To achieve its goals, US-VISIT uses biometric information (digital  fingerscans and photographs) to verify identity and screen persons  against watch lists. When a visitor arrives at a port of entry, the biometric information is  used to verify that the visitor is the person who was issued the visa  or other travel documents. Ultimately, visitors are to confirm their  departure by having their visas or passports scanned and  undergoing fingerscanning. Other key US-VISIT functions include  ●  collecting, maintaining, and sharing information on certain foreign  nationals who enter and exit the United States;  identifying foreign nationals who (1) have overstayed or violated the  terms of their admission; (2) may be eligible to receive, extend, or  adjust their immigration status; or (3) should be apprehended or  detained by law enforcement officials;  ●  detecting fraudulent travel documents, verifying traveler identity,  and determining traveler admissibility through the use of biometrics;  and  ●  facilitating information sharing and coordination within the  immigration and border management community. For example, on January 5, 2004, it  deployed and began operating most aspects of its planned entry  capability at 115 airports and 14 seaports, and added the remaining  aspects in February 2005. DHS Has Yet to Demonstrate that US-VISIT as Defined Is the Right Solution

A prerequisite for prudent investment in programs is having  reasonable assurance that a proposed course of action is the right  thing to do, meaning that it properly fits within the larger context of  an agency’s strategic plans and related operational and technology  environments, and that the program will produce benefits in excess  of costs over its useful life. We have made recommendations to DHS  aimed at ensuring that this is in fact the case for US-VISIT, and the  department has taken steps intended to address our  recommendations. According to the US-VISIT Chief Strategist, an  immigration and border management strategic plan was drafted in  March 2005 that shows how US-VISIT is aligned with DHS’s  organizational mission and that defines an overall vision for  immigration and border management. Return on Investment Has Yet to be Determined

Prudent investment also requires that an agency have reasonable  assurance that a proposed program will produce mission value  commensurate with expected costs and risks. Since our February 2005 report, the program has developed a cost- benefit analysis for Increment 1B (which is to provide exit  capabilities at air and sea ports of entry). For example, it did not include a detailed  work breakdown structure. Strengthening the program’s cost-estimating capability is extremely  important. DHS Is Still Establishing Needed Program Management Capabilities

Establishing effective program management capabilities is  important to ensure that an organization is going about delivering a  program in the right way. One area in which DHS has made good progress is in implementing  our recommendations to establish the human capital capabilities  necessary to manage US-VISIT. Since then, the program office has finalized the human capital plan,  completed more activities, and formulated plans to complete others  (for example, according to the program office, it has completed an  analysis of its workforce to determine diversity trends, retirement  and attrition rates, and mission-critical and leadership competency  gaps, and it has plans to complete an analysis of workforce data to  maintain strategic focus on preserving the skills, knowledge, and  leadership abilities required for the US-VISIT program’s success). DHS’s progress in implementing our human capital  recommendations should help ensure that it has sufficient staff with  the right skills and abilities to successfully execute the program. Having such staff has been and will be particularly important in light  of the program’s more limited progress to date in establishing  program management process capabilities. Until these controls are effectively implemented, US-VISIT  will be at risk of not delivering promised capabilities on time and  within budget. Because  DHS test plans were not sufficiently well-defined to be effective, we  recommended that before testing begins, DHS develop and approve  test plans that meet the criteria that relevant systems development  guidance prescribes for effective test plans: namely, that they  (1) specify the test environment; (2) describe each test to be  performed, including test controls, inputs, and expected outputs;  (3) define the test procedures to be followed in conducting the tests;  and (4) provide traceability between the test cases and the  requirements to be verified by the testing. However, the test plan did not adequately trace between test cases  and the requirements to be verified by testing. DHS Has Yet to Fully Establish Program Accountability Mechanisms

To better ensure that US-VISIT and DHS meet expectations, we  made recommendations related to measuring and disclosing  progress against program commitments. Without such measurements, program  performance and accountability can suffer. The expenditure plan for fiscal year 2005 (the  fourth US-VISIT expenditure plan) does not describe progress  against commitments made in the previous plans. The longer the program proceeds without  these, the greater the risk that the program will not meet its  commitments.
Why GAO Did This Study

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has established a program--the U.S. Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology (US-VISIT)--to collect, maintain, and share information, including biometric identifiers, on selected foreign nationals who enter and exit the United States. US-VISIT uses these biometric identifiers (digital fingerscans and photographs) to screen persons against watch lists and to verify that a visitor is the person who was issued a visa or other travel document. Visitors are also to confirm their departure by having their visas or passports scanned and undergoing fingerscanning at selected air and sea ports of entry. GAO was asked to testify on (1) the status of US-VISIT and (2) DHS progress in implementing recommendations that GAO made as part of its prior reviews of US-VISIT annual expenditure plans. The testimony is based on GAO's prior reports as well as ongoing work for the House Committee on Homeland Security. GAO's recommendations are directed at helping the department improve its capabilities to deliver US-VISIT capability and benefit expectations on time and within budget. According to DHS, the recommendations have made US-VISIT a stronger program.

What GAO Found

The US-VISIT program has met a number of demanding requirements that were mandated in legislation. A pre-entry screening capability is in place in overseas visa issuance offices, and an entry identification capability is operating at 115 airports, 14 seaports, and 154 land ports of entry. This has been accomplished during a period of DHS-wide change, and has resulted in preventing criminal aliens from entering the country and potentially deterring others from even attempting to do so. Nevertheless, DHS has more to do to implement GAO recommendations aimed at better ensuring that US-VISIT is maximizing its potential for success and holding itself accountable for results. DHS has taken steps to address those GAO recommendations intended to ensure that US-VISIT as defined is the "right thing." For example, it is clarifying the strategic context within which US-VISIT is to operate, having drafted a strategic plan to show how US-VISIT is aligned with DHS's mission goals and operations and to provide an overall vision for immigration and border management. However, the plan has yet to be approved, causing its integration with other departmentwide border security initiatives to remain unclear. In addition, the department has analyzed the program's costs, benefits, and risks, but its analyses do not yet demonstrate that the program is producing or will produce mission value commensurate with expected costs and risks. In particular, the department's return-on-investment analyses for exit options do not demonstrate that these solutions will be cost-effective. DHS has also taken steps to address those GAO recommendations aimed at ensuring that the program is executed in the "right way." The department has made good progress in establishing the program's human capital capabilities, which should help ensure that it has sufficient staff with the necessary skills and abilities. This is particularly important in light of the program's more limited progress in establishing capabilities in certain program management process areas, such as test management. For example, a test plan used in a recent system acceptance test did not adequately trace between test cases and the requirements to be verified by testing. Incomplete test plans reduce assurance that systems will perform as intended once they are deployed. DHS also has begun addressing GAO's recommendations to establish accountability for program performance and results, but more needs to be done. For example, DHS's expenditure plans have not described progress against commitments made in previous plans. Unless performance against commitments is measured and disclosed, the ability to manage and oversee the program will suffer. The longer the program proceeds without fully addressing GAO's recommendations, the greater the risk that it will not deliver promised capabilities and benefits on time and within budget.