The F-22A and JSF, along with the F/A-18E/F,   are the central elements of DOD’s overall recapitalization strategy for its  tactical air forces. F-22A and JSF Acquisition Business Cases Still Include Considerable Risks

The future of DOD’s tactical aircraft recapitalization depends largely on  the outcomes of the F-22A and JSF programs—which represent about $245  billion in investments to be made in the future. Currently, there is a  significant mismatch between the Air Force’s stated need for F-22A  aircraft and the resources the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) is  willing to commit. The business case for the JSF program, which has 90  percent of its investments still in the future, significantly overlaps  production with development and system testing—a strategy that often  results in cost and schedule increases. A 198-aircraft gap between what the Air Force needs and what is  affordable raises questions about what additional capabilities need to be  included in the F-22A program. JSF Business Case Still Contains Cost and Schedule Risks

The JSF program appears to be on the same path as the F-22A program. The JSF program expects to begin low-rate initial procurement in 2007  with less than 1 percent of the flight test program completed and no  production representative prototypes built for the three JSF variants. 2). DOD’s Tactical Aircraft Recapitalization Goals Are Not Being Met

DOD has not been able to achieve its recapitalization goals for its tactical  aircraft forces. 3). The delivery of these new aircraft has also been  delayed past original plans. Further delays or changes in the F-22A  or JSF programs could require additional funding to keep legacy aircraft in  the inventory and relevant to the warfighter’s needs. In  February 2006, the Secretary of Defense testified that recapitalization of  DOD’s tactical aircraft is important to maintain America’s air dominance. Despite this continued declaration about recapitalizing tactical aircraft,  DOD’s 2006 QDR report did not present a detailed investment strategy that  addressed needs and gaps, identified alternatives, and assessed costs and  benefits. DOD Has an Opportunity to Set Its Tactical Aircraft Recapitalization Efforts on Track

As DOD moves forward with its efforts to recapitalize its tactical aircraft  force, it has the opportunity to reduce operating costs and deliver needed  capabilities to the warfighter more quickly. Specifically, the department must change how it selects  weapon systems to buy, and how it establishes and executes the business  case. In conclusion, despite DOD’s repeated declaration that recapitalizing its  aging tactical aircraft fleet is a top priority, the department continues to  follow an acquisition strategy that consistently results in escalating costs  that undercut DOD’s buying power, forces DOD to reduce aircraft  purchases, and delays delivering needed capabilities to the warfighter. GAO Related Products

Joint Strike Fighter: DOD Plans to Enter Production before Testing  Demonstrates Acceptable Performance, GAO-06-356 (Washington D.C.:  March 15, 2006). Tactical Aircraft: Status of F/A-22 and JSF Acquisition Programs and  Implications for Tactical Aircraft Modernization.
Why GAO Did This Study

The Department of Defense's (DOD) F-22A and Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) programs aim to replace many of the Department's aging tactical fighter aircraft--many of which have been in DOD's inventory for more than 20 years. Together, the F-22A and JSF programs represent a significant investment for DOD--currently estimated at almost $320 billion. GAO has reported on the poor outcomes in DOD's acquisitions of tactical aircraft and other major weapon systems. Cost and schedule overruns have diminished DOD's buying power and delayed the delivery of needed capabilities to the warfighter. Last year, GAO testified that weaknesses in the F-22A and JSF programs raised questions as to whether DOD's overarching tactical aircraft recapitalization goals were achievable. At the request of this Subcommittee, GAO is providing updated testimony on (1) the extent to which the current F-22A and JSF business cases are executable, (2) the current status of DOD's tactical aircraft recapitalization efforts, and (3) potential options for recapitalizing the air forces as DOD moves forward with its tactical aircraft recapitalization efforts.

What GAO Found

The future of DOD's tactical aircraft recapitalization depends largely on the outcomes of the F-22A and JSF programs--which represent about $245 billion in investments to be made in the future. Both programs continue to be burdened with risk. The F-22A business case is unexecutable in part because of a 198 aircraft gap between the Air Force requirement and what DOD estimates it can afford. The JSF program, which has 90 percent of its investments still in the future, plans to concurrently test and produce aircraft thus weakening DOD's business case and jeopardizing its recapitalization efforts. It plans to begin producing aircraft in 2007 with less than 1 percent of the flight test program completed. DOD's current plan to buy about 3,100 new major tactical systems to replace its legacy aircraft represents a 33-percent reduction in quantities from original plans. With reduced buys and delays in delivery of the new systems, costs to keep legacy aircraft operational and relevant have increased. While the Secretary of Defense maintains that continued U.S. air dominance depends on a recapitalized force, DOD has not presented an investment strategy for tactical aircraft systems that measures needs, capability gaps, alternatives, and affordability. Without such a strategy, DOD cannot reasonably ensure it will recapitalize the force and deliver needed capabilities to the warfighter within cost and schedule targets. As DOD moves forward with its efforts to recapitalize its tactical aircraft, it needs to rethink the current business cases for the F-22A and JSF programs. This means matching needs and resources before more F-22A aircraft are procured and ensuring the JSF program demonstrates acceptable aircraft performance before it enters initial production.