The project’s schedule delays are due in part to scope changes, design  changes, and unforeseen conditions beyond AOC’s control (e.g., adding  the Senate and House expansion spaces and encountering underground  obstructions). However, factors more within AOC’s control also  contributed to the delays. More specifically, AOC needs to give priority attention to:    obtaining and maintaining acceptable project schedules, including  reassessing the times allotted for completing sequence 2 work;   aggressively monitoring and managing contractors’ adherence to the  schedule, including documenting and addressing the causes of delays;   developing and implementing risk mitigation plans;  reaching agreement on what project elements must be complete before  CVC can open to the public; and preparing a summary schedule, as Congress requested, that integrates the  major steps needed to complete CVC construction with the steps  necessary to prepare for operations. AOC has obligated over  $350 million for contracts and contract modifications for these activities. We have made several recommendations to enhance AOC’s contract  management. To help prevent further schedule delays and control  cost growth, AOC needs to aggressively manage its contractors’  performance, particularly in the areas of managing schedules and  obtaining reasonable prices on contractual actions, and continue to ensure  that contractors’ requests for payment based on incurred costs are  adequately evaluated. It also needs to ensure that its contractors report  accurate safety data and promptly act to correct safety concerns. Project Costs and Funding Provided as of May 2005

We currently estimate that the cost to complete the construction of the  CVC project, including proposed additions to its scope, is about $522  million without any allowance for risks and uncertainties. We continue to believe that this estimate of the project’s total costs is  appropriate. Most  of these costs were outside or largely outside AOC’s control, but other  costs were more within its control. About $147 million of the cost increase  was due to changes in the project’s scope, many of which were for security  enhancements following September 11 and the anthrax attacks in October  2001. Congress added the House and Senate expansion spaces and the  Library of Congress tunnel to the project’s scope after the original  project’s cost was estimated; similarly, the Department of Defense  recommended and funded an air filtration system for the facility. Other  factors also outside or largely outside AOC’s control contributed about $45  million to the increase. Finally,  factors more within AOC’s control accounted for about $58 million of the  expected additional project costs. To continue to move the project forward, Congress will have to consider  the additional funding AOC has requested for fiscal year 2006 to complete  the project, including the $4.2 million in additional scope items. Worker Safety Issues

Because the number of construction workers at the CVC site is soon  expected to increase significantly, worker safety will continue to be an  important issue during the remainder of the project. According to our analysis, the rates for injuries and illnesses and for lost  time were higher for CVC than for comparable construction sites. For  2003, the injury and illness rate was about 50 percent higher, and the lost- time rate was about 160 percent higher. AOC  and its contractors have taken some actions to promote and manage safety  on the site, such as conducting monthly safety audits and making  recommendations to improve safety. We  have found that AOC’s reports have sometimes failed to identify problems,  such as cost increases and schedule delays. This has resulted in certain  “expectation gaps” within Congress. This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the  United States.
Why GAO Did This Study

Approved in the late 1990s, the Capitol Visitor Center (CVC) is the largest project on the Capitol grounds in over 140 years. Its purposes are to provide greater security for all persons working in or visiting the U.S. Capitol and to enhance the educational experience of visitors who have come to learn about Congress and the Capitol building. When completed, this three-story, underground facility, located on the east side of the Capitol, is designed to be a seamless addition to the Capitol complex that does not detract from the appearance of the Capitol or its historic landscaping. According to current plans, it will include theaters, an auditorium, exhibit space, a service tunnel for truck loading and deliveries, storage, and additional space for use by the House and Senate. This testimony discusses the Architect of the Capitol's (AOC) management of the project's schedules and contracts; the project's estimated costs, including risks and uncertainties; worker safety issues; and AOC's monthly reporting to Congress on the project. This testimony also discusses recommendations that we have made in previous testimony and briefings and the actions AOC has taken in response.

What GAO Found

In summary, the CVC project is taking about 2 years longer than planned and is expected to cost between about $522 million and $559 million--significantly more than originally estimated. The majority of delays and cost increases were largely outside AOC's control, but weaknesses in AOC's schedule and contract management contributed to a portion of the delays and cost overruns. Of the project's estimated cost increase, about $147 million is due to scope changes, such as the addition of the House and Senate expansion spaces; about $45 million to other factors also outside or largely outside AOC's control, such as higher than expected bid prices on the sequence 2 contract; and about $58 million to factors more within AOC's control, such as delays. Also, our analysis of CVC worker safety data showed that the injury and illness rate for 2003 was about 50 percent higher for CVC than for comparable construction sites and that the rate for 2004 was about 30 percent higher than the rate for 2003. Finally, a number of AOC's monthly reports to Congress have not accurately reflected the status of the project's construction schedules and costs and have transmitted inaccurate worker safety data. This has led to certain "expectation gaps" within Congress. AOC has taken a number of actions to improve its management of the project; however, these actions have not yet fully corrected all identified problems. To help prevent further schedule delays, control cost growth, and enhance worker safety, AOC urgently needs to give priority attention to managing the project's construction schedules and contracts, including those contract provisions that address worker safety. These actions are imperative if further cost growth, schedule delays, and worker safety problems are to be avoided. AOC also needs to see that it reports accurate information to Congress on the project. Furthermore, decisions by Congress will have to be made regarding the additional funding needed to complete construction and address any risks and uncertainties that arise.