The exercise of the judicial power of the United States often requires that courts construe statutes so enacted to apply them in concrete cases and controversies. Judicial interpretation of a statute is authoritative in the matter before the court, and may guide courts in future cases. Beyond this, the methodologies and approaches taken by the courts in interpreting meaning also can help guide legislative drafters, legislators, implementing agencies, and private parties. That is, to inform Congress on how the Court might go about analyzing the meaning of particular legislative language, this report emphasizes "textualist"-based means of interpretation. When reading statutory text, the Supreme Court uses content-neutral canons developed by the judiciary that focus on word usage, grammar, syntax and the like. To this end, the Court has expressed an interest "that Congress be able to legislate against a background of clear interpretive rules, so that it may know the effect of the language it adopts." (These canons are discussed below.) In any event, one possible suggestion of the indeterminacy of canons is that statutory construction should be a narrow pursuit, not a broader one:
[C]anons of construction are no more than rules of thumb that help courts determine the meaning of legislation, and in interpreting a statute a court should always turn first to one, cardinal canon before all others.... [C]ourts must presume that a legislature says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says there. In this exercise, a threshold inquiry is whether language is being used in the "ordinary," "general dictionary" sense or in a narrower, specialized sense or as a term of art. Statutory Language Not to be Construed as "Mere Surplusage"

A basic principle of statutory interpretation is that courts should "give effect, if possible, to every clause and word of a statute, avoiding, if it may be, any construction which implies that the legislature was ignorant of the meaning of the language it employed." The modern variant is that statutes should be construed "so as to avoid rendering superfluous" any statutory language: "A statute should be construed so that effect is given to all its provisions, so that no part will be inoperative or superfluous, void or insignificant...." A related principle applies to statutory amendments: there is a "general presumption" that, "when Congress alters the words of a statute, it must intend to change the statute's meaning." Context and statutory history can override the presumption. "Substantive" Canons of Construction

In some circumstances, the Court subordinates the general, linguistic canons of statutory construction, as well as other interpretive principles, to overarching presumptions that, unless rebutted, favor particular substantive results. Application of a substantive canon often, but not always, results in some form of "clear statement" rule, requiring that Congress, if it wishes to achieve a particular result inconsistent with the Court's view of legal traditions, must state such an intent with unmistakable clarity. 2), federal law supersedes inconsistent state law. Findings and Purposes Sections

To apply the principle that statutory language be interpreted consistent with congressional intent, courts may consult the stated purposes of legislation to resolve ambiguities in the more specific language of operative sections. The primacy of text in discerning meaning is expressed in the "plain meaning rule." When the Court does infer acquiescence, the most important factor seems to be congressional awareness that an interpretation has generated widespread attention and controversy.
The exercise of the judicial power of the United States often requires that courts construe statutes to apply them in particular cases and controversies. Judicial interpretation of the meaning of a statute is authoritative in the matter before the court. Beyond this, the methodologies and approaches taken by the courts in discerning meaning can help guide legislative drafters, legislators, implementing agencies, and private parties.
The Supreme Court has expressed an interest "that Congress be able to legislate against a background of clear interpretive rules, so that it may know the effect of the language it adopts." Though the feed-back loop of interpretive practices coming from the courts may not always speak well to actual congressional practice and desires, the judiciary has developed its own set of interpretive tools and methodologies, keeping in mind that there is no unified, systematic approach for unlocking meaning in all cases.
Though schools of statutory interpretation vary on what factors should be considered, all approaches start (if not necessarily end) with the language and structure of the statute itself. In this pursuit, the Court follows the principle that a statute be read as a harmonious whole whenever reasonable, with separate parts being interpreted within their broader statutory context.
Still, the meaning of statutory language is not always evident. To help clarify uncertainty, judges have developed various interpretive tools in the form of canons of construction. Canons broadly fall into two types. "Language," or "linguistic," canons are interpretive "rules of thumb" for drawing inferences based on customary usage, grammar, and the like. For example, in considering the meaning of particular words and phrases, language canons call for determining the sense in which terms are being used, that is, whether words or phrases are meant as terms of art with specialized meanings or are meant in the ordinary, "dictionary" sense. Other language canons direct that all words of a statute be given effect if possible, that a term used more than once in a statute ordinarily be given the same meaning throughout, and that specific statutory language ordinarily trumps conflicting general language. "Ordinarily" is a necessary caveat, since any of these "canons" may give way if context points toward a contrary meaning.
Not infrequently the Court stacks the deck, and subordinates the general, linguistic canons of statutory construction, as well as other interpretive principles, to overarching presumptions that favor particular substantive results. When one of these "substantive" canons applies, the Court frequently requires a "clear statement" of congressional intent to negate it. A commonly invoked "substantive" canon is that Congress does not intend to change judge-made law. Other substantive canons disfavor preemption of state law and abrogation of state immunity from suit in federal court. As another example, Congress must strongly signal an intent to the courts if it wishes to apply a statute retroactively or override existing law. The Court also tries to avoid an interpretation that would raise serious doubts about a statute's constitutionality.
Interpretive methods that emphasize the primacy of text and staying within the boundaries of statutes themselves to discern meaning are "textualist." Other approaches, including "intentionalism," are more open to taking extrinsic considerations into account. Most particularly, some Justices may be willing to look to legislative history to clarify ambiguous text. This report briefly reviews what constitutes "legislative history," including, possibly, presidential signing statements, and the factors that might lead the Court to consider it.