Applying Management Lessons May Reduce Costs and Avoid Schedule Delays

By incorporating management lessons into the NSSN program, the Navy may avoid repeating many of the problems that caused Seawolf detail design and lead ship construction cost increases and schedule delays. However, because of the absence of a DOD approved acquisition strategy, the extent to which the NSSN acquisition strategy will include these lessons cannot be assessed now. It also caused a 1-year delay in the SSN-21’s delivery. Moreover, according to the NSSN project manager, the NSSN, to the extent possible, will incorporate existing systems and components from prior submarine programs and off-the-shelf, commercially available technology. The Navy estimates that NSSN savings from all approved lessons could range from $90 million to $100 million. Recommendation

To allow an assessment of how the Navy will avoid a repetition of past problems, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense ensure that the formal NSSN acquisition strategy explicitly documents how the Navy is to address and incorporate the management and technical lessons from prior submarine programs.
Why GAO Did This Study

Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Navy's plans to incorporate lessons learned from prior submarine programs into the design and construction of the NSSN, a new class of nuclear-powered attack submarine.

What GAO Found

GAO found that: (1) by incorporating management lessons from prior submarine construction programs, the Navy could reduce its costs and avoid the schedule delays that it has experienced in the Seawolf SSN-21 program; (2) the NSSN project manager intends to incorporate lessons learned from the Seawolf SSN-21 program into the NSSN program acquisition strategy, but the extent to which these lessons will be applied cannot be assessed until the Department of Defense (DOD) approves the strategy and makes it available to the public for evaluation; (3) the Navy estimates that NSSN cost savings could range from $90 million to $100 million; and (4) the DOD acquisition strategy should explicitly address how the Navy will avoid repeating the problems of prior construction programs.