Based on the distinction between national and operational/tactical, IC spending is usually understood as the combination of (1) the National Intelligence Program (NIP), which covers the programs, projects, and activities of the intelligence community oriented towards the strategic needs of decisionmakers, and (2) the Military Intelligence Program (MIP), which funds defense intelligence activity intended to support tactical military operations and priorities. NIP and MIP labels are also not definitive. The information in this report is based entirely on unclassified, publicly available sources. CRS Report R44381, Intelligence Spending: In Brief , by [author name scrubbed], contains tables comparing NIP and MIP spending to national defense spending from FY2007 to FY2017. National Intelligence Program (NIP)39

Both 50 U.S.C. For example, the IRTPA:
authorizes the DNI to "develop and determine" the NIP budget, based on budget proposals provided by IC elements heads and after obtaining the advice of the Joint Intelligence Community Council (JICC); directs the DNI to "monitor implementation," and "ensure the effective execution of the annual budget for intelligence and intelligence related activities;" stipulates that the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), at the exclusive direction of the DNI, may direct ( apportion ) how congressionally appropriated funds will flow from the Department of the Treasury to each of the Cabinet-level agencies containing IC elements—to better ensure that the funds are spent as directed; stipulates that the DNI may allot appropriations directly, providing the DNI an additional opportunity to control spending at the sub-Cabinet agency and department level; requires the DNI to notify Congress if a departmental comptroller refuses to act in accordance with a DNI spending directive; provides the DNI with enhanced "transfer and reprogramming authority." Table E-1 ( Appendix E ) provides a table listing IC leaders in terms of a number of their management titles. NIP and MIP Budget Process (IPPBE and PPBE)

Management and oversight of intelligence programs is complicated by the fact that they are resourced through two separate budget processes—one entirely within the IC and one entirely within the DOD. Enduring Issues

Based on the FY2017 President's Budget request, the IC programs discussed in this report currently equate to approximately $70 billion dollars (or roughly 11%) of national defense spending. Observers point to a number of issues that may affect the ability of IC and DOD leadership to make the best use of those resources. Transparency

Total intelligence-related spending is almost impossible to calculate and its management and oversight is completely decentralized. IC funding alone is divided into two budget categories. The NIP and MIP are managed within the executive branch separately, justified to Congress separately, and overseen by congressional committees separately. Intelligence-related programs that are not part of the IC include, for example, the large Office of Intelligence within DHS's Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) division. The ICE Office of Intelligence is not included in the IC because theoretically, ICE activities primarily support the DHS mission to protect the homeland. Furthermore, there is no one source that provides a list of all intelligence-related programs in the U.S. government. Further Reading

Appendix A. IC Collection Disciplines 
Appendix B. Intelligence Programs: In Brief
Appendix C. CIARDS and ICMA 
The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Retirement and Disability System (CIARDS) and Community Management Account (ICMA or CMA) are seldom discussed in IC-related literature. Appendix E. IC Leaders and Selected Management Hats
Appendix F. Budget Processes (IPPBE and PPBE)
Appendix G. NIP MIP Program Integration
Appendix H. Selected Acronyms
Congress's and the American public's ability to oversee and understand how intelligence dollars are spent is limited by the secrecy that surrounds the intelligence budget process. Yet, total spending on the Intelligence Community (IC) programs discussed in this report equates to approximately $70 billion dollars—roughly 10% of national defense spending. This report is designed to shed light on the IC budget—in terms of its programs, management, and enduring issues—using unclassified materials available in the public domain.
This report focuses those IC programs, grouped, for the most part, under two labels: (1) the National Intelligence Program (NIP), and (2) the Military Intelligence Program (MIP). Nevertheless, the combined NIP and MIP budgets do not encompass the total of U.S. intelligence-related spending. Intelligence-related programs that are not part of the IC include, for example, the large Office of Intelligence within the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS's) Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) division. The ICE Office of Intelligence is not included in the IC because, theoretically, ICE activities primarily support the DHS mission to protect the homeland.
This report explains the management structure for the NIP and MIP to include their two separate budget processes and the roles of the Director of National Intelligence and the Under Secretary of Defense (Intelligence). The concluding section of this report considers the ability of the U.S. government to make the best use of its intelligence-related resources when: (1) total intelligence spending is impossible to calculate; (2) its management and oversight is completely decentralized; and (3) IC funding alone is largely divided into two categories (NIP and MIP)–managed within the executive branch separately, justified to Congress separately, and overseen by separate congressional committees.
The Appendices are designed, in a number of cases, to provide quick reference tables summarizing the more detailed information available in the body of the report.
Appendix A provides a summary of intelligence disciplines. Appendix B provides very brief explanations of NIP and MIP subordinate programs. Appendix C examines two unique and relatively obscure NIP programs, the Central Intelligence Agency's Retirement and Disability System and the IC's Community Management Account. Appendix D briefly describes a program called the Homeland Security Intelligence Program (HSIP). Appendix E provides a summary table of management hats. (Senior executives are often referred to as dual-hatted, triple-hatted, and so on, when they are charged with a number of different roles and responsibilities and associated titles.) Appendix F provides a summary table comparing the IPPBE and PPBE budget systems. Appendix G provides a figure illustrating the ways in which the IPPBE and PPBE are integrated. Appendix H provides a list of IC-related acronyms, many of which are commonly used in this report.
For more on IC spending trends, see CRS Report R44381, Intelligence Community Spending: Trends and Issues, by [author name scrubbed].