DOE Seeks Reductions in Plutonium Stockpiles, but Disposition Program Faces Uncertainties

U.S. executive branch officials told us that the United States and Russia should ultimately reduce their plutonium stockpiles to equivalent levels. Furthermore, Russia may not have the financial resources to implement its program in a time frame that would be comparable to the U.S. disposition schedule. In January 1997, DOE formally announced that it would pursue two technologies to convert excess plutonium to safer, more proliferant-resistant forms. On the basis of preconceptual design data and preliminary plans, DOE estimates that implementing its plutonium disposition program—excluding long-term storage—will cost approximately $2.2 billion. DOE officials told us that, in their opinion, a U.S.-only plutonium disposition program would not be supported by the Congress because it could put the United States at a strategic disadvantage. Disposition Technologies Have Not Been Demonstrated on a Large Scale in the United States

DOE’s plutonium disposition program is expected to be completed in about 25 years but faces technological uncertainties that could increase program costs and time frames because neither disposition technology has been demonstrated on an industrial scale in the United States. Uncertainties Facing the Implementation of a Plutonium Disposition Program in Russia

According to U.S. executive branch officials, Russia’s plutonium disposition efforts are not as advanced as U.S. activities and face impediments, including Russia’s ongoing production of weapons-grade plutonium. According to DOE, the costs for the disposition of about 50 metric tons of plutonium in Russia could range from $1 billion to $2 billion. U.S. Officials Recognize a Bilateral Plutonium Disposition Agreement Is Needed

According to officials from DOE, the Department of State, and the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy, an agreement between the United States and Russia on plutonium disposition should be negotiated before large-scale expenditures are made for U.S. disposition facilities. These officials said that a bilateral agreement should address such major issues as the following: the quantities of plutonium to be dispositioned by both countries and the amounts of plutonium that will remain in their respective military stockpiles; the dates when both sides plan to complete the dispositioning of their excess plutonium; the methods to ensure that plutonium and disposition facilities are properly safeguarded to reduce the risks of diversion and/or theft; the assurances that the plutonium to be dispositioned will be subject to verification and inspection measures; the assurances that the facilities to fabricate MOX fuel will only be used for plutonium disposition until all declared excess weapons plutonium is processed through them and that spent nuclear fuel will not be reprocessed and recycled for continued use in civilian nuclear power reactors as long as Russia has surplus stocks of weapons plutonium; and the funding arrangements. U.S. Views on Impact of DOE’s Plutonium Disposition Program Differ

Representatives of the U.S. government, private industry, and nongovernmental groups have differing views about the potential effects of DOE’s plutonium disposition program on nuclear proliferation. Furthermore, there is a concern that Western assistance would help create a MOX fuel industry in Russia that does not now exist and would increase the risk of the diversion or the theft of nuclear material. Furthermore, the U.S. program depends heavily on Russia’s adoption of a similar program that also faces many impediments. Matters for Congressional Consideration

Because of the uncertainties about Russia’s commitment to implement a program similar to the U.S. program, the Congress may wish to consider linking DOE’s future funding requests for large-scale projects to design and construct plutonium disposition facilities in the United States and Russia to the progress being made in negotiating and signing a bilateral agreement. U.S. Nuclear Weapons That Are Sources of Plutonium for DOE’s Disposition Plan

DOE’s programmatic environmental impact statement for plutonium disposition analyzes the disposition of about 50 metric tons of excess weapons-usable plutonium over the next 25 years. Russia’s A. DOE is placing significant resources in this program and plans to contribute $40 million to $80 million over the next 5 to 7 years for research and development and for the design and the construction of a pilot-scale plutonium conversion facility in Russia.
Why GAO Did This Study

Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on: (1) the goals of the Department of Energy's (DOE) plutonium disposition program and the impediments facing its implementation; (2) U.S. government officials' views on the importance of a U.S.-Russian agreement on plutonium disposition and the status of efforts to negotiate an agreement; (3) the costs to implement plutonium disposition programs in the United States and Russia; (4) experts' views about the potential nonproliferation impacts of the U.S. plutonium disposition program; and (5) surplus nuclear weapons that are among the sources of plutonium for DOE's disposition plan.

What GAO Found

GAO noted that: (1) DOE's plutonium disposition program seeks to decrease the risk of nuclear proliferation by reducing U.S. plutonium stockpiles by about half over the next 25 years and by influencing Russia to take reciprocal actions, with the goal of reducing Russia's stockpiles to U.S. levels; (2) achieving these mutual reductions is a challenge because DOE's immobilization and mixed oxide fuel technologies have not yet been demonstrated on an industrial scale in the United States, and licensing, regulatory, and environmental issues will need to be addressed for both options; (3) the Russian plutonium stockpile is estimated to be about twice as large as the U.S. stockpile, and Russia may not have the financial resources to implement its program in a time frame comparable to that of the United States; (4) according to some U.S. executive branch officials, the success of the U.S. plutonium disposition program depends on Russia's implementing a similar program because a U.S.-only program could be seen as putting the United States at a strategic disadvantage and would not be supported by Congress or the international community; (5) executive branch officials told GAO that a plutonium disposition agreement between the United States and Russia should be negotiated before large-scale expenditures are made for U.S. plutonium disposition facilities; (6) no formal negotiations have begun to implement such an agreement; (7) DOE's preliminary estimates indicate that implementing the U.S. disposition program, which focuses on two technologies to convert plutonium to safer, more proliferant-resistant forms, could cost approximately $2.2 billion over the next 25 years; (8) the cost for a similar program in Russia could range between $1 billion and $2 billion, according to DOE's estimates; (9) U.S. assistance to Russia's program is expected to total between $40 million and $80 million over the next 5 to 7 years and includes plans to construct a pilot-scale plutonium conversion facility; (10) differing views exist about the potential nuclear nonproliferation impacts of DOE's plutonium disposition program and include: (a) a contention that DOE's consideration of burning plutonium in commercial nuclear reactors may pave the way for plutonium recycling and reverse a long-standing policy; and (b) a concern that an industry for mixed oxide fuel would be created in Russia that would increase opportunities for diversion and theft of nuclear materials; and (11) Department of State officials state that these and other issues will have to be addressed in a future binding agreement with Russia.