	Purpose and Scope

Congress has long been concerned about whether U.S. policy advances U.S. security interests in reducing the role of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and missiles as well as obtaining China's cooperation in weapons nonproliferation. Using unclassified consultations and citations, this CRS Report discusses the national security problem of the PRC's role in weapons proliferation and issues related to the U.S. policy response, including legislation. PRC weapons proliferation has persisted, aggravating trends that result in more ambiguous technical assistance (vs. transfers of hardware), longer range missiles, more indigenous capabilities, and secondary (retransferred) proliferation. China's "entities," including state-owned defense industrial corporations, reportedly were "associated" with Pakistan's nuclear and missile programs and Iran's missile programs. Moreover, China's own "entities" have supplied sensitive technology to Iran. Enacted on December 31, 2011, the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for FY2012, P.L. UNSC Resolutions and Sanctions

Under U.S. and other foreign pressure, China has evolved to vote for some sanctions at the UNSC. Still, on February 4, China was one of 27 countries that voted at the IAEA to support a resolution to report Iran to the UNSC, showing some progress in China's cooperation since it abstained on a resolution on Iran in September 2005. Still, in diplomatic negotiations on another UNSC Resolution for a fourth set of sanctions, China reportedly opposed sanctions to target Iran's oil and gas industry. On June 9, 2010, China voted for UNSC Resolution 1929 to impose sanctions against Iran. In February 2012, the Section 721 Report for 2011 told Congress that PRC "entities" continued to supply missile-related items to Iran. PRC technology transfers have further implications for secondary, or retransferred, proliferation, since North Korea reportedly supplied technology to Iran, Syria, Pakistan, Egypt, Libya, and Yemen. However, some have raised issues of whether China has been helpful in fully using its leverage with North Korea, whether it seeks North Korea's denuclearization with as much urgency as the United States and its allies, whether China's role warrants a closer U.S.-PRC relationship that risks other U.S. interests, and whether China actually undermines regional stability, given its support for the status quo that includes a provocative, belligerent DPRK. The "Six-Party Talks" resumed on July 18-20. Implementation and Impasse

However, the PRC-sponsored Joint Document of October 2007 raised a number of questions about implementation, including about the disposition of nuclear equipment (in North Korea, China, Russia, or elsewhere); disablement of nuclear facilities aside from the three cited; ultimate dismantlement of nuclear facilities; U.S.-only funding and work for disablement; declaration of nuclear weapons in addition to nuclear programs; clarification of uranium as well as plutonium programs; missile and nuclear proliferation (with the North Korean-built nuclear reactor in Syria just bombed by Israel in September); nuclear testing sites; verification and monitoring; timelines for bilateral normalization; other concerns of the United States and Japan about human rights, terrorism, and abductions; strains in the U.S.-Japan alliance; coordination with Seoul; and the State Department's consultations with Congress, Defense Department, and European allies. Reportedly, PRC policy makers reviewed their approach toward North Korea. Then, on June 12, 2009, the UNSC approved Resolution 1 874 to expand the sanctions previously imposed under Resolution 1718 in 2006. Given the DPRK's missile and nuclear tests, and sinking of the Cheonan , the Obama Administration shifted to call the talks explicitly the "six-party process," while doubting the credibility of any announcement in Beijing of repeated talks and looking for results in North Korea's implementation of the existing Joint Statement of 2005. The United States also warned North Korea through the U.N. channel. One question has been whether Xi would change China's approach to North Korea. Beijing continued its balanced approach that includes support for Pyongyang along with incremental implementation of UNSC sanctions. Policy Issues and Options

		Issues for Policy

Weapons proliferation by the PRC and/or its organizations raises policy issues concerning (1) assessments of the nature and seriousness of the PRC government's role in the proliferation threat; (2) the priority of this issue relative to other U.S. interests (i.e., other security issues, Taiwan, trade, human rights); and (3) U.S. leadership and leverage (including the use of sanctions and diplomacy, and congressional actions) to obtain China's cooperation in nonproliferation. In April 2014, the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Strategic Forces' markup of the FY2015 NDAA ( H.R. (The final FY2015 NDAA ( H.R. 3979 ) became P.L. 113-291 on December 19, 2014.) Nonetheless, President Obama has not announced significant breakthroughs, including in this meetings with PRC leader Xi Jinping in Sunnylands Retreat, CA, in June 2013 or in Beijing in November 2014. China has not joined the PSI. (See discussion on North Korea above.) In contrast to the Clinton Administration, the Bush Administration repeatedly imposed sanctions on PRC "entities" (but not the PRC government) for transfers (related to ballistic missiles, chemical weapons, and cruise missiles) to Pakistan and Iran, under the Arms Export Control Act, Export Administration Act, Iran Nonproliferation Act of 2000, Iran-Iraq Arms Nonproliferation Act of 1992, Executive Order 12938, and Executive Order 13382. About half of the PRC entities, "serial proliferators," have faced repeated sanctions, raising questions about effectiveness. By 2014, President Obama's officials started to negotiate a potential renewal of the nuclear cooperation agreement. It also required a report on the PRC's adherence to the MTCR.
Congress has long been concerned about whether policy advances the U.S. interest in reducing the role of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and missiles that could deliver them. Recipients of PRC technology included Pakistan, North Korea, and Iran. This CRS Report, updated through the 113th Congress, discusses the security problem of China's role in weapons proliferation and issues related to the U.S. policy response since the mid-1990s. China has taken some steps to mollify U.S. and other foreign concerns about its role in weapons proliferation. Nonetheless, supplies from China have aggravated trends that result in ambiguous technical aid, more indigenous capabilities, longer-range missiles, and secondary (retransferred) proliferation. Unclassified intelligence reports told Congress that China was a "key supplier" of technology, particularly with PRC entities providing nuclear and missile-related technology to Pakistan and missile-related technology to Iran.
Policy issues in seeking PRC cooperation have concerned summits, sanctions, and satellite and nuclear exports. PRC proliferation activities have continued to raise questions about China's practices and policies in weapons nonproliferation. The United States has imposed sanctions on various PRC "entities" (including state-owned entities) for troublesome transfers related to missiles and chemical weapons to Pakistan, Iran, or perhaps another country, including repeated sanctions on some "serial proliferators." Since 2009, the Obama Administration has imposed sanctions on 18 occasions on numerous entities in China for weapons proliferation. By 2014, the Administration started to negotiate a renewal of the U.S.-PRC nuclear cooperation agreement. President Obama's summits with PRC leader Xi Jinping have not produced significant results.
Skeptics question whether China's roles in weapons nonproliferation warrant a closer relationship with China, even as sanctions were required on some PRC technology transfers. Some criticize the imposition of U.S. sanctions targeting PRC "entities" but not the government. Others doubt the effectiveness of any stress on sanctions over diplomacy or a comprehensive strategy. Concerns grew that China expanded nuclear cooperation with Pakistan, supported North Korea, and could undermine sanctions against Iran (including in the oil/gas energy sector). In 2002-2008, the U.S. approach relied on China's influence on North Korea to dismantle its nuclear weapons. Beijing hosted the Six-Party Talks (last held in December 2008) with limited results. Since 2006, China's balanced approach has evolved to vote for some U.N. Security Council (UNSC) sanctions against missile or nuclear proliferation in North Korea and Iran. Some called for engaging more with Beijing to use its leverage against Pyongyang and Tehran. However, North Korea's nuclear tests in 2006, 2009, and 2013 prompted greater debate about how to change China's calculus and the value of its cooperation. After negotiations, the PRC voted in June 2009 for UNSC Resolution 1874 to expand sanctions imposed under Resolution 1718 in 2006 against North Korea. The PRC voted in June 2010 for UNSC Resolution 1929 for the fourth set of sanctions against Iran. In 2013, the PRC voted for UNSC Resolutions 2087 and 2094 on North Korea for missile and nuclear tests. Still, China has continued its balanced approach that includes incremental implementation of UNSC sanctions. China's approach has not shown fundamental changes toward Pakistan, Iran, and North Korea. China has called for resuming the Six-Party Talks, but the Administration says the goal is North Korea's credible denuclearization. Legislation in the 113th Congress includes the FY2014 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) (P.L. 113-66) with Section 1248 to require a report on a plan to reduce missile proliferation in Iran, North Korea, and Syria, including how to secure the PRC's cooperation. In its report on the FY2015 NDAA (H.R. 4435), the House Armed Services Committee required a report from the Defense Intelligence Agency on the PRC's support for Karl Lee's repeated transfers to Iran. The final FY2015 NDAA (H.R. 3979) became P.L. 113-291 on December 19, 2014.