The demonstrator models logged several thousand-flight hours  and effectively supported combat operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. In December 2002, DOD restructured  the program again. Restructured Global Hawk Program Attempts to Do More in Less Time

Global Hawk’s restructuring has impacted the acquisition program in a  number of significant ways: the time span for funding has been compressed  into roughly half the time and the overall funding amount has increased;  concurrent development and production is causing the Air Force to invest  in almost half the total fleet of the new and improved Global Hawk vehicle  before a production model has proven that it will work as intended; and  development costs have tripled because of the need to develop a new and  improved vehicle. Procurement is now concentrated into  11 years instead of the 20 years of relatively level procurement set out in  the original plan. Cumulatively, the restructured plan  requires $6.3 billion to be completed in fiscal year 2012, whereas the  original plan would only have needed $3.4 billion by that year. Additionally, schedule delays have already  occurred in the restructured plan that will continue to add pressure in  the program. The program acquisition unit  cost increased 44 percent since program start, from $85.6 million to  $123.2 million. Restructured Program Has Created Other New Challenges

Space, weight, and power constraints of the RQ-4B limit what capabilities  can be included now or added in the future. Delays in Key Events Since Restructuring Can Impact Delivery of New Capability

The new schedule for some key events and activities has slipped because  of programmatic, budget, or external issues. Global Hawk Program’s Current Management Approach Sets Stage for Additional Risks

In attempting to get advanced capabilities to the warfighter sooner, the  Air Force’s restructured acquisition strategy for the Global Hawk program  does not fully follow best practices and DOD acquisition guidance for an  evolutionary, knowledge-based acquisition process. However, by this time most of  the air vehicles will have already been bought. Nevertheless, using a knowledge-based  approach that captures critical knowledge at key junctures in a program  has been shown time and again in both commercial and defense acquisition  programs to consistently produce successful outcomes—cost, schedule,  quality, and performance. Recommendations for Executive Action

To decrease risks of poor outcomes and to increase the chances of  delivering required warfighter capabilities with the funds available, we are  making recommendations to the Secretary of Defense to take the following  two actions  direct the Air Force to revisit the decision to begin concurrent  development and production of the Global Hawk B design and direct the  Air Force to create and present a new business case that defines the  warfighter’s needs that can be accommodated given current available  resources of technology, engineering capability, time, and money, and  delay further procurement of the Global Hawk B, other than units  needed for testing, until a new business case is completed that reduces  risk and justifies further investments based on a knowledge-based  acquisition strategy. These subsystems are key to providing  the advanced intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities for  which the RQ-4B is being developed.
Why GAO Did This Study

Global Hawk offers significant military capabilities to capture and quickly transmit high-quality images of targets and terrain, day or night, and in adverse weather--without risk to an onboard pilot. Global Hawk first flew in the late 1990s as a demonstrator and supported recent combat operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. In 2001, the Air Force began an acquisition program to develop and produce improved Global Hawks. In 2002, the Department of Defense (DOD) restructured and accelerated the program to include a new, larger and more capable air vehicle. GAO was asked to review the program and discuss (1) the restructuring's effect on the Air Force's ability to deliver new capabilities to the warfighter and (2) whether its current business case and management approach is knowledge-based and can help forestall future risks.

What GAO Found

The restructuring of the Global Hawk program impacts the acquisition program in multiple ways. More and accelerated funding: Funding, which previously spanned 20 years, now is compressed in about half the time. The restructured plan requires $6.3 billion through fiscal year 2012; the original plan would have needed $3.4 billion by that time. The budget request is now three times higher for some years. Immature technologies: Several critical technologies needed to provide the advanced capabilities are immature and will not be tested on the new air vehicle until late in the program, after which most of the air vehicles will already have been bought. New requirements, new costs: DOD's desire to add additional Global Hawk capabilities tripled development costs. The program acquisition unit cost increased 44 percent since program start, yet fewer vehicles are to be produced than originally planned. Challenges, trade-offs, and delays: The addition of new capabilities has led to space, weight, and power constraints for the advanced Global Hawk model. These limitations may result in deferring some capabilities. Some key events and activities--many related to testing issues--have been delayed. Global Hawk's highly concurrent development and production strategy is risky and runs counter in important ways to a knowledge-based approach and to DOD's acquisition guidance. The restructuring caused gaps in product knowledge, increasing the likelihood of unsuccessful cost, schedule, quality, and performance outcomes. Because the restructured program is dramatically different from the initial plan for the basic model, the business case now seems out of sync with the realities of the acquisition program.