	Agencies Have Improved Sharing as They Build the ISE, but a Better Roadmap and System of Accountability Could Guide Future Development

		ISE Has Improved Sharing By Advancing Goals and Priority Programs

In our July 2011 report, we noted that the Program Manager for the ISE  and key security agencies have continued to make progress in  addressing issues that keep terrorism-related information sharing on our  high-risk list. The Program Manager and the Office of Management  and Budget generally agreed and are taking steps to address the intent of  this recommendation. Federal Agencies Are Helping Fusion Centers Build Capabilities, but Have More Work to Help Them Sustain Operations and Measure Their Value

		Federal Agencies Have Provided Resources to Develop a National Fusion Center Network, but Centers Are Concerned about Sustaining Operations

The federal government recognizes that fusion centers represent a critical  source of local information about potential threats, including homegrown  terrorism, and a means to disseminate terrorism-related information and  intelligence from federal sources. Federal Agencies Plan to Assess Centers’ Capabilities and Develop Performance Metrics to Determine Centers’ Value to the ISE

Consistent with efforts to develop this national network of fusion centers,  federal agencies have also issued a series of guidance documents,  including the baseline capabilities, to support fusion centers in  establishing their operations. According to these officials, such performance measures are to be in  place by the end of 2011. We reported in  September 2010 that consistent with federal requirements, DHS and DOJ  have provided technical assistance and training to help centers develop  privacy and civil liberties policies and protections. Continuous  assessment and monitoring are key steps to help ensure that fusion  centers are implementing privacy and civil liberties protections and that  DHS, and other federal agencies, are supporting them in their efforts. In  December 2010, we reported that I&A had initiatives underway to identify  state and local information needs, developing intelligence products to  meet these needs, and obtaining more detailed feedback on the  timeliness and usefulness of these products, among other things. I&A  also provided a number of services to its state and local partners— primarily through fusion centers—that were generally well received by the  state and local officials we contacted. However, I&A had not yet defined how it plans to meet its state  and local information-sharing mission by identifying and documenting the  specific programs and activities that are most important for executing this  mission. For example, the personnel measure did not provide  information related to the effectiveness of the I&A personnel or the value  they provide to their customers, such as enhanced information sharing,  analytic capabilities, and operational support. To help I&A strengthen its efforts to share information with state and local  partners, we recommended, among other things, that I&A (1) identify and  document priority programs and activities related to its state and local  mission, and (2) take actions to develop additional performance  measures that gauge the results that I&A’s information-sharing efforts  have achieved and how they have enhanced homeland security. DHS agreed with these recommendations and expects to address  them as part of new strategic planning efforts. This work is assessing (1) the actions the federal government  has taken since the attempted attack to strengthen the watchlist  nominations process, as well as any resulting challenges and impacts; (2)  how the composition of the TSDB changed as a result of agency actions;  and (3) how screening agencies are addressing vulnerabilities exposed  by the attempted attack, the outcomes of related screening, and the  extent to which federal agencies assessing the impacts of this screening. Our preliminary observations show that federal agencies have made  progress in implementing corrective actions to address problems in  watchlist-related processes that were exposed by the December 2009  attempted attack. These actions are intended to address problems in the  way agencies share and use information to nominate individuals to the  TSDB, and use the watchlist to prevent persons of concern from boarding  planes to the United States or entering the United States at a port of  entry. It will be important for  agencies to monitor and address these impacts as appropriate moving  forward. We plan to issue a report with the final results or our work later  this year. Related GAO Products

Department of Homeland Security: Progress Made and Work Remaining  in Implementing Homeland Security Missions 10 Years after 9/11. Information Sharing Environment: Better Road Map Needed to Guide  Implementation and Investments. Terrorist Watch List Screening: Efforts to Help Reduce Adverse Effects  on the Public.
Why GAO Did This Study

A breakdown in information sharing was a major factor contributing to the failure to prevent the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. Since then, federal, state, and local governments have taken steps to improve sharing. This statement focuses on government efforts to (1) establish the Information Sharing Environment (ISE), a government-wide approach that facilitates the sharing of terrorism-related information; (2) support fusion centers, where states collaborate with federal agencies to improve sharing; (3) provide other support to state and local agencies to enhance sharing; and (4) strengthen use of the terrorist watchlist. GAO's comments are based on products issued from September 2010 through July 2011 and selected updates in September 2011. For the updates, GAO reviewed reports on the status of Department of Homeland Security (DHS) efforts to support fusion centers, and interviewed DHS officials regarding these efforts. This statement also includes preliminary observations based on GAO's ongoing watchlist work. For this work, GAO is analyzing the guidance used by agencies to nominate individuals to the watchlist and agency procedures for screening individuals against the list, and is interviewing relevant officials from law enforcement and intelligence agencies, among other things..

What GAO Found

The government continues to make progress in sharing terrorism-related information among its many security partners, but does not yet have a fully-functioning ISE in place. In prior reports, GAO recommended that agencies take steps to develop an overall plan or roadmap to guide ISE implementation and establish measures to help gauge progress. These measures would help determine what information sharing capabilities have been accomplished and are left to develop, as well as what difference these capabilities have made to improve sharing and homeland security. Accomplishing these steps, as well as ensuring agencies have the necessary resources and leadership commitment, should help strengthen sharing and address issues GAO has identified that make information sharing a high-risk area. Federal agencies are helping fusion centers build analytical and operational capabilities, but have more work to complete to help these centers sustain their operations and measure their homeland security value. For example, DHS has provided resources, including personnel and grant funding, to develop a national network of centers. However, centers are concerned about their ability to sustain and expand their operations over the long term, negatively impacting their ability to function as part of the network. Federal agencies have provided guidance to centers and plan to conduct annual assessments of centers' capabilities and develop performance metrics by the end of 2011 to determine centers' value to the ISE. DHS and the Department of Justice are providing technical assistance and training to help centers develop privacy and civil liberties policies and protections, but continuous assessment and monitoring policy implementation will be important to help ensure the policies provide effective protections. In response to its mission to share information with state and local partners, DHS's Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) has taken steps to identify these partner's information needs, develop related intelligence products, and obtain more feedback on its products. I&A also provides a number of services to its state and local partners that were generally well received by the state and local officials we contacted. However, I&A has not yet defined how it plans to meet its state and local mission by identifying and documenting the specific programs and activities that are most important for executing this mission. The office also has not developed performance measures that would allow I&A to demonstrate the expected outcomes and effectiveness of state and local programs and activities. In December 2010, GAO recommended that I&A address these issues, which could help it make resource decisions and provide accountability over its efforts. GAO's preliminary observations indicate that federal agencies have made progress in implementing corrective actions to address problems in watchlist-related processes that were exposed by the December 25, 2009, attempted airline bombing. These actions are intended to address problems in the way agencies share and use information to nominate individuals to the watchlist, and use the list to prevent persons of concern from boarding planes to the United States or entering the country, among other things. These actions can also have impacts on agency resources and the public, such as traveler delays and other inconvenience. GAO plans to report the results of this work later this year.

What GAO Recommends

GAO is not making new recommendations, but has made recommendations in prior reports to federal agencies to enhance information sharing. The agencies generally agreed and are making progress, but full implementation of these recommendations is needed.