Essential Technology May Not Be Ready

Although the Air Force plans to rely upon existing missile designs and off-the-shelf technology to speed JASSM development, essential guidance and automatic target recognition technologies are not mature. With this schedule, however, this system may not be available in time to meet JASSM’s June 1998 critical design freeze when the missile design is to be finalized. Later, as funds are available, separate programs are to complete integration with the remaining aircraft. Some Developmental Missiles May Not Be Needed

The Air Force plans to buy 72 JASSMs during development and 75 during low-rate initial production. If the JASSM acquisition plan is revised to eliminate the 35 pilot production missiles, the Air Force could reduce some of the overlap between development and production, as well as the associated cost and schedule risk. We support the Air Force’s objective to acquire an affordable and capable replacement for TSSAM. The Air Force believes the price objective is achievable if (1) JASSM is derived from an existing missile in a competitive environment and (2) the Air Force and contractor are able to realize savings by implementing acquisition reforms and using best commercial practices. Navy Commitment Is Uncertain

Although JASSM is a joint Air Force and Navy program, the Navy has not provided development funding and, until March 1996, did not require carrier operability. In March 1996, the Chief of Naval Operations committed to providing funds for F/A-18 integration, but this is not expected to occur during JASSM development. Therefore, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense ensure that (1) required autonomous guidance and automatic target recognition technologies are mature before finalizing the JASSM design, (2) the Air Force does not acquire the 35 pilot production missiles early in development without a demonstrated need for additional test missiles, (3) missiles used during planned initial operational test and evaluation are production-representative missiles, and (4) the Navy participates fully in the program so the final JASSM design meets both Air Force and Navy requirements.
Why GAO Did This Study

GAO evaluated the Air Force's and Navy's Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile (JASSM) program, focusing on: (1) the acquisition process; (2) schedule and cost risks; (3) the Air Force's plan to acquire 35 pilot production missiles; and (4) the Navy's commitment to the program.

What GAO Found

GAO found that: (1) the Air Force is using an innovative acquisition process to procure JASSM; (2) the Air Force expects JASSM contractors to modify existing missile designs, use off-the-shelf technology, and apply best commercial practices to their design and production work; (3) some crucial JASSM technologies may not be mature in time for them to be integrated into JASSM; (4) JASSM may be vulnerable to jamming, and the Air Force is trying to identify a cost-effective countermeasure; (5) a JASSM automatic target recognition capability is still under development; (6) the Air Force will phase in integration of JASSM with combat aircraft, undertaking separate programs to integrate the missile with each type of aircraft as funds become available; (7) the Air Force plans to acquire 35 pilot production missiles, but those missiles may not be needed for testing, and may not represent the actual production configuration; (8) the Air Force's unit price goal for JASSM is optimistic when compared to similar missile procurement programs; (9) the Navy has not provided JASSM development funding, but carrier operability is a firm JASSM requirement, and the Navy expects to commit funds for JASSM integration with the F/A-18 aircraft after JASSM development; and (10) the need for JASSM may not be as urgent as the Air Force believes.