facility (construction, renovation, and maintenance) and  support personnel (reserve component, civilian, contractor, or a  combination) costs—to determine the most efficient options; and then  update the list of primary and secondary mobilization and  demobilization sites as necessary. The Department specifically concurred with  our recommendations to (1) update Army mobilization and demobilization  planning assumptions to reflect the new operating environment for the  Global War on Terrorism; (2) develop a coordinated approach to evaluate  all the support costs associated with Army mobilizations and  demobilizations at alternative sites—including both facility and support  personnel costs—to determine the most efficient options, and then update  the list of primary and secondary mobilization and demobilization sites as  necessary; (3) issue updated Marine Corps mobilization guidance that  specifically lists the requirement to submit pre-deployment health  assessments to AMSA; (4) set a timeline for the military departments to  electronically submit pre- and post-deployment heath assessments; and (5)  develop a mechanism for tracking Air Force reserve component members  who are on voluntary active duty orders with medical problems. To examine the extent to which DOD can effectively manage the health  status of its mobilized reserve component members, we collected and  analyzed data from a variety of sources throughout DOD.
Why GAO Did This Study

Over 335,000 reserve members have been involuntarily called to active duty since September 11, 2001, and the Department of Defense (DOD) expects future reserve usage to remain high. This report is the second in response to a request for GAO to review DOD's mobilization and demobilization process. This review specifically examined the extent to which (1) DOD's implementation of a key mobilization authority and personnel polices affect reserve force availability, (2) the Army was able to execute its mobilization and demobilization plans efficiently, and (3) DOD can manage the health of its mobilized reserve forces.

What GAO Found

DOD's implementation of a key mobilization authority to involuntarily call up reserve component members and personnel policies greatly affects the numbers of reserve members available to fill requirements. Involuntary mobilizations are currently limited to a cumulative total of 24 months under DOD's implementation of the partial mobilization authority. Faced with some critical shortages, DOD changed a number of its personnel policies to increase force availability. However, these changes addressed immediate needs and did not take place within a strategic framework that linked human capital goals with DOD's organizational goals to fight the Global War on Terrorism. DOD was also considering a change in its implementation of the partial mobilization authority that would have expanded its pool of available personnel. This policy revision would have authorized mobilizations of up to 24 consecutive months without limiting the number of times personnel could be mobilized, and thus provide an essentially unlimited flow of forces. In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD stated that it would retain its current cumulative approach, but DOD did not elaborate in its comments on how it expected to address its increased personnel requirements. The Army was not able to efficiently execute its mobilization and demobilization plans, because the plans contained outdated assumptions concerning the availability of facilities and support personnel. For example, plans assumed that active forces would be deployed abroad, thus vacating facilities when reserves were mobilizing and demobilizing but reserve forces were used earlier and active forces had often not vacated the facilities. As a result, some units were diverted away from their planned mobilization sites, and disparities in housing accommodations existed between active and reserve forces. Efficiency was also lost when short notice hampered coordination efforts among planners, support personnel, and mobilizing or demobilizing reserve forces. To address shortages in housing and other facilities, the Army has embarked on several construction and renovation projects without updating its planning assumptions regarding the availability of facilities. As a result, the Army risks spending money inefficiently on projects that may not be located where the need is greatest. Further, the Army has not taken a coordinated approach evaluating all the support costs associated with mobilization and demobilization at alternative sites in order to determine the most efficient options for the Global War on Terrorism. DOD's ability to effectively manage the health status of its reserve forces is limited because its centralized database has missing and incomplete health records and it has not maintained full visibility over reserve component members with medical problems. For example, the Marine Corps did not send pre-deployment health assessments to DOD's database as required, due to unclear guidance and a lack of compliance monitoring. The Air Force has visibility of involuntarily mobilized members with health problems, but lacks visibility of members with health problems who are on voluntary orders. As a result, some personnel had medical problems that had not been resolved for up to 18 months, but the full extent of this situation is unknown.