Overall, where information sharing among  federal, local, and tribal agencies along the borders occurred, local and  tribal officials generally said they had discussed their information needs  with federal agencies in the vicinity and had established information  sharing partnerships with related mechanisms to share information with  federal officials—consistent with the National Strategy for Information  Sharing—while the agencies that reported not receiving information from  federal agencies generally said they had not discussed their needs and had  not established partnerships. Local and Tribal Agencies We Contacted That Received Information from Their Federal Partners Found It Useful in Enhancing Their Situational Awareness of Border Crimes and Potential Terrorist Threats

Officials from three-quarters (15 of 20) of the local and tribal law  enforcement agencies in the border communities we contacted said they  received information directly from the local office of at least one federal  agency (Border Patrol, ICE, or the FBI), and 9 of the 20 reported receiving  information from the local office of all three of these federal agencies. By more consistently and more fully identifying the information needs of  local and tribal agencies in border communities, as called for in the  National Strategy for Information Sharing, federal agencies could be better  positioned to provide these local and tribal agencies with useful  information that enhances their situational awareness of border crimes  and potential terrorist threats. DHS recognizes that it needs to add  personnel to fusion centers in border states to support the creation of  such products, and is developing related plans, but cited funding issues  and competing priorities as barriers to deploying such personnel. Identifying and Sharing Promising Practices from Fusion Centers That Develop Border Intelligence Products and Soliciting Feedback on Their Usefulness Would Support Other Fusion Center Efforts to Develop Such Products

The creation of border intelligence products—such as those developed by  the Arizona and New York fusion centers—represent potential approaches  that other border state fusion centers could use to target products for local  and tribal law enforcement agencies in border communities. While it is understandable that I&A  would focus on its own activities, DHS could benefit from identifying  promising practices related to fusion center border intelligence products  because of the importance the federal government places on fusion  centers to facilitate the sharing of information. Also, DHS had not obtained feedback on the utility and quality of the  border intelligence products that its analysts in fusion centers have helped  to develop. Suspicious Activity Indicators That Are Associated with Criminal Activity along the Borders Could Assist Local and Tribal Officials in Identifying Potential Terrorist Threats

According to the director of I&A’s Border Security Division, senior  intelligence officials at fusion centers in two of the five border states we  contacted, and other subject matter experts—including federal and state  officials who were involved in developing suspicious activity indicators for  local and tribal agencies in border communities—the suspicious activity  indicators could be more useful if they also contained terrorism-related  behaviors, activities, or situations that were more applicable to the border  or border crimes and were periodically updated to reflect current threats. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

The objectives of our review were to determine the extent to which (1)  local and tribal law enforcement agencies in border communities are  receiving information from their federal partners that enhances the  agencies’ situational awareness of border crimes and potential terrorist  threats; (2) federal agencies are assisting fusion centers’ efforts to develop  border intelligence products that enhance local and tribal agencies’  situational awareness of border crimes and potential terrorist threats; and  (3) local and tribal law enforcement agencies in border communities are  aware of the specific types of suspicious activities related to terrorism  they are to report and to whom, and the process through which they  should report this information. To identify criteria for answering these questions, we analyzed relevant  laws, directives, policies, and procedures related to information sharing,  such as the October 2007 National Strategy for Information Sharing and  the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007  (9/11 Commission Act). We also  asked whether federal officials had discussed local and tribal officials’  information needs and had established information sharing partnerships  and related mechanisms to share information with them—consistent with  the National Strategy for Information Sharing and best practices described  in GAO reports.
Why GAO Did This Study

Information is a crucial tool in securing the nation's borders against crimes and potential terrorist threats, with the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Border Patrol and Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), and the FBI, having key information sharing roles. GAO was asked to assess the extent to which (1) local and tribal officials in border communities received useful information from their federal partners, (2) federal agencies supported state fusion centers'--where states collaborate with federal agencies to improve information sharing--efforts to develop border intelligence products, and (3) local and tribal agencies were aware of the suspicious activities they are to report. To conduct this work, GAO analyzed relevant laws, directives, policies, and procedures; contacted a nongeneralizable sample of 20 agencies in border communities and five fusion centers (based on geographic location and size); and interviewed DHS and FBI officials.

What GAO Found

Officials from 15 of the 20 local and tribal law enforcement agencies in the border communities GAO contacted said they received information directly from at least one federal agency in the vicinity (Border Patrol, ICE, or the FBI) that was useful in enhancing their situational awareness of border crimes and potential terrorist threats. Nine of the 20 agencies reported receiving information from all three federal agencies. Overall, where federal officials had discussed local and tribal officials' information needs and had established information sharing partnerships and related mechanisms to share information with them--consistent with the National Strategy for Information Sharing and best practices--the majority of the local and tribal officials reported receiving useful information. However, most local and tribal officials that reported federal agencies had not discussed information needs and had not established partnerships with them also said they had not received useful information. By more fully identifying the information needs of local and tribal agencies along the borders and establishing information sharing partnerships, federal agencies could be better positioned to provide local and tribal agencies with information that enhances their situational awareness of border crimes and potential terrorist threats. Federal officials at two of the five state fusion centers we visited were supporting fusion center efforts to develop border intelligence products or reports that contained information on border crimes and potential terrorist threats, as discussed in the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007. DHS recognizes that it needs to add personnel to other fusion centers in border states to, among other things, support the creation of such products, and is developing plans to do so, but cited funding issues and competing priorities as barriers. The creation of border intelligence products--such as those developed by two of the fusion centers we visited--represent potential approaches that DHS and the FBI could use to identify promising practices that other fusion centers could adopt. Identifying such practices is important because of the central role the federal government places on fusion centers to facilitate the sharing of information. Also, DHS had not obtained feedback from local and tribal officials on the utility and quality of the border intelligence products that its analysts in fusion centers have helped to develop. Additional efforts to obtain such feedback would support DHS and FBI efforts to improve the utility and quality of future products. Officials from 13 of the 20 local and tribal agencies in the border communities we contacted said that federal agencies had not defined what suspicious activities or indicators rise to the level of potential terrorist threats and should be reported to federal agencies or fusion centers. Recognizing this problem, federal agencies are participating in national efforts to standardize suspicious activity reporting. Until such efforts are implemented, defining suspicious activity indicators and current reporting processes would help better position local and tribal officials along the borders to identify and report incidents indicative of criminal activity associated with terrorist threats.