Deficiencies Must Be Corrected to Achieve Air Force Objectives

To test the operational performance of the B-2A, the Air Force measured B-2A performance against five broad operational objectives that were derived from documented Air Force operational requirements and concepts related to nuclear and conventional missions. As the B-2A matures, numerous minor problems identified in the test reports are scheduled to be corrected or improved based on their relative priorities. This will limit the Air Force’s ability to rapidly strike targets and sustain operations. The lack of an effective defensive avionics system could affect the B-2A’s survivability in selected situations because it is supposed to provide B-2A crews with information on the location of threats, both known and unknown that they may encounter during a mission. The Air Force’s cost estimate does not include the cost of correcting all deficiencies but does cover some improvements in the defensive system. These software changes are intended to provide capabilities that are useful but less than were expected in the original defensive system design. Inadequate Reliability and Maintainability of Low Observable Materials

Low observable materials and features on the B-2A frequently fail, requiring high amounts of maintenance. Lack of Environmental Shelters for Deployment

The operational test report states that the block 30 B-2A aircraft must be sheltered to protect it from weather and provide a suitable environment in which to maintain low observables. However, the Air Force will incur additional costs if it plans to correct the deficiencies identified during testing and achieve the full operational capability originally planned for the B-2A. At this time, there is no comprehensive plan that identifies the efforts required to achieve the full B-2A capability, the likely cost of these efforts, or a funding plan. Most B-2A Funds Have Been Appropriated

The fiscal year 1999 B-2A cost estimate indicates the cost to complete development, procurement, and modification of the B-2A program is $44.3 billion then-year dollars. In addition to the cost increases needed for defensive avionics, low observable materials, and support needed for deployment, the Air Force will also incur costs to procure spares to support the nuclear mission of the B-2A. As of April 1998, Northrop Grumman had delivered three modified aircraft later than, and one modified aircraft earlier than, the contract schedule. This change would be to accommodate the need to provide an aircraft for flight testing planned upgrades. DOD agreed there is a need to identify to Congress future efforts and funding requirements to upgrade current B-2As. To identify the status of the block 30 modification schedule, we reviewed the contract and planning schedules for the block 30 modification process, delivery documents identifying the delivery date and number of deficiencies on the delivered aircraft, and reports showing planned and actual manning at the contractor’s modification facility.
Why GAO Did This Study

Pursuant to a legislative requirement, GAO reviewed the total acquisition costs of the B-2A bomber, focusing on: (1) deficiencies that must be corrected to achieve Air Force objectives for the B-2A; (2) additional costs to correct the deficiencies; and (3) the B-2A modification schedule.

What GAO Found

GAO noted that: (1) the Air Force evaluated the B-2A capability to meet several broad objectives--strike rapidly, sustaining operations, deploy to forward locations, survive in hostile environments, and accurately deliver weapons; (2) the November 1997 operational test reports concluded that B-2As, in the block 30 configuration, are operationally effective, but with several important deficiencies that limit the aircraft's ability to fully meet those objectives as planned; (3) the test reports identify four deficiencies: (a) incomplete development of the automated ground mission planning system, which is needed to rapidly plan and carry out B-2A strike missions; (b) unsatisfactory performance of the defensive avionics system, which is used to provide enemy threat information to the crews and increase their survivability in certain situations; (c) inadequate reliability and maintainability of low observable materials and structures, reducing the ability to sustain the defined pace of operations while maintaining a high degree of survivability for conventional B-2A missions; and (d) lack of environmental shelters to maintain low observable materials and to protect the aircraft from certain weather conditions during deployment; (4) the fiscal year 1999 B-2A cost estimate identifies the cost to complete the B-2A program for the block 30 configuration at $44.3 billion then-year dollars; (5) included in this figure is funding to correct or improve some, but not all, of the deficiencies listed above; (6) for example, the estimate does not include the additional costs that would be incurred if defensive avionics were to be required to achieve the originally planned capability, which Department of Defense officials said is no longer required at this time; (7) however, it does include funding for software upgrades to improve the system performance, which meets current operational objectives; (8) further, it does not include the cost to improve low observable materials, which are needed to sustain the pace of B-2A operations, and to provide for a sufficient number of deployment shelters to accommodate repairs to B-2As; (9) the estimate also excludes costs to buy spare parts that are being identified to support the B-2A's nuclear mission; (10) modifications of B-2As to the block 30 configuration have not been accomplished on schedule; (11) four modified aircraft were delivered as of April 1998--three later than scheduled and one ahead of schedule; and (12) according to the Air Force, the contractor has had difficulty hiring enough personnel to achieve the schedule.