By early 1992, the United States and other countries were concerned that senior weapons scientists struggling to support their families could be tempted to sell their expertise to terrorists or countries of concern such as Iraq, Iran, and North Korea. 1). As figures 2 and 3 show, the United States has provided about 45 percent of the funding for projects at the science center in Russia and about 72 percent of the funding for projects at the science center in Ukraine since 1994. The State Department’s selection is limited to those projects approved by the national government where the scientists work and, in some instances, the State Department has not been granted access to scientists at critical biological research institutes. Since 1994, the State Department has selected for funding 590 projects that employed about 9,700 senior scientists. For example, four biological weapons institutes under the Russian Ministry of Defense have not submitted project proposals to the science center in Russia. According to the science centers, funding from all sources, including the United States, has employed about 21,000 senior scientists to date. For the 35 projects we reviewed at nine institutes in Russia and Ukraine, the science centers were following their monitoring procedure. Science Center Staff Conduct Routine Monitoring of Projects

The State Department first relies on the mostly Russian and Ukrainian staff at the science centers to ensure that scientists are working on the research they are paid to produce. When possible, the science centers also participate in meetings between the scientists and collaborators.
Why GAO Did This Study

Since 1994, the United States has appropriated $227 million to support two multilateral science centers in Russia and Ukraine. The science centers pay scientists who once developed nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and missile systems for the Soviet Union to conduct peaceful research. By employing scientists at the science centers, the United States seeks to reduce the risks that these scientists could be tempted to sell their expertise to terrorists. This report examines the (1) selection procedures the State Department uses to fund projects that meet program objectives and (2) monitoring procedures the State Department uses to verify that scientists are working on the peaceful research they are paid to produce.

What GAO Found

GAO found that State lacks complete information on the total number and locations of senior scientists and has not been granted access to senior scientists at critical research institutes under the Russian Ministry of Defense. GAO also found that State has designed an interagency review process to select and fund research proposals submitted by weapons scientists to the science centers in Russia and Ukraine. The overall goal is to select projects that reduce proliferation risks to the United States and employ as many senior scientists as possible. The science centers were following their monitoring processes and were taking steps to address audit deficiencies.