In contrast, DOJ has not identified topics  it considers as CVE-related training. According to the DHS Principal Deputy Counterterrorism  Coordinator, identifying these topics helped to provide a logical structure  for DHS’s CVE-related training–related efforts. DHS Is Undertaking Additional Communication to Help Ensure Grantees Fund CVE-Related Training That Is Consistent with the Goals of the CVE National Strategy

DHS’s communication efforts have helped DHS components and state  and local partners to better understand what constitutes CVE-related  training, but our review indicates that some state administrative agency  representatives are not clear about the principal topics CVE-related  training addresses, making it difficult for them to determine what CVE- related training best supports national CVE efforts. However, DOJ  has not yet identified topics that should be covered in its CVE-related  training. According to senior DOJ officials, even though the department has not  identified CVE-related training topics, they understand internally which of  the department’s training is CVE-related and contributes either directly or  indirectly to the department’s training responsibilities under the CVE  national strategy. However, according to  DHS officials that participated in the working group, members who led this  effort found it challenging to do so because agencies’ views differed as to  what CVE-related training includes when providing information on their  training. The other DOJ components, however, relied upon a framework that  we developed for the purpose of this review to determine which of their  existing training was CVE-related. Few Participants Raised Concerns about DHS and DOJ CVE-Related Training, but the FBI and USAOs Could Help Ensure Quality of Training by More Consistently Soliciting Feedback

Less than 1 percent of state and local participants in CVE-related training  that DHS and DOJ provided or funded who provided feedback to the  departments expressed concerns about information included in the  course materials or that instructors presented during training. In addition,  while DOJ generally solicits feedback from all participants for programs  that provide formal, curriculum-based CVE-related training, the FBI and  USAOs do not always solicit feedback for programs that provide less  formal CVE-related training (e.g., presentations by guest speakers), even  though such training was provided to about 9,900 participants in fiscal  years 2010 and 2011. DHS and DOJ collected and retained feedback forms from 8,424 of the  more than 28,000 participants—including state, local, and tribal law  enforcement officials, prison officials, and community members—of  training they provided or funded in fiscal years 2010 and 2011 that was  CVE-related according to our framework. The FBI does not require entities providing  informal training, such as briefings and presentations during outreach, to  solicit feedback. We have previously reported that evaluating training is important and that  agencies need to develop systematic evaluation processes in order to   We obtain accurate information about the benefits of their training. DOJ Components Have Undertaken Reviews of CVE-Related Training

DOJ components have conducted or are currently conducting internal  reviews of their training materials, including those with topics that our  framework identified as related to CVE, in an effort to identify and purge  potentially objectionable materials. In addition, by  proactively soliciting feedback from participants in informal CVE-related  training on a more consistent basis, FBI field offices and USAOs could  more effectively obtain information on the strengths and weaknesses of  their presentations and briefings, and thus better ensure their quality. To obtain valuable information for determining the extent to which CVE- related programs are yielding the desired outcomes and complying with  the CVE national strategy, we recommend that the Deputy Attorney  General direct USAOs and the Director of the FBI’s Office of Public  Affairs direct FBI field offices to consider soliciting feedback more  consistently from participants in informal training, such as presentations  and briefings, that covers the type of information addressed in the CVE  national strategy. For example, DHS stated that it  will be hosting a CVE train-the-trainer workshop in September 2012, and  identifying trainers on its online CVE training portal who meet the  standards included in DHS’s training guidance and best practices. To what extent have the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and  the Department of Justice (DOJ) identified and communicated topics  that countering violent extremism-related (CVE-related) training  addresses to their components and state and local partners? What, if any, concerns have been raised by state and local partners  who have participated in CVE-related training provided or funded by  DHS and DOJ? 3. To determine the extent to which DHS and DOJ identified and  communicated topics that should be addressed by CVE-related training,  we met with officials from both departments to discuss how they define  CVE-related training, which departmental training programs were relevant  to our review, and how the departments communicated principal CVE- related training topics to relevant components and state and local  partners. Identifying DHS and DOJ Efforts to Improve the Quality of CVE-Related Training

To address what actions, if any, DHS and DOJ have taken overall to  improve the quality of CVE-related training, we interviewed DHS and DOJ  officials responsible for providing or funding CVE-related training to  inquire about any current or pending guidance, whether documented or  undocumented, they adhere to when vetting training materials and  instructors and other actions they have taken to ensure the quality of  CVE-related training.
Why GAO Did This Study

DHS and DOJ have responsibility for training state and local law enforcement and community members on how to defend against violent extremism--ideologically motivated violence to further political goals. Community members and advocacy organizations have raised concerns about the quality of some CVE-related training that DOJ and DHS provide or fund. As requested, GAO examined (1)the extent to which DHS and DOJ have identified and communicated topics that CVE-related training should address to their components and state and local partners, (2) any concerns raised by state and local partners who have participated in CVE-related training provided or funded by DHS or DOJ, and (3) actions DHS and DOJ have taken to improve the quality of CVE-related training. GAO reviewed relevant documents, such as training participant feedback forms and DHS and DOJ guidance; and interviewed relevant officials from DHS and DOJ components. This is a public version of a sensitive report that GAO issued in September 2012. Information that the FBI deemed sensitive has been redacted.

What GAO Found

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has identified and is communicating to its components and state and local partners topics that the training on countering violent extremism (CVE) it provides or funds should cover; in contrast, the Department of Justice (DOJ) has not identified what topics should be covered in its CVE-related training. According to a DHS official who leads DHS's CVE efforts, identifying topics has helped to provide a logical structure for DHS's CVE-related training efforts. According to DOJ officials, even though they have not specifically identified what topics should be covered in CVE-related training, they understand internally which of the department's training is CVE-related and contributes either directly or indirectly to the department's training responsibilities under the CVE national strategy. However, over the course of this review, the department generally relied upon the framework GAO developed for potential CVE-related training topics to determine which of its existing training was CVE-related. Further, because DOJ has not identified CVE-related training topics, DOJ components have had challenges in determining the extent to which their training efforts contribute to DOJ's responsibilities under the CVE national strategy. In addition, officials who participated in an interagency working group focusing on ensuring CVE-related training quality stated that the group found it challenging to catalogue federal CVE-related training because agencies' views differed as to what CVE-related training includes.
The majority of state and local participant feedback on training that DHS or DOJ provided or funded and that GAO identified as CVE-related was positive or neutral, but a minority of participants raised concerns about biased, inaccurate, or offensive material. DHS and DOJ collected feedback from 8,424 state and local participants in CVE-related training during fiscal years 2010 and 2011, and 77--less than 1 percent--provided comments that expressed such concerns. According to DHS and DOJ officials, agencies used the feedback to make changes where appropriate. DOJ's Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and other components generally solicit feedback for more formal, curriculum-based training, but the FBI does not require this for activities such as presentations by guest speakers because the FBI does not consider this to be training. Similarly, DOJ's United States Attorneys' Offices (USAO) do not require feedback on presentations and similar efforts. Nevertheless, FBI field offices and USAOs covered about 39 percent (approximately 9,900) of all participants in DOJ CVE-related training during fiscal years 2010 and 2011 through these less formal methods, yet only 4 of 21 FBI field offices and 15 of 39 USAOs chose to solicit feedback on such methods. GAO has previously reported that agencies need to develop systematic evaluation processes in order to obtain accurate information about the benefits of their training. Soliciting feedback for less formal efforts on a more consistent basis could help these agencies ensure their quality.
DOJ and DHS have undertaken reviews and developed guidance to help improve the quality of CVE-related training. For example, in September 2011, the DOJ Deputy Attorney General directed all DOJ components and USAOs to review all of their training materials, including those related to CVE, to ensure they are consistent with DOJ standards. In addition, in October 2011, DHS issued guidance that covers best practices for CVE-related training and informs recipients of DHS grants who use the funding for training involving CVE on how to ensure high-quality training. Since the departments' reviews and efforts to implement the guidance they have developed are relatively new, it is too soon to determine their effectiveness.

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that DOJ identify and communicate principal CVE-related training topics and that FBI field offices and USAOs consider soliciting feedback more consistently. DOJ agreed that it should more consistently solicit feedback, but disagreed that it should identify CVE training topics because DOJ does not have primary responsibility for CVE-related training, among other things. GAO believes this recommendation remains valid as discussed further in this report.